The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 20. Lvo
Consideration of the events on the eve of the war in the border districts we will start with the LVO, the first district in the list of addressees of Directive No. XXUMX. Since in the Directive directives are given to all five border VOs and no districts are singled out specifically, then all indications are equivalent for all districts. The words supposedly that in the General Staff everybody understood perfectly well that in relation to the LWO there would be other instructions — this is from the evil one. There is no evidence for these words, and if there is no evidence, then these words cannot be trusted.
If all the instructions of Directive No. 1 are identical for all HEs, then, therefore, orders before June 21 regarding the troops of the districts should also be identical for all districts. What happened to the troops and aviation in LVO, before receiving Directive No. 1, it should somewhat resemble similar events in the western border districts. This is a hypothesis, and we will check it in other parts devoted to the western districts, and in this part we will check in the LVO. Help 1 Office NKGB USSR 7.5.41: "1. According to officers of the Finnish General Staff, in the event of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, the Germans will do their utmost to involve Finland in the war against the USSR.
2. The German offensive will begin on Murmansk military units stationed in Northern Norway, and the German naval and air forces will support the Finnish army in southern Finland.
3. German officers said that the month of May will be a critical month in the Soviet-German relations... »
As of June 15-18, it was not known whether Finland would take part in the war with the USSR, and if so, when. For the period of preparation of Directive No. 1 there was no clarity on this issue in the General Staff.
From the second half of 1940, the transfer of German troops and cargo for the group being created begins.
Special Post 4.10.40: "According to reports, from the 2nd half of August 1940, reinforced transfers of German troops from the Narvik region to the northern part of Norway, Finmarken, bordering Finland, began. At the same time, winter uniforms, airplanes, were transported through Sweden and Norway to Kirkenes tanks, heavy artillery, anti-aircraft artillery... »
In accordance with Considerations GSA spacecraft on a strategic deployment plan (15.5.41) states: "Probable allies of Germany can put up against the USSR: Finland - before 20 front... "About Finnish troops is clear. And how many German divisions according to the General Staff were in Finland and in Northern Norway?
In 1941, the transportation of German troops to Finland continues. As estimated by RU GSH on 20-00 22.6.41: "In the north [in Finland] the main grouping is made up of units of the German army, which in the Rovaniemi sector has up to 3-4-x divisions, and ... in the Kirkenes area, up to three more divisions... "Total to 7 German divisions.
In addition, according to intelligence data, German divisions were stationed in Northern Norway: on 5 in May 1941 - 4, on 15 in May - 5, on 1 in June - 6. By the beginning of the war, some of them could have been relocated to our border, but this did not happen.
In fact, a separate German army “Norway” and the Karelian army of the Finns were deployed on the territory of Northern Norway and Finland. This group consisted of 21 division and 3 brigades (of which to 22.6.41 - to 4 German divisions).
Special message. Ostwald 15.6.41: "Head RU GSH KA. It was precisely established: during the period of June 5-15, at least two motorized divisions following the train trains, the 12-16 pace, and marching order to the regions of Northern Finland were unloaded in the ports of Vaaza, Oulu, Kemi. Unloading in ports and transportation from the end areas of unloading in Rovaniemi continues... "
Specify destination Rovani. In the 14 part, it was said that the number of German MDs could be included 133 tank. The two focused MD could be part of a mobile group with up to 266 tanks. Until the morning of June 10, the leadership of the spacecraft was to see this information. In the future, the reaction of the Commissar of Defense and the General Staff to these RMs was to follow.
17 of June, on the instructions of the NSH LVO 1-I of the 1-m, begins the extension by rail to the Alakurtti station. Such a movement of a tank compound cannot be made without the approval of the General Staff. According to the author, this movement was carried out by order from Moscow. The figure shows the location of the concentration of German divisions, etc. of the Red Army.
According to P.A. Sudoplatova: "Guide NGOs and GSH sought to prevent the creation of the enemy on our borders groups that would have overwhelming superiority over spacecraft. Achieving at least the balance of forces on the border was the most important direction of the military policy of deterring Hitler from throwing at Russia... »
If you accept the version of PA Sudoplatov, it becomes clear the meaning of the transfer of 1 th TD in Karelia. It was carried out to counter the threat of a breakthrough of a mobile German motorcycle and tank grouping to the railway connecting Murmansk and Leningrad.
In some books, this transfer is associated by the authors with the planning of a pre-emptive strike of a spacecraft on Finnish troops. It is probably beneficial for someone to show in his writings the “bestial face of the USSR”. It should be noted that in fact there was no MD in Finland, but there were only two German sections with the total number of 124 tanks.
The situation on the border of LVO with Finland before the war can hardly be called peaceful. The border guards and commanders of the LVO visually fixed the concentration of German-Finnish troops during the summer nights near the border. The decision of the head of the Navy Hanko to transfer the base to increased combat readiness confirms this. Below is a message that describes the preparatory activities for military actions or provocations by Finland.
Special Post 17.6.41: "We report English data on the concentration of German troops in the area of Rovaniemi. According to the British, two German divisions are heading south from the Kirkenes area. Two divisions are being transferred by sea across the Gulf of Bothnia, and some parts of these two divisions are being transferred by sea from Oslo. It is not excluded that these transfers are indeed a holiday of a large size, as claimed by the Germans, but it is possible that they are timed to coincide with the use of maximum pressure by the Germans on the USSR... "
The Republic of Moldova once again speaks about the version connected with the use of pressure on our country by the Germans, and not about a full-scale war ...
Special message. Brand 17.6.41: "1. A general mobilization in Finland is confirmed. Everywhere there are a large number of reservists, following the destination. Mobilization started on 10 – 11 June. In Turku, in the parish of Koski, Pernio and in the villages of the Vuoksi Valley, mobilization is being carried out. 12 June in Tammisaari declared a state of siege, everything is brought to combat readiness.
2. In Helsinki, there are signs of evacuation. 16 June at the Helsinki station marked echelon with women and children, ready to be sent to Tornio.
3. In parts of the holiday discontinued, being on leave ordered to immediately appear in part... »
Only after the beginning of the war comes information that gave hope for postponing the period of a possible conflict with the armed forces of Finland.
Intelligence service RU GSH KA 20-00 22.6.41: "According to 21.6.41 in the Finnish army are called 24 age, i.e. before 1897, which allows you to mobilize an army in 350-400 thousand people and form up to 18 front (including brigades and individual battalions). Information about the deployment of the Finnish army on 21.6 has been reported... »
K.A. Meretskov: “[21.6.41 evening] S.K.Timoshenko said then: “Attention! tomorrow the war will begin! You need to be a representative of the High Command in the LVO. You know his troops well and will be able to help the district leadership if necessary. The main thing is not to succumb to provocations. ” “What are my powers in the event of an armed attack?” I asked.
- Exposure first. To be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into a war. But be on alert. In the event of an attack, you know what to do ...
Everything fell into place of its own accord when I turned on the radio and heard a speech by the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov about the villainous attack of fascist Germany on our country...
Arriving in Leningrad, I immediately went to the district headquarters ... Major General D.N. Nikishev and corps commissioner N.N. Klementyev [According to the memoirs of the commander of the LVO corps commissioner N.N. Klementyev 21-22 June was with him on the train.]
