Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Coastal troops

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Renewing our cycle about the current state of the Russian Navy, we cannot pass by such an important component of it as its Coastal Forces (BV Navy). In this article we do not set ourselves the goal of making a comprehensive analysis of the development of the Coastal Forces of the USSR and the Russian Federation, since, unfortunately, the author of this article lacks the necessary statistical material for this. We will only pay attention to some aspects of the current tasks, the state and prospects of development of the BV of the Russian Navy.

Briefly, the list of the main tasks of these troops can be described as:

1. Protection of naval bases and other important objects, forces fleet, troops, as well as the civilian population from the influence of the naval forces of the enemy, primarily through the destruction of its surface ships and amphibious assault forces, as well as anti-air defense.

2. The defense of key coastal sites from attacks from the land.

3. Landing and actions in the sea, airborne assault forces.

4. Anti-sabotage fight.

BV Navy include:

1. Coastal Missile-Artillery Troops (BRAV).

2. Marines.

Let's start with BRAV. In the years of the USSR, it was based on missile and rocket-artillery brigades, and separate divisions and regiments, which were armed with both missile and artillery systems.

The first missile system, which entered service with the domestic BRAV was the Sopka 4K87.



For its time (and the complex was put into service on December 19 1958 g), it was a rather formidable weaponbut nevertheless, as a coastal missile system, it had significant drawbacks, the main of which should be recognized as a semi-active guidance system. Theoretically, the missile range of this complex reached 95 km, but, of course, only under the condition that the radar target illumination can provide guidance at such a distance. The launch mass of the rocket was 3 kg, the weight of the warhead was 419 kg, the speed was 860 M, the marching flight height was 0,9 m. launch from missile carriers and there was an attempt to turn it into a universal, that is, used and aviation, and ships, and coastal parts. The beginning, without a doubt, is good, but then it failed. Nevertheless, despite significant shortcomings, the “Sopka” was in service with the BRAV until the early 80s.

Of course, the leadership of the USSR was quite clear that much more advanced weapons were needed for the coastal forces, and they received them. In 1966, the BRAV USSR adopted the coastal missile system (DBK) 4K44B Redut.



It can be said that it was then that for the first (and, alas, for the last) times, the Brav of the USSR received modern weapons, and fully responded to the tasks of the BRK. For the end of the 60s, this was the real pinnacle of this technique.

The Redut DBK was built on the basis of the P-35 anti-ship missile, which armed the first Soviet missile cruisers of the 58 (Grozny) type and 1134 (Admiral Zozulya) projects. The length of its land modification P-35B reached 9,5 m, the starting weight was 4 400 kg, the cruising speed was 1,5М, that is, it was supersonic. The firing range of the BRK, according to various data, was 270-300 km, the mass of the warhead, again, according to various data 800-1000 kg or 350-kiloton "special ammunition".

The missile seeker worked very interestingly. On the marching site, an inertial guidance system was used, and after the missile entered the target area, a radar sight was turned on. The latter transmitted the radar "picture" to the missile operator, and he assigned each missile its target for attack, after which the anti-ship missile attacked the ship assigned to it using the radar seeker. Another interesting feature of the complex was the ability to use the P-35B not only in the shock, but also in the reconnaissance version - the author of this article does not have a detailed description, but it can be assumed that such a missile was, in fact, a disposable UAV, which, due to the removal the warhead significantly increased the flight range. As far as can be understood, there were three flight profiles of the rocket, however, the indications of the range on them differ. Probably, the numbers were close to the following - 55 km at an altitude of 400 m, 200 km at an altitude of 4 m, and 000 km at an altitude of 300 m. In the reconnaissance version, the missile's range was increased to 7 km. At the same time, in the last segment of the trajectory, the rocket descended to a height of 000 m and attacked from it.

Subsequently, at the end of the 70-ies, the BRK received the upgraded 3М44 Progress rocket, in which the range (in the shock version) reached 460 km, while the GOS of the rocket became more interference-proof. Also, the height in the final section has been reduced from 100 m to 25 m, while this section itself has been increased from 20 to 50 km.

The mass of the self-propelled launcher (SPU-35B) reached 21 tons, with only one missile placed on the vehicle. In addition to launchers and machines with a control system (“The Rock”), the complex also had a mobile radar, but, of course, the main target for targeting the Redut missile systems was external target designation, which the complex could receive from specialized aircraft and reconnaissance helicopters 95D, Tu-16D and Ka-25Ts.

Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Coastal troops


Today, the complex is certainly outdated, but still represents a certain threat and utility (at least due to the diversion of air defense when used in conjunction with more modern anti-ship missiles) and is still in service with the Coastal Forces of the Russian Navy. The exact number of surviving launchers is unknown, perhaps - 18 units. (regular strength of one battalion, 18 missiles in salvo).

As we have said above, for its time, the Redut BRN 4K44B was a very sophisticated complex, basically responding to the tasks faced by the Brav of the USSR, this cannot be said about the following (and, alas, the last) Soviet BRK. BRK 4K51 "Frontier"



was created to replace the "Sopka", and was considered not operational-tactical (as "Redut") but a tactical complex. In addition, it was supposed (and actually carried out) the export deliveries of this complex to the Allied countries in the Department of Internal Affairs - the export of "Rubezh" was prohibited.

In essence, 2 can distinguish the key shortcomings of the Frontier. The first is that it was built on the basis of the deliberately outdated Termit missile P-15, which was put into service in 1960, which is still nonsense for the complex, which they began to develop ten years later. Of course, the rocket was upgraded - the Rubezh received the P-15М, on which stood the upgraded GOS (active radar DS-M instead of DS or thermal Snegir-M instead of Condor), the maximum range increased from 40 to 80 km, flight altitude, on the contrary, decreased from 100-200 to 25-50 m (although, apparently, it strongly depended on the firing range), the mass of the warhead increased from 480 to 513 kg, while P-15M could carry tactical nuclear warhead power 15 kilotons.

Nevertheless, it was a large (2 523 kg) subsonic (0,9М) rocket with a homing system, which can hardly be called adequate for 70's, and after all, Rubezh BRK was adopted by 22 in October 1978, that is, on the eve of 80's. According to the author of this article, the creation of such a complex could only be justified by the principle “On you, God, that we are not fit” - that is, the implementation of a purely export weapon system, in which combat effectiveness was sacrificed for the cost and simplicity of service, but Rubezh "Entered into service with the USSR BRAV and is in service at the present time.

The second disadvantage of the complex was the concept of a “land missile boat” - taking advantage of the fact that the weight of the P-15M anti-ship missiles was almost half that of the P-35B, and that this complex, by and large, was intended to attack targets within the radio horizon, it was decided to install on car chassis not only 2 launchers, but also a fire control radar. This was possible to do, but the mass of the 3S51M self-propelled launcher was 41 tons, with all the ensuing consequences for the mobility and patency of the DBK. In fairness, however, we note that tank “Tiger” from “Rubezh” didn’t work out - according to those who served on it, the launcher could still move not only along asphalt roads, but also along dirt roads, and even in the forest (although there were already significant restrictions).

But, in any case, Rubezh BRK cannot be attributed to the successes of Russian rocket production. Nevertheless, it is still in service with the Bravo Navy. Precise data on the number is not, presumably - 16-24 launchers for 2 missiles on each, more or less evenly distributed between the four fleets.

