Russian Navy. A sad look into the future: a mine-catastrophe

Mine-sweeping forces of domestic fleet... Usually, the articles of the cycle presented to your attention are created according to a certain template. A certain class of ships is taken, the composition and capabilities of those representatives of this class who are currently part of the Russian Navy are studied, and their cancellation is forecasted. And then the possibilities and the number of new ships of the same class that the Russian Federation is building or intending to lay in the near future are explored. All this is compared, after which a conclusion is drawn about the sufficiency or insufficiency of our forces for the next 10-15 years.

In the case of domestic mine-sweeping forces, this scheme does not work. No, of course, in the structure of the Russian Navy there are both sea and base and raid minesweepers, and in quite a noticeable number. The problem is that in spite of the presence of ships, mine-trawling forces capable of dealing with some kind of modern threat, in the Russian Federation there is no.

Why did this happen?

It is no secret that today, the fleet’s combat capability is still based on ships built and built under the Soviet Union. SSBN? Their basis is still constituted by the “Dolphins” of the 667BDRM project, made in the USSR. Multipurpose NPS? "Pike-B", made in the USSR. Submarine missile carriers? Project 949A "Antey", made in the USSR. Missile cruisers? Big anti-submarine ships? Diesel submarines? Our only aircraft carrier?

Made in USSR.

But with the minesweepers, alas, they blundered in the USSR. And by 1991 g we had, although numerous, but already outdated trawling fleet, which already then was not able to solve the tasks before it. Of course, the USSR worked on overcoming this lag, but it didn’t have time, and “bequeathed” it to the Russian Federation, and we ...

However, first things first.

From the very moment of mine-trawling inception and up to about the 70-s of the last century, the main method for the destruction of mines was trawls towed by specialized ships - minesweepers. At first, the trawls were contact (their principle was based on cutting the miniport - a cable connecting the mine to the anchor), then - non-contact, able to imitate physical fields in such a way as to force the detonation of the bottom mines. However, the mine case was continuously improved, and the moment came when this scheme was outdated. In the 70 of the twentieth century, a mine revolution took place in the west: trawling (that is, towing a trawl across a minefield) replaced mine trawling ahead of the minesweeper, and specialized hydroacoustic stations (GUS) were engaged in the search, and - Unmanned underwater vehicles.

At first, everything was not so bad - at the beginning of the same 70-s of the Soviet Navy received a comprehensive mine finder seeker KIA-1. It consisted of a hydroacoustic station MG-79 and STIUM-1 (self-propelled remote-controlled mine finder). KIU-1 is a first-generation complex, its technical characteristics were quite at the level of imported counterparts.

But then the strange began. First, the fleet with a creak accepted innovation, preferring the usual towed trawls. Secondly, the development of the next-generation anti-mine complexes was taken from Leningrad to Uralsk (Kazakh SSR) - and there it was started from scratch. As a result, before the collapse of the USSR, in 1991 g, the second generation STIUM “Ketmen” was created, as far as can be judged - a powerful aggregate of large dimensions, but alas, with a high level of physical fields, which is absolutely not good for fighting the threat of mines. Ketmen became an integral part of the KIU-2 complex. Apparently, the USSR is already lagging behind the NATO naval forces. Work was also begun on the 3 generation STIUM “Route”, which were supposed to provide parity for the USSR as tools for mine-fighting. However, the development of the "Route" could not be completed before 1991 g, and then ...

Then there was a failure almost in a decade, and only at the end of the 90-ies the corresponding order was issued to the state research-and-production enterprise (SNNP) "Region", which had considerable experience in creating uninhabited underwater vehicles and underwater marine weapons. The new complex was supposed to include:

1) Automated mine action system (ACS PMD) "Sharp"

2) GAS mine detection with a podkidny antenna "Livadia"

3) GAS mine detection on a self-propelled remote-controlled underwater vehicle "Livadia STPA"

4) STIUM for the destruction of mines "Maevka"

Russian Navy. A sad look into the future: a mine-catastrophe

Two "Mayevka" and "Livadia"

Unfortunately, it seems that “Livadia STPA” had difficulties, a towed side-scan sonar was created instead. Everything would be fine, but with such a GAS the minesweeper loses the ability to conduct anti-mine reconnaissance along the ship's course. According to others, “Livadia STPA” nevertheless ultimately earned as it should, but, unfortunately, the author does not have accurate data on this subject.

And now let's briefly briefly describe the peripeties of domestic mine action complexes and list minesweepers as part of the Russian Navy. In total, our fleet includes three types of minesweepers:

1) Marine - the largest, capable of performing minesweeping work at a great distance from their native shores, including accompanying ships of the fleet on long voyages,

2) Basic - for operation in the waters of the closed seas, ensure the safety of approaches to the bases of the fleet.

3) Raid - for action inside the water area of ​​ports, on raids, in rivers.

Let's start from the end. As 1 December 2015 g as part of the Russian Navy was totaled 31 raid minesweeper (RTSCH), including: RTSCH project 697TB (2 pcs) RTSCH 13000 project (4 pcs) RTSCH 12592 project (4 pc), RT-168 1253 project (1 units), XTNXX RTN-343 project (items 1225.5), 1 RTN projects (1258 pieces) and 10 RTsch project (10750 pieces). All of these ships have from 9 to 61,5 tonnes of displacement, speed from 135 to 9 units, artillery armament in the form of a single 12,5-mm or 30-mm machine gun, or 25-mm Utes machine gun, some of them are provided with the placement of MANPADS.

As an exotics, there are some interesting two radio-technical equipment of the project 697TB, created on the basis of small fishing trawlers.

