“It’s not for nothing that all of Russia remembers.” Barclay's retreat
Continuation. Start here: “It’s not for nothing that all Russia remembers”
At the theater of war
By the return of the sovereign, events had taken place in the theater of operations that gave reason for joy. The commander-in-chief of the 3rd Western Army, cavalry general A.P. Tormasov, reported on a major victory won by him on July 15 at Kobrin over the Saxon corps:
“The trophies of this victory are: four banners, eight cannons and a large number of various weapons; captured: the commander of the detachment, Major General Klingel, 3 colonels, 6 staff officers, 57 officers, 2 non-commissioned officers and privates, more than a thousand people were killed on the spot; the loss on our part is not very significant.”
Then a report was received from Lieutenant General Count P. Kh. Wittgenstein about the defeat of the French troops under the command of Marshal Oudinot in a three-day battle at Klyastitsy (Vitebsk province) on July 18, 19 and 20; our troops pursued the enemy to Polotsk and captured up to 3 privates, 000 officers and 25 guns; on our side, the main loss was the murdered General Kulnev.
As a result of the battle of Klyastitsy, the enemy's offensive on St. Petersburg was suspended. The voice of the people called Count Wittgenstein “the savior of Peter’s City.” Because of this failure, Napoleon was forced to send Saint-Cyr's corps (13 thousand people) to reinforce Oudinot, which could not help but weaken his forces in the main Moscow direction.
Both of these victories - at Kobrin and Klyastitsy - revived the hearts of the public with joy and hope. They proved that our troops are strong in spirit and courage and can successfully fight Napoleonic troops, who were reputed to be invincible.
Lack of unity of command
Finally, news was received of the connection of the 1st and 2nd Western armies on July 22 at Smolensk. The public took heart. Now, they hoped, the retreat of our armies was over, the enemy would be driven out of Russia, and the war would take a different turn. Alas, these hopes were not destined to come true. The reason lay in the disagreement of both commanders-in-chief, Barclay and Bagration, and therefore in the lack of unity of command in our armies.
The question of overall command with the departure of the sovereign from the army remained, unfortunately, open, probably because in that situation - the separation of our armies - this question seemed to the sovereign not very relevant, since Barclay, as Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of a larger army, was already could have influenced Bagration's actions.
But the armies were too far from each other and the conditions of their retreat were too different for each of the commanders in chief not to have a prejudice regarding the actions of the other, “due to always incomplete knowledge of the mutual position from a distance.” Their mutual dissatisfaction was moderated by the presence of the sovereign while he was with the army, but after his departure it was no longer restrained by anything, became open and was superimposed on the general dissatisfaction with the retreat, so alien to the spirit of the Russian army.
But if Bagration’s retreat was justified by circumstances - he simply had to retreat, and with fighting, in order to escape from the bag into which Napoleon drove him, then the retreat of the 1st Army, which had no direct reason in the onslaught of the enemy and was explained only in the tactical considerations of the commander in chief , known to him alone, caused growing murmurs in the army.
However, Barclay, "having removed his hearing from any nasty judgments," followed the sovereign's order to protect the army and patiently carried the cross of general condemnation, avoiding futile battles. He allowed himself to stop only once - at Ostrovno - when he had a hope that Bagration would be able to reach him to connect through Mogilev.
These were, as they said then, "the first linear actions", where the troops of the 1st Army "measured themselves, and it must be said in truth that the spirit and courage of our soldiers were sufficient to humiliate the arrogance of the enemy and destroy his own dream of its invincibility." So wrote D. I. Akhsharumov, the “Russian warrior-witness” of the 1812 campaign and the author of its first historical description.
Nevertheless, the retreat of the 1st Army continued, because Bagration was unable to get through Mogilev. However, the battle he fought at Saltanovka (also the first “linear affair” of the 2nd Army) with his persistence stopped Davout in Mogilev and allowed Bagration to connect with Barclay’s army at Smolensk. This long-awaited union of our armies seemed to reconcile both commanders-in-chief with the consciousness of its common benefit, but not for long.
“They met with possible expressions of politeness, with coldness and alienation in their hearts,”
– writes Ermolov.
The counter-offensive undertaken by our armies near Smolensk, although it was agreed upon by both commanders-in-chief, immediately revealed differences in their tactical and strategic guidelines and again led to their quarrel.