Attention is drawn to the fact that the BRAV equipment with modern missiles seems to be in the 70-80 years. was not a priority of the leadership of the USSR Armed Forces. So, for example, in 1975, the Basalt P-500 RCC was adopted; its capabilities were significantly superior to both the P-35B and the future Progress 3М44, but it was not much in terms of the Brav armor, though PKR BRK "Redut". The same applies to the very high-quality for its time PKR "Mosquito".

On the other hand, according to some sources, in the USSR, the “long arm” was designed specifically for the BRAV - the anti-ship missile with a range of up to 1 500 km. But it is obvious that its design was curtailed after the signing of the INF Treaty in 1987, when the United States and the USSR assumed obligations to completely abandon land-based ballistic and cruise missiles in nuclear and non-nuclear design. In the future, work on the creation of new complexes did not involve the use of anti-ship missiles with a range of 500 km or more. And the following DBKs entered BV Navy already in the Russian Federation.

The first was adopted by the BRK "Ball"



This event was joyful for the Coastal Forces in 2008. The complex is built “around” the X-35 anti-ship missile, and its more long-range variant X-35U. Apparently, “Ball” is not a Soviet reserve, but was already developed in the Russian Federation.

This was the case - work on the X-35 began in the 80s of the last century, and although the rocket itself was created in 1987 g, the identified problems with its GOS were eliminated only by 1992. But in the “wild 90-e” works X-35 stopped and were reanimated thanks to the X-35E export offer that interested the Indians (during the period 2000-2007 r, 222 of such missiles was supplied to them). It was only after this that the development of the onshore complex for this rocket began, and, as we have said earlier, the Ball DBK in 2008 g was adopted.

This BRK can be described in two words: "cheap" and "angry". The mass of the “coastal” X-35 reaches 670 kg, which is several times less than what was previously received by domestic RIS. Flight range - 120 km from X-35 and 260 km from X-35. The mass of the warhead - 145 kg. The missile’s homing is carried out with the help of an inertial guidance system (plus satellite correction) on the cruise and an active-passive radar homing (i.e., capable of being guided both by the on-board radar and by the radar source). The range of target acquisition from the original version of the GSN Gran-K was 20 km, while the more modern version had 50 km. The advantages of the rocket also include the low ESR (unfortunately, the data were not disclosed), as well as the low-altitude flight profile: 10-15 m on the cruise, and 3-4 m on the attack site.

The disadvantage of X-35 is usually considered to be the subsonic speed of its flight (0,8-0,85М), but in fairness we note that “according to Senka and the cap” - there is no point in putting expensive and heavy supersonic anti-ship missiles on small, or relatively weak, surface enemy warships. As for large and well-protected, for example, such as American destroyers of the Arly Burk type, here too the massive attack of subsonic anti-ship missiles has very good chances of success. Despite the seemingly slow speed that emerged from the radio horizon (that is, 25-30 km from the destroyer), the X-35 rocket will hit the target in just 1,5-2 minutes - and this is very little even by the standards of modern combat information systems . Of course, one or several of the Aegis missiles are quite capable of intercepting, but two or three dozen ...

The Ball division of the BRK division includes up to 4 mobile launchers, with 8 containers for missiles installed on each, which allows 32 rocket salvo to be launched within 21 seconds or less (the interval between missile launches is up to 3 seconds). Some surprise, however, is caused by photos of four-rocket installations.



But here is one of two things - or our Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation saved on the armed forces for the umpteenth time, or (which, according to the author is closer to the truth), the launcher is modular, consisting of two 4 missile blocks each, and it’s understandable that in daily operation (including exercises with the actual use of weapons) one unit is enough.

In addition to the launchers, the division's regular staff also includes up to two control machines, and up to 4 transport and handling machines (obviously, their number corresponds to the number of launchers), which allows, if necessary, to form a second volley.

On the whole, it can be stated that the Ball DBK is a very successful tactical missile system (and operational-tactical missile complex with the X-35U anti-missile missile), which, of course, does not solve all the tasks facing the Russian BRAV, but successfully complements capabilities of their more powerful and long-range "brothers" in the near sea zone.

Unfortunately, the author of this article does not know the exact number of Ball ballistic missile systems currently in service with the Russian BRAV, but a few years ago they were equipped with at least 4 units in the Pacific, Black Sea and Baltic fleets, as well as the Caspian flotilla, which suggests that no later than 2015 g in the composition of the Russian Navy there were at least 4 of such a division (that is, 16 PU for 8 missiles). There is also information (possibly - inflated, the source is “The Military Balance 2017”), then as of last year the number of mobile launchers reached 44 units.

The next DBK - “Bastion”, apparently, began to be developed in the USSR, but entered service later “Bala” - in 2010.



Its creation began at the end of 70, the beginning of 80, because, judging by some data, the P-800 “Onyx” missile (export name - “Yakhont”) was originally intended, among other things, for the use of Brav of the USSR. to replace the gradually aging “Redut”.

In general, the P-800 rocket is a much more formidable weapon than the X-35 or X-35U. The mass of the warhead reaches 200 kg, while the rocket is supersonic — it can overcome the same 120 km by following the low-altitude flight profile, that is, at an altitude of 10-15 m, while developing a speed twice the speed of sound. But, unlike X-35, P-800, a combined trajectory is available when a rocket travels a significant part of the way at high altitude (up to 14 000 m) and only after capturing the active radar homing target will correct the flight direction and go to low altitudes. “Onyx” seeker is considered to be noise-free, that is, it is designed to operate under conditions of active and passive interference, while, according to the developers, the target acquisition range is at least 50 km. This is a very important caveat - usually for promotional purposes, the longest range of capture of the GOS is indicated, which, of course, is achieved under ideal weather conditions and in the absence of electronic countermeasures. Apparently, the concern "Granit-electron", which is the creator and manufacturer of the specified GOS, indicates a much more realistic value. And then - what does 50 km mean without specifying an EPR target? According to some data, a target the size of a missile cruiser is “caught” by the “Granit-electron” brainchild at a distance of 80 km ... By the way, the GOS is active-passive, that is, it is completely capable of being directed at the radiating object. Apparently, including at the jamming director, at least in aviation, this issue was resolved quite a long time ago, and in fact, on air-to-air missiles, the dimensions of the GOS are much more modest.

"On the Internet" there is a perception that, thanks to its high-altitude trajectory section, the Onyx anti-ship missiles are an easy target for newer air defense systems, such as the US SM-800 SAM. In fact, this is a rather controversial statement, since, unfortunately, we do not know many of the parameters of the American Aegis system, and the Onyx EPR when flying at high altitude. In other words, at the “everyday” level, it is impossible even to determine at what distance the radar station of the same “Arly Burke” will be able to detect the attacking “Onyxes”. Nevertheless, assessing the current level of technology in general, it can be assumed that such concerns have certain grounds. The fact is that the Americans initially “sharpened” their naval air defense just to repel altitude threats, such as the regiments of Tu-6, Tu-16 and Tu-22М22 with their anti-ship missiles X-3 inclusive, and it would be strange to expect that they have not achieved any success here. Nevertheless, a massive attack of rockets flying at a speed of 22 meters per second, even at a high altitude, is quite capable of “breaking through” almost any defense, the only question is the density of the volley, that is, the number of simultaneously launched rockets.