Yes, perhaps, the four minesweepers of the 13000 project, which are radio-controlled unmanned boats - breakers of minefields.

But alas - with the exception of nine ships of the 10750 project, all ships of this subclass can only use towed trawls, which means they are completely outdated. In essence, it does not matter when they were created or how long they could remain in the ranks - the only important thing is that they are not able to fight not even with the modern mine threat, but even with 80 mine of the last century.

The situation with the minesweepers of the 10750 project is slightly better.

They were originally built taking into account the use of the KIU-1 or KIA-2M Anakonda mine complex (the latter using the KImen STIUM).

There were 22 units in the Russian fleet, including the 19 of the 12650 project and the 3 project of the 12655 project, however, these projects do not have any fundamental differences between them.

The standard displacement of ships is 390 T, the speed is 14 knots, the cruising range is up to 1 700 miles. Originally armed with one twin 30-mm gun mounted in the bow and one 25-mm - in the stern, later instead of them began to install 30-mm six AK-630. The "highlight" of the project was the wooden case - fiberglass at that time was not yet sufficiently mastered by industry. As an anti-mine vehicle, BSTSH can carry either KIU-1 or towed trawls of various types. Due to the reduced level of physical fields (wood!) And the newest for 70-s (the construction of the minesweepers of this project started then), the anti-mine fighting system, which at that time KIU-1 was, could be considered one of the best minesweepers in the world. All 22 ships of this type were commissioned in 80-x - the beginning of 90-ies of the last century, and only "Magomed Hajiyev" - in 1997 g.

And finally, sea minesweepers. We have them on 1 December 2015 g was listed as 13 units, including:

MSCH project 1332 - 1 units.

A former fishing trawler, in 1984-85 he was re-equipment in Arkhangelsk. Standard displacement 1 290 t, speed - 13,3 bonds, weapons - 2 double-barreled 25-mm machine gun, two grenade launchers MRG-1.

MSCH project 266M - 8 units.

The standard displacement is 745 T, the speed is 17 knots, the range is 3 000 miles, the armament is two 30 mm cutters AK-630, two 25 mm submachine guns, 2 RBU-1200, Igla-1 MANPADS. Of all the MTSchch of the 266M project as part of the Russian Navy, only 2 ships of this type were put into service in 1989 g, the rest - as early as the 70s of the XX century They were very good for their time, they could use KIU-1, today six ships of this type are in the 40 formation for years and more, and the two youngest are 29 for years.

MSCH project 12660 - 2 units.

The standard displacement is 1 070 T, the speed is 15,7 knots, the range is 1 500 miles, and the armament is one Xnumx-mm AK-76 and AK-176М, 630 * 2 PU launchers of the Strela-4 MANPADS. Anti-mine - KIU-3 with STIUM "Ketmen"

MSCH project 266МЭ - 1 units. Valentine Pikul. Similar in its performance characteristics to the ships of the 266M project, it was possibly intended for more modern mining and armament weapons (KIA-2?), Became part of the fleet in 2001 g

MSCH project 02668 - 1 units. "Vice Admiral Zakharyin".

The standard displacement is 791 t, the speed is 17 knots, one 30-mm AK-306, two 14,5-mm machine guns, the Igla-1 MANPADS. It is a MTSCH project 266МЭ adapted for a new anti-mine complex with the STIUM “Mayevka”. Launched in 2009

So what do we have? Formally, we have as many 56 minesweepers of different types, but if you look a little more closely, it turns out that only modern X-machines of trawling can be used with modern methods of trawling. It seems to be a good idea too - but if this is to forget that the 34 ship of the above listed can only be used by the C-21, that is, the equipment of the 1-s. But the same Kaptora (at least theoretically) are capable of fighting only 70 ships, of which 13 are raid minesweepers with a displacement of 9 tons, i.e. they are completely non-merciless.

However, if you listen to the words of people directly related to the mine case, then the picture emerges much more gloomy. The fact is that for some reason the leadership of the Navy underestimated the modern means of searching and destroying mines, and, despite the appearance of the newest KIA, it preferred to use the old, good, time-tested trawls. In the fleet, KIU (integrated mine-seeker-destroyer) in the fleet was used by individual officers and enthusiasts, and all official tasks were set and solved by towed trawls — in other words, the Soviet Navy, despite the presence of remote-controlled underwater vehicles, did not acquire as many Something rich experience in dealing with mine danger through CVD.

In the Russian Federation, these trends have only intensified. And therefore, despite the presence of ships that theoretically can use KIA, practically only two minesweepers used them - the “Valentin Pikul” and the “Vice-Admiral Zakharyin”. On the first, the container version of the new KIU with the STIUM (self-propelled remote-controlled mine finder) was tested, “Mayevka”, on the second - the ship version.

Container version of "May Day" on "Valentina Pikule"

The first one is interesting in that it can be installed on almost any ship, even if it is not a minesweeper, but, as far as the author knows, after the tests this copy was removed from “Valentin Pikul”, and at “Vice-Admiral Zakharyin” exploitation was faced either with technical, whether with some more problems.

In other words, as part of the Russian Navy on 1 December, 2015 g was ONE minesweeper with a bit of modern anti-mine weapons. And perhaps there was not one.

What does this mean? For example, the impossibility in combat conditions to withdraw strategic-class submarine cruisers from bases, because no one is stopping the US nuclear submarines from setting up mines during a threatened period.

Here, however, the question arises - how could it happen then in general? And here we return to the description of the misfortunes of domestic KIA.

The fact is that at about 2009, we had a relatively modern CI 3 generation - the combination of Dies, Livadia and Mayevki, which was developed instead of the Route created in Kazakhstan. Judging by the table below, among its foreign “classmates”, “Mayevka” did not shine with “indifferent in the world” indicators.