Barclay, fulfilling the will of the sovereign “to prolong the campaign as long as possible without endangering both armies,” saw no greater need for offensive actions than “to try to find the weakest part of the enemy and completely defeat it.” Such a possibility, it seemed to him, opened up when acting on the enemy’s left flank, which reflected his constant attachment to securing his right flank, from which he would maintain communication with Wittgenstein’s corps, which covered St. Petersburg, and provide himself with food from stores located in Velikiye Luki , Toropets and Belaya; Covering the Moscow road, he believed, could be provided by Bagration's army.
Based on these considerations, Barclay changed the decision agreed with Bagration the day before to launch an attack on the center of the enemy forces and moved his army to the right, from Rudnenskaya to the Porechenskaya road, only notifying Bagration that he needed to take the place of the departed 1st army. Having not found an enemy in Porechye, Barclay again returned to the Rudna road, and in these “stupefied”, as the soldiers called them (from the village of Shelomets, past which they had to walk back and forth), the movements lost both time and the enemy, not to mention about the exhaustion of the troops.
“We do not know what we are doing, but it seems that we are not doing what we need,”
– wrote Ermolov.
The enemy did not ask for forgiveness
The only, albeit unexpected, success of our fruitless movements near Smolensk was the cavalry business at Molev Bolot, where Platov, who did not receive news of the transition of the 1st Army to the Porechenskaya road, walking in the original direction, stumbled upon Sebastiani's cavalry and, with the support of Count Palen's hussars broke it. In his report on this case, Platov wrote:
"The enemy did not ask for pardon, but the Russian troops of His Imperial Majesty, being furious, stabbed and beat him."
This initial success exhausted all the achievements of our counter-offensive near Smolensk.
Bagration agreed in principle with the necessary restraint of our offensive.
“The 1st and 2nd armies, having advanced from Smolensk, although they have offensive movements, but considering that we do not have a reserve army, we must for some time limit ourselves to occupying and harassing the enemy with small detachments, without giving a general battle ",
- he wrote to Chichagov at that time.
But Barclay’s behavior, acting arbitrarily and in violation of the agreements reached, could not help but hurt his pride. As a full general, Bagration was “older” than Barclay and even had him under his command in the war of 1807, but near Smolensk he voluntarily subordinated himself to Barclay, recognizing the advantage of his title as Minister of War as a person enjoying special power of attorney from the sovereign.
Now Bagration recognized that it was only possible for him to formally follow Barclay's orders, while demonstrating the compulsion to carry them out. He wrote to Emperor Alexander at this time:
“Your Imperial Majesty deign to see from these papers that, regardless of my seniority, but considering the circumstances, thinking about the common good and fulfilling the will of Your Imperial Majesty, in order to act with united forces, I follow in the movements of the army entrusted to me the orders of the Minister of War, who , demanding my opinions, does not agree with them.
The need for unity of command in our armies was obvious. Letters flew to Petersburg promising an imminent catastrophe if the question of a common commander of our armies was not resolved in the very near future.
Meanwhile, Napoleon, taking advantage of the confusion of our actions near Smolensk and the weakening of our left flank, concentrated his forces, transferred his entire army to the left bank of the Dnieper and rushed swiftly to Smolensk in order to occupy it in the rear of our armies. Here, on the Krasnenskaya road, he was opposed only by the detachment of Major General Neverovsky: the 27th Infantry Division, which consisted of recruits, one dragoon and three Cossack regiments (7 in total) with 000 guns. The forces were too unequal.
From the very beginning of the battle, Neverovsky lost his cavalry and artillery, and the enemy already considered Neverovsky's division his easy prey. But nothing happened.
The French cavalry attacked our infantry, which formed battalion squares, more than 40 times, but all attacks were repulsed. Neverovsky categorically, without any discussion, rejected proposals for surrender. In the end, the continuous attacks of the enemy brought our detachment into one close, solid column, which, firing back, slowly moved along the road lined with birches, and they, like relatives, protected it, interfering with the attacks of the enemy cavalry.
“The day of August 2 belongs to Neverovsky,” wrote Grabbe, a participant in the defense of Smolensk. - He brought it into history. Attacked by the vanguard under the command of Murat, followed by the entire huge cloud of the French army, without having the slightest support to Smolensk, Neverovsky, surrounded, cut off, made his lion's retreat, so called by the enemies themselves.
Bagration reported to the sovereign:
“Neverovsky was forced to retreat from Krasnoy, being surrounded by all enemy forces for 6 miles in a row: and although his damage is significant, one cannot praise enough courage and firmness with which his division, completely new, fought against excessively superior enemy forces.”
Arriving in time for Smolensk with his corps, Raevsky took over the Neverovsky detachment and repelled the first onslaught of the enemy on the city. Thus began the heroic defense of Smolensk.
