The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 16)
Before continuing to analyze the chain of events, you will need to consider several documents. On June 19, the order of the People’s Commissar of Defense “On camouflaging airfields and major military facilities” was prepared. Some authors argue that on the basis of this order Aviation the western border districts were to disperse and mask by dawn on 22.6.41. Are they right?
Order of the Commissioner of Defense of the USSR №0042 19.6.41: "Nothing significant has been done so far to disguise airfields and major military facilities.
The airfield fields are not all planted, the take-off stripes for the color of the terrain are not painted, and the airfield buildings, standing out sharply in bright colors, attract the observer’s attention by tens of kilometers.
The crowded and linear arrangement of aircraft on airfields in the complete absence of their masking and poor organization of airfield service with the use of unmasking signs and signals finally unmask the airfield.
A modern aerodrome must completely merge with its surroundings and nothing at the aerodrome should attract attention from the air.
Artillery and mechanized units display a similar carelessness for disguise: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks represents not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are advantageous for air strikes.
Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with colors that give a bright reflection, and are well observed not only from air but also from the ground.
Nothing has been done to disguise warehouses and other important military installations.
I order:
1. TO 1.7.41 sow all airfields with grass to the color of the surrounding terrain, paint the runways and simulate the entire airfield environment according to the surrounding background.
2. Airfield buildings to the roofs inclusive paint over one style with the buildings surrounding the airfield. Gas storage bury in the ground and disguise very carefully.
3. Strictly prohibit the linear and crowded location of the aircraft; dispersed and disguised location of the aircraft to ensure their complete observability from the air.
4. Arrange to 5.7 in each airborne 500 km of the 8 – 10 border strip of false airfields, equip each of them with 40 – 50 aircraft mock-ups.
5. TO 1.7 to paint tanks, armored vehicles, command, special and transport vehicles. For camouflage coloring apply matte paint in relation to the location of areas of location and action. Strictly prohibit the use of paint, giving a reflection.
6. For districts within the threatened zone, to carry out the same measures to disguise: warehouses, workshops, parks and 15.7.41 ensure their complete observability from the air.
7. To carry out a masking of airfields, warehouses, combat and transport vehicles to check from the air by observing the responsible commanders of district headquarters and taking photographs. All defects revealed by them immediately eliminate.
8. Execution to convey 1.7 and 15.7.41 through the head GSh.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.Timoshenko.
Chief of General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov».
First of all, we note that the order contains the dates 1 July, 5 July and 15 July, which do not match the date 22 June 1941 of the year. On the same day, the decree of the People's Commissar of Defense is approved in the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars. At the same time, the order of the People's Commissar of Defense to disguise the lanes sets the date for July 1, and the resolution of the CCN - July 20.
Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "On the masking color of airplanes, runways, tents and airfield facilities»19.6.41:
«... 4. To oblige the chief of the State Air Force, t. Zhigareva:
a) to July 20 1941 of the year to paint all the planes in service with masking paint, in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Resolution, with the exception of the lower surface, which should be left with the same color;
b) to July 20 1941 of the year to disguise runways;
VC July 1 1941 of the year to mask the tents;
d) to July 30 1941 of the year to disguise airfield facilities.
5. Approve the order of NGOs - On the masking color of the aircraft and the camouflaging of the runways, tents and airfield facilities in the air force units ...
8. Charge Air force... to July 15 1941 years to make offers about the winter masking color of aircraft.
9. To oblige the NKVD after the construction of the runway, taxiways and anchorage of aircraft to disguise them by painting in relation to the background of the surrounding terrain.
Oblige nach. Air Force t. Zhigareva to July 10 1941 Mr. hand over to the NKVD technical conditions for masking runways, taxiways and anchorage of aircraft ...
Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin»
The next day comes the clarifying order Commissar of Defense.
Order of the Commissioner of Defense of the USSR №0043 20.6.41: "Airplanes that are in parts of the air force, runway, tents and airfield facilities throughout the color do not meet the requirements of modern disguise. Such an attitude to camouflage, as one of the main types of combat readiness of the Air Force, can no longer be tolerated.
I order:
1. TO 20.7.41 the aviation units, with the involvement of the aviation workshop workers, produce a masking coloration of all existing aircraft in accordance with the enclosed color scheme, with the exception of the lower surface, which is left with the same color.
2. TO 10.7.41 to mask all existing runways, concrete taxiways and anchorage of aircraft in relation to the background of the surrounding area.
3. TO 1.7.41 make masking of all airfield structures in relation to the background terrain.
4. TO 1.7.41 camouflage tents in the camps of aviation parts.
5. At the airfield aerodromes, the aircraft should be dispersed under natural and artificial shelters along the edges of the airfield, preventing them from being arranged in straight lines.
6. Responsibility for the implementation of all camouflage activities both in quality and in terms of time I assign to the Military Councils and personally to the commanders of the District Air Force.