Before I arrived in Leningrad, a directive was sent from the NKO to the district headquarters to bring the troops on alert in connection with the possible start of the war. During the elapsed time, the formations, units and subdivisions of the district began to pull themselves closer to the state border and take up SD, but they did it slowly, because the directive required the troops to remain dispersed and move covertly ... [there was a period of white nights and the movement of the German-Finnish troops to the border was revealed by visual observation].
Gradually adjusted air defense. In general, the district failed to fulfill all the required. Even bringing the troops on alert carried out rather timidly: did not allow the last paragraph of the directive, which was forbidden to carry out without special orders any other measures.
At about eight o'clock in the morning, the district received a second directive from Moscow. But it was practically impossible to implement it, since in fact, it concerned only those armies that had already fought with the enemy in the NWF, Polar Division and the WFB. The special directive forbade us to cross the state border where the enemy did not violate it, and it was specifically stated that our aircraft should not make air raids on Finnish territory. Again the LVO could only wait for the development of events. Taking full responsibility, I instructed to force the bringing of troops into combat readiness and request information on the situation on the flanks of the district.
The Federation Council, commanded by Rear Admiral AGGolovko, said that the sailors are on their guard, but they are calm. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet under the command of Vice-Admiral V.F. Tributs conducted military operations at sea. Disparate information came from land bases on the coast of Latvia. However, from the mouth of the Neva Leningrad so far nothing threatened.
Finally managed to contact the headquarters PribOVO. The deputy commander of the district Ye.P. Safronov approached the phone ... The commander of the okrug’s forces, Colonel-General F. I. Kuznetsov, was at the border last night and even gave additional instructions on how to conduct combat shooting. Now it is not known where he is.
Further, EPSafronov said that the fate of the families of the commanders was very worried. A few days before the start of the war, on instructions from the district command, the family commanders were taken to the rear. But 20 Jun from the NCO came a categorical order to immediately return all to the old places. And now the fate of the families of the officers is unknown. Most likely, they are captured by the enemy... »
Calls from Moscow from spacecraft administration to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District before the receipt of the extensive Directive No. XXUMX, decision-making related to the activities of raising the district troops "fell on their heads" to the only head of the Military Council of the Leningrad Military District - Major General DN Nikishov. At that time, the commander of the military district troops of the military district of the military and military districts was on a train to Leningrad. Deputy Commander LVO Lieutenant-General KPPyadyshev at this time was in the Baltic States, because the territory of Estonia was in the area of responsibility of the LVO.
PC 00-10 22.6.41: "Tallinn, the Commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. By order of the commander 22 sk I am informing that the deputy commander of the military military unit General Pyadyshev arrived at the camp Petseri in 22-40. Nashtakor 22... »
It is strange that General Pyadyshev was allowed to go to Estonia on June 21, leaving the sole head of the District Military Council, NSN D.N.Nikishev, at the district headquarters. It is strange that the commander of the district was not in a hurry to arrive at the headquarters of the LVO and he rode the train calmly for 32 hours. All this is strange, if, according to literary figures, the highest command of the spacecraft expects a war at dawn on June 22. however, it’s commonplace war does not expect...
For various reasons, the situation in all the districts turned out to be painfully the same, except for ZOVO, where the decisions were taken by the District Military Council headed by the commander of the troops.
In the LVO, the entire responsibility for making decisions fell on the shoulders of the NSH of the district of DNNikishev.
In PribOVO, for some time, during negotiations with Moscow on the night of June 22 and making decisions on Directive No. 1, there was one NShP PS Klenov at the front control point. The deputy commander of the district troops, EP Safonov, was in the headquarters in Riga. The location of the commander of the troops Kuznetsov to 2 hours of the night is unknown. After 1-30 ... 2-00, Klenov probably manages to contact the commander. At about ten o'clock in the morning Kuznetsov is seen going out of his dugout. All decisions made in PribOVO, basically, this period lay on the shoulders of the NSH, which, like in other districts, was called and given "very valuable instructions", demanded not to panic, they reassured the heads of the spacecraft. And from below, the commanders of subordinate associations demanded instructions ...
In KOVO, the commander of the forces, Kirpanos, as recalled by NS Purkaev, did not dare to give instructions to the troops after receiving fragmentary information on the content of Directive No. XXUMX. Only after the arrival of the NS KOVO did instructions be given to the troops, in which the commander also took part. Is this so, we look at the appropriate part.
In OdVO, the commander of the troops, Ya.T. Cherevichienko, called NSh M.V. Zakharov and delegated to him the powers of the Military Council of the Okrug when deciding on Directive No. XXUMX.
According to the author, the situation during this period was so ambiguous that many of the leaders (including the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff) did not know what to do and probably did not dare to take responsibility. The consequences of the wrong decision for any of them at that time could lead to serious consequences both for the manager (who made the decision) and for the members of his family.
Thanks you, NSh districts, because they began to do at least something, while the leaders of the SV and the commanders of the districts turned out to be (willingly or unwittingly) aside from making extremely important decisions. It should be noted that during this period the only commanders involved in the decision-making and who personally gave orders of an operational nature, which were forbidden to transmit on HF, were the general Pavlov.
Again, a question arises, to which there is no answer backed up by facts: if the top management of the spacecraft (according to literary figures) expects the outbreak of war on the night of 18 on June 22, then why are the VO commanders far from headquarters or KP during this period ? ..
The situation is similar with the vacations of military personnel, including senior managers. We have already met with such examples in the framework of the topic “Navy"And we will see such examples when considering the memories of veterans from the border western districts. If they are waiting for a war with 18 June, then what could be the vacation? And if they do not wait, then the situation is immediately clarified: with vacations and with the absence of commanders, and with the relocation of headquarters to field control points.
Literary figures offer a version to answer this question: "This is so that the Germans do not guess that we are preparing for a preemptive strike... "The European parliamentarians will applaud such figures: here it is, the despicable essence of the Russians: they do not observe any contracts and quietly violate them if they want to do some dirty trick to civilized people ...
Memories commander LVO MMO Popov, we consider at the end of, because on the eve of the war he was absent from the district headquarters.
A.A. Novikov (commander of the Air Force LVO): "In mid-June 1941g. together with a group of district executives ... I went on a field trip near Murmansk and Kandalaksha. But 20 June unexpectedly, on the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense ... was summoned to Moscow. On Saturday, I returned to Leningrad and immediately called the Commissariat. General Zlobin, who was under the People's Commissar for special assignments, said that they were transferring me to Kiev. Naturally, I immediately thought of General E. S. Ptukhin and inquired where they were transferring him. My question remained unanswered. Zlobin somehow hesitated and, after a short pause, answered that the question of Ptukhin had not yet been resolved, and I should be at the marshal’s 9 o'clock in the morning 23 Juneand hung up...
[If the question of Ptukhin is not yet resolved, then leave as unreliable a general (from the point of view of the agencies, the spacecraft leadership and the country) to leave the Air Force of the largest military unit. And why the new head of the KOVO Air Force should arrive in Moscow on 23 June, if, for example, literary figure Kozinkin claims that Tymoshenko and Zhukov are waiting for war on the night of June 22 ...]