And so, as far as it is possible to assume according to information from open sources, a collision of interests of the three groups occurred.

The first group, the creators of “Mayevka”, naturally, advocated that their system, which passed, by the way, all the required state tests and adopted, went into mass production.

The second is the designers of the new mine-threat complex called Alexandrite ISPUM. This system is the next, 4-th generation, which should, by its functionality, go to the world level.

And finally, the third group, which did not see the point of messing with domestic developments, but preferred to purchase self-propelled controlled underwater vehicles in France.

In the end, it turned out that for the HPN 2011-2020 we had, albeit not the best in the world, but still quite functional complex "Diez" / "Livadiya" / "Mayevka", which passed state tests and is ready for mass production. Perhaps this complex had some problems, but again, judging by the information in the open press, there was nothing that could not be fixed during the operation. In other words, we had mine-sweeping forces of about six dozen mine sweepers, “stuck” in their fighting qualities somewhere in 60-s and completely unable to fight not with the modern, but even with the mine threat of 90 level years of the last century. And with a relatively modern mine fighting complex, which, perhaps, did not have enough stars from the sky, but was still fully operational - but which was not available to our minesweepers.

So, we could choose “a bird in the hands” - to put it simply, to modernize our least old sea, base and raid minesweepers, replacing the equipment (or using the place where it should have been) KIA-1 and 2 “With Sharp,“ Mayevka ”and Livadia. We could, in addition to the old ships, build a small series of cheap basic minesweepers based on the same 12650 project, with its wooden hull. Thus, we would have today, if not the best in the world, but still more or less adequate mine-sweeping forces, capable with high probability of ensuring the entry-exit of our surface and underwater forces from naval bases.

But instead, we preferred the “crane in the sky” - with a wave of the hand at “Maevka”, we continued to develop “Alexandrite-ISPUM”, and developed a new type of minesweepers for the 12700 “Alexandrite” project. At the same time, at a minimum, the lead ships of the series were to receive French systems for the search and destruction of mines, until the Alexandrite-ISPUM was ready, and when it would still be ready ... Well, it could turn out differently, because under the Minister Defense Serdyukov the rejection of domestic developments in favor of imports was with us, as it is now said, the most fashionable trend.

In fairness it should be noted that there were supporters of the "French loaf" and the rationale for their position. The fact is that remote-controlled vehicles in conjunction with the GUS to search for mines turned out to be quite effective anti-mine weapons. Accordingly, the mines received technology that impedes such a method of trawling. It looked like this - when setting up a minefield, most of the mines were set based on the surface and submarine ships of the enemy, but some of them had to play the role of “mine defenders” - they exploded as they approached the underwater demining vehicles.

Of course, such an approach complicated the trawling, but still did not make it impossible. For example, it would be possible to use surface unmanned vehicles to initiate explosions of “mine defenders”, and then, when “defenders” are neutralized, to carry out trawling using conventional methods. Or it was possible to create kamikaze underwater vehicles, which, at the cost of their death, would have caused the mine defenders to explode, after which nothing would have threatened the “real” underwater remote-controlled vehicles. Perhaps there were also other options for dealing with mine defenders, but we didn’t have this.

The enthusiasm of our fleet with old towed trawls did not allow us to gain much-needed experience in the operation of remote-controlled underwater vehicles, respectively, with the appearance of "mine defenders" there was a feeling that even promising domestic STIUM were outdated and some fundamentally new means of dealing with the new threat not even in development. At the same time, foreign military thought followed the path of the "kamikaze", creating disposable mine destroyers. Their advantage was that with the help of such a “kamikaze” the mine was destroyed quickly and very reliably, the disadvantage is that the device cost much more than any mine.

Therefore, the position of the supporters of the “French” option: “Let's buy a foreign superaparatura, but we will not wait until our MIC creates the next one” either a mouse or a frog, but the unknown animal still had a perverted logic, but because from Alexandrite-ISPUM "(ulita is traveling - sometime it will be) foreign submarines actually proved their worth. Therefore, if the idea was to acquire several sets of imported equipment in order to gain experience with them and an idea of ​​their potential If we could improve our own developments, this would be a very reasonable decision. However, as far as the author could understand, the supporters of the purchase of French equipment were talking about something else - about the complete replacement of domestic elaborations with imports.

In general, we tried to purchase the whole range of equipment required in France - judging by the armament that is offered for minesweepers of the 12700 project for export, each minesweeper should receive:

1) Two autonomous anti-mine underwater vehicles of the Alister 9 type with an operating depth of up to 100 meters;

2) Two remote-controlled uninhabited underwater vehicles of the K-Ster Inspector type with an operating depth of up to 300 meters;

3) Ten disposable remote-controlled underwater mine destroyers of the K-Ster Mine Killer type.

Alas - then everything went in full accordance with the proverb of the people, and instead of “a crane in the sky”, we got a “duck under the bed”.

The head minesweeper of the 12700 project, “Alexander Obukhov”, was laid on 22 in September of 2011 g, was launched in June on 2014 g, and entered the system only in 2016 g.

Yes, but he did not receive any French equipment - by virtue of the sanctions, it was prohibited to supply modern trawling systems to the Russian Federation.

Thus, we have received the latest, very large (full displacement - 800 t) and not having analogues in the world minesweeper. Do not laugh, it really has no analogues - its hull is formed by vacuum infusion, while the world record was set, since its length was 62 meters and the "Alexander Obukhov" became the largest ship in the world made using this technology.

The fiberglass hull gives the minesweeper advantages, significantly reducing the level of its physical fields. Even taking into account the fact that a modern ship of this class should not climb into a minefield by itself, this is an extremely useful bonus, because anything happens to the sea and additional protection by the minesweeper will never be superfluous.

