“It’s not for nothing that all of Russia remembers.” Battery Raevsky

4
“It’s not for nothing that all of Russia remembers.” Battery Raevsky

Raevsky continues:

“Indeed, it was a decisive moment in which I could not leave my post under any pretext. As the enemy approached and my guns fired, the firing began and the smoke covered the enemy from us, so that we could not see either the frustration or his success. After the second shots, I heard the voice of one officer who was with me as an orderly and stood not far from me to the left; he shouted: “Your Excellency, save yourself!” I turned around and saw the French grenadiers fifteen steps away from me, who were running into my redoubt with bayonets forward. With difficulty I made my way to my left wing, which stood in a ravine, where I jumped on a horse, and, riding up to opposite heights, I saw how generals Vasilchikov and Paskevich, as a result of the orders I had given, rushed at the enemy at the same time; how Generals Ermolov and Count Kutaisov, who arrived at that very moment and took command of the battalions of the 19th Jaeger Regiment, struck and completely smashed the head of this column, which was already in the redoubt. Suddenly attacked from both flanks and directly, the French column was overturned and pursued to the very ravine, covered with forest and located in front of the line. Thus, this column suffered a complete defeat and its commander, General Bonamy, covered with wounds, was captured. On our side, Count Kutaisov was killed, and Ermolov received a severe concussion in the neck. I believe that the enemy himself was the cause of his failure, by not arranging a reserve to support the column going on the attack.



Never only Korf, below one cavalryman, did not help the infantry in this case: this is an error in stories Buturlina. After this success, I ordered everything on the battery to be restored to its previous order, and I myself went to Semenovskoye, where I found Konovnitsyn, Saint-Priest and General Dokhturov, who had taken the place of Prince Bagration. Saint-Priest received a severe concussion in the chest at the same time that Prince Bagration was wounded. Having nothing to do there, I returned to my redoubt; but he found the rangers already there under the command of General Likhachev. My corps was so scattered that even after the end of the battle I could barely gather 700 people. The next day I also had no more than 1500. Subsequently, this building was completed another time; but then there was nothing left to act on.”

Raevsky talks too generally. From the story of Paskevich, whose 26th division defended Raevsky’s battery, we learn that his division “more than an hour"kept the French in the bushes on the approaches to the battery and"Only at 10 o'clock did the enemy manage to dislodge the riflemen and enter the plain directly opposite our large battery", where he began to line up in a column to attack the battery. Consequently, “more than an hour” passed from the moment Bagration was wounded until the actual assault on Raevsky’s battery began.

Paskevich continues:

“Seeing that the enemy was preparing to attack, [I] went out to meet him with the rest of the regiments of my division, having gathered my rangers, placing troops on both flanks of the lunette, I placed the Nizhny Novgorod and Oryol regiments on the right side, the Ladoga and one Poltava battalion - on left, and the other Poltavsky battalion was scattered around the fortification and in the ditch. The 18th, 19th and 40th Chasseur Regiments are located behind the lunette in reserve.

Despite Russian artillery fire, the division moved forward. Although [we] were outnumbered against the enemy, I managed to hold off the enemy’s onslaught safely. Finally, superior numbers forced me to retreat to organize my half-reduced regiments.”

From Kutuzov’s report:

“The enemy was strengthening every minute against this point, the most important in the entire position, and soon after that, with large forces, he went to our center under the cover of his artillery in dense columns, attacked the Kurgan battery, managed to take possession of it and overturn the 26th division, which could not resist the superior forces enemy."

Captain Francois of the 30th Line Regiment of Moran's Division says:

“The Russian line wants to stop us; 30 steps from her we open fire and pass. We rush to the redoubt, climb there through the embrasures, I enter there at the very moment when one gun has just been fired. Russian artillerymen hit us with banners and levers. We engage them in hand-to-hand combat and encounter terrible opponents... Our regiment is defeated... The brave General Bonamy, who fought all the time at the head of the regiment, remained in the redoubt: he received 15 wounds and was taken prisoner by the Russians.

