The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 14)
We will continue consideration of the topic, which was not finished in the previous part. Another misconception is the highly overstated view of the top leadership of the Red Army about the capabilities of air defense when covering ground forces. GKZhukov (SVKS): “... To cover the anti-aircraft artillery of the strike and mobile groups with fire, you need to cover the area along the front in 30 km and in depth 30 km - 900 sq. Km. One ass can cover 160 square kilometers with fire, and 900 square meters to cover it. km will require an 6 ass ... "(The report is probably about the ass, which is armed with twelve medium-caliber anti-aircraft guns.)
During the war years, the ozadas, armed with 37- and 76-mm guns, were able to cover the troops with double-layer fire on an area of 2 km along the front and 2,5 km in depth (only 5 sq. Km). Even if all three batteries in the ass are armed with 76-mm guns, it is unlikely that they would cover a 160-square-foot area. km Since the spacecraft has not previously encountered massive use aviation against its parts, we see a reassessment of the capabilities of air defense to cover ground troops from enemy aircraft. And this is not strange, since Soviet aviation was the first to seize air supremacy.
In 1940, the industry supplied anti-aircraft missiles to the NKO: 37-mm - 21% of the plan, and for 85-mm - 35%. In the first half of 1941, the plan was completed on 37-mm projectiles on 81% and on 85-mm on 99%. Total for one and a half years not planned anti-aircraft projectiles were delivered: 37-mm - 99%, and 85-mm - 66%.
In accordance with the norms of consumption of ammunition for one day of intense combat, small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery allowed 100 shots per day, and for medium-caliber (76-mm and 85-mm) shots 84. The annual consumption rate of ammunition was: on 37-mm gun - 6000 shells (on average per day 6000 / 365 = 16,4 projectile), on 76 and 85-mm - 5040 shells (5040 / 365 = 13,8). The table shows data on the number of guns, on the stocks of shells and on the number of shells per gun in the border districts.
The draft “Strategic Deployment Plans for the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union ...” by 15.5.41 stated: “The deployment of troops and their combat operations with available reserves are provided (by anti-aircraft guns): 37-mm - for 5 days; 76-mm - for six weeks; 85-mm - on 11 days... "
Taking into account the number of days in the border districts of the anti-aircraft guns and the number of days specified in the “Plans ...” it was planned to spend the following day: 37 / 539 = 5, 108 = 76, 1291 = 45, 28 -mm - 85 / 235 = 11 pcs. Is it a lot or a little? In the memoirs of the air defense veterans it is mentioned about the consumption of medium-caliber assault shells of several thousand for one German air raid. In the author's understanding, "several thousand" is from 21 thousand shells and more. From the calculation of 3 guns in the ass, the consumption of 12 shells per raid is obtained. This amount of shells lasts just 250 minutes of continuous shooting. Now it’s clear: why the Zenap, armed with 10-mm guns, were left without shells on the 85 or 1 day and were taken away with the materiel to the rear.
The situation was similar with the 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. In PribOVO, on average, the gun accounted for 600 shells, which is more than in other districts. In ZOVOVO and KOVO there were no projectiles for these systems at all. But even in PribOVO, on the second day of the war, the 37-mm gun batteries were transferred to a “hungry” ration - there were almost no shells left. It turns out that small-caliber artillery shot off all the existing 300-600 shells for the 1-2 of the day.
Thus, if the industry in the 1940 year (the year when the 37 and 85-mm anti-aircraft guns began to enter the spacecraft) and in the first half of the 1941 year completed the anti-aircraft projectile plan, even this additional amount would hardly be enough for 2- 3 intense day war at the rate of fire, which fired anti-aircraft gunners.
Probably, anti-aircraft gunners shot too much and often. Admiral A.G. described something similar. Golovko: "Coastal anti-aircraft batteries and naval artillery continually fiercely but still uselessly fire at aircraft: at strangers and at their own... ”The author does not discuss the question: how did the artillery shoot and how should it have been fired. He only notes that the available stock of shells for 37-mm and 85-mm guns (even with regard to central warehouses) was not enough to cover the spacecraft during the first tense days of the war.
In other words, when assessing the conduct of hostilities by specialists of the General Staff, clearly underestimated consumption rates of antiaircraft ammunition were used to repel less intense enemy air raids. Again, we are faced with sluggish fighting before the transfer of industry to "war rails".
The author assumes that the commanders of anti-aircraft units and zones did not know that there were practically no ammunition stocks for their guns (with the exception of 76-mm anti-aircraft guns). They shot every last piece of iron in the hope that, along with the innumerable compounds of the spacecraft that came to their aid, they would also bring a huge amount of projectiles. In reality, in the central warehouses there was less than one BK for 37-mm guns and less than 0,5 BK for 85-mm guns. Subsequently, the release of anti-aircraft shells grew to the required volume.
In conclusion of the material presented on the reports and speeches at the SVKS, I would like to draw attention to the fact that the senior command personnel correctly understood the actions of the German tank and motorized troops, which were united in mobile (tank) groups.
P.L.Romanenko (commander 1 mk): "The German army decided the operation in the West mainly mechanized and aviation connections ... The decisive element of the operation of the German army was the mechanized army of the Reichenau group [below F.I. Golikov will clarify that such an army did not exist]. This army broke into Namur independently, north of Sedan, cut the front of the French and Belgian armies and later completed the encirclement of the army group operating in Belgium, and ultimately played a decisive role in the final defeat of France ... The Germans, having a significantly smaller number of tanks than we , they took into account that the strike force in modern warfare is composed of mechanized and air formations and all their tanks were assembled into operational units, massaged and assigned decisive independent operations to them.... »
F.I.Golikov (Deputy Head of General Staff, Head of RU): “To 10 in May, the German command concentrated 110-120 DD, 8-10 etc., to 4 md, 2-3 air fleets ... The 200 army centered on the impact direction, from the northern border of Belgium to the southern border of Luxembourg, 4 army, 60 front 3 tank groups, not united in a mechanized army, consisting of up to 8 td and 3-4 md, as well as the main forces of military aviation... »
D.G.Pavlov (commander ZOVOVO): "During the German-Polish war the Germans launched on their border 5 mobile groups on the front to 600 km, total 12 td, 7 light and 5 md. In the border battle, mobile groups operated with infantry, the average daily advance was 10-12 km. The depth of penetration 20-40 km. Only a group of Guderian, without meeting resistance, immediately went to a depth of 100 km. This leg of the day lasted for 3-4 ...
Having broken the resistance of the Poles and quickly put themselves in order, mobile groups started the pursuit. The depth of the operational maneuver reached 200-400 km, daily transitions were 50-60 km. The duration of the detachment from the infantry reached 2-5 days ... Such use of mechanical connections led to the fact that Poland was defeated in 16-17 days.
