The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 17)
Introduction. We are completing a review of material devoted to reconnaissance and estimation of enemy strength by the spacecraft leadership. There are also materials from seven parts: about air defense, air defense, air defense, stockpile and KOVO. The author is interested to know how important these publications are to readers. If, according to the results of a reader’s assessment, an article gains 51 plus (or more), the continuation expects you, dear visitors. If not, then it’s not fate: this is your decision. Parts will be large, many memories and almost no drawings. Maybe someone historical the material will seem boring.
Consider the first military report GSA. We must understand that the county filed the materials in the summary. At this time, chaos reigns in the districts: problems with communication, with command and control and the lack of reliable RM ...
Operation No.01 GSH KA on 10-00 22.6.41: "NWF ... enemy ground forces launched an offensive and are hitting in two directions - the main one from the Pillkallen region, Suwalki, Goldap with forces of 3-4 pd and 500 tanks in the direction of Olita and providing the main grouping strike from the Tilsit region on Taurag, Jurbarkas forces of up to 3-4 with an obscure group of tanks.
As a result of the border battles, the enemy’s attack on Taurage was repulsed, but the enemy managed to capture Jurbarkas. The position on the direction of the main grouping of the enemy is specified. The enemy apparently seeks actions on Olita, Vilna to go into the rear of the ZF, ensuring his actions on Taurage, Siauliai... »
From the figure it is clear that, according to the information that came from the NWF, the report of the General Staff reflects some sluggish fighting. The situation is not alarming GSH, probably because everything is developing, as it was supposed there. The main attack from the long front is made only by the reinforced corps group: 3-4 front and 500 tanks (about two mn, according to the estimate we saw in the previous part). The tanks in the infantry group will move at a slow pace and will not go far ... In Moscow, it seems that the situation can be kept under control ... The actual situation, which is unknown either in the headquarters of the NWF or in the General Staff, is much more serious ...
Operation No.01 GSH KA (continued): "ZF ... With ground forces, the enemy is developing a strike from the Suwalki area in the direction of Golynka, Dombrov and from the Sokolow area along the Volkovysk railway. The advancing forces of the enemy are specified. As a result of the battles, the enemy managed to capture Golynka and reach the Dombrov region, dropping parts of the 56 sd to the south.
In the direction of Sokolow, Volkovysk go intense fighting in the area Cheremkha. By their actions of these two directions, the enemy obviously seeks to embrace the north-western grouping of the front.
The front commander plans a counterattack in the direction of the Gorynka for the destruction of a broken enemy... »
In ZOVOVO, we see the same thing: instead of a multitude of strikes in particular directions, reflected in the “Cover Plans ...”, the report reflects only two. In this case, no word about the Brest direction, in which, as one of the users said: “At the border of the district there is a large fully operational mechanized connection capable of striking the operational depth of 400-600 km... »
According to the previous RM, we have seen that such a conclusion was problematic, because there were no data on the presence of a micron or, moreover, a tank group in the RM district and the General Staff Directorate. And in the report in this area there is not a single word of doubt or reference to the lack of data. The situation is under control ...
B.A. Fomin (head of the operational department of the headquarters of Zapovo) in his note spoke about the Klimovskys, who had a great capacity for work and honesty, but did not differ in his sobriety in assessing the enemy and his capabilities. NS ZOVOVO, for example, did not believe that the Germans "able to plan his initial operation so far and deliver massive strikes far in depth aviation».
The author would only clarify that, according to intelligence data (on 20-00 21.6.41 and on 20-00 22.6.41), the Germans have the opposite:
- it was only 4-5 air regiments. What kind of massive strikes into the depth by German aviation can we talk about with such small forces ...;
- there were no major motorcycle tank groups.
Therefore, the NS district rightly assumed that it was impossible to talk about some deep advancement of the German troops in the initial period of military operations with the forces they had. Of course, individual users will connect here with the words: “Traitors-generals... "There were no such ... Probably, this is the initial vision of the highest commanding staff of the districts, General Staff and NGOs for the military operations of the initial period of the war ... In KOVO everything is the same as in ZOVOVO ...
Operation No.01 GSH KA (continued): "...SWF ... In the 4-35 after the artillery fire in the area Vladimir Volynsk and Lyuboml ground troops of the enemy crossed the border developing a strike in the direction of Vladimir Volynsk, Lyuboml and Kristinopol.
In 5-20 in the Chernivtsi region near Karpeshki, the enemy also launched an offensive ...
The enemy, having preempted our troops in deployment, forced parts of the spacecraft to take the fight in the process of occupying a starting position according to the cover plan. Using this advantage, the enemy was able to achieve private success in certain areas. Chief of General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov».
Consider Intelligence of RU GSH on 20-00 22.6.41: "The Northern Front: ... In the north, the main group is made up of units of the German army, which in the Rovaninsky sector has to 3's - 4's Divisionsand besides in the Kirkenes area up to three divisions...
The total number of enemy groupings is determined by:
a) On the northwestern front - 29 divisions (of which 5 md and 4-5 etc.) ...;
b) On the Western Front in the Warsaw District 31 division (of which 1 md and 4 etc.) ...;
c) On the south-western front (to Slovakia) - 48 divisions (of which 5 md and 6 etc.) ...
In addition, in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, the number of German troops is 13-15 divisions. In Romania - 33-35 divisions ...
Front-line reserves in the area of Czestochowa, Breslau, Mor.Ostravka - to 7 divisions; in the area of Thorn, Bromberg, Poznan the number of divisions of the front reserve has not been established.
The reserve of the main command to 20.6 consisted of 17-20 divisions located in the central regions of Germany.
Due to the fact that the June redeployment of troops to the east was carried out from the western front, it is necessary to consider that the composition of this reserve has been preserved, especially since further withdrawal of troops is quite possible from the west for use against the USSR.
CONCLUSION:
1. Opponent for 22.6 brought considerable forces into battle; namely 37-39 pd, 5 md, 8 td, and total 50-52 divisions. However, this is only approximately 30% enemy forces concentrated to the front [/ i] ... "
From the summary follows:
- the enemy has entered the entire 50-52 division into battle (on the first day of the war crossed the Soviet-German border or has already taken part in the hostilities of more than 70 German divisions);
- There are up to 7 German divisions on the North Front;
- on SZF - 29 divisions, the same number as according to intelligence before the war (in fact, PribOVO deployed against the troops; 24 front, 6 etc., 6 md, 4 guard divisions);
- at ZF (Warsaw District) - 31 division; one division added compared with pre-war data;
- on SWF (to Slovakia) - 48 divisions.