Napoleon, “taking advantage of the disproportion of forces, used every effort to occupy the city before the arrival of our armies, but the unwavering spirit and skillful defense of Raevsky replaced the small number of his troops” and held Smolensk until the arrival of our armies. On the night of August 5, Raevsky's corps was replaced by General Dokhturov's corps, reinforced by the 3rd and 27th infantry divisions; At dawn, the 2nd Army moved to the Dorogobuzhskaya road to cover the Moscow highway, providing the protection of the city to the 1st Army.
On August 5, Napoleon launched a general attack on Smolensk. A participant in this battle, Radozhitsky writes in his memoirs:
“The French have already approached the city along the Krasnenskaya road. The cannonade continued horribly. Our artillery, in front of us, blew up the enemy's charging boxes and mixed up his columns. Our riflemen met the French with continuous fire, but they climbed like mad...
By evening the battle intensified to a desperate battle, and its horrors were inexplicable. Several hundred cannonballs and grenades whistled and burst one after another, the air around the city was darkened with smoke, the earth groaned and seemed to be spewing hellish flames from its womb - death did not have time to swallow its victims. Thunder, crackling, flames, smoke, moaning, screaming - all together represented the terrible chaos of the destruction of the world..."
By evening the battle intensified to a desperate battle, and its horrors were inexplicable. Several hundred cannonballs and grenades whistled and burst one after another, the air around the city was darkened with smoke, the earth groaned and seemed to be spewing hellish flames from its womb - death did not have time to swallow its victims. Thunder, crackling, flames, smoke, moaning, screaming - all together represented the terrible chaos of the destruction of the world..."
“The bitterness with which our troops, especially the infantry, fought near Smolensk on the 5th, is inexpressible. Minor wounds were not noticed until those who received them fell from the exhaustion of strength and the flow of blood,
– writes Liprandi, another participant in the battle for Smolensk.
Russian troops defended Smolensk; they did not allow the enemies into the walls of the city, but at midnight on August 6 they received an order from the commander-in-chief to leave the city. It was the eve of the Feast of the Transfiguration of the Lord. Besieged Smolensk was burning on all sides. Crowds of unfortunate Smolensk residents in despair sought salvation by fleeing the city. And yet, there seemed to be no one in the Russian army who agreed with Barclay’s decision to leave the city.
The first persons of the army sent Count Kutaisov to Barclay, who used his location to ask the commander-in-chief not to leave Smolensk. After listening to him, Barclay replied: "Let everyone do his own thing, and I will do mine." And this firmness of Barclay was salutary for Russia, although at that time it did not seem to be shared by anyone. “The murmur was loud,” writes Zhirkevich, a participant in the Smolensk battle.
Leaving Smolensk, the army brought out the miraculous icon of the Smolensk Mother of God, which from then on accompanied her until the return of the icon to her native Smolensk exactly three months later.
Kutuzov
On August 5, in the evening, when the hottest battle for Smolensk was taking place, in St. Petersburg, by the highest order, an Emergency Committee was convened from the highest dignitaries of the empire, which was entrusted, taking into account the situation that had developed in the theater of war, to propose a general commander-in-chief of our armies.
As a result of the discussion, all committee members agreed that
“The hitherto inactivity in military operations stems from the fact that there was no positive single-command power over all the active armies. < > After this, reasoning that the appointment of a general commander-in-chief of the armies should be based, firstly, on well-known experiences in the art of war, excellent talents, on general trust, as well as on seniority itself, therefore they are unanimously convinced to propose for this election a general from infantry of Prince Kutuzov."
No matter how personally disliked Emperor Alexander was towards Kutuzov, he could not help but take into account the opinion of the Extraordinary Committee, for the “general voice” of Russia was already crying out for the same thing; Moscow, already alarmed by the endless retreat of our armies, prayed for the same thing in a letter from its mayor:
“Moscow wants Kutuzov to command and move your troops; otherwise, sir, there will be no unity in actions.”
Emperor Alexander, “suppressing his personal feelings,” was forced to “yield to unanimous wishes.” On August 7, Kutuzov was invited to the Kamennoostrovsky Palace, where the sovereign informed him of his decision to appoint him commander-in-chief of all active armies.
Kutuzov, as he himself said that evening in the close circle of his relatives, “accepted the command from the lips of the emperor with Christian humility, as a calling from above.”
“I was not timid,” he said, “and with God’s help I hope to make it in time, but listening to the sovereign, I was touched by my new appointment.”