7. Event Plan Report on 23 Jun 1941 Mr.
On the course of painting the aircraft to the commanders of the Air Force of the districts, report daily on the HF chief of the Main Command of the Air Force of the spacecraft from 21 hours to 23 hours.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko.
Member of the Main Military Council Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) G. Malenkov.
Head of General Staff, General of the Army G.Zhukov».
And again mismatched deadlines ... And they say the tyrant of all spread rot! We see that the military set deadlines that they want (they also show their initiative):
- in the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars on the masking of the bands, the date of July 20 is set, and in the new order of the People’s Commissar of Defense - July 10;
- In the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars on the masking of airfield facilities, the deadline is July 30, and in the new order, July 1;
- in terms of masking tents and applying a masking coloration, the terms in both documents coincide.
The question arises: when will both orders reach the air force units for execution? For example, the literary figure O. Yu. Kozinkin argues that if there are no deadlines, then this means immediately. Immediately - how is it? In a minute, in an hour, in a day or a month? A very incorrect explanation ... It is interesting, and when these orders were to reach the responsible persons?
Order Commissar of Defense from 19.6.41. Since the order concerns the Air Force, the ABTU, artillery units, warehouses, etc., then the order will be required to familiarize the Military Council of the District: the commander, the NSH and the EMF. Since the commander and the CWS often travel in parts and civil organizations, the order should be addressed to the deputy. commander and head of the political department (to make a decision in the event of the absence of the above-mentioned persons).
Further, the order will be addressed to the chiefs of the Air Force, ABTU, artillery and deputy. Commander for the rear. We understand that the chiefs themselves will not directly execute the orders of the People's Commissar, but will forward them to their subordinates. At the same time to report to the General Staff will have NSH district. Therefore, he additionally addresses this document to the Chief of Operations, who will appoint a responsible commander for collecting information from various services and preparing a reporting document for the District High School.
We have not yet reached the point of sending a military aircraft with an order in the army, where we have our own air force, armored vehicles and vehicles, artillery and warehouses. Then more instructions will go to the MK, CK, and Air Division ... Interestingly: for how long should everyone be familiarized and given orders?
With the order of the Commissar of 20.6.41 even worse - the application to the order is a coloring scheme. Therefore, this order will be sent not by STA, but by courier mail. And when he comes, for example, at least to the command of the districts?
Let's look at the order of the commander of the Kharkov VO, which also enters the threatened zone.
Note on masking objects of the Air Force, military units and warehouses: "1. By Air Force facilities. 1. A modern aerodrome must completely merge with its surroundings and nothing at the aerodrome should attract attention from the air.
2. At all aerodromes, the aircraft at anchorage are located dispersed along the boundaries of the airfields, with intervals of at least 100 meters between the aircraft. The linear arrangement of the aircraft, even when dispersed, does not allow ...
3. Aerodromes camouflage under the general background of the terrain, which is why before planting airfields with special varieties of grass, apply artificial camouflage for gardens, areas covered with bushes and individual trees. To build artificial roads through the airfields ...
District commander Lieutenant-General Smirnov.
ChVS districts corps commissioner Nikolaev.
NS District Major General Kolpachi».
Document prepared by 22 Jun. Thus, the order of the People's Commissar of 19.6.41 reached the HVO only in the morning of June 22. And it is required to acquaint a long list of persons and prepare an order for the district. Well, in any way until the dawn of 22 June, the order of the People's Commissar could not be executed ... The People's Commissar of Defense and the head of the General Staff should have known, unlike the rear workers ...
The next day, prepared a new order on the HVO. Please note that after the start of the war in the order on the HVO and the word "immediately". Military people are well aware that if there are no deadlines, this does not mean immediately. And if immediately, then this particular word is added.
Order of the troops of the Kharkov VO № 0011 23.6.41 d. (22.6.41 printed): "In pursuance of the order of the National Commissioner of Defense against 19.6 № 0042,
I order
Immediately carry out air-masking activities based on the following:
1. Masking should be performed in accordance with the attached instructions (Annex No. 1).
2. All airfields and airfield buildings, gas storage facilities, military camps, camps and warehouses, artillery, tank fleets, as well as passenger and transport vehicles are subject to disguise.
3. To proceed to the camouflage activities immediately and finish:
... c) Camouflage coloring of combat, transport and passenger cars - to July 1 this year.
d) warehouses and military camps - to 15 July sg ...»
It turns out that the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense from 19.6.41 and 20.6.41 could not reach the aviation units by dawn of 22 June and, consequently, lead to the dispersal of aircraft on airfields. Only in the event that the commander of the VO was concerned about what was happening on the border could he give the order to the commander of the Air Force about the dispersal of aviation. We considered such a situation earlier in PribOVO and saw that they had acted on their own initiative long before the preparation of the above orders of the People's Commissar of Defense. In OdVO, repeated exercises on the dispersal of aviation took place on the personal initiative of the NSh district, which also had not yet seen the said orders of the People's Commissar. In the LVO - the aircraft was not dispersed - orders did not reach the district commanders. Events in the Air Force ZOVOVO and KOVO will be covered in other parts of these districts.