Total for NWP, ZF and SWF (to Slovakia) for the Republic of Uzbekistan RU GSH listed 108 divisions.
In addition, in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, the number of German troops is 13-15 divisions. Romania has 33-35 divisions. Earlier, divisions in the Danzig, Poznan, Thorn area (6 rd) were added to the divisions intended for an attack on the USSR. Considering the divisions mentioned, the number of German divisions intended to attack the USSR will be 165.
From the findings of the report, it can be calculated that if 30% of enemy forces is 50-52 divisions, then 100% forces will be from 167 to 173 divisions.
Phrase: "From the west it is quite possible to further withdraw the troops for use against the USSR"And the presence of 7 divisions in Finland smoothly leads to 180 German divisions. As we remember, this is the number of connections that, according to the leadership of the spacecraft, Germany will allocate for the war with the USSR.
What else is interesting in intelligence? In the last part, we talked about selected two SS divisions against ZOVOVO. According to a summary in the Suwalki region, it is said that the 21.6.41 1-2 td SS are up. They got to the report by the evening of June 22, but it is still not clear whether this is a division or two.
Intelligence, placed in the section “Electronic exhibitions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation”, has nine pages and is signed by the head of the GS GS KA Golikov. In the right corner you can see the numbers (circled in blue), which are put down after filing the document in the case. The summary is the first document in the case, and therefore the numbering of the pages of the document and the pages of the document in the case coincide. The figure in the red frame shows the right corner of the tenth sheet, placed in the composition of the report number XXUMX. It does not have its own numbering. The page number in the 1 case. This indicates that this sheet was not originally related to Intelligence No. XXUMX and was hemmed to it later (after filing into the file of other documents). Such practice in office work exists. Only it is not clear, this sheet was prepared before the release of the report or after it ...
The data of Intelligence and the Form of the combat composition and distribution of the German army are quite close. According to the Form, 107 divisions are listed against the forces of the North-West Front, Polar Division and South-West Front, and according to Intelligence Service - 108. The only significant difference is in the number of divisions versus ZF: according to the Blank of their 40, and according to the summary - 31.
According to the author, Blank is a later document, which included a vision of the number of divisions according to the RO intelligence information of the ZF headquarters: “With the dawn of 22.6.41, German troops consisting of up to 30-32 PD, 4-5 td, 2 md, 4-5 aviation regiments, airborne division, 40 ap launched an offensive against the ZF... "
In reconnaissance of the RO ZF, the number of divisions along the line of demarcation of Suwalki - Heilsberg is again taken into account, although the German divisions from this direction went in the direction of the NWF. In the previous part, it was shown that the RO of the headquarters of Zapovo had previously overestimated the number of German troops against their area of responsibility. Thus, a significant change in the vision of the leadership of the spacecraft and the RU GSH on the Republic of Moldova from the point of view of the pre-war and first day of the war did not happen.
Divisions of the Republic of Moldova. Earlier in the comments to the first ten parts of O. Yu. Kozinkin said that the author, referring to RM RM GSH, distorts real data. And if you read the answers komdivov, then it says about the true state of affairs. The author was not too lazy to present all the answers of the divisional commanders who can be “pulled down by their ears” to the definition of “they knew at least something about the enemy”.
The book S.L. Chekunov "I am writing solely from memory ..." there are answers from the spacecraft commanders who served on the eve of the war in the LVO (4 response), in PribOVO (18), ZAPOVO (18), KOVO (24) and OdVO (8). Only 24 responses of the squadron commanders (from the 72 respondents) indicate the presence or absence of the RM before the start of the war.
Lvo BEFORE. Leichik: "The offensive actions of the German troops in the 14 line And began a few days after the general offensive. By this time, the nature of the actions of the enemy, mostly determined. As for the preliminary information about the enemythen for that matter no specific data...»
THEM. Pyadusov: "We knew exactly the opposing enemy before the war and knew the state of its positional areas.... »
IN AND. Shcherbakov: "By the beginning of World War II, there was evidence in the corps headquarters that the Germans had already transferred up to seven stations with tanks to Finland and that the German forces, in agreement with the Finnish government, were to be conducted beyond the Arctic Circle; Finnish troops. As for the data on the Finnish military units in the corps, they were very scarce by the beginning of the war... »
From the presented answers it is clear that only two of the four commanders replied that there were RMs about the enemy troops. In the answers V.I. Shcherbakov speaks about 7 German divisions. On 21.6 in Finland there were actually 3 German divisions (one infantry and two mining infantry), the combat group SS “Nord” (two regiments) and two dep. tank battalions (40 and 211 - the total 124 tank). From the information provided in Intelligence No. 1 RU GSH, it is clear that the RMs were incorrect (overstated by almost 2 times).
PribOVO. P.V. Afanasyev: “The fact that they moved to KP not for conducting exercises, but on the eve of a possible war with the Germans, was obvious to everyone, but Whether the war really begins or whether everything is limited to private border clashes, it was not clear. Hope to delay the war continued to exist... »
CM. Firsov: "Colonel AB told me that, starting with 17-18.6, observation from the border posts, from the towers, the light, the movement of cars and the roar of engines were detected at night, which he personally observed and listened to .... 17 and 18 June I, together with the commander, traveled to check the progress of work on field construction and heard from officers similar stories and reports... »
I.T. Shlemin (NSH 11 A): "There were many signs of preparations for an attack by Nazi Germany (the concentration of troops near the border, the forests along the border were closed for visiting by the local population, a large number of saboteurs crossed the border, the daily violation of the border by planes, etc.).
... The numbers of 18-20 June frontier units appealed to the army with a request to assist them in the fight against saboteurs, who in large numbers passed from Germany to the territory of Lithuania. It was decided, under the pretext of conducting tactical exercises on a defensive theme, to put 28, 33 and 5 sd on defense and give them ammunition.