Separately, I would like to say about the firing range of the "Bastion" BRK. As is known, the export modification of the Onyx - Yakhont missiles has a “conventional” range of fire in 300 km, but what range the Onyxes themselves have is unfortunately unknown. Some analysts suggest that such can reach 800 km, however, according to the author of this article, the range of P-800 missiles, at least - in their “land” version does not exceed 500 km, since it is extremely doubtful, or rather, almost unbelievable so that Russia, on its own initiative, violates the highly advantageous treaty on the INF and will start the deployment of land-based cruise missiles with a range of over 500 km.

Apparently, the composition of the BRC Bastion division has a structure similar to that of the Ball - 4 mobile launchers for 2 missiles on each, one or two control machines and 4 transport and handling machines. Strictly speaking, the correct name of the BRK is “Bastion-P”, since there is also its immobile, mine “variation” - “Bastion-C”.

Unfortunately, it is also not possible to establish the exact number of "Bastions" in service with the Russian Navy. Greater confusion is brought about by the use of “non-standard” terminology by officials. For example, at the end of 2015, “Intefax” cited the words of the Minister of Defense S. Shoigu that: “By the end of the year, two Bastion complexes will arrive in the Northern and Pacific fleets”, while he specified that in 2016 The Navy will receive five such complexes, and “in the future, the fleets will receive four complexes annually,” and “As a result, before the 2021, we will be able to completely re-equip the coastal missile units with modern weapons” However, what is meant by “complex” in this case?

If by "complex" we mean a division of the composition described earlier (that is, 4 mobile launchers with support equipment) and taking into account the fact that at the time of the announcement of S. Shoigu from one to three battalions of "Bastions" was already in service with the Black Sea Fleet, then 2020 g inclusively the fleet should have received neither more nor less, as well as the 23 division, apart from the 1-3 available. This is too good to be true - even in the USSR, the BRAV had 4-5 divisions per fleet, both tactical and tactical missiles. And here - so many "Bastions" alone! However, if we are not talking about divisions, but about the number of mobile units, then counting 4 launchers per division, we get almost 6 divisions up to 2020 g - taking into account the need to re-equip at least four BRAV brigades (one for each fleet), each which has in its composition 3 division, it turns out somehow regrettably small, and does not correspond to the terms of rearmament declared by S. Shoigu.

The “The Military Balance” data on the availability of launchers (i.e., 2017 divisions) as of 48 and 12 g are more or less realistic.

What can be said today about the missile weapon of the BRAV as a whole? On the one hand, the most positive trends are evident - judging by the information we have at our disposal, the re-arming of the enemy-mounted missiles is in full swing, and the newest bastion and ball complexes significantly exceed their predecessors in their combat capabilities, and for the first time domestic coastal the troops will receive a nomenclature of missile weapons, not inferior to what is located on our warships. But on the other hand, it is necessary to recognize that the capabilities of our missile systems are to a certain extent limited.

The first is, in fact, technical limitations, the range of our RCC does not exceed 300, and if to be an optimist, then 500 km. Such a range provides very good, reliable protection of the coast against enemy landings. But nevertheless, we, first of all, should fear not landings, but AUG, and here the range in 300 km, and even in 500 km is not enough, and it was not enough even in 80-ies of the last century. In addition, there are questions to the power of typical domestic compounds of the ballistic missiles.

At present, the brigade is the highest compound of the CRAB, while the 3 division usually enters it. Considering the fact that in one Bastion division 4 launchers (that is, 8 missiles in a volley), the brigade’s general salvo is 24 missiles, which, in principle, is equivalent to hitting one Antei SSGN , Of course). However, a volley of similar density could be considered sufficient for the AUG air defense to break through and destroy the aircraft carrier only in the 949 of the last century, today it obviously will not be enough (although ... the author of this article would not want to be in place the American admiral, whose compound was attacked by the 80 "Onyxes"). It would be a different matter if the enemy warrant could coordinate the strikes of two brigades, but where can we get the bastions 24 battalions for each fleet? On the other hand, there is some suspicion based on the fact that hypersonic Zircon anti-ship missiles, which our scientists are working on with might and main, have been declared to be fully compatible with the UBCS, capable of shooting Onyxes and Gages. And won't it happen that after a certain number of years in the armament of the bastions battalions, not supersonic “Onyxes” will appear, but hypersonic “Zircons”? The 6 volley of hypersonic rockets ... I do not know who can stop it, even after being warned in advance about the time of the raid.

So, it is quite possible that the problem of volley power will be solved in the near future - as for the “short arm” too, then, alas, nothing can be done - at least until all of us, dearly loved Mr. Trump will finally terminate the INF Treaty.

But the story about the main armament of the Brav Naval Forces of the Russian Federation will be incomplete without mentioning its artillery component - 130-mm coastal self-propelled artillery complex A-222 "Bereg"



It is possible that someone will now slyly grin - well, well, in the age of rockets, someone else remembers barreled artillery! And it will be categorically wrong: because today, and tomorrow, and for a very long time, in full accordance with Napoleon’s expression, it is the guns that will kill people. Perhaps sometime, in the era of space blasters and the Death Stars, the barrel artillery will lose its key positions in the armed forces, but this is clearly going to happen very, very soon.

A-222 "Beach" began to develop at the end of 70-s, but its performance characteristics inspire respect today. The installation is semi-automatic and is able to send 14 projectiles with a caliber of 130 mm to a distance of 23 km (at the initial speed of 850 m / s) in flight per minute. As far as can be understood from the descriptions of this gun, it is possible to fire a reinforced combat charge in which the initial speed rises to 930 m / s and range to 27 150 m. In addition to high-explosive, the A-222 ammunition also includes armor-piercing and anti-aircraft missiles.

Six of these guns form a division capable of bringing more than 2,8 tons of shells containing almost 300 kg of explosive to the enemy in a minute more than 130. But the main advantage of this artillery system is the fire control system, which is largely unified with that used on AK-35 shipboard installations. The fire control system uses two channels - radar and optical-electronic, which allows detecting the enemy at a distance of up to 200 km and capable of operating in a difficult jamming environment. The OMS provides target designation for small marine targets (up to a tank or an armored personnel carrier), moving at speeds up to XNUMX nodes (such, in general, have not yet been invented) and provides support for four targets, while simultaneously firing two of them two.

The mass of the self-propelled artillery installation is 43,7 tons with full ammunition, numbering 40 shots.

Of course, in terms of its anti-ship capabilities, the A-222 loses much to the Bastion and Ball missiles, but the Bereg is much more versatile. It is an extremely formidable anti-landing vehicle capable of “working” not only on ships and vessels, but also directly on a landing force, on which the use of anti-ship missiles is irrational (despite the fact that the Bal ballistic missiles are not intended to attack ground targets). But after all, the threat to domestic naval (and not only) facilities off the coast can emanate not only from the sea, but also from land, and against the ground forces of the enemy, "Bereg" is able to "work off" no worse, and perhaps even better than the army large-caliber artillery. Therefore, A-222 should be considered an extremely important addition to GRAVs and one can only hope that in the future, the developers of domestic ACS will not forget about the specific needs of the Coastal Forces.

To date, the BRAV of the Russian Navy is likely to include 36 A-223 artillery systems, that is, six divisions.

Продолжение следует ...