I have participated in more than one campaign, but I have never participated in such a bloody affair and with such resilient soldiers as the Russians.”

Let us add to this that in the battle for the Raevsky battery, both Captain Francois himself and division general Moran were wounded.

“Out of 4100 people in the regiment,” writes Francois, “only 300 survived.”

From the side of the artillery, which repelled the enemy attack on Raevsky’s battery, we have evidence of second lieutenant of light company No. 12 Mitarevsky (was in the 7th Infantry Division Kaptsevich of the 6th Corps Dokhturov); he's writing:

“After occupying Borodino, the enemy moved their batteries closer and began firing cannonballs and grenades. Ahead there was a strong gun fight and bullets were flying in abundance towards us... Soon a strong cannonade thundered on the lunette. Our company was ordered to take six guns on limbers and go to Borodino. Having descended from the hill, we turned left and, over a rather steep, albeit small ravine, lined up with our right wing towards Borodino, and our left towards the side of the lunette, dismounted and got ready. Soon huge enemy columns appeared; they walked straight and orderly from the direction of Borodino to the lunette. The sun was shining brightly and the shine from the gun barrels was directly reflected into our eyes. Although the enemy battery, from Borodino, fairly showered us with cannonballs, we did not look at it; all our attention was turned to the columns, at which the fiercest firing immediately began. We fired, the batteries to our left fired, they fired from the lunette and from behind the lunette. The rifle shots were no longer heard; they were drowned out by the cannonade. The enemy columns advanced without firing a shot. It seems that only Napoleonic troops could advance in this way. But how many of them lay along this path! As we approached the lunette, it began to get dark in the columns and then everything was hidden in smoke and dust, so, having fired at the columns almost at random, we turned our guns against the enemy. We did not see how the French retreated from the lunette, but, of course, not as orderly as they advanced. It soon became known that the enemy was on the lunette, that he was driven out of there, and even a rumor spread that Murat or some general had been captured.”

At this time,

“Major T*** of the Yeletsk regiment, delighted with the military spirit, galloped from the battlefield along our line, proclaiming to everyone that the French had been defeated and the King of Naples had been captured. This major lisped a little, and therefore involuntarily made us laugh with his proclamation, shouting with all his might: “Byats! They took Muyat! But this imaginary Murat was General Bonamy."
- another artilleryman, lieutenant of the light No. 3 company of the 11th artillery brigade of the 4th corps, Radozhitsky, writes in his memoirs. Already this seemingly insignificant detail clearly demonstrates what unanimity surrounded our troops who fought at Borodino! They fought like one big family. And what kind of “victory” over such troops could the enemy think about at Borodino?!

The counterattack on Raevsky’s battery and its return was organized by Ermolov, who became the main character of this episode of the battle. In his report to Barclay, he writes that “around noon"was sent by Kutuzov to the left flank

“inspect the location of the artillery and strengthen it according to circumstances.”

The chief of artillery of the 1st Army, Count Kutaisov, followed him without Kutuzov's knowledge. Passing the center of the army, Ermolov, to his surprise, saw the enemy on the Raevsky battery, “in great strength already nesting on it", and our Jaeger regiments, "retreating discordantly" Realizing the importance of this place as the key to the entire position, Ermolov immediately decided to return the battery.

“I needed audacity and my happiness, and I managed to do it,” he writes. - Having taken only the 3rd battalion of the Ufa Infantry Regiment (24th Infantry Division of the 6th Corps. - V.Kh.), I stopped the fleeing ones and struck with bayonets in a crowd in the form of a column. The enemy defended himself brutally, his batteries caused terrible devastation, but nothing stood. The 3rd battalion of the Ufa Regiment and the 18th Jaeger Regiment rushed straight to the battery. The 19th and 40th Jaeger Regiments are on the left side of it and in a quarter of an hour the insolence of the enemy is punished. The battery is in our power, the entire height and field around it is covered with bodies, and Brigadier General Bonamy was one of the enemies who won mercy.”