At this time at night, the border guards were fighting a real battle with the saboteurs. Fearing any provocation, the commander of the district ordered the army to take away the ammunition and hand them over to the divisional warehouses. Thus, the numbers 18-20 of June, three divisions were put on the defensive with the task of firmly holding the lines occupied and not letting the enemy... »
In the presented three answers there is not a word that the commanding staff had information about the grouping of German troops before the war. At the same time, we examined in detail the RM RO of the PribOVO headquarters and there are no data on a large number of German formations and associations, as well as on their mass concentration directly at the border.
True, there is still information in the answers of the deputy. the chief of the RO Derevyanko that the command of PribOVO fully owned information about the enemy and showed criminal negligence. Is it so - you can judge only by one table with the number of tanks in the directions presented in the previous part ...
SOBOVO. P.I. Lyapin: "Explicit preparation of the Germans for decisive action, of which we were thoroughly informed through the RO... »
Mv Bobkov: "Long before the treacherous attack of the fascists on the Soviet Union, we had information about the impending offensive of the enemy, about the concentration of his troops on the state border, about the consolidation of battle formations, about the concentration of warehouses and other data... »
M.A. Zashibalov: "21 June 1941 of the year ... at the end of the 20 watch checkout, returning to the location of the division headquarters, visited the commandant of the Mayanovo border area, from whom he learned that during the nights from 19 to 20 in June and from 20 to 21 in June 1941, west of Malkin station -Gura concentrated up to one infantry corps and in the Ostrov-Mozovetski area — up to two railway stations with tanks of the fascist troops ... The commandant of the border area believed that the fascist German units probably located in 8-20 km to the west of our State border are defensive. bots and field exercises... »
RM on the location to the west of Malkin-Gur of one AK, is generally correct. Only, it is not entirely clear which divisions were assigned to the AK in question. In the area of the Island of Mazowiecki there are (but again it is not clear what exactly we are talking about), but there are no tanks there. I remind you that according to the RM RO of the headquarters of Zapovo, there was a whole place there.
We see that only in three responses (from 18) of the commanders of Zapovo there is some mention of the RM about the enemy. Moreover, not a single commander wrote that the Republic of Moldova was confirmed after the start of the war. Please note that in the answers of the divisional commanders standing in the way of tank groups (most of them were torn down by an unexpected avalanche of tanks), there are no words about confirming the Republic of Moldova after the start of the war ...
OdVO. PM Verkholovich (NSh 35 sc): "Data on the concentration of enemy groups in the body band, in the headquarters of the corps was increased gradually. Back in May, the concentration of enemy troops in the forests at a depth of 10-12 km from the state border was noted, while in early June the enemy conducted reconnaissance.
12 and 18 of June corps troops, located on the state border, were expecting provocative actions by the enemy, which were timely warned about the adoption of measures of combat readiness. The main grouping of the enemy in the corps was outlined in the directions of Balti and Chisinau. This assessment and information about the enemy’s grouping that was available before the start of the war was fully confirmed during the initial period of hostilities.... »
A.G. Batyunya (NS 48 ck: 74 cd and 150 cd): "The position of the Romanian-German units in the territory of Romania was systematically received by the corps headquarters from the OdVO headquarters. Based on these intelligence reports and bulletins, it was known that a large group of German-Romanian troops was concentrated on the Soviet-Romanian border. The deployment of these troops and the numbering of the units was subsequently fully confirmed.... "
P.A. Belov: "Information about the enemy to 22.6 in the corps headquarters was clearly not enough. In any case, there was no reason to draw any serious conclusions on individual fragmentary information. Even from the border guards, with whom 9 cd was closely connected, the information was sparse. In general, the information did not correspond to reality. On Saturday 21 June, I went to the RO of the district headquarters ... RO had such detailed information that was very close to reality. It is therefore surprising why the District Headquarters did not report this information to the corps headquarters.... »
Komkor Belov, PA after getting acquainted with the Republic of Moldova in the RO OdVO in the evening, 21.6 continues to rest easy and does not hurry to its troops. Maybe everything was trivial and enemy connections were in the RPM?
Memoirs of PA Belova: "I spent my holidays with my family in Odessa ... It was time to go back. I had to jump on the oars. “Dad, look!” - the daughter called me. To the shore ... the wife quickly descended, invitingly waving her hand. My chauffeur ran after her ... "Take back from vacation ", - I decided... "War! The Germans attacked! "- shouted my wife... »
N.K. Ryzhi: "The barracks' location of units located at the beginning of the war in the city of Rene was not more than one kilometer away from the south bank of the Danube River, which was occupied by Romanian troops. The possibility of covert location of troops and artillery allowed the enemy with the outbreak of hostilities to conduct artillery fire direct fire directly on our barracks... »
Two commanders from 8-mi respondents confirmed that all information about the enemy was confirmed. One wrote that the information of the PO of the OdVO headquarters was detailed, and the information in the headquarters of the QC was fragmentary. Only this commander did not rush into the corps, but continued to rest ...
Head of Artillery N.K. Ryzhi writes that the covert location of troops and artillery allowed the enemy to conduct artillery fire directly. It turns out that the intelligence did not reveal the exit of the enemy troops to the initial positions for the attack?
The saddest thing is that the RM in the headquarters of the OdVO were distorted. We saw this in the previous section, and therefore all three of these commanders (except N.K. Ryzhi), speaking of correct intelligence data, mean German misinformation, which significantly overestimates the number of troops.
KOVO. M.A. Purkaev: "On the night of June 11 or 12, intelligence was received:
a) from the KOVO agency - on the completion of the deployment of the German forces of the Kleist group ...;
b) from the headquarters of the OdVO that German soldiers and officers in Romania in squash talk about the start of hostilities against the USSR on the morning of June 17. About 4 nights, I reported this intelligence on the HF to the people's commissar, who ordered me to wait at the office. Hours around 6 in the morning tov.Timoshenko called me on HF and said that this intelligence is also available in the General Staff, it is possible that drunken Germans are chatting inaccurate data, but “keep your ear sharp ...».
Information "about the end of the deployment of the German forces of the Kleist group"Not true: the German moto-tank units 11-12 of June did not even concentrate at the border and the headquarters of the tank group and the MK headquarters were not detected by our intelligence. And for the work of the RO of the headquarters of KOVO, among others, he answered NSH. Speaking of the completeness of information obtained from intelligence - he is a person interested ...