However, its main anti-mine weapons remain the same towed trawls, which are conceptually outdated in the 70s of the last century. However, this is not a completely correct statement, because unmanned boats were also used by the “Alexander Obukhov”.

Do not give to buy overseas mine complexes? Let's buy a crewless boat, the benefit of which the restrictions on sanctions for some reason have not spread. Moreover, the “device” of the French turned out to be really quite interesting: it has two GUS, one of which is designed to detect mines at a depth of 10 m (old anchor mines), and the other at depths of 100 m, including bottom , and can operate at a distance of 10 km from the carrier ship! In addition, the Inspector is able to “manage” (more precisely, to relay control from the minesweeper) to submersible mine destroyers of the K-Ster Mine Killer type.

True, the K-Ster Mine Killer itself was never sold to us. The reasons why the French Navy was not at all interested in the brainchild of the “gloomy French genius” under the name Inspector-MK2 have not been announced. At the time of the transaction, the manufacturer didn’t have a single “Inspector” in any country in the world. On this informational background, questions about whether a competition was held among foreign manufacturers of such equipment, whether an optimal offer was chosen, and whether the Inspector-MK2 passed state tests in the Russian Federation clearly go to the category of rhetorical. In the end, we should have bought from the French at least something, because the funds for this are allocated! And so, in 2015, Prominvest, part of Rostec Corporation, concludes a contract for the supply of Inspectors to 4. Two of them were delivered directly to our fleet in the same 2015, but it’s unclear about the second pair, perhaps they were never delivered to the fleet (did the French remember the sanctions?)

But, be that as it may, a pair of “Inspectors” filled up our fleet. So, the lead ship of the 12700 project minesweepers series still received modern anti-mine weapons? Unfortunately no.

The problem is that buyers somehow did not pay attention to the geometric dimensions of the "Frenchman." And they, unfortunately, do not allow Inspector-MK2 to be taken aboard the minesweeper of the 12700 project.

As a result, “Alexander Obukhov”, of course, can bring “Inspectors” in tow ... or put the crew there (there is such an opportunity) so that they take the French boats to the right area, and then, before the trawling, take people off. The main thing is that the excitement does not happen, because in this case the transfer from the 9-meter boat will become one more problem ...

There is one more “funny” nuance. Someone might say that we supposedly bought Inspector-MK2 in order to get acquainted with the best foreign technologies, see what they are doing abroad and adjust their own developments. But the problem is that the French "Inspector" is optimized to search for mines at shallow depths (up to 100 m), that is, it completely does not cover the whole range of mine defense tasks (today some mines can be placed at 400-meter depth). Accordingly, its acquisition (followed by ... eghkm ... replication) could solve only the particular tasks of trawling the waters of naval bases and approaches to them (where the depth is appropriate). But these boats were purchased for a very large sea minesweeper, which is absolutely contraindicated for work at shallow and very small depths!

Today we are designing Typhoon unmanned boats, which should surpass the French Inspectors in their capabilities, but ... let's start with the fact that the 12700 project minesweepers in the world, with all their advantages, have one minus - they are expensive. The cost of "Alexander Obukhov" is authentically unknown, but the bmpd blog cites data on its insurance contract. So, the insured value of the head minesweeper of the 12700 project is “from the moment of testing until the ship is handed over to the Customer” 5 475 211 968 rub. Most likely, this is the cost of the new minesweeper, but it is possible that this insurance contract only provides for compensation for the costs of its construction, i.e. the cost of this ship is higher by the amount of the manufacturer's profit and VAT.

But even if 5,5 billion rubles. - this is the price of the fully finished ship, and without its main weapon, the anti-mine complex (which could only be partially taken into account in the cost of the minesweeper, as the minesweeper was not equipped with anything except the HAS), the 12700 project ships for us truly "Gold". And it is precisely such that, apparently, the “Typhoons” want to make for them, which already cost 350 million rubles in the basic configuration.

But what is 350 million? Nonsense. Therefore, the manufacturer proposes to equip the unmanned boat with shock modules (!) And / or Orlan unmanned aerial vehicle (!!!). No, don’t think bad, the UAV performs an “archival” function - if without it, the typhoon control range from the minesweeper reaches 20 km (which is clearly more than enough), then from the UAV - as many as 300 km! The same can be driven directly from the St. Petersburg Admiralty into radio-controlled boats! And if they are also equipped with combat modules, then they can arrange a "sea battle" at the meeting ...

It remains only to be glad that there are no proposals to equip the Typhoon with launchers for the Gauges and the landing deck for a promising vertical take-off and landing fighter (although ... the author of this article is not surprised by anything). Strictly speaking, the integrity of the developers perfectly characterizes the above poster. As follows from the table “heading”, they compare their “Typhoon” with the Inspector-MK2 ... but here in the “for some reason” table the performance characteristics of the previous Inspector-MK1 modification are given.

And here's the sad result. Today we are building the “golden” minesweepers of the 12700 project - one was commissioned, four more - at different stages of construction, are expected before 2020. In December, 2016 of the Navy Commander Vladimir Korolev reported that 3 of the minesweeper was “contracted”, but stocks, they still have not stood up. In addition to them, we create at least "golden" typeless "Typhoon" type boats. In the depths of the scientific research institute "gloomy domestic genius" with might and main is designing the latest and most modern anti-mine system Alexandrite-ISPUM, which will certainly be the best in the world, but sometime later, for now, you need to remember to transfer the next stage of development work in a timely manner ... And, by the way, discover new research. Because of the incomprehensible negligence of the Alexandrite-ISPUM is being developed exclusively in the ship modification, but not in the container one, therefore, for example, it is not possible to install it on our under-ships-patrol ships of the 22160 project.