Two cavalry companies of Colonel Nikitin reinforced the counterattack of our infantry, firing at the enemy’s left flank. Kutaisov, who became separated during the counterattack to the right, did not return. The troops were carried away by the pursuit of the enemy; Ermolov returned them and arranged them in columns to hold the battery. On the battery itself, he found 18 guns and only two charges of buckshot. For another hour and a half, as Ermolov writes, before the arrival of Likhachev’s 24th division, he remained at Raevsky’s battery, changing guns, organizing servants for them from soldiers from the battalion of the Ufa regiment, and organizing the troops.

It should be said, in order to imagine the real scale of our resistance in this sector, that from the very beginning, not only the troops of the 7th Corps, but also our other troops located in the center of our position participated in repelling enemy attacks on Raevsky’s battery. Already known to us, Major Petrov from the 1st Jaeger Regiment says that his regiment at that time prevented the enemy from crossing Kolocha and striking “to the rear of the large lunette»

“of which four repetitions were repulsed by our regiment, which inflicted great damage on the enemy troops each time.”

Then, writes Major Petrov,

“our 1st Jaeger Regiment, occupying a place in front of the army at the confluence of the Stonets stream into Kolocha, acted in separate units to retain the right bank of this river, which has convenient crossings, and our glorious rifle commanders, Lieutenant Konevtsov and Ensign Atamansky, showed notable distinction, and With all the remaining forces, two times, together with the Libau Musketeer Regiment assigned to Colonel Karpenkov’s brigade, they responded to the general pressure of the enemy who stormed Raevsky’s battery. When the artillery battery company of Colonel Gulevich, which occupied a combat position with us behind the left bank of the Stonets stream, having lost more than half of its people, stopped its action and wanted to retreat back to the right bank of the stream to the post road, Colonel Karpenkov sent me with two officers and 40 lower ranks , learned before the war in Slonim in a divisional apartment for a similar case in artillery, with which I, having replenished the number of ranks of the battery, gave the means to continue its fire, being myself with it until Karpenkov called me for the urgent need to carry out an attack on the enemy with his entire brigade , who has captured an important place to the left of us..."

That is, he took possession of Raevsky’s battery, which also speaks of the participation of the 1st Jaeger Regiment in the return of this battery. Here, Major Petrov also describes the practice that took place under Borodin of voluntary replacement of servants who had left the guns with infantry, which allowed our batteries to continue their operation.

The false Murat captured at the Raevsky battery turned out to be Brigadier General Bonamy. He was captured by the sergeant major of the 18th Jaeger Regiment, Zolotov, for which he was promoted to second lieutenant. Chief Quartermaster of the 6th Corps Liprandi, who happened to accompany the captured French general, says:

“At this time, from the battery itself, where the battle was still in full swing, Kaptsevich ordered me to take General Bonamy to Prince Kutuzov, why, dismounting from the horse, I put the prisoner, wounded by bayonets in the side and a bullet to the forehead, - I went on foot. Bonamy was in great haste to get away from his shots. French cannonballs were constantly flying over us; I could not follow quickly on foot and held the horse by the reins. Bonamy was without a hat, with a bloody face, in an embroidered uniform and a blue overcoat with sleeves; he seemed drunk, constantly uttering an abyss of swear words as a soldier, but it was difficult to make out who they were referring to. On the way to the commander-in-chief, the aide-de-camp in the headquarters officers' epaulettes met us and asked: “Isn’t this the king?” After answering “No!” - he asked: “Where is he? - and to the answer “I don’t know,” he returned back.

Kutuzov was sitting on a long log; a large retinue surrounded him. Bonamy asked me which one was the field marshal. But at this time the prince stood up and, approaching us, uttered the following words: “Vous êtes blessé camarade! Qui etes vous?” (“You are wounded, comrade! Who are you?”) and, turning around, said: “Hurry up the doctor!” Bonamy replied: “Maréchal! Je suis le general Bonamy qui a emporté votre redoute" (“Marshal! I am the same General Bonamy who took your redoubt.”). Getting off his horse with the help of some adjutant, Bonamy began wiping the blood on his forehead with a handkerchief, muttering something. Kutuzov offered him “Quelques gouttes de vin” (“A few drops of wine”) - which was readily accepted, and, instead of a few drops, he drank a huge silver glass of red wine, which the prince ordered to pour for me.”