When the seizure of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, the Germans acted by the same methods as in Poland. Total 4 groups were deployed. total number of 9 td, several md and up to 60000 motorcyclists. If the defense was not particularly strong, then the mobile groups immediately broke into the depths; for the 3 of the day in the Netherlands, the group passed about 140 km. In the same place, where the defense was solid, as on the Wilhelm Canal, the defense was broken first by infantry, and then mobile groups were thrown into the breakthrough. The use of mechgroups allowed the Germans to seize Holland in three days, smash the Anglo-French in Belgium in 15 days.
Operation in northern France began with a breakthrough Weygan line consisting of field defensive, hastily constructed, without concrete, constructions. Moving groups, all three, acted in close cooperation with the infantry, penetrating into the depth of the French troops on 5-7 km. Total participated in the breakthrough of about 2000 tanks - or up to 50% of all tanks concentrated on the front ...
After breaking through Weygan's line mobile groups were thrown into a breakthrough and, ahead of the retreating French troops on the Seine and the Loire rivers, did not allow the French to organize a defense against them. The magnitude of daily transitions in this period was 50-60 km, reaching on some days for certain groups up to 100 km per day. For the period from 5 to 22 July, i.e. for the 18 days of the German army’s advance of mechanized units, the French army was not able to offer significant resistance... »
It turns out senior officers knewthat mototankovye parts and compounds should be used in groups: in mobile or tank groups. Why did the author pay attention to this fact? Just because in the prewar RM 1941 of the year there is no mention of any of them at our borders - they were not found. Only tb, tp, td and md (in bulk) were noted in the RM without a single command. Quite a lot of TB and TP are combined into some conditional TD. With this we will face in the next part. It should be understood that the operational depth to which tb - tp - td - mk can advance in an offensive is different. This is ensured by their structures.
For example, if there is a group of 6-9 TB or two TP, then it is not equivalent to td. This group (even if it has more tanks) will not be able to advance to the same operational depth for several days, which TD or MK could afford. For this, it lacks the headquarters (control), numerous subunits of communications, repair and maintenance, reconnaissance, sapper, anti-aircraft artillery and infantry units. In addition, all these units and parts must be motorized.
Therefore, if there are no headquarters (parts of divisional or corps subordination), individual tp and tb can only serve to reinforce front or backfighting (or move with the pace of infantry movement) or be used to reinforce ppm (which may include tb or tp). The pace of advancement of the reinforced MD will be somewhat higher than that of the AK units, but the operational depth of the breakthrough will be determined by the infantry, i.e. such a division will be tied to the AK. The most interesting thing is that a staff member of the Regional Office PribOVO in March 1941 delivered information that TB will be included in MD. In principle, it is logical, since it was implemented in the Soviet MD. Our intelligence during this period did not know that the Germans did not have enough tanks even for manning the existing ones. The Germans will try to implement this idea only in 1942 year ...
Of course, it is possible to create a large moto-tank group of army subordination of several MD and tank units. The creation of such a group, the organization of its headquarters and the addition of necessary parts at the expense of army formations and unions (including the withdrawal of some officers from the headquarters at all levels) can be tracked by our intelligence (too much turmoil and coordination of everything and everything rises in the troops). To ensure such a group will require a huge amount of vehicles, weapons and communications equipment from the army, which is not superfluous. This was understood by the German generals and therefore they hid their tank groups. The leaders of the spacecraft understood this and waited for the appearance of large mototank groups of Germans near our borders, which did not appear (in the Republic of Moldova) before the start of the war ... Next, in several parts we will look at information provided by intelligence to the leadership of the USSR and the Spacecraft, and also talk a little about deployment of spacecraft troops.
And intelligence reported exactly. In 1 and 2 parts of this cycle, materials were presented that indicate that many of the RM contained contradictory and even fantastic information about the plans of the German leadership regarding the USSR. This misinformation was actively “flipped” by the first persons and special services of Germany, attracted by numerous officials, military and other specialists.
More or less accurate dates of the German attack on the USSR began to appear in the Republic of Moldova since the first decade of June. In parallel with the reports on more or less exact terms, the Republic of Moldova received information on postponing the start of the war to the end of June, to August, and also about refusing to attack the USSR when the country's leadership fulfills certain conditions. As an example, consider several such messages.
Special message. "Senior" 09.06.41: "Next week, the tension in the Russian question will reach its highest point, and the question of war will be finally resolved. Germany will present to the USSR a demand to provide the Germans with economic leadership in Ukraine and the use of the Soviet military fleet against England... "
Special message. "X": 10.6.41: "If Stalin does not come to Berlin, then the war is inevitable. Germany made demands on the USSR: a) additional supplies of 2,5 million tons of grain; b) free transit to Persia and military occupation of Soviet grain warehouses for 4-5 million tons. The deadline for accepting offers is 23 June 1941 g... "
Special message. Ramsay 17.06.41: "The German courier told BAT ... that the war against the USSR was probably delayed until the end of June. BAT does not know there will be war or not... »
In the Soviet embassy in Berlin, in the very center of Germany, not everyone expects the start of the 22 war of June. The report of the German agent 21.6.41 about the opinion of a Soviet employee: "The situation is very serious ... We firmly believe that Hitler started a giant bluff. We do not believe that war can begin tomorrow. The process is likely to continue. It is clear that the Germans intend to put pressure on us in the hope of obtaining the benefits that Hitler needs to continue the war.... »
The author fully agrees with the opinion P.A.Sudoplatova (Deputy Head of the NKGB USSR):The most convincing data on the timing of the attack appeared in 2-3 the day before the start of the war.... »
We will begin to consider the events and arrivals of the Republic of Moldova from the spring - summer of 1940. In 1940 and in the first half of 1941. NKO intelligence (5 RKKA Directorate, 1940 since July — RU GSH) and NKVD (5 department of the NKVD GUGB) constantly exchanged information about German troops stationed or relocated both at the USSR border and in the rest of the Reich. As an example, consider several documents.
Note by the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the BSSR in the NKVD of the USSR 14.7.40: “...According to the Belarusian Border District, with 1 to 7 July this year. seven divisions of the German troops arrived in Warsaw and its environs... »
Note by the NKVD of the USSR to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I.V. Stalin, USSR SNK V.Molotov and K.Ye. Voroshilov, NKO USSR S.K.Timoshenko 15.7.40: "According to the border troops of the Belarusian District, from 1 to 7 July this year. seven divisions of the German troops arrived in Warsaw and its environs... "
The RM from the border guards arrive at the central NKVD administration and from there are sent: to Stalin, to the SNK and to the NGOs. The path of materials from the border to Stalin takes about 2 day. Perhaps this time is even less, but the lack of time stamps for sending and receiving documents does not allow you to determine the time more accurately. Of course, it takes a certain time for the Republic of Moldova to arrive from commandant's offices and detachments in the border area. Probably by analogy, this time is also about a day. Thus, the Republic of Moldova very swiftly (for that time) circulate from the RO and intelligence points to the RO of the central department, from where they reach the country's leadership and other departments. For example, the aforementioned RM got into reconnaissance of the General Staff. It is possible that these materials could get to the leadership of the General Staff and RU already on July 15.
