The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 17)

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The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 17)


Introduction. We are completing a review of material devoted to reconnaissance and estimation of enemy strength by the spacecraft leadership. There are also materials from seven parts: about air defense, air defense, air defense, stockpile and KOVO. The author is interested to know how important these publications are to readers. If, according to the results of a reader’s assessment, an article gains 51 plus (or more), the continuation expects you, dear visitors. If not, then it’s not fate: this is your decision. Parts will be large, many memories and almost no drawings. Maybe someone historical the material will seem boring.



Consider the first military report GSA. We must understand that the county filed the materials in the summary. At this time, chaos reigns in the districts: problems with communication, with command and control and the lack of reliable RM ...

Operation No.01 GSH KA on 10-00 22.6.41: "NWF ... enemy ground forces launched an offensive and are hitting in two directions - the main one from the Pillkallen region, Suwalki, Goldap with forces of 3-4 pd and 500 tanks in the direction of Olita and providing the main grouping strike from the Tilsit region on Taurag, Jurbarkas forces of up to 3-4 with an obscure group of tanks.

As a result of the border battles, the enemy’s attack on Taurage was repulsed, but the enemy managed to capture Jurbarkas. The position on the direction of the main grouping of the enemy is specified. The enemy apparently seeks actions on Olita, Vilna to go into the rear of the ZF, ensuring his actions on Taurage, Siauliai
... »



From the figure it is clear that, according to the information that came from the NWF, the report of the General Staff reflects some sluggish fighting. The situation is not alarming GSH, probably because everything is developing, as it was supposed there. The main attack from the long front is made only by the reinforced corps group: 3-4 front and 500 tanks (about two mn, according to the estimate we saw in the previous part). The tanks in the infantry group will move at a slow pace and will not go far ... In Moscow, it seems that the situation can be kept under control ... The actual situation, which is unknown either in the headquarters of the NWF or in the General Staff, is much more serious ...

Operation No.01 GSH KA (continued): "ZF ... With ground forces, the enemy is developing a strike from the Suwalki area in the direction of Golynka, Dombrov and from the Sokolow area along the Volkovysk railway. The advancing forces of the enemy are specified. As a result of the battles, the enemy managed to capture Golynka and reach the Dombrov region, dropping parts of the 56 sd to the south.

In the direction of Sokolow, Volkovysk go intense fighting in the area Cheremkha. By their actions of these two directions, the enemy obviously seeks to embrace the north-western grouping of the front.

The front commander plans a counterattack in the direction of the Gorynka for the destruction of a broken enemy
... »



In ZOVOVO, we see the same thing: instead of a multitude of strikes in particular directions, reflected in the “Cover Plans ...”, the report reflects only two. In this case, no word about the Brest direction, in which, as one of the users said: “At the border of the district there is a large fully operational mechanized connection capable of striking the operational depth of 400-600 km... »

According to the previous RM, we have seen that such a conclusion was problematic, because there were no data on the presence of a micron or, moreover, a tank group in the RM district and the General Staff Directorate. And in the report in this area there is not a single word of doubt or reference to the lack of data. The situation is under control ...

B.A. Fomin (head of the operational department of the headquarters of Zapovo) in his note spoke about the Klimovskys, who had a great capacity for work and honesty, but did not differ in his sobriety in assessing the enemy and his capabilities. NS ZOVOVO, for example, did not believe that the Germans "able to plan his initial operation so far and deliver massive strikes far in depth aviation».

The author would only clarify that, according to intelligence data (on 20-00 21.6.41 and on 20-00 22.6.41), the Germans have the opposite:

- it was only 4-5 air regiments. What kind of massive strikes into the depth by German aviation can we talk about with such small forces ...;

- there were no major motorcycle tank groups.

Therefore, the NS district rightly assumed that it was impossible to talk about some deep advancement of the German troops in the initial period of military operations with the forces they had. Of course, individual users will connect here with the words: “Traitors-generals... "There were no such ... Probably, this is the initial vision of the highest commanding staff of the districts, General Staff and NGOs for the military operations of the initial period of the war ... In KOVO everything is the same as in ZOVOVO ...

Operation No.01 GSH KA (continued): "...SWF ... In the 4-35 after the artillery fire in the area Vladimir Volynsk and Lyuboml ground troops of the enemy crossed the border developing a strike in the direction of Vladimir Volynsk, Lyuboml and Kristinopol.

In 5-20 in the Chernivtsi region near Karpeshki, the enemy also launched an offensive ...

The enemy, having preempted our troops in deployment, forced parts of the spacecraft to take the fight in the process of occupying a starting position according to the cover plan. Using this advantage, the enemy was able to achieve private success in certain areas. Chief of General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov
».



Consider Intelligence of RU GSH on 20-00 22.6.41: "The Northern Front: ... In the north, the main group is made up of units of the German army, which in the Rovaninsky sector has to 3's - 4's Divisionsand besides in the Kirkenes area up to three divisions...

The total number of enemy groupings is determined by:


a) On the northwestern front - 29 divisions (of which 5 md and 4-5 etc.) ...;

b) On the Western Front in the Warsaw District 31 division (of which 1 md and 4 etc.) ...;

c) On the south-western front (to Slovakia) - 48 divisions (of which 5 md and 6 etc.) ...

In addition, in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, the number of German troops is 13-15 divisions. In Romania - 33-35 divisions ...

Front-line reserves in the area of ​​Czestochowa, Breslau, Mor.Ostravka - to 7 divisions; in the area of ​​Thorn, Bromberg, Poznan the number of divisions of the front reserve has not been established.

The reserve of the main command to 20.6 consisted of 17-20 divisions located in the central regions of Germany.

Due to the fact that the June redeployment of troops to the east was carried out from the western front, it is necessary to consider that the composition of this reserve has been preserved, especially since further withdrawal of troops is quite possible from the west for use against the USSR.

CONCLUSION:

1. Opponent for 22.6 brought considerable forces into battle; namely 37-39 pd, 5 md, 8 td, and total 50-52 divisions. However, this is only approximately 30% enemy forces concentrated to the front [/ i] ... "

From the summary follows:

- the enemy has entered the entire 50-52 division into battle (on the first day of the war crossed the Soviet-German border or has already taken part in the hostilities of more than 70 German divisions);

- There are up to 7 German divisions on the North Front;

- on SZF - 29 divisions, the same number as according to intelligence before the war (in fact, PribOVO deployed against the troops; 24 front, 6 etc., 6 md, 4 guard divisions);

- at ZF (Warsaw District) - 31 division; one division added compared with pre-war data;

- on SWF (to Slovakia) - 48 divisions.

Total for NWP, ZF and SWF (to Slovakia) for the Republic of Uzbekistan RU GSH listed 108 divisions.

In addition, in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, the number of German troops is 13-15 divisions. Romania has 33-35 divisions. Earlier, divisions in the Danzig, Poznan, Thorn area (6 rd) were added to the divisions intended for an attack on the USSR. Considering the divisions mentioned, the number of German divisions intended to attack the USSR will be 165.

From the findings of the report, it can be calculated that if 30% of enemy forces is 50-52 divisions, then 100% forces will be from 167 to 173 divisions.

Phrase: "From the west it is quite possible to further withdraw the troops for use against the USSR"And the presence of 7 divisions in Finland smoothly leads to 180 German divisions. As we remember, this is the number of connections that, according to the leadership of the spacecraft, Germany will allocate for the war with the USSR.

What else is interesting in intelligence? In the last part, we talked about selected two SS divisions against ZOVOVO. According to a summary in the Suwalki region, it is said that the 21.6.41 1-2 td SS are up. They got to the report by the evening of June 22, but it is still not clear whether this is a division or two.

Intelligence, placed in the section “Electronic exhibitions of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation”, has nine pages and is signed by the head of the GS GS KA Golikov. In the right corner you can see the numbers (circled in blue), which are put down after filing the document in the case. The summary is the first document in the case, and therefore the numbering of the pages of the document and the pages of the document in the case coincide. The figure in the red frame shows the right corner of the tenth sheet, placed in the composition of the report number XXUMX. It does not have its own numbering. The page number in the 1 case. This indicates that this sheet was not originally related to Intelligence No. XXUMX and was hemmed to it later (after filing into the file of other documents). Such practice in office work exists. Only it is not clear, this sheet was prepared before the release of the report or after it ...





The data of Intelligence and the Form of the combat composition and distribution of the German army are quite close. According to the Form, 107 divisions are listed against the forces of the North-West Front, Polar Division and South-West Front, and according to Intelligence Service - 108. The only significant difference is in the number of divisions versus ZF: according to the Blank of their 40, and according to the summary - 31.

According to the author, Blank is a later document, which included a vision of the number of divisions according to the RO intelligence information of the ZF headquarters: “With the dawn of 22.6.41, German troops consisting of up to 30-32 PD, 4-5 td, 2 md, 4-5 aviation regiments, airborne division, 40 ap launched an offensive against the ZF... "

In reconnaissance of the RO ZF, the number of divisions along the line of demarcation of Suwalki - Heilsberg is again taken into account, although the German divisions from this direction went in the direction of the NWF. In the previous part, it was shown that the RO of the headquarters of Zapovo had previously overestimated the number of German troops against their area of ​​responsibility. Thus, a significant change in the vision of the leadership of the spacecraft and the RU GSH on the Republic of Moldova from the point of view of the pre-war and first day of the war did not happen.

Divisions of the Republic of Moldova. Earlier in the comments to the first ten parts of O. Yu. Kozinkin said that the author, referring to RM RM GSH, distorts real data. And if you read the answers komdivov, then it says about the true state of affairs. The author was not too lazy to present all the answers of the divisional commanders who can be “pulled down by their ears” to the definition of “they knew at least something about the enemy”.

The book S.L. Chekunov "I am writing solely from memory ..." there are answers from the spacecraft commanders who served on the eve of the war in the LVO (4 response), in PribOVO (18), ZAPOVO (18), KOVO (24) and OdVO (8). Only 24 responses of the squadron commanders (from the 72 respondents) indicate the presence or absence of the RM before the start of the war.

Lvo BEFORE. Leichik: "The offensive actions of the German troops in the 14 line And began a few days after the general offensive. By this time, the nature of the actions of the enemy, mostly determined. As for the preliminary information about the enemythen for that matter no specific data...»

THEM. Pyadusov: "We knew exactly the opposing enemy before the war and knew the state of its positional areas.... »

IN AND. Shcherbakov: "By the beginning of World War II, there was evidence in the corps headquarters that the Germans had already transferred up to seven stations with tanks to Finland and that the German forces, in agreement with the Finnish government, were to be conducted beyond the Arctic Circle; Finnish troops. As for the data on the Finnish military units in the corps, they were very scarce by the beginning of the war... »

From the presented answers it is clear that only two of the four commanders replied that there were RMs about the enemy troops. In the answers V.I. Shcherbakov speaks about 7 German divisions. On 21.6 in Finland there were actually 3 German divisions (one infantry and two mining infantry), the combat group SS “Nord” (two regiments) and two dep. tank battalions (40 and 211 - the total 124 tank). From the information provided in Intelligence No. 1 RU GSH, it is clear that the RMs were incorrect (overstated by almost 2 times).

PribOVO. P.V. Afanasyev: “The fact that they moved to KP not for conducting exercises, but on the eve of a possible war with the Germans, was obvious to everyone, but Whether the war really begins or whether everything is limited to private border clashes, it was not clear. Hope to delay the war continued to exist... »

CM. Firsov: "Colonel AB told me that, starting with 17-18.6, observation from the border posts, from the towers, the light, the movement of cars and the roar of engines were detected at night, which he personally observed and listened to .... 17 and 18 June I, together with the commander, traveled to check the progress of work on field construction and heard from officers similar stories and reports... »

I.T. Shlemin (NSH 11 A): "There were many signs of preparations for an attack by Nazi Germany (the concentration of troops near the border, the forests along the border were closed for visiting by the local population, a large number of saboteurs crossed the border, the daily violation of the border by planes, etc.).

... The numbers of 18-20 June frontier units appealed to the army with a request to assist them in the fight against saboteurs, who in large numbers passed from Germany to the territory of Lithuania. It was decided, under the pretext of conducting tactical exercises on a defensive theme, to put 28, 33 and 5 sd on defense and give them ammunition.

At this time at night, the border guards were fighting a real battle with the saboteurs. Fearing any provocation, the commander of the district ordered the army to take away the ammunition and hand them over to the divisional warehouses. Thus, the numbers 18-20 of June, three divisions were put on the defensive with the task of firmly holding the lines occupied and not letting the enemy
... »

In the presented three answers there is not a word that the commanding staff had information about the grouping of German troops before the war. At the same time, we examined in detail the RM RO of the PribOVO headquarters and there are no data on a large number of German formations and associations, as well as on their mass concentration directly at the border.

True, there is still information in the answers of the deputy. the chief of the RO Derevyanko that the command of PribOVO fully owned information about the enemy and showed criminal negligence. Is it so - you can judge only by one table with the number of tanks in the directions presented in the previous part ...

SOBOVO. P.I. Lyapin: "Explicit preparation of the Germans for decisive action, of which we were thoroughly informed through the RO... »

Mv Bobkov: "Long before the treacherous attack of the fascists on the Soviet Union, we had information about the impending offensive of the enemy, about the concentration of his troops on the state border, about the consolidation of battle formations, about the concentration of warehouses and other data... »

M.A. Zashibalov: "21 June 1941 of the year ... at the end of the 20 watch checkout, returning to the location of the division headquarters, visited the commandant of the Mayanovo border area, from whom he learned that during the nights from 19 to 20 in June and from 20 to 21 in June 1941, west of Malkin station -Gura concentrated up to one infantry corps and in the Ostrov-Mozovetski area — up to two railway stations with tanks of the fascist troops ... The commandant of the border area believed that the fascist German units probably located in 8-20 km to the west of our State border are defensive. bots and field exercises... »



RM on the location to the west of Malkin-Gur of one AK, is generally correct. Only, it is not entirely clear which divisions were assigned to the AK in question. In the area of ​​the Island of Mazowiecki there are (but again it is not clear what exactly we are talking about), but there are no tanks there. I remind you that according to the RM RO of the headquarters of Zapovo, there was a whole place there.

We see that only in three responses (from 18) of the commanders of Zapovo there is some mention of the RM about the enemy. Moreover, not a single commander wrote that the Republic of Moldova was confirmed after the start of the war. Please note that in the answers of the divisional commanders standing in the way of tank groups (most of them were torn down by an unexpected avalanche of tanks), there are no words about confirming the Republic of Moldova after the start of the war ...

OdVO. PM Verkholovich (NSh 35 sc): "Data on the concentration of enemy groups in the body band, in the headquarters of the corps was increased gradually. Back in May, the concentration of enemy troops in the forests at a depth of 10-12 km from the state border was noted, while in early June the enemy conducted reconnaissance.

12 and 18 of June corps troops, located on the state border, were expecting provocative actions by the enemy, which were timely warned about the adoption of measures of combat readiness. The main grouping of the enemy in the corps was outlined in the directions of Balti and Chisinau. This assessment and information about the enemy’s grouping that was available before the start of the war was fully confirmed during the initial period of hostilities.
... »

A.G. Batyunya (NS 48 ck: 74 cd and 150 cd): "The position of the Romanian-German units in the territory of Romania was systematically received by the corps headquarters from the OdVO headquarters. Based on these intelligence reports and bulletins, it was known that a large group of German-Romanian troops was concentrated on the Soviet-Romanian border. The deployment of these troops and the numbering of the units was subsequently fully confirmed.... "

P.A. Belov: "Information about the enemy to 22.6 in the corps headquarters was clearly not enough. In any case, there was no reason to draw any serious conclusions on individual fragmentary information. Even from the border guards, with whom 9 cd was closely connected, the information was sparse. In general, the information did not correspond to reality. On Saturday 21 June, I went to the RO of the district headquarters ... RO had such detailed information that was very close to reality. It is therefore surprising why the District Headquarters did not report this information to the corps headquarters.... »

Komkor Belov, PA after getting acquainted with the Republic of Moldova in the RO OdVO in the evening, 21.6 continues to rest easy and does not hurry to its troops. Maybe everything was trivial and enemy connections were in the RPM?

Memoirs of PA Belova: "I spent my holidays with my family in Odessa ... It was time to go back. I had to jump on the oars. “Dad, look!” - the daughter called me. To the shore ... the wife quickly descended, invitingly waving her hand. My chauffeur ran after her ... "Take back from vacation ", - I decided... "War! The Germans attacked! "- shouted my wife... »

N.K. Ryzhi: "The barracks' location of units located at the beginning of the war in the city of Rene was not more than one kilometer away from the south bank of the Danube River, which was occupied by Romanian troops. The possibility of covert location of troops and artillery allowed the enemy with the outbreak of hostilities to conduct artillery fire direct fire directly on our barracks... »

Two commanders from 8-mi respondents confirmed that all information about the enemy was confirmed. One wrote that the information of the PO of the OdVO headquarters was detailed, and the information in the headquarters of the QC was fragmentary. Only this commander did not rush into the corps, but continued to rest ...

Head of Artillery N.K. Ryzhi writes that the covert location of troops and artillery allowed the enemy to conduct artillery fire directly. It turns out that the intelligence did not reveal the exit of the enemy troops to the initial positions for the attack?

The saddest thing is that the RM in the headquarters of the OdVO were distorted. We saw this in the previous section, and therefore all three of these commanders (except N.K. Ryzhi), speaking of correct intelligence data, mean German misinformation, which significantly overestimates the number of troops.

KOVO. M.A. Purkaev: "On the night of June 11 or 12, intelligence was received:
a) from the KOVO agency - on the completion of the deployment of the German forces of the Kleist group ...;
b) from the headquarters of the OdVO that German soldiers and officers in Romania in squash talk about the start of hostilities against the USSR on the morning of June 17. About 4 nights, I reported this intelligence on the HF to the people's commissar, who ordered me to wait at the office. Hours around 6 in the morning tov.Timoshenko called me on HF and said that this intelligence is also available in the General Staff, it is possible that drunken Germans are chatting inaccurate data, but “keep your ear sharp ...
».

