Station project 10831: AC-12, in the ranks with 2004 g .;
1910 project stations: AC-13 (1986 g), AC-15 (1991 g) AC-33 (1994);
Project stations AC-21 (1991 g), AC-23 (1986 g), AC-35 (1995 g).
Little is known about them. These are small submarines with a surface displacement from 550 to 1600 tons with a crew of 25 to 35 people, all of them are part of the Northern fleet and are used in the interests of the Main Directorate for Deep-Water Research of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (GUGI).
What is gugs? This is one of the most secret organizations of our armed forces - according to some data, the percentage of Heroes of the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation among the personnel of the GUGI is comparable to that in the cosmonaut detachment. GUGI is engaged in hydrology and hydrography - there is no need to explain how important the maps of the underwater situation are for the crews of our submarines, including strategic missile submarines. Of course, a detailed knowledge of the hydrology of the northern seas will give our ships very great advantages in confronting any foreign submarine fleet - in essence, this can be compared with the opposition of two armies, one of which has a complete set of military maps, and the second - an atlas for elementary school. However, in addition to science, even if in its most applied variety in the interests of our fleet, the GUGI is also engaged in other activities, including:
1) Collect intelligence information about enemy vehicles;
2) Protection and maintenance of deep-water communication lines;
3) Lifting from the bottom of the remnants of secret equipment remaining after tests or accidents.
There are some suspicions that the term “service of deep-water communication lines” refers not only to Russian, but, first of all, to foreign fiber-optic lines laid across the ocean floor. But here it is only possible to guess and envy the descendants about the possibilities of the GUGI: there is no doubt that in the distant future, when the activity of the GUGI is declassified, they will learn a lot of interesting and unusual things.
According to the speculations of the open press, our nuclear deep-water stations are capable of sinking to a depth of six kilometers (at least some of them), but they cannot independently go far into the ocean on their own. Accordingly, as part of the Russian Navy there are two nuclear submarines-carriers of deep-water stations and underwater vehicles. This is about:
1) BS-136 "Orenburg" project 09786. Boat converted from K-129 - SSBN project 667BDR, was put into operation in 2002 g
2) BS-64 "Moscow region" project 0978. Converted from K-64 project 667BDRM to 2015.
There are no data on the technical characteristics of these ships, but they are used, of course, in the interests of the same GUGI. So, for example, the bmpd blog in 2012 g reported:
"27 September 2012 of the BS-136 nuclear submarine of the 09786 project with the nuclear deep-water station of the grade AC-12 of the 10831 project reached the North Pole during the Sevmorgeo expedition. The Sevmorgeo expedition carried out to clarify the high continental shelf boundaries in order to clarify the high continental shelf, the North Pole expedition aimed at refining the high continental shelf to make the North Pole. rock samples were taken to collect evidence of the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ranges to the Russian continental shelf. The results are planned to be submitted to the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea in 2014 year. "
The representative of "Sevmorgeo" reported additionally:
"During the expedition, we drilled three wells at a depth of 2-2,5 kilometers and took three cores (rock columns), which are removed by the drill - ed.). One core is 60 centimeters long, the second is 30, and the third is 20 centimeters. Unhindered The silt layer at the bottom, which reached five meters in thickness, interfered with hard rock
Well, we wish our submariners from GUGI further success, and in any case not to stop there. Since they were able to substantiate the belonging of the Lomonosov and Mendeleev ranges to the Russian continental shelf, it would be quite good to present irrefutable evidence that Alaska is no more than one of the peaks of the above-mentioned ridges ... (it was a joke - approx. auth.)
In addition to the above ships, which are part of the Russian Navy, today two more nuclear-powered special-purpose submarines are being built, namely:
1) К-329 "Belgorod", which began to be built as the SSGN of the Antey 949 project, but December 20 of 2012 was refilled according to the 09852 design. Entry into service is expected before the end of this year.
2) Submarine project 09851 "Khabarovsk". This submarine was laid 27 July 2014 g in the highest secrecy in the shop number 50 ON "Sevmash". According to some reports, the entry into the fleet should be expected in 2020.