Lieutenant Grabbe, who was then next to Ermolov, continues the story:

“In order to prevent us from taking advantage of our success, the entire space occupied by the enemy against us was covered with artillery and bombarded us with grapeshot, grenades and cannonballs. One hundred and twenty guns under the command of General Sorbier (as we learned from the bulletin) formed one huge, incessant battery. At the prominent angle of our position, the enemy fire was cross, and its effect was destructive. Despite the fact, our infantry, in a formidable formation, stood on both sides of the Raevsky battery. Ermolov sent me to tell the infantry that they could lie down to reduce the effect of fire. Everyone remained standing and closed ranks when the ranks were broken. There was no boasting or timidity. They died in silence. When I gave Ermolov’s order to one battalion commander, who was standing on horseback in front of the battalion, he bowed his head towards me in order to listen better. The incoming cannonball crushed it and splashed me with its blood and brain.

Soon after I returned to the battery, we saw Count Kutaisov’s horse galloping across the field. She was caught. The saddle and stirrup were bloodied. Officers from different parts of the army had been looking for him for a long time, as the commander of all artillery. There was no doubt about the fate that befell him, but his body was not found, and the circumstances of his last minutes remained unknown. The only thing that is true is the universal regret for him and the harm to the general course of affairs that resulted from his early loss. He was in his 29th year of life and in the 11th hour of the Battle of Borodino, when he fell without reaching half a day of either the last or the first.

Almost at the same moment, they carried out Prince Bagration, who was bleeding...

Soon... Likhachev's division approached us. Supported by the arms of officers, sick, broken, it seems, by paralysis, he was cocked to the battery. One could rely on the general for her protection, who in such a position of the body, alive and vigorous in one soul, does not leave his place. Ermolov, having entrusted him with command, intended to go to the left flank, when a fragment of a grenade or grapeshot hit him in the neck. Ermolov’s removal should be one of the fatal events of this day, for him and for the army.”

What do we learn after getting acquainted with the testimonies of participants in the battle for the Raevsky battery? That the assault on the battery itself, as well as our counterattack of the enemy who captured the battery, take place at the 11th hour of the day; that at the same time the wounded Bagration was being taken out of the battlefield, and, therefore, all this time the battle on flushes continued. There is direct evidence of this. Non-commissioned officer Tikhonov says:

“Buturlin says that there was a dump near the Bagrationovsky trenches when Bagration was wounded. There was a landfill both before and after. Either our infantry will recover and move forward, then our cavalry will go to rescue the infantry, then the French chasseurs will run into the cannons and go to cut down the artillerymen. The whole problem is not in the dump, but in the fact that the reserves approached Bagration in parts. When we approached, there were no other people there except Vorontsov and Neverovsky. They lined up behind us and went into action again. The combined grenadiers arrived there, just as we had already been repulsed.”

«Combined grenadiers", which Non-Commissioned Officer Tikhonov is talking about here, is the 1st Combined Grenadier Brigade (4 battalions) of Colonel Kantakouzin, who with his brigade "stole several guns from the enemy's hands” and was killed on flushes. The battalion commander of the brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Albrecht, also fell here; his place was taken by the remaining senior captain Bukarev, who was also seriously wounded and

“he remained at the scene of the battle, lying between the dead bodies, until Providence was pleased to send his 60-year-old father, ensign Bukarev, who served in the militia, to save his life, through whom he was taken to Moscow to bandage his wounds.”

That the retreat of our left flank did not follow immediately after Bagration was wounded is evidenced by Konovnitsyn’s letter to his wife, written the day after the battle. There he writes:

“My division is almost gone. She served more than anyone. I drove her several times for batteries.”