At the same time, our only operational complex "Diez" / "Livadia" / "Mayevka" is already on one minesweeper, its container modification tested on "Valentina Pikule", according to some sources, was taken somewhere near Moscow.

Well, what if war? Well, have to learn from the experience of the Royal Navy. One of the key tasks of Rear Admiral Woodward, who commanded the carrier group of the British in Falklands, 1982, was to ensure the landing of the landing force - and bloodless whenever possible. All anything, but the approaches to the landing site could be mined, and in the composition of the Woodward connection there was not a single minesweeper. New ships of this type have just been tested, and they have not sent them to beat the originally British Falklands from the Argentines.

But how to deal with mine danger? Rear Admiral had no choice - he had to send one of his frigates, Alakriti, so that he could check the presence of mines in the landing zone with his own bottom. In his memoirs, Woodward wrote:

“Now I had a difficult mission to invite Christopher Craig, the captain of 2 rank, to say,“ I would like you to go tonight and see if you can drown when you hit a mine in the Falklands ”...”

The admiral risked a small frigate with a crew of 175 people, so as not to endanger the landing craft jam-packed with marines. It is in this way that, in which case, we will have to put SSBNs into the sea - by launching a multipurpose nuclear submarine in front of them, because the Russian Navy does not have a different way to protect missile submarines from modern mines. There is only one nuance - when the British ship was killed in battle, its commander or senior officer, according to tradition, uttered the phrase: “The King has many” (“King has a lot”). And even in the Falklands, despite the fact that the Royal Navy in 1982 r was only a shadow of its former glory, this phrase would still be fair with respect to Alakriti - the Crown still had quite a few small frigates.

Alas, this cannot be said about our multi-purpose submarines.

Previous articles of the cycle:

Russian Navy. Sad look into the future
Russian Navy. A sad look to the future (part of 2)
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 3. "Ash" and "Husky"
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 4. "Halibut" and "Lada"
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 5. Specialty boats and this weird EGSONPO
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 6. Corvettes
Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Part of 7. Small rocket
Our news channels

Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.

Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +7
    22 February 2018 15: 26
    Now comes uv. mina - and then described in the article will seem optimistic look. smile
    1. +9
      22 February 2018 16: 42
      Well, I don’t know - it’s even darker? :))) By the way, mina read with great interest, and even stole some photos from his posts.
      1. Cat
        22 February 2018 17: 07
        I knew that the state of the mineral fleet of Russia is sad, but so .......
        Thank you very much Andrey! hi
        1. +9
          22 February 2018 17: 14
          You're welcome. Alas, until recently, I myself thought that things were a little better ...
          1. Cat
            22 February 2018 17: 30
            Three years ago in the Kuban, they showed me the "cottage" Serdyukov. Then I first pecked "crazy thought" - Stalin is not enough for them.)))
      2. +4
        22 February 2018 17: 57
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Well, I don’t know - where is it even darker? :)))

        Well, for example, to describe the history of the development and selection by the fleet of complexes and systems of mine-seekers-destroyers - in colors and details. In bmpd's comments, when it came to this, the poison literally drained from the monitor. smile
        1. +5
          22 February 2018 18: 06
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Well, for example, to describe the history of the development and selection by the fleet of KIU - in colors and details.

          And I would listen with pleasure, chesslovo. I love the big boatswain bend performed by a professional!
          1. +5
            22 February 2018 19: 39
            excellent article, read in one breath.
            and what is not visible or anything about:
            Mobile multi-purpose complex for lighting the bottom and bottom conditions of the Galtel-Alevrit type. It is not a glider, immersion is due to the operation of the screws. Designed by order of the Russian military. Designed to detect underwater mines, but can be used for other tasks.
            Autonomous uninhabited vehicles can scan depths up to 400 m. By using a group of vehicles, an increase in the area survey speed is achieved.
            The complex includes the Chilim apparatus, designed to destroy detected dangerous objects.

            The complex includes a remote-controlled unmanned underwater vehicle and two autonomous uninhabited submarines, with autonomy up to 24 hours and range up to 100 kilometers. For 12 hours, an underwater drone surveys an area of ​​four square kilometers. The submarine can move along different trajectories and is able to avoid obstacles. So, fixing the approach of an obstacle, the command control system gives the autopilot the task to bypass the danger. The device independently chooses the path, and then returns to the previous course.
            Initially, the complex was intended to search for underwater mines, but Galtel can make out an object the size of a matchbox. In parallel with the photos, the device also shoots video footage. All data is transferred for analysis to the control center. If necessary, a telecontrolled apparatus capable of operating at a depth of up to 400 meters is lowered into the water.
          2. +4
            22 February 2018 19: 40
            Andrey, I welcome you! I am always happy to read your articles. It’s a pity that there has been critically little time lately to express an opinion on a particular issue, but I still try to properly review comments. Moreover, the last of the inhabitants of the site who have something to draw from the "pantry of knowledge" called the head are natively gathering around your materials. However, I am somewhat worried. I remember the first series of articles you wrote while looking for a new job. I hope this time the reason for writing this, I’m not afraid of this word, research (because it is such) is still a spiritual impulse, and not at all an excess of “free time”.
            Be that as it may, I do not have to complain - as a reader I get excellent analytical reviews of the state (although rather degradation) of our fleet, but I would also like the author of this review to be fine too good hi
            1. +2
              23 February 2018 19: 01
              Quote: Dante
              However, I am somewhat worried. I remember the first series of articles you wrote while looking for a new job. I hope this time the reason for writing this, I’m not afraid of this word, research (because it is such) is nevertheless an emotional impulse, and not at all an excess of “free time”.