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  1. +8
    29 October 2018 05: 08
    "The Russian Navy. A sad look into the future. Coastal troops" In contrast to the look, the present does not seem to be without problems, but on the whole everything is in order ...
    1. +11
      29 October 2018 06: 38
      "but in general everything is in order" sounds not even optimistic, but just blindly .... The construction speed is useless .... We have small missile ships of Project 22800 with a displacement of 800 tons (well, with the appropriate capabilities) are built at the speed of destroyers type "Arleigh Burke", with a displacement of under 10000 tons .... But this issue has already been discussed a million times ...
      1. +2
        29 October 2018 06: 55
        stupid just to say:
        We have small missile ships of project 22800 with a displacement of 800 tons (well, with the corresponding capabilities) being built at the speed of destroyers such as Arly Burke, with a displacement of 10000 tons.

        given the capacity of the budgets of the Russian Federation and our "potential partners"
        1. +13
          29 October 2018 07: 38
          Quote: Soho
          given the capacity of the budgets of the Russian Federation

          And what does the budget have to do with it, I wonder? Just something, but enough money for ships under construction
          1. -3
            29 October 2018 07: 49
            it may be that the budgetary framework determines (or should determine) both the type of ordered weapons, their quantity, and the speed of construction / production. Is not it? So why refer to the pace of construction of "Berks" in relation to our Russian reality?
            1. +19
              29 October 2018 08: 25
              Quote: Soho
              it may be that the budget framework determines (or should determine) both the type of weapons being ordered, their quantity, and the speed of construction / production. Is not it?

              Not this way. Our problems of military construction in recent years are completely unrelated to money. There is money, there is not much else. It’s like a person who found a treasure on a desert island - a carriage of money, but if a tooth aches, it cannot be cured - there is no dentist, no equipment, no medicine.
              1. -2
                29 October 2018 08: 52
                the lack of MTB, the absence (or low level) of design thought, the thievery of officials from the Moscow Region, etc. - this is already particular. Of course, they have an impact, sometimes cardinal. But this is a topic for another question. And now we are talking about something else: the emphasis on the construction of littoral vessels of the type indicated by IRAs is due to the fact that for those allocated modest means it allows us to get the maximum possible result. Yes, let us not bake destroyers like pies (unfortunately). But we are building frigates and corvettes that, with some assumptions, allow us to solve protection tasks in the near sea zone
                1. +12
                  29 October 2018 11: 40
                  Quote: Soho
                  the lack of MTB, the absence (or low level) of design thought, the thievery of officials from the Moscow Region, etc. - this is already particular.

                  Well, "Gorshkov" was built for 12 years precisely because of these particulars.
                  Quote: Soho
                  Yes, let us not bake destroyers like pies (unfortunately). But building frigates and corvettes

                  Yeah ... we build corvettes for 7-11 years. If there is money for them in state programs. We could somehow agree with you if we were to build these "littoral" buildings on time. But we don't
                  1. -4
                    29 October 2018 13: 16
                    Well, "Gorshkov" was built for 12 years precisely because of these particulars.

                    I'm talking about Thomas, you're talking about Yerema ...
                    1. +6
                      29 October 2018 14: 31
                      Quote: Soho
                      I'm talking about Thomas, you're talking about Yerema ...

                      Because it seems to you that some unfavorable budget constraints affect our long-term construction. But this is not
                      1. -2
                        29 October 2018 14: 42
                        Because it seems to you that some unfavorable budget constraints affect our long-term construction. But this is not

                        I absolutely didn’t mean it. I spoke only about the priority of the program for the construction of small ships in view of the limited budget. I know enough about the problems of designing, building, arming and commissioning combat ships. It does not make sense to convince me of this.
                        ps. And yes, if my memory serves me, then Gorshkov was built in 4 years. And not for 12. Volokita went later, when the running, mooring started ... 4 years, of course, also not ice, of course.
                  2. -1
                    2 November 2018 10: 24
                    everything always rests on the headstock. it is inadequate funding that greatly delays the construction of ships. to build a vessel is not a problem, although it is also necessary to recruit staff for the plant will be convinced of its qualifications and so on. But the contractors who build the equipment - which is not in nature, they also need to hire personnel whose often also is not in nature, etc., etc. - that is, this time and money. The main thing was accomplished during the construction of new ships: the creation of their BIUS with an open SIGMA interface, which made it possible to build ships of different sizes with various weapons on its base. If you are interested in old BIUS models, then there was a farmer system - when in fact all warheads operated autonomously and the old BIOS BIUS took less part in the work.
                    And it was precisely on the development of a new BIOS for all the devices connected to it, a completely new model that time was wasted. That is, in fact, they spent time resuming production of a modern computer system for a ship, but they could have simply gathered everything together and managed according to a far-fetched principle much earlier - only the point is in such a ship in modern time. But most of the equipment was created anew anyway.
                2. +7
                  29 October 2018 13: 28
                  Quote: Soho
                  the lack of MTB, the absence (or low level) of design thought, the thievery of officials from the Moscow Region, etc. - this is already particular.

                  It is these particulars, and not the budget at all, that are now decisive in the programs of the domestic shipbuilding.
                  Quote: Soho
                  And now we are talking about something else: the emphasis on the construction of littoral vessels of the type indicated by IRAs is due to the fact that for those allocated modest means it allows us to get the maximum possible result.

                  In theory. But in practice, it turned out that the above-mentioned "particulars", even with full budget funding, bury all attempts to obtain maximum possible result.
                  A typical example is pr. 22800. There is money. The contracts are signed. Ships are being built. And suddenly - bam, one of the subcontractors who signed the contract signs the impossibility of delivering the equipment on time. In the absence of funding problems.
                  It turned out that money does not directly turn into goods - in the real world, this needs some kind of production base. But the subcontractor didn’t have this base - and the pr.22800 launched into the water have every chance to repeat the fate of the second triple 11356 (but now it will not be possible to dump the deadline for the Maidan).
                  1. -8
                    29 October 2018 14: 08
                    thanks for "enlightening". Finally I found out the truth (sarcasm)
                3. 0
                  1 December 2018 10: 32
                  I think that in Moscow the level of theft is much lower than in officialdom as a whole, since Putin’s life depends entirely on the strength of the army, and he is extremely interested in preserving his skin
            2. +4
              30 October 2018 15: 44
              We have a problem with personnel in production. There are even designers, but there is no one to embody their projects "in hardware". We have completely destroyed the Soviet system of personnel training and there is no new one. Such an example, the Kazan aircraft plant invites a team of its former assemblers and they assemble the systems and the interior of a passenger aircraft (new or during overhaul) in six months. As the saying goes - "you won't be full of money."
          2. +1
            30 October 2018 10: 35
            the fact is that an unlimited budget greatly increases the speed of production, allows you not to waste time searching for optimal supplies, hire employees of any quantity and quality to engage in effective work (the USA attracts the best specialists from all over the world, including from the Russian Federation), and attract contractors of any kind , and not only those who can cheaper and most importantly acquire modern technology and equipment
          3. +2
            30 October 2018 20: 55
            Andrew! Thank you very much for your articles. I read about RYAV heavily, you clearly know the Navy theme.
            Taking off my hat!
      2. +8
        29 October 2018 07: 26
        So it seems in the article about the ships not a word. Well, if Andrei Chelyabinsky (known for his pessimistic view) claims that the coastal defense is less or less, I personally tend to believe that it is. If you want to be upset, read the previous articles in the series)
        1. 0
          1 November 2018 16: 14
          Well, if Andrei Chelyabinsky (known for his pessimistic view)
          - this is not pessimism, but reality ... hi
  2. +7
    29 October 2018 07: 20
    Thanks to the author for another interesting article. But there is one request, do not spray. Waiting (there are many of us like that) the end of the Varangian, I’m not waiting for the Game of Thrones already)) With respect and best wishes
    1. +8
      29 October 2018 07: 37
      Quote: Xazarin
      Thanks to the author for another interesting article.