Let me remind you that Konovnitsyn learns about Bagration’s injury after the success of his first counterattack. F. Glinka quotes the words of one veteran of the Patriotic War of 1812, which can also speak in favor of the duration of the flush battle:

“Near Borodino we came together and started shooting up. We inject ourselves for an hour, we inject ourselves for two... we are tired, our hands give up! Both we and the French don’t touch each other, we walk like sheep! One side will rest and then shoot up again. We inject, we inject, we inject! They shot up in one place for almost three hours!”

We don’t have these “three hours in one place” of such fierce hand-to-hand combat at Borodino anywhere except on flushes. And the same non-commissioned officer Tikhonov says:

“When Bagration was wounded, Konovnitsyn began to move us beyond the ravine, around noon. Dokhturov arrived after. The French infantry did not cross the ravine, but lay back behind the trenches and behind the bushes; The cavalry jumped over the ravine, rushed at us, and mostly at the guards, and they treated them so much that for a long time they remembered what it was like to attack the guards. The cuirassiers and chasseurs were carried off to God knows where. Our captain was wounded, so a non-commissioned officer and four soldiers carried him to be bandaged, and I was among the porters. We met dead French cuirassiers behind the second line.”

Based on the totality of all the evidence in general (in order not to cite them here in full), the retreat of our troops from the flushes beyond the Semenovsky ravine is really happening “so, around noon" And, of course, this period of time - from 9 o’clock to noon - cannot indicate any disorder of the troops or the leadership of the troops. Let us say once again that our troops at Borodino did not seek salvation, but sought battle, fought with inspiration and willingly sacrificed their lives for what they stood for - for the Faith, the Tsar and the Fatherland. And if they could retreat, then, of course, not due to loss of spirit or frustration, but only by order of their superiors. And we actually find such a command.

Quartermaster officer Shcherbinin, in his comments on the history of the War of 1812, Bogdanovich writes:

“After Bagration was defeated by a bullet, Konovnitsyn invited Raevsky, who was in the center, to take command of that army and sent to Kutuzov to ask for reinforcements. Kutuzov refused and appointed the Duke of Wirtemberg as chief. But then he appointed Dokhturov and at the same time sent Tolya to inquire about the progress of the battle.”

Shcherbinin does not name the reason for Kutuzov’s sudden change in his decision when appointing the commander of the troops of the left flank after Bagration was wounded. We find the answer in the memoirs of Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky:

“When Prince Kutuzov found out about Prince Bagration’s wound, he sent the Duke of Wirtemberg to the left wing of the army to inspect what was happening there and report it to him. Upon his arrival there, the Duke ordered the troops to retreat, but as soon as the field marshal noticed this, he became enraged,” and then sent Dokhturov to replace the Duke on the left flank, giving him the following instructions: “Although the Prince of Wirtemberg rode on the left flank, despite this you have command the entire left wing of our army and the Prince of Wirtemberg is subordinate to you. I recommend that you hold out until I receive a command to retreat.”

The time of the order given to Dokhturov is not stated, but Dokhturov himself says that his “detached to the left wing at 11 o'clock in the morning"and, according to Liprandi's testimony,

“slightly before the Shulmanovskaya battery (Raevsky’s battery - V.Kh.) was taken by Bonami. He was already walking towards her.”

That is, Dokhturov went to the left flank before Ermolov, and if we remember that soon afterwards (apparently due to the fact that Ermolov did not reach his destination) Kutuzov sent Tolya to the left flank “inquire about the progress of the battle", it becomes clear how closely Kutuzov followed the progress of the battle.

Dokhturov says:

“Upon arrival there (on the left flank - V.Kh.) I found everything in great confusion: the generals did not know from whom to receive orders, and the enemy’s attacks were constantly becoming more persistent. Prince Alexander of Virtemberg, whom Prince Mikhail Illarionovich, after the wounding of Prince Bagration, sent to this flank, had just arrived there; he did not have time to find out in detail the state of affairs and, therefore, could not explain anything to me. I rode to look for the chief of staff of the second army, Count Saint-Prix, and found him shell-shocked; Leaving the battlefield, he told me: “I am so weak that I am not able to provide the information you require.” Fortunately, I met General Konovnitsyn, who satisfied me in everything. At that time our troops were retreating."