              Alas :)))) Something has not been lucky for me lately :)))) so yes, I'm sitting without work hi
          3. 0
            22 February 2018 22: 55
            the conclusion is very simple. with "Galtel - Aleurite" any Our warship will have the functionality of a minesweeper
  2. +8
    22 February 2018 16: 56
    In general, the subject of mine-torpedo and mine weapons of the Navy of the USSR / Russia is some sacred taboo, a lot of rumors and few facts. For all the time, and this is 15 years, I found only two books on torpedo weapons and one on mine weapons and that's it, books which are really interesting, not murzilki. The article is a big plus, I really liked it, the author is very requested to continue this very interesting topic, and if you can cover foreign equipment in chronological order. Thank you very much.
  3. +2
    22 February 2018 17: 01
    the problem has long been known, the fleet command is subject to a tribunal, ...... but there is money for the Mistrals and super destroyers and cruisers
  4. +1
    22 February 2018 17: 16
    Becoming I looks provocative. Today in Syria they tested a robot underwater "Galtel" of the naval forces. Which successfully scanned the seabed off the coast of Syria, conducted a search for unexploded ordnance, and also performed combat missions that were not reported in the media.
    1. Cat
      22 February 2018 17: 59
      Conversation and children about the mine-sweeping weapons of the open sea. According to the article, we have a good base ship, but without modern minesweepers.
    2. +7
      22 February 2018 18: 04
      Quote: Geksagena
      Today in Syria they tested a robot underwater "Galtel" of the naval forces. Who successfully scanned the seabed off the coast of Syria

      Well, this news was not when I laid out the article - it does not immediately appear on the main page. And then, sorry, but so far I see no reason for optimism - the device is not something that has not been adopted for service, it has not entered the CRM, so far it is only a question of finalization based on the operation results.
      And, excuse me, but an unexploded ordnance and a mine are SO different objects, that ... there is nothing to talk about.
      1. 0
        23 February 2018 07: 42
        This is good news, but how many similar systems are there in the Russian Federation? As usual, individual pieces that do not weather. If only with time, if enemies give such an opportunity.
  5. +6
    22 February 2018 18: 00
    Dear Andrey! About the project 1332 MSC, it can be said that the patient is more likely dead than alive. Alas..
    1. +5
      22 February 2018 19: 15
      I guessed, respected Testov, but I didn’t know that for sure. Thank! And with the coming! drinks
  6. +2
    22 February 2018 18: 44
    There is no need to scratch your turnips for a long time: I would urgently put into production our only workable DIES / Livadia / Mayevka complex. We have no other and it is not clear when it will be. And Livadia with Mayevka can always provoke mine defenders, which will do a useful job. By then there will be our new complex. Yes, and this can be equipped with cheap "mine provocateurs" - kamikaze.
  7. +2
    22 February 2018 18: 46
    Here the questions arise:
    - How big is the threat of running into a minefield in a modern conflict? (for over 50 years nothing has been heard about their use)
    Minesweepers are not only engaged in the search and destruction of these mines, but they themselves must be able to set them? How are things going with the installation of minefields?
    Are there any lags in our mines from western samples?
    How prepared is the world for such mine wars?
    Will they be used only in global conflict? (There is no information on the use in local conflicts)
    1. +4
      22 February 2018 18: 55
      Perhaps there is no problem!
      1) We have a bunch of outdated minesweepers who can put minefields
      2) In stocks from the time of the USSR there were huge reserves of sea mines (well, I hope so)
      3) Our fleet is not a rival in an open battle to a potential enemy ... and it will not be possible to arrange raids on enemy shores ... the fleet will focus on protecting our coast and under the cover of aviation ...
      Under these conditions, minesweepers will set up barriers ... they are not expected to have another job ...
      If of course we begin colonial expansion and go on to seize some sort of banana republic ... then we will need minesweepers and UDC and other means of aggressive attack ...
      Do I get it right?
      1. +11
        22 February 2018 19: 14
        Quote: seos
        How big is the threat of running into a minefield in a modern conflict? (for over 50 years nothing has been heard about their use)

        That is, the undermining of the American landing helicopter carrier Tripoli and the cruiser Princeton during the Storm in a Glass - is it "not heard"?
        Quote: seos
        Minesweepers are not only engaged in the search and destruction of these mines, but they themselves must be able to set them?

        They can also supply, if necessary, within the framework of the defense of bases.
        Quote: seos
        Under these conditions, minesweepers will set up barriers ... they are not expected to have another job ...

        The main work of our fleet is to ensure the deployment of SSBNs, in which we have more than a third of the strategic strategic nuclear arsenal. Given the fact that today the Russian Navy does not have the means to control deployment areas, one should expect there herds of enemy nuclear submarines that are quite capable of any dirty tricks, including minefields.
        In other words, the absence of sane mine-sweeping forces = a threat to our nuclear shield.
        So clearer?
      2. +2
        22 February 2018 19: 48
        Quote: seos
        the fleet will focus on protecting our coast

        Will the ships protect the shore at the walls, or will they go to sea? And if so, then access to the open sea through the narrownesses that the enemy will seek to close the cost center is necessary, and minesweepers must make passages to the cost center. The fellow countryman has already explained about ensuring the combat stability of the strategic nuclear forces.
      3. +1
        23 February 2018 09: 59
        A likely adversary, by the way, has recently had the opportunity to remotely place sea mines remotely from airplanes with the possibility of dumping out of the coverage area of ​​ground-based air defense systems. Mines are equipped with GPS modules, which provides good accuracy, and spread wings.
        May be reset with B-52 for example.
        1. 0
          26 February 2018 10: 06
          You can also remember about self-transporting mines - a hybrid of mines and torpedoes with a range of 30-40 miles.
    2. 0
      26 February 2018 11: 33
      Quote: seos
      - How big is the threat of running into a minefield in a modern conflict? (for over 50 years nothing has been heard about their use)