Summary of the 5 Office of the Red Army 20.07.1940 [totals on 16.7.40 city]: "...According to the NKVD, requiring verification, in the area of Warsaw arrived from 1 to 7 in July to 7 front... »
Information received from the NKVD of the BSSR is used operatively by the RP GSH when compiling their RMs, which in turn are sent to the recipients. The addressees include: Stalin (2 copies), Beria, RO VO (regarding them), etc. It can be assumed that the time of passage of the above RM to the addressees is also about a day.
RO NKVD (later RO NKGB) regularly request RG GS about the assessment provided by the Republic of Moldova. The 5 department of the RU GSH regularly responds to these 7 ... 10 requests every day. The last published pre-war estimate has a date of 7.6.41.
Special message. Head of the 5 Department of the State Security Department of the NKVD of the USSR, Fitin 7.08.1940: "I am sending a rating on your materials No. 5 / 10088, 5 / 10089 and No. 10092 from 27 July 1940 g ... Information about the transfer of German troops in the eastern direction is of interest and valuable. They mostly confirm the data we have, and in some cases almost duplicate them.... "
From the presented message it is clear that the Republic of Moldova of different intelligence services confirm or duplicate each other. A situation is impossible when one intelligence service has numerous RM about a certain event and does not inform the other service about it. In addition to the monthly assessments of the Republic of Moldova, there were urgent documents for which the NKVD RO requested an extraordinary assessment.
Special message 9.7.1940: "I ask you to urgently give an assessment of the following agent data:
1. The former English king Edward, along with his wife Simson, is currently in Madrid, from which he maintains contact with Hitler. Edward conducts negotiations with Hitler on the formation of a new English government, the conclusion of peace with Germany under the condition of a military alliance against the USSR.
2. In the coming days, the Germans planned large offensive operations against England.
3. The German and Italian ATU in Bucharest stated that in the future Bessarabia, as well as Soviet Moldova, would be rejected from the USSR ... Head of 5 of the Department of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR Fitin»
On the eve of the war, the so-called interdepartmental council of the NKVD-NKGB and the NKO will be created to coordinate intelligence work. Inside this board, there is also an exchange of RM.
Special Post RU GSH KA in the NKGB USSR 29.03.1941: "Your recent data on the transfer of German troops and military cargo to the borders of the USSR are plausible. They are confirmed by a number of our sources. Information about the transfer of two TD in Tripoli is also quite plausible... »
From the presented message it is clear that the RMs coming through the NKGB to a certain extent already exist in the RC GS. It is also known that Beria sent the RM to Stalin in the SNK. Only from published materials it is difficult to determine how often this happened.
Report of the NKVD of the USSR in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), SNK USSR and NKO USSR 21.04.1941: " From 1 to 19 on April 1941 by border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border, the following data was obtained on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border in East Prussia and the Governor-General Beria»
The Head of the NKGB Directorate also regularly sends RM I.Stalinu to the CPC.
The headquarters of the western border VO also prepared reports on the materials of the illegal agents of the RO district, according to the observations of the intelligence agencies of subordinate units, formations and associations. The Republic of Moldova received from the border detachments stationed in the district.
Thus, in addition to the exchange of the RM through the central departments, there is an exchange of information between neighboring districts (in terms of their relation), between the border detachments (commandant's offices) and the headquarters of divisions, corps, and armies. It turns out that the information coming from the GS GSH is partially already available in the RO VO. The information received from the border guards is also included in the intelligence reports of the district headquarters, which are sent to the RU GSH and to the headquarters of the neighboring HE. There is a duplication of intelligence information at all levels. In addition, the information received from the border guards is verified by the Regional Department of the Military District of Uzbekistan, and the Republic of Moldova received from the NKVD of the USSR is checked by the GS.
In Intelligence Headquarters SOBOVO from 20.6.41 says: "According to RO PribOVO on 16.6, 291 DD is deployed in Klaipeda, Šilutė - 161 md.... »
In turn, in the RM headquarters Pribovo from 21.6.41 is indicated: "In the area of Letzen, Allenstein, Johannisburg (data RO ZOVOVO) ... According to the 105-th border detachment in Klaipeda, the headquarters of the 61 station is marked, in the forest ... - up to two battalions of tanks (data require verification). Note. The data of our intelligence headquarters 61 th PD in Klaipeda was not observed... »
Thus, due to repeatedly duplicated information, it is impossible to hide or distort the RM by any high-ranking intelligence official. Hiding or distorting the RM would lead to the arrest of this person. The only question is: how many days will this happen.
Two copies of the Republic of Uzbekistan Republican General Staff were sent to JV Stalin. What he wrote on them, dribbled, considered what notes he made for himself - we do not know. But, the presence of two copies of one document testifies that he worked painstakingly and carefully with the RM, tracking the data provided. Perhaps he knew as well as Tymoshenko and Zhukov the situation with the German factions on the border, and maybe he knew even better ...
P.A. Sudoplatov: "By distorting the real picture of the leadership of Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Voroshilov, Tymoshenko by the Soviet intelligence activity, the leaders of the KGB and GRU GSh's foreign intelligence in 1960-1980 also voluntarily and involuntarily joined ... On the eve of the war, the intelligence officers “Reported exactly”, and the dictator Stalin ... criminally ignored the authentic RM about the German attack ... We did not open misinformation actions of the enemy’s intelligence and his satellites on the eve of the outbreak of war... »
We consider the RM, which came from various intelligence structures. In other parts, we will see what the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the country could see in the intelligence provided.
Not to be repeated in the future, we note that scouts of all levels tried, without sparing their lives, to obtain information about the German attack on our country. It is not their fault that they were confronted with the highest class of misinformation. At that time, no one could have thought about the possibility of such a large-scale opposition to our intelligence. The data obtained by intelligence included misinformation, which the Nazis skillfully slipped through many different channels. People who process the RM in the Center and get acquainted with it, considered that this information is confirmed by many sources that are not related to each other. However, it was only misinformation from many sources. This, according to the author, was one of the main reasons for wrong decisions taken by the leadership of the country and the army on the eve of the war. Later, our intelligence officers worked more efficiently than the enemy intelligence services and, in turn, repeatedly misled the Nazis.