The purpose of these boats is secret. It has been suggested that Belgorod will become the carrier of the once acclaimed Status 6 system - a giant deep-water high-speed torpedo with a nuclear warhead intended for the destruction of coastal cities. Foreign sources see Belgorod as an all-rounder that can not only threaten with a Status blow, but also carry the newest harpsichord-2P-PM deep-water submersibles, as well as Shelf nuclear power plants for powering the network of underwater sensors.
The latter are worth to dwell on them in more detail. "Harpsichord-2P-PM" is a deep-sea uninhabited apparatus. According to Igor Vilnit, developer and general director of the Rubin Central Design Bureau, “Harpsichord-2Р-ПМ” is capable of performing work at depth 6 000 m.
But almost nothing is known about the purpose of this device, except to the question of the correspondent: “We also wrote about robotic complexes for the protection of sea areas and the continental shelf in the Arctic. Is this also “Harpsichord”? ”, I. Vilnit answered:
It's still a slightly different family.
As for the "Shelf", this is a very interesting and extremely necessary undertaking for the domestic fleet. According to American experts at HI Sutton, Russia is preparing to deploy a network of naval facilities designed to detect and identify foreign submarines in the Arctic Ocean. In their opinion, Russia's goal is to build a system, like NATO's SOSUS, but more modern and at the best technological level, such that it will allow you to control the movement of the latest submarines in real time. The system architecture includes underwater sensors-hydrophones, the energy supply of which will be performed by special underwater nuclear power plants of low power.
Nuclear reactors for such stations have already been developed and are called “Shelf”.
But we will return to the underwater lighting systems, but for now let us return to the Belgorod nuclear submarine. Another intended method of its use is the use of geophysical towed antennas for the exploration of mineral resources located under the seas and oceans.
According to the author of this article, Belgorod is being created to replace the BS-136 Orenburg. The fact is that K-129, which was converted into “Orenburg”, was commissioned by the Soviet Navy in 1981, respectively, in 2021 g, it will celebrate its fortieth anniversary. This is a lot for a Soviet submarine, since it was assumed that their service life should not exceed 30 years. Of course, in the course of large-scale re-equipment and modernization the boat will be able to serve more, but nevertheless it’s time for her to “retire” in the very near future. Therefore, the most likely destination of Belgorod will be the transportation and management of crew-less and robotic deep-water vehicles of a new generation, it is also possible to lay cables for various purposes under the ice.
As for the Status-6 super-torpedo, its existence or development is in serious doubt. Of course, the task for which the “Status-6” is allegedly created is extremely important - in the event of a full-scale nuclear conflict, the destruction of major US port cities will be a terrible blow for Americans, as it paralyzes external sea transportation, which will interrupt foreign trade and prevent the transfer of troops to Europe . But still this task can be completely solved by conventional means, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles of land or sea-based and the creation of a separate, fairly complex and expensive weapon system that requires special carriers does not look reasonable. In addition, there are big questions to the media. No matter how modernized the Belgorod is, it will still remain the 3 generation's boat, and far from the quietest among its peers. "Belgorod" does not need to be called a "roaring cow", but it repeatedly loses in the secrecy of modern nuclear submarines and SSBNs, and does it make sense to install strategic weapons on it? The author is inclined to assume that the Status-6 project is, rather, a means of information warfare, and is intended to force Americans to spend money on protection against a non-existent threat.
... although, of course, it cannot be ruled out that the author of this article fulfills the instructions of the Russian Defense Ministry and convinces Americans that “Status-6” is a fake. And then, when Armageddon blows out, Belgorod and Khabarovsk will come out on the line of attack and kaaaak ....
As for the submarine project 09851 "Khabarovsk", then absolutely nothing is known about this boat.
One of the fantasies about how Khabarovsk will look
There were a variety of opinions about its purpose, including that the boat will be:
1) carrier of deep-sea vehicles
2) Multipurpose atarinas, less expensive than "Ash"
3) Ship for long-range sonar watch
4) Experimental platform for testing GAK and armament for submarines 5-th generation
5) And finally, that this is not a submarine at all, but a large nuclear deep-water station.
The first option raises certain doubts, because it is unlikely that the Russian Federation is experiencing the need to have as many as three large submarines - carriers of deep-sea vehicles. It is expected that Khabarovsk will be put into operation in the 2020 year and it can hardly be assumed that it is needed to replace the Moscow Region, which has returned to service after the conversion to 2015.
