“It’s not for nothing that all of Russia remembers.” Semenov flushes

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“It’s not for nothing that all of Russia remembers.” Semenov flushes
Mitrofan Grekov. Life Grenadier Regiment (1st Grenadier Division) in the Battle of Borodino. 1912-1913


“Until noon, that is, after a 6-hour battle, all points of our position remained in the hands of our troops, except for the Semenovsky fortifications,”

- writes a veteran of the Finnish Guards Regiment. After the retreat of our troops from the flushes beyond the Semenovsky ravine, the guard regiments became the support of our left flank. This fully reveals Kutuzov’s calculations. Here, in the words of Ermolov, “the enemy's steps to success were stumbled" Norov also writes about this:



“But how great was the surprise of the enemy when the Russian army, bloodied, but in the best order, crossed only the ravine that separated the Semyonovsky flushes from the hilly square behind them, located under the cover of our menacingly lined up batteries, which were smashing the Semyonovsky heights taken by the French, and boldly challenged him for a new fight. Dokhturov, who took over the command after Bagration, declared that he would not move a step away from here, got off his horse, sat calmly on a drum under terrible fire and began to command reflections and attacks. He kept his word. “Thus the most important part of Napoleon’s plan failed,” writes Segur. This was the end of the French successes."

We find the same assessment in the notes of Meshetich (in the Battle of Borodino - second lieutenant of the 11th artillery brigade of battery company No. 2, which was in the 11th Infantry Division of the 4th Infantry Corps of Osterman-Tolstoy):

“But the commander-in-chief of the Russians was the first to show him (Napoleon - V.Kh.) the art of how to resist large masses in small units. He saw this on the Russian left flank. Having attacked him almost twice and forced him to change the lines of battle, he thought that a retreat would begin. No, the battle had just begun when the right flank and center of the army approached! And at the same time, the cavalry attack on his left flank (that is, Napoleon’s left flank - V.Kh.) both his generals and himself already frightened him, and he weakened, which was clearly visible.”

From the very beginning of the battle, the Guards Infantry Division occupied the position "behind the right flank of the 2nd Army to reinforce it" But already at 6 o’clock in the morning the Izmailovsky, Litovsky regiments and the 1st combined grenadier brigade with the battery companies of His Highness, Count Arakcheev and the light cavalry battery No. 1 under the overall command of Colonel Khrapovitsky were moved to strengthen Bagration’s left flank. The remaining guards regiments are Preobrazhensky, Semenovsky and Finlyandsky, under the general command of Mr. Rosen, "it was ordered to move closer to the 1st line of the 2nd Army" Upon arrival at the place, Count Saint-Prix sent Khrapovitsky’s detachment to the village of Semenovskaya, where the Izmailovsky and Lithuanian regiments were stationed “at the height of our left wing to cover the battery and hold the position" The combined grenadier brigade was transferred to the other side of the Semenovsky ravine to reinforce the troops defending the flushes, and the artillery, under the command of Colonel Taube, to reinforce the existing artillery of the 1st line, which was in the battle. At the occupied position, the guards regiments immediately "felt the cruelty of grapeshots" A veteran of the Life Guards of the Finnish Regiment recalls:

“The enemy spared neither bullets nor grapeshot. Cannonballs rained down around us, and some fell into the ranks. I remember how now we stand in columns; There was gunfire all around, a terrible roar, smoke, among which the only visible lights were frequent lights - signs of a shot, and a dark red, round, like a ball - the sun. The earth trembled and seemed to groan under our feet, and the screams and groans of the wounded tore our souls even more and aroused passions.”

Colonel Khrapovitsky positioned the battalions in a staggered formation to reduce damage from artillery fire;

“In this situation, vainly wanting to shoot down our columns, the enemy intensified the fire of his artillery; its action, destroying our ranks, did not create any disorder in them, they closed and were verified with such composure as if they were outside the shots,”

- Colonel A.P. Kutuzov, the last remaining commander of the Life Guards Izmailovsky Regiment, wrote in his report.