“It's good that you came back,” said Alexey Vasilyevich. - I finished the inspection tour of the district aviation units and tomorrow I will fly to Arkhangelsk. My report is ready, it will be transferred to you. In general, things are going well for you, but I would like to verbally inform you about something, Alexander Alexandrovich. There are questions that are best addressed in a personal conversation. I wanted to tell Nikitin that I was no longer the commander of the District Air Force, but I changed my mind: it was always useful to have a thoughtful, well-informed person like Alexey Vasilyevich to talk face-to-face ... Our conversation dragged on.
At the end of the conversation, I asked Nikitin, as a more informed person, that can be heard on other parts of our western border and how there, at the highest levels, assess the situation in the border VO. In response, Alexey Vasilyevich made an indefinite gesture with his hands. “And by the way, we will try to find out,” he said, “order me a conversation with Moscow.”
A few minutes later, Nikitin talked with General PF, Chief of the Main Command of the Air Force Space Agency. Zhigarev. The conversation was short. Nikitin reported that he had finished his work in Leningrad, and asked if he should go to Arkhangelsk or return to Moscow. From the expression on the face of Alexei Vasilyevich, I realized that Zhigarev surprised by such a question. “Well,” said Nikitin, after hearing the authorities' answer, “ ordered to immediately fly to Arkhangelsk... »
Was running out the first hour of the night... We left the district headquarters ... and went off in different directions ... I did not have time to get undressed, when a telephone call rang in the corridor ... General D.N.Nikishev called NSH HE. Dmitry Nikitich ordered an urgent visit to him on a very important matter. I replied that I had already transferred my duties as Commander of the Air Force to General A.Nekrasov and on the evening 22 June train I am leaving for Moscow. “I know, I know, Alexander Alexandrovich! - impatiently interrupted Nikishev, - and yet I ask you to immediately come to headquarters. The decor is very serious. I will explain everything at the meeting. Waiting for you…"
About ten minutes later I entered Nikishev's office. Dmitry Nikitich was very excited. He immediately, without any prefaces, said that at dawn 22 June, i.e. today, the German attack on the Soviet Union is expected, and ordered to immediately bring the entire aviation of the district to full combat readiness.
- But for now, until receiving special instructions from Moscow, Aviation specific combat missions. Please give orders personally.
I again reminded that I am no longer the commander of the District Air Force.
“I’m done, I know,” Nikishev interrupted me angrily. - But there is no order to take office of General Nekrasov. Tomorrow Popov will return from Murmansk, and Zhdanov will probably arrive from Sochi, they will make the final decision about your replacement. In the meantime, the commander of aviation, I consider you.
The situation excluded any altercations, and I agreed. But I was it is not clear how to bring this aircraft into full combat readiness, and not to set specific combat tasks? After all, if there is war, then it is necessary to act as if in a war. Without clear objectives, without knowledge of the targets for which you will have to strike, aviation will not be allowed into action at once, especially the bombers. The bombers of ammunition depends on the target object: for strikes on manpower, he is one, on the fortifications - the other, on the airfields - the third. And I said that to Nikishev.
- That you, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, explain to me the elementary truths! - angry NS. - We are ordered clearly: do not set specific combat tasks. And the order must be executed. Here, read it!
Nikishev handed me a telegram just received, signed by the People's Commissar of Defense, SKTimoshenko, and the Head of the General Staff, G.K.Zhukov. I quickly ran her eyes ... and I involuntarily looked at my watch - it was already about two in the morning.
Returning to my headquarters, I phoned the commanders of all the air connections on the phone, ordered me to immediately pick up all the units at the signal of an alarm and spread them across field airfields and added that for duty on each home base of fighter aircraft they allocated one squadron ready for departure on a missile signal, and for bombers to prepare ammunition for attacking enemy forces and airfields. Only after giving all the orders did the administration go around ...
So the war began for me. She entered the city at 3 in the morning when Leningraders were still fast asleep. V. this time high in the sky, nine fighters rushed past, led by senior lieutenant M. Gneushev. Twenty minutes later, the first air battle broke out near Leningrad.... »
Something similar to the initiative of the commanders is again manifested after reading the incomprehensible and lengthy Directive No. XXUMX. As a result, anti-aircraft artillery attempted to fire on the territory of the LVO during the first raid of enemy aircraft, and the fighters began to patrol the airspace ... The aircraft of the LVO air force was rescued by the fact that at dawn on 1 June, enemy aircraft were not attacked ...
A.L. Shepelev (Deputy Chief Engineer, Air Force LVO): "21.6.41 we had to stay in control. The commander of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District, Major General Aviation A.A. Novikov handed over the case to another military leader ... Gen. A.A. Novikov was not able to go to Moscow for a new appointment. As soon as he returned home, he was urgently called to the district headquarters. There he was introduced to the directive of the People's Commissar just received ...
On the night of 22.6.41, General A.A. Novikov some once he called the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force KA General PF Zhigarev and reported that there was calm in the area of the LVO both in the air and on the ground. Informing about this Moscow, he simultaneously tried to learn about the situation in other border districts, but received answers that were not very intelligible...
At dawn 22 June 1941, General A.A. Novikov phoned General to Kiev E.S.Ptuhinu. It was felt throughout that that now is not up to talk. Alexander Alexandrovich slowly put the phone down and sighed sadly: "Yes, the war still began! Ptukhin says that the fascists are bombing Kiev ... ”Then General A.A. Novikov contacted the commander of the Air Force ZAPOV, General I.I. Kopets, and found out that the Nazi troops attacked our borders, the enemy’s planes bombed airfields, / d nodes and settlements. Equally bleak news came from the commander of the Air Force PribOVO, General A.P. Ionov ...
We did not think then that this would be the last conversation with the commanders of the Air Force of neighboring border districts, that we would not meet with them anymore. Like other veterans of the LVO, I knew well from the joint work of these aviation generals, who had been promoted to leading posts in special border VO. They possessed deep military knowledge, high flying culture, and more than once they showed heroism and bravery, selfless devotion to the Soviet Motherland.
As for the miscalculations and misses, allegedly admitted by them in the first days of the war, the right word, not only they allowed them. Let historians speak about this objectively and impartially.... ”Unfortunately, it is easier for individual literary figures, to their advantage, to declare these people traitors. If only money paid for their labors ...
P.A. Sudoplatov: "Forged charges was shot in February 1942, the Hero of the Soviet Union, the Hero of the Spanish War, the commander of the Air Force of the Southwestern Front Ptukhin. They arrested him and brought him to court on the basis of a special note by N. Khrushchev, which he handed over to Stalin, raising the question of Ptukhin’s responsibility “for the defeat of Soviet aviation”... »
B.V. Bychevsky: "By mid-June, the district headquarters had information about the concentration of the German fascist divisions in Finland, being transferred from Germany and Norway ... In the first half of June, I went with the assistant general of the district commander for Major-General PA Zaitsev to the Hanko peninsula, which after the Soviet - Finnish war turned into a naval base ... The district commander, Lieutenant-General MMPopov visited Hanko, examined the coastal fortifications and gave new instructions to the base commander, Lieutenant-General S.I. Kabanov, and 8 commander, Colonel SEC. .P.Simonyaku. After that, without waiting for the sappers to finish the long-term structures of the naval base, the Baltic and infantry sailors quickly began to create field defenses. The three-kilometer isthmus on the border with Finland has already crossed the anti-tank ditch, bunkers were created on the most dangerous areas ...