Thus, it is impossible to associate the considered orders with the expectation of the top leadership of the SC of a full-scale war from the dawn of 22 on June 1941 of the year ... Therefore, when it comes to the betrayal of generals who did not follow orders from Moscow, the authors are cunning in their interests or they could not understand what is happening. ..
RM RO SOVOVO. In order to consider further events, attention should be paid to intelligence information of the RO of ZOVOV headquarters. Previously I want to bring a fragment of the book A.E. Golovanova, who had previously been used quite often when discussing the negligence of General Pavlov. Many readers in various forums were indignant at the carelessness or criminal negligence of the commander of ZAPOV, reading these lines: “...A few minutes later he was already talking to Stalin. He didn’t have time to say that he was calling about the submission of Golovanov, who is now with him, as from his answers I understood that Stalin was asking counter questions.
- No, Comrade Stalin, this is not true! I have just returned from the defensive lines. There is no concentration of German troops on the border, but my intelligence works well. I will check it again, but I think this is just a provocation. Well, Comrade Stalin ... What about Golovanov? Clear.
He put the phone down: “Not master in the spirit. Some bastard is trying to prove to him that the Germans are concentrating troops on our border... »
Who among us could have thought then that in less than two weeks, how would Hitler bring down his main forces just to the area where Pavlov was at the head of the leadership of the troops? .. How could Pavlov, having intelligence and warnings from Moscow in his hands, to be in pleasant delusion remains secret... "
The conversation took place less than two weeks before the start of the war. Perhaps somewhere around the 10 number. The commander of Zapov was right about something - his intelligence worked no worse, and even better than the intelligence of other districts ... Let's try to figure out the RM.
From the materials given in the previous part, you already know that, according to the RU GSH, against ZOVOVO troops in the border zone From mid-May to the start of the war there were 30 German divisions. (including 1 md, 1 td and 6 tp (total 4 td)). Four so-called conditional TD was formed from TP without special and other parts. In addition, since 15 in May, the rate of concentration of German troops throughout the entire length of our border has sharply decreased.
You already know that intelligence posts of the GSG regularly come to the headquarters of ZOVOVO, and reports from the RO ZOVOVO also regularly leave for the GSH RU. Therefore, the distortion of the RM is simply impossible even theoretically, since additionally still receives information from the intelligence services of the NKGB and the NKVD. 1-2 times to distort more information can be risked, so to speak, health and life. But there were no traitors in the intelligence agencies...
Why did the author raise this question? This is due to the fact that some literary figures are putting forward their new version: RU GSH deliberately provided the wrong RM on the number of German divisions, but now RO ZAPOV correctly evaluated everything! The “traitor generals” are to blame ... And the memory is given as an example L.M. Sandalow: "At the end of the first week of June, the headquarters of our 4 Army, stationed in Kobryn, received information from the district headquarters that by June 5 concentrated more than 40 German divisions on the border of Belarus and that 15 rd, 5 etc., 2 md and 2 cd were concentrated on the Brest direction... »
How easy it is to be such a figure: I found a quote, and you can build any version on it - it will come to mind. The author of this cycle is more difficult: you have to somehow check the information ...
With RM, supplied by RO headquarters Zapovo, in fact, something is not right. The lack of complete texts of the Republic of Moldova does not allow to understand everything - the conclusions from them are not enough. Initially, we will try to construct the dependence of the change in the number of connections at the border according to the few data from the RO ZOVOVO. In the figure, the information on the RO SOVOVO is added to the dependencies you already know.
The figure shows that the number of divisions estimated by the RO of ZOVOV headquarters:
1) exceeds the same number of compounds according to RU GSH: in February-March - by 16%, at the beginning of May - by 30% and by the middle of June 1941 of the year - by 47%;
2) is more than 1 / 3 of the total number of divisions concentrated at our border;
3) has nothing to do with the change in the actual number of units in the border area opposite Zapovo troops. Perhaps RO ZAPOVO takes into account divisions for 400-500 km from the border? It is difficult to disprove the data of the Republic of Moldova.
For almost five months, RO VO overestimates the number of compounds as compared with the RG GSH data, and neither the RO nor RU nor change their data. And the data of the RS GSH are supported by the information of the NKGB and the NKVD. How can this be? Anarchy does not reign in subordinate headquarters ... This is possible only in one case: when these data are fairly close.
But how can the data be close, if they diverge strongly? This is possible if the PO of the headquarters Zapovo considers the territory of its responsibility to be larger than that considered by the GS GS. In this case, the total number of divisions defined by the RU and RO remains the same, but their number increases in the area of responsibility of ZOVOVO. The district simply increased its area of responsibility.