      And thank you for your kind words!
      Quote: Xazarin
      But there is one request, do not spray. I’m waiting (there seem to be many of us) for the end of the Varangian,

      This week there will be another article :)))
      1. +7
        29 October 2018 12: 52
        Hi Andrey
        you forgot about RK-55 Relief, they were even released by 4 launchers under the KR 3М10 (КС-122), the complex was even operated specifically from 1986 to 1988 the year before the signing of the INF Treaty
        1. +2
          29 October 2018 13: 02
          The relief is OTRK and not PBRK.
          1. +1
            29 October 2018 13: 06
            I agree, it's just the line of development. 3M10 is the "ancestor" of the current KR R-500 from OTRK Iskander
            BUT, everything has unification, as an option, TPK with P-500 can be introduced into BK Bastion Bastion
            1. +5
              29 October 2018 14: 32
              Quote: Romario_Argo
              Hi Andrey
              you forgot about RK-55 Relief,

              Which never were part of GRAV, so I forgot nothing
      2. 0
        29 October 2018 18: 03
        Thanks for the article, Andrew! Apparently here is the most positive result in updating the army, if we take all the articles good Which is actually not surprising. Yet BRAV consists of several complexes and that’s all. With the Marine Corps, things are probably more complicated.
    2. -1
      29 October 2018 22: 27
      feel I wildly apologize, but the story of the Varangian is well known - it was sunk, raised, sold, an accident off the coast of Great Britain (I won’t give out the secrets of the Game of Thrones! wink ).
      smile Although there are of course alternative studies (for example, Doinikov smile ), which break the whole concept of Andrei from Chelyabinsk: the Varyag’s speed is normal, and the armored deck as protection is nothing, the main thing is to hang the anti-torpedo nets on the sides. And as you know wink Asama is sunk (and not only!). But as you know request The Current Reality was created by Japanese alternativeists .... recourse . And they seem belay , distract some modern authors from writing articles on modern topics, for example, "The Russian Navy" (by the way, it would be nice to describe the state of the "yacht fleet" of our Navy ...), or on the topic of the Japanese "destroyer, aka an aircraft carrier", "as to conduct a patrol for the civilian ministry "and an" experimental ship ".
  3. +2
    29 October 2018 07: 32
    In Kamchatka, they seem to have completely rearmed themselves on the "Balls" and "Bastions", on the day of the Navy they are rolling out these samples of our equipment to the parade.
  4. +6
    29 October 2018 07: 39
    I do not agree with the "coast". the coalition "made" it in all respects. 16 rounds per minute, 70 rounds, 152 caliber and a much longer range. we need a "coast-2" coalition on the chassis of the "coast" complex.
    1. +13
      29 October 2018 07: 51
      Quote: ruslan
      I do not agree with the "coast". the coalition "made" it in all respects

      Well you give. We compared the artillery system that EMNIP began to develop in 1978 r and the Coalition that began to design in 2002 r, i.e. a bit like that on 24 a year later :)))))
      At the same time, "Bereg" is on alert today. Where is the Coalition? I haven’t finished GOS yet, they are not in the troops.
      1. +2
        29 October 2018 08: 00
        that’s why I wrote my comment :-) maybe I didn’t correctly understand the message of this paragraph, where I heard about the need to continue to purchase it
        "Therefore, the A-222 should be considered an extremely important addition to the BRAV and one can only hope that in the future the developers of domestic ACS will not forget about the specific needs of the Coastal Forces."
        Now I re-read it and perhaps it was the new samples that were meant. but in any case it is necessary to take the "coalition" as a basis. to subtle the new development will be too bold, it is cheaper to rely on at least something ready.
        1. +3
          29 October 2018 08: 26
          Quote: ruslan
          now re-read and perhaps it was precisely the new samples that were meant

          Of course
          1. 0
            29 October 2018 12: 14
            Dear Andrey, what are the “specific needs of the Coastal Troops”? The target designation is kind of external. Wheel travel? Or does the fleet (to be different) require a cap charge?))))
            1. +8
              29 October 2018 13: 45
              Quote: anzar
              Dear Andrey, what are the “specific needs of the Coastal Troops”?

              Most likely - work on point moving targets, including high-speed ones of the same LCAC.
              It is easier for the army team - they have either areal or point targets, but motionless. If we describe the work of coastal artillery in terms of the army, then this is "to achieve a direct hit on a maneuvering tank while firing from divisional guns with PDO." smile
              The most interesting thing is that initially a complete Msta turret was offered as an armament option for Bereg. But the navy clung to its native 130mm caliber. As a result, a wide range of 152-mm projectiles, including active-reactive and guided ones, was left "overboard".
              1. +1
                29 October 2018 15: 37
                ... then this is "to achieve a direct hit on a maneuvering tank

                Her, the ship will have a larger tank, but the speed will be the same)) During the flight of the projectile, even by 20 km no more than 1,5-2 of its own lengths will pass. But still hoping to get in a reasonable time from a single barrel with an unguided projectile is a great optimism.
                But the fleet clung to its own 130-mm caliber ...

                I think this is the exact answer.
                1. +10
                  29 October 2018 15: 48
                  Quote: anzar
                  Her ship will be a larger tank, but the speed is the same))

                  Here is a typical coastal artillery target:

                  Dimensions 26x14 m. Speed ​​- 40 knots per load.
                  More than a tank, but also faster (taking into account the fact that the tank cannot develop maximum speed on the battlefield).
                  Quote: anzar
                  During the flight of the projectile, even at 20 km no more than 1,5-2 of its own lengths will have time to go through.

                  In theory first approach - yes, everything is simple: I took the necessary lead - and with the first shell hit the target to the core. And in real life, all kinds of difficulties begin, such as inaccurate determination of the elements of the target’s movement, maneuvering of the target, ellipse of dispersion of shells, etc. smile
                  1. 0
                    29 October 2018 16: 09
                    Colleague Aleksey, you still can't hit a target like a boat (not even on a pillow) from the "Coast". That is URS, even cf. range, say Whirlwind / Storm. At the moment of unloading, yes, but this is a typical task for conventional self-propelled guns. They did not convince me of the need NOW of any special self-propelled guns.
                    1. +9
                      29 October 2018 16: 48
                      Quote: anzar
                      Colleague Alexei, a target like a boat (not even on a pillow) from the "Shore" and still not hit

                      OMS "Berega" does not agree with you :)))
                      1. +1
                        29 October 2018 20: 36
                        OMS "Berega" does not agree with you :)))

                        Of course, he will try)), but the LMS will not get into the helmsman’s head when and how he will make the next turn of the broken line of rapprochement. A direct fire is already 2-3 km and you can shoot from the tank. Those. 20km needed to catch the chosen landing coastal area[b] [/ b] to shoot, self-propelled guns are not worth every kilometer))) Otherwise, landings are usually supported from the air ....
                        Self-propelled guns are certainly needed, but the main role is for others (aviation / missiles)
                      2. +2
                        29 October 2018 22: 03
                        Thanks for the article, put a plus, of course! hi
                        Hopefully the next article will be about the Marine Corps (and landing ships wink ).
                        Question: "In addition to high-explosive, A-222 ammunition also includes armor-piercing and anti-aircraft shells." Anti-aircraft shells are apparently a consequence of the "kinship" relationship with the A130 and A192. But is there any data on an MSA capable of working against air targets (for such a weapon it would not be superfluous at all)? Such an option would justify the caliber.
                    2. +3
                      29 October 2018 17: 15
                      Quote: anzar
                      Colleague Alexei, a target like a boat (not even on a pillow) from the "Shore" and still not hit

                      And as soon as the naval and coastal gunners coped before that? After all, it’s not that in the DKVP - in the TCA, SKA and Moscow Oblast fell. Without radar UAO - on pure optics. smile
                      Quote: anzar
                      That is URS, even cf. range, say Whirlwind / Storm.