At the same time, General A.V. Vladimirov does not confirm the presence of the completeness of the Republic of Moldova on the tank group: "The composition, numbering and location of enemy formations were not precisely and fully revealed by our intelligence. So, before the 5 th army, there was only the presence of enemy 15 divisions, including only 2, etc. In fact, the 21 division was, including the 5 TD. The concentration of the 1 tank group in front of the 5 army, as well as the headquarters of Army Group South and the 6 army in front of KOVO was not noted at all... »
N.P. Ivanov (NS 6 A): "While still in Transbaikalia and receiving intelligence reports, we felt a looming threat, since intelligence quite accurately determined the concentration of the fascist German troops (see, for example, West Intelligence Service No. 4 in May 1941 of the year)... »
Intelligence on the West in May 1941, unfortunately, was the product of German disinformation.
P.A. Beginners (NSh 62 sd): "Long before the start of the war, i.e. from October 1940, there was intelligence about the concentration of German troops near our border. And throughout the winter and spring of 1941, we had data on the concentration of German troops, the sources of this data were intelligence reports from the headquarters of the army, district and intelligence bulletins of the RS GS. We knew that the parts of 62 and 56 PD and No. 3 PD didn’t remember that they were concentrated in front of the division strip.... »
From the presented figure it is clear that the German 62 front and part of the 62 front were deployed against the 298 sd troops. German 56 PD deployed against 45 sd. In the intelligence report mentioned by PA Beginners, there are no RM about divisions 3 microns the adversary. Otherwise, he would have written about the opposite: what he knew about the enemy troops. We see that there are parts opposite the 62 cd 25 md and 14 td the adversary. 62-th SD was lucky that the mobile group hit was more to the left, mostly on 87 SD, the commanders of which did not write about the loyalty of the RM - the Germans smashed that SD ... If only the German missile had attacked Novichkov’s division, it wouldn’t be alive He wrote about the authenticity of the pre-war RM ...
Z.Z. Rogozny (NSh 15 sc): "The 5 A command underestimated the intelligence information, which exhaustively revealed the intentions of the German command. Major General Potapov 20 on June 1941 of the year replied to Lieutenant Colonel Chernykh (former intelligence officer of the army headquarters) about his clear preparations for the fighting that the Germans would not and cannot fight with us... »
The general phrase: "The 5 A command underestimated the intelligence information that revealed with complete exhaustion the intentions of the German command." Agree that this wording can be presented to any commander of the spacecraft, including the top management of the spacecraft. The head of the operational department of 5 A states the opposite, that the enemy’s motorcycle and tank grouping was not fully opened ...
I.A. Kornilov (commander 49 ck): "A few months before the war, reading the intelligence reports I received regularly, it was possible to establish that the Germans were intensively preparing for war against the USSR ... Commanding 45 sd (before being appointed corps commander), located on the border, and having a connection with the frontier detachment, I had more detailed information that convinced me of the inevitability of Germany’s attack on our homeland... »
The inevitability of an attack on the USSR was doubted by quite a few of the military. In addition, you were shown that there was a lot of misinformation in the Republic of Moldova, which significantly overestimated the number of German troops.
G.I. Sherstyuk (commander of the 45th division): "The situation at the border thickened every day. An almost daily state border was violated by German aircraft penetrating deep into our country. To the border, new numbers of German units and formations were concentrated; the number of new German OP artillery units was clearly increasing at the state border.... »
Baranov A.M. (NSh 17 sc): "The corps command, receiving almost daily intelligence from the border detachments, concluded that not only Romanians but also German troops with tanks, artillery were concentrated in front of the state border, and ammunition and engineering property was being created in the forests, and concentration was considered not a simple deployment of troops in peacetime, but in preparation for the war, about which, according to intelligence, since March, they have had an intensified conversation in Romania ...»
N.V. Fecklenko: "Headquarters of special data corps from intelligence reports about the enemy did not have except that German troops after operations in France, Poland, etc. they concentrate their troops along and near the Soviet border, as if to rest... »
Vladimirov V.Ya. (NSh 96 GSD): "The reasons for failure are: firstly, confusion and lack of organization in the higher headquarters; secondly, lack of knowledge of the true situation and the very pr-ka and poor awareness of direct performers; excessive autonomy and classifying urgent needs and tasks in case of war... »
DI. Ryabyshev (commander 8 mk): " The command of 8 MK from intelligence reports of the GS GSA was aware, as far as I remember, that the Germans concentrated on the state border of the Kiev operational direction before 34, 4, etc. and 4 md, during the war these data were confirmed... »
Since there is a link to the RM RU GSH KA, then in these documents was an overestimated number of German divisions. DI. Ryabyshev writes as far as he remembers the 42 divisions (of which 8 md, etc.). According to RU GSH, there were 46 divisions in this area (of which 11 md, etc.). From memory, the commander 8 MK leads quite close data to that indicated in the RM.
In fact, there were 37 German divisions (including 9 md, etc.). At the same time, we already know that the actual number of 22.6.41 approached the data in accordance with the Republic of Uzbekistan RU GSH, and, for example, in May the discrepancy was even more significant.
Thus, from the 72 answers presented in the book, according to 70, we can say that the intelligence data on the number of German divisions at our border were not reliable. To a greater extent, this related to the assessment of the deployment of the moto-tank forces, which the German command tried to conceal.
Once again about the Navy. In the previous parts, several examples of private initiative were shown by the commanding staff of NGOs and NWFMs in preparing troops for an attack by fascist Germany. During this period, several messages were received in which outraged users write: “There can be no private initiative ... Only a person who is far from the army can argue this way ... All instructions came from NGOs and the General Staff... "Let everyone remain unconvinced, but we will see examples of private initiative more than once ...
The 12 part talked about introducing operational readiness levels №2 on the SF admiral A.G.Golovkabout: "17.6.41... You have to take the initiative again at your own risk. I translate the fleet with my order for exhaust gas №2... »
The author wrote then that he had been promised to find the memoirs of one of the veterans of the North Sea, and he would post a text confirming or refuting the above statement.