In addition to the presence of misinformation in the Republic of Moldova, there were The second reason, which led to an incorrect assessment of the events on the eve of June 22. it incorrect estimation of the number of divisions, after redeployment of which, Germany will decide to attack the USSR. In presenting the following material, the author decided to adhere to the chronology when describing events and documents. This will make it somewhat difficult to get acquainted with the material of the article, since the RM will alternate with other NPO documents.
Even before the capitulation of France, there was a German grouping numbering around the 30 division on the Soviet-German border (hereinafter - on the border). In April-May 1940, the transfer of German troops to the west and north was recorded. The published reports refer to the movement of relatively small forces.
Summary of the Fifth Directorate of the Red Army 3.5.40: "According to a noteworthy source, April 11 from the Zamoscie district departed to the Western Front 209 PD, instead of which arrived 110, 210, 219 and 88 nn (No. of the division they are part of, is not installed). From the area of Krakow, the troops are moving in an unknown direction, and instead of them arrive parts of the Gestapo ...
10 on April from the airfields near the city of Warsaw sent 400 bombers to the Norwegian front and about 2500 people of the flight crew. At the same aerodromes, there are up to 200 aircraft, including 160 bombers and 40 fighters... »
Summary of the Fifth Directorate of the Red Army 23.05.1940: "...According to RO KOVO, the transfer of German troops stationed on the territory of the former Poland to the western front is observed from 13 in May. From 13 to 16.5 from Tarnow to Krakow proceeded to 3 infantry regiments...
In the Republic of Moldova, the number of German troops operating in the west is greatly overestimated.
Summary of the Fifth Directorate of the Red Army on events in the West 14.05.40: "The total number of the German army in the West is 8 million people - exaggerated, it must be assumed that at present there are no more than 5-6 million people. The rise of new reserves of up to 4 million people in the near future is in doubt, in general, Germany is able to put up an additional amount... "5-6 million people in the German Armed Forces during the war with the Allied forces in the West - this is an excessively high estimate. Interestingly: what size did the German group have to reach when attacking the more powerful Soviet army in the spring and summer of 1941, according to the leadership of the spacecraft?
After the capitulation of France, Germany planned to once again strengthen the grouping of troops near our border.
Memorandum Deputy Chief of the General Staff to the USSR People's Commissar of Defense on a meeting with the German ATN 9.7.1940: “General Koestring told me that on the instructions of the Chief of the General Staff he had to report that the command of the German army had decided to demobilize his army. This demobilization should be expressed in the dismissal of older ages from units located in East Prussia and in the territory of the former Poland, instead of demobilized into these units, soldiers of young ages will be transferred.
In addition, the transfer of troops to permanent locations in East Prussia and the formation of new garrisons in Poland will be made, since in the west they now do not need to keep a lot of troops. In this regard, large movements of troops will be made in East Prussia and in the territory of Poland ... The head of the General Staff of the German Army instructed him to bring this to the attention of the General Staff of the SC in advance, before the start of military traffic ... Smorodinov"Newsletter:"NKO, Stalin, Molotov»
Summary RU GSH KA: "On the territory of V. Prussia on 15 June it was established before 7 PD and 2 qp ... On the territory of the Bolshoy Polshi on June 15 was located before 20 CD and 4 qp ...
During the period from 19.6 to 14.7, the 5 Directorate and the ZOVOVO and KOVO RO were marked up by 860 military echelons, proceeding from the west in the east and southeast directions. As a result, it can be assumed that during this period, Prussia was transferred from the West to 6 PD (and in them up to two MD ...), 5 CP, over two TBR (TBR and six TB) ...
To territory b. In Poland over the same period, the following number of units and connections arrived: ... Against CECO - before 3 front-door and tp; ... Against KOVO - before 5 PD, CP and tank units of unspecified numbers ...
In Austria - on the Slovak-Hungarian-Yugoslav border 12 – 13 divisions, of which 2 etc. In addition, in the region of Zvolen (Slovakia), a tank part of an unspecified number and numbering is noted.... "
In fact, at that time, in the specified areas there were about 31 of the German division. The divisions noted in the report were deployed at a distance from 20 ... 30 to 50 ... 150 km from the border. In the summary against PribOVO, tbr and six tb are noted, which are conventionally combined into another tbr. Intelligence did not establish the belonging of this brigade and battalions to specific tank units or formations. The published information from the Republic of Moldova on whether there were any tank units near the border of the USSR at the current time. Upon request, the RU GSH intelligence of the NKVD received information about the availability of equipment in TB.
Special message. Head RU GSH KA 2.8.40: "At your request ... I inform you that according to the intelligence information obtained in recent days from various sources, it has been established: ... in TB located in the territory of V. Prussia and b.Polshi, there are 133 light and medium tanks... »
The figure shows the data on the number of German divisions in accordance with the RM RU GSH and their actual number. The difference between the actual number and the "discovered" intelligence shows once again testifies to the excellent work of the German intelligence and military command.
It should be noted that in the figure, the dependences are plotted according to control points related to the dates of arrival of the Republic of Moldova, which do not coincide with the dates of the presence of the actual number of German divisions at the border during this period. On the sections of the curves between the control points, the number of connections may be distorted, since unknown speed of movement of connections between control points. Therefore, the data in the figure are reliable only at control points, and between them they create a conjectural picture (given for data visualization).
In the Republic of Uzbekistan RU GSH in certain areas presents the range of existing divisions at the border. For the minimum values of this range, the dependence of the minimum number of divisions is constructed, and for the maximum values - the maximum.
According to RU GSH from 11.5.40 to 1.9.40, the number of divisions near the border increases from 31 to 90. 90 divisions are 73% groupingwhich will invade our territory 22.6.41. In fact, on the 1.11.40 near the border (against the troops of PribOVO, ZOVOVO and KOVO, including the territory of Austria) there is only 32 division.
It turns out that by the end of August 1940, our intelligence counted near the border almost 3 / 4 of an assault force, which 22.6.41 would invade the territory of the USSR. At the same time, almost all the same areas were considered, which will be considered in the future from April to June 1941. Only the territory of Romania, which at that time did not have German connections, did not enter.
NKVD intelligence 24.8.40 reports an even more fantastic number of German troops: "The German ambassador in Belgrade told the military minister of Yugoslavia that the Germans had concentrated 75 divisions in Poland, of which 18 md. According to the plan, the 120 divisions should be concentrated on the Soviet-German border. Please rate the reported material.... "Number of divisions overestimated on 28 compared to the already overestimated data of the RU GSH.
The large gap between the “discovered” reconnaissance compounds and their actual number leads the author to the idea that coincidence of the number of divisions to 22.6.41 is a random factor.. Having a different angle of inclination, the dependencies shown in the figure should have crossed somewhere ...