The troops retreating from the fleshes, crossing the ravine, lined up in a battle line under the auspices of our artillery, forming a rifle chain in front of the guard regiments or standing on their flanks.

“The action of both our and French infantry, exhausted from the incessant fighting, ceased for a while, and a brutal artillery duel began,” writes Norov. – Let us note that when we entered into action (we were demanded to the left flank), it was already well after noon: almost all the main phases of the battle had already unfolded. But, despite this, the position of our 3rd line did not change: no turmoil, no disorder was noticeable then: our second line parallel to us, although sometimes visible, was not broken anywhere. We stood, as it were, on maneuvers, with the only exception that the cannonballs were then snatched from us by several more victims than at the beginning.”

By this time, the 4th Infantry Division of Evgeniy Württemberg from Baggovut’s 2nd Corps had already approached Semenovskaya and occupied the interval between this village and Raevsky’s battery. Here, in a very short time, the division lost several hundred people from artillery fire, and three horses were killed near Eugene of Württemberg. By order of Barclay, the regiments of the 1st brigade of the division, Volyn and Tobolsk, were left here, and the regiments of the 2nd brigade, Kremenchug and Minsk, were transferred to the right, closer to the center of the position.

“I had just mounted a new horse,” writes Evgeniy of Württemberg, “and before they even had time to adjust the stirrups, Miloradovich’s adjutant, Bibikov, galloped up to me with a convincing request to hurry to his superior. When I asked where to find it, Bibikov showed me with his hand, and at that moment it was torn off by a cannonball. He picked up another and answered: “Over there! Hurry up!” Having entrusted the 1st brigade to Major Wolf, the only surviving staff officer from it, I galloped to Miloradovich, who was already with the 2nd brigade. He warned about enemy cavalry. Wolf's brigade immediately folded. Pyshnitsky's brigade, also surrounded on all sides by French cavalry, formed into battle squares, in which Barclay, Miloradovich, Raevsky and many others took refuge. We barely had time to get rid of the cavalry when enemy artillery thundered again, and the regiments of the 2nd brigade lost up to 300 people killed, in addition to the wounded.”

Napoleon, having captured the flushes, threw the cavalry corps of Nansouty and Latour-Maubourg on our left flank, so that, as Jomini writes,

“to make decisive the acquired benefits.”

The French cavalry attacked the position of our troops from two sides: Nansouty - to the right of the village of Semenovskaya, and Latour-Maubourg - to the left. Nansouty's cavalry swept through the ravine and rushed to the left flank of our troops; but the Izmailovsky and Lithuanian Guards regiments, built in six squares, repelled all attacks of the French cavalry. The commander of the Izmailovsky Guards Regiment, Colonel Kutuzov, wrote in his report:

“The enemy cuirassiers did not hesitate to rush into the attack with extreme desire, but they paid dearly for their insolence; All the kareis, with amazing firmness, allowing them to take a wide shot, opened battle fire from their fronts facing the enemy: their armor was a weak protection for them, not giving them courage. They instantly showed their rear and fled in disarray. Fresh cavalry, consisting of mounted grenadiers, attempted to correct the failure of the first attack, but having been received in the same way, they were also overthrown and returned back with the same shame; several of them who dared to gallop to the Kareevs were punished with bayonets for their insolence.”

The Life Guards Lithuanian Regiment, stationed to the left of Izmailovsky, even counterattacked the enemy cavalry. The commander of the 2nd battalion of this regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Timofeev, says:

“After some time, a column of French cuirassiers appeared, heading straight towards us and probably intending to break through the center, because they attacked my battalion, which was in the middle of the first line. As the cavalry approached, I gave the command to the battalion, previously formed in a square, and, strictly forbidding them to shoot, ordered the people to wave only their bayonets to the sides, being sure from experience that horses would not go to metal that shines, and also ordered them to stab at the muzzle of those horses that the cuirassiers would force to approach the front. This order had the best consequences.