20 June [NSHLO] urgently called me by phone from Vyborg: “Come immediately”. Three hours later I was in his office.
- The situation, brother, has become more complicated. Finns on the Karelian Isthmus are activated. We will begin combat cover of the border. Clear?
- Not really.
- Prepare the sappers for minefield installation on the border.
“But all my people are busy in concrete work, Dmitry Nikitich.”
- So take off!
- Do you have instructions from Moscow on this? I believe that the laying of concrete can not be stopped ...
Nikishev angrily interrupted: “You never know what you think! Now there is no time to wait for instructions;. Collect all the mines in the warehouses and take them to the troops. For now we will write instructions to armies.
[Again we meet with the fact of the personal initiative of the NSH of the district of DNNikishev.]
I brought a newly developed engineering border cover plan and began writing orders to the 14, 7 and 23 armies about blocking the most important areas and roads with minefields. NS prepared an order to the commander of 23 army Lieutenant-General PS Pshennikov about advancing one division from the 2-echelon to the Vyborg region. This is so far limited.
Nikishev immediately locked himself in his office with employees of the intelligence and operations departments. And I sat down at my work cards, trying to imagine what tasks might arise before the District Engineering Department in the event of a war. Just a month ago, the General Staff demanded that we focus our attention on strengthening the borders north of Leningrad....
21 June I left home late at night. [How did he go home if war was about to be expected? Or not expected?]
An hour later, the duty officer called and told that an alarm had been raised at the headquarters. Gathered quickly. Commanders went from room to room, trying to figure out the causes of the alarm, but no one really knew anything. Only about five o'clock in the morning, General Nikishev invited to his office the chiefs of the combat arms: “War, comrades! Fascist Germany attacked us. Everyone to start the execution of plans "... »
G.A. Veshchersky: "In the morning of 21.6.41, I went to Major General D.N.Nikishev's NSH LVO to sign my holiday ticket. I was going to rest on the southern coast of Crimea. We were well acquainted with Dmitry Nikitovich ...
Nikishev was the commander of one of the newly formed divisions. Not stopping the conversation with him, Dmitry Nikitovich took my vacation ticket, but, before signing it, he handed me a note. “It is unlikely that you will be able to leave,” I read. Then he took the slip from me, tore it up, and nevertheless signed the holiday ticket and handed it to me. I lay down early, something around ten in the evening. Just fell asleep - woke the driver of my car Sparrows. I gave the order to immediately appear to the NSh district. Half an hour later I was already in the office of General Nikishev: “The Germans moved the troops close to the border. Go to the seventieth. By morning, the division should disperse and prepare for mobilization.... "
PC "Commander 70 sd: “The commander of the troops ordered ... 70 sd full combat readiness in 20-00 22.6 to make a campaign and to 7-00 25.6.41 concentrate in the area of Mutoranta, Pien-Pego, st.
RCB 7 Army: "20.6.41 units and units of the 7 Army stationed in points and areas ... according to plans and schedules were engaged in combat and political training. The headquarters of the divisions, in its full composition, were at staff exercises conducted by the army command.
Protection battalions from the joint ventures, sapper battalions of the army units and the Sortavala SD (stationed in the border zone) also engaged in combat training and part of the forces carried out work to improve the defenses built since the Finnish campaign 39-40. somehow: finishing the clearing and rarefaction of the forest in front of the embrasures of the bunker and the bunker and doing a number of other small works, on field filling areas, between the nodes of resistance and strong points ...
In the second half of the day, 21.6.41 from Finland took part in the violation of the state border - a Finnish aircraft in the border area No. 773 flew over the state border and plunged into our territory to 100 km. In the same day, in 18-55, in the border area No. 775, the plane flew into its territory.
22.6.41 fascist Germany perfidiously, without warning and declaring war on the Soviet Union, breaking the treaty between the USSR and Germany ... crossed the state border and began a war with the USSR using insidious methods ...
Knowing and firmly remembering that long before the start of the war, German troops were allowed to enter Finland on their territory, and that Finland’s entry into war was in alliance with Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union very likely, the commander of the 22.6.41 army ordered the commanders of the formations: 54, 71 and 168 sd to withdraw the troops for the defense of the state border to the areas designated by the plan and notify 19-00 not later than this day. In addition, an order was issued - to immediately deploy defensive work on the State Border on the construction of wire and anti-tank barriers.
Under the existing plans in 6-00 - 7-00 22.6.41, the battalions covering the army units located in the border zone took their positions by order of the commanders of the troops and, after monitoring the adjacent side, covered the collection and exit of units and formations to the state border... »
From the CCD it is clear that immediately after the alarm was announced, the covering battalions advanced to the border and by the morning of the morning took defensive positions.
RCB 81 cn (54 cd): "22.6.41. In 12-00, t.Molotov announced on the radio a treacherous German attack on the USSR. After the end of the speech of t.Molotov, NSH Captain Titov (stayed for the regiment commander, because the regiment commander was in the Voynitsa area with the 2 battalion), were called for instructions ... In 16-00 a copy was received an order of NGOs and mobilization was announced... »
RCB 337 cn (54 cd): "22.6.41 to 13-00 on the basis of the oral order of the 54 cd 337 cn, the company switched to the combat position and occupied the field UR No. 1, 2, 3, 4 for defense... »
RCB 462 cn (168 sd): “22.6.41. In 4-00, fascist Germany, without a declaration of war, treacherously attacked our homeland, .. In 8-00 the regiment was declared combat alarm. The regiment in full military armament lined up at the hippodrome on the highway, heading the column to the north. AT 13-00 a regiment composed of ... marched to the border... »
RCB 14 Army: "22.6.41. The fascist German forces are concentrated at our state border. Enemy aircraft make reconnaissance flights over our territory. At the ZF began major military operations. Not declaring war, Hitler's gangs invaded our country. Army units have put in place a "Covering Directive for 1941 of the Year."
22.6.41 by the end of the day parts of 14 sd are on alert ... Parts of 52 sd complete loading onto the Spartak steamer for crossing to Mishukov subway ... ... parts of 122 td also began to focus... »
D.O. Leichik (head of the engineering troops 14 A): "Against 14 And the German command launched two mountain corps ... The first instruction on bringing the troops on alert and preparing for combat was given to the army commander early morning xnumx... »
RCB 420 cn (122 sd, 42 ck): "22.6.41 on the orders of the regiment took defense at the state border... »
CDB 104 sd (42 sc): "12-15 22.6.41. Government report about the beginning of 4-00 22.6 of the military actions of Germany against the Soviet Union.
13-18 22.6. An order was received by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR on the destruction of the enemy forces that had crossed the Soviet borders.