The second option - a cheap multi-purpose submarine - is also very unlikely and there are two reasons for this. First, the design of “cheap Ash” would most likely be trusted to the developer, i.e. CB "Malachite". Khabarovsk, as it became known, was developing the Rubin Central Design Bureau. Secondly, it is known that the development of a boat of the 5 generation has been started in the Russian Federation, and the head boat is planned to be laid closer to the 2025 year. Against this background, financing the development and construction of the second type of MAPL 4 generation looks like a waste of money. The version of the deepwater station is also somewhat doubtful, because the Russian Federation has recently clearly favored relatively small, unmanned deep-sea apparatuses. According to the author, the versions of the ship of the long-range sonar watch, or an experimental boat for testing the MAPL technology of the 5 generation, look the most likely, but by and large all this is fortune telling on the coffee grounds.
In addition to numerous nuclear submarines and stations, a special-purpose diesel submarine is also part of the Russian Navy: B-90 "Sarov" of the 20120 project, which was commissioned in 2008,
This boat is also at the disposal of the GUGI, but probably its main profile is testing various weapons and equipment for non-nuclear and atomic submarines.
In general, we can say that with the special purpose submarines of the Russian Navy, the situation is quite good. What, alas, cannot be said about the underwater lighting system, the deployment and operation of which our underwater commandos could well provide.
A long time ago, 4 March 2000 was signed and adopted the document "Fundamentals of the policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities up to 2010 year." In accordance with it, the construction of the Unified State System for Lighting Surface and Underwater Situation (EGSONPO) was supposed. The importance of this task for the country is difficult to overestimate, especially in the context of the continuing reduction of the fleet.
The ancient Romans used to say “Praemonitus praemunitus”, which means “who is forewarned is armed” in Latin. There is no doubt that in modern naval war, knowledge of where the enemy ships are located would be for our small fleet the most important advantage that can at least largely compensate the numerical superiority of the enemy. This is also because in the seas washing our shores the enemy cannot have such information about our fleet. And besides, operational knowledge of the location of enemy nuclear submarines would practically guarantee the invulnerability of our submarine strategic missile carriers.
Unfortunately, the construction of EGSONPO in the Arctic before 2010 g was completely failed.
Then, at the end of 2010, the creation of EGSONPO was included in the “Strategy for the Development of the Maritime Activity of the Russian Federation before 2030 of the Year”. According to this strategy, the UGSONPO should have covered the Arctic direction by 2012% for 30 and by 2020% for 50. As far as today can be judged, these figures are completely not met. Moreover, judging by the publications in the open press today there is not even an understanding of what should be EGSONPO.
Thus, for example, Rear Admiral S. Zhandarov, in his article “The Homeless Arctic”, published in 2015, indicates that, instead of deploying the currently existing developments, the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation has continued to invest all kinds of experimental design work on this topic. Moreover, according to Rear Admiral, for the most part these OCDs are of a very dubious nature:
“Each State Armaments Program (HPV-2015, 2020, in the project - and 2025) begins with large-scale billions of billions of R & D to cover the situation in the Arctic region. Through the Federal Target Program “Development of OPK-2020” from 2011 to 2014, 3,2 was spent a billion rubles to organize the groundwork for creating an “Integrated Network-Centric Underwater Surveillance System”. But not a single square kilometer under water in the Arctic, in the exclusive economic zone as a result of this work, has been illuminated. ”
At the same time, the rear admiral states that (at the time of writing this article, that is, 11 in February, 2015 d) only one sonar complex was adopted, but it is not deployed in positions either.
As far as can be expected, this is the MGC-608M system, which provides for the placement of bottom-passive sensors connected in a single network and powered by energy from underwater reactors. According to Rosoboronexport's advertising brochure, a similar system (ICG-608E North-E) can include from 8 to 60 sensors and detect objects with noise levels from 0,05 to 0,1 Pa over an area from 1000 to 9000 square kilometers, but let's say , objects with noise in 5 Pa - to 300 000 square kilometers.
On the other hand, even the MAPL of the 3 generation (if the data for the “Pike-B” is correct) had about 60 dB of noise, and this is just 0,02 Pa. Will the "North-E" "catch" submarines 4-th generation? It is not known, but one should not forget that “E” in the name of the system most likely implies “Export”, and in our country sometimes the potential of export products is reduced.