For example, the area of responsibility of the RO of PribOVO headquarters was: on the left - Suwalki, Lykk, Allenstein and in depth - Konigsberg, Allenstein. ZOVOVO, on the other hand, “chopped up” a large area of responsibility for itself: on the right — Suwalki, Heilsberg; on the left - Vlodawa, Deblin. If you look at the reconnaissance information of the RO ZOVOVO, you can see that they contain information on German troops stationed in Koenigsberg, in Danzig, in the Czech Republic, against KOVO troops and even in Romania. The cities of ~ód (~ 280 km to the border) and Poznan (~ 424 km to the border), as well as other settlements located more than 150 km from the border or in the PribOVO area of responsibility are mentioned repeatedly. The figure shows the specified areas of responsibility of districts and settlements, which are marked in the Republic of Moldova RO ZOVOVO (some points are outside the map).
Attention is drawn to the “cover” of the responsibility zones of RO PribOVO and ZOVOVO, as well as the absence of a depth limit for ZOVOVO. Is this right or not? It is difficult to say why RU GSH did not specify the specified limits ...
According to the General Staff, from the Suwalki bulge, the most critical areas (directions of possible strikes) were:
a) towards ZOVOVO: Suwalki - Lida and Suwalki - Bialystok;
b) in the direction of PribOVO: Suwalki - Olita.
Thus, in the direction of Zapovo, two times more possible strikes were considered from the ledge and, therefore, twice more troops could be required to invade. PribOVO “slaughtered” part of the territory from which German troops could approach for two strikes against ZOVOVO. At the same time, ZOVOVO attributed part of the formations that the RUGHG attributed to the troops opposing PribOVO to the forces opposing themselves.
The first reason for the increase in the number of troops against Zapovo (regarding the reports of the GS GS) is the increase in the zone of their responsibility on the front, the second reason is the increase in the zone in depth. What else is alarming in RM RO ZOVOVO? This is incorrect information, as well as from all other intelligence services. Perhaps this is the result of German disinformation.
For example, the intelligence service RO ZOVOVO 20.4.41: "The German command made a significant redeployment of troops against Zapov, pulling troops from the Mlava-Warsaw meridian directly to the state border line, reinforcing the grouping with mostly motorized and tank units... "
The problem is that massively German troops from the said “meridian” began to be moved to the border only after mid-May, but not since mid-April, when the RM received for the report. It is hard to say what kind of transportation the district intelligence service recorded, but this is not the transfer of divisions to the border. And especially not a massive transfer ... Ie the information provided by RO ZOVOVO could have been as erroneous or thrown up by the German command, as was the information of the GS GS.
In other parts of the cycle, we saw how incorrect information was provided by the intelligence services of NGOs, NKGB and NKVD. Is it so possible that everyone is mistaken, and ZapovO’s intelligence with “x-ray vision” revealed the entire German grouping and provides only truthful information? Of course not. RM, which the Germans throw up, should also have been reflected in the information of RO ZOVOVO.
Intelligence Service RO Headquarters ZOVOVO 5.6.41: "According to agents and other sources ... the grouping of German troops in the area against ZOVOVO ... on 5 June 1941 is defined in 29-30 pd, 2-4 md, one cd and two cavalry brigades, .. and, presumably, two armored division of the SS...
Marked the arrival of new parts: in Suwalki - two selected armored divisions SS (requires verification)... »
Two selected td SS. This is a good result for intelligence and should be, checked as soon as possible! Why? Because as of 1.5.41 against the troops, Zapovo (according to its RM) counted: “28-29 rd, 7-8 tank. regiments, 3-4 md, up to three cd ... "
Again we see several TPs and not a single tank division! We have repeatedly discussed the issue of the presence of German tank battalions and regiments in bulk, which are quite simply converted by scouts into conventional ones without headquarters, special units, artillery, communications, support units, etc. etc. Does anyone really believe that our generals will guess by means of a fortune-telling on the cards that the uk and the indicated conditional TDs will turn into real high-grade uk and tank groups? Interesting: how quickly clarified information about the arrival of full-fledged SS?
In the last peaceful intelligence headquarters of RO ZOVOVO (21.6.41) states: "In the range ... presumably two SS divisions ..."In addition to these two td ss against troops, Zapovo is listed as 5 td, four of which evolved from 7-8 mn. Those. With the arrival of the SS divisions, the number of full-fledged units increased threefold, but it was not possible to confirm their presence by reconnaissance services of the Zapovo and Pribovo guards, the GS GS, the NKGB and the NKVD border guards. Was it possible to believe in Moscow data that is not confirmed by any other source, including the intelligence itself Zakovo? Of course not. Intelligence does not believe data that is not confirmed by other sources and is contrary to common sense. It turns out that RM ZOVOVO caused doubts in its credibility in Moscow ...