14-00 22.6. 104 cd (without 242 cn, 2 and 3 / 273 cn, 2 / cnNXX cn, 502 sapbat, without 276 and 1 / 2 ptd) made a route Kandalaksha, Alakurtti, leaving a cover, KS, XAUMX / 161, 3, 359 / 502 cn. Xnumx gap. An order of 242 cn was given from 2 / 502 gap to immediately take up the line prepared for the defense along the east bank of the river Sophianga. 2 and 3 / 273 order were given, 276 Sapbat returned from Kokosalm to Kandalaksha... »
RCB 217 cn (104 cd): "22.6.41. 15-00. Received the combat order No. 1 stadium 104 from 22.6.41 217 cn with 290 up to the end of 22.6 concentrate in the district of Baraki (35 km)... »
I.M. Pyadusov (chief of artillery 19 ck 23 A): "A few days before the war, the district headquarters conducted an inspection of parts of 19 and 50 c ... The teaching was to continue for five days. And suddenly, on the third day, I was backed off ... Upon arrival at Kexholm, I reported to the corps commander about the end of my work and asked Is there anything new? Corps Commander He looked at me in surprise and answered - there is nothing new. At night, all the corps headquarters officers were summoned to headquarters, where the start of the war with the Finns was announced.... »
RCB 19 ck: "В 2-00 22.6.41 K-rom Corps received personally from the NSH LVO order to call the commanders and declare a combat alarm ...
The 2-12 K-rum corps declared a combat alarm.
4-15 - 4-25 received an order from the LVO headquarters (in cipher) to exit the corps parts to the state border.
In the 4-30 parts of the 115 and 142 sd to the corps, the order was issued to exit the parts to the state border. The same cipher order is completed by transfer to 17-30 22.6.41.
In 7-07 a telegram was received about violation of the state border by the Germans ...
Parts of 142 sd and 115 sd delivered to the state border: 142 sd - advanced parts in 6-40 22.6; 1 echelon in 7-40 22.6; 115 sd 1 Echelon to 7-30... »
Telegram. «Headquarters LVO. Parts of the body made to the border: 115 cd - in 7 h 30 m142 sd - in 7 h 40 m... »
CDB 142 sd: "22.6.41. The division in 6-00 on the basis of the government message and the order of the commander of 19 ck was raised on alert with the occupation of defensive areas - according to the plan to cover the state border... »
PC: "NSH 19 SC. Parts of 142 sd delivered to their area 8-00 22.6.41... "
PC 7-50 ... 8-30: "Commanders 142 and 115 sd. I hand over the order of the Military Council of the LVO. At dawn 22.6.41 the Germans launched the bombing of Sevastopol, Lubava, Vandava. The fighting began in the Kiev and Baltic VO. There were border violations by Finnish and German aircraft in the direction of Vyborg, Kronstadt, Leningrad.
The People's Commissar ordered all troops, headquarters and air defense systems to be brought to combat readiness, to prepare all the conditions for receiving the mobilized. The border with Finland does not cross and do not fly. Violators to destroy on its territory. Bring the units immediately to the state border and take up defense areas.
The corps commander ordered to immediately report on the withdrawal of troops to the border and to report on the occupation of the defense areas according to the cover plan, in the form of opera reports indicating the battalion (division)... "
Supplement to the exploitation number 1 (to the headquarters of LVO). 42 ck 18-00 22.6.41 ... "Parts of 122 sd focus the occupied op and re-equip areas. 285 ap 17-30 passed by Kairal... »
V.F.Konkov (commander of the 115th division): "In May 1941, the division made a transition from Kingisepp region, through Leningrad, to the Karelian Isthmus, to the Vanhala, Enso, and Kirvo areas with the solution of training issues, with the development of actions with aviation, etc. ... state border in the occupied area ...
In the evening, 21.6.41 and I, the deputy for political affairs, V.O. Ovcharenko, were invited by Red Army soldiers and 638 commanders to a concert of amateur performances ... Vladimir Andreevich and I, without saying a word, went along the edge of the forest towards the location of one of our parts ... discussing a friendly meeting with battle friends. It was past midnight. But I didn’t want to sleep ... We parted ways with Vladimir Andreevich, when the sun's rays began to play with colorful sparkles of dew on the grass. In the house did not want to go. He sat down on the porch fits. And, it seems, dozed off. The agitated voice of the coherent brought me out of this drowsy state: "Comrade general, you are urgently called to headquarters."
In the headquarters I had a telephone conversation with the army commander 23, Lieutenant-General PS Pshennikov. From him I learned about the treacherous attack of fascist Germany on our country. I was ordered by the forces of 115 sd to provide a solid defense of the USSR State Border... »
V.I. Scherbakov (commander 50 ck): " The plan of covering the border provided for tasks and variants of the action of the troops in case of war, the same plan defined the defense lines of the cd and the regiments inclusive of company defense areas. OP were identified as ground and anti-aircraft artillery to the battery, inclusive ... The cover plan provided for the order of withdrawal of troops from the RPD to the border in their lanes and areas of defense ...
The trained lines and defense areas were not constantly occupied by the troops, but the troops were withdrawn by units from time to time to their areas for their equipment. Parts were withdrawn to their defense areas, as a rule, on alert.
43 and 123 sd, as well as corps units, began to advance to the border according to my signal, which was provided for by the cover plan on the basis of the received directive of the People's Commissar of Defense. The directive was passed from the headquarters of the LVO around June 4's 22 hours ... The departure of the troops to the border began on June 6-30 June 22... »
RCB 147 cn (43 cd): "22.6.41 12-00. The regiment with the attached units in accordance with the order of the stadium 43 advanced to the front line of the state border and began defensive work to strengthen the state border.... »
CDB 123 sd: "By the verbal order of the corps commander, units of the division began their advancement by separate subunits to the border in their areas of cover. 255 cn and 272 cn in 8-30 22.6.41. went to their sites. 245 cn - reserve KSK [commander sk]. Parts began reconnaissance and defense work on their sites. During the advancement of units to their areas as a result of insufficient camouflage, there were cases of raids of planes on the advancing columns.... »
RCB 272 cn (123 cd): "22.6.41 5-00. 272 cn pursuant to the order of the commander 123 of the Order of Lenin sd from the area of concentration ... acted in the direction of the state border with the task of covering it and to 8-00 took up defense according to the cover plan... »
ZhBD 24 cap (50 sc): "At 6 o'clock in the morning 22 June 1941g. throughout the Vyborsk Garrison, an alarm was declared and by the 12 watch the 24 cape was already on full alert, with the exception of the 2 Division, which at that time was at the border equipping its battle formation ... B 12-30 the regiment began its movement to the borders of Finland... »
ZhBD 21 td (10 microns): "17.6.41. In full composition, Shtadiv performed a corps staff exercise conducted on the Karelian Isthmus. The teaching was designed for five days, i.e. to 22.6.41 inclusive. But 21.6 to 9-00 the exercise was given a retreat and the entire commanding staff was sent to Vyborg to analyze the exercises, which took place in DKA [House of the Red Army]. After parsing, it was ordered to immediately depart to their units.
It was clearly felt that the situation has changed dramatically and the teachings were minimized. By the end of the day 21.6 shtav arrived at Black River and the command staff disbanded to rest on vacation with a warning - do not leave the area of the military town.