Information "about the end of the deployment of the German forces of the Kleist group"Not true: the German moto-tank units 11-12 of June did not even concentrate at the border and the headquarters of the tank group and the MK headquarters were not detected by our intelligence. And for the work of the RO of the headquarters of KOVO, among others, he answered NSH. Speaking of the completeness of information obtained from intelligence - he is a person interested ...

At the same time, General A.V. Vladimirov does not confirm the presence of the completeness of the Republic of Moldova on the tank group: "The composition, numbering and location of enemy formations were not precisely and fully revealed by our intelligence. So, before the 5 th army, there was only the presence of enemy 15 divisions, including only 2, etc. In fact, the 21 division was, including the 5 TD. The concentration of the 1 tank group in front of the 5 army, as well as the headquarters of Army Group South and the 6 army in front of KOVO was not noted at all... »

N.P. Ivanov (NS 6 A): "While still in Transbaikalia and receiving intelligence reports, we felt a looming threat, since intelligence quite accurately determined the concentration of the fascist German troops (see, for example, West Intelligence Service No. 4 in May 1941 of the year)... »

Intelligence on the West in May 1941, unfortunately, was the product of German disinformation.

P.A. Beginners (NSh 62 sd): "Long before the start of the war, i.e. from October 1940, there was intelligence about the concentration of German troops near our border. And throughout the winter and spring of 1941, we had data on the concentration of German troops, the sources of this data were intelligence reports from the headquarters of the army, district and intelligence bulletins of the RS GS. We knew that the parts of 62 and 56 PD and No. 3 PD didn’t remember that they were concentrated in front of the division strip.... »



From the presented figure it is clear that the German 62 front and part of the 62 front were deployed against the 298 sd troops. German 56 PD deployed against 45 sd. In the intelligence report mentioned by PA Beginners, there are no RM about divisions 3 microns the adversary. Otherwise, he would have written about the opposite: what he knew about the enemy troops. We see that there are parts opposite the 62 cd 25 md and 14 td the adversary. 62-th SD was lucky that the mobile group hit was more to the left, mostly on 87 SD, the commanders of which did not write about the loyalty of the RM - the Germans smashed that SD ... If only the German missile had attacked Novichkov’s division, it wouldn’t be alive He wrote about the authenticity of the pre-war RM ...

Z.Z. Rogozny (NSh 15 sc): "The 5 A command underestimated the intelligence information, which exhaustively revealed the intentions of the German command. Major General Potapov 20 on June 1941 of the year replied to Lieutenant Colonel Chernykh (former intelligence officer of the army headquarters) about his clear preparations for the fighting that the Germans would not and cannot fight with us... »

The general phrase: "The 5 A command underestimated the intelligence information that revealed with complete exhaustion the intentions of the German command." Agree that this wording can be presented to any commander of the spacecraft, including the top management of the spacecraft. The head of the operational department of 5 A states the opposite, that the enemy’s motorcycle and tank grouping was not fully opened ...

I.A. Kornilov (commander 49 ck): "A few months before the war, reading the intelligence reports I received regularly, it was possible to establish that the Germans were intensively preparing for war against the USSR ... Commanding 45 sd (before being appointed corps commander), located on the border, and having a connection with the frontier detachment, I had more detailed information that convinced me of the inevitability of Germany’s attack on our homeland... »

The inevitability of an attack on the USSR was doubted by quite a few of the military. In addition, you were shown that there was a lot of misinformation in the Republic of Moldova, which significantly overestimated the number of German troops.

G.I. Sherstyuk (commander of the 45th division): "The situation at the border thickened every day. An almost daily state border was violated by German aircraft penetrating deep into our country. To the border, new numbers of German units and formations were concentrated; the number of new German OP artillery units was clearly increasing at the state border.... »

Baranov A.M. (NSh 17 sc): "The corps command, receiving almost daily intelligence from the border detachments, concluded that not only Romanians but also German troops with tanks, artillery were concentrated in front of the state border, and ammunition and engineering property was being created in the forests, and concentration was considered not a simple deployment of troops in peacetime, but in preparation for the war, about which, according to intelligence, since March, they have had an intensified conversation in Romania ...»

N.V. Fecklenko: "Headquarters of special data corps from intelligence reports about the enemy did not have except that German troops after operations in France, Poland, etc. they concentrate their troops along and near the Soviet border, as if to rest... »

Vladimirov V.Ya. (NSh 96 GSD): "The reasons for failure are: firstly, confusion and lack of organization in the higher headquarters; secondly, lack of knowledge of the true situation and the very pr-ka and poor awareness of direct performers; excessive autonomy and classifying urgent needs and tasks in case of war... »

DI. Ryabyshev (commander 8 mk): " The command of 8 MK from intelligence reports of the GS GSA was aware, as far as I remember, that the Germans concentrated on the state border of the Kiev operational direction before 34, 4, etc. and 4 md, during the war these data were confirmed... »

Since there is a link to the RM RU GSH KA, then in these documents was an overestimated number of German divisions. DI. Ryabyshev writes as far as he remembers the 42 divisions (of which 8 md, etc.). According to RU GSH, there were 46 divisions in this area (of which 11 md, etc.). From memory, the commander 8 MK leads quite close data to that indicated in the RM.

In fact, there were 37 German divisions (including 9 md, etc.). At the same time, we already know that the actual number of 22.6.41 approached the data in accordance with the Republic of Uzbekistan RU GSH, and, for example, in May the discrepancy was even more significant.

Thus, from the 72 answers presented in the book, according to 70, we can say that the intelligence data on the number of German divisions at our border were not reliable. To a greater extent, this related to the assessment of the deployment of the moto-tank forces, which the German command tried to conceal.

Once again about the Navy. In the previous parts, several examples of private initiative were shown by the commanding staff of NGOs and NWFMs in preparing troops for an attack by fascist Germany. During this period, several messages were received in which outraged users write: “There can be no private initiative ... Only a person who is far from the army can argue this way ... All instructions came from NGOs and the General Staff... "Let everyone remain unconvinced, but we will see examples of private initiative more than once ...

The 12 part talked about introducing operational readiness levels №2 on the SF admiral A.G.Golovkabout: "17.6.41... You have to take the initiative again at your own risk. I translate the fleet with my order for exhaust gas №2... »

The author wrote then that he had been promised to find the memoirs of one of the veterans of the North Sea, and he would post a text confirming or refuting the above statement.

N.P. Dubrovin (Chief of Logistics of the Northern Fleet, engineer-rear admiral): "1On June 7, 1941, the first Nazi plane appeared over the main base of the Northern Fleet - Polyarny ... Command fleet made a decision put the fleet on high alertwhat actually meant the implementation of a significant part of the mobilization plan ...

Formally, the situation with the liquid fuel in the Federation Council immediately before the war was not so bad: fuel oil was 96,6% of the total demand, gasoline - 149,5%. But such an assessment of security was correct only in terms of peacetime. These calculations lost ground, as soon as the commander of the fleet 17 1941 June year, due to the apparent threat of war, put the fleet on high alert. On this day, most of the stocks of fuel oil, diesel fuel, gasoline was supplied to the ships, and in the tanks of the rear of the fuel there was less than one filling
... »

Private initiative of Admiral A.G. Golovko led to his order to use NZ fuel for refueling ships of the fleet. The remaining fuel was spent (handed over) to the mobilized ships and 22.6.41 ships. Do not start a war, for this Admiral AG Golovko would have had to “answer with his head” ... For the author now is a confirmed fact - the fact of the announcement of 17.6.41 at the SF readiness number XXUMX. A logical question arises: can it be then that the admiral Yu.A. Panteleyev's NS and the Red Banner Baltic Fleet are true? Let me remind you what it is about.

Yu.A. Panteleyev: "19 June 1941 of the year ... the Red Banner Baltic Fleet decided to lead the fleet in increased operational readiness... Admiral [V.F. Tribuz] detained me. He called Moscow and summoned NG People's Commissar of the Navy. Kuznetsova: “Comrade Commissar, I formed the opinion that a German attack is possible at any hour. We must start to put barriers, otherwise it will be too late! I consider it necessary to increase the fleet's OG ... ”Putting down the phone, the admiral sighed with relief:“ With the increased OG of the fleet he agreed, but ordered to be careful not to go for provocation. And with the production of mines ordered to wait. Let's act!»

Thus, it is possible that at the Red Banner Baltic Fleet readiness No. XXUMX was announced not by a team from Moscow, but at the suggestion of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet Commander, but by Commissar N.G. Kuznetsov only agreed with this. It turns out that the leadership of the NKO and the General Staff has nothing to do with bringing fleets into readiness No. XXUMX. Remember how surprised the commander of the Navy, Hanko, General S.I. Kabanov, when the Red Banner Baltic Fleet declared readiness No. 2, but 2-nd Dep. Ssbr declared it before the start of the war ...

The author has made simplified calendar of events. Some of the materials you have already seen, and some await you in subsequent parts.

Mid June. N.G. Kuznetsov: "Vatutin promised to notify us immediately if the situation becomes critical.... »

Tymoshenko called Kuznetsova only on 23-00 21 June. It turns out that before 23-00, 21.6.41 in the General Staff did not consider the situation critical ...

17 ... 18.6.41. M.I. Kazakov: "I was told that the mobilization of the armed forces of Finland was under way, and the troops of fascist Germany were already concentrated on our borders. To my direct question: “When will the war start with fascist Germany?” - A.M. Vasilevsky replied: “Well, if it does not start within the next 15-20 days... »

The war can begin within 15-20 days ... It turns out that around 17-18, the numbers in the GSH didn’t expect war at dawn 22 June, but waited for a long time interval ...

Special message NKGB USSR 19.6.41: "Yesterday, a telegram from the Italian ambassador in Berlin arrived at the Italian Foreign Ministry, in which he reports that the highest German military command informed him about the start of German hostilities against the USSR between 20 and 25 in June of this year. "Titus"»

20 June, there is no war yet and German troops, according to intelligence, are not moving to the border.

Special Post 20.6.1941: "Head RU GSH KA. Bulgarian, the German emissary, said here today that a military clash is expected on 21 or 22 on June, that there are in Poland 100 German divisions, in Romania - 40, in Finland - 6, in Hungary -10, in Slovakia - 7. Total 60 motorized divisions ... In Romania, the mobilization is over and every moment military action is expected. Currently there are 10 thousands of German troops in Bulgaria... »

RU and GSH know that the presence of 100 German divisions in Poland is disinformation, 40 - in Romania - is a bit overstated, 60 German medias. The document is contradictory, but there are few German troops near the border, no mobile groups, no aviation. It is hard to believe in the beginning of the war by such small forces in 1,5 days ...

20.6.41. M.I. Kazakov: "On the morning of June 20 ... GK Zhukov invited me along with Vatutin. He looked through our development rather attentively ... In the evening ... Vatutin and I once again looked through all the documents, sealed the folders, handed them over to the vault and said goodbye for a long time... »

It is difficult to name the considered issue of the “Plans for the Protection of the SAVO”, a secondary district for the General Staff of the Spacecraft, if Zhukov expects a June 22 war. And as usual - if he does not expect ... Vatutin 20 devotes a lot of time to June Kazakov ...

20.6.41. P.I.Batov: "Marshal S.K.Timoshenko informed me that I was appointed commander of the land forces of the Crimea and at the same time the commander of 9 sk. At the same time, the marshal did not say a word about what relations with the Black Sea Fleet should be, what to do first of all, if you have to urgently bring the Crimea in readiness as a theater of military operations... »

Tymoshenko will call after the start of the war with an indication of the antiamphibious defense of the Crimea.

20.6.41. Headquarters PribOVO introduced FG No. 2 for air defense and issued an order to darken Riga. Information comes to Moscow. The next day, the reaction of the Chief of the General Staff follows.

N.N. Ravens: "By order of the commander of the troops PribOVO ... the blackout of cities and individual objects of military significance was introduced. Immediately, by telephone, I reported this to the head of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, to obtain permission to conduct such blackouts in other border districts. In response, I heard abuse and threats against Kuznetsov.... »

In other districts, FN 2 for air defense was not introduced.

20.6.41 evening. M.M. Popov: "Well, that called, - the voice of the People's Commissar sounded in a tube. - Putting to sea for the time being. Immediately return to Leningrad... "

The commander of the LVO leaves for the headquarters of the LVO by train, the arrival of which is expected only Happy 22.6.41. In the evening, 20, the People's Commissar does not expect the beginning of the war at dawn on June 22. Otherwise, he would have given the command to immediately take off by plane.

«June 21 day, spent in the car, passed quietly. At large stations, the military commandants who were on duty to the car could not report anything alarming. In Petrozavodsk, where we arrived around 4 in the morning on 22 in June, in addition to the commander waiting for us, Lieutenant-General F.D.Gorelenko, we also met the secretary of the Central Committee of the Karelo-Finnish SSR and the head of the Kirov railway. First of all, they reported on the received order from Moscow: to unhook the wagon of the commander from the train and to deliver him to Leningrad outside the schedule, for which purpose a separate steam locomotive...»

The order to speed up the arrival of the commander at the headquarters of the LVO appears only after the start of the war.

Morning 21.6.41. Head of the Republic of Uzbekistan received information from the source "X": "The embassy received a telegram from the Foreign Ministry. A Tippelskirch meeting is taking place at 4. The source is convinced that the war will begin in the coming 48 hours.»

Messages from “Maro'('The attack is scheduled for June 22... ") and"Costa'('21 or June 22 military clash... ").

Up to 13-00 21.6.41. Zhukov sends PC to PribOVO headquarters: “Without the approval of the People's Commissar, you gave an order for air defense to put into action provisions №2 - this means a blackout in the Baltics, and this will damage the industry. Such actions can be carried out. only by government decision. Now your order causes a variety of rumors and unnerves the public. I demand to immediately cancel the illegal order and give an explanation for the report to the Commissar. Chief of General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov»

15-00 21.6.41. N.D. Yakovlev: "The head of the General Staff, General of the Army GK, was in the office of the People's Commissar. Zhukov ... S.K. Tymoshenko did not give us time to talk. Concisely suggested ... from June 23, to start accepting business from the former head of GAU… [At that time] I called the commander of the troops PribOVO General F.I. Kuznetsov. The People's Commissar rather strictly asked him if it was true that they, Kuznetsov, had been ordered to introduce a blackout in Riga. And in the affirmative answer ordered to cancel it... "

Happy 21.6.41. N.N. Ravens: "It was not possible to get to the authorities, they promised to accept me with a report only on Monday or Tuesday... "

Happy 21.6.41. I.T. Peresypkin (Commissar of Communication): "You have not left yet? ”Stalin asked me. [This is about the Commissar's trip to the Baltic States.] I tried to explain to him that, on his instructions, he worked at the commission, but he interrupted me and again asked the question: “When do you leave?” I had no choice but to answer: “Tonight.” He hung up ... [Morning xnumx] I called Moscow... [and asked to speak with K.E. Voroshilov]. A few minutes later, an instruction from Moscow followed: “Return immediately... »

People's Commissar of Communications is sent on a secondary trip, in which any representative of the Commissariat can handle, with the appropriate authority. Even I.Stalin, who carefully studies the Republic of Moldova, does not expect a war in the coming days ...

21.6.41 evening. K.A. Meretskov: "S.K. Tymoshenko said then: “Perhaps the war will start tomorrow! .. The main thing is not to succumb to provocations ... Exposure above all. Be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into a war... »

The representative of the People's Commissar of Defense, who must determine whether provocations began or this is a war, leaves for LVO headquarters by train, not having time for dawn. He is also not sent urgently by plane. Does anyone in Moscow actually expect an attack at dawn on 22 Jun, or not ??

21.6.41 evening. Pn Goremykin: "In the building ... where GAU was located ... Questions were raised very sharply by General of the Army GK Zhukov. He spoke of the need for substantial revision of the mobilization plan for ammunition, referring to the increase in digital tasks... »

Yes, in the evening of June 21, the head of the General Staff should not have other important matters ... But everything is ordinary, if he does not expect the 22 war.

21.6.41 near 19-00 J.E. Chadayev: “Poskrebyshev:“The owner .., just in an excited state, was talking to Tymoshenko ... Apparently, he is about to be expected ... German attack... »

19-05…20-15 21.6.41. In the office of Stalin is among others Tymoshenko. Zhukov is missing. The question of the organization of the Law Faculty, the appointment of the command of the Law Faculty, the Northern Front and the command of the general leadership of the Law Faculty and the South-Western Fleet is being decided. Consideration of this issue, some writers associated with the expectation of war at dawn on June 22. It is interesting where Zhukov will have time to go in the morning of 22, in time to start the war. This is the usual meeting for the future, the same as the departure of front-line departments ...

After 20-00 21.6.41. Special message is delivered to Stalin from the source “Х'"The embassy in the morning was instructed to destroy all the secret papers. It is ordered to all employees of the embassy to pack their belongings and hand them over to the embassy until the morning of June 22. Living outside the embassy - move to the embassy. It is believed that the coming night will be a decision. It's a war».

20 50-21.6.41 XNUMX S.M. Budyonny: "Stalin informed us that the Germans, without declaring war on us, could attack us tomorrow, i.e. 22 June ... What we should and can do today and until dawn tomorrow 22.6.41

Tymoshenko and Zhukov said that if the Germans attacked, we would break them at the border, and then on their territory.

I. Stalin thought and said: "This is not serious." Appealed to me: "What do you think?" ...
»

21.6.41. P.A. Sudoplatov: "The combat readiness [of the headquarters and command of the border and internal troops deployed in Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States.] Was announced ... in 21-30 ...»

Beria acts differently: unlike the military, he brings his territorial units and troops on alert. There will be a war or will not be unknown. But his forces are ready for provocations and counteraction to saboteurs ...

