Military Review

Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 6. Corvettes

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In the previous article of the cycle, we completed the analysis of the state of the domestic underwater fleet. Now move on to the surface.


Studying the capabilities of our SSBN, MAPL, DEPL and this strange EGSONPO, we paid special attention to the ability of the Russian Navy to solve its most important strategic task, namely the task of delivering a large-scale and crushing nuclear attack on the aggressor country. For this, the fleet must have modern types of SSBNs and ballistic missiles for submarines, and, in addition, must ensure the strategic stability of strategic missile submarines before they use nuclear weapons.

Therefore, we will begin the description of surface ships with light forces destined for operations in the near-sea zone and capable of assisting other forces in ensuring the security of the deployment areas of SSBNs. In other words, in this article we will talk about corvettes.

First, a little stories. In the USSR, anti-submarine defense in the near-sea zone was engaged in patrol ships, as well as small anti-submarine ships, and boats. TFRs were represented by a very successful project 1135 and its modifications.



In the standard 2 810 displacement, domestic designers were able to fit the stationary SAS MG-332 Titan-2 quite good for its time, towed by the SAS MG-325 Vega, and the most powerful anti-submarine armament, which included a quad anti-submarine rocket launcher aerial module aerial package aerial control unit, which included a quad anti-aircraft missile system, a quad missile system, and a powerful anti-submarine armament, which included a quad anti-submarine aerial control unit. "Blizzard", two four-pipe torpedo tubes and bomb-bombs. In addition, the ships had a pair of self-defense SAMs Osa-M and two twin 4-mm units. These ships received gas turbine chassis and were deservedly loved by sailors for their reliability, high combat and seaworthiness. In total, the USSR built the 76 ship for the 21 project and another 1135 - for the improved 11M project, and, in addition, the 1135 ships were built under the 7 "Nerey" project for the border guards of the KGB of the USSR, whose anti-submarine capabilities were weakened, but which, if necessary, also Could be brought to the TLO water areas.

Small anti-submarine ships were presented:

Project 1124: very good for its time ships.



Of course, in the standard 830 tonnage it was impossible to place a powerful gas generator (the famous Polynom just weighed about 800 tonnes), but the IPC still had two sonar stations with an antenna and a lowered antenna, and four 533 as the main anti-submarine armament mm torpedoes It is unlikely that the individual search capabilities of the IPC struck the imagination, but this was bathed by their multiplicity - starting with 1970, 37 ships of this type entered the USSR fleet. The IPCs turned out to be quite successful, and therefore, starting with 1982, their advanced versions were put up - under the 1124M and 1124М projects, the 31 ship was built. They received more sophisticated airborne systems, and with the same main armament (two two-pipe torpedo tubes) and somewhat enhanced self-defense armament — the advanced Osa-MA system (and not Osa-M on the 1124 project ships), 76-mm (and not 57-mm) machine gun, AK-30M 630-mm “metal cutter”. And besides this, one IPC was built on the project 1124K, on ​​which the OSA “Osa” was replaced by the “Dagger”. In total, the Navy of the USSR received the 69, 1124M / MU, and K projects. 1124 ships. As in the case with the 1135 project guard ships, these IPCs “liked” the KGB, which had built a certain amount for the protection of the USSR sea borders. But, since they did not belong to the navy, we will not take into account the “KGB fleet”.

Project 1331M: these ships were designed in the GDR, with the help of Zelenodolsk PKB.



In general, the ships were not very successful and were inferior to the IPC family 1124. Nevertheless, the composition of the fleet of the USSR replenished 12 IPC of this type

The ships of the above projects had a standard displacement of more than 800 tons, but then we will consider the BMDs where they are smaller, to 450 tonnes, so it makes sense to classify them as anti-submarine boats (although in the USSR Navy they were considered to be IPC)

Project 11451: a very original project of the 320-ton ship on hydrofoils.



According to the developers, he had to quickly go to the area where the submarine was spotted, search for it with the help of the MNNXX-1 Star (MG-01) smashed and destroy, for which he was armed with four 369-mm torpedoes. It was considered extremely useful for the Black Sea, before the collapse of the Union, they managed to build 400 of such boats

The 12412 project was an anti-submarine version of a missile boat with a standard 420 tonnage.



Received the Bronze SJS with a podkilny and low-towed antennas, 4 * 400-mm torpedoes, 76-mm and 30-mm artillery systems. For the Navy of the USSR, 16 of such ships was built (another 20 - for the KGB of the USSR).

So, the 32 patrol ship (excluding the KGB ships), the 81 small anti-submarine ship and the 18 IPC, which we decided to consider anti-submarine boats, and the total - 131 ship, were commissioned in the USSR. The author of this article does not have data on how many of them are left in the fleet today, but as of 1 in December 2015 g in the composition of the Russian Navy was listed as:

The patrol ships of the project 1135 / 1135М - 2 units: "Ladny" and "Inquisitive"

IPC project 1124 / 1124М: respectively 2 and 18 units.

IPC project 1331M - 7 units.

Anti-submarine boats - not at all.

And all - 29 ships.

The Russian fleet also includes two patrol ships of the 11540 project (Fearless and Yaroslav the Wise) and the last singing frigate of the 01090 Smetliy, but according to the author, they are more of a frigate, rather than to corvettes, and in this article will not be considered.

Obviously, the capabilities of the PLO surface forces, as compared with the times of the late USSR, have decreased by a factor of several. But the problem, in essence, is not even the fact that the number of domestic anti-submarine ships decreased by 4,5 times. Even if, by magic, they suddenly returned today to the ranks of the fleet, their effectiveness against modern means of submarine warfare, such as the submarines of the 4 generation, could not be high. Being commissioned before the collapse of the USSR, they would today have a very respectable age of about 30 years and more, and in any case, in the very near future, it would be a time of rest.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the state program of armaments on 2011-2020 was planned to build as many 35 corvettes. And, undoubtedly, such an ambitious number of warships in the coastal zone could indeed largely restore the surface PLO component of our Navy.

However, this did not happen.

HPV-2011-2020 assumed the commissioning of six corvettes of the project 20380 and twelve - the project 20385, and then the transition to the construction of ships of a new type. Such plans were fully justified, because, first, the development of the 20380 technical design was completed in 2001, which was already distant, so that by the end of the LG-2011-2020 ship was not the last word of naval science and technology. And secondly, the 20380 project and its upgraded version of 20385 can hardly be called successful ships.

Since in the past we have already described the shortcomings of this project, this time we will limit ourselves to a brief listing of them.

The first drawback - weapons, inadequate tasks of the corvette. First, the ships are simply overloaded with weapons, although for the sake of justice, we note that the founder of the series, the corvette Steregushchy, was least affected by this lack. Moreover, a helicopter, eight anti-ship missiles “Uran-U”, ZRAK “Kortik-M”, 100-mm AU and two 30-mm “metal cutters”, along with eight tubes of the small-size torpedo complex “Package-NK”, looked quite reasonable in the standard displacement 1 800 t. In general, it was a fairly balanced ship with universal weapons. It would look very well as an export ship for the third world countries, but in terms of its combat capabilities it didn’t meet the needs of the Russian Navy.

“Uranus” was too weak to use the corvette as a strike ship, and generally the use of a sufficiently large, but not too high-speed (27) ship node in this capacity causes great doubts. But there is no doubt that the main enemy of our corvettes will be enemy submarines, and the “Steregushchy” carries quite powerful (for its size) hydroacoustic complexes for their detection. But at the same time, the corvette is deprived of some adequate anti-submarine armament: the Pack-NK installed on it is rather an anti-torpedoing than anti-submarine complex: although its 324-mm torpedoes can attack enemy boats at a distance of 20 km, but their speed is makes only 30 nodes, although the maximum speed of torpedoes of this complex is 50 knots. An air defender of the “Steregushchy” would be sufficient provided that the Kortika-M was brought to working condition (there is information that the complex had problems with both the missile defense system and the artillery target before the attack with its missiles) or replace it with a naval variant "Shell".

Alas, the development of the 20380 corvettes went completely the other way - they tried to install the Redoubt anti-aircraft missile system on the ship. Of course, there was no possibility to put on the ship of such a small displacement a multifunctional Polimer radar, which was supposed to carry out fire control of this air defense system. As a result, the task of issuing target designation and correction of missiles in flight (until the moment when their homing head captures the target) was attempted to entrust to the full-time general-purpose radar "Furke-2", which is not intended for this at all. According to some, unverified data, today, some kind of effective management of missiles is provided by the Puma radar control of artillery fire, but this is not certain.

With the improvement of the corvette on the 20385 project, its armament underwent significant changes: two light four-barreled anti-ship missiles Uran-U were replaced with a vertical launcher for eight Caliber missiles, and the number of Reduta cells was brought to 16 (on 20380 ships, their It was 12), in addition, to control the SAMs used a new radar. Anti-submarine capabilities also increased to a certain extent, because the family of Caliber cruise missiles also includes missile-torpedoes (91Р1 and 91РТ2). But the “admiral revolt” began here, because with such weapons the cost of the 20385 corvettes reached the price of frigates of the “admiral” series (the 11356Р project) which was completely unacceptable. The corvette should be relatively cheap to be massive, otherwise there is no point in creating ships of this class. Moreover, in their combat capabilities, seaworthiness, range, the 11356Р frigates left the 20385 corvettes far behind.



The second drawback is the use of a diesel power plant. The fact is that of the four types of power plants: atomic, gas turbine, steam turbine and diesel, the shipbuilders of the USSR mastered the first two perfectly. There was not much point in creating diesel engines for any large surface combatant ships, and without that, the Soviet Navy had enough problems with the different types of weapons and equipment. Moreover, ship diesel engines are surprisingly difficult, one can say that in the world only Germans and Finns have succeeded in such diesel engines. However, for the corvettes of the project 20380 adopted diesel power plant. Understanding that you should not count on your own strength, we assumed to equip domestic warships with German diesel engines from MTU. But, after the introduction of sanctions, the use of the brainchild of the “gloomy Teutonic genius” had to be abandoned and switched to the products of the national Kolomna plant. In which diesel engines for electric locomotives are not bad, but their ship "products" essentially lose to the German ones in terms of reliability.

In general, it can be stated that the 20380 / 20385 corvettes of the XVUMX / 20380 corvettes suitable for mass construction, reliable “horses” for the coastal seas did not work out. Unsuccessful choice of weapons, inactive anti-aircraft missile system, unreliable running gear ... And after all, it cannot be said that the project had absolutely no merits. The designers managed to solve a very nontrivial task of placing a helicopter hangar on a ship of such a small displacement, to provide reduced radar visibility to place very numerous sonar weapons ... but all this, alas, did not make the 20385 / XNUMX corvettes successful.