In addition to inaccurate information (according to the RS GSH), in the area of responsibility of Zapovo (as well as in the areas of responsibility of other districts), substantial transfers of German troops took place and it was very problematic to track all their movements. But in ZOVOVO they were tracked ...
Intelligence Service RO Headquarters ZOVOVO 1.5.41: "Presumably, during the period of movement of troops (March — April), separate units and formations departed from the strip against Zapov, and therefore the deployment of units in the garrisons of Suwalki, Sedlec, Biala Podlaska, Warsaw requires careful rechecking ... "
Intelligence Service RO Headquarters ZOVOVO 1.4.41: “Over the past month, the German command has increased the grouping of troops against ZAPOVO by two or three PD, two TP and one motorcycle battalion, at the same time replacing a number of units - the 12 and 217 PD headquarters; 86, 93, 103, 125, 203, 235, 500, 504, 506, 507 PP; 27, 45, 211 an and 94 CP, descending to the south, by the new arrivals: headquarters 9, 11, 34 front; 5, 12, 23, 134, 135, 136, 316, 402, 514, 903 PP and up to five PP, not set numbering; 18 and 248 ap, 28 regiment of communication, 616 mp, 11 sappolk ...»
The accuracy is striking: in addition to five items, all numbers of parts and connections are installed. Either reconnaissance works perfectly or the German servicemen walk with posters ... But if the RO leadership is “not put in place”, then in general the information they supply should not contradict the information of the General Staff.
Let us consider the question of the reliability of the RM RO ZAPOVO from the reverse. If the RO correctly reflected the information in its area of responsibility for a long time, then in the last intelligence report the information should be reliable. The last intelligence service of the RO of ZOVOVO headquarters was drawn up on the last peaceful Saturday. Consider only information about the presence of motorized and tank forces.
Intelligence Service RO Headquarters ZOVOVO 21.6.41: "1. East Prussian direction ... Two MD (data PribOVO) ... presumably two SS divisions.
2. Mlavskoe direction. ... Until one MD; up td ...
3. Warsaw direction. ... Two etc ...; one md ...; four armored regiment ...
4. Deblin direction. ... Until two td, ... five armored regiments, ... up to two md ...».
Simplified distribution of German troops in front of Zapovo in the areas before the start of the war is shown in the figures.
According to the RO against troops Zapovo is available up to 13 td and md, as well as 9 armored regiments. Did you notice anything strange? In the direction of Warsaw - Brest in two directions according to the RO there is 4 TD and 9 armored regiments...
And how many TP and so on actually was in this direction? 2-I tank group on 21.6.41 consisted of 24 MK (3 td (6 tp), 4 td (35 tp), 10 md, 1 cd), 47 mk (17 td (39 tp), 18 td) tp), 18 md) and in reserve 28 micron (20 td (46 tp), md SS "Das Reich", pp "Grossdeutschland"). In total, the entire 2 tank group had 6 TP, and according to intelligence data ZOVOVO there were at least 13 (if we consider one tp in each division). What kind of credibility of the RM after that? Once again, it should be noted that neither the tank groups nor the MK were detected by the intelligence agency RO Zapovo.
According to intelligence data, there are four TDs and 9 TPs in the Brest region, but even from the location of these moto-tank forces, according to the General Staff, two strikes could be made in the directions of Brest-Baranovichi and Sedlec-Volkovysk.
Those. the mobile forces were to be divided into two groups. Only we do not know whether these groups were identical in composition, in the opinion of our GSH or not. And in the directions of these blows they stand on one of our microns, and in the depth of one more micron they counteract this threat. And one moment. The specified tank divisions and regiments can be subordinated only to the headquarters of the army corps. After all, there are no other headquarters for their leadership near the border, and the AK does not have structures to support these divisions. And much more is not necessary for mobile groups ...
Let us return once more to the memories of L.M. Sandalova about RM, which dated 5 June. The material for this report should have been received somewhere on June 3-4. We know that almost all MD and so on began to move to the border since June 6 (of course, not all at the same time). Those. at the time of receipt of materials for the report, these compounds were located at a distance of hundreds of kilometers from our border, because they were located much further than the Mlava-Warsaw meridian. According to the General Staff, there are four directions of strikes by the German troops on ZOVOV: two on the front and two near Brest. Where the troops were supposed to move from the RPD, this is a question, the answer to which until June 5 was unknown not only to our intelligence service, but also to the majority of the officers of the German army ...
We will continue consideration of materials received from intelligence services.
16.6.41 handed over the British leadership to the Soviet ambassador in London, I.M. May map with the scheme of the German grouping near the Soviet borders. According to these data, there were 76 divisions in Poland (of which 2 tank and 2 were motorized), in Romania, Hungary and Slovakia, 29 divisions (of which 4 tank and 2 were motorized), the transfer of 2 divisions in Baltic and 2 divisions was still assumed. Northern Finland. The diagram shows the total 109 of the German divisions.