But in general, it can be assumed that Rear Admiral S. Zhandarov proposes to rely on stationary hydroacoustic complexes. Obviously, S. Zhandarov knows about their capabilities not by hearsay, since he himself was a military sailor in the past, and later - the director of defense at the Atoll research institute, which is engaged in the development of MGC-608M. By the way, because of this, “on the Internet” he is reproached for not taking care of the good of the business, but defending the interests of his institute, but is this reproach deserved?
Other well-known specialists in hydroacoustics - Valentin and Viktor Leksiny, in their series of articles “Does Russia have modern hydroacoustic armament?” Believe that such a system should be not so much stationary as mobile and include not only stationary (near-bottom) sonar complexes , similar to MGC-608M, but also a large number of their mobile analogues, i.e. a network of remote receivers that can be quickly deployed in the right areas when the need arises. Valentin and Viktor Leksiny, at the same time, consider stealth as an extremely important factor for the survival of such systems and suggest concentrating on passive sonar.
But M.Klimov, in his article “Hydroacoustic Sadness”, on the contrary, believes that passive sonar cannot provide an opening of the underwater environment, and that it must be supplemented with an active one.
There are other authors who propose other ways to solve the underwater situation, and they also contradict each other and the above points of view. In addition, the author of this article is forced to state that very often publications on hydroacoustic topics are kept in the style of “only I know how to do it right, and the rest are deeply mistaken”, and even worse - there are frank accusations of forgery and corruption. It must be said that the topic of hydroacoustics is extremely difficult for a non-expert, and it’s completely impossible to understand it without being a hydroacoustics professional with real work experience at sea. Probably, some of the authors are really right (they all cannot be right, as they express polar points of view), but in general, there is still a feeling of corporate struggle between developers.
However, almost all publicists agree on one thing - no EGSONPO, we have no system for covering the underwater situation, and it is unclear when it will appear. What does this mean in practice? As Rear Admiral S. Zhandarov writes:
“From February 11 to August 13, the New Hampshire submarine 2014 uncovered all the strategic containment activities of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea.”
The same SSN-778 "New Hampshire"
In other words, in case of aggravation of international relations and the emergence of an armed conflict between the Russian Federation and the United States in 2014, Russian SSBNs would have been destroyed before they used ballistic missiles. It is clear that the one and only New Hampshire is incapable of this, but the Americans in the 2014 g had nine submarines of this type, and at the end of the year one more was added to them.
Of course, the SSN-778 "New Hampshire" is an extremely formidable opponent - this is the fifth boat of the "Virginia" type, and the first boat of the Block-II modification, but you need to understand - today and in the future we will be confronted by an even more formidable opponent. And we should be ready for this yesterday, but alas, we are not ready today and it’s not a fact that we will be ready tomorrow.
There is one more important aspect in the EGSONPO problem. Although in the open press attention is not focused on this, but EGSONPO should extend not only to the Arctic, but also to the waters of the Far East, where we also have strategic submarine-launched cruisers.
Can we handle it all before 2025? Are the EGSONPO fully aware of the importance of the government? It is known that V.V. Putin personally participated in the meetings on the non-working Polimet-Reduta, an anti-aircraft missile system, whose problems prevented the delivery of the main frigate of the 22350 Gorshkov project. But the solution to our problems in hydroacoustics is much more important than even the entire series of these frigates.
The conclusion from the above is very simple. Today we are experiencing a total shortage of modern multi-purpose nuclear and non-nuclear submarines. To this is added the absence of systems for controlling the underwater situation, which further complicates the deployment of our SSBNs in a threatened period. No matter how sad it is to admit it, but today, in the event of an exacerbation of relations with NATO, we will send our submarine strategic cruisers to the unknown, in the hope that their low noise, sonar and crew experience will allow them to slip past the American cordons and yet the red button will be pressed to fulfill its purpose. In essence, today the fate of a third of Russian strategic nuclear forces is entrusted to the Russian “avos”. And, what is even sadder, there are no guarantees that during the 2018-2025 years. our position will change for the better.
To be continued ...
Previous articles of the cycle:
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future
Russian Navy. A sad look to the future (part of 2)
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 3. "Ash" and "Husky"
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 4. "Halibut" and "Lada"