N.P. Dubrovin (Chief of Logistics of the Northern Fleet, engineer-rear admiral): "1On June 7, 1941, the first Nazi plane appeared over the main base of the Northern Fleet - Polyarny ... Command fleet made a decision put the fleet on high alertwhat actually meant the implementation of a significant part of the mobilization plan ...
Formally, the situation with the liquid fuel in the Federation Council immediately before the war was not so bad: fuel oil was 96,6% of the total demand, gasoline - 149,5%. But such an assessment of security was correct only in terms of peacetime. These calculations lost ground, as soon as the commander of the fleet 17 1941 June year, due to the apparent threat of war, put the fleet on high alert. On this day, most of the stocks of fuel oil, diesel fuel, gasoline was supplied to the ships, and in the tanks of the rear of the fuel there was less than one filling... »
Private initiative of Admiral A.G. Golovko led to his order to use NZ fuel for refueling ships of the fleet. The remaining fuel was spent (handed over) to the mobilized ships and 22.6.41 ships. Do not start a war, for this Admiral AG Golovko would have had to “answer with his head” ... For the author now is a confirmed fact - the fact of the announcement of 17.6.41 at the SF readiness number XXUMX. A logical question arises: can it be then that the admiral Yu.A. Panteleyev's NS and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet are true? Let me remind you what it is about.
Yu.A. Panteleyev: "19 June 1941 of the year ... the Red Banner Baltic Fleet decided to lead the fleet in increased operational readiness... Admiral [V.F. Tribuz] detained me. He called Moscow and summoned NG People's Commissar of the Navy. Kuznetsova: “Comrade Commissar, I formed the opinion that a German attack is possible at any hour. We must start to put barriers, otherwise it will be too late! I consider it necessary to increase the fleet's OG ... ”Putting down the phone, the admiral sighed with relief:“ With the increased OG of the fleet he agreed, but ordered to be careful not to go for provocation. And with the production of mines ordered to wait. Let's act!»
Thus, it is possible that at the Red Banner Baltic Fleet readiness No. XXUMX was announced not by a team from Moscow, but at the suggestion of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Commander, but by Commissar N.G. Kuznetsov only agreed with this. It turns out that the leadership of the NKO and the General Staff has nothing to do with bringing fleets into readiness No. XXUMX. Remember how surprised the commander of the Navy, Hanko, General S.I. Kabanov, when the Red Banner Baltic Fleet declared readiness No. 2, but 2-nd Dep. Ssbr declared it before the start of the war ...
The author has made simplified calendar of events. Some of the materials you have already seen, and some await you in subsequent parts.
Mid June. N.G. Kuznetsov: "Vatutin promised to notify us immediately if the situation becomes critical.... »
Tymoshenko called Kuznetsova only on 23-00 21 June. It turns out that before 23-00, 21.6.41 in the General Staff did not consider the situation critical ...
17 ... 18.6.41. M.I. Kazakov: "I was told that the mobilization of the armed forces of Finland was under way, and the troops of fascist Germany were already concentrated on our borders. To my direct question: “When will the war start with fascist Germany?” - A.M. Vasilevsky replied: “Well, if it does not start within the next 15-20 days... »
The war can begin within 15-20 days ... It turns out that around 17-18, the numbers in the GSH didn’t expect war at dawn 22 June, but waited for a long time interval ...
Special message NKGB USSR 19.6.41: "Yesterday, a telegram from the Italian ambassador in Berlin arrived at the Italian Foreign Ministry, in which he reports that the highest German military command informed him about the start of German hostilities against the USSR between 20 and 25 in June of this year. "Titus"»
20 June, there is no war yet and German troops, according to intelligence, are not moving to the border.
Special Post 20.6.1941: "Head RU GSH KA. Bulgarian, the German emissary, said here today that a military clash is expected on 21 or 22 on June, that there are in Poland 100 German divisions, in Romania - 40, in Finland - 6, in Hungary -10, in Slovakia - 7. Total 60 motorized divisions ... In Romania, the mobilization is over and every moment military action is expected. Currently there are 10 thousands of German troops in Bulgaria... »
RU and GSH know that the presence of 100 German divisions in Poland is disinformation, 40 - in Romania - is a bit overstated, 60 German medias. The document is contradictory, but there are few German troops near the border, no mobile groups, no aviation. It is hard to believe in the beginning of the war by such small forces in 1,5 days ...
20.6.41. M.I. Kazakov: "On the morning of June 20 ... GK Zhukov invited me along with Vatutin. He looked through our development rather attentively ... In the evening ... Vatutin and I once again looked through all the documents, sealed the folders, handed them over to the vault and said goodbye for a long time... »
It is difficult to name the considered issue of the “Plans for the Protection of the SAVO”, a secondary district for the General Staff of the Spacecraft, if Zhukov expects a June 22 war. And as usual - if he does not expect ... Vatutin 20 devotes a lot of time to June Kazakov ...
20.6.41. P.I.Batov: "Marshal S.K.Timoshenko informed me that I was appointed commander of the land forces of the Crimea and at the same time the commander of 9 sk. At the same time, the marshal did not say a word about what relations with the Black Sea Fleet should be, what to do first of all, if you have to urgently bring the Crimea in readiness as a theater of military operations... »
Tymoshenko will call after the start of the war with an indication of the antiamphibious defense of the Crimea.
20.6.41. Headquarters PribOVO introduced FG No. 2 for air defense and issued an order to darken Riga. Information comes to Moscow. The next day, the reaction of the Chief of the General Staff follows.
N.N. Ravens: "By order of the commander of the troops PribOVO ... the blackout of cities and individual objects of military significance was introduced. Immediately, by telephone, I reported this to the head of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, to obtain permission to conduct such blackouts in other border districts. In response, I heard abuse and threats against Kuznetsov.... »
In other districts, FN 2 for air defense was not introduced.
20.6.41 evening. M.M. Popov: "Well, that called, - the voice of the People's Commissar sounded in a tube. - Putting to sea for the time being. Immediately return to Leningrad... "
The commander of the LVO leaves for the headquarters of the LVO by train, the arrival of which is expected only Happy 22.6.41. In the evening, 20, the People's Commissar does not expect the beginning of the war at dawn on June 22. Otherwise, he would have given the command to immediately take off by plane.