The cuirassiers, having surrounded the square on all sides and drove around it for quite a long time close to the bayonets and making sure that there was no possibility of disrupting the square, began to form a column 30 steps in front of its front face. It is obvious that their intention was to crush my battalion with the mass of the column, and therefore, in order to prevent their intention from being fulfilled, one way was to take advantage of their confusion during the formation of the column, when everyone was looking for their place.

I commanded “Hurray” and rushed with the battalion at hostility. The front cuirassiers, not having a strong front, were victims of our bayonets, overturned on their column, mixed it up even more, and all fled. Then I ordered battle fire to be opened on them, and this completed the defeat.”

Major General Kretov with the Ekaterinoslav and Order cuirassier regiments arrived in time to help the guards regiments and overthrew Nansouty’s cavalry,

“I destroyed most of it and on this occasion myself was wounded.”

Latour-Maubourg's corps, having crossed the swampy ravine below Semenovskaya, galloped into the rear of the Izmailov and Lithuanian squares, but here he had to suffer a serious setback: the French cavalry was showered with grapeshot from three batteries of guards artillery and attacked in the flank and rear by the dragoons of the 4th corps of Sievers and cuirassier regiments of His and Her Majesty and Astrakhan; the matter here was decided by an attack on the enemy’s flank by the Akhtyrsky Hussar Regiment, armed with pikes.

“The end result of these attacks,” writes N. Ivanov, a researcher of the actions of the Russian cavalry at Borodino, “was the complete breakdown of most of Napoleon’s cavalry. With the raids of his cavalry, he thought to shake the courage of the Russian infantry, which he believed to be in disarray after the retreat from Bagration's flushes; but there was no such disorder: the brave guards regiments of Izmailovsky, Litovsky and Finlyandsky and two regiments of the 4th division, Volynsky and Tobolsk, withstood the attacks of the French cavalry, and our cuirassiers, dragoons and hussars showed the greatest courage in fighting with the French men-at-arms. French squadrons even reached the regiments of the L.G. Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky, who were in reserve, but these regiments, shouting “Hurray,” went to the cavalry and drove back the enemies with bayonets. The battlefield remained behind us: the French did not advance a single step; their cavalry, having suffered terrible losses, retreated behind their infantry.”

To this we can add Liprandi's testimony:

“Despite the significant superiority in numbers of the enemy cavalry, especially the heavy ones, and its strong pressures in masses, it did not manage to start a single square or crush a single infantry formation. Our cavalry, with its attacks, penetrated to the enemy reserves.”

When "arrows sent from the enemy who occupied the edge of the forest", began to harm our cavalry and try to bypass our left flank, then a battalion of the Life Guards of the Finnish Regiment under the command of Colonel Gervais was sent to hold it and reinforce our cavalry. A veteran of the Finnish regiment talks about this:

“Before we had time to deal with the French cavalry, the 3rd battalion, with Colonel Gervais, was sent to the left flank of the position... Arriving at the place, Colonel Gervais scattered the riflemen and held back the enemy’s pressure with fire; but when the strengthened enemy began to advance in this place in two columns, then the remaining battalions of the regiment were sent, under the command of our regimental commander, Colonel Kryzhanovsky.”

The arriving Finnish battalions, the commander of the Guards Infantry Division, Mr.-L., writes in his report. Lavrov,

“with excellent courage, shouting “Hurray!”, they rushed with bayonets, overthrew the enemy and drove him to the edge of the forest, where they stationed riflemen, against whom a battery opened from the enemy side under the cover of cavalry, which was powerful with grapeshot, where Captain Ogarev was wounded by grapeshot in knee, whose place was taken by staff captain Baikov.”