Is 90 "discovered" German divisions a lot or a little? These divisions are deployed against the troops of Pribovo, Zapovo and part of the forces of KOVO. In early September, 40-th is not yet German troops in Romania. On 17.6.41, intelligence will “locate” in Romania (near our border) to 18 German divisions. It is well known that according to 22.6.41 intelligence, the German group at our border (including the territory of Romania) consisted of 129 divisions (in fact, they were 124). If you add German divisions in Romania to 90 connections, you get the number 108. 108 divisions are 87% of the invasion grouping. Thus, in the territory where the 90 divisions are allegedly deployed, the entire 16 is not enough to the number that will be concentrated in this territory by 22.6.41.
Some writers are confident that they say that the command of the spacecraft was very confident at the beginning of the war, namely 22.6.41. So why aren't they preparing for the September 1940 war? To transfer the remaining 16 divisions for the German command is a matter of a few days.
Many documents from that period provide data on the number of German trains per day in different directions.
For example, "Lublin grouping ... railway capacity, leading to the Visla river - 72 pairs ..., i.e. per day is possible to bring one division... »
«Krakow grouping ... railway capacity up to the Visla river line 126 par ..., i.e. gives you the opportunity to bring up to 2 divisions every day... »
«Hungarian grouping ... The capacity of the 126 railway pairs ... You can bring up two divisions per day... »
«East Prussia ... the railway network with a total capacity of up to 300 pairs of trains per day, of which up to 200 can be used for operational traffic, ensures that, on the 12-th day of mobilization, concentration up to 40 enhanced traffic... "If we carry out the simplest calculation, we get that the speed of concentration in the direction of East Prussia is more than three divisions per day.
There is no data on the assessment of rail transportation in the direction of Warsaw - Zapovo border, but it can be assumed that in this direction it is possible to transport up to 2 divisions per day. In this way, within two days the missing 16 divisions could be at the border.
So why not particularly prepared for the attack of Germany in the month of September? After all, there was a sharp increase in the grouping since May 1940, almost 3 times, and no one could guarantee that there would not be a further increase in one week (during this time you can transfer more than 50 ... 60 divisions). But they did not prepare because they were sure: Germans are required much more divisions than available 90 (Of these, 9 TD and 4 MD) and also require much more motorcycle-tank connections.
From Notes of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I.V. Stalin and V.M.Molotov about the basics of deploying the 18.09.40 aircraft:Currently, Germany has deployed 205-226 DD (including up to 8 md) and 15-17 etc., and only to 243 divisions ... Of the above 243 divisions before 173 divisions, - of them up to 140 PD, 15-17 td, 8 md, 5 light and 3 airborne ... will be directed against our borders..."According to the GSH against the USSR, up to 71% of German armed forces can be set. According to the memoirs of A.M. Vasilevsky, this document was twice brought into Stalin's office. Consequently, the leader should have read this document.
Prior to September 1940 of the number of divisions concentrated against the western border VO, indicated in the Note 48% of connections missing: 69-ti and to 14, etc. and md. Therefore, the country's leadership and the Red Army were not afraid of a sharp increase in the grouping of German troops on the Soviet-German border during this period.
The projects of the “Cover Plans ...” are being worked out. A.M. Vasilevsky: "Troop commanders, members of the Military Councils, NSH and operational departments of the LVO, PribOVO, ZOVOVO and KOVO in the second half of 1940 and at the beginning of 1941 were summoned in the General Staff, where, on the basis of the operational plan, the General Staff worked on their district plans for weeks. Working out, as a rule, began with a decision to allocate the necessary forces for cover echelons and the order of their use. In order to work out certain special issues that arose during the development of the plan, the commanders of the troops were allowed to call up the respective commanders of the arms of service and the chiefs of services of their district. All principal decisions taken by the district command in accordance with the plan being developed were immediately reported by them to the Chief of the General Staff, and then to the Commissar of Defense.... »
Let's go back to intelligence reports, Special message RU GSH KA 28.09.1940: "In the near future, it is planned to hold a new appeal, from which 40 of new divisions intended for the east should be formed, and this refers to the call of people with technical knowledge, in particular for service in motorized units.... "Newsletter:"Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, Kuznetsov, Vatutin, Kornev»
Intelligence reports that new divisions will be formed. For their formation and preparation requires a lot of time. Consequently, the beginning of the war is postponed. Ahead is a thaw on the territory of the USSR, a winter with drifts and, perhaps, there will be no war until the spring of 1941. Two days later, a new message of a more threatened nature comes in, which included misinformation.
Special message 30.9.40: "NKVD USSR reports the following agent data ... During September of this year. about 20 of German divisions, which were being transferred from the western front to the territory of the eastern regions of Germany to the borders of Romania and the Soviet Union, proceeded through Paris ... During September of this year. through Vienna, went east around 10 German td ... "
In early October, 1940, the leadership of the NPO was also preoccupied with the formation of new tank units. From the document "On increasing the number of tank units and formations'"The creation of the missile forces forced us to temporarily reduce the tanks intended for direct support of infantry ... I consider it necessary to increase the number of infantry support troops at the rate of providing each missile with one tactical ... People’s Defense Commissar S.Timoshenko Head of the General Staff KA K.Meretskov»
Guderian: "In October, 1940. Hitler was busy negotiating with the French and Franco to continue the war. At the end of the talks, he met in Florence with his friend Mussolini. On the way to Florence, at the Bologna station, Hitler unexpectedly learned that his ally, without notifying him, Hitler, and even without his consent, started a war with Greece. Thereby the Balkan problem was again affected, and the war went in a direction extremely undesirable for Germany.
The first consequence of the unauthorized step of Mussolini was, as Hitler told me, the refusal of Franco from any actions with the Axis. He clearly did not want to pursue a joint policy with such partners, from whom one could expect any surprises.
The second consequence was the growing tension in relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. This tension has been exacerbated by a number of incidents of recent months, and especially by German policy in Romania and on the Danube ... From the Molotov visit [13-14.11.40 g.] and the course of negotiations Hitler concluded that the war with the Soviet Union can not be avoided... »
From KOVO's Note on the Deployment Plan for 1940 Year [before 8.11.40]: "Estimating the modern grouping of the German army with the most rigorous assessment of its temporary nature, arising from current aspirations, we must understand that for the near term the group against the USSR will be created from the existing, characteristic presence of large forces in the Balkans and in southern Germany.
Germany has: 230 – 240 PD, 8-10 MK ... Currently, these forces are grouped:
... in East Prussia and Poznan 18 PD, 2 TD, 1 MD;
against ZOVOVO 19 PD, 3 TD, 1 MD;
against KOVO 23 – 25 DD, 3 gds, 3 - 4 etc., 4 md;
group of gen.Blaskowitz (most of it is already in Romania) 20 – 25 pd, 1 td, 1 md ... NSH KOVO Purkaev»
This Note states that it was released no later than December 1941 of the year. You can specify the time of its release. The note also states: "...group gen.blaskowitz (most of it is already in Romania)... ", i.e. General Blaskowitz’s group has not yet completed its concentration.