In 2-00 22.6.41, the commander of the 23 Army arrived in the roundabout and warned about the division’s readiness for action. It was about 11-00 22.6 that the speech of Comrade Molotov was broadcast by radio that Nazi Germany attacked our Homeland without a declaration of war. AT 12-00 divisions declared combat alarm with the release of parts in their areas of the collection of anxiety. By 18-00, all parts in full readiness went to the areas of collection for alarm... »
RCB 1 micron: "17.6.41. By personal order NSH LVO of Major General Nikishov, 1, etc. was taken from the corps and sent to perform a special task where I went plunging at Berezka station ...
22.6.41. PCS of LVO headquarters No.1 / 39 1 mechkorpusu (without 1 etc.) was tasked to follow its own course from the areas: 3 etc. - Strugi Red; Office Corps, 202 obs, 5 Motts.polk, from Pskov; 163 MSD from Cherekh - to the area of cities - Slutsk, Pushkin... »
RCB 1 reconnaissance battalion 1 MK: "The 7889 military unit being in the Strugi Krasnye camps, the Vladimir 22.6.41 camp in 9-00 was raised for combat alert and as part of a tank company, bronerot, motorota, park platoon and platoon control, went to the collection point for alert, 2 km south. camps... »
RCB 3 td 1 micron: "22.6. In 7-30 according to the 7373 telegram, parts are on alert and for 11-00 are concentrated in the collection area, 3 km. South. ammunition tanks... "
PC. 23-25 22.6.41: «Commander 16 sd. The commander of the military military district ordered: 1. To occupy a division for the defense of the division from Tallinn to Hapsalu and Dago Island, where there is at least 4 cn.
2. Parts of the division must have a standard supply of food, ammunition and fuel.
3. Take all air defense measures in parts of the division.
4. On the occupation of the defense to convey ... "
RCB 2 Garden: "3-00 22.6. Parts of the 2 Air Division are on alert. The materiel is dispersed and disguised at the dislocation aerodrome ... The defense of the airfields is organized. Background: Telegram of the Commander of the Air Force LVO from 21.6... »
Here, too, did not seek to execute the order of the People's Commissar of Defense from 19.6.41 by dispersing aircraft to 22 June. As part of the activities carried out in accordance with Directive No. XXUMX, measures to disguise and disperse are accelerated in accordance with the order of the People's Commissar of Defense, which has not yet entered the formations. The date of the June 1 telegram is probably a typo. Such typos were repeatedly encountered by the author when viewing documents on the Memory of the People website.
N.F. Kuznetsov (Deputy 436 iap): “I and several of my comrades received an appointment in the Air Defense IAP ... On Saturday, we could not sleep for a long time. Silent, warm June night ... A siren that screamed fiercely woke us. Her howl seemed to fill everything — the tent ...
“Great neighbors excite!” Shouted Savchenkov. “Soon we will be alarmed on flights,” he rolled over, yawned sweetly and hid his head under the pillow ...
Someone jerked open the tarpaulin valve of our tent, and at that very moment I saw the head of the NS: “What the hell are you waiting for ?! Anxiety does not concern you, is it ?! ”A minute later, all those who were in tents and in the whole forest camp ... ran to the airfield ... When the planes were put on alert, we were built not far from the parking lot. The captain of the Banshchik with the unfamiliar major came: "War, comrades .. Fascist Germany attacked our Homeland... »
N.I. Gapeenok (pilot 202 bap): "The pre-day of June 21 ended, which did not foreshadow anxiety. All the family officers were leaving for their families ... Early on Sunday morning 22 June 1941, the alarm alert sounded in the camp. On alarm, all those remaining in the camp gathered at the designated place. On the first team we were sent to the parking of the aircraft. And here we are in the parking lot, where, like a parade, white-winged bombers are lined up [Sat]. All planes are sheathed and sealed ... Soon from the camp officer Received a team to mask the aircraft branches of trees and nearby shrubs. Two trips to the forest behind the branches ... No one, of course, did not assume that the alarm is realfighting until arriving from winter flats [pilots] ... "
A.A. Kukin: "Before the war we organized courses for flight commanders at the airfield Gorelovo. The head of the course was I.P. Neusturuev, I was the deputy ... At 3 in the morning, 22 in June and 1941, we arrived at the airport in alarm, and in 3-30, in three links, leading: Neustruev, I and Chuguev flew to the cover of Leningrad with photo machine guns, since expected the beginning of the exercise, not war. During the patrol they did not meet anyone in the air and returned to their airfield. After landing, Neustruev reported to the division commander about the task, and he learned about the beginning of the war ... It was at four in the morning... "
I.D.Gaidaenko (flight commander rap): "21 June I and several other pilots were sent on vacation. I decided to go to Kexholm ... and then home, to Ukraine. While going - anxiety. We went out in alarm on the airfield, uncovered our whites, like swans, SB planes, warmed up the engines, prepared for departure. We do everything as usual in terms of training. No one knew that the alarm is a battle one! Only hours in 9-10 morning announced the end of the training alarm - combat alarm. So the war began for me... »
RCB 63 Obap 22 of the Karelian SD: "22.6.41 7-30. Exit and training for anxiety strongholds - Lembolovo, Elizavetinka, Agolatovo. In 7-30 b-well, declared combat alarm. The companies quickly occupied their company strong points ... "
It is clear from the FBD that the long-term facilities of 63-m obap to 22.6.41 were not occupied.
A.M. Andreev (chief of 5 frontier detachment): "In the middle of June, 1941 from the border towers in the area of the city of Enso, Finnish troops were seen advancing to the border. Artillery and tanks occupied firing and initial positions ... On June XN one of the trespassers was delivered to the squad headquarters. He refused to answer questions. Only two words hissed through his teeth: "Tomorrow is war."
21.6.41 after the meeting ... with the deputy chief of the detachment for political affairs, the regimental commissioner Zyablikov and the NSH of the detachment, Major Okunevich, we evaluated the situation and came to this conclusion:
a) the German-Finnish troops complete the concentration of the operational offensive group ...;
b) the enemy is most likely to attack in the coming hours;
c) ... according to the cover plan ... it is envisaged to nominate units of 115 sd of Major General V.F. Konkov from the 23 army.
On the morning of June 21, 1941, the command of 115 sd informed us: “We are instructed to be on full alert in places of permanent deployment”.
Based on this assessment of the situation, I gave the following order for the detachment:
“1. Continue to strengthen the protection and defense of the State Border ...
2. The personnel of the outpost, free from direct service on the state border line, on the night of 22.6.41, take up and defend combat positions in the outpost area.
3. The commandant's office and the maneuvering group should occupy spare command posts and areas, paying particular attention to reliable, stable communication and control with outposts and border patrols along the front and bypass connection with the depth.
4. The headquarters of the border detachment ... from Enso on the night of 22 June 1941 moved to the area of the emergency command post ... to 24-00 21 June 1941 of the year to organize communication and control with commandant's offices, outposts and units of the SV, deployed in the border detachment band, as well as with district and center.
5. I and the regimental commissar Zyablikov with the task force, with the means of communication with the troops, district and center remain at the same place of deployment of the headquarters of the border detachment of Enso.
6. On the night of June 22 1941 military families (children, old people) to lead to the rear, highlighting for this the appropriate vehicles».
Again we see private decision and initiative of the border guard command. Light memory of them ...