The wounded captain Ogarev had relatives nearby, in Staroye Selo; They left him there for treatment. But it was not possible to save his life; in February 1813, Ogarev died from his wound and was buried near the Smolensk Church. In 1964, his ashes were reburied on the Borodino field, at the site of the battle of his regiment. His diary has been preserved, which contains entries dating back to the Battle of Borodino; from them one can judge the feelings that possessed our soldiers on the eve of the battle. Entry dated August 23:

“I am ready to shed my blood, and if necessary, to die. What is more sacred than the word Fatherland! And my soldiers are ready to die for the Fatherland, for our native mother land, as our ancestors said. The soldiers know what they will fight for.”

The last entry is from August 25th:

“Our hearts are pure. The soldiers put on clean shirts. Everything is quiet. Mitkov and I looked at the sky for a long time, where bright lights were burning - stars.”

Let's continue our story. The forest near our left flank was filled with enemy riflemen. Dokhturov ordered the Life Guards Finnish Regiment,

“Having cleared the forest, keep it behind you at all costs.”

Colonel Kryzhanovsky sent skirmishers there from the battalion of Captain Ushakov, who, under the command of Staff Captain Rahl 4th, overturned the enemy chain, and “in an hour the entire forest was cleared" The enemy then tried to repel our riflemen several times, but without any success.

“The fire was strong from the enemy side with rifles and cannons with grapeshot,” writes Lavrov in his report, “and in order to hold the enemy and not allow him to break into the forest again, Staff Captain Afrosimov 4th was sent with a company to help, and then Staff Captain Akhlestyshev is also with the company. The arrows maintained a chain at the edge of the forest at all times.”

The enemy’s cavalry, writes Colonel Kutuzov,

“I no longer dared to disturb our columns and only looked from afar at the place of my defeat.”

The artillery fire from both sides did not stop. From Lyubenkov’s story:

“The enemy, outnumbering us..., was amazed at the fearlessness of the Russians, he was tired of the attacks, we took him to certain death, the battle became slow, but deadly, the tired troops rested for new exterminations - only the artillery did not stop. The muzzles of the guns spewed flames, the light darkened, smoke swirled in the atmosphere, a grave roar shook the earth and the terrible roar of the guns did not stop.

We knew what we stood for, death overwhelmed everyone with one feeling, we no longer had concern for loved ones, concern for human life disappeared, the virtue that distinguishes so many Russians, there was only the Fatherland and the thirst to destroy the enemy. So the wounded asked for help - there’s no time for you, brothers, now, we’ll all be there, the soldiers answered their comrades; whether they kill someone or mortally wound them - in one heap, compassion fell silent for a while; his own life became a burden: he who threw it off rejoiced - he died for the Emperor, for Russia, for his relatives.”

In this incessant artillery fire, the only respite from which was cavalry attacks, the commanders of the guard regiments were wounded: Kozlyaninov, Udom, then Khrapovitsky and, finally, Musin-Pushkin, whose place in command of the regiment was taken by Colonel Kutuzov. Dokhturov and Konovnitsyn were all this time in the Izmailovka square next to Khrapovitsky and were eyewitnesses of the steadfastness and courage of the guards. Dokhturov wrote about this in his report to Kutuzov:

“The enemy, who had decided to overthrow our left flank, attacked with all his might under terrible artillery fire. But these attempts were completely destroyed by the measures taken and the unparalleled courage of our troops. The Lithuanian, Izmailovsky, Finlyandsky regiments of the Life Guards throughout the battle showed courage worthy of the Russians and were the first who, with their extraordinary courage, restrained the enemy’s desire, hitting him everywhere with bayonets.”