21.6.41 after 22-20 Tymoshenko and Zhukov went to NGOs to prepare Directive No. XXUMX.

G.K. Zhukov: “...It has long been dark. The end of June is the 21 day. We arrived with C.K. Tymoshenko silently before the people's office entrance, but I felt that the same people's worrying thoughts were overwhelming me. When we got out of the car, we agreed to meet in his office in ten minutes ...»

Yes, there are not disturbing thoughts should overcome, and running to the phones and raise troops! But the leadership of the spacecraft did not believe in the attack, or did not decide to take on something ...

About 23-00 21.6.41. L.M. Sandalwood: "At about 23 hours we were called to the NSh district telephone. However, we received no special orders. About the same, that you need to be ready, we ourselves knew... »

The echo of Tymoshenko’s call to ZOVOVO headquarters around 23 hours has come to the headquarters of the 4 army. Not a word about the rise of troops ...

About 23-00 21.6.41. Tymoshenko called Y.T. Cherevichienko: “Keep in mind that provocation by Germany and Romania is possible.

- What, war? - involuntarily burst from me.

“War may not be, but the troops must be ready,” answered Tymoshenko
... »

About 23-00 21.6.41. N.G. Kuznetsov: “S.K. Tymoshenko: “There is very important information. Come to me ... ”In a few minutes we were already on the second floor of a small mansion, where S.K. Tymoshenko. Marshal, walking about the room, dictated ... Army General GK Zhukov was sitting at the table [without jacket] and wrote something. Several sheets of large notebook lay to his left. It can be seen, the Commissar of Defense and the head of the General Staff worked for quite a long time. Semyon Konstantinovich noticed us, stopped. Briefly, without naming the sources, he said that it is considered possible the German attack on our country. Zhukov got up and showed us the telegram he had prepared for the border districts. I remember she was extensive... »

After 23-00 21.6.41. Stalin left the Kremlin.

23 45-21.6.41 XNUMX. PC with Directive No. 1 entered the SHO.

0 30-22.6.41 XNUMX. PCs sent to recipients - 2 hours 10 minutes after leaving Stalin's office. During this time, the inmates in the NCO did not give any specific instructions for lifting the troops. Troops are not raised ... We will consider actions in districts in other parts.

3 13-22.6.41 XNUMX. German air raids on Sevastopol. Parachutes with them dropped ground non-contact mines. Two mines fell on dry land. In 3-48 and 3-52, they self-destruct.

3 55-22.6.41 XNUMX. German air raids on Libau.

N.N. Ravens: "About four o'clock we received the first report of the bombing by enemy aircraft of Sevastopol. Soon through VNOS information was received about the air raids on Vindava and Libau ... In a few minutes I was at [Tymoshenko] with data on the bombing of a number of our cities. The head of the Main Political Directorate L.Z. Mehlis ... I left the office with a stone at heart. It struck me that in such a serious situation the people's commissar did not set any task for the air defense forces, did not give any instructions. It seemed to me then: he could not believe that the war really began... "

In the memoirs of N. Kuznetsov, it was noted that the Commissar of Defense dictated, and the head of the General Staff wrote. The figures are (allegedly) draft Directive No. XXUMX, signed by S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov. It was noted that on the back of the 1 sheet, among other marks, there is an indication of the names of the coders: Agapov and Khramtsovsky. After G. Zhukov left the General Staff, Khramtsovsky would become his personal coder.





Historian S.L. Chekunov pointed out that there are two handwritten copies of the Directive, written with a small interval. This person now knows best of all how Directive No. XXUMX was written, how it was sent to the troops and many other interesting things. According to his messages on the forum, we can say that S.L. Chekunov is preparing the release of several books, starting with the 1 year. There will be many interesting documents that we do not even suspect. The only thing waiting for a book about the events before 1927 June will take a long time. Keep track of these book novelties ...



The messages on the sites indicate that the PC contains the following notes: "Entered the SHO in 23-45 21 June 1941 g. ”The directive is sent to 00-30 in the LVO, ZOVO, KOVO, OdVO, PribOVO under the numbers: 19942, 19943, 19944, 19945, 19946, respectively.

What is interesting about the Directive? First of all, unfinished words that are crossed out. The directive was written "live", was born on the move. Does anyone believe that it was dictated by I. Stalin? The author does not believe. If you believe Budenny, the Directive was written after the Kremlin. The author believes this, but it is unprovable. There are no documented facts about this period. I don’t want to believe the author of Zhukov’s memoirs ...

Important phrases removed from the text “at night" and "air defense bring to combat readiness". The spacecraft management is not in a hurry and does not believe in the beginning of the war at dawn ... The author asks for forgiveness, but in part 4 incorrect information is given about General Pokrovsky and the typist Mushroom ...

The basis for the encryption communication was the “Manual on the encryption communication (or service)”. The main provisions of this Manual should be made available to the commanders, who had the right to sign PCs. About all violations related to registration, transfer, addressing, etc., the head of the SHO (department or body) is obliged to inform the higher management (NSH to which he belongs, or to the higher headquarters, if the violations are made by the command staff of the headquarters). When reporting to a higher headquarters about violations related to ciphering, the maximum that the SHO leader can expect is a transfer to another district for the same position, transfer to a higher headquarters or removal of the commanding staff of the headquarters, which requires employees to allow violations. I say this to the fact that cryptographers were protected from the tyranny of commanders at headquarters.

In June 1941, the following communication schemes existed between the General Staff and military districts:

1) using cipher machines - individual between two addressees;

2) circular (or general) using a manual cipher. The processing time of PCs with the help of a manual cipher was increased by 6-10 times. There were also individual communication schemes using a manual cipher.

Why was there only an individual connection using the machines? The installation, with the help of which the places of the holes were marked and their subsequent breaking through, made it possible to work with only two tapes, which then turned into encryption tapes. Perhaps the requirement for the organization of the machine cipher communication between the two recipients was laid down in the technical specifications for the development.

The tables in the cipherblock notes for the manual cipher were printed by typography and therefore allowed to have any number of recipients.

Directive No. XXUMX was sent to the districts using cipher machines, as evidenced by the five numbers of outgoing PCs put on the PC draft. The author estimated the length of PCs (according to PCs Zapovo for armies), which is about 1 groups. The length is approximate and we need only to estimate the time of transmission of PCs by different services. If the coders worked with the speeds indicated above (they were indicated in the 205 part), then the processing of one PC at “Z” took about 4 minutes, and on its “P” it would take up to 6. We know that the draft was made on three sheets, and two specialists worked with PC, who had to work in parallel, passing the draft sheets to each other. The Deputy of the SHOD provided them with ciphers and collected the material to be sent to the communication center. In this case, one expert processed three PCs in a time around 8 minutes, and the other two PCS per 18. It turns out that, taking into account additional corrections, all five PCs could be handed over to the communications center before 12-00.

In the link “district headquarters - army headquarters” there were practically no encryption machines. All ciphering was done using manual ciphers.

In ZOVOVO there were at least two complete sets for cipher machines. This means that the set of ciphertechnique consisted of a device that, when decrypted on a cipher machine, simultaneously printed decrypted text on a device on a sheet of paper. The decrypted text on a sheet of paper (or with a tape pasted on a sheet of paper) is called draft material, which is taken into account in the journal along with PCS and ciphers used. PC blanks with text that are freely available are the result of reprinting text on typewriter types by an SHO employee specifically for guidance.

When PC with the text of Directive No. 1 entered the ZOVOVO headquarters SHO, the district leadership was already waiting for it. The school district ordered the SHO attendant to deliver the draft PC material to the Military Council, which was done. Since the coders were still living in peacetime norms, the duty officer made a violation by ordering the decryption of PCs a second time. It took a little over 5 minutes. Using the secondary draft material, they began to print, as they used to, the text on the letterhead of the incoming PC. Thus, in order to save time by the commanding staff of the district, resolutions and addressing appeared on a sheet of draft material, becoming the incoming PC. Printed text on incoming letterheads turned into outgoing.

According to S.L. Chekunova: “The very first PribOVO took it in 1 hour 07 minutes. All others accepted later, for example ZOVOVO in 01.10. Decoding the first did PribOVO. Safronov (PribOVO) was the first among all addressees to read about 01.40-01.45. All the rest read later. SOVO only at the beginning of the third... »

Due to the huge influx of information from the districts, Directive No. XXUMX was already sent circularly to the addressees with the help of a manual cipher.



The figure underlined numbers PCS Directive (20021, 20022, 20023). Five recipients again. The length of PC by the author is estimated in 248 groups. The permissible length of PCS is 300 groups (in exceptional cases, it was allowed to send PCs of length 350 groups). If it were sent using cipher machines, the telegram would have five numbers, like Directive No. XXUMX. Three numbers indicate preparation for sending it circularly to all five HEs. Processing was carried out using a manual cipher. Also on the sheets we see a working breakdown in parts of the duty of the SHO (or his deputy) into three parts for the 1-2 coders. For urgent PCs, the breakdown was carried out "by eye", which with extensive experience allowed us to use a number of sheets of cipher-block, which is close enough to the required. There are two original Directives No. XXUMX, the same as Directive No. XXUMX. To explain this, the author did not set himself a goal ...



We have finished consideration of material relating to the exploration and evaluation of enemy compounds by the leadership of the spacecraft. In the future, we will have to consider all the districts (except for PribOVO, considered in the first parts of the cycle).

By reviewing the first six parts of the 2 cycle, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Since the summer of 1940, the reconnaissance missions of the GS GSA and the NKVD have inflated the number of German troops concentrated at our borders. The concept of "at our borders" is purely conditional, since German divisions were located from 20 to 424 (and more) kilometers from the border. The overestimation of the number of divisions is probably the result of the good work of the German command on disinformation of the Soviet leadership of the country and the spacecraft.

2. From the autumn of 1940, some German connections began to move towards the Balkans (including to Romania). At the end of April 1941, the number of German formations concentrated on our border (against the PribOVO, ZOVOVO, KOVO troops) again reached the level registered by our intelligence in late August - early September 1940.

3. The KA leadership estimated the number of German formations needed to start a war with the USSR, and in 173 (autumn 1940) - 200 (March-April 1941) - 180 (May 1941) divisions.

By June 21, according to the GR GSH, the 124 divisions were located at our western borders, which was significantly different from the above-mentioned 180 number. It should be noted that more than 2 / 3 of these troops were located at a distance from 20 to 100 km from our border.

4. The spacecraft leadership knew very well that in the initial period of the war, the German command was using several mobile groups, supported by a large number of aircraft, to advance groups of troops to a great depth.

The composition of the mobile groups should include MK, divisions of heavy tanks. Mobile groups interact with amphibious and infantry divisions. As of the end of 1940, the German Armed Forces had 12 microns.

5. Before the start of the war, not a single tank group (of four located near the border), not a single uk (from 10-ti located), not a single heavy tank division (of the 0 existed), one airborne division (of the five, Germany could allocate for the war with the USSR according to the leadership of the AC) Most of the aircraft flew to the airfields closer to the border in the evening 21.6.41.

More than half of those found by reconnaissance at the border are tb and tp in bulk, summarized into conventional ones: without headquarters and control, communications and engineering units, motorized infantry and artillery, without parts of supply, repair and maintenance. These conditional td suited only to strengthen AK.

The artillery brigades equipped with artillery systems with large armor penetration were to parry the presence of heavy tanks in mobile groups.

6. Immediately before the start of the war, significant resources were thrown into long-term programs: the deployment of a heavy KV-3 tank, the design of KV-4 and KV-5 tanks, the construction and equipping of hundreds of long-term structures on our border, and the construction of concrete runways at aerodromes .

7. The military-political leadership of the country thought:

- that by fending off the German grouping near the border by spacecraft divisions (without at the same time achieving superiority over them), it is possible to postpone the beginning of the war with Germany;

- that the USSR’s peace-loving policy towards Germany will also make it possible to postpone the start of the war.

However, Hitler’s manic idea of ​​a war with the USSR reduced these sensible actions to zero. When he had to reconsider his views from the point of view of facts, he began to doubt the correctness of his actions. According to Guderian, 4.8.41 Hitler said: “If I had known that the Russians really had such a number of tanks ... I, perhaps, would not have started this war ...”

8. Aware of the unpreparedness of our army for war, Stalin could not even admit the idea of ​​a first strike on the German troops mobilized and located near the border.

The fact that we poke on the maps and plans with arrows - it's just pictures. Plans are a pile of several cubic meters of paper. And what we have seen is drafts by planters ...

9. In six parts, we encountered cases of manifestation of private initiative by the commanders of various levels of the spacecraft and the navy in preparing their troops (forces) for war. These actions were not the result of instructions from Moscow to prepare for war by the leadership of NGOs and the General Staff of the Spacecraft. We will see many more examples of the manifestation of such a private initiative when considering events in the border districts.

10. So far, we have not seen a single document, fact or memory, directly indicating the presence of the mythical Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft on the transfer of ground forces and air forces to readiness number XXUMX. We will continue to look for the presence of the mythical directive in the materials on cross-border HE.

However, the events reviewed indirectly indicate the opposite: the spacecraft management did not expect the war to start at dawn on 22 on June 1941, and we haven’t met yet a single fact indicating the opposite ...
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  1. +35
    11 August 2018 06: 29
    As always with a lot of facts
    thanks to the author I will wait for the continuation
    1. VS
      -26
      11 August 2018 07: 38
      Koi facts she is not able to understand and digest)))
    2. -2
      13 August 2018 23: 05
      facts - NOTHING.
      individual peasants could not quickly and consistently deploy in the covering army.
      Politicians understood this.
      the sacrifice was made back in the beginning of 41 g, when the fortuneteller won’t attack — he won’t attack.
      and what can we answer?
      The mentality of the peasants does not change from the slogans of the world revolution instead of the liturgy. for centuries, they have lived and not otherwise.
      LOSS ---------- IN THE HIGHEST POLIT OF RUK-BE. they could not dare to bring the 2 million army into the field and start (like the kokhly now - "to fight with the ahresars" in their dugouts.) - to deploy
      they would say all over the world - paranoia.
      but it turned out how it happened.
      the team wins, the coach loses (in hockey ??)

      it makes no sense to list the RM and reports - the special forces react instantly, and 30 million (western republics of the USSR) cannot be deployed in war for 5 or 10 days, MOBILIZATION - ONLY WHAT ALREADY READY FOR THE PREVIOUS 10-15 YEARS (OR 3G WOULD??)
      DELIVERED + FOR CONTINUED BLOCKS - haha ​​who is to blame for the failure
    3. 0
      8 November 2018 05: 05
      Revealed the fact that Zhukov in his memories of 22.6.41. he is simply and INTENTIONALLY lying, referring to already dead witnesses - Purkaev and Vatutin. Or his author's text was ruled by "must-loids" in the Central Committee of the CPSU and military censorship, with the task of shielding Tymoshenko and blaming everything on Stalin ONLY. But it would be good for the author to focus not so much on General of the Army Zhukov, freshly baked from the corps corps (experience of commanding a corps in Mongolia for 130 days), as Marshals Tymoshenko and Kulik, "heroes of the Finnish war", "victors of Poland and Bessarabia." Zhukov de facto wrote and signed all the directives of the NCO and the General Staff under the dictation of the UKRAINIAN marshals. In addition, his relationship with the head of the General Staff of the General Staff, Lieutenant General (!) Golikov, was extremely hostile, since Golikov, being a PMC of the Belarusian Military District in 1937, according to Zhukov, drowned him, then a cavalry brigade commander, along the party line and the line of the NKVD ( Golikov himself denied this). Fortunately, Zhukov was then saved by a long, almost year-long, treatment for botulism exactly during the repressive purge of the Red Army from the military-Trotskyist conspiracy (I am writing without quotation marks, since this anti-Stalinist conspiracy has actually existed since the late 20s, and not all participants were eventually identified). Let me remind you that Trotsky was liquidated in Mexico only in 1940, and his "Internationale" is still really working and has its headquarters in Spain. Zhukov's personal acquaintance with Uborevich, Tukhachevsky and others resulted in a multi-page "party case" in the political agencies of Belarus, and Marshal Budyonny, the division commander Zhukov, saved him from him, urgently summoning him to Moscow and appointing him as a cavalry inspector. But in any case, in 1941, who commanded the KOVO troops for less than a year and had a month's experience of the "Bessarabian campaign" in 1940, Zhukov was ABSOLUTELY subordinate to Timoshenko, and the People's Commissar-Marshal often substituted him for the discontent or anger of Stalin, to whom he MANUSCRIPT secret draft directives written precisely by Zhukov's hand under Timoshenko's dictation, including a draft directive on counter-offensive and almost preventive actions in March-April 1941.Nevertheless, historians, for some reason, amicably digging Zhukov, although responsibility for the defeat of June 1941 was 1941 % lies with the head of the non-profit organization Tymoshenko and the head of the GAU Kulik. But, oddly enough, they are led into the shadow of military history, exposing Zhukov as a barrier and the main culprit.
  2. +63
    11 August 2018 06: 42
    A survey should have been attached to the article, but for technical reasons it was not included in the article.
    In the introduction it was said that if at least the 51-th user who voted to continue the cycle does not reach, then naturally there will be no continuation ...
    The materials will be considered out of date. This is your choice, dear users of the Military Review forum.
    If there is more than the specified number, then thank you, readers and continuation will be. Consider the fact that there will be a lot of material and it can be difficult to see ...
    Since there is no survey, the author will decide on the continuation of the number of positive signs to this message.
    If there are site visitors who are also interested in this topic, then register on the VO website and put a plus sign.
    Voting is anonymous. Naturally, who is totally against it, then put the cons to the author ...
    Thanks to those who read or participated in the vote.
    Regards author)))
    1. +23
      11 August 2018 06: 58
      I am certainly for the continuation of the topic raised by the author ... and it is just wonderful that the author shows genuine documents and not their interpretation.
      Regardless of the number of users who read the article, one must continue to publish the real facts of what happened in 1941 on June 22 and more archival documents with the signature stamp of the secret of those years.
      For me, this day ... the day of the tragedy of the Soviet (Russian) people ... thousands and thousands of our people died at once ... grief came to thousands of families ... and we should by no means forget this so that now does not happen in our country.
    2. +1
      11 August 2018 10: 49
      Quote: article
      ... In the memoirs of N. Kuznetsov it is noted that the people's commissar of defense dictated, and the chief of the General Staff wrote. The figures show (allegedly) a draft of Directive No. 1, signed by S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov ...