It is impossible not to recognize the high accuracy of the data of British intelligence on the total number of German troops in the East, but their information about the number of tank and motorized divisions was significantly underestimated. It is not clear whether the British intelligence also was not able to "reveal" the German MD and so on, or deliberately provided the USSR with disinformation, replacing the so on with the DD ...
At that time, this information was considered misinformation from the "sworn friend". If we recall the text from the diary of Gebels on disinformation on the invasion of England, it is clear that the leadership of the USSR found it difficult to believe in these RMs ...
Consider intelligence data on the number of enemy troops on the southern flank.
P.A. Sudoplatov: "We overestimated the grouping of German troops opposing us in the south-west, as a result of which the law firm was forced to withdraw in early July. Despite the very serious network of agents we had in Romania, mythical information was obtained about the considerably superior forces of the Germans and Romanians in the South, consisting of 40 front and 13, etc.
The incorrect assessment of our intelligence situation in Bessarabia, as the People's Commissar of State Security of Moldova self-critically told me, later the head of the special department of the Law Faculty N. Sazykin, at the critical moment of the start of the war led to the low effectiveness of the actions of the law forces of the LF, despite the fact that the enemy was not superior . Undoubtedly, this had an adverse impact on the development of events in the entire South-West direction ...»
According “Note on the action plan of the OdVO troops” (June 1941 of the year): "In total, on the territory of Romania is available on 31.5.41: 40-45 pd and md, 4 cd, 4 gsbr and 2 etc., of which (data require verification) Germanic 17 pd and md and 2 td... "Just before 19 German divisions. In accordance with Intelligence RU GSH on 1.6.41 in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja there were 17 German divisions (including 4 md and 2 etc.).
The figure shows a schematic map with a ratio of forces to 17.6.41. According to these materials in Romania, there were 14-16 German divisions at the border, including up to 7 md and so on. In fact, it was 9 PD, of which 2 was in the 1 echelon. We see that from 1-th to 17-June, the German group, according to intelligence, remained virtually unchanged.
According to RU GSH, the transfer of German divisions from Bulgaria to Romania began in June with 19-20. After the start of the war, updated materials were received on the number of troops in Romania. For example, the number of enemy groupings in the area of Stefaneshty was determined in the 9-10 divisions (including 5-6 etc. and md), although in reality there were only 5 front and 5 brigades (including TBR). Intelligence counted 900-960 tanks in the area. In fact, there were about 60. The strike of the “discovered tank group” was waited until the beginning of July ...
We considered the mythical grouping on the southern flank of our border. And now consider the undetected grouping on the northern flank.
Intelligence headquarters PribOVO (a summary is given in the 7 part) from 18.6.41: "On 17.6.41 v. PribOVO ... installed: army headquarters - 2, AK headquarters - 6, pd - 12, md - 5, td - 1, tp - 5 and up to 9 individual TB - just at least td, kn - 6-7 , Sat - 17, airplanes - over 500... "In more detail this grouping is shown in the two figures below.
From the pictures you can see:
- Directly close to the border of PribOVO, only a small part of the troops are concentrated in the form of a certain number of PB and four regiments in the zone of the Suvalki lug. The bulk of the troops is located at a sufficiently large distance from the border;
- the city of Suwalki has three divisional headquarters and a total of up to 8 regiments at a distance of 20-25 km from the border. These troops should be distributed in three strike groups, forces for which is not enough. Consequently, additional troops must still approach the area;
- one more grouping of troops is concentrated near the city of Gumbinnen (the distance to the border is about 30 km);
- a large group of troops stationed in Tilcite (distance to the border 20-25 km);
- The reinforced divisional group is deployed in Memele.
In order to concentrate troops remote from the border on the initial lines for an attack, it takes up to two days for infantry formations and theoretically a day for TD and MD, located in the area of responsibility of RO PribOVO. Given the huge number of vehicles in md and td and a limited number of roads - one day may not be enough ...
It should be noted that the reconnaissance detected only one full-fledged TD and not a single MK headquarters, tank groups, and the headquarters of Army Group North were found.
In the above report, 18 of the German divisions is noted, and taking into account the individual battalions and regiments, their total number can be estimated to 20. In accordance with the Republic of Uzbekistan, the number of German divisions against PribOVO is 29. Missing divisions are located west of the PribOVO area of responsibility. According to the RS GSH near 17.6.41 / 1, groups of German troops planned for military operations with PribOVO are deployed on 3 deployed at a depth of more than 100-120 km.
There is one more document of the Regional Office of the PribOVO headquarters, which is blamed for the NSH of the PS district. Maple. The indictment states: "In sabotage activities caught testimony... "Among the witnesses are three intelligence officers of PribOVO headquarters. The document is called: "On the grouping of forces and means of German troops in East Prussia to 18-00 21.6.41". Ten hours before the start of the war ... Many saw him, but did not work hard with him ...