As we remember from the 9 part, a similar request to Beria was addressed by the head of the border troops of the NKVD of the USSR: “The commander of the border troops of the NKVD BSSR, Lieutenant-General T. Bogdanov informed that, by order of the commander of the Baltic border district, the families of the commanding personnel of the CA units of the Taurogren direction are being prepared for evacuation. T. Bogdanov asks for instructions on the evacuation of families of the commanders of the Sakiai border detachment, on the preparation for which the order was given to them ... I ask for your instructions. Lieutenant-General Maslennikov"According to the memory of the surviving border guards, the families remained at the outposts ...
A.M. Andreev: "During the night on 22 June 1941 of the year, carrying out the order received, border outposts with outfits of at least 3-5 border guards covered the main potential enemy offensive directions ..., the gaps were blocked by mobile sentinel posts. After three o'clock in the morning, 22 June began receiving reports from 9 and 12 of numerous outbreaks by German aircraft of our border. Finnish border guards left the cordons ... and retreated to the rear. On the area of the border detachment appeared divisions of the Finnish and German regular troops, who began to equip the initial area for the offensive... »
A.P.Kozlov (Head of the 3 frontier post): "Sports competitions between 22 and 1 outposts were scheduled for the morning of June 3. Our island was chosen as a meeting place ... A messenger arrived and handed me a package ... Captain MS Small ordered no one to leave the island, strengthen his outfits, keep his eyes on the adjacent shore, check again the condition of the bunkers, trenches, slots and trenches ... Border guards took their places according to combat crew ...
He passed hour after hour ... That night fell on the island ... "Well, that's all! - I thought with relief. - In vain the commandant was worried". And just at that moment there was an unfamiliar bass sound ... I looked up and was numb - planes with black crosses on the wings were going to Leningrad. Suddenly, one of the close-in armada of aircraft broke away from the line and dived onto the island ... Senior Lieutenant Ryatskov's anti-aircraft battery opened fire... "
E.I. Vodopyanov (border guards of the NKVD): "After the Finnish War, I remained at the first frontier post ... We had no idea whether there would be a war. Were, as usual, guard the state border... "
Post-telegram: "NSH LVO. 20-00 22.6.41 in the area [entrusted] my division without changes. The camps are collapsed, the units of the units should be winter apartments. Major General Ivanov, commander of the 2 division of the NKVD Troops for the protection of railways.»
In the documents and memoirs of the veterans, there is no data on the preparation of LVO troops to repel a possible attack in accordance with the mythical directive of the General Staff, according to which they allegedly began to conduct activities in Western HE, including and in PribOVO.
Probably, on the night of 20 on June 21, on the instructions of an unknown person, some units and formations of the cover of the 1 train are in full alert, remaining in the RPM.
All activities for the promotion of compounds to the defensive line at the border, the dispersal of aviation begin only at dawn, the day of June 22. The actions of saboteurs until 22 June are not expected, since The division of the NKVD moves out of the camps in the PPD only on the evening of June 22.
Let's try to determine who is the above-mentioned person who made the decision to increase the combat readiness of parts of the 1-echelon of the cover of the Leningrad Military District. I will preliminarily say that these are not instructions from Moscow ...
Consider the memories Commander LVO M.M. Popova: "At the beginning of May, we were summoned to the General Staff with the chief of the operational department of the district headquarters, General PG Tikhomirov, where for several days we were working on the option of covering and defending the district’s borders in case of war. Preliminary outlines of this plan have already been made in the General Staff, and Tikhomirov and I were asked to study them carefully and make our own specific proposals. Since these issues were not once comprehensively discussed at narrow operational meetings of the district command, it was not difficult for us to delve into the General Staff’s proposals and to make the necessary, in our opinion, amendments and clarifications ...
In the tenths of June, the directive of the People's Commissar of Defense was received, which appointed ... a commission chaired by the commander of the LVO with entrusting it with the tasks of selecting sites for building airfields to base fighter and bomber aviation on the shores of the Barents Sea...
[A completely unnecessary question for the district commander if everything is supposedly waiting for war.]
Such an assignment did not suit me as a commander who had not yet had time to properly study the troops and the border territory of the district. Therefore, before the commission’s work, it was necessary to carry out a field trip planned by the operational preparation plan for a part of the 14 Army to study the issues and conditions for covering and defending the Murmansk and Kandalaksha areas, on which, according to intelligence data, German forces had already begun to concentrate in Finland.
Stay at the border once again convinced me how frankly the Germans and the Finns bring their troops to our borders and prepare a bridgehead for offensive. For example, when familiarizing with the border area in the area of Kuolajärvi (Kandalaksha direction) according to the reports of the commander 122 st and the head of the border detachment was found that in the immediate vicinity of the state border against Kuolajärvi a few days ago began the concentration and deployment of German troops, and a little south of the Finnish units. The white nights did not allow to hold these events covertly, and they were well observed by the border posts, especially from the towers and the NP, equipped on tall trees ...
Yes, we personally observed, climbing some of the towers of the border guards, clearly visible groups of German officers moving directly along the state border with binoculars and maps, groups of soldiers moving in equal directions, cars running along the roads, and a lot of smoke — obviously field kitchens, as on a hot June day hardly anyone made a fire ...
It was something to ponder under the fresh impression of everything seen and heard during these days. An experienced and combat commander of the division, taking this opportunity, remarked: "Here the matter is absolutely clear and not subject to doubt. They will come for sure. How good it would be for us to sit on the defensive, gain a foothold and prepare for the meeting of the enemy».
Frankly, I myself thought about it, weighing everything in my mind "behind" and "против". "According"- clear need and appropriateness of training and defense preparation. "Против"- the absence of firm directives to this effect and the fear that the measures we have taken may be used by the opposing party for all sorts of provocations.
However, prudence prevailed, and After consulting with the commander of the 14 Army, Lieutenant-General V.A. Frolov, I ordered the 122 Division to immediately go on the defensive, firmly and well to gain a foothold, but to do it skillfully, without repeating the mistakes of the Germans and Finns, who created their groupings very frankly. White nights and we did not guarantee the secrecy of the deployment and conduct of defensive work.
The division commander assured that he perfectly understands and will accept all measures to ensure that their events as much as possible to hide from the German observation. I ordered the division commander occupy defenses, barricade, put barriers and mines. On the way to Murmansk, we and the army commander discussed in detail the situation in the Murmansk sector ...
The field trip confirmed our fears that were born at the district headquarters that the Murmansk and Kandalaksha directions are aimed approximately at the German forces corps, reinforced by the Finns, with the obvious task of capturing very important points for us - Murmansk, the main base of our Federation Council and the only non-freezing port in the area , and Kandalaksha, as a result of which the enemy would have been able to cut the Kirov railway, along which all supplies of the Northern Fleet, the 14 army and a relatively large population of the Polar region go ...
In Murmansk, we summed up our field trip, made some adjustments to the cover plans developed earlier, without changing their basic essence, - Murmansk direction - two sd, Kandalaksha - two sd and one etc. and, finally, on the Kestengsky direction - one unit... »
District Commander writes about the decision without solid directives from Moscow about the expediency of supplying units to the border and occupying the line of defense. The events described occur 20 th June. After visiting 122, the commanders of the military detachment of the Leningrad Military District and the 14 army leave for Murmansk. And now we will consider negotiations of two chiefs of associations.