                      Do you remember the range of the ATGM? Effective range, not technical range of ATGM flight for fuel generation.
                      1. 0
                        29 October 2018 20: 22
                        And as soon as the naval and coastal gunners coped before that?

                        Bad)))) The key word here is distance with which they fell. And not at 40uz.
                        Do you remember the range of the ATGM?

                        8-10km (supersonic) and range from model to model increase. But I indicated them in principle, in other countries there are small medium-range anti-ship missiles (Penguins, etc.) imprisoned under boats. RF does not recognize a smaller frigate goal))))
            2. +3
              29 October 2018 14: 34
              Quote: anzar
              Dear Andrey, what are the “specific needs of the Coastal Troops”?

              Shooting at sea targets, of course :)))) This is a very specific thing, different from what the hunters do.
              1. 0
                29 October 2018 15: 29
                This is a very specific thing, different from the fact that make land traders

                The method of application differs of course, but does this affect the DESIGN or even the configuration of the self-propelled gun? Why can't the same "Msta" do it - the firing radar on the tower is not enough? Does the "coast" shoot direct fire? After all, both have external target designation.
                1. +3
                  29 October 2018 15: 58
                  Quote: anzar
                  The method of application varies of course, but does it affect the DESIGN or even the configuration of the self-propelled gun?

                  On the structure, yes. The differences are the same as between a field and anti-aircraft gun: more powerful guidance drives + automatic weapon guidance according to data from the Central Post. The turret and the gun must continuously and with high precision work out commands from the CPU, "tracking" a moving target (the speed of which is comparable to an aircraft of the 30s).
                  1. 0
                    29 October 2018 16: 22
                    ... more powerful guidance drives + automatic gun guidance according to data from the Central Post. The turret and gun must continuously and accurately train teams with CPUs ...

                    UTB eats everything modern "land" self-propelled guns.
                    ... "tracking" a moving target

                    Tracking will not help - after all, she maneuvers, and the projectile flight time is long. Your comparison with anti-aircraft guns is good because it indicates what will happen with "special" self-propelled guns for firing at sea targets - they will go where large-caliber anti-aircraft guns are)))
                2. +3
                  29 October 2018 16: 54
                  Quote: anzar
                  The method of application varies of course, but does it affect the DESIGN or even the configuration of the self-propelled gun?

                  Little. "Coast" in terms of equipment and automatic loader is unified with "Msta", but precisely in terms of. SSP, probably others, plus each gun is equipped with sights that allow you to fire in the absence of an external control center (if the command vehicle is damaged)
                  1. -1
                    30 October 2018 18: 05
                    Offer, do not carry sacks, ... It's time to switch to high-precision ammunition for coastal artillery. UAVs perfectly serve as target designators and reconnaissance. That and the results will be different, there will be no need to make excuses in the form of "getting into a moving tank with a ZAP" but rather to "fire and forget", the rest will be done by corrected ammunition and aiming, - UAVs, aircraft, unmanned boat ...
                    1. +2
                      30 October 2018 18: 40
                      Quote: Vladimir 5
                      It's time to switch to high-precision ammunition for coastal artillery.

                      And they already have it - the army team.
                      And, PMSM, it is cheaper to make a new "Coast" on the basis of "Msta" than to convert the entire range of "vengeful" ammunition to 130-mm caliber with the inevitable loss of performance characteristics. And then also to establish their mass production.
              2. +5
                29 October 2018 17: 52
                Greetings, Andrey. I wondered for a long time when you will take up the continuation of your "sad" series in the part of the coastal complexes and still waited. Thank you. As always, I read it with pleasure. For a long time I have been tormented by one question: why the peninsular / island states, such as Malaysia, Taiwan, Cuba, will not be interested in acquiring the same "Coast", because it would seem that it is an ideal (and, what is important, cheap) option for protecting their coast. And if everything is clear with Cuba - there is simply no money to update the aircraft fleet, then why the same Thailand prefers to buy French Caesar self-propelled guns or Israeli Atmos (or vice versa, I write from memory - I can get it wrong) has always remained a mystery to me. Of course, foreign samples outperform the domestic complex due to the power of the 150+ mm projectile, but again they do not provide those opportunities for tracking and hitting sea targets, i.e. the main highlight that Soviet engineers put into their development, for which it was created in general and which, in theory, should be the most attractive for the island states. And let's be honest, the 130 mm charge is not so much inferior to its larger brothers (as far as can be judged from the Internet). Nevertheless "Bereg", despite all its uniqueness, remains on the balance sheet only of the Russian army.
                Personally, it seems to me that the main mistake of both the Russian army and modern Russian arms dealers was the positioning of the complex as a purely "niche" product with a very specific sphere of application - repelling sea threats. At the same time, the possibility of using the "Coast" as the main land-based ACS is completely silent. However, for the sake of truth, it is worth noting that I could not find either confirmation or denial of this kind of possibility. Purely logically, there should be no obstacles to such use of the A-222 product. Nevertheless, the fact of such an application of the complex is not advertised anywhere. At the same time, it seems that such an approach could largely attract the attention of foreign buyers, since the acquisition of one such art installation could immediately kill two birds with one stone, for a long time closing the issue of the domination of artillery both on land and on the water surface. The only options for explaining this situation, which I see, are in two positions:
                1. From the standpoint of our military and engineers, the use of the "Bereg" as a land-based ACS is comparable to using a microscope as a hammer - in principle, they can hammer in nails, but it is not advisable, primarily for economic reasons. This statement can most likely stem from the fact that the cost of one shot of the "Bereg" is still higher than the cost of a shot of the same "MSTA-S". I do not know if this is a matter of the projectile involved and embedded in the design of the radar or the resource of the barrel, I can only guess.
                2. The most impartial option for us, but personally for me it is still the most unrealistic. The "coast" still cannot work against ground targets. Practice itself opposes this theory, because nothing prevents the same AK-130 from firing at ground targets, even if its accuracy is significantly reduced (compared to land artillery) in view of the aggressive marine environment with its longitudinal and transverse waves. But this is if you take the AK-130. We are talking about its self-contained version, which means that these negative factors should also be leveled. Nevertheless, I have no other hypotheses that could explain why the emphasis is on "specialization" and not on "universalization" of the A-222 complex, although maybe Comrade Lopatov will come to my aid here. And maybe you, Andrey, have thoughts on this matter.
                1. -1
                  30 October 2018 19: 26
                  "A good idea comes afterward," so about the leadership of the USSR-RF Navy, - the caliber of 130mm in terms of impact power is DOUBLE the caliber of 155, and the opponents are promoting their versatility. keep all the developments at 130, they gave a strategic blunder ... Moreover, corrected ammunition for 130 mm is already available, and for 152 mm it will not appear soon ...
  5. +4
    29 October 2018 08: 13
    Thank you for the article . Barrel artillery will still be ore = pouring, that is Ak 222. on UDC will work at a time. One question, defense of Alik Berkov, do you have in view of EW and Aegis? but then something I suddenly thought, is there really armor protection.
    1. +2
      29 October 2018 11: 41
      Quote: Conductor
      One question, defense of Alik Berkov, do you have in view of EW and Aegis?