      ... That is, when Kuznetsov arrived, Tymoshenko dictated, and Zhukov wrote down the text of the directive in a notebook for radiograms. But when was this text written?
      In another version of his memoirs, published in the book “Defense of Leningrad,” the admiral recalls this moment in a slightly different way. The fact is that this book was published in 1968, and was handed over to the set in 1965. The memoirs of Marshal Zhukov had not yet been published, and he still did not read his report at the plenum in 1956, so the official position on the question of who suggested bringing the troops into combat readiness was not known. Here is what the admiral recalls:
      “When they entered the office, the People's Commissar in an unbuttoned tunic walked around the office and dictated something. At the table sat the chief of the General Staff G.K. Zhukov, and without stopping, continued to write a telegram. Several sheets of a large notebook lay to his left: it means that it has been a long time since they returned from the Kremlin (we knew that at 18 hours they both called there) and prepared instructions to the districts ...

      Elena Prudnikova. Forgotten Victories of 1941 of the Year
      He cited this passage as an example of a "multiple" interpretation of one of the most intriguing moments of the very eve of the Great Patriotic War ....

      Not only that, the memoirs were released immeasurably. So every memoirist, as a rule in a high military rank, that he "remembered", he wrote in his "memoirs". Moreover, in different editions of "memoirs" the memoirist "recalled" differently.

      I’m what it is .... It seems that trying to find the truth, they often get the average arithmetic mean with the standard deviation when they try to compare memoirs and archival documents, the latter, in turn, sometimes also contradict each other.
      [
      Quote: article
      However, the events reviewed indirectly indicate the opposite: the spacecraft management did not expect the war to start at dawn on 22 on June 1941, and we haven’t met yet a single fact indicating the opposite ...

      Doesn’t climb into any gates ...
      The author together with water splashed out and the child .....
      1. VS
        0
        11 August 2018 15: 06
        Do you want to throw in your mailbox a more detailed chronology of the events of June and the night of June 22?))) What really was done in the districts and Moscow in connection with the expectation of the German attack ??))
        1. +2
          11 August 2018 18: 32
          Quote: V.S.
          and you want to throw in your box a more detailed timeline

          Thank you, Vasily!
          hi
          I can’t say that I read (or studied) ALL available materials on this one. But for those who have read and read those authors whose concept is built more or less logical, based on the facts known today, this issue is described well. And there are relevant documents and memories attached.

          This question should have been, and therefore was brought up in a separate topic by researchers. I will not say the names that the next hype did not start ....
          The author of as many as 17 (seventeen, Karl!) Articles aKtoR described in such detail everything that is possible about what is happening in the USSR on the eve of the Great Patriotic War that he already began to doubt "Why once again analyze this issue?", If many on the site, who familiar with this topic firsthand gave their comments during the publication process, which went on for more than one month.

          And if the last paragraph "the leadership of the spacecraft did not expect the outbreak of war at dawn on June 22, 1941" would sound in a different form, as we all know, there would not be such amazement "Why publish documents and comments in such detail that would not come to to simply unpopular, and I would say a paradoxical conclusion? "

          Well, just like one unfortunate researcher notorious for his opuses, now living out his days in Britain .... fellow
        2. +7
          11 August 2018 19: 04
          Quote: V.S.
          Do you want to throw in your mailbox a more detailed chronology of the events of June and the night of June 22?

          Thank you, Vasily!
          hi
          It's enough for me that there is "in the storerooms" .... Yes
          1. VS
            -5
            14 August 2018 15: 45
            I’m not Vasily and - what are your storerooms?))) There is something about what directive - what it was about -
            was carrying Zhukov to Stalin on June 11 ??))) Is there something about what Tymoshenko and Zhukov offered to Stalin on June 11 for Hitler ??))
      2. GAF
        +2
        12 August 2018 00: 26
        [quote = stalkerwalker] [
        Quote: article
        However, the events reviewed indirectly indicate the opposite: the spacecraft management did not expect the war to start at dawn on 22 on June 1941, and we haven’t met yet a single fact indicating the opposite ...
        Evidence of this from the enemy. I apologize for the "overkill" - the telling about the 1st week of the war.
        Halder DIARY start
        22 June 1941 g. “The offensive of our troops, apparently, was for the enemy on the whole front a complete tactical surprise.
        The border bridges across the Bug and other rivers are everywhere captured by our troops without a fight in complete safety. The complete surprise of our attack for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in the barracks, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the advanced units attacked by our troops asked the command about what to do. We can expect an even greater influence of the element of surprise on the further course of events as a result of the rapid advancement of our moving parts, ... "
        However:
        24.06: “The enemy in the border strip almost everywhere showed resistance. If he did not quite imagine the situation, then this was the result of tactical surprise, which led to the fact that the enemy’s resistance was disorganized, fragmented and therefore ineffective. ”
        25.06/XNUMX. “The enemy is organizing to retreat, covering the withdrawal with tank formations, and at the same time transferring large masses of troops from the north to the Western Dvina ...”
        26.06/XNUMX. “The enemy, acting against Army Group South, has a firm and energetic leadership ... At the front of Army Group Center, there is strong pressure from the enemy trying to break out of the sack in the Białystok area.”
        To close the holes in the bags, it was necessary to distract from the attack on the East the connection of the tank groups of Goth and Guderian. In the presence of competent command, individual units managed to get out of the environment. The division under the command of Galitsky, having traveled over 500 km across the rear of the enemy and leaving heavy weapons due to the loss of fuel and ammunition in the battles, went to his full strength, replenishing on his way groups of retreating from the encirclement.
        26.06/XNUMX. “The enemy, acting against Army Group South, has a firm and energetic leadership ... At the front of Army Group Center, there is strong pressure from the enemy trying to break out of the sack in the Białystok area.”
        To close the holes in the bags, it was necessary to distract from the attack on the East the connection of the tank groups of Goth and Guderian. In the presence of competent command, individual units managed to get out of the environment. The division under the command of Galitsky, having traveled over 500 km across the rear of the enemy and leaving heavy weapons due to the loss of fuel and ammunition in the battles, went to his full strength, replenishing on his way groups of retreating from the encirclement.
        28.06/4. “At the front of Army Group Center, as a result of desperate attempts by the enemy to get out of the encirclement, the situation in a number of sectors has seriously deteriorated. This forced the 12th Army to send the 9th Army Corps to the north. And the 5th Army to abandon the XNUMXth Army Corps in a southerly direction.
        "A small number of prisoners are characteristic of all sectors of the front, along with a very large number of captured property."
        29.06/6. “Information from the front confirms that Russians everywhere fight to the last man. They only surrender in places, primarily where there is a large percentage of Mongolian nationalities in the troops (in front of the 9th and XNUMXth armies). It is striking that when capturing artillery batteries, etc. only a few are surrendered. Some Russians fight until they are killed, others flee, throw off uniform uniforms and try to get out of the encirclement under the guise of peasants. The morale of our troops is everywhere regarded as good, even where it was necessary to conduct heavy fighting. Horses are extremely exhausted. ”
        Ott General Inspector of Infantry reported on his impressions of the battle in the Grodno area. The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to fight according to all the rules of our combat manuals. In Poland and in the West, we could allow ourselves certain liberties and deviations from statutory principles; now this is unacceptable. "
        No matter how tragic the Beginning, it predetermined the outcome of the war.
        1. GAF
          +2
          12 August 2018 00: 54
          Quote: GAF
          The site administrator was forbidden to leave comments on this site

          May explain the reason for the ban.
        2. +4
          12 August 2018 10: 15
          Quote: GAF
          Halder DIARY start
          22 June 1941 g. “The offensive of our troops, apparently, was for the enemy on the whole front a complete tactical surprise.

          It is worth reading Halder's diary and a little further - there tactical surprise already "did not smell".

          About tactical surprise.
          Already during the war, when the Great Patriotic War was in full swing, such tactical surprises were innumerable in every successful operation - from "Typhoon" to "Uranus" and "Bagration".
          We conclude - could not undermobilized Red Army, "smeared" along the border with a thin layer, which either oppose the Wehrmacht Tank Groups in the direction of the Main Strike.
          I also remind you of the tragedy near Vyazma and Bryansk, when the Red Army, which was being prepared for defense, was not defeated, but they were cut and circumvented by the same TGr, and the Wehrmacht infantry closed the ring and finished off the encirclement.
          In November of 1942, under Stalingrad, there was another tactical surprise: As a result, the Stalingrad boiler with all the consequences.
          1. GAF
            +1
            12 August 2018 19: 40
            Quote: stalkerwalker
            It is worth reading Halder's diary and a little further - there was no longer a smell of tactical surprise.

            In fact, the text from the diary was cited in support of the author's thesis - "8. Knowing that our army was unprepared for war, Stalin could not even admit the thought of a first strike on the mobilized German troops located near the border." And therefore, it has nothing to do with the interpretation of the term "tactical surprise" later in the course of the war. Strategically, war was inevitable and the country was not quite ready for it STRATEGICALLY. Hence the problems during the course of the war until the second half of 1943. Therefore, the main task was to gain time to prepare - to delay the start of the war by any means, including the elimination of provocations. Judging by the memoirs, the war found the spacecraft in the period of its reorganization, rearmament and retraining of personnel for new equipment, which began to enter the troops. Hence, there are a lot of organizational inconsistencies, when sometimes the KV had to shoot with training blanks, there was not enough trained crews for the T34, there was not enough ammunition for new types of weapons, etc., etc.
    3. +3
      14 August 2018 06: 31
      Currently the author will be absent for a long time. The author instructed me to post a sequel if there is at least 51 th plus to his post below the message (and not to the article itself).
      Since I am not authorized to make decisions, I am forced to act strictly within the direction of the author.
      1. VS
        -20
        14 August 2018 08: 06
        Well, cho for cheap games babskie then)))

        EVERYTHING is simpler - Madame UNDERSTANDED that in THIS last article she foolishly and completely delirious that the attack was not expected, they weren’t preparing for it and it was unexpected))) and if something was done, DECLINE the tyrant and on the initiative of the individual general’s fearless tyrant) )))

        Especially namutila as for and .. n deer. 1 - so Madame decided to sit out - wait until she figured it out and figured out how to better fit the following FACTS to her own and how better to transfer the facts to her as usual)))
  3. VS
    -5
    11 August 2018 07: 37
    "" In addition, in Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine, the number of German troops is 13-15 divisions. There are 33-35 divisions in Romania. Earlier, formations in the Danzig, Poznan, Thorn area (6th division) were added to the divisions intended for the attack on the USSR. If we take into account these divisions, then the number of German divisions intended for an attack on the USSR will be 165.

    From the findings of the report, it can be calculated that if 30% of enemy forces is 50-52 divisions, then 100% forces will be from 167 to 173 divisions.
    ""

    madam - study ALL possible facts)))

    They even brought the divisional commanders to LenVO - 120 will attack !! German divisions and not 167 of yours))))
    1. +2
      11 August 2018 09: 51
      You, do not vote like a woman, but tell me specifically what the mistake is in the summary of the General Staff.
      The author’s right of women has put everything on the shelves. What is the discrepancy? Come on liar facts and not womanish cries
      1. VS
        -3
        11 August 2018 15: 08
        Not a mistake but a juggling - according to the desire to implement the pre-war plans of GSh-Zhukov))) Do you want to understand HOW it was in reality - give me a box - I’ll throw off more information on this issue - what really was done in the pre-war days and even more so in the pre-war day)))
  4. VS
    -4
    11 August 2018 07: 41
    "" A significant difference is only in the number of divisions against the ZF: according to the Form there are 40, and according to the summary - 31.

    According to the author, Blank is a later document, ""

    Sandalov’s words faintly recall - what they knew from 45 German divisions by June 21 - AGAINST STOCK ??)))
    1. +3
      11 August 2018 09: 53
      Except obs something you can show, liar kozinkin?
      Or pld confirm by analysis
      Although, pooh, the storekeeper and the analysis are not compatible
      1. VS
        -1
        11 August 2018 15: 08
        those. MY books you did not read the wise guy?)))
  5. VS
    -6
    11 August 2018 07: 53
    "" Yu.A. Panteleev: “On June 19, 1941 ... the Armed Forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet decided to bring the fleet into increased operational readiness ... Admiral [V.F. Tributs] detained me. He called Moscow and called the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsova: “Comrade People's Commissar, I have the opinion that an attack by Germany is possible at any hour. We must begin to erect barriers, otherwise it will be too late! I consider it necessary to increase the fleet's exhaust gas ... "Putting down the phone, the admiral sighed with relief:" I agreed with the increase in the fleet's exhaust gas, but ordered to be careful, not to go for provocations. And with the setting of the mines he ordered to wait. Let's act! "

    Thus, it is possible that at the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, readiness No. 2 was announced not on a command from Moscow, but at the suggestion of the commander of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, but People's Commissar N.G. Kuznetsov only agreed with this. It turns out that the leadership of the NKO and the General Staff has nothing to do with bringing the fleets to alert number 2. ""

    - here ..ura))) NPO and NKMF - where Kuznetsov with his consent to the CBF OFFER to introduce readiness No. 2 - AUTHORIZED THIS - - DIFFERENT ministries)))

    REQUESTS came from the counties on June 8–9 - IT ISN’T TIME TO COME INTO Coverage Plans !! And on June 9 this was discussed by Stalin))) AND THE PERMISSION WAS given)))
    And a taikm of orazom under the command of STALIN ALL the okrug, the Navy and the Air Force and led to the increased B.G. - in connection with the expected attack by Germany)))

    But Madame rubs us that Stalin did not expect an attack and that everyone did everything on a private initiative of the Kuznetsovs)))
    1. +3
      11 August 2018 09: 59
      Do not lie kozinkin. The only request was from Zakharov.
      If I'm wrong, let me show you the documents, liar kozinkin.
      The fact is not the link that in your scribble it is.
      But you can’t imagine, and you’ll wriggle again
      1. VS
        -3
        11 August 2018 15: 12
        actually - a request from KOVO is even published quite)) And for example, Baghramyan wrote about IT)))

        And this is what happened in the Kremlin after these requests))

        "" During two evening meetings on June 9, decisions were made to start the main deployment. As a result of these meetings, the 16th army was reoriented to Ukraine, directives were sent to the border districts to start the advancement of deep divisions (Pavlov and Kuznetsov received directives personally in Moscow, field communications were sent to KOVO), the commander of PribOVO received personal instructions to bring the district to combat readiness.
        All decisions were made precisely late in the evening on June 9 And the directives to Pavlov and Kuznetsov were issued on the 11th. After returning to PribOVO, a withdrawal plan was drawn up, then Kuznetsov turned to Moscow in encryption, where he described the actions being taken and asked for approval. "
      2. 0
        8 November 2018 07: 49
        Readiness No. 2 in the fleets meant a complete refueling with fuel, BC and products of all ships, the cessation of holidays and the transfer to the barracks position of the entire command staff, including the command staff of air defense bases and coastal URs, including aerodromes of naval aviation, the intensification of intelligence work in the areas where the fleet and state borders are based, transfer communications and logistics services for wartime, the issuance of full-time weapons, ammunition, gas masks, helmets, etc. all ships and ships of the fleets, as well as coastal units and units from warehouses, preparation for the reception and uniforms of enlisted personnel, as well as an appeal for mobilization, for the evacuation of family members from border bases, the deployment of naval hospitals. The history of Libava’s defense and surrender in the first week of the war indicates that in reality it was fully prepared for readiness No. 2 announced on the fleets on 19.6.41. the fleets did not have time to go.
    2. +9
      17 August 2018 12: 13
      attacks were feared, but there was no certainty that they would attack at any given moment.
      There is no need to engage in sophistry, distorting the meaning of events into the phrase "they did not wait for the attack, they were not ready." But it is worth remembering what Finland did while waiting for the Soviet Union to attack and compare it with what was done on the western border of the USSR before the German attack. Then the degree of reaction becomes clear, and it was at times more sluggish. Let me remind you that the Finns in a short time, using the methods of total mobilization, equalized the number of their troops on the border with the forces with which they planned to attack the USSR and did not really hide it.
  6. VS
    -6
    11 August 2018 07: 56
    "" Mid June. N.G. Kuznetsov: "Vatutin promised to immediately notify us if the situation becomes critical ..."

    Tymoshenko called Kuznetsov only at 23-00 on June 21. It turns out that until 23-00 on 21.6.41 the General Staff did not consider the situation critical ... ""

    yeah - and so the admiral introduced the readiness of t No. 2 on his own initiative))) contrary to the tyrant))) - from June 16-17 .. And at the same time both the Air Force and Air Defense entered No. 2 - contrary to the tyrant)))

    Madame - finally get down)))
    1. +2
      11 August 2018 09: 57
      I told you stupid, read in syllables then you will go for not stupid
      With the initiative, the drug addict left the Baltic, and he allowed.
      This was not Kuznetsov’s initiative. Did it happen, liar kozinkin?
      1. VS
        -4
        11 August 2018 15: 14
        And that they were the first to give such an admiral ??))) And you are a wise guy aware that there were TAM exercises and so the fleet was ready and No. 2 and the request was - let me leave this degree))

        But - WHAT does the admiral’s initiative have to do there if WITHOUT Stalin they could NOT do this ??)))
  7. VS
    -5
    11 August 2018 08: 02
    "" 15-00 on 21.6.41. N. D. Yakovlev: “In the office of the People's Commissar was the Chief of the General Staff, General of the Army G.K. Zhukov ... S.K. Tymoshenko did not give us time to talk. Laconically suggested ... from June 23, to start accepting business from the former head of GAU ... [At this time] The commander of the PribOVO troops, General F.I. Kuznetsov. The People's Commissar rather sternly asked him if it was true that they, Kuznetsov, had been ordered to introduce blackouts in Riga. And to the affirmative answer ordered to cancel it ... "" "

    girl - but why don’t you give the words of Admiral Kuznetsov and Chadayev that at noon, Stalin gives the command of the air defense missile defense - to enter the increased b.g. for air defense ??)))
    And - SO GKZH canceled the increased B.G. for air defense PribOVO or only dimming screaming at Kuznetsov ??)))
  8. VS
    -7
    11 August 2018 08: 08
    "" The People's Commissar of Communications is sent on a secondary business trip, in which any representative of the People's Commissariat can cope with the appropriate powers. Even I. Stalin, carefully studying the RM, does not expect a war in the coming days ... ""

    but why did you get that that trip was secondary and why did you get one hundred Stalin does not wait for an attack ??)) Ignore the words of eyewitnesses that your nonsense is refuted ??))
    SO WHEN NAME you name your sister - I would like to know where the next falsifier came out of - from what hole?