      During the Six Day War, the Suez Canal was bombarded with mines. For several years, traffic got up in it.
  8. +5
    22 February 2018 19: 42
    Bravo, countryman! Great analytical article! More to such in. And where only in the South Urals, decently remote from the ocean theater, such marine-related analysts? good
  9. +4
    22 February 2018 19: 44
    five points as always hi
  10. 0
    22 February 2018 22: 51
    The article is good. One thing is surprising: do our minesweepers still use old 25-mm anti-aircraft guns?
    1. 0
      23 February 2018 00: 05
      Oh .. how many wonderful discoveries for us ...
    2. +1
      23 February 2018 05: 29
      Well yes. They are also called "fly swatter" in the fleet ... Their task is to shoot the anchor mine that has surfaced after the "cutting". Many thanks to the author for the informative article. I was taught mine sweeping over 20 years ago, and even then a lot was an anachronism ... now the situation seems simply disastrous.
      1. +1
        23 February 2018 10: 44
        After that, I won’t be surprised if suddenly somewhere on the ships there are unicorns from the time of Catherine
        1. +4
          26 February 2018 10: 08
          Quote: Aviator_
          After that, I won’t be surprised if suddenly somewhere on the ships there are unicorns from the time of Catherine

          DShKM on "Peter the Great" is suitable? wink
          1. 0
            4 March 2018 14: 33
            So there isn’t much difference, DShKM, that KORD, HB2, the Belgians, the ancient French and the Japanese will shoot almost exactly the same - the main thing is that the curbstone does not hang out, it's not an infantry machine. Mines (and barmales) are fired from machine guns from about 500-1000 meters, for other distances there are other calibers and settings
  11. -1
    23 February 2018 00: 22
    800-ton “ship” (with emphasis on the last syllable) 5 !!!!!! years to build. You go the right way, Russians.
    1. +1
      23 February 2018 00: 35
      Quote: Seeker
      800-ton “ship” (with emphasis on the last syllable) 5 !!!!!! years to build. You go the right way, Russians.
      Oil and gas tankers are building faster. What are ships, missiles, air defense, minimum crew, future trend ..... laughing
      1. +1
        24 February 2018 12: 05
        Quote: XXXIII
        oil and gas anchors build faster. What are ships, missiles, air defense, a minimum of crew, the future trend.

        As far as I understand, commercial is always faster to build. There are problems with the military.
        1. +1
          24 February 2018 16: 15
          Quote: Antares
          Quote: XXXIII
          oil and gas anchors build faster. What are ships, missiles, air defense, a minimum of crew, the future trend.

          As far as I understand, commercial is always faster to build. There are problems with the military.
          There is such a topic, “CONSOLIDATED TABLE OF PROPORTIONS OF SHIPS AND FRIGATES,” which we have approved, we will build! In general, a lot of what is taken into account when building ships and their purpose, and around Russia there are different water ecosystems, different composition of water, depths. And also the doctrine of the Russian Federation is defensive, which means that patrol vessels and coastal air defense are in priority, the size of ships and weapons are also different.
          Direct development of the report card began no later than March 1723; it was then that the ship masters F. Sklyaev, O. Nye, R. Kosenz, R. Brown, G. Ramz and “the chief ship master Peter Alekseevich Mikhailov” (the tsar himself) presented their options for measuring the ships to the Ober-Sarvaer (shipbuilding) office. Peter I then proposed measurements for 96-, 80-, 70-, 64-, 54-, 42-, 32-, 26- and 16-gun ships.
    2. +3
      23 February 2018 05: 52
      However, built. How many ships did you build during this period?
  12. +8
    23 February 2018 07: 29
    It seems that when the Alexandrite was designed, the designers thought not about the fleet getting an inexpensive, but efficient ship, but about getting the most out of it. Those. Notorious selfish interest. And what were the wooden cases bad for them? They can be similarly constructed with composites, epoxies, but several times smaller than a fiberglass monolith .. Moreover, the fire at Kurbatov showed that the restoration of such hulls is a complicated matter, not like a wooden one .. But the minesweepers themselves are still there is no panacea. from mine danger, methods of search and destruction of mines are important. From my point of view, unmanned underwater vehicles are one of the best options, but progress on this path is minimal, and primarily for psychological reasons, the mentality. And if the article voiced the idea of ​​using MAPL as a human shield when withdrawing an SSBN from bases, then there is nowhere else to go. But with what rapture the submarines of obsolete projects started to cut through the cutter:: 671 (of all modifications). What a freebie from the delivered metal! This was not what our commanders thought in order to get a good one for the fleet, but most likely about their personal benefit. But these RTshki, RTMki. could become just those unmanned ships with a wide range of capabilities. Only in Russia they are so eager to destroy, everything previously created by previous generations is stupid and thoughtless. Just like the barbaric attitude to natural resources (subsoil, forests, fish .... that is, everything that gives income without unnecessary brain effort. And this is the level of banana states, but not of a Great country, something like that
  13. +3
    23 February 2018 09: 29
    Welcome Andrew! hi
    But with minesweepers, alas, they blundered in the USSR.