      Of course, we are talking about active and passive air defense systems :))) The armor was not delivered :)))
    2. +3
      29 October 2018 13: 55
      Quote: Conductor
      Barrel artillery will still be ore = pouring, that is Ak 222. on UDC will work at a time.

      He is zisty, but what can he give him? ©
      With a firing range of less than 25 km, "Bereg" only has to shoot landing boats. He simply cannot reach the UDC.
  6. +5
    29 October 2018 08: 20
    To date, the BRAV of the Russian Navy is likely to include 36 A-223 artillery systems, that is, six divisions.
    Probably still 6 batteries.
    1. +2
      29 October 2018 11: 44
      Yes, it is possible. Yesterday I wrote "division" on the machine, today I reread "the complex consists of six ..." that is, the organizational structure is not indicated. Probably still batteries
  7. 0
    29 October 2018 08: 26
    To solve the problems of combating the assault forces of a potential enemy, it would be nice to introduce ARS into the Berega's range of ammunition. And then 20 km for an amphibious group is actually close combat.
  8. +9
    29 October 2018 08: 40
    Apparently, BRAV owes its excellent condition to the deplorable condition of the crew. It is surprising that in Soviet times the BRAVs were in a very sad state, but ships of all possible classes flew off the assembly line like hot cakes. Today the situation is reversed - ships are piece goods, and BRAV is saturated with the most modern technology. It looks like this is a necessary measure. We cannot secure the distant sea zone, therefore the enemy will be close to our coast. Sad but true. But BRAV in this case becomes a very effective weapon. Bastion's attack is much more dangerous than a missile boat. The enemy may not even understand where the fire was coming from. it is much easier to hide a PU battalion on the shore than even the most inconspicuous boat off the coast. And at the same time "Bastion" can not detect itself by any radiation. Weapon for those who cannot build destroyers.
  9. +1
    29 October 2018 09: 30
    hi Thank. A bit of history.
    Of course, it was perfectly clear to the leadership of the USSR that the coastal forces needed much more advanced weapons, and they got it ....
  10. 0
    29 October 2018 09: 31
    The topic is very interesting and relevant. But the article contains too many so-called "highley like" (sorry, my Bavarian accent). Is it really that even the statistics are so closed, not to mention the performance characteristics? And a question for the artillerymen: compare the effectiveness of six (battery or battalion) A-222 "Coast" with six MLRS launchers?
    1. 0
      29 October 2018 10: 35
      Here it’s clear to the intelligent conscript, the efficiency of the Mtstrel’s shooter, that the effectiveness depends on the reliability and efficiency of reconnaissance, the control of fire from the KP (coastal, ship, air), and the reliability of the air defense system to secure the positions of the BRAV complex.
  11. +3
    29 October 2018 09: 58
    In 1966, the BRAV of the USSR adopted the coastal missile system (DBK) 4K44B "Redut"
    DBK 4K51 “Rubezh” was created to replace the “Sopka”, and was considered not as an operational-tactical (like “Redoubt”) but a tactical complex.
    ... the rearmament of the BRAV is in full swing, and the latest Bastion and Ball complexes are significantly superior to their predecessors in their combat capabilities.
    But the story about the main armament of the Russian Navy’s BRAV armament will be incomplete without mentioning its artillery component - the 130-mm coastal self-propelled artillery complex A-222 “Shore” ... hi
    1. +2
      29 October 2018 10: 12
      termites smoke as if they had been tanned by a solarium lol
    2. -2
      29 October 2018 10: 37
      As for the full speed, it is very doubtful. Especially considering the size of the KTOF coast and the number of airborne bridgeheads.
  12. 0
    29 October 2018 10: 18
    All hi ... Coastal art is not long-range. There are few surface ships. And why did everyone forget about the submarines. This is also a formidable weapon. If in the same Black or Barents, etc., near the coast there are 2-4 "Varshavyankas", the enemy can stumble very hard.
    1. 0
      29 October 2018 10: 33
      - forgot about the submarines. This is also a formidable weapon-

      There are three units of the Varshavyanka Project 877 at KSF and two at the KTOF. This is practically zero. Especially considering that their crews need to provide AB charge by making transitions to the areas allocated for this, plus ventilation of the compartments. Since the air regeneration system is chemical and not electrochemical as on nuclear boats, or boats with VNEU.
    2. +3
      29 October 2018 11: 46
      Quote: ksv36
      And why did everyone forget about submarines.

      Because they do not belong to BRAV sideways, and so we already disassembled them :)))
  13. -1
    29 October 2018 10: 30
    Given the widespread use of electronic warfare, the Bereg complex will be the most effective means of defeating naval targets. Provided that air defense systems are provided with the attached Buk, Tor, and MANPADS systems.
  14. -13
    29 October 2018 10: 41
    The mass of erroneous assumptions and assumptions is accompanied in the article by the same mass of incorrect numerical data. Hence the value of the "labor" of the amateur analyst is not at all.
    1. +12
      29 October 2018 11: 09
      Well, write another Yuri, or refute. There is nothing to be smart about it. A person really tries, digs, and you are here - "no. Article ...
    2. +10
      29 October 2018 11: 36
      Quote: Yuri Malyshko
      Hence, the value of the "labor" of the amateur analyst is none.

      Advise analysts better if it does not bother you.
      1. 0
        29 October 2018 13: 18
        There are unofficial data on the performance characteristics of non-export RCC.
        1. The range of the Kh-35U is 500 km, judging by the reservation of the fighter from the control cabin of the Ball, which was subsequently cut from the record.
        2. Onyx range - 1300 km judging by the advertising drawing of the new destroyer, because Onyx's silhouette cannot be confused with another rocket.

        And most likely its flight altitude, of the order of 25 km and a speed of 3,5M
  15. +3
    29 October 2018 11: 22
    the author did not find the P-35 reconnaissance capabilities most likely that they were not used at all, even if the creators declared them.
    P-35 has no possibility of target selection, despite the help of the operator.
    Proof of this is getting into the ship Vereshchagin Redutom during training firing.

    this incident, by the way, illustrates the complexity of over-the-horizon shooting of anti-ship missiles, even though the operator participated.
    A story about getting a P-35 into a BT Kherson Komsomolets also roams the Internet for the same reason.
    e.g. http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=1452
    1. +4
      29 October 2018 11: 49
      Quote: Avior
      P-35 has no possibility of target selection, despite the help of the operator.
      Proof of this is getting into the ship Vereshchagin Redutom during training firing.

      Honestly, I do not see evidence at all here. The steamboat climbed into the missile firing area and it would be possible to talk about no selection only knowing the parameters of the steamer and the target that the rocket was supposed to hit
      1. 0
        29 October 2018 12: 09
        I'm just about that. reconnaissance involves the selection of targets, but the p-35 did not allow this.
        After all, the parameters of the goal should have been known.
      2. +1
        29 October 2018 12: 18
        in any case, the operator should at least see that there are more goals than expected.
        1. +3
          29 October 2018 14: 39
          Quote: Avior
          I'm just about that. intelligence involves target selection, and p-35 did not allow this

          Selection was carried out by EPR, this is obvious, and here, I repeat, in order to talk about poor selection, you need to know the parameters of the target. Because, as far as I know, missile targets are just like a merchant ship.
          Quote: Avior
          in any case, the operator should at least see that there are more goals than expected.