Blank record: "Who negotiates Skvirsky [NSH 14 army]
Who are the negotiations with Panin [Commander 42 sc Lvo].
В 21-30 Shevchenko [commander 122 sd] reported that the farm reconnaissance new apartment.
[Shevchenko reported after the departure of both commanders: the LVO and the 14 Army.]
Skvirsky: Waiting for action tomorrow, after tomorrow 22.23.6. [The above phrase indicates that negotiations are underway on June 21.]
Economic movement immediately. Warn about it Shevchenko. Applying full measures of disguise, let him take what he is supposed to take.
Move in small batches to remember the air. Take ... measures readiness at any moment of Morozov [commander 104 sd].
Ensure by all means [Kirov Railway] ...
More detail after receiving data from Popova [commander LVO], whom we wait in an hour...
[Popov must leave Murmansk by train to 7 in the morning on 21.6.41.]
Panin: how to understand 22.23.6.
Skvyra - wait for 22 or 23.6.41 action. Is it clear.
Panin: I will push tonight 715 [715 sp xnumx cd] into place. Shevchenko hurry with the promotion of a convoy. Morozov plunges two kul 273 cn [104 sd] 25 in Kesteng. I have everything for now.
Skvirsky: Are there any questions for me.
Panin: no questions... »
According to the results of the inspection of the adjacent territory, the commander of the military-military detachment and the commander of the 14 Army came to the conclusion that the enemy’s 22-23 could begin hostilities in June 1941 in this direction! The 122-I division was supposed to occupy defenses on the border west of Alakurtti and up to the Arctic Circle. It took several more days to concentrate the 1 th ... Opponent began concentrating earlier.
The commander of the LVO was obliged to inform the district's NSN of its decision on the gradual advancement of 122 units to the border and on the expected (in their opinion) deadline for the 22-23 attack on June 1941. It is likely that after this conversation, other troops of the district 1-echelon of the district were instructed to switch to increased readiness on the morning of June 21 while in the PDP. Does not have the top management of the spacecraft to this relationship ...
M.M.Popov: "Then there was an acquaintance and the first meeting with the commander of the Federation Council, Vice-Admiral AG Golovko, with whom a true friendship was subsequently established, which lasted until the last days of his life. The Federation Council on land defense issues quickly obeyed the LVO, and both of us had something to talk about ... Naturally, the questions to me first of all came down, and issues related to the assessment of the overall political and military situationbecause under the conditions of that time, any additional information on exciting questions was of vital interest.
By the end of our meeting, AGGolovko reported that the destroyer allocated for the commission on the choice of airfields, where I was supposed to go, was ready to go to sea, and suggested clarifying the time of this exit. The soul did not lay, as they say, to this parting from the land almost a month. However, the directive of the Commissar did not».
Markian Mikhailovich Popov hesitated for a long time before he decided to call Marshal Timoshenko.
«And the Commissar on the wire. A short report on the situation at the land border, at sea and in the air, and a frank statement that in these conditions going to sea is impractical.
“It's good that I called,” said the people's commissar's voice. - Putting to sea for the time being. Immediately return to Leningrad. ” Those present during the conversation with the People's Commissar - the komflot and the commander - saw in the cancellation of going to sea some confirmation of our fears....
[In the morning of June 21, M.M.Popov left Murmansk for Leningrad by the express train “Polar Arrow” (travel time 32 h 40 min). If his presence at the district headquarters was required immediately, he would have been ordered to take off by plane. According to the author, at that time, the People's Commissar of Defense did not expect a war in the morning of June 22. In addition, the commander of the LVO himself did not expect full-scale military operations on the entire border of his district, since was forced to break away from communication for more than 32 hours. He was probably expecting a provocative attack on 122 sd positions ...]
June 21 day, spent in the car, passed quietly. At large stations, the military commandants who were on duty to the car could not report anything alarming. In Petrozavodsk, where we arrived around 4 o'clock in the morning 22 June, in addition to the commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General FD Gorelenko, who was waiting for us, we also met the secretary of the Central Committee of the Karelo-Finnish SSR and the head of the Kirov railway. First of all, they reported on the received order from Moscow: to unhook the wagon of the commander from the train and to deliver him to Leningrad outside the schedule, for which purpose a separate steam locomotive...
[Only after the bombing of a number of Soviet cities from Moscow is an order to speed up the arrival of the commander to his district headquarters.]
We are with WWW N.N. Klementyev puzzled at the guesswork, which means this order about urgent delivery of us to Leningrad... [The People's Commissar of Defense on the phone did not tell Popov anything about waiting for an imminent war with Germany. Maybe he didn’t know about it yet?]
At around 7 in the morning, our ... line-up made its first stop. The commandant who appeared in the carriage ... reported that the stop was due to the need to check the axle boxes and it would be very short ... About an hour ago, the selector from Leningrad sent a message only for the attention of the station head and the commandant that the Germans bombed a number of our cities in the west around 4 railway nodes and after a strong artillery shelling crossed the border and invaded our territory. Both of them were ordered to start holding events according to the mobilization plan ... In the morning of June 22 we returned to Leningrad... »
Finally, we will consider the talks of Colonel Kurasov [deputy head of the operational management of the General Staff] with the headquarters of the LVO.
«At the unit, Colonel Kurasov = Passing instructions to General Lieutenant Vatutin = At dawn on June 22, the bombing of Sevastopol by Libau Vindava began. The fighting began in Krystynopil in the Kiev Military District and on the borders of PribOVO the Germans began the fighting
It has been ordered to bring the troops of the Leningrad district into a state of combat air defense and prepare all the conditions in case of a rise of troops = While all
Please repeat the points of trespassing. At which points are the borders violated.»
Negotiations between the General Staff and the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District are under way even before Directive No. XXUMX arrived at the General Staff. Not a word about the beginning of the war. Only about the bombing of cities and the fighting in one direction in KOVO and about PribOVO. In ZOVOVO - calm. During negotiations, the requirement of Directive No. XXUMX on bringing troops and air defense into a combat state is duplicated. According to the author, at the time of the negotiations at the beginning of a full-scale war, neither Vatutin nor Kurasov were yet sure of the start of the war.
Below are the later negotiations in the LVO, which are already a reflection of Directive No. 2 received from Moscow: “I convey the order of the military council = First = Dawn 22 June the Germans began the bombing of Sevastopol, Libau, Vindava. Fighting began in the Kiev military district of the district of Hristanopol and on the borders of PribOVO. The fighting began the Germans. Violations of the Finnish and German planes Tisovka, Vyborg, Kronstadt and Leningrad took place at the borders with Finland 22 June. The People's Commissar ordered to bring all the troops, headquarters and air defense into a combat condition and prepare the conditions for receiving the mobilized. The border with Finland does not cross and do not fly. Violators destroy everything on their territory ... = Everything is clear= "
According to the results of the presented material, it can be seen that the instructions from the NKO and the General Staff regarding the dispersal of the Air Force and on the transfer of the units to increased combat readiness did not arrive at the Leningrad Military District before the receipt of Directive No. XXUMX. There are no traces of the mythical directive (or directives, as it is already customary to say) ...
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