«June 21 day, spent in the car, passed quietly. At large stations, the military commandants who were on duty to the car could not report anything alarming. In Petrozavodsk, where we arrived around 4 in the morning on 22 in June, in addition to the commander waiting for us, Lieutenant-General F.D.Gorelenko, we also met the secretary of the Central Committee of the Karelo-Finnish SSR and the head of the Kirov railway. First of all, they reported on the received order from Moscow: to unhook the wagon of the commander from the train and to deliver him to Leningrad outside the schedule, for which purpose a separate steam locomotive...»
The order to speed up the arrival of the commander at the headquarters of the LVO appears only after the start of the war.
Morning 21.6.41. Head of the Republic of Uzbekistan received information from the source "X": "The embassy received a telegram from the Foreign Ministry. A Tippelskirch meeting is taking place at 4. The source is convinced that the war will begin in the coming 48 hours.»
Messages from “Maro'('The attack is scheduled for June 22... ") and"Costa'('21 or June 22 military clash... ").
Up to 13-00 21.6.41. Zhukov sends PC to PribOVO headquarters: “Without the approval of the People's Commissar, you gave an order for air defense to put into action provisions №2 - this means a blackout in the Baltics, and this will damage the industry. Such actions can be carried out. only by government decision. Now your order causes a variety of rumors and unnerves the public. I demand to immediately cancel the illegal order and give an explanation for the report to the Commissar. Chief of General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov»
15-00 21.6.41. N.D. Yakovlev: "The head of the General Staff, General of the Army GK, was in the office of the People's Commissar. Zhukov ... S.K. Tymoshenko did not give us time to talk. Concisely suggested ... from June 23, to start accepting business from the former head of GAU… [At that time] I called the commander of the troops PribOVO General F.I. Kuznetsov. The People's Commissar rather strictly asked him if it was true that they, Kuznetsov, had been ordered to introduce a blackout in Riga. And in the affirmative answer ordered to cancel it... "
Happy 21.6.41. N.N. Ravens: "It was not possible to get to the authorities, they promised to accept me with a report only on Monday or Tuesday... "
Happy 21.6.41. I.T. Peresypkin (Commissar of Communication): "You have not left yet? ”Stalin asked me. [This is about the Commissar's trip to the Baltic States.] I tried to explain to him that, on his instructions, he worked at the commission, but he interrupted me and again asked the question: “When do you leave?” I had no choice but to answer: “Tonight.” He hung up ... [Morning xnumx] I called Moscow... [and asked to speak with K.E. Voroshilov]. A few minutes later, an instruction from Moscow followed: “Return immediately... »
People's Commissar of Communications is sent on a secondary trip, in which any representative of the Commissariat can handle, with the appropriate authority. Even I.Stalin, who carefully studies the Republic of Moldova, does not expect a war in the coming days ...
21.6.41 evening. K.A. Meretskov: "S.K. Tymoshenko said then: “Perhaps the war will start tomorrow! .. The main thing is not to succumb to provocations ... Exposure above all. Be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into a war... »
The representative of the People's Commissar of Defense, who must determine whether provocations began or this is a war, leaves for LVO headquarters by train, not having time for dawn. He is also not sent urgently by plane. Does anyone in Moscow actually expect an attack at dawn on 22 Jun, or not ??
21.6.41 evening. Pn Goremykin: "In the building ... where GAU was located ... Questions were raised very sharply by General of the Army GK Zhukov. He spoke of the need for substantial revision of the mobilization plan for ammunition, referring to the increase in digital tasks... »
Yes, in the evening of June 21, the head of the General Staff should not have other important matters ... But everything is ordinary, if he does not expect the 22 war.
21.6.41 near 19-00 J.E. Chadayev: “Poskrebyshev:“The owner .., just in an excited state, was talking to Tymoshenko ... Apparently, he is about to be expected ... German attack... »
19-05…20-15 21.6.41. In the office of Stalin is among others Tymoshenko. Zhukov is missing. The question of the organization of the Law Faculty, the appointment of the command of the Law Faculty, the Northern Front and the command of the general leadership of the Law Faculty and the South-Western Fleet is being decided. Consideration of this issue, some writers associated with the expectation of war at dawn on June 22. It is interesting where Zhukov will have time to go in the morning of 22, in time to start the war. This is the usual meeting for the future, the same as the departure of front-line departments ...
After 20-00 21.6.41. Special message is delivered to Stalin from the source “Х'"The embassy in the morning was instructed to destroy all the secret papers. It is ordered to all employees of the embassy to pack their belongings and hand them over to the embassy until the morning of June 22. Living outside the embassy - move to the embassy. It is believed that the coming night will be a decision. It's a war».
20 50-21.6.41 XNUMX S.M. Budyonny: "Stalin informed us that the Germans, without declaring war on us, could attack us tomorrow, i.e. 22 June ... What we should and can do today and until dawn tomorrow 22.6.41
Tymoshenko and Zhukov said that if the Germans attacked, we would break them at the border, and then on their territory.
I. Stalin thought and said: "This is not serious." Appealed to me: "What do you think?" ...»
21.6.41. P.A. Sudoplatov: "The combat readiness [of the headquarters and command of the border and internal troops deployed in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States.] Was announced ... in 21-30 ...»
Beria acts differently: unlike the military, he brings his territorial units and troops on alert. There will be a war or will not be unknown. But his forces are ready for provocations and counteraction to saboteurs ...
21.6.41 after 22-20 Tymoshenko and Zhukov went to NGOs to prepare Directive No. XXUMX.
G.K. Zhukov: “...It has long been dark. The end of June is the 21 day. We arrived with C.K. Tymoshenko silently before the people's office entrance, but I felt that the same people's worrying thoughts were overwhelming me. When we got out of the car, we agreed to meet in his office in ten minutes ...»
Yes, there are not disturbing thoughts should overcome, and running to the phones and raise troops! But the leadership of the spacecraft did not believe in the attack, or did not decide to take on something ...
About 23-00 21.6.41. L.M. Sandalwood: "At about 23 hours we were called to the NSh district telephone. However, we received no special orders. About the same, that you need to be ready, we ourselves knew... »
The echo of Tymoshenko’s call to ZOVOVO headquarters around 23 hours has come to the headquarters of the 4 army. Not a word about the rise of troops ...
About 23-00 21.6.41. Tymoshenko called Y.T. Cherevichienko: “Keep in mind that provocation by Germany and Romania is possible.