Konovnitsyn equally highly appreciated the valor of the guards regiments in his report to Kutuzov:

“I cannot speak with sufficient praise to Your Lordship about the exemplary fearlessness shown this day by the Lithuanian and Izmailovsky Life Guards regiments. Arriving on the left flank, they unwaveringly withstood the heaviest fire from enemy artillery; Their ranks, showered with grapeshots, despite the loss, were in the best order, and all ranks from the first to the last, one before the other, showed their zeal to die before yielding to the enemy. Three large cavalry attacks by enemy cuirassiers and mounted grenadiers on both regiments were repulsed with incredible success, for despite the fact that the quarters formed by these regiments were completely surrounded, the enemy was driven away with extreme damage by fire and bayonets. The 3rd battalion of the Izmailovsky regiment and the Litovskaya regiment, which in particular had in mind to cover their former battery to the right, did this at all times in the best possible way, completely destroying all attempts on it. In a word, the Izmailovskaya and Litovskaya regiments, in the memorable battle of August 26, covered themselves in the sight of the entire army with undeniable glory, and I consider myself fortunate that I was given the opportunity to testify to their exploits before your lordship.”

And later, presenting the Izmailovsky and Lithuanian Guards regiments for awarding the St. George banners, Konovnitsyn wrote that

“These regiments, by holding their position without yielding one step, decided the matter on the left flank.”

* * *
Probably nothing made Napoleon feel the failure of his attempts to break the left flank of the Russian army more than the lack of any advance at Poniatowski on the Old Smolensk Road. Pele laments:

“The actions of the Poles did not at all produce the consequences that could have been expected from their courage and the feelings that they had for the Russians.”

The instructions given to Poniatowski were, as Kolaczkowski writes,

“in order to turn our entire corps at an angle back onto the Smolensk road, knock out the enemy’s left wing, located behind Utitsa on the hill, from its position, and try to enter the enemy’s flank. This task was obviously not easy, considering our forces did not exceed 10 men under arms."

Kolachkovsky believes that “the enemy was twice as strong as our forces[/]", and that,

“Having defeated Tuchkov, we would have found ourselves with strong reserves ready to push back our movement in this direction.”

For such reserves, he takes the regiments of the Moscow militia, stationed at some distance from Tuchkov, and concludes:

“Under such conditions, not only our 10, but also 000 people would have had enough to do.”

In fact, by the time Poniatovsky came to a military clash with Tuchkov’s corps, the latter had only Stroganov’s 1st Grenadier Division at his disposal, since Konovnitsyn’s 3rd Infantry Division was required to reinforce Bagration’s troops fighting on flushes, which, as we remember, happened “at eight o’clock, if no later
" In addition, Tuchkov had no cavalry at all, while Poniatovsky had one - Sebastiani's cavalry division. So, numerically, Poniatowski’s corps was significantly superior to Tuchkov’s troops here. However, not knowing the actual number of Russian forces in front of him and fearing being lured into an ambush, Poniatowski moved through the forest slowly and carefully. Napoleonic army officer Lejeune writes that he was instructed to convey to Napoleon

“The sad news is that Prince Poniatowski, who, by maneuvering, was supposed to bypass the left flank of the Russians with the Polish corps and create confusion among them, could not do this, since he encountered an obstacle in a too dense and swampy forest.”

The real obstacle that delayed Poniatowski’s movement was “extremely hot shootout", which ensued between our and Polish riflemen; to her "echoed the heavy guns", staged by Tuchkov near the village of Utitsa. Kolachkovsky writes:

“The 16th division, under the command of General Krasinsky, supporting its riflemen, was divided into small detachments, and although it brought two-thirds of its entire strength into battle, it still did not move forward. The enemy riflemen, retreating to their columns, stopped retreating and even went on the offensive. It was difficult to gather our infantry, scattered throughout the bushes and thickets, into one place in order to form a column for attack, and even more so in full view of the enemy rangers and under their fire. The fire kept getting stronger; along the entire length of our battle line white clouds of smoke from the French batteries rose, clearly indicating the advance of our center. But still our weak forces could not achieve anything definite. The 8th Westphalian Corps, located on our left wing, suffered heavy damage from Russian cavalry and artillery and was in a state close to complete destruction. Therefore, there was nothing to expect help from him.”