To date, there are five corvettes of the 20380 project, including the “Steregushchy” (transferred to the fleet even before the launch of the LG 2011-2020). Five more corvettes are in various stages of construction, while the “Loud” will obviously be ready in 2018 g, the rest are expected in 2019-2021. As for the 20385 project, only two ships of this type, the Thunder, were laid. and "Agile" - they must replenish the fleet in 2018-2019.

On this construction of the corvettes of the 20380 / 20385 family is likely to be completed. True, the press expressed an opinion (RIA News, 2015 d) that at least six ships of this type will be built for the Pacific Fleet, for which two more ships should have been laid at the Amur Shipbuilding Plant, but due to the fact that 2018 d was already in the yard, and the bookmarks did not take place most likely they will not. Thus, the composition of the Navy will not replenish 18, as originally planned for the LG 2011-2020, but only 12 corvettes project 20380 / 20385. The only plus in all this is only one - there are very good chances that most of them will indeed join the fleet before 2020 g, and the rest will be operational at the beginning of the 20's. This century.

Apparently, patrol ships of the 20380 project were called to somehow remedy the situation with the failed 22160. But these ships either suffered greatly from an ill-conceived design specification, or they (they have such a feeling) were simply offered at the right time and place.

For the umpteenth time, the developers tried to tie a horse and a quivering doe in one harness. On the one hand, the ship’s displacement needed to be reduced to reduce the cost of construction, but on the other hand, the catastrophic situation with large surface ships required to provide seaworthiness sufficient for operations outside the seas washing the shores of the Russian Federation. As a result, the patrol ships of the 22160 project received a displacement in 1 300 t and 60 days of autonomy, as well as seaworthiness sufficient for the far sea zone (the combination of the above in one ship is more than doubtful, but ...) As you can see, the tasks of the Black Sea ships of this type will include a demonstration of the flag in the Mediterranean.

At the same time, the ships were originally designed for the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia. Their staff weapons, X-NUMX-3 “Bending” air defense missile system (in fact, the turret for Strela MANPADS), 47-mm gun mounts, a pair of 57-mm machine guns and a DP-14,5 grenade launcher complex designed to destroy combat swimmers look quite reasonable for a patrolman, whose task is the protection of territorial waters in peacetime and the detention of violators, but it is absolutely not suitable for a warship in wartime. And the patrol ship of the 65 project does not carry any more weapons.

More precisely, bears, but how? Free space is provided in the stern of the ship.


Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 6. Corvettes


There you can install several standard cargo containers with weapons placed in them - for example, Caliber cruise missiles, or a mine-complex, or ...

Only there is one problem - as of today, nothing is known about any container complexes other than Caliber. But it is known that the armed forces of the Russian Federation have not purchased a single container complex. Probably, the ships of the 22160 project will have to temporarily resemble without “container” weapons ... that's just nothing more permanent than temporary.

And after all, what a shame - the patrol ships of the 22160 project have very well-developed sonar weapons. These are both the stationary GAK MGK-335EM-03, and GAS with the towed Vignette-EM antenna. There is a hangar (although it looks very narrow) and a helicopter. Throw away all these “flexible” and 57-mm gun mounts with machine guns, put the naval version of the Shell, the usual torpedo tube, and the same “Package-NK” and you would have a great small anti-submarine ship with a standard 1 ton displacement, in which so needs today the Russian fleet ...

... although, probably, still would not have turned out. Because the ships of the 22160 project are equipped with a combined power plant, in which high speed is provided by gas turbines, but the economic move is still the same diesel engines, and on the first ship of the series, Vasily Bykov, German diesel engines from MAN were installed. In other words, six ships that can search for submarines, but cannot destroy them, because they do not have anti-submarine weapons, will go into service with the Russian Navy.

“But wait, what about the helicopter?” The attentive reader will ask. True, the ship has a helicopter, but as far as the author of the article knows, usually a search for enemy submarines is carried out by a pair of helicopters - while one searches, the second carries ammunition to destroy the detected submarines. If there is no second helicopter, then the defeat of the discovered submarine is assigned to the ship - for this, BOD of the USSR was carried by long-range missile-torpedoes. But at the same time carry a sufficient ammunition, and a helicopter can not search for submarines. Therefore, a rather strange method of combat with submarines will be available for the patrol ship; while the ship searches for submarines by its own means, the helicopter is on duty in readiness for takeoff with suspended armament. However, taking into account the short distance of submarine detection and a long reaction time (the helicopter will take off so far), it may easily turn out that there will be no place for the helicopter to return.

Today, six patrol ships of the 22160 project have been laid, the latter, “Nikolay Sipyagin”, 13 in January 2018. Considering that the head “Vasily Bykov”, being laid down in 2014 g, has not yet been commissioned, we can assume that The series will be built before 2022 - 2023.

It can be stated that the 20380, 20385 and 22160 projects do not meet the requirements of the Russian Navy. And therefore 28 in October 2016 r. At the Northern shipyard was laid the corvette of the new project 20386 “Daring”. It was supposed to be the “work on the mistakes” of previous projects and give the fleet the “workhorse” it needs so much. What kind of ship this time turned out?

Tasks Corvette Project 20386:

1. Protection of maritime communications within the mile economic zone 200.

2. Opposition to the ships of a probable enemy at any distance from the fleet bases.

3. Ensuring a steady air defense of the ships' connections against air strikes.

4. Search, detection and destruction of submarines in a given area.

5. Providing air defense and fire support amphibious operations.

What catches your eye? First, the corvette of the 20386 project ... has ceased to be a corvette, because with a displacement in 3 400 t (unknown, however, standard or full), this ship can be called anything but the corvette.

According to the author of this article, the following happens. For a long time in the Russian Federation, design offices were on the verge of survival, and were ready to do anything for the sake of budget funds, and the fleet was in dire need of full-fledged warships, but had no opportunity to pay for them. As a result, there appeared a competition of “miracle ships” - in the struggle for financing, the designers tried to shove maximum armament into the minimum displacement and vied with each other to offer the missile cruiser to the displacement of the missile boat. The consequence of this was that our first projects — the 20380 corvette and the 22350 frigate — were re-equipped with a lack of displacement. However, in fact, the cost of a modern ship determines its equipment - the hull itself costs little, so there was no point in saving pennies and creating low-seagoing frigates (these were the 20386 corvettes). As a result, the only truly successful ship project was the frigates of the 11356 project, which became an improved version of the Talvars, designed for the Indian Navy based on the famous 1135 SCR, which the designers did to create an effective warship, rather than trying to cram into the minimum size.

Now everything is gradually returning to normal: for example, the sailors do not want to continue the series of frigates of the 22350 project, but they want to get a much larger ship based on it (we will talk about the 22350М project later). And the same thing happens with corvettes.

The author of this article is not a shipbuilding engineer, but in the drawings of the 20386 project corvettes do not look equal to 11356 frigates.



Therefore, most likely, their standard displacement is about 2 800 t, a little more or less, and the full one is 3 400 t. Thus, we can say that we refuse corvettes as a class and return to the idea of ​​the 1135 project 2 (whose displacement just was 810 2 t) on a new technological base. We plan to build relatively small, but well-armed ships, seaworthy enough to make inter-theater crossings if necessary and be present, say, in the same Mediterranean Sea. In fact, in its functionality, the new ships will replace both the classic corvettes (ships of the order of 000 4 t) and, to a large extent, frigates (of the order of 000 22350 of t). The remaining "frigate" functions will be taken over by the destroyers - and the ships that are planned to be built according to the XNUMX project, regardless of what they are called, are destroyers.

What has changed in comparison with the previous types of corvettes? Fundamental changes have affected the power plant of the ship. Instead of diesel engines, the 20386 Corvette of the project received a combined gas-turbine installation with partial electric propulsion, which consists of two M90FR gas-turbine engines rated for 27500 hp. and two main electric motors with 2200 horsepower, hp. In other words, the electric propulsion of the ship will be ensured by the electric motors, and the gas turbines will provide full power.

The advantage of this decision is that we are finally moving away from diesel engines and gradually introduce electric propulsion on warships. Theoretically, this is a very advanced technology that offers us many benefits: the ability of an electric motor to quickly change speed, and even the direction of rotation of the propeller allows us to make a ship with electric motors very maneuverable. But the main advantage is that the electric movement (at least potentially) provides minimal noise, which would be a huge advantage for the anti-submarine ship.

It must be said that in the USSR and the Russian Federation the electric movement was not something unknown - it was used on icebreakers and auxiliary ships, but for reasons unknown to the author, it was not used on surface warships. If such a scheme turns out to be successful on the 20386 corvette, then it will most certainly be used on ships of other classes, at least the mention of partial electric propulsion for the destroyer Leader was in print.

The armament of the new corvette largely repeats the ships of the 20380 project. The air defense system is provided by the same “Redoubt” air defense missile system, only the cells will not be 12, but 16 (as on 20385 corvettes). But now they will be managed by a completely new multifunctional radar complex (MF RLC) Zaslon, which is a real highlight of the project.

What is MF RLC "Barrier"? Most of all, it resembles a cross between the American AN / SPY-1 and the British SAMPSON, installed on destroyers of the Daring type. Four phased arrays give the similarity to the American complex, deployed in such a way as to collectively provide an overview of 360 degrees around the ship.

But the American radar was one, not the best feature. He worked in the decimeter range of radio waves, which allowed him to see very high (including objects in near space) and far, but decimeter radar poorly sees low-flying objects, because the latter are on the background of the underlying surface (sea). On the other hand, radars operating in the centimeter range do an excellent job of looking at low-flying targets, but not as good as decimeter targets are controlling high-flying ones. In the Soviet navy, this problem was solved in the following way - survey radars were decimeter, and to control what was flying over the waves, they used a separate, specially designed for this purpose, Podkat radar.

The British in their radar simply combined two in one - their SAMPSON has both decimeter and centimeter grids, while the decimeter provides a general overview, and centimeter - control low-flying targets. This technology brought the destroyer "Daring" the glory of the best air defense ship of all times and peoples.

MF RLC "Barrier" works in a similar way. It also has decimeter and centimeter range radar systems, the principle of which corresponds to the British radar. It is known that the complex controlling the centimeter range uses AFAR.