Here we cannot help but say a few words about Kutuzov.
His appearance in 1812 was so significant and so in line with the general expectation that it is really impossible not to feel in his role a kind of “calling from above”. In May 1812, Kutuzov "corrected the mistakes of his predecessors" - he brilliantly completed the five-year war with Turkey and delivered the "God-given" Bucharest peace to Russia, thereby freeing the Danube army to fight Napoleon. As Academician E. V. Tarle said:
“Kutuzov the diplomat inflicted a heavy blow on Napoleon in 1812 even earlier than Kutuzov the commander.”
After the French occupied Mitava (now Jelgava, Latvia), the Committee of Ministers on July 12, “having no information in what number the enemy crossed the border in the indicated place, and also whether any measures are being taken from our army to block his further path, and realizing that his movements could be directly to Petersburg through Pskov or Narva, he entrusted the name of His Majesty to the gene. gr. Golenishchev-Kutuzov, so that, in case of insistence on the need to defend the capital, outside it he would take at his disposal the troops that would gather here for this. These troops made up the Narva Corps, which was headed by Kutuzov.
And already on July 16, the Moscow nobility elected Kutuzov the head of their militia; the very next day, Kutuzov was elected head of the St. Petersburg militia, which he accepted as commander while in St. Petersburg. On July 31, Emperor Alexander I subordinated to Kutuzov already "all the troops located in St. Petersburg, Kronstadt and Finland, not excluding the sea."
And finally, on August 5, the decision of the Emergency Committee followed, unanimously supporting the candidacy of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of all Russian armies. And such a rapid, necessary and desired promotion of Kutuzov to the leadership of our troops in 1812 by all Russian people, carried out at the most critical time of the war, cannot, of course, fail to confirm his “calling from above.”
“Believe me, Your Serene Highness! - it was said in one anonymous note on the occasion of the election of Kutuzov as commander-in-chief of the Russian armies, - that throughout Russia of all states people pray to God that the Lord will grant you and with you the entire army victory over the enemy. May your beginning and end be glorious and glorified forever. Instruct every work to begin by praying to God, and with His help, destroy to the end the enemies of the world. May God Himself be your and your army’s assistant in all your deeds.”
Remarkably, Kutuzov himself, estimating his "bodily strength", already very modestly judged his suitability for directing military operations.
“In less old age I would have been more useful”
- he wrote to the Minister of War when he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Moldavian Army in the spring of 1811. And a year after the victory over the Turks he wrote to his wife:
“I admit that at my age, service in the field was difficult, and I don’t know what to do. However, I won’t be able to make a campaign like the last one even in ten years.”
But no, he was destined to endure a campaign that was both harder and more difficult - to win the war against "Napoleon himself", whose name at that time, as Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky writes, "embodied some kind of unconscious concept of strength without any boundaries ".
Let's return to the theater of war.
On theater
During the retreat from Smolensk, the 1st Army was attacked by the enemy on the 7th; her rearguard is almost cut off; but with significant losses, the army by country roads reached the 7th verst on the high road of Moscow. In his report to the sovereign, Barclay explained his decision to leave Smolensk as follows:
“Our goal in defending the ruins of the Smolensk walls was to occupy the enemy there, to suspend the execution of his intention to reach Yelna and Dorogobuzh and thereby provide the prince. It was time for Bagration to arrive unhindered in the last city. However, further holding of Smolensk could not be of any benefit and, on the contrary, could entail the vain sacrifice of brave soldiers, and therefore, after successfully repelling the enemy attack on the night of the 5th to the 6th, I decided to leave the city of Smolensk.”
Here, it seems, for the first time the impulsive nature of Barclay's retreat becomes noticeable.
Indeed, the task of holding Smolensk - the "key to Moscow" - could not really be reduced to "occupying the enemy there" while Bagration would strive to reach Dorogobuzh, which was already beyond Smolensk, in order to block Napoleon's path to Moscow there. Not to mention the fact that Barclay here contradicts the promise he made earlier (in a letter to the sovereign dated July 16) - from Smolensk "I will not take a single step back and will give a general battle", with his explanation, Barclay only describes the current situation, but by no means claims that it arose from his assumptions or corresponded to his intention to continue further retreat.
The unexpected result of this retreat, which in the eyes of Barclay was always justified and saving the army, is revealed immediately after leaving Smolensk - Barclay faces the fatal inevitability of a general battle - until Moscow there was no longer any other obstacle except the army itself, which he was now forced to sacrifice to block the enemy's path to Moscow.