In a special report RU GSH KA from 9.11.40 is indicated: "According to new data from our sources from Romania and Bulgaria, the army of Colonel-General Blaskowitz, who previously occupied the region of Moravia and Galicia, finished my concentration in romania... "Therefore, the term of the Note - no later than 8.11.40 - the time of sending the message.
In the beginning of the part it was said that before the war, intelligence did not find a single tank group of Germans. The presented fragment of the Note is interesting in that it mentions about German micron.
Consequently, our intelligence and senior officers knew about MK, but intelligence to 22.6.41 near our border found neither their headquarters nor these associations themselves. Just as she did not find a single tank group of the enemy before the start of the war. And if there are no tank (mobile) groups and even no MK, then how can the Germans apply their favorite blitzkrieg tactics? For our military and intelligence, these unions became the same mythical troops as the amphibious divisions and divisions of heavy tanks. The difference is that tank groups and microns were, but they could not be found ...
Help 5 Department of the State Security Department of the NKVD 6.11.1940: "From the first half of October begins the gradual weakening of the concentration of German troops on our borders by transferring them to the Balkans (to Romania), as well as to Hungary and Slovakia due to the beginning of the implementation of the plans of the German command to occupy Romania and further advance deep into the Balkan Peninsula... "These transfers explain the decrease in the number of divisions in the figure above.
In the certificate below on the number of German compounds in the spring of 1940, the years are quite close to the actual number. Since July intelligence NKVD, as well as intelligence and spacecraft, begins to inflate the number of German troops on the border. This is probably due to the onset of misinformation by the German command.
Help 5 Department of the State Security Department of the NKVD 6.11.1940: "During the period of operations in France, the German command held in East Prussia and the former Poland to 27 PD and 6 CP.
After the capitulation of France, the German command began in early July 1940 to massively redeploy its troops from west to east and southeast, with the result that in East Prussia and the former Poland it was concentrated: on 16 July - up to 40 nd and over 2 etc; on 23 July - up to 50 PD and above 4 TD; on 8 August - up to 54 PD and up to 6 etc ...
On 1 in October in East Prussia and in the territory of the former Poland are concentrated 70 pd, 5 md, 7-8 etc. and 19 kn... »
When we are told that the NKVD (including the border guards) on the eve of the war had accurate information about the German troops to a depth of 400 km - this is a hoax to reinforce fantastic nonsense. At the same time, except for words, they do not impose anything on us. Yes, they can publish an exact list of weapons, for example, the guard battalion. But by the number of troops - nothing to show. It does not happen like this: they reported, they reported overestimated data about the troops, and suddenly “saw the light” before 22.6.41 ...
Pauls: "Decisive in the further preparatory work on the Barbarossa plan was that the OKN directive from 18.12.40 set the beginning of the offensive around mid-May 1941. The appointed time was explained by the Russian climatic conditions ... The attack on Yugoslavia led to a change in the directive on the strategic deployment of forces under the Barbarossa plan, since for the attack from Romania [on the USSR] there was not enough troops that were connected in the Balkans... »
Below again in the Republic of Moldova, we will see the flow of dezu. Special message. "Harry" 11.12.40: "Head RU GSH KA. 4/5 Germany's motorized forces transferred to Poland... »
Special message RU GSH KA 14.2.41: "Starting from October, 1940 should be additionally mobilized around 1,5 million people, including 750 thousand people in the army, the rest for the military industry. In January, 1941 was called up in Germany proper, ranging in age from 40 to 45 years, as well as those who recovered after injury. There is information about the additional formation of 25-td, five td and five md, the final formation of which must be completed by March 1, in addition, expeditionary corps (number unknown) are formed from persons who participated in the war in Spain and fit for military service in African conditions ...»
Special message of the NKVD 25.2.41 ("Dora" 21.2.41): "Head RU GSH KA. According to the intelligence officer of the Swiss General Staff, Germany now has 150 divisions in the east. In his opinion, the performance of Germany will begin in late May.. "There are litters:"BUT-1. This is probably ... desa. It is necessary to specify "Dora". Golikov»
RU GSH KA asks intelligence NKVD on clarification provided by RM: “[1.2.41] The information material received from you on the deployment of troops, on defensive construction and the military industry in the territory of the former Poland, which ceded to Germany, is of interest to the Republic of Uzbekistan. Particularly valuable information about the construction of fortifications in the areas of Biala Podlaska, Radzimin and Belzhets, new airfields and dislocation of parts.
I ask you to give instructions to the source to additionally check and supplement individual information on the following points:
... 4. Check the quartering message for 3 and 14 divisions 67, 68, 107, 108, 109. 214, 215 and 216 paras.
5. To clarify the grouping and numbering of parts in the areas: a) Warsaw-Modlin-Minsk-Mazowiecki; b) Krakow-Tarnow-Jaslo; c) Biala Podlaska Lukov Mezhirechye... »
We see that in the GS GSH “stupidly” does not use the information provided, but tries to clarify it from the intelligence that obtained these RMs. Probably, along its line RU GSH will also recheck this information.
The flow of misinformation does not stop. It continues in the spring in the reports of the agency of the GSH, NKVD and border guards, It also comes from future allies.
Note Commissar of State Security JVStalin, V.M.Molotov 11.3.41: “A source from the USSR NKGB, close to the British Embassy in Moscow, reported that 6 in March of this year. British Ambassador Kripps held a press conference, which was attended by British and American correspondents ...
Currently, the Turks are trying to improve their relations with the USSR, and if they manage to get a certain guarantee that the USSR will not attack Turkey and in the event of a German attack on Turkey will provide the latter with material assistance, then the Turks will definitely go to war with Germany ...
On the other hand, if Hitler is convinced that he will not be able to defeat England before America can help her, he will try to make peace with England on the following conditions: the restoration of France, Belgium and Holland and the seizure of the USSR. These conditions of peace have good chances for them to be accepted by England, because both in England and America there are influential groups who want to see the USSR destroyed, and if England’s position deteriorates, they will be able to force the government to accept Hitler’s peace conditions . In this case, Hitler will very quickly attack the USSR... »
We see how the British throw up information about a possible alliance with Germany - this is what the leadership of our country feared. German intelligence officers could also receive this information and deliver it to the leaders of Germany. Wasn’t Hess’s flight to England a step by the German government towards making peace with England?
Information about the steps of British intelligence aimed at provoking a collision between Germany and the USSR also came to Moscow earlier. In an effort to divert the threat of invasion from England, her intelligence spread rumors that "The Soviet Union intends to immediately take further aggressive military actions as soon as Germany is involved in major operations.". According to K.Filby, the British leadership by all means sought to escalate the fear of Soviet military preparations among the German leadership in order to stimulate tension and conflicts in Soviet-German relations. In the United States, British agents spread rumors about the inevitability of the Soviet-German war on the initiative of the Soviet Union, which would strike at southern Poland. We do not know what information they threw at the German intelligence services for the same purpose ...