    The fact that Stalin did not accept Voronov - say that HIS report was not so relevant on the day of June 21 ..
  9. VS
    -3
    11 August 2018 08: 11
    "" 19-05 ... 20-15 21.6.41. In Stalin's office is Tymoshenko, among others. Zhukov is absent. The question of the organization of the LF, the appointment of the command of the LF, the Northern Front and the command of the general leadership of the LF and the South-Western Front are being resolved. Consideration of this issue, some writers associate with the expectation of war at dawn on June 22nd. ""

    You look at the composition of this meeting)) THIS - K.O. - The Commission on Military and Naval Affairs at SNK And Zhukov TAM should not have been))

    And - how do you know what was discussed at this meeting if there are NO shorthand notes for this meeting ??)) But Chadayev, the manager of SNK affairs, showed that TAM was discussed quite well - there was talk about the war with Germany in those hours)))
  10. VS
    -4
    11 August 2018 08: 13
    "" I wonder where Zhukov will have time to leave on the morning of the 22nd in order to be in time for the start of the war. "

    why are you carrying a girl - WHAT the hell is Zhukov generally supposed to leave, and even more so by the beginning of the war ??)))
  11. VS
    -4
    11 August 2018 08: 16
    "" This is an ordinary meeting for the future, the same as the departure of front-line departments ... ""

    madam - but why don’t you show that in the MORNING of the 21st there came messages from the districts that the Germans were taking off the wire and a resolution was imposed on them - urgently to report to the Foreign Ministry and SNK ??)))

    In your opinion - according to the woman’s - the departure of district headquarters in field CPs is a common thing ??))) from nothing to do and go ??)))
  12. VS
    -6
    11 August 2018 08: 18
    "" The representative of the People's Commissar of Defense, who must determine whether provocations have begun or is it a war, leaves for the headquarters of the LMO by train, not having time to dawn. He is also not sent urgently by plane. Anyone in Moscow actually expecting an attack at dawn on June 22, or not ?? "

    ON THE BORDER WITH FINLAND ??)) Nope ... HERE do not wait for the attack and do it right)))
  13. VS
    -6
    11 August 2018 08: 20
    ""AND. Stalin thought and said: "This is not serious." He turned to me: "What do you think?" ... "" "

    and according to you in a womanish way - this is the phrase of a tyrant to the military against their dashing statements about how they will famously defeat everyone, say that Stalin does not believe in an ATTACK or something ??))

    yes uzhzh))))
    1. +12
      17 August 2018 12: 32
      and your way

      Why be rude, who needs it ???
      and what are you trying to prove?
      1. VS
        -8
        18 August 2018 13: 44
        as current ladies climb into history - wait for trouble)))
        I do not want to prove anything - no more than trying to show where Madame deliberately lies and distorts the facts)))
  14. VS
    -6
    11 August 2018 08: 25
    "" On 21.6.41, after 22-20, Tymoshenko and Zhukov went to the NGO to prepare Directive No. 1. "

    Well, why is it so dirty to lie ??)))

    SIA Dir. it was written in Stalin’s office - when Zhukov arrived there with his directive, at 20.45)))

    MADAM - get down already))) When you misinterpreted and customized the facts under your women’s ravings, it was still funny, but Lying about the LAST-known facts SO it went and dirty - it’s not worth it)))

    At 22.20, NCOs and the General Staff went to NCOs to READY to send the text of a directive written in Stalin’s office and Zhukov himself directly showed it)))
  15. VS
    -7
    11 August 2018 08: 27
    "" the People's Commissar is overwhelmed by the same disturbing thoughts. Leaving the car, we agreed to meet in his office in ten minutes ... "

    Yes, here not anxious thoughts should prevail, but run to the phones and raise troops! ""

    Madame - according to the GKZh he ALREADY - sent Vatutin directly from the Kremlin with the text to the General Staff so that the text would go to the okrugs - why did he fuss more than necessary ???
    1. +3
      11 August 2018 10: 05
      And according to your ideas, he called at ten in the evening from Stalin’s office.
      I asked a question there, present evidence, and not a phrase from Zakharov, a liar kozinkin
      1. VS
        -8
        11 August 2018 15: 17
        and HOW do you think you can confirm or refute the call from the General Staff ??))) YOU are ignorant there is only one thing left — or believe or not))
        You hunt Madame stupid liar to believe - your problems))))
  16. VS
    -5
    11 August 2018 08: 29
    "" 0-30 22.6.41. The PC was sent to the addressees - 2 hours 10 minutes after leaving Stalin's office. During this time, the inmates in the NCO did not give any specific instructions on the rise of troops. The troops are not raised ... "

    actually - THEY CALLED AT THESE hours in the district))) Zhukov - at KOVO at midnight - pass the directive to the army faster)))
  17. VS
    -5
    11 August 2018 08: 32
    "" The directive was written "live", was born on the fly. Does anyone believe that J. Stalin dictated it? The author does not believe. ""

    yes do not care about your BELIEF)))

    The TEXT was written in Stalin’s office at 22 p.m. and there he corrected IMMEDIATELY))) Instead of the brought-in directive, Zhukov’s billet - for ENTERING PP)))
  18. VS
    -9
    11 August 2018 08: 34
    "" According to Budyonny, the Directive was written after the Kremlin. "

    LIE beauty (or not beauty) ?? )) There are no Budeno’s memoirs in general on this subject .. There are muddy drafts of memoirs unclear as published in the newspaper))
    1. +3
      11 August 2018 10: 10
      The red star published in the newspaper on the anniversary of the attack and not disputed by anyone
      A muddy your creations scribble from fools
      1. VS
        -5
        11 August 2018 15: 18
        THIS IS NOT A PUBLICATION)) AND TO WHOM it is necessary - to refute something - what is not published and to WHOM it is necessary ??))
        Calm down smartass - in the publication of KZ there is nothing about the fact that the text was written AFTER the military left Stalin))))

        REMEMBER and write yourself down - the text is deer. b.n. (SO she’s called exactly) - WRITTEN in the office of Stalin)))
  19. The comment was deleted.
    1. +4
      11 August 2018 10: 13
      Put the glasses on. Is it crossed out in the photo or not? Can you take a magnifying glass where it says that this text went to the district? Kozinkin talks about a draft. That's because he lies and does not bounce
      1. +2
        11 August 2018 14: 26
        Quote: RuSFr
        Is it crossed out in the photo or not?

        In the photo of the paragraph on air defense is NOT AT ALL. And on the decoding below this paragraph is available, NOT crossed out, BUT highlighted in red.
        Both parties to the argument should explain this incident, and not call each other.
        1. VS
          -1
          13 August 2018 06: 18
          On the "photo", with the red ones, it is Madame SAMA who emphasized the words about air defense lines))) The text written in the Kremlin left the General Staff and there is a point about air defense there)))
          1. 0
            14 August 2018 11: 05
            Quote: V.S.
            On the "photo" red

            "Photo" is a photocopy of the MANUSCRIPT text. In the photo, the paragraph on air defense is absent altogether, there is neither red nor crossed out. Not at all.
            And under the photo there is an image of the text in computer font, where this paragraph is available.
            So, before pouring water on each other, the arguers should explain on the basis of what documents the paragraph on air defense appeared in the computer text?
            1. VS
              -4
              14 August 2018 15: 57
              everything is simple here))) And you just do not know what kind of photo is given here - on that photo))

              This Solonin shot on the phone most likely or on the camera - it doesn’t matter - in two visits to each page - the draft pages of the so-called deer 1.
              Doing this at TsAMO is not worth it - they might be offended .. Therefore, Solonin does not publish these photos in full))).
              There were THREE pages. Solonin published the top of the first page in his book - and Madame led the photo of this half to rip off the photo itself on the site of a certain K. Zakoretsky - Pan Probzdetsky as I call him - a rabid rezun and a psycho from Kiev)))
              Solonin cited a photo of the third page from two frames on his website and articles in the military-industrial complex several years ago too .. This probzdetsky connected these frames on his computer - and we got a photo of the 3rd page)))
              But - after all, there is a second page and there is TAM and there is a provision on air defense completely .. And without giving a scan of these pages, S. Chekunov also brought TEXT itself on the milleter's website - http://militera.borda.ru/?1-3- 0-00001243-000-0-0-1521787172 - and in 2009 still)))
              No underlines in the text of the draft deer. b.n. - SO, it’s right to call her - there’s no red one))) This is already our quirky lady on her computer - for these statues)))

              Srach in the network about this text goes NINE years at least - according to the draft that Chekunov brought))) .. for these photos a little less but also not a couple of years these photos were mounted by Probzdetsky)))
              I have a book "Who slept through the beginning of the war" - according to this directive, it was also published in 2011, and in every book, one way or another, I show about it))) As soon as something new is found on it))) And madam decided that she was the smartest and better than men and the more military knows what for)))
              Let's get your box - I'll throw off a brand new one on the events of June and the night of June 22))) I have no problem)))
      2. VS
        -7
        11 August 2018 15: 23
        The clever lady writes that - "" The important phrases "in the night" and "bring the air defense on alert" were removed from the text. "
        WHAT IN RUSSIAN means - STRIKED-out provision on air defense !!))
        And this is a lie)))

        And far away the lady is talking nonsense - "The leadership of the spacecraft is in no hurry and does not believe in the beginning of the war at dawn ..."

        I TE and HER brought the text sent and received in Minsk)) - THERE is about air defense))) Which means - the lady is nonsense built on a lie)))
  20. The comment was deleted.
  21. +16
    11 August 2018 08: 47
    Thanks to the author, wonderful article, wonderful cycle! good .
    It is NECESSARY to continue the series of articles, regardless of the plus or minus signs: today they will not appreciate it, tomorrow with a bang! will go.
    First of all, the huge amount of ACTUAL source material is interesting, allowing the MOST reader to draw conclusions and assessments.
    However, in general, and with the conclusions of the author, I agree:
    spacecraft leadership did not expect the outbreak of war at dawn on June 22, 1941

    .
    N.K. Ryzy: “The barracks of units located at the beginning of the war in Reni were removed no more than one kilometer from the southern bank of the Danube river, engaged in Romanian troops. The possibility of a secret location of troops and artillery allowed the enemy to conduct artillery with the outbreak of hostilities direct fire directly to our barracks... »

    There are no words! And so, where there were so many ....
    "S.K. Tymoshenko said then: “Perhaps the war will begin tomorrow! .. The main thing - not succumb to provocations... Excerpt above all. To be able to distinguish a real attack from local incidents and prevent them from escalating into war
    ... »

    If this People's Commissar and others like him were elementary literate and would have studied History, they would have known that wars of this magnitude are being read not because of "provocations and incidents", but advance decision and never any fight against provocations could delay anything in principle! .
    At the border, a huge, fully mobilized warring army, but for Timoshenoks this is not at all a reason to declare the readiness of their army, I am already silent about mobilization. fool
    1. VS
      -8
      11 August 2018 09: 32
      yes she is lying))) because she is hiding behind a clique who is lying)))

      Researchers of such an important topic as June 22, NEVER hide their names behind klikuhi ...) ONLY if these are not cutters or falsifiers are stupid to the same)))
      1. +5
        11 August 2018 10: 14
        Here alone follow rezuna Rezun oleg yurevich, a liar and a small pacifier
        1. VS
          -4
          11 August 2018 15: 24
          about how))) This is from what it is that since then I became a supporter of Rezun then ??)) Would you even read my book or something)))
    2. +1
      8 November 2018 08: 09
      Readiness No. 2 in the fleets meant a complete refueling with fuel, BC and products of all ships, the cessation of holidays and the transfer to the barracks position of the entire command staff, including the command staff of air defense bases and coastal URs, including aerodromes of naval aviation, the intensification of intelligence work in the areas where the fleet and state borders are based, transfer communications and logistics services for wartime, the issuance of full-time weapons, ammunition, gas masks, helmets, etc. all ships and ships of the fleets, as well as coastal units and units from warehouses, preparation for the reception and uniforms of enlisted personnel, as well as an appeal for mobilization, for the evacuation of family members from border bases, the deployment of naval hospitals. The history of Libava’s defense and surrender in the first week of the war indicates that in reality it was fully prepared for readiness No. 2 announced on the fleets on 19.6.41. the fleets did not have time to go.
  22. VS
    -8
    11 August 2018 08: 48
    "" The military-political leadership of the country thought: "

    and again the lady composes - who is there who "thought"))) spiritualist sucks)))
  23. VS
    -7
    11 August 2018 08: 49
    "" 8. Knowing that our army was unprepared for war, Stalin could not even admit the thought of a first strike at the mobilized German troops located near the border. "

    horror (((FIRST common sense in the reasoning of the lady (((horror ...
    1. +3
      11 August 2018 10: 16
      Users counted more. You taught arithmetic at school or skipped, a liar kozinkin ?????
      1. VS
        -10
        11 August 2018 15: 25
        yes you never know LITERATURE, not in the topic of boobies here wandered and bought on the delirium of ladies liars)))
  24. VS
    -7
    11 August 2018 09: 02
    ""nine. In six units, we encountered cases of private initiative by the command of various levels of the spacecraft and the Navy in preparing their troops (forces) for war. These actions were not the result of instructions from Moscow to prepare for war by the leadership of the NKO and the General Staff of the KA. We will see many more examples of such private initiative when examining events in the border districts. ""

    Madame - in the Urals on personal initiative - WITHOUT an order from an NGO, troops are not withdrawing in peacetime)))

    According to the PP, the troops with the beginning of the conduct of the ZhBD do not withdraw troops from June 12 WITHOUT the order of the NPO)))
    1. +2
      11 August 2018 10: 17
      Parts did not go to the pp, liar kozinkin. They walked to the border. And nebylo them in pp, for example kovo
      Here's a sick fantasy and still lying
      1. VS
        -5
        11 August 2018 15: 27
        and this is finally how - BE in PP ??)) Cho for the terms you compose a wise guy then ??))

        THEY WENT TO THE AREAS envisaged by the Cover Plan - THEREFORE, THEY WAS SUBMITTED TO THEIR DIR. NPO and GSh))). And this means - to become a camp in the BASIC defense zone that then eyewitnesses and ZhBD showed))) And it was in KOVO from June 12 that they started conducting ZhBD in which these things are noted)))
  25. VS
    -7
    11 August 2018 09: 10
    "Until now, we have not seen a single document, fact or recollection directly indicating the presence of the mythical General Staff Directive No. 2 on the transfer of ground forces and the Air Force to readiness."


    Madame - FOR Dumb I’ll explain the number of times it was - there was NO readiness No. 2 in the ARMY)) In the Air Force, Air Defense and Navy SUCH THE DEGREE of this year there were them in THESE readiness TRANSFER and by ZAPOVE there are such orders)) And in the army - THERE WASN'T such an extent b.g.)) So - not that look))))

    Madam - BEFORE YOU ALL of these problems have been sucked up hundreds of times on the forums FOR YEARS and YOU have suggested reading the theses already formulated on THESE events, but you don’t have any interest - climb into the open gates like a ram))) and carry Crap, insisting that the attack on June 22 was not expected and they didn’t do anything to him, and if they did then, contrary to the tyrant - on the personal initiative of the fearless tyrant Kuznetsov)))
    1. +3
      11 August 2018 10: 18
      From the oak fell?
      1. VS
        -4
        11 August 2018 15: 29
        Isn’t our Pan probzdetsky here drawn - a slaughter fucking from dill - and the victim yells ?? )) Well, let’s give your mailbox - I'll throw you a new book)))
  26. VS
    -7
    11 August 2018 09: 24
    "" The leadership of the spacecraft did not expect the start of the war at dawn on June 22, 1941, and so far we have not come across a single fact indicating the opposite ... "

    for stubborn and ..ur I will repeat - in PribOVO from June 18, according to cover plans, 7 out of 9 of their frontiers were brought into the main hollow of defense. The remaining two moved from Riga and Dvinsk from June 16 ..

    From June 12, in the KOVO, by June 22, 10 of the 17 border regions were withdrawn — those that were stationed far from the defense areas from the PP .. the rest were stationed near their areas ..

    OdVO - ALL of their border areas since 8 June were brought along the border crossing point to the border)))

    TOTAL - 22 of the 41st border were withdrawn along the border crossing points from June 8-12-18.
    WITH INFORMATION ABOUT THIS RECORDS in railways of divisions what is done at the beginning of the implementation of the PP divisions)))

    In ZAPOV not a single cross-border in terms of software was withdrawn. They were deployed in areas on the border, but at the same time they had to move 30-50 km from the enemy’s base points to the defense area along the border along the border ...

    And Pavlov was asked at the investigation into the divisions of Brest - WHAT the hell did you not withdraw from the troops if you received ALL orders for it on time from YOUR words ??

    Question for dumb and ladies - So, on what grounds and for what twenty-two border divisions were withdrawn according to cover plans from June 8-12 and 18 - if no one was waiting for the attack on the 22nd ??)))