    True, in the USSR Navy, as in the Imperial Navy, minesweepers were treated indulgently. In 70-80 it was believed that if war is tomorrow, we will mobilize trawlers, seiners and cover the need for mine-sweeping forces (pr. 1332 confirmation of this). In 70-80 minesweepers wherever they were involved as convoys, and for tracking, and for art support, and for displaying the flag, and even as an air defense ship (MTSC Steering and MTSC-219). Although sometimes the minesweepers worked according to their profile, during the clearance of the Suez Canal, the KFF and KTOF minesweepers spent thousands of hours in the minefields of 6, having traveled thousands of miles with 17 mines and eliminated the mine danger on the 1250 square. miles!
    Thank you Andrew for the article, happy holiday drinks
  14. +6
    23 February 2018 09: 35
    At the Pacific Fleet there are 5 strategic nuclear-powered submarines (of which 2 are the latest 955 projects). And their deployment is provided by as many as three minesweepers of old projects. The arrival of the first minesweeper at the Pacific Fleet is planned only by 2021. Here is another crime of our "strategists". But give them an atomic carrier in 100 thousand tons and an atomic destroyer in 17500 tons. Some kind of idiocy. Or maybe a conspiracy? ... :))
  15. +2
    23 February 2018 10: 04
    By the way, having looked at the composition of modern foreign anti-mine complexes (SACs, remotely-controlled search apparatuses and hunting apparatuses, remote mine detonation systems with acoustic and magnetic detonators), I thought this: if there is currently no way to file a new version of classic anchor contact mines, but in an all-plastic case (Schaub magnetometer did not detect) with an anti-acoustic coating? ... Cheap, cheerful, plus to this, as I understand it, there are no contact trawls on modern foreign minesweepers ....
    1. +1
      23 February 2018 12: 34
      Alas, the plastic case and the anti-sonar coating will not hide a mine from sonar ... they catch fish in the sea and ocean with the help of fishfinding sounders and sonars. That is, mines will be detected in the same way as fish. There is another option. Do not think of a mine that can dig into the ground? What would only the sensors of the physical fields of the ship stick out ... in a rocky or rocky ground, a mine cannot be "drilled", but in sand - why not? And the combat part of such a mine will be a small torpedo, something like a Hummingbird.
      1. +1
        23 February 2018 15: 54
        If the mine has an echo signature at the fish level - then, KVM is already not bad.
        Bottom mine launching torpedoes are the norm, but modern search / destruction methods are precisely for such (approximately) objects.
        In general, you have to look at the options. And that is a real chance to lag behind in the mine-torpedo race.
        1. +3
          24 February 2018 05: 18
          We are already behind, nowhere else. The author of the article has not yet reached our torpedo weapons, I assure you, the situation there is not much different from the state of mine weapons.
          Nevertheless, I would like to draw the attention of readers to this:
          Quote: doktorkurgan
          Bottom mine launching torpedoes are the norm, but modern search / destruction methods are precisely for such (approximately) objects.

          they are imprisoned for the search for bottom and anchor mines. In other words, they are looking for something that lies at the bottom or rises above it for several meters. To look for a mine buried in the ground is quite another ... I think that the future of sea mine productions will be behind this: mines will begin to be hidden.
  16. +1
    24 February 2018 09: 18
    development of mines and weapons, the most important task of the navy
  17. +1
    24 February 2018 12: 08
    Mine weapons are always "in the shadows." He has always been underestimated. As a result, losses.
    By the way, modern mines are very complex mechanisms (than the usual mines from the time of the Second World War), there will be much more harm from them ..
  18. +1
    26 February 2018 11: 38
    Do we have minesweepers at all?
    Mi-14 modifications were in the USSR, if they have not all been written off.
  19. +1
    27 February 2018 15: 44
    Quote: Evgeniy667b
    It seems that when the Alexandrite was designed, the designers thought not about the fleet getting an inexpensive, but efficient ship, but about getting the most out of it.

    here the question is different - MARASME ISPUM
    STA ISPUM frankly fought with the “Double Needle”, only when the “Double Needles” and the GAS were put on the “Tripartites”, they also SAVED the “pair of hammers” of RAR-104 (and moreover, they added small TNLA to them now)

    we have washed down with GOLD at the cost of a “piece of the hydroacoustic complex” weighing in TON, which is offered to THROW ON MINES
  20. 0
    27 February 2018 15: 48
    Quote: Geksagena
    Becoming I looks provocative. Today in Syria they tested a robot underwater "Galtel" of the naval forces. Which successfully scanned the seabed off the coast of Syria, conducted a search for unexploded ordnance, and also performed combat missions that were not reported in the media.

    YOUR post looks like a fool unable to think
    1. And what is the ACCURACY of the definition of "filth" in the "acceptance" to say "modestly forgotten"? After “My Army-17”, after my questions, the Gling IMPT FEB RAS felt “very wet”
    2. The fact that “Galteli” has such a level of physical fields that it itself is blown up in a mine and does not mean anything?
    3. And “Chilim” “acceptance” “where lost”? Ah yes, IMPT asks "ANOTHER 2,5 YEARS - ON OCD"
  21. +2
    27 February 2018 15: 50
    Quote: Romario_Argo
    the conclusion is very simple. with "Galtel - Aleurite" any Our warship will have the functionality of a minesweeper

    IT'S Nonsense
  22. +1
    April 21 2018 04: 32
    Dear Andrey, the impression, of course, remains depressing after reading your articles in this series. But there must also be something good, why not write you an article about Russia's nuclear missile shield?
    Yes, this is probably not what it was during the late Brezhnev, but the West is no longer the same.
    I would love to read a cycle in your style, here are tactical, here are strategic, etc. nuclear forces.

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned), Kirill Budanov (included to the Rosfinmonitoring list of terrorists and extremists)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev Lev; Ponomarev Ilya; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; Mikhail Kasyanov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"