Special message RU GSH KA 11.3.41: "The total number of the German army by September 1940 was about 228 divisions, including 15-17 etc. and 8-10 md. According to reports, over the past winter period, the German command has additionally formed 25 front, 5 etc., 5 md. In addition, due to the PD formed, apparently, to 5 MD. Thus, the total number of divisions of the German army on 1.3.41 is about 263 divisions, of which: 221 pd, 22 etc and 20 md... »
In reconnaissance, a change was also noted in the grouping of the German army: in the south-east direction: the number of divisions increased from 22 (by 1.9.40) to 62 (1.3.41). Again, we are faced with an estimate of the RP, which provides overestimated data on the number of German connections.
From the Plan of the General Staff of the Spacecraft for Strategic Aircraft Deployment 11.3.41: "Germany currently has deployed 225 radar, 20 td and 15 md, and a total of up to 260 divisions, 20000 field guns of all calibres, 10000 tanks and up to 15000 aircraft, of which up to 9000 – 9500 combat.
Of the specified number of divisions, 76 divisions, of which up to 6 td and 7 md, are currently focused on our borders and before 35 divisions in Romania and Bulgaria.
If the war with England ends, it can be presumed that of the existing 260 divisions, Germany will leave at least 35 divisions in the occupied and bordering countries and up to the 25 divisions in the depths of the country.
In this way, before 200 divisions, of which up to 165 DD, 20 TD and 15 MD, will be directed against our borders... »
The Plan ... also states that the main forces of the German army can be deployed in the south or in the north. On 11.3.41 - for GSH it is not yet clear where the main attack is possible. At the SVKS, it was said that the Germans concentrated on the main line during the war in the West up to 100-130 divisions. The same leadership of the spacecraft is also waiting for it: it is considering grouping divisions in the southern or northern directions in 100-130. The concentration of such a huge grouping at the border is hard to miss intelligence ...
The draft Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander, ZOVOVO, prepared in April 1941, also mentions the same number of troops: “In the event of a war with us, Germany, out of its existing 225 PD ... will be able to send against our borders before 200 divisions, of which up to 165 PD, 20 etc. and 15 md... »
From both documents it can be seen that, according to the GS (in March-April), the USSR can be concentrated on the border of the 200 divisions, which is 77% of the existing formations in the German Armed Forces. Attention should be paid to the distribution of German troops near the USSR border. In some books, the redistribution of spacecraft forces is explained to counteract a possible German strike in the southern direction by the fact that Zhukov brought along with him in the GSH many people from QUO (KOVO). According to the author - this is not a correct explanation. The author agrees that the leadership of the spacecraft was probably secretly willing to launch a counterstrike in the direction of southern Poland. But to desire is not to fulfill your wish ...
On 25.4.41 against troops, PribOVO and ZAPOVO are estimated by the RU GSH concentrating on 49-50 divisions (including 9, etc. and md), against KOVO and OdVO - 40-44 (including 7 etc. and md).
5.5.41-52 divisions are listed on 53 against PribOVO and ZOVOVO, against KOVO and OdVO are 45-49.
15.5.41-53 divisions (including 54 td and md) are listed as 10-55 against 59 vs PribOVO and ZOVOVO, 15-XNUMX are against KOVO and OdVO. (including XNUMX td and md).
1.6.41 vs. PribOVO and ZAPOVO have the same 53-54 divisions (including 10 etc. and md), and against KOVO and OdVO rises to 61-62. (including 17 td and md).
In addition, according to intelligence data in Bulgaria, there were: on 25.4.41 - 25-27 German divisions, on 15.5.41 - 15-16 divisions, on 1.6.41 - up to 11 divisions. Do not forget about the other German divisions that could be sent to the southern border of the USSR. According to intelligence data, 1.6.41 had German connections in the central part of Romania - 11, in the Protectorate - 6-8, in Greece - 12.
Thus, a powerful grouping (eg, for 10.6) consisting of up to 87 divisions could be created against the KOVO and OdVO troops. Taking into account the further concentration of troops, theoretically, a much more powerful grouping could be created in this direction.
In the 13 part, you were presented with data on the significant difference at our border between the actual number of divisions and the number presented in the Republic of Moldova. Consider the assessment of the German intelligence forces border guards and RU GSH.
Note by People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and the People's Commissar of Defense S.K.Timoshenko 21.4.41: “From 1 to 19 on April 1941 by the border detachments of the NKVD of the USSR on the Soviet-German border, the following data was obtained on the arrival of German troops at points adjacent to the state border
In East Prussia and the General Government:
In the border strip of the Klaipeda region: profits 2 PD, PP, kavskadron, hell, TB and a company of scooters.
In the area of Suwalki - Lyk: profits before 2 md, 4 nn and 2 kp, tb and sat.
In the area Myszyniec - Ostroleka: arrived up to 4 pp and an, TB and a battalion of motorcyclists.
In the Ostrov-Mazowiecki-Malkinia-Gurna area: arrived at PP and CP, before 2 hell and a company of tanks.
In the area of Biala Podlaska: arrived pp, 2 sat, kavskadron, company scooters and artillery battery.
In the area of Vlodawa - Orkhovok: arrived before 3 pp, kp and 2 an.
In the area of the town of Kholm: arrived before 3 PP, 4 an, MP, CP, TB and sat. There is also concentrated over 500 cars.
In the area of Hrubieshov: arrived before 4 nn, an and mp and kavskadron.
In the Tomashov district: the compound headquarters arrived, up to 3, and up to three hundred tanks.
To the Przheorsk-Yaroslav district: arrived before the first, above an, and up to two cavalry regiments.
Total in these areas arrived: compound headquarters 3 md, 6 PD, up to 21 PP, 2 mp, 7 kn and 9-10 an, up to 7 TB and 4 sat, motorcycle battalion, 2 companies of scooters and more than 500 cars ... People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria»
It should be noted that the regiments listed in the Note are not included in the divisions indicated in the same document. The RM indicates the arrival of 9 divisions (6 front and 3 md). Let's try to combine the remaining parts (21 PP, 9-10 an, 2 mp and 7 TB) into conditional divisions. We will not consider smaller parts and divisions.
We will conduct a calculated estimate: 21 PP / 3 + 1 an ~ 7 front; 1 mp + 1 an + 4 TB ~ 1 TD.
It remains with us: 1 mp, 2 an, 3 TB - let's conditionally evaluate them in the 0,5 division.