"Barrier" can still very much. So, for example, the complex is able to conduct not only active, but also passive search, focusing on the radiation of the enemy's electronic systems - in this mode, Barrier is able to detect and track more than 100 targets at a distance of 300 km. Moreover, the complex is able to put active radar interference, and manage passive interference. MF RLC "Barrier" is also versatile in that it can control not only the missile weapons of the Redut air defense system, but also the artillery of the ship. It goes without saying that, within sight, the Zaslon can also provide target designation for an anti-ship missile, and in addition, it provides information support for external weapons systems, such as a ship-based helicopter or an outside fighter.

The only drawback of the “Zaslon” MF RLC is a very moderate range - the target “sees” 1 km with the EPR in a square meter this complex “sees” at a distance of 75 km. This is not a very good result. Although, of course, the developers' claims that SAMPSON is able to see a pigeon (0,008 sq. M) at a distance of 105 km are most likely a publicity stunt (i.e., the British radar can do it, but in ideal conditions, and in such a mode that it will never be used in the usual scanning of space), but still it should be understood that the MF RLK Zaslon is much inferior to the British radar in terms of detection range. On the other hand, we need to understand that we are creating, in essence, the patrol ship and pushing at it “not having any dialogues in the world” weapons and equipment blocking (or at least equal) with what the world's best destroyers of air defense do not need.

An interesting question is: where did this MF RLC “Barrier” come from? Who managed in such a short time to solve all the issues that "torment" the Poliment radar of similar purpose, preventing the entry into operation of the head frigate of project 22350? It turned out that this was the work of the Zaslon Scientific and Technical Center, a developer of on-board electronic equipment for aviation Russian Aerospace Forces, including for the Mig-31BM. The author of this article suggests that against the backdrop of the catastrophic air defenses of the new corvettes, the Zaslon Research and Development Center was able to offer a quick solution based on radars of modernized 4th generation combat aircraft (and even using AFAR). If MF RLC “Zaslon” will work on a regular basis, then this will be a huge breakthrough even if “Polement” proves to be a complete failure. In any case, at the Barrier many necessary technologies will be worked out (for example, such as "transferring" the control of missiles and the object attacked by it from one lattice to another) on which, according to rumors, the "Polyment" stumbled.

The rest of the armament ship project 20386 is consistent with the previous series of corvettes. These are two four-pipe installations of the Uran-U anti-ship missile missile, the missile's range is 260 km. In terms of its combat capabilities, the rocket is similar to the latest modifications of the “Harpoons” which is more than enough to counter the enemy’s light forces. The launchers themselves are located near the superstructure behind the shields that open only before launching the missiles, which is done to minimize the ship's ESR. The artillery is represented by the 100-mm installation, which is the minimum "gentleman standard" that allows you to talk about the ability of the 20386 corvette to support the landing force, as well as a pair of 30-mm AK-630M (information that the ship will receive much less rapid-firing AK-306 probably still erroneous), torpedoes - the omnipresent 324-mm package-NK complex. There will be a new corvette and a helicopter with its hangar. And besides, for unclear reasons, on the corvette of the 20386 project, as well as on 22160, they placed free space for the placement of container weapons.



In theory, it will, in which case, drastically enhance strike or anti-submarine weapons, or, in addition to the helicopter, deploy a number of UAVs. In addition, the presence of side lazportov allows the use of lightweight speedboats (for example, for throwing sabotage groups in the rear of the enemy) or, more importantly, the placement of unmanned anti-mine devices.

Unfortunately, with all the advantages mentioned above, there are a lot of questions regarding the arming of the 20386 project.

Firstly, it is completely unclear why domestic developers ignore such powerful anti-submarine weapons, like 533-mm torpedoes, which would be very much in demand if an enemy submarine was detected in 15-20 km from the corvette. It seems that the 533-mm torpedo would be the weapon that could destroy the submarine at a distance at which the corvette is able to detect it. As a result, in the current configuration (ie, with the “Package-NK”), the 20386 project's corvette is clearly under-armed against the underwater threat - the submarines, which it will have to look for, have much more powerful means of destruction than he does. Secondly, the modularity of armament led to the unjustified complication of the ship design. There is a hangar on the corvette, but it is underdeck, i.e. Each ships of this type will have to complete helicopter, like an aircraft carrier. And this entails a significant complexity of the design. And, of course, its appreciation.

In the published annual report of PJSC Shipbuilding Plant Severnaya Verf (St. Petersburg) for 2016 a year the cost of a corvette of the project 20380 (“Reactive”) is 17 244 760 rubles. , the cost of the new ship has again come close, or it has already surpassed the frigates of the “admiral” series, while the fighting qualities ... may have become better in terms of air defense, but definitely worse in terms of anti-submarine warfare.

All this raises doubts that the corvette of the 20386 project will become the “workhorse” of the fleet. It is likely that the Russian Navy will need a new type of corvette ...

But even if not, although the fleet showed interest in ten such ships, but according to plans up to 2025, it is planned to commission three such corvettes.

So, in the USSR, the near sea zone PLO was provided by 131 TFR and IPC. Today, their 34: 29 old, still Soviet times, and 5 new corvettes project 20380. By 2025 g, when ships of Soviet construction will retire or lose combat significance, the Russian Navy will have a 21 ship of the corvette class of four (!) Different types of which 6 ships of the 22160 project do not carry onboard anti-submarine weapons.

One more thing. All six ships of the project 22160 designed for the Black Sea. Of the ten corvettes of the 20380 project, six are planned to be based in the Baltic and four are to be handed over to the Pacific Fleet. Both corvette project 20385 go to the Pacific Fleet. And only 20386 designed for the Northern Fleet.

In other words, by 2025, the safety of deploying SSBNs will be ensured by six corvettes in the Far East and as many as three in the northern seas ...

To be continued ...

Previous articles of the cycle:
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future
Russian Navy. A sad look to the future (part of 2)
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 3. "Ash" and "Husky"
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 4. "Halibut" and "Lada"
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 5. Specialty boats and this weird EGSONPO
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  1. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 30 January 2018 06: 46
    10
    Greetings, Andrew! hi Project 22160 is called official anti-piracy, because they are intended for the World Cup to display the flag in the Mediterranean Sea and fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden.
    I agree with you, because all this fuss with heaps of various projects is likely not from the fact that the admirals do not know what they want, but from a banal lack of funds! yes
    Admirals still remember the capabilities of the USSR in comparison with which the capabilities of Russia today indecently fade, therefore it is more likely that from this realization there is a desire to get the maximum benefits from the minimum opportunities. The only visible way out today is the notorious universalism sad
    Morality - Hello to Capitalism laughing
    1. The Siberian barber
      The Siberian barber 30 January 2018 10: 34
      0
      I’ll insert 3 kopecks, I’m sorry .. hi

      ... I agree with you, because all this fuss with heaps of various projects is likely not from the fact that the admirals do not know what they want, but from a banal lack of funds! ...

      According to sound logic, when there is an acute shortage of funds, you need to clearly prioritize and strictly follow them, and not try to sit with one ass, on several chairs, at once)) this principle works both in our everyday life and in solving more global issues.

      ... Admirals still remember the capabilities of the USSR in comparison with which the capabilities of Russia are indecently fading today, because it is more likely that from this realization there is a desire to get the maximum benefits from the minimum opportunities. The only visible way out today is the notorious universalism ..

      Kohl, our naval commanders have such a "long" memory, then in any case, they must remember that "Venigret" (with all the "charms") of which the USSR Fleet consisted
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 30 January 2018 16: 40
        +3
        Quote: The Siberian Barber
        According to sound logic, when there is an acute shortage of funds, you need to clearly prioritize and strictly follow them, and not try to sit with one ass, on several chairs, at once)) this principle works both in our everyday life and in solving more global issues.

        Well, yes, prioritize when a bunch of mouths pretend to be a fat cake, because everyone wants to eat wink Then we’ll see what you say when they give you some money in fact, for example, for one vessel, and you understand that you need to cover three directions with this ship ... So, set your priorities smile
        Quote: The Siberian Barber
        Kohl, our naval commanders have such a "long" memory, then in any case, they must remember that "Venigret" (with all the "charms") of which the USSR Fleet consisted

        At least the USSR had a Fleet and specialization was, as described by the author.
        And the “vinigret,” as you write, arose only because “thanks to” the flaws of the system (and any system has flaws), sober-minded views were hushed up in favor of ideological ones. But then, at least, on any of the fleets, a squadron of PLO ships could go to sea to complete the task. Today scratch at least one ????
        That's the same ....
        1. The Siberian barber
          The Siberian barber 30 January 2018 23: 04
          +1
          ... And the "vinigret", as you write, arose only because "thanks to" the flaws of the system (and any system has flaws), sober-minded views were hushed up in favor of the ideological. But then, at least, on any of the fleets, a squadron of PLO ships could go to sea to complete the task. Today scratch at least one ????
          That's the same ...
          I did not write about the number of pennants, on the fleets, everyone knows that our Fleet was completely competing with the US fleet, but about the underwater one, I am generally silent.
          I'm talking about all kinds of things, though ..
          Serg65, fully explains one of the reasons for this ..
          The results of attempts to create universal ships, we see (
          I don’t remember that in which area (not only the fleet), universal platforms were created that could equally well cope with various tasks.
          1. Nehist
            Nehist 31 January 2018 00: 20
            +3
            Well, let’s say that not one versatile platform can fully cope with specific tasks (Polyment Redoubt is a great example for you) Specialized ships are preferable.
    2. Serg65
      Serg65 30 January 2018 10: 41
      10
      hi Greetings, my Belarusian friend!
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Admirals do not know what they want, but from a banal lack of funds!

      I have a different suspicion, the same thing is repeated as in the USSR, there is a quiet war between the Navy and the military-industrial complex. The Navy wants to get one thing, and the military-industrial complex wants to get another one in and everyone lobbies for it at the top, hence the postponements to the right!
      Quote: Rurikovich
      The only visible way out today is the notorious universalism

      bully Oh and controversial this way out, Nikolaitch. drinks
      1. Aristarkh Lyudvigovich
        Aristarkh Lyudvigovich 30 January 2018 12: 44
        +1
        Quote: Serg65
        Prospect 22160 named official anti-piracy

        The more information about 22160 appears, the more clear it is that not only an anti-piracy ship, but vice versa - a pirate ship, a kind of privateer for local wars and special operations. Such a raider can be used for deep penetration or interception of ships.
        1. Serg65
          Serg65 30 January 2018 12: 58
          +8
          Quote: Aristarkh Ludwigovich
          Such a raider can be used for deep penetration or interception of ships.