    WHAT was decided at a meeting with Stalin on June 9 "!! ?? AT TWO meetings with it)))

    WHAT did GKZH propose to Stalin in those same days to do - what directive did he bring him on June 11 and brought it to him at 20.45 on June 21??))
    1. VS
      -9
      11 August 2018 09: 38
      And the question for the newspaper’s admins is - WHY the hell are you popping here the anonymous ravings of a falsifier of a lady who is misinterpreting the facts and don’t want to print what I offered you - ON THE FACTS of June 41st ??
      The fact that you threw out this lady - wanting to ANONYMOUSLY prove that Stalin and the military were not preparing for war and the attack was unexpected for everyone - IT'S UNIQUE and NEW Nonsense or something ??)))
      "New" facts under the old delirium - NOT INTERESTING alas))))
      1. +6
        11 August 2018 10: 34
        Well, your nonsense is not needed for nothing. Sergey Chekunov wrote to you - you are a liar and so many times - a liar kozinkin
  27. VS
    -11
    11 August 2018 09: 47
    "" If, according to the results of the reader's evaluation, the article gets 51 plus (or more), the continuation awaits you, dear visitors. If not, then it’s not destiny: this is your decision. ""

    - SO EXCEPT ME, no one here discusses your strange anonymous writings))) except for me with my analysis of this anonymous nonsense, then a man of heels will drop by)))
  28. +4
    11 August 2018 09: 48
    Quote: V.S.
    Koi facts she is not able to understand and digest)))

    The liar kozinkin said, do not touch me
    You don’t have facts, only your faculty
    1. VS
      -3
      13 August 2018 06: 21
      God forbid you touch))) demoniac and wretched - do not touch)))
  29. +4
    11 August 2018 09: 55
    Quote: V.S.
    NPO and NKMF - where Kuznetsov with his consent to the CBF OFFER to introduce readiness No. 2 - AUTHORIZED THIS - - DIFFERENT ministries)))

    Are you dumb Why did Tymoshenko directive 1 to the admiral given to read, although different drug commissariats.
    How do you, a dumb liar print? The Americans are paying, eh, a liar kozinkin?
    1. 0
      11 August 2018 14: 39
      Quote: RuSFr
      Why did Tymoshenko give the admiral the 1 directive, although there were different people's commissariats.

      Familiarize (give read) and authorize (approve) - these are two big differences. One People’s Commissariat HAD THE LAW, and sometimes, for example, in the case under consideration, WAS OBLIGED to acquaint with his document another People’s Commissar, but HAD NO RIGHTS to authorize actions of another people's commissariat. And now - the same.
      1. VS
        -3
        13 August 2018 06: 22
        you are too smart but complicated veschi for violent fans of the ladies issued)))
    2. VS
      -2
      11 August 2018 15: 30
      BECAUSE it was OBLIGED to do this - it was also addressed to him and Kuznetsov at the meeting with Stalin was not on the evening of the 21st)))
  30. +4
    11 August 2018 10: 03
    Quote: V.S.
    at the same time, and the Air Force and Air Defense entered No. 2 - contrary to the tyrant)))

    Kozinkin is lying again. Lying on a lie and driving a lie. Bring any document on air defense (except the Baltic states), which indicates readiness 2 for air defense. A document, not your stupid thoughts and conjectures. And do not refer to your military experience. Warehouse rat you. A lying, ratty rat. If you submit the documents, I’ll apologize right here.
    But you have no fact, liar kozinkin
    1. VS
      -3
      11 August 2018 15: 32
      and I won’t think about it ..)) PSYCHAM I have not yet given evidence)))
  31. +4
    11 August 2018 10: 07
    Quote: V.S.
    actually - THEY CALLED AT THESE hours in the district))) Zhukov - at KOVO at midnight - pass the directive to the army faster)))

    Quote what they said. Or do not know, liar kozinkin
    1. -1
      11 August 2018 14: 49
      Quote: RuSFr
      Quote what they said.

      Please, from the article:
      When the PT with the text of the Directive No. 1 arrived at the SHO of the ZapOVO headquarters, the district leadership was already waiting for its arrival.

      Who else, besides Zhukov and Timoshenko, could have warned the command of the district: "Wait for a particularly important directive and immediately transmit it to the army" ?!
      1. VS
        -4
        13 August 2018 06: 28
        It was something like this - the operational and responsible duty officers on duty at the Zhukov command naturally notified the district - Wait for an important encryption. Zakharov received this indication at 22 o’clock. Those. - Zhukov DIRECTLY from Stalin’s office and gave an operational command - notify the district urgently about an important encryption)))
        At 23 o’clock Tymoshenko called the ODVO EXACTLY - there are memoirs for this from Cherevichenko and Zhukov at precisely 24.00:XNUMX called exactly KOVO)))
        Also, Zhukov, even before visiting Stalin, phoned the district - there will be an attack - everyone should be at headquarters)) In the answers of the commanders Pokrovsky this is about the fact that they had already been warned all evening, but Madame was rubbing nonsense that the attack was not expected and she was not interested in such words of the commanders) )))
    2. VS
      -5
      11 August 2018 15: 31
      find in Zhukov’s memoirs and prove that HE LIES)))
  32. +2
    11 August 2018 10: 09
    Quote: V.S.
    The TEXT was written in Stalin’s office at 22 p.m. and there he corrected IMMEDIATELY))) Instead of the brought-in directive, Zhukov’s billet - for ENTERING PP)))

    Any evidence other than Zhukov’s memoirs, liar kozinkin
    Have you ever seen documents besides gossip ??
    1. -2
      11 August 2018 14: 51
      Quote: RuSFr
      Any evidence other than Zhukov’s memoirs,

      Do not recognize inconvenient evidence? What a hackneyed way of falsification!
    2. VS
      -4
      11 August 2018 15: 34
      and how do you imagine this ??))) Madame in general, NO evidence that the text was not written by Stalin did not lead - ignoring Zhukov’s words about it in general)))
  33. +3
    11 August 2018 10: 26
    Quote: V.S.
    Departure of district headquarters to field CPs is common

    the departure of the district headquarters contrary to the cover plans was planned much earlier than June 22 and the date of the final deployment there later than June 22.
    How do you write books, liar kozinkin if you don’t know such elementary things
    who is interested in your bret reads except for children ?????
    maybe at least three from the site will intercede for you - I’m sorry, I’ll apologize
    1. VS
      -5
      11 August 2018 15: 35
      calm down wise guy - the date for the departure of field CPs was EVERYTHING - to be ready on June 22.)) Only Minsk was given - June 23)))
  34. +4
    11 August 2018 10: 27
    Quote: V.S.
    And - SO GKZH canceled the increased B.G. for air defense PribOVO or only dimming screaming at Kuznetsov ??)

    Where are the facts that besides the Baltic states there was a readiness of two for air defense? Facts, a liar is not your words, but excerpts from documents or memoirs (from your books do not give me nonsense
    Facts liar kozinkin !!!!!!!!!
    1. VS
      -4
      11 August 2018 15: 36
      so cho - canceled bg. for air defense bugs Riga or not ??)))
  35. +3
    11 August 2018 10: 31
    Quote: V.S.
    So, on what grounds and for what twenty-two border divisions were withdrawn according to the cover plans from June 8-12 and 18 - if no one was waiting for the attack on the 22nd ??)))

    WHAT DOES GKZH proposed to Stalin in THESE days to do - what directive did he bring him on June 11 and brought it to him by 20.45 on June 21 ??


    They went to the border in the second echelons and many were not taken into account in the cover plans. Bring the documents, liar kozinkin, where they walked in accordance with cover plans, rear rat.

    Bring documents that the beetles brought the same directive on June 11 and if you can come up with a text, liar kozinkin
    Just do not refer to the words from Zhukov’s memoirs. Otherwise, there and with the defector there all the traitors border guards confused))))
    Facts, Not Stupid Versions
    1. VS
      -4
      11 August 2018 15: 39
      read the railway border guard divisions wise guy crazy))) in KOVO THEY started on June 12 and started)))

      Understand for starters WHAT directive Zhukov carried to Stalin on June 11 and 21)) I’ll tell you - this is not something that went to the okrug at 0.30 on June 22))

      And Zhukov about this did not write in his memoirs - from the word sapsem)))

      Remember the wise guy - I do not compose versions, unlike stupid ladies and cutters - from the word sapsem)))
  36. +2
    11 August 2018 10: 32
    Quote: V.S.
    SO EXCEPT ME, no one here is discussing your strange anonymous writings))) except for me with my analysis of this anonymous nonsense, a man of heels will drop by)

    In a fool, patients also go and stick to everyone with their idiotic ideas? Does anyone healthy, besides the attending physician, argue with them ???? Why argue with a dumb - he is a dumb storekeeper))))))))))
    1. +2
      18 August 2018 09: 34
      Please note, Kozinkin, that in a week not a single person defended you or put me in my place for insults. I reread all your comments starting from the 4th part. Everyone who argued with you stopped the polemic - they don’t argue with the patient, right?
      1. VS
        -3
        18 August 2018 13: 49
        Well this is what courage you need to have - RETREAT ALL my words)))
        Alas - those who wanted to - asked me for details and some asked me to send them what I wrote on THESE events ... but you didn’t notice)) Well, what you behaved like - your problems - do not touch it and it doesn’t smell)))
  37. +1
    11 August 2018 10: 35
    Quote: V.S.
    OdVO - ALL of their border areas since 8 June have been brought along the border crossing point to the border

    Do not lie kozinkin. NOT ALL. Look in the books you can see that you're lying))))
    1. VS
      -1
      11 August 2018 15: 40
      there are FIVE of them there, and ALL of them were on the PP after 8 June put into the main defense zone))
  38. +3
    11 August 2018 10: 40
    Quote: V.S.
    According to the PP, the troops with the beginning of the conduct of the ZhBD do not withdraw troops from June 12 WITHOUT the order of NPOs

    Are you generally not friends with your head or is it a woman’s tantrum ?????
    In KOVO, the units went to the border and did not know that they were being guided according to cover plans, as you write. Turn on your head if there are convolutions besides your ass, how they began to keep military journals, knowing that they were going to camps to the border. Even the division commanders did not know this, and the magazines in the headquarters kept .. How ??????????
    Bring the documents, we will think what you saw there ......
    But you don’t have a small fact, liar kozinkin. You saw something and attached it to your version.
    Where are the facts that the KOVO divisions knew that they were following cover plans, where is the mention of these divisions in the cover plans themselves, which they sent to Moscow, where is the indication for the introduction of magazines?
    Where the facts are the bragging Olga Yuryevna. You don’t pull on a man, you wave your tongue like a broomstick too much
    1. VS
      -5
      11 August 2018 15: 42
      Darago psycho - in KOVO the divisional officers who wrote their ZhBD did not know that they were deduced by PP - in THEIR areas on the BORDER ?? ))) Blow into the archive and study those ZhBD)))

      If you weren’t a haml - I would have brought these ZhBD)))
  39. 0
    11 August 2018 10: 41
    Quote: V.S.
    "" The military-political leadership of the country thought: "

    and again the lady composes - who is there who "thought"))) spiritualist sucks)))

    you can’t even think, the gyrus is overgrown with fat
    1. VS
      -1
      11 August 2018 15: 42
      I'm glad that you showed yourself to the end))) maladets)))
  40. +3
    11 August 2018 12: 25
    the leadership of the spacecraft did not expect the outbreak of war at the dawn of 22 on June 1941, and so far we have not encountered a single fact indicating the opposite ...

    Maybe it was 22 of June and did not expect a blow. But on the whole, everyone knew that there would be a war and were preparing hard. That is, in the strategic plan, surprise did not happen, but in the tactical plan, the blow was delivered suddenly.
    1. VS
      -4
      11 August 2018 15: 45
      waited on the 22nd .. waited .. so all the activities were done under this attack)))

      There was NO suddenness from this attack, the more and the more unexpected it was not)) So in the so-called deer. 1 and wrote - maybe a SUDDEN attack - and this was written BEFORE the attack yet)))

      And the fact that the attack will be exactly SUCH - "sudden" - was discussed in December 40 by the military)))
      1. +4
        11 August 2018 19: 24
        Quote: V.S.
        There was NO suddenness from this attack, the more and the more unexpected it was not)) So in the so-called deer. 1 and wrote - maybe a SUDDEN attack - and this was written BEFORE the attack yet)))
        And the fact that the attack will be exactly SUCH - "sudden" - was discussed in December 40 by the military)))

        It is rather a philosophical question, "Didn't you expect an attack from the word" in general ", or" Didn't you expect such a defeat in the Battle of the Border? "
        Most adequate researchers are inclined to the second version of the question, since alongside forces and degree of readiness, not to mention the concentration of forces in the directions of the main attack, the Wehrmacht was head and shoulders above the Red Army. What can be seen from the example of the battles in July-August 1943 on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge - there you can't blame the Red Army leadership for some kind of myopia. And, nevertheless, based on the results of Operation Citadel, Kutuzov and Rumyantsev, we can conclude that the Red Army won tactically. And the final loss ratio of 1: 3 is not in favor of the Red Army. Proceeding only from this, we can conclude that by June 41st tactically the Wehrmacht was at a much higher level, and to make hasty conclusions based on 17 publications that the generals of the Red Army did not expect an attack, smells if not delirium, then ... lol
        1. +1
          12 August 2018 14: 07
          Quote: stalkerwalker
          The Wehrmacht was head and shoulders above the Red Army. What can be seen from the example of the battles in July-August 1943 on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge - there you can't blame the Red Army leadership for some kind of myopia. And, nevertheless, based on the results of Operation Citadel, Kutuzov and Rumyantsev, we can conclude that the Red Army won tactically.


          I may not understand your pun, but on the Kursk Germans and tactically. and quickly and strategically oboros .... smiling.

          And in 1941, due to the lack of a power supply and a prepared reserve, the Germans (who were really not ready for a war with us) were very lucky.
          1. +2
            12 August 2018 14: 33
            Quote: chenia
            I may not understand your pun, but on the Kursk Germans and tactically. and quickly and strategically oboros .... smiling.

            Come on ... Don’t joke ....
            Tactically, the Red Army repelled the convergent attacks of the Wehrmacht from the north and south of Kursk. And if no strong collisions were observed in the Central Front, the situation under Prokhorovka on the 12 of July of the 43 and in the following 2 of the day remained in an unstable state. Ultimately, the shock fist in the form of a TD SS under the command of Hausser was dismantled and transferred to the Donbass.
            The results of the operation "Kutuzov" can be characterized as positive - Oryol was freed and went to the Hagen line. But it was not possible to defeat Model. It turned out to be pushing out. The losses of the Red Army both in battles in Operation Citadel, as well as in Kutuzov and in Rumyantsev, significantly exceed the losses of the Wehrmacht.
            Operation "Rumyantsev" also ended well tactically. But in the course of its development, “grandmaster” Vatutin received a scolding from Headquarters, since Manstein had a chance to repeat March 43 again. Losses of 5-GvTA Rotmistrov from July to the end of August 43 are off scale. This is not widely discussed. But the number of lost b / t is approximately equal to 200% of the original composition on 11.07.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX.
            It wasn’t particularly fun with the flyers. Especially in the early days of the battle of 5-7 on July 1943. But that's another story.....
            1. +1
              12 August 2018 15: 15
              Quote: stalkerwalker
              Come on ... Don’t joke ..


              Yes, what a joke. Were there serious fears that our defense could not stand it?

              The only reason for this, an event more than a year ago, the Crimean catastrophe, when something happened that, in principle, could not have happened.
              And ours perebdili - created nine army lines (the Germans on the southern front took only two).

              You do not consider each army or even front-line operation separately.

              The Germans prepared the operation in a strategic direction, created a group for this (massing forces and means), And ....

              They did not have the strength to hold the captured lines.
              They did not have the strength to keep the original.
              They did not have the strength to hold the intermediate.
              They did not have the strength to keep the super-profitable line-Dnepr
              They did not have enough strength to stop the advance of the "broken" Voronezh front (so broken that it even lost its name), after the Dnieper, as much as a hundred kilometers away (our Zhitomir was taken - though it was already at its end. Then we had to leave). And while the Germans have minimal losses?
              And where did the bunch of troops gathered for the strategic offensive go? I ask you not to mention Italy, not that case.

              For four months, 500 km (yes, it wasn’t too much for the summer in 1941, the pace was twice as high), and this is called the triumph of German military thought - superiority in operational and strategic terms.
              Well, then came 1944 year.

              Well, who is joking?
              1. +1
                12 August 2018 19: 01
                Quote: chenia
                They did not have enough strength to stop the advance of the "broken" Voronezh front (so broken that it even lost its name), after the Dnieper, as much as a hundred kilometers away (our Zhitomir was taken - though it was already at its end. Then we had to leave). And while the Germans have minimal losses?

                Quote: stalkerwalker
                Prokhorovka 12 July 43-th and the next 2 day remained in an unstable state. Ultimately, the shock fist in the form of a TD SS under the command of Hausser was dismantled and transferred to the Donbass.