- What, war? - involuntarily burst from me.
“War may not be, but the troops must be ready,” answered Tymoshenko... »
About 23-00 21.6.41. N.G. Kuznetsov: “S.K. Tymoshenko: “There is very important information. Come to me ... ”In a few minutes we were already on the second floor of a small mansion, where S.K. Tymoshenko. Marshal, walking about the room, dictated ... Army General GK Zhukov was sitting at the table [without jacket] and wrote something. Several sheets of large notebook lay to his left. It can be seen, the Commissar of Defense and the head of the General Staff worked for quite a long time. Semyon Konstantinovich noticed us, stopped. Briefly, without naming the sources, he said that it is considered possible the German attack on our country. Zhukov got up and showed us the telegram he had prepared for the border districts. I remember she was extensive... »
After 23-00 21.6.41. Stalin left the Kremlin.
23 45-21.6.41 XNUMX. PC with Directive No. 1 entered the SHO.
0 30-22.6.41 XNUMX. PCs sent to recipients - 2 hours 10 minutes after leaving Stalin's office. During this time, the inmates in the NCO did not give any specific instructions for lifting the troops. Troops are not raised ... We will consider actions in districts in other parts.
3 13-22.6.41 XNUMX. German air raids on Sevastopol. Parachutes with them dropped ground non-contact mines. Two mines fell on dry land. In 3-48 and 3-52, they self-destruct.
3 55-22.6.41 XNUMX. German air raids on Libau.
N.N. Ravens: "About four o'clock we received the first report of the bombing by enemy aircraft of Sevastopol. Soon through VNOS information was received about the air raids on Vindava and Libau ... In a few minutes I was at [Tymoshenko] with data on the bombing of a number of our cities. The head of the Main Political Directorate L.Z. Mehlis ... I left the office with a stone at heart. It struck me that in such a serious situation the people's commissar did not set any task for the air defense forces, did not give any instructions. It seemed to me then: he could not believe that the war really began... "
In the memoirs of N. Kuznetsov, it was noted that the Commissar of Defense dictated, and the head of the General Staff wrote. The figures are (allegedly) draft Directive No. XXUMX, signed by S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov. It was noted that on the back of the 1 sheet, among other marks, there is an indication of the names of the coders: Agapov and Khramtsovsky. After G. Zhukov left the General Staff, Khramtsovsky would become his personal coder.
Historian S.L. Chekunov pointed out that there are two handwritten copies of the Directive, written with a small interval. This person now knows best of all how Directive No. XXUMX was written, how it was sent to the troops and many other interesting things. According to his messages on the forum, we can say that S.L. Chekunov is preparing the release of several books, starting with the 1 year. There will be many interesting documents that we do not even suspect. The only thing waiting for a book about the events before 1927 June will take a long time. Keep track of these book novelties ...
The messages on the sites indicate that the PC contains the following notes: "Entered the SHO in 23-45 21 June 1941 g. ”The directive is sent to 00-30 in the LVO, ZOVO, KOVO, OdVO, PribOVO under the numbers: 19942, 19943, 19944, 19945, 19946, respectively.
What is interesting about the Directive? First of all, unfinished words that are crossed out. The directive was written "live", was born on the move. Does anyone believe that it was dictated by I. Stalin? The author does not believe. If you believe Budenny, the Directive was written after the Kremlin. The author believes this, but it is unprovable. There are no documented facts about this period. I don’t want to believe the author of Zhukov’s memoirs ...
Important phrases removed from the text “at night" and "air defense bring to combat readiness". The spacecraft management is not in a hurry and does not believe in the beginning of the war at dawn ... The author asks for forgiveness, but in part 4 incorrect information is given about General Pokrovsky and the typist Mushroom ...
The basis for the encryption communication was the “Manual on the encryption communication (or service)”. The main provisions of this Manual should be made available to the commanders, who had the right to sign PCs. About all violations related to registration, transfer, addressing, etc., the head of the SHO (department or body) is obliged to inform the higher management (NSH to which he belongs, or to the higher headquarters, if the violations are made by the command staff of the headquarters). When reporting to a higher headquarters about violations related to ciphering, the maximum that the SHO leader can expect is a transfer to another district for the same position, transfer to a higher headquarters or removal of the commanding staff of the headquarters, which requires employees to allow violations. I say this to the fact that cryptographers were protected from the tyranny of commanders at headquarters.
In June 1941, the following communication schemes existed between the General Staff and military districts:
1) using cipher machines - individual between two addressees;
2) circular (or general) using a manual cipher. The processing time of PCs with the help of a manual cipher was increased by 6-10 times. There were also individual communication schemes using a manual cipher.
Why was there only an individual connection using the machines? The installation, with the help of which the places of the holes were marked and their subsequent breaking through, made it possible to work with only two tapes, which then turned into encryption tapes. Perhaps the requirement for the organization of the machine cipher communication between the two recipients was laid down in the technical specifications for the development.
The tables in the cipherblock notes for the manual cipher were printed by typography and therefore allowed to have any number of recipients.
Directive No. XXUMX was sent to the districts using cipher machines, as evidenced by the five numbers of outgoing PCs put on the PC draft. The author estimated the length of PCs (according to PCs Zapovo for armies), which is about 1 groups. The length is approximate and we need only to estimate the time of transmission of PCs by different services. If the coders worked with the speeds indicated above (they were indicated in the 205 part), then the processing of one PC at “Z” took about 4 minutes, and on its “P” it would take up to 6. We know that the draft was made on three sheets, and two specialists worked with PC, who had to work in parallel, passing the draft sheets to each other. The Deputy of the SHOD provided them with ciphers and collected the material to be sent to the communication center. In this case, one expert processed three PCs in a time around 8 minutes, and the other two PCS per 18. It turns out that, taking into account additional corrections, all five PCs could be handed over to the communications center before 12-00.
In the link “district headquarters - army headquarters” there were practically no encryption machines. All ciphering was done using manual ciphers.
In ZOVOVO there were at least two complete sets for cipher machines. This means that the set of ciphertechnique consisted of a device that, when decrypted on a cipher machine, simultaneously printed decrypted text on a device on a sheet of paper. The decrypted text on a sheet of paper (or with a tape pasted on a sheet of paper) is called draft material, which is taken into account in the journal along with PCS and ciphers used. PC blanks with text that are freely available are the result of reprinting text on typewriter types by an SHO employee specifically for guidance.