          Aristarkh Ludwigovich, of course I am not an angel either, but this ....... good
          Quote: Aristarkh Ludwigovich
          a kind of privateer for local wars

          I do not see such local wars with the participation of the Russian Federation, where the 22160 project would be tasked with raiding.
          1. Aristarkh Lyudvigovich
            Aristarkh Lyudvigovich 30 January 2018 13: 08
            +2
            They didn’t even think about the participation of Russian troops in Syria and the annexation of Crimea ten years ago. And this one is actually a privateer of the Russian Navy, and the purpose of the ship as an carrier of an assault boat, in the presence of stealth and an electronic warfare complex, is interesting.
        2. al.schenaev
          al.schenaev 30 January 2018 13: 13
          +2
          I watched this video, a good idea.
          Such for the OVR are of course a luxury when there are few of them, but the fight against piracy is most likely camouflage. The military, as always, will add a couple of tasks uncharacteristic for them and they will plow, as the 705s plowed at one time, until the engine resources are completely exhausted.
          But Bursuk Viktor Iosifovich (they served in the same division, he is NEMS, I’m nachkhim for the plat), he is an intelligent man, he won’t drive bullshit.
          1. NikWik
            NikWik 30 January 2018 19: 36
            +2
            Al.schenaev colleague - 6th division? ... Just on the avatar, a condor, and the 705s were only with us.
          2. bayard
            bayard 31 January 2018 00: 13
            +1
            In order to solve the issue of different sizes, it would be nice to select several basic platforms of different displacement and sculpt ships of different specializations based on them - with an emphasis on PLO, shock functions, guard towers, privateers. This will lead to cheaper costs thanks to large series of the same type of buildings, and will simplify operation, training, repair. And it will also speed up the saturation of the fleets with the necessary combat units.
      2. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 30 January 2018 16: 31
        +1
        Quote: Serg65
        Oh and controversial this way out, Nikolaitch.

        Hello buddy !! drinks hi
        So I meant not my opinion, namely a way out of the situation in the minds of admirals !!! fellow
        Just not formulated clearly. recourse repeat
  2. Alexander War
    Alexander War 30 January 2018 07: 43
    +2
    At prices - In March 2011, a frigate of pr. 22350 cost 18 billion rubles, and a corvette of pr. 20380 - 11 billion rubles. In February 2013, SKR pr. 11356 and a corvette of pr. 20385 were worth 14 billion rubles. Today's prices should be something like this: 20380 - 17,3 billion rubles., 20385 and 11356 - 19,9 billion rubles, 22350 - 28,3 billion rubles. According to the published data, excluded from the annual report of the Northern Shipyard for 2016, the contract value of orders 1007 and 1008 (corvettes of the project 20380 “Retivy” and “Strict”) amount to 17,2-17,3 billion rubles, which exactly corresponds to the translation from the 2011 price, and order 1009 (“Daring”) - 29,1, 22350 billion rubles which exceeds the cost of frigate pr. XNUMX
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      30 January 2018 09: 46
      +2
      Quote: Alexander War
      In March 2011, frigate Ave. 22350 cost 18 billion rubles

      Somehow it is doubtful - maybe we are talking about 11356?
  3. Alexander War
    Alexander War 30 January 2018 07: 52
    +1
    Corvette pr 20385 I think successful! And as for the SKR ships, the Frigates will not finish building Frigates pr 11356, most likely they will sell it, since the engines do not do for them but do for Pr 22350 All the forces should be thrown to frigates pr 22350 to replace the old TFRs, then the engines will make the question faster or they’ll bring the Poliment-Redoubt air defense
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      30 January 2018 09: 47
      +2
      Quote: Alexander War
      Corvette pr 20385 I think successful!

      Is it with diesels as an EU?
      Quote: Alexander War
      All forces must be thrown to frigates pr 22350 to replace the old TFR

      This is too expensive a replacement.
      1. Alexander War
        Alexander War 30 January 2018 17: 02
        0
        Not so expensive! Less need to be invested in US treasuries
      2. Nemchinov Vl
        Nemchinov Vl 30 December 2018 02: 10
        0
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Quote: Alexander War
        Corvette pr 20385 I think successful!

        Is it with diesels as an EU?
        Quote: Alexander War
        All forces must be thrown to frigates pr 22350 to replace the old TFR

        This is too expensive a replacement.

        Not really?
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        And after all, what a shame - the patrol ships of the 22160 project have very well-developed sonar weapons. These are both the stationary GAK MGK-335EM-03, and GAS with the towed Vignette-EM antenna. There is a hangar (although it looks very narrow) and a helicopter. Throw away all these “flexible” and 57-mm gun mounts with machine guns, put the naval version of the Shell, the usual torpedo tube, and the same “Package-NK” and you would have a great small anti-submarine ship with a standard 1 ton displacement, in which so needs today the Russian fleet ...
        But according to Timokhin, who writes an order, is there nothing there, and this project is not at all suitable?
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        ... although, probably, still would not have turned out. Because the ships of the 22160 project are equipped with a combined power plant, in which high speed is provided by gas turbines, but the economic move is still the same diesel engines, and on the first ship of the series, Vasily Bykov, German diesel engines from MAN were installed. In other words, six ships that can search for submarines, but cannot destroy them, because they do not have anti-submarine weapons, will go into service with the Russian Navy.
        Then comment on the project 20380? Isn't the situation the same? There seems to be something to detect a submarine (including a helicopter), but there is nothing to fight with it ?! "Package-NK", I perceive only as an anti-torpedo weapon (like RBU-6000), nothing more! This is, proceeding from the fact that I simply do not believe that an enemy submarine will allow any corvette to approach itself within the "Packet-NK" attack range, i.e. 14-18 (well, even 20) km.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        It can be stated that the 20380, 20385 and 22160 projects do not meet the requirements of the Russian Navy. And therefore 28 in October 2016 r. At the Northern shipyard was laid the corvette of the new project 20386 “Daring”. It was supposed to be the “work on the mistakes” of previous projects and give the fleet the “workhorse” it needs so much. What kind of ship this time turned out?
        And then the question is - "Will it work ?"
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Instead of diesel engines, the project 20386 corvette received a combined gas turbine unit with partial electric movement, which includes two M90FR gas turbine engines with a capacity of 27500 hp each. and two main electric motors with a capacity of 2200 hp.
        The idea is not bad, but ?! First, I haven't received it yet, and there are big problems with gearboxes. Secondly, was it worth it to test this power plant, come up with a project 20386, or could it (this power plant with partial electromotion) be tested on the same 11356 R / M ?! Don’t you?
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The armament of the new corvette largely repeats the ships of the 20380 project. The air defense system is provided by the same “Redoubt” air defense missile system, only the cells will not be 12, but 16 (as on 20385 corvettes). But now they will be managed by a completely new multifunctional radar complex (MF RLC) Zaslon, which is a real highlight of the project.
        So they would test the "zest" on the 20380/20385 being completed, you see, the "redoubt" air defense system, would not remain "partially capable" !!! Was it worth coming up with a project that is similar in price (if not superior to) frigate 22350, and in terms of the functionality of providing PLO in BMZ, hardly better than 20380 ?! Which in itself, in my personal opinion, is too expensive (the cost of construction / the possibility of effectively providing an anti-aircraft missile defense in BMZ), where corvette 11661 could occupy this niche (to replace the aging Albatrosses, but more functional due to the presence of 8-cell UKSK, and full 533 mm TA) !!
  4. Cherry Nine
    Cherry Nine 30 January 2018 08: 33
    +5
    Which has good diesel engines for electric locomotives

    Diesel locomotives
    As a result, there was a competition of “miracle ships” - in the fight for financing, the designers tried to push maximum armament into the minimum displacement and vied with each other offering the military a missile cruiser in the displacement of a missile boat.

    Somewhat reminiscent of the 30s. Which, in turn, does not characterize responsible persons in the best way
    Who managed in such a short time to solve all the issues that "torment"

    Well, how! It's like a fairytale!

    PS. There is a clear impression that customers of corvettes do not agree with the author’s ideas on the RPKSN account. And they want to burke themselves all the time, no matter what they order.
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 09: 49
      +1
      the idea of ​​destroyers and cruisers is vicious, but it’s more comfortable on a big ship, but a combat NK must still have a berth, permanent or prolonged stay on the roads is dangerous, expensive, damages the crew and equipment. The smaller the ship and especially its draft, the more likely it is to have a bay shelter. Now there are 8 DBK 1155 and steam 956 in operation, but the water displacement and dimensions of the Navy Pacific Fleet are limited for obvious reason by the size of the port of Nikolavevsk on the Amur, and you can only push Fr Gorshkov there, therefore, in reality, a series of destroyers will not be more than 4 pieces all in the SF (taking into account conservation cruisers 1144), in my purely personal mini game the game is not worth the candle, it is better to continue the Gorshkov series and make only one universal NK, but as a series, stopping the construction of other NKs with more than 900 tons of displacement.
      1. Serg65
        Serg65 30 January 2018 11: 04
        +8
        vladimir1155, of course I apologize, but you were carried somewhere far off!
        Quote: vladimir1155
        combat NK must still have a berth, permanent or prolonged presence on the roadstead, dangerous, expensive, damaging the crew and equipment,

        Any ship should have a berth, but it is not required to be permanently and for a long time on the roadstead, why?
        Quote: vladimir1155
        The smaller the ship and especially its draft, the more likely it is to have a shelter bay

        The smaller the ship, and especially its draft, the more unsuitable it is Vladimir’s axiom!
        Quote: vladimir1155
        The water displacement and dimensions of NK Pacific Pacific Fleet are, for obvious reasons, limited by the size of the port of Nikolavevsk on the Amur

        what Wow!!!!! And how did the Pacific people never know about this before? good
        The most interesting thing is that you completely ignore the huge number of bays on the DV theater; moreover, you managed to tie the construction of the fleet not to operational-tactical tasks, but to the presence of small bays request
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 19: 27
          +1
          I don’t know whether the Pacific people are aware that in the event of a war and a likely adversary, Japan -USA, surface ships should get out of the sphere of warfare defeated by ground means, that is, Russian ships can only work in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and near the Pacific coast of Kamchatka, then Nikolaevsk on Amur will be the only supply and repair base on the mainland, the bays are good, but there is no berth and gantry cranes in them.
        2. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 19: 50
          0
          for example, the cruiser EM and the BOD on the tof have the ability to be located only in Vladivostok, Sovetskaya Gavan, Vanino, in the case of performing tasks in the Okhotsk Sea region, only a raid or Magadan, and still not equipped bays for them? AB has in Russia one berth at the plant, and in the Mediterranean Sea and frigates are always on the roads, Tartus is not enough for them
          1. Serg65
            Serg65 31 January 2018 08: 39
            +4
            Quote: vladimir1155
            for example, the cruiser EM and BOD on the tof have the ability to be located only in Vladivostok, Sovetskaya Gavan, Vanino

            smile You somehow boldly missed Fokino (famous Texas), Bolshoi Kamen, Podyapolsky, Danube, South Sea, Olga, Vladimir, Pavlovsky! But this is not the point, each fleet has a plan for the dispersal of warships and auxiliary vessels, timed to the hour "H", each ship has a place of shelter!
            Quote: vladimir1155
            in the event of war against a probable adversary, Japan -USA, surface ships must get out of the sphere of warfare defeat by ground means and