Whatever they say later, both Barclay himself and subsequent historians, but after the retreat from Smolensk, the idea of \uXNUMXb\uXNUMXbsaving the army by retreat exhausts itself, ceases to justify the retreat. A general battle remains the only possible and necessary response to an enemy invasion.
And such a situation, which made the fate of the army, Moscow and Russia itself dependent on the outcome of one battle, was no longer justified by any considerations and directly declared the exhaustion of the retreat strategy that Barclay followed, saving the army. Barclay feels it himself. Now he is ready to fight the enemy at the first available position. However, there are always reasons that deviate him from such an intention. And even Bagration, always eager to fight, is now showing caution.
On August 10, the army stopped at a position at Usvyatye, from where Barclay wrote to Count Rostopchin:
“I consider it an indispensable duty to notify Your Excellency that after the retreat of the army from Smolensk, the current state of affairs certainly requires that our fate be decided by a general battle. < > All the reasons that hitherto forbade giving it are now being destroyed.”
However, Bagration finds the position uncomfortable, and the retreat continues. So the army left one position after another at Usvyatye, near Dorogobuzh, beyond Vyazma and moved towards Gzhatsk - everywhere some inconvenience of the position was found.
This retreat, echoing the growing proximity of Moscow, no longer found any justification in the eyes of the army and caused a loud murmur among the troops. From Dreyling's memoirs:
“...We left one position after another without any resistance, except for minor rearguard skirmishes. Everyone was overcome with indignation, and there was a murmur about the endless retreat. Feeling strong, aware that the army was in good condition, each and every one of us individually longed for battle. In our common prayers, in that “Our Father” with which I addressed the Creator, one prayer was heard from the depths of my soul - that tomorrow we would be given the opportunity to fight the enemy, even if we had to die - if only we would not retreat further!
Our pride, the pride of a not yet defeated soldier, was insulted and deeply indignant. How! We retreated before the arrogant enemy, and they penetrated deeper and deeper into the native fields of each of us, closer and closer, and, unrestrained by anyone, they approached the very heart of our common Fatherland. The terrible word “treason” was already heard in the ranks.
In despair, embittered, we marched under banners which, in our opinion, had been disgraced in the eyes of the whole world by a shameful retreat.”
Our pride, the pride of a not yet defeated soldier, was insulted and deeply indignant. How! We retreated before the arrogant enemy, and they penetrated deeper and deeper into the native fields of each of us, closer and closer, and, unrestrained by anyone, they approached the very heart of our common Fatherland. The terrible word “treason” was already heard in the ranks.
In despair, embittered, we marched under banners which, in our opinion, had been disgraced in the eyes of the whole world by a shameful retreat.”
On August 17, the army stopped at Tsarevo-Zaimishche, 18 km short of Gzhatsk.
“The location is low and without strongholds,” notes Saint-Prix, chief of staff of the 2nd Army, in his diary. Nevertheless, Barclay decided, and, it seems, firmly, to give the enemy a general battle here. He seems to be in a hurry with this battle, because the arrival of the new commander-in-chief, Kutuzov, is expected from hour to hour.
Barclay received news of his appointment on August 14 on the way to Vyazma, where he intended to “take a position with a corps of 20-25 thousand people and strengthen it, so that this corps will be able to resist an excellent enemy, so that then with greater confidence it will be possible act offensively” (from a letter to the sovereign dated August 14).
On the same day, Barclay also wrote to Kutuzov, informing him of the position of the armies and his actions. On the 16th, he again wrote to Kutuzov:
“... Finding the position at Vyazma very unfavorable, I decided to take this day a position near Tsarev-Zaimishch in an open place, in which, although the flanks are not covered by anything, they can be provided with our light troops.”
And further:
“Having received the news that General Miloradovich with the troops entrusted to him was approaching Gzhatsk, I set out to stop here and accept the battle, which I have so far avoided, fearing to expose the state to great danger in case of failure, because, apart from these two armies, there are no more troops it was, which could be disposed of and make a barrier to the enemy; therefore, I tried only by private battles to stop his rapid advance, which is why his forces daily weakened more and more and now they have become, perhaps, a little more than ours.
Yes, Barclay finally finds an exhaustive justification for his retreat, which seemed to be fully justified in the current circumstances. And he is already very close to the decisive result of his strategy - a pitched battle, which, if successful, could have become a brilliant confirmation of the success of his strategy itself, but that did not happen.
Fate had already passed the further conduct of the campaign into the hands of Kutuzov.
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