So that in the period from 1.4.41 on 19.4.41 (for 19 days) frontier guards "discovered" the arrival of German divisions before 17,5 in the area from Klaipeda to the area of Hrubieszhov-Tomashev-Przhevorsk-Yaroslav. From the city of Yaroslav to the border with Slovakia, 92,5 km was still there, and German troops could also concentrate there, which were not included in the above Note.
And what did the RU GSH report? Intelligence services of the RU GSH completely coinciding with the dates specified in the RM of the NKVD could not be found. But there is, for example, Intelligence RU GSH from 4.4.41.
Intelligence: "Throughout March the German command carried out reinforced troop movements to the border strip with the USSR. They began as early as the end of January 1941 ... As a result of analyzing all the data received, the overall reinforcement of the Eastern German front against the USSR from the Baltic Sea to Slovakia for February and March is six per day and three, etc., the total number of German troops on the border with the USSR to Slovakia ... 72-73 divisions... »
We see a summary of the total number of divisions, taking into account their transportation from January to March, i.e. as of on 31 March. We can say that the initial period of further observation 1.4.41 the border guards of the NKVD and the RU GSH coincides.
In the next published Intelligence RU of the GSH German group at our border on 25.4.41 estimated in 84-88 divisions. For 25 bottomth there was an increase in grouping on 12-15 divisions. The intelligence data of the NKVD for a shorter period speak of a greater number of arrived divisions (17,5), compared with the information of the RU GSH. And we know that according to the estimates of the GS GS overestimated the number of German troops at our border.
And how many divisions were actually redeployed? Accurate information on 19 or 25 April is missing. It is only known that April 4 to May 15 1941 of the year has been relocated 24 divisions. Therefore, it can be said that the RM from the border troops of the NKVD also included misinformation thrown by the Germans and on a scale larger than in the Republic of Uzbekistan RU GSH KA.
At the end of April, the question of the redeployment of the 16 army (5 MK (1070 tanks) and 32 ck) from Transbaikalia to Transcaucasia is being considered. The army also includes 57 td (more than 300 tanks), which had previously been stationed in Mongolia. The structure ZakVO includes 28 MK, 3 and 40 ck, two cd, two cd and 6 gsd. The 1.4.41 has an 151 armored car, a 892 tank and a wedge.
Why in the Caucasus, and not on the western border? Probably because the western border at that time was less disturbing than, for example, the invasion of German troops through Turkey or Iran ...
Special message. "Senior" 17.4.41: "The source notes that in connection with the successful advance of the German troops in Denmark, the sentiments of the circles advocating for action against the Soviet Union have somewhat subsided, because now hope to win the war with England by striking its vital communications and oil sources in the middle east... »
Special message. "Senior" 24.4.41: "At present, the Aviation General Staff has almost completely ceased the development of Russian facilities and is intensively preparing for an action against Turkey, Syria and Iraq in the first place. The rally against the USSR seems to be relegated to the background... »
Special message RU GSH KA «On the distribution of German armed forces in theaters and fronts of military operations as of 25.04.41 ”:“ The mass transfer of German troops from the interior regions of Germany and the occupied countries of Western Europe continues uninterruptedly. The main transfer flows follow in two directions: to our western border and to the Balkans ... Due to the reserves brought to Bulgaria and the liberation of the German parts in Yugoslavia an army is being created against Turkey... »
BAT Note in Germany To Chief of the General Staff of the 25 / 26.4.41 SC: "The next coming German events seem to me like this:
a) Settling Turkey with a pact of three or some similar to it ...
d) Whether the Germans are planning extensive operations in the Middle East and Africa with such a number of troops that would weaken their European grouping is difficult to say, although such goals as Suez, Mossul, the defeat of the British in Abyssinia are officially proclaimed.... »
Special message. "Zeus" 27.4.41: "Germany will not allow the conclusion of a treaty of the USSR with Turkey... »
Note NKGB USSR Stalin, Molotov, Beria 30.04.41: "Message "Corsican" from 28.4.41 g. Source reports: 1. The referent of the Ministry of Economy told ... that the Germans are taking all measures to include Turkey in the fairway of German policy. The Germans promised Turkey a part of Thrace, as well as the accession of other territories ... The German proposal also included the rejection of some Soviet areas in the Caucasus in favor of Turkey... »
Special message. "Mars" 29.4.41: "Part of the German troops operating against Yugoslavia with Hungary ..., are returning by car through Budapest to Vienna. German soldiers say they will get a few days of rest, then they will be sent to Poland to the border of the USSR. Another part of the German troops from Yugoslavia is sent to Romania. In Budapest and Bucharest, there are many rumors about the upcoming war between Germany and the USSR... "There are litters:"It is especially important to trace where the German forces from Yugoslavia are being transferred.. Golikov 29.04.41»
Special message. "Mars" 1.5.41: "Intensive air operations of the German army and the war in the Balkans extremely depleted stocks of gasoline. The situation with gasoline is so complicated that the Germans intend to by all means force an offensive against Iraq to occupy oil sources. For this purpose, the reinforced transfer of German troops to Libya through Italy and the concentration of troops in the Balkans is currently underway.
The assault on Iraq is planned to be carried out from Egypt and through Turkey, or by transferring troops through the Dodekanevskie Islands and then by sea along the Turkish coast. Rumors are circulating in the high command circles that in the event of a successful attack on Iraq, an attack will be launched on the USSR, on the Caucasus from Turkey and on Ukraine from the west... »
Note NKGB USSR in the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I.V. Stalin, the SNK of the USSR V.Molotov and the NKVD of the USSR L.P. Beria with the transmission of telegrams from the British Ambassador to the USSR S.Kripps 5.5.41: “A likely and effective counterweight to German pressure can be: a) the fear that Turkey will join the powers of the “axis”... »
We see that misinformation has also touched upon a new strategic direction for striking the USSR from the Transcaucasus. It is possible that 16 A was thrown to counter this threat. Parry threat could occur due to the rapid advance of mechanized troops, which were represented by two microns, one etc. and two cd. Only one thing is not entirely clear: why is the 32 ck being transferred from Transbaikalia, and not a similar case being relocated from the North Caucasian Military District? Perhaps, according to the General Staff, a separate army group was needed in this direction, which went through internal coordination ... In any case, the North Caucasus Military District troops began to be transferred to KOVO from May ...
Whether this movement of troops was connected with the fear of the military-political leadership of the country in connection with the possible actions of Germany in the Middle East, the author cannot say for sure: not enough information. Could such a move be a legend to cover the redeployment of troops allegedly in the direction of Transcaucasia, and then towards Ukraine? According to the author, this is unlikely.
Memo Deputy Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova I.V. Stalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation, obtained by the agent's 6.6.41: "The Germans are extremely indignant at Turkey’s intractability in the issue of passing German troops through Turkish territory. Filov concluded that Moscow prevented the German-Turkish agreement on the passage of troops... »
Information