          Depends on the shooting conditions, that is, how accurately the operator knew the location of the target. By the way, here the operator could well be mistaken, and attack the first target seen.
  16. -3
    29 October 2018 11: 28
    frankly, for Russia all this is simply not necessary, since no idiot would ever think of openly attacking the shores of a large nuclear country, and even if it does, aviation will be much more effective for repelling.
    This was perfectly understood in the USSR, therefore, the coastal troops were held rather for show.
    1. +5
      29 October 2018 14: 02
      I remember China, although it did not carry out a landing, but there was more than one battle with the border guards .... And with Georgia, the shots got tired .... So everything can be .... Well, the rule "if you want peace, prepare for war" no one canceled ...
    2. 0
      30 October 2018 10: 51
      I, as an ardent stronghold of strategic nuclear forces, nevertheless believe that a certain number of non-nuclear weapons is necessary, so would you start to strike an SSA with a nuclear strike for clear and undisguised aggression in SYRIA and Ukraine? that in the fleet you still need to have several frigates for peacetime conflicts
  17. +2
    29 October 2018 16: 29
    Though somewhere the condition is not critical, it pleases me.
  18. +1
    29 October 2018 18: 36
    Despite the seemingly low speed that emerged from under the radio horizon (that is, 25-30 km from the destroyer), the X-35 missile will hit the target in just 1,5-2 minutes - and this is very little even by the standards of modern combat information systems. Of course, one or several such Aegis missiles are capable of intercepting, but two or three dozen ...

    To shoot at the ship with 30 missiles, in my opinion too much, not a single air defense can stand. And if you need to destroy several goals?
  19. +1
    29 October 2018 18: 39
    Deletant's question. I heard about the coastal version of the MLRS. Grad exactly but it seems that there were later ones too. Why the article is not voiced. "Coast" is described but no MLRS? The purpose is the same, the shelling of the landing vehicles.
  20. +1
    29 October 2018 22: 47
    By the way, interesting footage "The Bastion coastal missile system in action: an attack on the positions of terrorists in Syria"
  21. +1
    30 October 2018 00: 29
    Not so sad ... It is clear if we consider everything designated "narrowly", but if it is complex and from the interaction of forces, means and troops - the picture will change. Maybe not all denyuzhki are available, but in the complex - the country's defense is already powerful enough, believe me. Something was modernized and the capabilities began to overlap with outdated weapons. Something was simply replaced and thereby ensured the fulfillment of tasks that were solved by many components of forces and means earlier. Yes, and the tasks themselves, probably, were revised to suit the current situation: only the least is needed, where previously a lot was needed ... It is clear that not everything is visible from the outside, but if you go deeper, there are enough opportunities to protect the country.
  22. 0
    30 October 2018 02: 19
    To date, the BRAV of the Russian Navy is likely to include 36 A-223 artillery systems, that is, six divisions.

    So much? Recently, it seems (2-3 a year ago) wrote that there is only one division, experimental.
  23. +2
    30 October 2018 02: 54
    All of this, like ships, missiles, planes, could have been more, but all this in monetary terms lies on Panamanian and other offshore accounts, Roldugin, Kolbin, Rotenberg, Timchenko and other Putin’s homies.
  24. -3
    30 October 2018 07: 51
    There is only pissimism in the article. These articles are only from open sources. It’s just that the KAUG is afraid of our coastal systems. The range of the missiles is completely different. These are secret data. If you call them, they will come from me. Do I know how to say it? RSMD? Laughter. So the article is for chob to reassure them. The article is rubbish. So open sources for the FSA. Only amateurs discuss this article. For professionals this is a feuilleton. Dear Andrei, no one laughs at you. Well done, what are you writing. You have a beautiful presentation. But not to sit in a puddle, consult. Although it’s difficult for you to do this. Tell the truth in the article? It’s too wide. You just don’t taste. No offense.
    1. +2
      30 October 2018 14: 29
      Quote: VLADIMIR VLADIVOSTOK
      For professionals it’s a feuilleton

      Do professionals write anything themselves?
    2. +2
      31 October 2018 08: 07
      Why are you so spoiled by the Russian language? What did he do to you?
  25. +2
    30 October 2018 09: 14
    The judgment about the benefits of the INF Treaty for the Russian Federation is erroneous in principle. The country with the world's longest coastline and weakened shipbuilding and aircraft manufacturing has put itself in a losing position for the myth of the possible joy of Atlantist compliments such as Bush's legs. However, there are ways to bypass the restrictions, and it is in the field of BRAV of the Russian Navy. One has only to put BRAV on amphibious platforms or on towed barges, but for some reason this is not done. Amphibious platforms can be, for example, hovercraft, self-propelled, or towed from water or land. But in any case, the BRAV missiles should cover the range of AUG + 150 km aviation (the launch range of gliding bombs, including new American atomic bombs). Only in this case the updated BRAV will be able to protect our shores and bases of the Russian Navy. Now their options are limited. That is, now they must act on targets from distances of 1500-2000 km, and not up to 500 km.
  26. -1
    30 October 2018 10: 29
    Thanks to Andrei for an interesting and relevant article, coastal complexes are an effective and safe solution for personal sotava defense of their shores in the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet, as well as bases and ports in the Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet. Thanks to Andrei for the correct remark about the vulnerability of surface ships, and therefore about the need to transfer almost all the functions of surface ships to coastal assets, coastal aviation and submarines
  27. 0
    30 October 2018 20: 06
    "The Coast" is a masterpiece. Somewhere I found an article about the plight of the production association "Barricades", which produced (?) These complexes. An article in the spirit of "a voice crying in the wilderness" that there are no salaries, no orders, and the complex has been made and perfected on the sheer enthusiasm of brilliant workers, whom no one even really thanked. Can anyone give an answer - A-222 can be produced now, there are specialists, power and designer left? Or is that what is? There was an "authoritative" opinion of the media that the "Coalition" would replace everything, including "Bereg". But this is heresy. Small nimble landing ships "Coast" will click like nuts, and land equipment ("Coast" was created by naval specialists) can only hit barges. Sorry for the categorical nature and opinion of the average person, but now it is customary to hide a lot and present the desired successes as real, but in fact, all funding evaporates like rain in the desert, and everywhere.
  28. 0
    31 October 2018 13: 50
    Quote: VLADIMIR VLADIVOSTOK
    There is only pissimism in the article. These articles are only from open sources. It’s just that the KAUG is afraid of our coastal systems. The range of the missiles is completely different. These are secret data. If you call them, they will come from me. Do I know how to say it? RSMD? Laughter. So the article is for chob to reassure them. The article is rubbish. So open sources for the FSA. Only amateurs discuss this article. For professionals this is a feuilleton. Dear Andrei, no one laughs at you. Well done, what are you writing. You have a beautiful presentation. But not to sit in a puddle, consult. Although it’s difficult for you to do this. Tell the truth in the article? It’s too wide. You just don’t taste. No offense.

    It is precisely for such cases that an FAQ should be made on all frequently encountered questions to the series "The Russian Navy" ... Although for this case, judging by the text (this part is "straight AGON" hi ) - "This is secret data. If you name them, then they will come from the organs by me. We need a little more before evil people come." - The FAQ will not help much. No offense. hi

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