This retreat and the situation outlined are quite consistent with what Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky writes about the reason for this retreat, namely, that it took place at the behest of Duke Alexander of Württemberg, who, presumably, considered it impossible to hold the flush for longer. Konovnitsyn, who “satisfied in everything"Dokhturov, was in complete control of the situation: he transferred troops beyond the Semenovsky ravine, arranged them there, installed batteries at nearby heights, which with their fire held back the enemy’s pressure, and here he found part of the troops of the 2nd Infantry Corps, who arrived to reinforce the left flank, and with whom, writes Konovnitsyn,

“The regiments of the division entrusted to me with continuous rifle fire continued to repel the enemy. Meanwhile, Mr. Infantry General Dokhturov arrived, and I came under his command.”

Konovnitsyn adds that

“This happened until 1 o’clock in the afternoon.”

From Kutuzov’s report:

“This unfortunate incident (the wounding of Bagration. - V.Kh.) greatly upset the successful action of our left wing, which hitherto had the surface over the enemy, and of course would have had the most disastrous consequences if, before the arrival of General Dokhturov from the Infantry, General Lieutenant Konovnitsyn. Moreover, at the very same time the enemy attacked our fortifications, and the troops, who had defended them with courage for several hours in a row, had to yield to the large numbers of the enemy, retreat to the village of Semenovskaya and occupy the heights located near it, which, no doubt, would soon be would have been lost if Major General Count Ivelich had not arrived in time with the command of the 17th division and had not set up strong batteries on them, thereby restoring a close connection between the left wing of the army and the 1st Grenadier Division... After this, the enemy, although he did several attempts on our left wing, but each time was repulsed with the greatest loss.”

Here we again meet with the 17th Infantry Division of Baggovut’s 2nd Corps, and specifically with the brigade of Mr. Ivelich (Ryazan and Brest infantry regiments), and this again confirms the fact that the troops of our right flank "always arrived on time to where Kutuzov directed them" And Liprandi adds that

“as the battle progressed, our position itself entered those boundaries, that is, between Gorki and Utitsa, into which the critics wanted to include it when it was initially occupied.”

Only, let us clarify, “not by itself,” but in accordance with Kutuzov’s plan.
4 comments
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  1. +4
    25 September 2023 07: 34
    We remember, those for whom the word MOTHERLAND is not an empty phrase remember!
    There are many things we must not forget, otherwise we will cease to be ourselves!
  2. +1
    25 September 2023 11: 53
    Thank you. By the way, last time I didn’t immediately notice that this was a series of articles.
    Therefore, the question to the author is how much will there be in total? I just like to read in one gulp.
  3. -1
    25 September 2023 14: 50
    “Out of 4100 people in the regiment,” writes Francois, “only 300 survived.” - to the question of trust in the memoirs of participants in the events. Moran's 1st division, which included the 30th line regiment, had 1812 hp at the time of the opening of the company in 12. On August 800, three days before Borodino, it numbered 21 people, i.e. decreased by half. At the beginning of the company, the 6th Line Regiment consisted of 300 officers and 30 lower ranks. During the assault on Smolensk alone, the regiment lost 93 people killed and wounded. If we assume a proportionally equal loss of hp. shelf with loss of hp division, then on the day of the Battle of Borodino it should have consisted of approximately 3715 people.
  4. 0
    3 January 2024 11: 49
    Ermolov sent me to tell the infantry that they could lie down to reduce the effect of fire. Everyone remained standing and closed ranks when the ranks were broken. There was no boasting or timidity. They died in silence.

    Who can explain to me the meaning of this episode?
    Stupidly standing as a target under artillery fire - what's that?...
    They themselves didn’t think to lie down in order to reduce losses and maintain combat effectiveness, and they also didn’t follow Ermolov’s command!
    Where is common sense here?! In silent dying?.........
    I do not understand.
    Similar episodes were repeated many times during the Crimean War and were the cause of unjustified casualties in the Alma and Inkerman battles.