            The most interesting thing, Vladimir, is that by ground means (although I don’t know what you mean by this), your beloved Nikolaevsk-on-Amur will also be paralyzed, and if Vladivostok, Fokino, Bolshoi Kamen are covered by air defense, then on Amur it is absent.
            Quote: vladimir1155
            AB has one berth at the plant in the Russian Federation

            And how many berths should he have ????
            Quote: vladimir1155
            The Mediterranean Sea and frigates are always on the raid

            laughing Frigates are not in the raid, but in the field of combat duty, i.e. where the cars built for SEA BATTLE should be!
            Quote: vladimir1155
            Tartus is too small for them

            what Have you been to Tartus? Even in the conditions of the Soviet PMTO in Tartus, at the same time, 3 ships of the 1 rank and PMKA + 4 submarines at 2's berths could simultaneously stand at the pier.
            Quote: vladimir1155
            Japan’s land-based means of warfare hit the NK, if the Pacific people don’t know this, then immediately upon leaving Vladivostok, the cruiser, 4 BPC and destroyer will be guaranteed to be destroyed along with the entire crew,

            laughing Well, my friend, only the Lord God and a nuclear explosion can guarantee, the rest is all from the evil one! Again, you are somehow indulgent towards the American fleet and do not put it at all, but in vain my friend, in vain! It is from him that the main threat will come and if you hope to sit out in some kind of quiet bay, then do not hope bully
            1. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 1 February 2018 21: 41
              0
              “Do I have a plan, Mr. Fix,” of course there is just what kind of plan is this, real tactics and strategy, or a piece of paper? firstly, ships must fight, and for this not shelter bays are needed, but supply and repair bases, which in turn must have both infrastructure and transport links to the mainland! In the middle of an explosion, a war does not always start with an advance warning like June 22 ..... A defeat by ground, submarine, and other means depends on the distance to the target, the further the target, the more difficult it is to hit it and the easier it is to defend it, for example, with air defense systems on Sakhalin. The Sea of ​​Okhotsk can be made completely free of enemy submarines, because the Russian Federation controls (Maybe) all of its narrow straits. So, if Nikolavevsk is not protected on the Amur, and is not ready to become a fleet base, then the Pacific Fleet has only two ways: 1) as the first Pacific squadron in 1903 to surrender in Vladivostok under the protection of coastal batteries 2) as the second Pacific squadron completely die out in inequality struggle on the way from Vladivostok to the Tatar Strait ...... in the first case, the sailors will be sent to support the infantry, but without serious armament and infantry experience, they will all die as a Peterhof landing, during the Second World War, in the second case, 1740 people will die in one fell swoop, and this new cus ma cover the shame of the whole fleet ...... then why do we need the big ships on the Pacific Fleet? why do not they guard the submarine bases in Kamchatka, but bask in the evening cafes of Vladivostok? answer, do you know any plans?
      2. rumatam
        rumatam 30 January 2018 12: 17
        +1
        so all the same DBK 1155 or BOD?
        1. Serg65
          Serg65 30 January 2018 13: 38
          +4
          Quote: rumatam
          so all the same DBK 1155 or BOD?

          stop Tshchschschschschsch
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 19: 57
            0
            In the event of war, Pacific Fleet will not be able to use deep-sea ports, only Magadan, the only supply and repair base on the mainland will be Nikolaweski On Amur, because Japan’s land-based means of warfare affect NK
          2. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 20: 20
            +1
            In the event of war, the Pacific Fleet will not be able to use deep-sea ports, only Magadan, the only supply and repair base on the mainland will be Nikolavesk on the Amur, because Japan’s land-based means of warfare will hit the NK, if the Pacific people do not know this, then immediately after leaving Vladivostok, the cruiser 4 the BPC and the destroyer will be guaranteed to be destroyed along with the entire crew, but it is better to know in advance, replacing them with frigates to deploy away from enemy shores
        2. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 19: 36
          0
          yes typo
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      30 January 2018 09: 51
      +6
      Quote: Cherry Nine
      Diesel locomotives

      Agas
      Quote: Cherry Nine
      Somewhat reminiscent of the 30 years.

      Several? Yes, our fleet today is a living illustration of the immortal: "The only lesson in history is that people do not remember its lessons."
      Quote: Cherry Nine
      Well, how! It's like a fairytale!

      And nevertheless, most likely that everything turned out. The tragedy of Polement-Redoubt is not that it is somehow super-complex, but that the leadership simply leaned on this development - people scattered from the design bureau, etc. in general, there was no one to work there.
      Quote: Cherry Nine
      And they want to Burke themselves all the time, no matter what ordered

      This is yes ...
  5. The Siberian barber
    The Siberian barber 30 January 2018 08: 55
    +6
    We are stepping on the same rake as the USSR - a hodgepodge of ships of the same type, of the same class .. (no buzzing, absolutely !!
    Why, to me, to the “sofa” person, is this obvious, but in the General Staff this is not understood by people who are obliged to take this into account !?
    Cognitive dissonance ..
    Thanks to the author! As always, everything is clear, on the shelves, laid out)
  6. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 09: 26
    +1
    The NK problem is its visibility, it is visible visually (including from the satellite), its radar invisibility is doubtful, they usually speak of its decrease, but not the lack of visibility, combined with a slow speed and limited weapons (even the cruiser is organic in its capabilities) NK of any It’s ineffective in a modern war, therefore it can only be an addition to coast-based aviation and coastal equipment .... therefore, the number of NKs and their displacement must be reduced, and all submarines and minesweepers must be built, Corvettes must under the protection of coastal facilities. Consequently, the course towards universal corvettes is erroneous, MPCs, especially anti-submarine ones like the river-sea are necessary. The author ignored the Buyans and Karakurt, apparently like missile ships, but it is on their basis that the MPC should be created, providing the distant sea zone with frigates. At marine avatories, aircraft-carrying corvettes and frigates, all of them on the oceans, are not needed. Electromotion is impossible in principle, you still need a diesel engine or another power generator, why should you load the batteries with a noticeable battery anyway? that's why there is no electric movement on military NK
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      30 January 2018 09: 53
      +4
      Quote: vladimir1155
      The author ignored the Buyans and Karakurt

      Do not ignore, let’s get to them
      Quote: vladimir1155
      Electromotion is impossible in principle, you still need a diesel engine or another power generator, why should you load the batteries with a noticeable battery anyway?

      nobody overloads it, there are no batteries there, it’s just that the boiler does not feed the turbine, but the unit, which converts heat to electricity
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 10: 02
        +3
        the unit converting the tapo to electrical is either a turbine or a diesel engine, until they invented nothing else, it turns out that the electric motor is an extra wheel in the cart, because you can directly transmit torque from the diesel engine to the screws
        1. san4es
          san4es 30 January 2018 12: 03
          +4
          Quote: vladimir1155
          ... it turns out that the electric drive is an extra wheel in the cart, because you can directly transmit torque from the diesel engine to the screws
          hi
          Diesel electric ships differ in layout advantages: diesel generators can be placed anywhere on the ship; use schemes: two propellers - one diesel generator, one propeller - two diesel generators; no need to dock the diesel generator with the propeller shaft. The diesel-electric ship does not have long drive shafts stretching from the middle of the vessel to the propellers, as a result, the vibration load is reduced, the hold is released. The management of the vessel is greatly simplified, any power can be supplied to any of the propellers, and the maneuverability of the vessel accordingly increases.
          soldier

          Ship power plants with diesels as the main engines according to the method of transferring energy from a diesel engine to a propeller are divided into three groups (Fig. I): direct transmission, diesel-gear, diesel-electric.
          In a diesel power plant with direct power transmission to the screw (Fig. 1a), a short intermediate shaft is attached to the flange of the crankshaft of the diesel engine 5, having a comb for the thrust bearing 4. The intermediate shaft 3 is connected to the propeller shaft 2 laid in the stern tube 1
          In the diesel-reduction version (Fig. 1,6), the propeller can be driven into rotation by one or several diesels through a gear 6.
          A diesel-electric rowing installation (Fig. 1, c) is one or several diesel generators 8, the electric power of which is supplied to the rowing motors 7.
          http://many.kabobo.ru/docs/58600/index-1251-1.htm
          l
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 30 January 2018 13: 46
            +7
            Quote: san4es
            The diesel-electric ship does not have long drive shafts stretching from the middle of the vessel to the propellers, as a result, the vibration load is reduced, the hold is released.

            The limiting case of the absence of shafts is the now-popular helical-steering column:

            Without electric propulsion, such a propulsion option would be extremely difficult to implement.
            1. san4es
              san4es 30 January 2018 14: 03
              +4
              Quote: Alexey RA
              , ... The limiting case of the absence of shafts is the rotor-steering column, so popular today.

              ... Azipod (in another way) ... For special fleet ..- when it is necessary to maneuverability and to remain at one point in due course. Usually tied to GPS and thrusters.
            2. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 19: 37
              +1
              and now evaluate its maintainability in the conditions of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk
            3. san4es
              san4es 31 January 2018 13: 12
              +1
              Quote: Alexey RA
              ... Without electric propulsion, it would be extremely difficult to implement such a propulsion option.