                After the withdrawal of the Wehrmacht to the starting lines on the site of the Voronezh Front, a pause stretched to the 03.08.43. Both sides were preparing for battle. There was an accumulation of reserves. Reserves from the Steppe Front were allocated to Vatutin. Panzerwaffen had the opportunity to restore tanks damaged in battle. And get a recharge. Soviet tanks left behind in the rear of the Germans were waiting for a sad fate.
                The fighting over the capture of Kharkov was of the fiercest nature. Manstein also managed to spoil the blood of Vatutitna. As a result, the Kempf group was not destroyed, but left Kharkov.
                General losses of the Western, Bryansk and Central fronts for period july-august made up 439 890 people, including 112 529 people - killed and missing.
                According to Soviet data, from 21 to 31 of August 1943 Rotmistrov’s army lost 114 T-34 and 15 T-70. Losing more was simply difficult due to the fact that on 25 August 5-I Guards. The tank army consisted of 111 tanks (97 T-34 and 14 T-70).
                According to 10-day loss reports, The Voronezh Front during the period from 1 to 20 August lost only 79 313 people, including 14 111 people killed and 5899 missing. A significant proportion of the missing is explained by several tactical environments, in particular near Kotelva. Losses were distributed approximately equally between the armies of the front. The 5-I Guards Army lost from 1 to 20 August 14 516 people killed, wounded and missing, 6-I Guards Army - 14 411 people, 27-I Army, 12 576 people, 38-X Army, 12-I army - 573 40 people. The 14 Army, once again engaged in battle, managed to lose 102 people, the 47 Army of Guards - 5300 people. The 4-I tank army lost 460 people during the same period. The steppe front lost 3 23 people from 98 to 273 on August, including 23 272 people killed and missing.
                The German 8 Army (Kempf Army Group) lost 1 people killed, 31 4496 wounded, and 18 missing from 614 to 2703 on August. Accordingly, the 4-I tank army lost 5658 killed, 13 712 wounded and 6541 missing during the same period. And that is in brief.
                Quote: chenia
                Well, then came 1944 year.

                Before the 44th was the 43rd. And the operation "Bagration" was preceded by the "Russian Verdun".
                Unsuccessful operations in the Western direction in the winter of 1943 / 44 were shy. Through the cliches “secretly” in the inventory of the operational department of the Western Front, densely instructed in a period spanning several months, this feeling is visible. It was not without reason that, by 1944, the training of troops should reach a level high enough to prevent annoying mistakes in the preparation of offensive operations. Nevertheless, over these very few months, one of the sections of the Soviet-German front turned into Verdun and the Somme.

                What jokes are there ...
                1. +1
                  12 August 2018 20: 05
                  Quote: stalkerwalker
                  The fighting over the capture of Kharkov was of the fiercest nature. Manstein also managed to spoil the blood of Vatutitna. As a result, the Kempf group was not destroyed, but left Kharkov.


                  Actually, the Hans were supposed to surround part of the forces of the CF and VF and advance east at least 150 km, and not spoil the blood. And for this there was a calculation of forces and means, and for this a powerful group was created. Where did she go? Enough for something to spoil the blood?
                  The fact that the Germans knew how to fight convinced me is not necessary, just to be able to push the Germans for FOUR months per 500 km (and the Dnieper did not help), this is an indicator of the skill level of our army.
                  And about the losses, the Germans are lying in black, otherwise you can’t explain why they flew off like that.
                  Well, there are no minimal losses, but they dope fun and quickly (the general pace of our advance in this direction is not very weak).
                  You don't feel inconsistencies.

                  Can you imagine if in 1941 the Army Group Center (comparable groups) broke through the SF (although by this time it was mobilized and with combat coordination) 40 km and flew 500 km (albeit in four months), what superiority in tactics, operational and strategy could speak.


                  Quote: stalkerwalker
                  Westbound in the winter of 1943/44 hesitated


                  Well, in the South, it went very badly there, and the muddy way did not help, and this is on the black soil.
            2. +2
              8 November 2018 18: 07
              The ratio of losses in tanks and self-propelled guns in the Battle of Kursk was about 2 to 1 - but they also had heavy "Tigers" and "Ferdinands" with 88-mm cannons and Zeiss optics. And the most experienced powerful and high-quality artillery. And our entire 1942 was on starvation rations, partly still used the shells of 1902-1917, having lost in 1941 60% of the pre-war ammunition stock. If we add the losses in tanks in 1941 - more than 14000 out of 17000 in the West and losses in guns and mortars in 1941 - approx. 35 thousand out of 55 thousand barrels, and 80% of aviation losses (our wooden, about 8000 out of 10000 aircraft), with regular crews and crews, the ratio of losses in the Battle of Kursk was our best result in 2 years of a terrible war. This is despite the fact that the actual Tank Field near Prokhorovka in July 1943 remained under the Germans with new captured, albeit wrecked, T-34-76 / 85 tanks. The ratios of losses in 1941 were TENS. For 2 years, the Red Army has learned to fight the Germans almost on equal terms, despite the weaker weapons and equipment.
        2. VS
          -3
          13 August 2018 06: 32
          bravo)) maladets))))
          As Molotov said - They knew that we would retreat .. We did not know only dokudova - to Smolensk or to Moscow (((
  41. -1
    11 August 2018 13: 35
    The author - the western VOs of the Red Army as of mid-June 1941 were no longer in business, instead of them fronts were formed - operative bulletin No. 01 of the General Staff of the Red Army at 10-00 22.6.41: "NWF ... ZF".

    As for the post-war Soviet memories of the eve of and the beginning of the war, the surviving commanders and chiefs of staff of divisions, corps and armies of the Red Army, they all cheat as one - otherwise they would be demoted in an instant and go to court to recognize the true reasons for the failed 1941 company of the year.
    1. VS
      -2
      11 August 2018 15: 46
      In the answers to Pokrovsky ?? And they lied too .. but not very)))
  42. -10
    11 August 2018 16: 35
    It is very interesting to wade through the wilds of "noodles" ..
    For a long time I understand that the picture is "crooked".
    The author is "+" and I look forward to the deal further ..
    1. VS
      -3
      13 August 2018 06: 36
      intellectually - it is necessary to read DIFFERENT authors ...)) And especially not those that are nonsense in a couple of reports - STALIN thought it was thought))) And all the more so as in spite of the tyrant good people met the initiative war and others - initiatively contrary Stalin)))
      1. +2
        18 August 2018 09: 19
        Olga Yuryevna, your arithmetic is very tight
        What are a couple of bulletins? There are dozens of them in the materials.
        1. VS
          -4
          18 August 2018 13: 55
          there were hundreds and thousands of reports)))
    2. +2
      18 August 2018 09: 20
      Quote: Shturman_50
      It is very interesting to wade through the wilds of "noodles" ..
      For a long time I understand that the picture is "crooked"

      Same position your right
      The author also expresses his opinion, and not a new official theory
      1. VS
        -4
        18 August 2018 13: 56
        "" The author also expresses his opinion, and not a new official theory
        Reply""

        actually - that imposes the OLD in a new package and that the OFFICIAL theory - Stalin did not believe in attack and the attack was unexpected for him))) Bullshit in general)))
  43. -7
    11 August 2018 17: 55
    In June 1941, the following communication schemes existed between the General Staff and military districts:

    1) using cipher machines - individual between two addressees;

    This is nonsense - communication between the General Staff and the districts was carried out using Bodo or ST-35 devices, and no direct use of ciphers was provided, if only because of the interference distortions inherent in overhead communication lines, automatic decryption simply could not be performed, because . There is always a limit on the percentage tolerance of incorrectly received characters.
    Perhaps the requirement for the machine to establish encryption communications between the two recipients was laid down in the terms of reference for development.

    And this is nonsense, because the main factor affecting the automation of the processing of encrypted information is not the technical capabilities of the equipment itself, but the level of noise immunity of communication channels. Only if it is high enough can automated encryption-decryption systems be created, otherwise everything is wasted.
    1. +3
      18 August 2018 09: 18
      Quote: ccsr
      This is nonsense - communication between the General Staff and the districts was carried out using Bodo or ST-35 devices, and no direct use of ciphers was provided

      Sorry, but you write complete nonsense
      There are communication schemes between communication nodes. It is about her that you write.
      There are communication schemes between cipher agencies, which indicate the main, spare and spare reserve, adherent or individual (using a manual or machine cipher), signals for which a spare communication scheme is entered, and much more. Why assert confidently that which you do not understand ??
      1. -6
        20 August 2018 19: 31
        Quote: RuSFr
        There are communication schemes between communication nodes. It is about her that you write.

        At that time, it determined the order of passage and processing of encrypted telegrams. The author writes:
        In June 1941, the following communication schemes existed between the General Staff and military districts:
        using ciphers - individual between two recipients;

        The words "SCHEME OF COMMUNICATION GSH" you apparently could not understand correctly, and climbed into the bottle, although it is obvious that the author does not understand at all what he is writing about.

        Quote: RuSFr
        There are communication schemes between cipher agencies, which indicate the main, spare and spare reserve, adherent or individual (using a manual or machine cipher), signals for which a spare communication scheme is entered, and much more.

        What kind of machine encryption in 1941 can you talk about if it was impossible to automate decryption at that time?
        Yes, and at that time there were no extra people in the cipher agencies to work directly with the cipher agencies of the recipients, especially taking into account the low noise immunity of the telegraph communication channels and to conduct a long-term exchange of encrypted groups until they were all correctly received. Do you even understand why they share cryptographers and telegraph operators? And what is the reverse check, which is required when the number of groups does not match, or more spaces in the groups.
        It seems you have a vague idea of ​​what is at stake, although you imagine yourself a specialist - apparently you think that the cipherorgan has too much staff, but this is not so.
        Quote: RuSFr
        Why assert confidently that which you do not understand ??

        And you are very versed in why, in later Soviet times, along with encryption technology, the ZAS telegraph technique was used, which in its cryptographic strength was not inferior to encryption technology?
  44. +8
    11 August 2018 22: 01
    You, dear debaters, are not surprised. that in the archives of TsAMO, there are no documents from the period from 2.06.41. until 20.06.41yy NGO and General Staff.? Where did the directives and documents of this period disappear to, to the special fund under the "Sov.secretno" stamp, or were they seized and destroyed? Are the party documents of the Central Committee the same? Maybe it was profitable for someone ("Kukuruznik", GKZh, Timoshenko and other many stellar and responsible representatives of NGOs and General Staff), some did not expect the type, and the other "tyrant" did not believe, did not allow to raise troops? What would fit into their version? And the "tyrant" is to blame, and they are white and fluffy, they warned, demanded, but he did not give the "tyrant" and that was all (not the head of the USSR, but a tyrant, and even stubborn!) ..
    And such a strange phrase of the chief of the General Staff "... we did not expect that the enemy would go on the offensive in large motorized groups in all strategic directions on the first day of the war", isn't this where the dog is buried? A decisive mistake of the NKO and the General Staff! And to admit the blame for this, in the death of almost 70% of the cadre army in the west, the winners do not want to! And to bear responsibility for this ... And it does not matter whether they managed to raise troops or not (according to the cover plan of 5 divisions of the ZAPOVO, 7 divisions KOVO and 4 SZOVO) did not decide anything, they were destined to die .... but they could not stop the Wehrmacht, as well as cover the deployment, the forces were not commensurate. And that's why they did not expect it ..... From the analysis of the actions of the Wehrmacht for 1939-1940, this should have been expected in the first place, it was not in vain that the "tyrant" said "NGOs and the General Staff still do not know how to repel the blow of the Germans by the peacetime army" as he looked into the water (and it was in December 1940). And they could not ... And all the tales about suddenness, not readiness, etc. from the evil one. A strategic mistake in the cover plans, the replacement of mobile and active defense, which provides for a retreat of up to 300 km, for a rigid and stationary one .... who is to blame ("every mistake has a title and surname ..." I.S. Stalin)? And Isn't that the point? "Tyrant" never forgot anything!
    1. VS
      -3
      13 August 2018 06: 38
      Bravo)) Maladets)))
  45. +9
    11 August 2018 22: 47
    Thanks! Suvorov-Corned beef spinning in their coffins. Or where these "historians still live there."
    Very impressive stuff
    1. +2
      18 August 2018 09: 27
      I agree with your opinion, Artemon
  46. +2
    11 August 2018 23: 20
    Quote: V.S.
    waited on the 22nd .. waited .. so all the activities were done under this attack)))


    Well, wait, so what?

    Yes, bring the troops into full battlefield, and even having carried out the combat formation according to the cover plan, it would be what it was.

    It is clear that Stalin has nothing to do with it. But the guys with shoulder straps are very (Meretsky in the dungeons of the NKVD was pressed correctly, it would be necessary for Zhukov).

    But on the other hand, the fact that the Germans were not ready for war in 1941 was determined by the GRU to be absolutely true — even with the most favorable option, the Germans were obnoxious.

    And they didn’t know exactly what the war would be (in June) or a major provocation (as with Japan, but more), but the events really began to be held at the end of the first decade of June.

    A dispute about what?
    If the reasons are, this is about the zero level of combat training of our troops, and this is the full responsibility of commanders and commanders.
    1. VS
      -3
      13 August 2018 06: 43
      Not certainly in that way. Bringing to b..g and the military crushed into memoirs what the reason was for THIS reason — a tyrant supposedly didn’t give them troops in b .. g in advance and even on the night of the attack — it ensured the organized and inevitable withdrawal of troops and not their extermination in the sleeping barracks of Brest or on marches.
      The main reason is the adventure plan of the General Staff chosen by Zhukov and others in case of war ..
      What is the plan? Our IMMEDIATE RESPONSE offensive in the event of an attack by Germany ... From KOVO according to the minority forces of the enemy ...

      All this has long been described by Zakharov and in "lessons and conclusions"))) True, these works were classified for 20 years)))
      1. +2
        13 August 2018 09: 53
        Quote: V.S.
        The main reason is the adventure plan of the General Staff chosen by Zhukov and others in case of war ..


        I agree, but the construction of cover troops, where in the first operative was concentrated 2/3 of the forces. this is thanks to Meretskov (I said that it was not in vain that they pressed him). But Zhukov developed this idea, he decided it would be like with the Japanese, we’ll strike and the adversary will reconcile (here we must also take into account that it was more believed that a major provocation was possible, and not a full-scale war).
        Permanent organizational measures (leapfrog with staff, with staff, constant enlargement) buried BP. A deployment of 30 MK is generally stupid (even Meretskov objected here, and in his memoirs Zhukov himself was surprised. There were so many tank formations, like he wasn’t involved).

        But on the other hand, if the Red Army sample of 1944 (level of control and execution, secrecy of events, reconnaissance. Interaction, organization of marches) would take this strike, even with that balance of forces (and we were superior in means), it could have passed - but this is so by the way, about the level of combat skill.
        1. VS
          -4
          14 August 2018 08: 14
          "" the formation of covering troops, where 2/3 of the forces were concentrated in the first operational. "

          - TOTAL border divisions were 41 pieces - ON ALL border - That is, up to 50 km on average per division on the border (((

          41 border protection division for 4 districts is not 2/3 of ALL districts forces (((

          Meretskov and stretched SO divisions. Left so many divisions on the border = to have the strength for our offensive in the event of a war with Germany)))
          Meretskov was a supporter of a preemptive strike, but Stalin could not do this from September 41)) However, Zhukov was a dashing grunt and also dreamed of preemptive strikes (((And it was precisely Zhukov who came up with the idea of ​​turning the idea of ​​a preventive strike into the idea of ​​an immediate RESPONSE strike - from Ukraine ...
  47. +7
    12 August 2018 00: 03
    And you, dear debaters, are not worried that there are no documents in the TsAMO archives for the period 02.06.41. on 20.06.41/20/1941 NGOs and the General Staff? What is it beneficial for someone? Those who were pouring mud on Stalin from the rostrum of the XNUMXth congress? And others were keeping quiet? Those who invented a lie about surprise and unpreparedness, who were truly responsible for the tragedy of the western districts of XNUMX?
    And everything is very simple and logical. These documents are either hidden under the "SS" stamp or destroyed, which would correspond to the suddenness and unavailability. Isn't that why the Pavlovs, Korobkovs, etc. were acquitted? And they never made it to the main ones!
    It was not for nothing that Stalin said - "The NGOs and the General Staff do not know how to repel the blow of the Germans with the peacetime army." they looked into the water. And they did not reflect .. NCOs and General Staff made a strategic mistake and were not going to admit it, as the winners! And who will be responsible for the defeat of the western districts, for the death of hundreds of thousands of soldiers ?!
    Isn't the phrase of the chief of the General Staff surprising - "we did not expect that the enemy would immediately throw such a mass of armored troops in all strategic directions on the first day of the war", but what did you expect? An analysis of the actions of the Wehrmacht in 1939-1940, which brought him victories in the west and east, spoke of just such a development of events, and not otherwise. Is this not the reason the dog is buried? A strategic mistake in the development of cover plans? Who is guilty of replacing the plans of active and flexible defense, providing for a retreat of 300 km, for a rigid and stationary one? And it did not decide whether they had time to raise the troops or not, the result is natural. Could the first echelon cover the troops for deployment, 5 divisions of the Western Military District, 7 divisions of the KOVO and 4 divisions of the Northwest Military District, what could they? Only perish. The forces are too incomparable. And the idiotic directive number 2 ?! Without taking into account the state and capabilities of the troops, not knowing the forces of the enemy? And they remembered Stalin's words- “every mistake has a title and a surname!” Therefore, the whole talking shop is about suddenness and unpreparedness from the evil one!
    And finally, "who said that the winners are not judged ......" Stalin.
    1. +2
      18 August 2018 09: 13
      Alarming
      I do not think that such documents can be destroyed - there will not be enough authority.
      And can be stored in special conditions
  48. GAF
    0
    12 August 2018 01: 19
    "8. Knowing that our army was unprepared for war, Stalin could not even admit the thought of a first strike on the mobilized German troops located near the border."
    A lot of effort was made to delay the start of the war and gain time, so necessary to complete the reorganization of the spacecraft, but it did not work out.
    Testimony of the other side of the important in every way the first week of the war.
    Halder DIARY start
    22 June 1941 g. “The offensive of our troops, apparently, was for the enemy on the whole front a complete tactical surprise.
    The border bridges across the Bug and other rivers are everywhere captured by our troops without a fight in complete safety. The complete surprise of our attack for the enemy is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in the barracks, the planes stood at the airfields, covered with tarpaulin, and the advanced units attacked by our troops asked the command about what to do. We can expect an even greater influence of the element of surprise on the further course of events as a result of the rapid advancement of our moving parts, ... "
    However:
    24.06: “The enemy in the border strip almost everywhere showed resistance. If he did not quite imagine the situation, then this was the result of tactical surprise, which led to the fact that the enemy’s resistance was disorganized, fragmented and therefore ineffective. ”
    25.06/XNUMX. “The enemy is organizing to retreat, covering the withdrawal with tank formations, and at the same time transferring large masses of troops from the north to the Western Dvina ...”
    26.06/XNUMX. “The enemy, acting against Army Group South, has a firm and energetic leadership ... At the front of Army Group Center, there is strong pressure from the enemy trying to break out of the sack in the Białystok area.”
    To close the holes in the bags, it was necessary to distract from the attack on the East the connection of the tank groups of Goth and Guderian. In the presence of competent command, individual units managed to get out of the environment. The division under the command of Galitsky, having traveled over 500 km across the rear of the enemy and leaving heavy weapons due to the loss of fuel and ammunition in the battles, went to his full strength, replenishing on his way groups of retreating from the encirclement.
    28.06/4. “At the front of Army Group Center, as a result of desperate attempts by the enemy to get out of the encirclement, the situation in a number of sectors has seriously deteriorated. This forced the 12th Army to send the 9th Army Corps to the north. And the 5th Army to abandon the XNUMXth Army Corps in a southerly direction.
    "A small number of prisoners are characteristic of all sectors of the front, along with a very large number of captured property."
    29.06/6. “Information from the front confirms that Russians everywhere fight to the last man. They only surrender in places, primarily where there is a large percentage of Mongolian nationalities in the troops (in front of the 9th and XNUMXth armies). It is striking that when capturing artillery batteries, etc. only a few are surrendered. Some Russians fight until they are killed, others flee, throw off uniform uniforms and try to get out of the encirclement under the guise of peasants. The morale of our troops is everywhere regarded as good, even where it was necessary to conduct heavy fighting. Horses are extremely exhausted. ”
    Ott General Inspector of Infantry reported on his impressions of the battle in the Grodno area. The stubborn resistance of the Russians forces us to fight according to all the rules of our combat manuals. In Poland and in the West, we could allow ourselves certain liberties and deviations from statutory principles; now this is unacceptable. "
    The first week of the outbreak of the war determined its outcome.
  49. +2
    17 August 2018 11: 48
    I put the article a plus, but ... the impression is that the author often provokes the "peaceful" population of this site.
    Or is he a purely military man?
    The mere mention of the "private initiative" of the command in the border districts before the start of the war - throws any military man into a fierce rage and a desire to give a shtafirka on ... "you will be waist-deep" ... from behind.
    The Red Army, dear man, this is not APU today. Although even modern stubborn ones are unlikely to make such a decision on their own.