When PC with the text of Directive No. 1 entered the ZOVOVO headquarters SHO, the district leadership was already waiting for it. The school district ordered the SHO attendant to deliver the draft PC material to the Military Council, which was done. Since the coders were still living in peacetime norms, the duty officer made a violation by ordering the decryption of PCs a second time. It took a little over 5 minutes. Using the secondary draft material, they began to print, as they used to, the text on the letterhead of the incoming PC. Thus, in order to save time by the commanding staff of the district, resolutions and addressing appeared on a sheet of draft material, becoming the incoming PC. Printed text on incoming letterheads turned into outgoing.
According to S.L. Chekunova: “The very first PribOVO took it in 1 hour 07 minutes. All others accepted later, for example ZOVOVO in 01.10. Decoding the first did PribOVO. Safronov (PribOVO) was the first among all addressees to read about 01.40-01.45. All the rest read later. SOVO only at the beginning of the third... »
Due to the huge influx of information from the districts, Directive No. XXUMX was already sent circularly to the addressees with the help of a manual cipher.
The figure underlined numbers PCS Directive (20021, 20022, 20023). Five recipients again. The length of PC by the author is estimated in 248 groups. The permissible length of PCS is 300 groups (in exceptional cases, it was allowed to send PCs of length 350 groups). If it were sent using cipher machines, the telegram would have five numbers, like Directive No. XXUMX. Three numbers indicate preparation for sending it circularly to all five HEs. Processing was carried out using a manual cipher. Also on the sheets we see a working breakdown in parts of the duty of the SHO (or his deputy) into three parts for the 1-2 coders. For urgent PCs, the breakdown was carried out "by eye", which with extensive experience allowed us to use a number of sheets of cipher-block, which is close enough to the required. There are two original Directives No. XXUMX, the same as Directive No. XXUMX. To explain this, the author did not set himself a goal ...
We have finished consideration of material relating to the exploration and evaluation of enemy compounds by the leadership of the spacecraft. In the future, we will have to consider all the districts (except for PribOVO, considered in the first parts of the cycle).
By reviewing the first six parts of the 2 cycle, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1. Since the summer of 1940, the reconnaissance missions of the GS GSA and the NKVD have inflated the number of German troops concentrated at our borders. The concept of "at our borders" is purely conditional, since German divisions were located from 20 to 424 (and more) kilometers from the border. The overestimation of the number of divisions is probably the result of the good work of the German command on disinformation of the Soviet leadership of the country and the spacecraft.
2. From the autumn of 1940, some German connections began to move towards the Balkans (including to Romania). At the end of April 1941, the number of German formations concentrated on our border (against the PribOVO, ZOVOVO, KOVO troops) again reached the level registered by our intelligence in late August - early September 1940.
3. The KA leadership estimated the number of German formations needed to start a war with the USSR, and in 173 (autumn 1940) - 200 (March-April 1941) - 180 (May 1941) divisions.
By June 21, according to the GR GSH, the 124 divisions were located at our western borders, which was significantly different from the above-mentioned 180 number. It should be noted that more than 2 / 3 of these troops were located at a distance from 20 to 100 km from our border.
4. The spacecraft leadership knew very well that in the initial period of the war, the German command was using several mobile groups, supported by a large number of aircraft, to advance groups of troops to a great depth.
The composition of the mobile groups should include MK, divisions of heavy tanks. Mobile groups interact with amphibious and infantry divisions. As of the end of 1940, the German Armed Forces had 12 microns.
5. Before the start of the war, not a single tank group (of four located near the border), not a single uk (from 10-ti located), not a single heavy tank division (of the 0 existed), one airborne division (of the five, Germany could allocate for the war with the USSR according to the leadership of the AC) Most of the aircraft flew to the airfields closer to the border in the evening 21.6.41.
More than half of those found by reconnaissance at the border are tb and tp in bulk, summarized into conventional ones: without headquarters and control, communications and engineering units, motorized infantry and artillery, without parts of supply, repair and maintenance. These conditional td suited only to strengthen AK.
The artillery brigades equipped with artillery systems with large armor penetration were to parry the presence of heavy tanks in mobile groups.
6. Immediately before the start of the war, significant resources were thrown into long-term programs: the deployment of a heavy KV-3 tank, the design of KV-4 and KV-5 tanks, the construction and equipping of hundreds of long-term structures on our border, and the construction of concrete runways at aerodromes .
7. The military-political leadership of the country thought:
- that by fending off the German grouping near the border by spacecraft divisions (without at the same time achieving superiority over them), it is possible to postpone the beginning of the war with Germany;
- that the USSR’s peace-loving policy towards Germany will also make it possible to postpone the start of the war.
However, Hitler’s manic idea of a war with the USSR reduced these sensible actions to zero. When he had to reconsider his views from the point of view of facts, he began to doubt the correctness of his actions. According to Guderian, 4.8.41 Hitler said: “If I had known that the Russians really had such a number of tanks ... I, perhaps, would not have started this war ...”
8. Aware of the unpreparedness of our army for war, Stalin could not even admit the idea of a first strike on the German troops mobilized and located near the border.
The fact that we poke on the maps and plans with arrows - it's just pictures. Plans are a pile of several cubic meters of paper. And what we have seen is drafts by planters ...
9. In six parts, we encountered cases of manifestation of private initiative by the commanders of various levels of the spacecraft and the navy in preparing their troops (forces) for war. These actions were not the result of instructions from Moscow to prepare for war by the leadership of NGOs and the General Staff of the Spacecraft. We will see many more examples of the manifestation of such a private initiative when considering events in the border districts.
10. So far, we have not seen a single document, fact or memory, directly indicating the presence of the mythical Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft on the transfer of ground forces and air forces to readiness number XXUMX. We will continue to look for the presence of the mythical directive in the materials on cross-border HE.
However, the events reviewed indirectly indicate the opposite: the spacecraft management did not expect the war to start at dawn on 22 on June 1941, and we haven’t met yet a single fact indicating the opposite ...
- aKtoR
- The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. 13 part
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 14)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 15)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 16)
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