It seems to be true, there are significant forces and a large number of tanks - 2473. In the 18 th army, in the 3 th and 4 th tank groups there were about 1735 tanks. Of course, intelligence data may differ from real ones. Please note that the report does not indicate the direction of possible enemy strikes, and in the RO calculations, all German forces are “smeared” on the front, i.e. are given on 1 km front. Among other things, "spread" on the front and the main military equipment of the shock groups: tanks and armored vehicles. In fact, there are no mobile groups ...
Do you know how many tanks are in a German tank regiment according to this document? You can’t guess exactly, although you are well versed in such documents ... Look at the figure below for the number of tanks in TP, and if you don’t believe your eyes, look at one more picture below. How can this be?
Let us recall the old RMs with an indication of the presence of 133 tanks in TB, as well as information from illegal agents on the inclusion of individual TB in the MD. And then we will carry out simple calculations (shown in the figure below) using the above-mentioned document "On the grouping of forces ..."
According to intelligence from 18.6.41, in East Prussia it was reported: md - 5, td - 1, tp - 5, 9 individual TB. In the picture above we have one td, four md, which include one TB each. The fifth MD is divided in three directions on one MP. Not enough five tb. I wonder where are they? And they are hidden in the notes to the document: "Note: 1. Tank corps battalions were not taken into account."And according to the Republic of Moldova, we have six AKs in East Prussia. One of them was not lucky - did not get the battalion of tanks. According to the results of calculations, everything is the same. We even know: how many tanks in a German armored division - even 291. Bad that this is completely untrue. Even worse, this document distorted the picture for the PribOVO command.
See for yourself. The first enumeration of the enemy troops: more than three PD, MP, TP, CP and artillery units. We have an infantry grouping of three divisions, reinforced by one MP and one TP. How much will this group stomp on the depth, for example 250 km? Remember this figure, we talked about it in the first parts of the cycle? The document only confirms that the Germans do not have large mobile groups and will move slowly or in a couple of directions quickly in our territory, but not for a long time ....
This and this document is bad, in which there is no micron and, accordingly, there are no powerful mobile groups. Peter Semenovich Klenov did not sign this “tuft” document. He even regretted the scouts when he signed intelligence on 21 on June 1941. He simply instructed them to verify intelligence information without waiting for the start of the war at dawn the next day. There are no large groups of Germans near the border!
Intelligence No.02 to 20-00 21.6.41 PribOVO headquarters. The text of the summary was given in the 8 part. Below are presented in the pictures of the location of the German parts according to this report.
[/ Center]From the figures it is clear that 8 hours before the start of the war:
- the concentration of German troops near the border with PribOVO was not noted again. At a distance of about 10 km from the border, there are only four TB. Another part of the motorcycle and armored units is located in 15-20 km;
- again there are no pronounced shock groups near the border. The grouping concentrated near the city of Gambinnnen can also be redeployed to the Suwalki bulge, which corresponds to the concept of attacking Germany against the USSR in the opinion of the General Staff;
- the headquarters of the MK and tank groups were not found again;
- near the border with PribOVO there are no headquarters of German troops at all. An exception is the possible location of the 61 headquarters in 10 km from the border. The nearest AK headquarters is located in 20 km. If there are no headquarters near the attacking troops, then how can these troops be led? The number of aircraft has not changed significantly (on 17.6.41 - more than 500, on 21.6.41 - 583).
A significant part of the regiments and formations disappeared somewhere from the zone of attention of our intelligence, but intelligence was instructed to sort out this question: “...Do the parts that are not indicated in this report continue to be noted earlier (our intelligence report No. 15 from 18.6.41 g. "
If you look again at the dislocation of the German troops shown in the figures, then you can only conclude about the possible provocations of the German troops in the area of Klaipeda and the Suvalka outcry against PribOVO. In other places, the German units near the Baltic border are too few. There are also few of our troops near the border.
According to the disposition of the German troops shown in the figures, nothing can be said about the possible the beginning of a full-scale war through 8 hours...
We have already considered the presence of the German motorcycle tank divisions near the border of Zapovo. There is also no large groups.
We now turn to KOVO, against which there is the last tank group. What did intelligence find there?
The best thing about intelligence information can tell the staff officer of the 5-th army, concentrated against this group.
A.V. Vladimirsky (Head of the 1 Division of the Operations Division of 5 A Headquarters):On the concentration of large German fascist forces on the border with KOVO, the bulk of which concentrated on the Tomashevsk-Sandomir direction, i.e. in front of the front of the 5 Army, it was also noted in the intelligence reports of the KOVO headquarters, but the conclusions about the objectives of this concentration were wrong. Thus, in the intelligence survey of KOVO headquarters No. 3 from 20 of June 1941, it was stated that “a large movement of all branches of the armed forces and transports ... pursues some kind of demonstrative purpose or is connected with the holding of exercises».