Poniatowski pulls up additional forces and sends Sebastiani's cavalry around Tuchkov's left flank. By this time, Konovnitsyn’s division had already been sent to Bagration. Since the location could be unfavorable for us, Tuchkov ordered the troops of the 1st line to retreat to a height east of the village of Utitsa, which (the height) commanded the entire surrounding area, and upon retreat, set fire to the village in order to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to take cover behind it. At this height (Utitsky Kurgan) Tuchkov installed a battery of six guns from Colonel Glukhov’s battery company, giving it cover from the Life Grenadier, Ekaterinoslav and St. Petersburg regiments under the command of Mr. Foka. The enemy, for his part, installed up to 22 guns against our position.

“At this time, the most severe cannonade opened,” writes the commander of the 1st Grenadier Division, Mr. Stroganov, - but, despite the superiority of enemy fire, our battery acted incessantly, until having lost all its people and having shot most of its charges, it was forced to reduce its fire and only operate with four guns.”

Poniatovsky, noticing the importance of possessing the Utitsky Kurgan, by occupying which he could take our left wing into the flank and take away our opportunity to stay on the Old Smolensk Road, decided to take possession of it at all costs. 40 guns placed against the mound opened fire, while the infantry, in close columns, moved from different sides to storm the mound. The fire of our battery and the regiments covering it could not withstand the enemy’s onslaught. Kolachkovsky writes:

“The brigade commander, Rybinsky, came at the head of the battalion of the 15th linear regiment, from the right flank, and with a swift onslaught captured Mamelon (Utitsky Kurgan - V.Kh.), driving away the enemy infantry, namely the Pavlovsk grenadiers, and capturing 13 guns , stayed on the mountain for almost a quarter of an hour.”

The enemy's triumph was indeed short-lived. At this moment, a detachment of Mr.-L. approached Tuchkov. Olsufieva: 2nd brigade of the 17th infantry division - Vilmanstrand and Belozersky regiments with 6 battery guns of company No. 17. From the report of Mr.-L. Baggovuta:

“This detachment, having arrived at the place assigned to it, came under the immediate command of Lieutenant General Tuchkov, who ordered the aforementioned 6 guns to occupy the heights. The enemy, noticing this movement, opened heavy fire on our battery, sending forward riflemen under the cover of a strong column, trying not to allow us to occupy those heights, for they are very important to him. The grapeshot and nuclear hail fired from the enemy batteries could not stop the speed of the commander of these artillery guns, Lieutenant Shchepotyev, who with amazing composure took his assigned place and acted with incredible luck so that there was not a shot that would not cause great harm to the enemy and at the very In a short time the enemy columns, moving so quickly towards our battery, had to leave. The enemy battery, despite the fact that its lieutenant Shchepotyev blew up two boxes into the air, nevertheless did not cease its strong action, both on the batteries and on our columns. The enemy, seeing the failure of his infantry column, sent another, stronger than the previous one, which certainly wanted to take our battery and its arrows were already at its base. Here, Lieutenant General Olsufiev sent Lieutenant Colonel Kern with the battalion of the Belozersky Infantry Regiment to overthrow the enemy, who, being reinforced by Pavlovsk grenadiers, decisively rushed at the column and forced the enemy shooters with bayonets to turn back and seek salvation in flight. Here the grapeshots of our battery completed the complete destruction of it and thus ended his daring attempt. The enemy's double attack could not have the success he desired, which is why he was forced to retire behind the forest, and his battery became completely silent. During this time, Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st was wounded by a bullet, after which I, by seniority, took command of the left wing.”

Kolachkovsky confirms:

“The enemy, having forced out Rybinsky, again occupied Mamelon and, having installed 6 heavy guns on its top, held this position until 3 o’clock in the afternoon. Again, gun and rifle fire began from both sides, as before the first attack, without any visible benefit to us.”