              Through the steering gear. It is used on small vessels (mainly)
        2. al.schenaev
          al.schenaev 30 January 2018 13: 23
          +4
          “A unit that converts heat to electricity is either a turbine or a diesel engine” - I’ll clarify a little, it’s either a turbo generator (on the floor) or a diesel generator (in the same place, only a backup power source)
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 19: 35
            +1
            the electric ship Potmu is not suitable for military NKs, that 1 they are very powerful therefore the transmitted energy is also large therefore large, the size of the generators will turn out 2 ships are relatively short, and the shafts will also be short 3 generator is another chance to fall off without movement in case of breakdown, defeat, compartments of water
  7. tchoni
    tchoni 30 January 2018 10: 02
    +6
    That’s what I agree with the author, is that the corvette’s tasks are in the first goov, PLO, and in the second - air defense. The rest is unimportant. In light of this, the presence of shock anti-ship weapons on corvettes causes some bewilderment. In the end, the Falkland conflict, and the anti-Georgian showdown, showed that anti-aircraft missiles are limited in scope for solving anti-ship missions. And, the "weapon of support for the landing" is quite perplexing. Guys, are you serious? You are ready to put a boat at the cost of 11-17 billion ever-wooden trees on the coast and give the opportunity to enemy tanks at a price of 200 mil. shoot everlasting him ?! And the return fire of the boat to the tanks will be fillets ?! Isn’t it easier to make a specially trained landing support ship for these purposes by spending 10 times less? Yes, and having booked it slightly according to the urgent recommendation of General Kaptsov. And let the corvette cover it from coastal aviation with its air defense.
    1. Serg65
      Serg65 30 January 2018 11: 24
      +6
      Quote: tchoni
      You are ready to deliver a boat at a cost of 11-17 billion of ever-wooden coasts and enable enemy tanks at a cost of 200 mil. shoot everlasting him ?!

      what Well, let’s say I’m not leading the coast, but to remove 20 km, that is, with an impact range of 3,5 km and a range of Abramsov and Leopards of 10 km - this boat from a distance of 14 km can calmly fire tanks with an 1,5 rate of fire of a second, but art support landing is not only a duel with tanks! Yes, from my own experience I’ll tell you that, tank fire on a moving sea target is ineffective wink
      1. tchoni
        tchoni 30 January 2018 12: 13
        +4
        Quote: Serg65
        with an aiming range of 3,5 km and a firing range of Abrams and Leopards of 10 km - this boat from a distance of 14 km can calmly fire tanks with a rate of 1,5 shots per second, but artillery support is not only a duel with tanks!

        That it is so, only trochs are not. You forget about conventional and self-propelled artillery. Comrade it was not for nothing that the bourgeoisie came up with the concept of an over-horizon landing. Oh no wonder.
        1. Serg65
          Serg65 30 January 2018 12: 32
          +5
          Quote: tchoni
          You forget about conventional and self-propelled artillery

          laughing Well, let the tanks sideways and move on!
          What is a landing in the Soviet classic version? The first part of this ballet is air and missile suppression of the firing points of the landing area, the second part is the landing of the first echelon, here it is applied FIRE SUPPORT Squad and not a separate boat and plus volley fire systems BDK, KFOR and MDKVP. Those. the landing zone is literally flooded with fire !!!! In addition, high-altitude vehicles, namely BTR and PT-76, are also firing when moving to the shore. In Soviet times, EM units of the 56 project and the 956 project with their 130-kami were involved in fire support units.
          Quote: tchoni
          Comrade it was not for nothing that the bourgeoisie came up with the concept of an over-horizon landing. Oh no wonder.

          Of course not in vain, and they even came up with the right thing, but an over-horizon landing does not cancel fire support! wink
          1. tchoni
            tchoni 30 January 2018 13: 34
            +1
            Quote: Serg65
            The first part of this ballet is aviation and missile suppression of the firing points of the landing area,

            And I don’t offer you to refuse it. I suggest making a specially trained ship for this. Budget, cheap (the same karakurt costs about three billion, it seems), with a small team, adapted to a possible return flight from the shore (since this is the tenth matter) and not substitute a corvette with hundreds of people on board and at a price two tens of billions)
            1. Serg65
              Serg65 30 January 2018 13: 56
              +7
              Quote: tchoni
              I suggest making a specially trained ship for this.

              My friend, once in the distant past, under the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet, it was precisely for the artillery support of the landing forces at the 39th division of the MDS (Kramsk Naval Base) that the 65th destroyer division was on contentment. At first, it included EM pr.30bis (82th year), and then the 56th project. Those. no one will build a ship specially tailored for highly specialized purposes, both from the economic component and from operational-tactical views on the use of such ships! ...... what although no, recently the Americans launched the second such mistress and now they scratch in indecent places wondering where to put these two miracles.
              1. tchoni
                tchoni 30 January 2018 15: 54
                +1
                Sorry, the Americans went along the path of our carabest builders and crossed a bulldog with a rhinoceros at the same time in a futuristic frenzy (I'm talking about the number of innovations per square cm of the deck of this device). They made a bet and, in the process, really lost.
                I’m talking to you about Oooooooochen cheap vessel for ship MPRK. And the dish is very simple. Which, however, will not stand idle.
                By the way, the destroyer 30, and the 56th project was just such a ship. Perhaps that is why he served for so long.
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 30 January 2018 16: 25
                  +5
                  Quote: tchoni
                  I’m talking to you about Oooooooochen cheap vessel for ship MPRK. And the dish is very simple. Which, however, will not stand idle.

                  Heh heh heh ... the Chinese we still can not surpass:
                  1. tchoni
                    tchoni 30 January 2018 16: 56
                    +2
                    Well, why?
                  2. tchoni
                    tchoni 30 January 2018 16: 59
                    +1
                    In addition, we have everything invented and built. IAC "Buyan" without any "m" - what dohtur prescribed. Dshevo, angrily, not crowded. There are, however, few questions on artillery, but, as they say, there are no limits to perfection)))
                    1. tchoni
                      tchoni 30 January 2018 17: 00
                      0
                      Well, why. The same? [Quote] [/ quote]
                    2. Serg65
                      Serg65 31 January 2018 08: 44
                      +5
                      Quote: tchoni
                      In addition, we have everything invented and built. IAC "Buyan" without any "m" - what dohtur prescribed. Dshevo, angrily, not crowded

                      Well, we are building a bunch of Buyans! Opa! What about air defense? Air defense then forgot! We are also building ships for Buyanov’s air defense, and we also assign Buyanov’s PLO to these same ships ....... and we get the same expensive destroyer laughing good
                      1. tchoni
                        tchoni 31 January 2018 09: 44
                        +1
                        Buyan, who cost without the letter “M” if my memory serves me right 1.7 million (10 times cheaper (TEN CARL) than the corvette 20380) The one with the letter “M” costs 2.5 billion per-tree. If instead of one corvette to build a purely one artillery, one missile, one anti-submarine, then you still have a little money for the air defense ship))) and a little more ...
                        But seriously, narrow specialization always, you know, ALWAYS, wins versatility. The law of dialectics. About air defense, I already told you above. This is just the task of a corvette or frigate (in fact, the difference is only in seaworthiness)
              2. Vladimir1155
                Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 20: 12
                +1
                Well, and what was the use of such a number of destroyers, except of course the diverse allowance of the crews?
                1. Serg65
                  Serg65 31 January 2018 08: 45
                  +4
                  Quote: vladimir1155
                  Well, and what was the use of such a number of destroyers, except of course the diverse allowance of the crews?

                  What kind of destroyers are you asking about?
              3. Vladimir1155
                Vladimir1155 1 February 2018 21: 18
                0
                Quote: Serg65
                The Black Sea Fleet specifically for the artillery support of the landing at the 39th division of the MDS (Kramsk Naval Forces) was on the content of the 65th division of destroyers. At first, it included EM pr.30bis (82nd year), and then the 56th project.
                these are the destroyers
  8. Serg65
    Serg65 30 January 2018 10: 28
    10
    Andrew welcome hi
    Finally you got to surface ships laughing . The review of corvettes was completely successful for you, there are really a few inaccuracies, for example with regards to 11451
    for what was armed with four 400-mm torpedoes

    The Falcon had 8 torpedo tubes in two quad packs on each side. Built IPC -215 and IPC -220 were essentially experimental and often stood in an individual floating dock on Telephon in Sevastopol.
    The fact is that of the four types of power plants: nuclear, gas-turbine, steam-turbine and diesel, the USSR shipbuilders perfectly mastered the first two.

    Here, with your permission, I will correct you too ... the shipbuilders of the USSR perfectly mastered not the first two, but the first three! From KTU there were EMs at 30bis Ave., 56 Ave. and 57 Ave., RKR A58 Ave. and 1134 Ave., BOD Ave. 1134 Ave., RCC Ave. boiler building in the USSR was also successful!
    I must say that in the USSR and the Russian Federation electric movement was not something unknown - it was used on icebreakers and auxiliary ships, but, for reasons unknown to the author, was not used on surface combat ships

    For example, on 419 ave.killers, for providing electric movement, there are 5 diesel generators of 775 kW each!
    A logical question arises .... who will twist the generators on the 20386 project?
    smile Well, basically the analytics you cited, I liked! laughing All the same, you took into account the aspirations of the working people .... without allegories and with specific "surnames"! At what with all the questions that arise, you basically answered yourself ..
    According to the author of this article, the following occurs. For a long time, design bureaus in the Russian Federation were on the verge of survival, and were ready for anything for the sake of budget funds, and the fleet was in dire need of full-fledged warships, but did not have the ability to pay for them. As a result, there was a competition of “miracle ships” - in the fight for financing, the designers tried to push maximum weapons into the minimum displacement and vied with each other offering the military a missile cruiser in the displacement of a missile boat
    .
    After all, if you delve into the past ... who saved Sevmash? And this factory TAVKR "Gorshkov" saved the Indians who liked it! Well, a little later, and the Russian Navy, with the submission of GlavkoVerkh decided to revive and then Ostap ( laughing Well, in the sense of shipbuilders) suffered !!!!
    Thank you drinks
    Article +
  9. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 30 January 2018 11: 37
    +5
    It is true that the ship has a helicopter, but as far as the author of the article knows, usually the search for an enemy submarine is carried out by a pair of helicopters - while one carries out a search, the second carries ammunition to destroy the detected submarine. If there is no second helicopter, then the defeat of the detected submarine is assigned to the ship - for this, long-range missile torpedoes carried the USSR BOD. But at the same time carry sufficient ammunition, and the helicopter can’t search for submarines.