The composition, numbering and location of enemy formations were not precisely and fully revealed by our intelligence. So, before the 5 th army, only 15 enemy divisions, including only 2 td. In fact, it was 21 division, including 5 TD. Concentration of the 1 Tank Group in front of the 5 Army, as well as the headquarters of Army Group South and the 6 Army in front of KOVO not noted at all... »
The author came to the similar conclusions of General A.V. Vladimirsky, which he did a few decades ago, independently. It turned out that it has long been known, but nobody needs it ...
How to sell your books? Looking for a sensation, the highest person in the state and mystery.
For example, there is a mention of reconnaissance flight in June 1941 of the year in the book GN. Zakharova “I am a fighter”: “Somewhere in the middle of the last prewar week — it was either 17 or 18 on June 1941 — I received an order from Zapov’s aviation commander to fly over the western border. The length of the route was about four hundred kilometers, and was to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.
I flew to the U-2 with the navigator 43 th Major Rumyantsev. Border areas west of the state border were clogged with troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves stood poorly camouflaged, if not completely camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, guns. Motorcycles darted along the roads, cars — apparently, staff ones — cars. Somewhere in the depths of the vast territory, a movement was born, which here, near our border, was slowed down, resting on it, as if it were an invisible barrier, and it was just about to overlap through it.
The number of troops recorded by our eyes, at first glance, did not leave me any other options for reflection, except for one thing: the war is near. Everything that I saw during the flight was layered on my previous military experience, and the conclusion I made for myself could be formulated in four words - “from day to day” ...
We flew then a little more than three hours. I often put the plane on any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently took the visor and waited for a few minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received the report, the border guard disappeared, and we again rose into the air and, having traveled 30-50 kilometers, sat down again. And again I wrote a report, and the other border guard waited silently and then, with a salute, disappeared silently. By evening, thus, we flew to Bialystok and landed in the location of the Sergey Chernykh division.
In Bialystok, the deputy commander of Zapov, General I.V. Boldin analyzed the recently completed exercises. I briefly reported to him about the results of the flight, and that same evening, on the fighter plane provided to me by Blacks, flew to Minsk ... "
Martirosyan and Kozinkin came up with a fantastic version without a single confirmation: you can find out more in the article "Repetition".
Their creation: "And now do not think for burdensome work to think deeply into the essence of what Stalin and Beria actually did. After all, before you is a brilliant description of lightning carried out aerial reconnaissance along the entire borderline of ZOVOVO! And not just aerial reconnaissance, but carried out in real time. Because every 30 – 50 km Zakharov planted an airplane and wrote an urgent report, and the border guards who knew in advance about the arrival of such an aircraft silently received and sent Zakharov’s report. Moreover. In real-time, but within one daylight, integrated intelligence information was collected about the Wehrmacht’s military preparations for an attack on the USSR in the most dangerous direction from the point of view of the Soviet leadership - Belarusian! The scale of the entire border SOVOVO!»
What can the author add to what is written about them in this article? First of all, this: German td and md were located behind 20-30 km from the border, disguised in the forests and landings. In the multi-colored paint tanks are not painted to facilitate our intelligence detection capabilities. Perhaps the rear men simply do not know ...
In the area of the village of Korolino (in 6 km southwest of the city of Grodno), the 10-th separate aviation squadron subordinate to the border guards of the NKVD BSSR was stationed. The squadron consisted of four air lines of three P-10 reconnaissance aircraft each. Aircraft 10-nd Dep. The squadron of the NKVD Border Guards flew daily around the border in the north almost to Klaipeda and in the south within KOVO. Daily back and forth. It was not possible only to find out whether the same crew was returning back, or he stayed overnight at the end point of the route.
The next oddity is the frequent landing of the commander of the 43 iad Zakharov every 30-50 km. The figures came up with a fantastic version that information was transmitted online to Stalin. Cool, no one wrote. Das East Fiction ... It turns out that such frequent landings were in the practice of flying pilots, border guards. During the landings, they wrote reports that were delivered to those responsible for intelligence in the commandant's offices and border patrols. Further, they were included in the Republic of Moldova and were sent at the instance, being included in the generalized new intelligence materials. These reports were not sent to Stalin, and after the boundaries went to the State Border Guards of the NKVD and then to Beria. In the accepted procedure for conducting reconnaissance and clearance, Zakharov also took part. Zakharov was probably involved in this flight at the request of the leadership of the Belarusian border area (to support his observations by the commander of the spacecraft). Therefore, he handed over secret reports to the border guard - a soldier of another department, as was previously accepted. After arriving in Bialystok and then in Minsk, he did not make reports for the RO district. So fool the readers ...
- aKtoR
- The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. 13 part
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 14)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 15)
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