    EMNIP, they solved this problem on the Ka-27 - the machine has both a purely search and search-shock version of the download.
  10. VohaAhov
    VohaAhov 30 January 2018 13: 34
    +6
    The article is interesting, voluminous, informative, as always. But on some issues you can debate. Project 22160, well, this is not corvette. This is a peacetime patrol ship with a minimal armament (by the way, compared to world patrols, ours is most heavily armed, and compared to the British River 2 patrol under construction, ours is an order of magnitude stronger). The main armament is 1x1- 76 (rather than 57) mm AU, helicopter Ka-29 (with the option of replacing it with Ka-27M and PS), an assault landing boat, 2x1-14,5 mm machine guns, anti-sabotage grenade launchers and MANPADS . The ship is equipped with an MGK-335 hardened GAS (an old, good, but digitized Platinum with a detection range of 10-12 km) and a towed Vignette. When the “special” period begins, the ship is re-equipped. And only then he becomes a corvette. The power plant of this ship is our Kolomensky “diesel” diesel engines (there are no MANs there). And the attitude to this ship should be like a patrol ship, and not like a combat ship.
    I don’t know why you do not like the project 20385. Just because of the skepticism about diesels? In my opinion, they managed to solve the problem with diesels, otherwise our corvettes would not be sent to military service for 2 months and would not be put on patrol ships of project 22160. The radars will have the same radars as on pr. 20386 (ie “Barrier.” It is not clear where you got the detection range from 95 km, on the Mig-31BM the detection range is 280 km). And in terms of armament composition, 20385 is almost identical to Project 11356, but it is an order of magnitude superior to it in the search capabilities of submarines. The only plus of the project 11356 is its seaworthiness due to 1,5-1,8 times greater displacement. In a word, I am for the continuation of the construction of corvettes, etc. 20385 for Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet.
    Project 20386 is not clear to me at all. By the way, about a displacement of 3400 tons. Most likely it's just misinformation. Somewhere in the "web" information slipped, indicating the standard displacement of the ship and this figure is not 3400, or even 2800, but 2430 tons. It was also written that until 2025 "three" ships of this project will be built. Probably the only plus of this ship is its power plant. Search for submarines on electric motors is better than under diesel engines. True, here our designers screwed up. Instead of the Dawn basilica with a detection range of 20-25 km, the MGK-335 Platinum with a range of 10-12 km was installed.
    The result of the "throwing" of our admirals, the desire to get the ships newer, more powerful, to shove the "invisible" into a small boat, is visible. From 2001 to 2017, as many as 5 (FIVE) corvettes with a displacement of 1800-2000 tons were built. Plus, there are another 8 units under construction, under construction under 4 different projects. And together we get 13 corvettes for 5 projects (of which project 20380 is in three different versions). This is where I finish. And so almost the article turned out.
  11. Svetlana
    Svetlana 30 January 2018 14: 09
    +1
    Quote: vladimir1155
    electric wheel drive in cart

    Electric power on the ship is needed to power lasers and gyrotrons. For example, with diode-pumped trimaran lasers, ice can be melted between the hull and the outrigars in winter, as well as drones in the near zone and satellites in space can be hit in clear weather, and electromagnetic guns can be supplied with electricity. The gyrotrons through the H01 waveguides feed the power active phased array antennas for use by satellites from the ocean zones (Atlantic, Pacific, Indian and Arctic)
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 19: 43
      +1
      Well of course you need, we are discussing here the energy of the ship’s movement, and not the availability of power supply as such
      1. Svetlana
        Svetlana 1 February 2018 07: 59
        0
        The power of lasers, microwave guns, railguns is comparable to the power spent on moving a ship
        If we want to have on board modern weapons that can instantly reach the stars
        and throw projectiles with a speed of more than 4km / s, then have an electric generator on board
        A capacity of 100 MW is necessary. On the other hand Navigare necesse est ..
        It's up to you - having such a powerful electric generator on board, what we’ll twist the propeller with -
        the shaft directly from the turbine gearbox, wasting space in the БЧ-5 compartments on the gearbox in or still the shaft from the electric motor.
        1. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 1 February 2018 10: 04
          0
          while there is no such weapon, if it is developed, it is quite possible to make a diesel-electric vehicle with special tasks
  12. xomaNN
    xomaNN 30 January 2018 14: 31
    +5
    I still have the best memories of the TFR "Petrel" 1135 project. Moreover, he was engaged in just commissioning work with the REA RPK "Metel", his Main Caliber, as a responder. So the Black Sea "admirals" 11356 of the project "childhood diseases!" left mostly in the 70s. And they will serve in the Black and Mediterranean Sea for glory. winked
  13. spravochnik
    spravochnik 30 January 2018 15: 46
    0
    But, after the imposition of sanctions, the use of the brainchild of the “gloomy Teutonic genius” had to be abandoned and switched to the products of the domestic Kolomensky plant. Which has a good diesel engine for electric locomotives, but their ship "products" significantly lose German reliability.
    Why diesel engines for electric locomotives?
  14. Terran
    Terran 30 January 2018 17: 23
    +6
    Thanks for the interesting series of articles. I want to pay attention only to some points:
    1. Concerning the "Gas turbine installation with partial electric propulsion" and avoiding diesel engines - and who will twist the generators for electric propulsion? of course there are turbo generators, I encountered on the Bison, but not only do they have a small resource (for ships of one-time military use as a landing Bison it can go), but the reliability is terrible (at least I came across it - on the mooring 2 new TGAs, one was rejected immediately according to the beating of the shaft, at the second the turbine wheel scattered, then everything is normal, it is a sediment for life). So for electric motion powerful diesel generators are needed, and here again the question arises of powerful diesel engines.
    2. Concerning problems with electric movement. The problem here is not so much in powerful domestic electric motors with acceptable characteristics, as in domestic powerful frequency converters providing this most smooth regulation of electric motor revolutions. Domestic unreliable and with wild EM interference, or on foreign units, just in their case.
    3. Decimeter waves are used in surveillance radars not because they see high-flying targets well, but because the attenuation in the atmosphere and even more so when precipitation is much lower than in the centimeter range, but you pay for this with pointing accuracy and resolution, because with the same antenna dimensions the beam width will be larger, as well as the measurement error of the Doppler shift for the selection of a moving target against the background of other reflections. In this case
    4. And the last thing is the main thing. The loss of qualifications has hit not only the engineers, but also the military who write TK. Fearing responsibility and feeling weakness in the question, they write without specifics then to clarifying questions that they meant they are slamming their eyes - and you clarify / ask ... and decide where to kick off. Here is the disorganization between the structures inside. The signalmen say one thing, the helicopter pilots want something else, the RTS nicknames have their own requirements and, even knowing the contradiction, they won’t rub even the plant / designer gets out. There are also often jambs according to the TOR, from where infinitely additional requirements for the project come out, and almost on the moorings it turns out that something was missed, and these special stages must be coordinated by everyone and through DOGOZ to go to pay, and this for some reason military shoals it doesn’t bother, they need the military, which means they owe it for that! As one touched me when, according to the missed system, "well, you think xxx millions, you can do it just as easily for your money, help the fleet"
  15. Horse meat
    Horse meat 30 January 2018 17: 26
    0
    Normal boat?
  16. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 19: 30
    +1
    Quote: Serg65
    The smaller the ship, and especially its draft, the more unsuitable it is Vladimir’s axiom!
    this is not a fact and moreover not an axiom, because everything is determined by the specific situation on a particular solid fuel engine, starting from 3000 tons, seaworthiness itself ceases to depend on displacement, especially for heavily armed warships, although it affects crew comfort
  17. Dart2027
    Dart2027 30 January 2018 19: 59
    +1
    If intellectually, then the corvette was to become a replacement for the IPC and RTOs of the USSR fleet. 1400-1800 tons of displacement, 8 calibers (standard launchers guarantee that the ship can be safely operated for decades, and light anti-ship missiles can also be developed), 2-4 533 mm TA, 1 HAK.
    At the same time, air defense is only in the near zone, and the hangar for a helicopter is nafig, since it operates either near the coast, or as part of a squadron.
  18. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 30 January 2018 20: 08
    +1
    Quote: VohaAhov
    The result of the "throwing" of our admirals, the desire to get the ships newer, more powerful, to shove the "invisible" into a small boat, is visible. From 2001 to 2017, as many as 5 (FIVE) corvettes with a displacement of 1800-2000 tons were built. Plus, there are another 8 units under construction, under construction under 4 different projects. And together we get 13 corvettes for 5 projects (of which project 20380 is in three different versions). This is where I finish. And so almost the article turned out.
    The problem is deeper, admirals are now not heroes like Nakhimov and Makarov, but officials, apparatchiks, ..... therefore they are afraid to demand ships, and they can’t objectively, there’s no money, But if the manufacturer lobbies for a new ship, then the admirals grabbing like a straw, here comes the number of projects by the number of shipbuilders, the Shipyard, unlike the admiral, can lobby the project, because it receives funds for this, including kickbacks.
  19. doktorkurgan
    doktorkurgan 30 January 2018 21: 49
    +2
    SAM 3M-47 "Bending" (in fact - a turret for MANPADS "Strela")

    For MANPADS "Igla". Well, “Willow" probably get up.
    What catches your eye? First, the corvette of the 20386 project ... has ceased to be a corvette, because with a displacement in 3 400 t (unknown, however, standard or full), this ship can be called anything but the corvette.

    Now the concept of "corvette", KVM, has become blurred. Algerian corvette project C28A (Chinese-built) has a total displacement of 2880 tons, Indian corvettes, etc. 28 type. Komorta - 3400 tons; and the Chinese "small frigate" type 056 - 1800 tons of full displacement, which is typical.
    Probably, the ships of project 22160 will have to temporarily resemble without "container" weapons ... only there is nothing more permanent than temporary.

    The head BOD, pr. 1155, I remember, were also enlisted in the military, having stubs in place of the PU “Dagger”. EMs of the "Modern" type were also noted - the lead ship was put into service, the EMNIP, without the "Mosquitoes" - as a result, Western intelligence searched for a long time and unsuccessfully on it camouflaged VPU.
    However, if the place and energy are reserved, then something can be expected in the future. Moreover, the notorious container launchers, EMNIP, have not yet completed the test cycle.
    Firstly, it is completely unclear why domestic developers are ignoring such powerful anti-submarine weapons as 533-mm torpedoes, which would be very much in demand if an enemy submarine was found 15-20 km from the corvette. It seems that it was a 533-mm torpedo that would be a weapon capable of destroying a submarine at a distance at which a corvette could detect it.

    I completely agree. Moreover, of the 533 mm TA, you can easily use the "long arm":
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2WDRcuigIE0
  20. Dimax-nemo
    Dimax-nemo 30 January 2018 23: 01
    +5
    In general, an interesting series of articles, but still I also want to insert "my 5 cents", especially since I'm also not a shipbuilding engineer;). It is not clear why the author in the article about corvettes considers the "Petrels", which at first were generally classified as BOD, and only then were "lowered" in rank to patrol ships. In NATO, they are always classified as frigates.
    IPC 1124 under certain conditions as anti-submariners could give odds to many large destroyers. Firstly, because they have an omitted ASG, similar to a helicopter one according to the principle of operation, secondly, because they received remote-controlled torpedoes. Only in this way it was possible to "lay" a small "fighter" of submarines of 1 tons. Yes, it all works only "on foot", but here you have to choose - it is practically impossible to put a really effective classic HOOK into a small displacement.
    Regarding the armament of corvettes.
    In-1, unfortunately, neither the fleet nor the army received a light helicopter of the Ka-60/62 type. Based on the Ka-27, and even with a full-fledged hangar (while the 956s are still dispensed with "telescopic") on a small ship, it seems not entirely justified. Yes, such a helicopter would most likely have only buoys and a couple of light torpedoes, but even this is enough in its waters, there corvettes can and should support basic anti-submarine helicopters. It’s definitely not worthwhile to achieve the ability to operate in the “far sea zone” from these ships, because the frigate will be the output.
    Secondly, it is not entirely clear where the author came from, that an anti-submarine helicopter will not be able to attack an independently discovered target. We even developed a remote-controlled torpedo Strizh for the Ka-2, which, naturally, made sense only according to its own OGAS.
    B-3, the vast majority of small escort ships have, in the best case, a light helicopter and 324-mm torpedoes, and that is only because these pipes are easy to “take” by breech-holders into the cellar of aviation torpedoes. The latest Russian IPCs were supposed to be armed with a small-sized Medvedka submarine, generally similar to the American ASROK. In fact, not only corvettes would have been enough for him. But, unfortunately, after many years its development was discontinued.
    B-4, as the “main anti-submarine caliber” of 533-mm SET-65 torpedoes on NKs in the Soviet Navy, was used only for lack of a better one, i.e. in case of impossibility to install PLRK (pr. 58, 61, 1134, 956, 1164). Remote-controlled torpedoes with NK except for the MPK pr.1124 in the Soviet fleet were not used for obvious reasons. A submarine usually has a serious head start in front of the NK and, as a rule, can attack first. If a submarine is detected, it must be attacked immediately, incl. at the maximum possible range of their own HAC. Only PLRK meets these requirements.
    B-5, apparently, the maximalist bet on the “advanced” Redut-Polyment air defense missile system “for all occasions” turned out to be erroneous. Such systems are now being created for decades (and even in the conditions of the collapse of the military-industrial complex and the defense industry). As a result, Novik, who would now completely pass for the corvette, was “ditched”. Meanwhile, the land analogue of the naval air defense system Dagger is still in service with the air defense of the ground forces and is being modernized, and even the Broadsword has not replaced it. Yes, this "toy" for a number of reasons turned out to be "very weighty", but even managed to put it for testing on the IPC 1124, while maintaining the main anti-submarine weapons. And in general, for the corvette, it was possible to get by with Thor, a two-channel target without revolving launchers, which would already significantly reduce the mass of air defense systems.
    B-6, RCC Uranus should be considered quite sufficient for corvettes, if we consider them as the main NK of its own coastal zone and OVR. In this case, anti-ship missiles on corvettes are needed more for self-defense, so that there is nothing to snap on a suddenly appearing enemy missile boat or "classmate", without waiting for their fighter-bombers to arrive. Which should be the main carrier of the striking potential of the Navy in the coastal zone. And for everything else, you need to build a minimum of frigates. If you really want to shoot with "calibers", then submarines, especially nuclear submarines, are especially suitable for this (especially Project 949, which, I hope, will be modernized in this direction). Those. the corvette should be a multipurpose ship, a cross between an MRK and an IPC, but rather an IPC than an MRK.
  21. Odysseus
    Odysseus 30 January 2018 23: 05
    +1
    It is unclear why in this critical situation in submarines they plan to give part 20380 to the Baltic. The concept of the “patrol” 22160 is even more incomprehensible. In my opinion, it was more logical to give all the new corvettes only Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet, and turn 22160 into a normal anti-submarine one and give 3 to the Baltic and 3 to the Black Sea.
    PS Vinaigrette and chaos in the types of ships, over, depressing. And this is in conditions of modest funding ...
    1. Cherry Nine
      Cherry Nine 31 January 2018 08: 20
      +1
      Quote: Odyssey
      It is unclear why, at such a critical situation in submarines, part 20380 are going to be given to the Baltic

      Well then.
      In order to eliminate the completely useless KBF, a serious decision must be made. And if it is not accepted, the fleet needs to be “fed” by ships, otherwise it will rot to hell completely.
  22. Alexy
    Alexy 31 January 2018 08: 56
    0
    The article is a purely personal view of the author, no more.
  23. Serg65
    Serg65 31 January 2018 11: 11
    +4
    tchoni,

    Quote: tchoni
    If instead of one corvette to build a purely one artillery, one missile, one anti-submarine, then you still have a little money for the air defense ship

    laughing Those. because of your stubbornness in the landing zone, a certain detachment of dissimilar forces is assembled on the basis of the Buyan missile system, some of these boats are artillery, and some are missile. But here the air defense and anti-submarine boats confuse me honestly recourse Those. boats seem to be there, but air defense and anti-aircraft defense, as it were, are gone. Dozens of “attacking falcons” arrive and even from an average distance begin to reap the harvest for the sea god crying . And all because of what? And because we regretted the little thing! And sailors, and what sailors? Sailors still nurse mum!
    Quote: tchoni
    narrow specialization always, you know, ALWAYS outperform universality. The law of dialectics

    bully Your law is easily contested! Take, for example, the EM Zwolvt, a highly specialized ship ground for coastal operations. Powerful artillery, a bunch of Tamagavks, weak air defense and mediocre anti-aircraft defense. For the overthrow of objectionable princes, then this and no more !!! That is, Zamvolt’s fate to stand against the wall and wait for a call laughing
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 1 February 2018 21: 09
      0
      certainly a detachment of three small ships is much better than one super destroyer, specialization is effective, small draft is a maneuver, small size is radar invisibility, three coral coils are three small targets, and not a large and light one ... well, by streaming instead of a super destroyer you can make five triples of small ships, that is, for the same money five times more combat power
  24. Valery Saitov
    Valery Saitov 31 January 2018 14: 21
    +1
    Diversity is needed at the first stage, but when a project is rolled in, then they will come to a common denominator and will build 2-3 species, or even one.
  25. Fury
    Fury 31 January 2018 14: 35
    0
    I do not completely agree with the author of the article, and here's why. 1) A diesel power plant today could be a salvation for Russia, because it does not interfere with the construction of corvettes due to the lack of domestic turbines and it is not yet known how well they will prove themselves when they are ready. 2) Russia does not build large ships, ostensibly because of a lack of funds, but in fact due to the fact that Russia cannot feed the eternally hungry Rublevka, whose appetites are growing excessively all the time. This is where it is appropriate to build corvettes with real multipurpose weapons so that they can at least somehow replace the frigates ... 3) In ships with different modules, most of which will remain on shore, I see no benefit, since wars start suddenly and the enemy will not wait for the necessary modules to be loaded from the shore. Russia needs multipurpose ships capable of immediately engaging in battle, and everything else is a waste of money ...
  26. Svetlana
    Svetlana 31 January 2018 15: 06
    +1
    Quote: Terran
    The problem here is not so much in powerful domestic electric motors with acceptable characteristics, but in domestic powerful frequency converters

    It's time for our industry to produce power three-phase inverters based on ScC switches with nominal parameters of 1200 V / 300 A
    They have small dimensions. 1000 pcs of such inverters, sufficient to control 100 MW power, can easily fit in several cabinets with dimensions of 1m * 1m * 1.5m each.
    https://www.macrogroup.ru/preimushchestva-zameny-
    igbt-na-sic-moduli-v-silovyh-sborkah
    http://datasheet.su/news/3671:2015-10-15
    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WaI2ok2UH1Q igbt модули 3-фазные 2 полумоста на 75А 1200В на инвертор неубиваемый Toshiba MG75N2YS40
  27. 3danimal
    3danimal 1 February 2018 07: 13
    0
    Quote: Rurikovich
    Morality - Hello to Capitalism

    Do you think that the miniature budget of the military-industrial complex (with its share of 25% of the total) is caused by "capitalism"?
    Pay attention to the quality of managers in the ministries and "state corporations", the principles of their appointment. On the number of parasites in the economy, general theft at the highest levels (unattainable for Themis, who herself often trades with her body), attractiveness for investments, conditions for medium and small entrepreneurs (the best business now is to stick to the budget based on nepotism and family ties).
    Armed forces must match the capabilities of the economy. And it turns out how to appoint a machine gunner dystrophic 50kg ..
  28. 3danimal
    3danimal 1 February 2018 07: 20
    0
    Quote: Fury
    Russia cannot feed the eternally hungry Rublevka, whose appetites are growing excessively all the time. Here it is appropriate to build corvettes

    The modern Rublevka (Tuscany, Cote d'Azur, etc.) are not compatible with a healthy and strong economy and state institutions.
    And the corvettes .. This is, first of all, the guard. With an abundance of weapons, their price comes close to the frigates. The “case” costs very little in comparison with the “stuffing”. The result is low-sailing, expensive and, as a result, a few ships.
  29. 3danimal
    3danimal 1 February 2018 07: 37
    +2
    Quote: Alexander War
    Less need to invest in US treasuries

    You ... don’t swing at the sacred. And then they will write to extremists)
    In fact, this is the real foreign policy, and the stories about the confrontation are for internal use.
  30. mauuu
    mauuu 1 February 2018 14: 33
    0
    Thanks to the author! An interesting series of articles. This article about corvettes is hard to read because only ship project numbers are indicated, if there were names, it would be much better
  31. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 1 February 2018 21: 14
    0
    tchoni,
    exactly! I agree completely
  32. Dmitry Tantsyura
    Dmitry Tantsyura 4 February 2018 01: 14
    0
    not yet diving?
  33. Nemchinov Vl
    Nemchinov Vl April 13 2018 13: 30
    0
    I also find the shipbuilding program of the Russian Navy in many ways not logical. For example, I don’t understand for what reason 20380/20385 corvettes (and later 20386 or 22160) were chosen to ensure the BMZ PLO functions in the presence of a proven project 11661K (such as Dagestan) that they are ready to build for Vietnam and Sri Lanka (even in credit), etc., if, as it seems to me, both in terms of armament composition and price / quality ratio, to ensure the BMP PLO functions (i.e., to replace the aging MPK 1124 and 1131) are they more suitable ??
  34. Chaldon48
    Chaldon48 18 March 2020 22: 12
    0
    Without a Soviet backlog, Russia was defenseless like a chicken.