    The author would "only clarify" that according to intelligence:
    "What kind of massive strikes into the depths of the German aviation can we talk about with such small forces ..."
    And this is when the Germans launched massive raids on Minsk, Kiev, naval bases!
    Sitting under the bombing in Minsk comrade Pavlov firmly believed in these opuses? Especially comrade Stalin receiving information about the bombing of cities and this report on the inability of the Germans to such raids?
    And you think you can believe your conclusions? Probably the same as these reports.
    1. +3
      17 August 2018 11: 59
      Sitting under the bombing in Minsk comrade Pavlov firmly believed in these opuses?

      for some completely incomprehensible reasons, Pavlov for the first two weeks thought that his entire ZVO (with 4 tank corps, by the way) was attacked by only 2 German divisions - this is reflected in the documents. His opinion changed only when the German headquarters documents were captured, where more was stupidly drawn. I cannot understand HOW Pavlov could argue his so erroneous conclusions. How could he not have noticed for weeks already two tank groups of troops. Therefore, it’s difficult to even guess what he thought in Minsk, because I did not find any logic in his thoughts.
      1. -8
        31 August 2018 18: 48
        Quote: yehat
        for some completely incomprehensible reasons, Pavlov for the first two weeks thought that his entire ZVO (with 4 tank corps, by the way) was attacked by only 2 German divisions - this is reflected in the documents.

        This is a lie - Pavlov received information about the enemy not only from his commanders and intelligence agencies, but also through neighbors and higher command. It is not clear in what documents the author found such stupidity about two divisions.
  50. +1
    17 August 2018 16: 53
    Almost sure - everyone knew and understood everything. From a simple regiment to the Supreme. But they acted in accordance with the prevailing atmosphere of those years and their own sense of security.
    Why did some RO have accurate data and reported to the top, while others "did not know and knew nothing"? Put yourself in the place of the regiment commander: I will report, and tomorrow the organs will arrive and they will arrest me as an alarmist and provocateur. And if I don't report, nothing will happen ... and whether the war starts or not ... it will be seen there.
    The higher commanders reasoned in approximately the same way.
    Even after receiving a "strict" directive on bringing troops to BG - Who signed it? Zhukov with Tymoshenko ... so what? Yesterday they imprisoned or shot some of the highest spies ... tomorrow they will also imprison these. And so that I would not be raked in for executing "criminal" orders ... if I go on vacation, or sit in the theater. And tomorrow we will see.
    Of course, if the Orders were signed by the Supreme himself, everything would be different.
    Only the most without warlords (now they would say cool) would really prepare to repel the enemy - withdraw troops, occupy launchers and so on. There were not many of them, but perhaps it was they who saved the country as a result.
    1. VS
      -6
      18 August 2018 14: 03
      "" Only the most without tower commanders (now they would say - tough) began to really prepare to repel the enemy - to withdraw troops, occupy the launcher, and so on. There weren't many of them, but perhaps they were the ones who saved the country in the end. ""

      -)) STUPID))))

      "" The mere mention of the "private initiative" of the command in the border districts before the start of the war - throws any military man into a fierce rage and a desire to give a shtafirka on ... "you will be waist-deep" ... behind.
      The Red Army, dear man, is not the APU of today. Although even modern stoned ones are unlikely to make such decisions on their own. ""

      we will not kick babs below the belt for her SUCH nonsense - that on the personal initiative of some brave commanders and "just good people", the divisions were withdrawn into the border zone, but ...))) but maybe sometimes it is necessary to weigh such historians in the ass )))
  51. +2
    18 August 2018 09: 23
    Quote: V.S.
    we waited for the 22nd... we waited... that’s why all the activities were done for this attack

    Olga Yuryevna, where are the facts? Post it and we'll see if we can trust them.
    You can, of course, refer to your “works”, but this is very reminiscent of the words from the famous Soviet film “While spaceships roam the expanses of the universe”
    1. VS
      -3
      18 August 2018 14: 05
      It’s better to go straight to TsAMO - and study the docks of the pre-war days YOURSELF))) You damn sure won’t believe me) and it’s not worth it)))
  52. +2
    18 August 2018 09: 26
    Quote: kunstkammer
    I’m almost sure that everyone knew and understood everything. From a simple regiment to the Supreme

    What about the opinion of the regiment commander on the Grebnev border, given in part 11?
    The topic of the attack on the USSR is somewhat painful to me. My close relative died on June 22 in the Baltic states, participating in the troops of the attacking side. It's a shame that the bastards pitted two nations against each other.
    I had to work for many years in the intelligence service of the no longer existing socialist country of the GDR. I don’t regret it, but it’s a shame that everything is repeating itself in the world again
    1. VS
      -5
      18 August 2018 14: 08
      "" My close relative died on June 22 in the Baltic states, participating in the troops of the attacking side. It's a shame that the bastards pitted two nations against each other."

      - how beautifully he said - in the troops of the attacking side (((Did YOU write so tolerantly about the German army or something? The one that killed the CIVILIAN POPULATION with great pleasure too?

      That's for sure - it would be better to remain silent sometimes...
    2. -9
      21 August 2018 15: 54
      Quote: RuSFr
      I had to work for many years in the intelligence service of the no longer existing socialist country of the GDR.

      And here you continue to work for Bundeswehr intelligence?
      By the way, the intelligence service of the GDR ceased to exist in 1989, and taking into account the words “many years,” I suspect that you are now at least near seventy. Tell us in more detail how you managed to retain your knowledge of the Russian language so well, if all the GDR intelligence officers were expelled from service, and they eked out a miserable existence, receiving a meager pension. Otherwise, one gets the impression that you too zealously set out to dig up a Russian-language site - it doesn’t happen that easily, we swam, we know...
  53. +1
    18 August 2018 09: 30
    Quote: V.S.
    If you weren't a wild boor, I would have brought these reinforced concrete vehicles

    Bring me and prove me wrong
    I have already written more than once that if you prove it, I will apologize
    Just bring the documents and we will see what you personally saw there and whether it corresponds to real things. They are warehouse people, after all, they think in terms of the rear and they don’t understand the military
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 14: 09
      go to the archives and study)))

      I have already cited these reinforced concrete structures))) they have been on the Internet for a LONG TIME)))
  54. +2
    18 August 2018 09: 32
    Quote: V.S.
    There were only FIVE of them there, and ALL of them were taken to the main defense line by PP after June 8

    Better study documents or provide facts
  55. +2
    18 August 2018 09: 39
    Quote: V.S.
    Remember, smart guy - unlike stupid ladies and idiots, I don’t make up versions - from the word sapsem

    Oh, do you have senile sclerosis??? How do you write your books????
    But what about the version about Zhukov’s call to the General Staff from Stalin’s office???? I’m asking for the fifth time: where is the confirmation of this version (which you allegedly do not make up)?
    You refer to the words of Marshal Zakharov about the call to him from the commander of the district troops at 22-00. The district commander writes about the time 23-00. At this time, the People's Commissar and the head of the General Staff had already left Stalin. And the time 23-00 fits in with the time indicated in the Zapovovo and the People's Commissar of the Navy.
    Zakharov's memory is neutralized by the memories of the commanding troops. Which one is right? But the words of the commanders about the time 23-00 are confirmed by documents.
    And you, Olga Yuryevna, write that you are not making up a version. Or do you invent them for you????
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 14: 16
      "" You refer to the words of Marshal Zakharov about the call he received from the commander of the district troops at 22-00. The district commander writes about the time 23-00"

      miracle - Zakharov writes about a call to him at 22 o'clock from Cherevichenko - who do you think could call at 22 o'clock and inform Cherevichenko that they were waiting for an important encryption message - isn't the duty officer on duty at the General Staff??)))

      "" Around 22 p.m. I was called to Bodo's office for negotiations with the commander of the district troops. He asked if I could decipher the telegram if I received it from Moscow. The commander was given the answer: that any encryption from Moscow would be read. The question followed again: “They ask again, confirm your answer, can you decipher the encryption from Moscow?” ""))

      ""Zakharov's memories are neutralized by the memories of the commanding troops.""

      WHAT DOES this have to do with memories in OTHER districts, and even more so with mythical military troops if Zakharov was in Odeskoye??))

      ""The words of the commanding troops about the time 23-00 are confirmed by documents. ""
      WHAT?? miracle)))
      It is almost impossible to confirm a call with a “document”)))
  56. +1
    18 August 2018 09: 42
    Quote: V.S.
    so cho - canceled bg. for air defense bugs Riga or not ??)))

    How can you write books, Olga Yuryevna, without knowing the facts?????????????7
    It was not canceled in PribOVO OG No. 2 after Zhukov’s encryption. It was canceled only after a second call from the People's Commissar of Defense! Eight years of writing all sorts of nonsense and not knowing such little things, how is it possible? You're a crook, Kozinkin, you're a crook.
    1. VS
      -5
      18 August 2018 14: 18
      and you can CALL the NGO and confirm that they CANCELED for the air defense of B.G. in PribOVO??))

      Alas - b..g. for air defense was not canceled in PribOVO at all))
  57. +1
    18 August 2018 09: 43
    Quote: V.S.
    calm down, smart guy - the date for departure of the field control posts was EVERYONE - June 22, be ready.)) Only Minsk was given - June 23

    So, when was this date determined? And who took the initiative on this issue?
    1. VS
      -3
      18 August 2018 14: 20
      what difference does it make if EVERYONE was determined to have June 22)))

      Read Irinarkhov about KOVO))

      "" A huge miscalculation, which significantly influenced the command and control of the district's troops in the first hours of hostilities, was made by the district command when the front's field control moved to Ternopil. Knowing the exact time of the German attack, the commander appoints the departure of the main column of headquarters for June 21, 1941. There is no way that by this time the headquarters management will already take their jobs, check and establish communications with subordinate troops. Unfortunately, this was not done by the district command."
  58. +2
    18 August 2018 09: 52
    Quote: V.S.
    and how do you imagine this??))) Madam did not provide ANY evidence at all that the text was not written by Stalin - having ignored Zhukov’s words about this altogether

    Should Zhukov’s words be taken as an axiom???? Then why don’t you try to describe the actions of the traitorous border guards who distorted the time of transition of the defector-sergeant major? Or do you not believe these words of Zhukov, but believe only those that are needed in your sensational theory?

    “On the evening of June 21, the chief of staff of the Kyiv Military District, Lieutenant General M.A. Purkaev, called me and reported that a defector, a German sergeant major, had appeared to the border guards, claiming that German troops were leaving for the initial areas for the offensive, which would begin on the morning of June 22.

    I immediately reported to the People's Commissar and I.V. Stalin what M.A. Purkaev had conveyed.

    “Come with the People’s Commissar to the Kremlin in about 45 minutes,” said J.V. Stalin.

    Taking with us the draft directive to the troops, together with the People's Commissar and Lieutenant General N.F. Vatutin, we went to the Kremlin. On the way, we agreed to achieve a decision to bring the troops into combat readiness at all costs.

    JV Stalin met us alone. He was clearly concerned.

    — Didn’t the German generals plant this defector to provoke a conflict? - he asked.

    “No,” answered S.K. Timoshenko. “We believe that the defector is telling the truth.”

    Meanwhile, members of the Politburo entered J.V. Stalin’s office. Stalin briefly informed them.

    - What do we do? - asked I.V. Stalin.

    There was no response.

    “We must immediately issue a directive to the troops about bringing all the troops of the border districts to full alert,” the Commissar said.

    - Read! Said I. V. Stalin.

    I have read the draft directive. J.V. Stalin remarked:

    “It’s premature to give such a directive now, maybe the issue will be settled peacefully.” It is necessary to give a short directive indicating that the attack can begin with provocative actions by German units. The troops of the border [261] districts should not succumb to any provocations so as not to cause complications."
    How do you explain the lack of mention of Budyonny’s surname? I explain this in such a way that having written about Budyonny, Zhukov would have been drawn into a controversy after the publication of his memoirs about what exactly was said at that meeting
    And then the beetles lie: “Without wasting time, N.F. Vatutin and I went out into another room and quickly drew up a draft directive from the People's Commissar.
    Returning to the office, they asked permission to report."

    According to the visitor log, there was no visitor to Vatutin’s office. How can one trust Zhukov when he clearly deliberately distorted the events of June 21 and did not write a word about his participation at the meeting at the State Autonomous Agrarian University? I don't believe. You defend this - then give the facts, not a quote from lies
    1. VS
      -3
      18 August 2018 14: 35
      I showed Zhukov’s chatter about that defector - after which Stalin believed in the attack - how nonsense)))

      If Zhukov’s words are refuted by other sources and his own words in the drafts of his same V&R, then we reject it, and if not, we take it on faith))) until... until new data appears)))

      I agree that the GKZh “strangely forgot” about Budyonny))

      But VATUTIN COULD AND HAD TO be in the Kremlin, but not in Stalin’s office, but he could WAIT in the reception room and when Zhukov went out into ANOTHER room so that they could compose a new text - INSTEAD of the draft version he brought with him that he HAD to carry to the Kremlin and HE ABOUT THIS ALSO in ANOTHER source he showed it, mentioning that he was wearing this version back on June 11 - he took Vatutin with him - his deputy for operational issues))) So it’s not worth running into the marshal HERE. He lies further - how Vatutin immediately went to the General Staff to send a text to the director. to the districts - straight from the Kremlin))) ))

      And here is a simple question for a smart guy - SO WHAT OPTION WAS CARRIED - SHOULD I have carried the head of the General Staff to the Kremlin - HAVING WARNED the districts that an attack was possible and this was confirmed by the Komarmies, including - WHAT WAS WRITTEN in Zhukov’s preparation??)))


      "" didn't write a word about his participation at the meeting at the State Agrarian University? ""
      - but you never know what was not included in his memoirs - that means it was not important in that meeting))

      For example, there is NO anything in VIR about the fact that Zhukov personally called the districts before visiting Stalshn and warned them about a possible attack)) NO about what he carried on June 11 to Stalin - WHAT preparation - that the nasty tyrant rejected))) There is nothing about that On June 11, he and the NGO suggested to Stalin how to approach Hitler))))
      But all this quite beautifully characterizes Zhukov as a politician in general))) And here he did not mention some meeting at the State Agrarian University))

      Are you aware of HOW many different directives left from the General Staff on THAT night - June 22??)) Madame Cheknuvo gave examples - why didn’t she risk showing them HERE in the article - as an example of the fact that the attack was not expected)))
      Ask her yourself - her champion is a lousy one - what kind of directive did Chekunov give her from the same night at the SAME hours??)))
    2. -8
      31 August 2018 19: 00
      Quote: RuSFr
      And then Zhukov lies: “Without wasting any time, N.F. Vatutin and I went into another room and quickly drafted the People’s Commissar’s directive.
      Returning to the office, they asked permission to report."

      According to the visitor log, there was no visitor to Vatutin’s office.

      Stop fantasizing about something you have no idea about - Vatutin was not in Stalin’s office, but waited in a special room in the Kremlin, where the People’s Commissar of Defense or the National General Staff usually works when they arrive there on call or for a planned event. Maps, documents, and other necessary materials that may be required during the meeting with Stalin are also stored there. There is a high-frequency telephone in the room, from which it was possible to call any district or the structures of the People's Commissariat - this was specifically done to organize operational work.
    3. -7
      2 September 2018 10: 07
      Quote: RuSFr
      Should Zhukov’s words be taken as an axiom???? Then why don’t you try to describe the actions of the traitorous border guards who distorted the time of transition of the defector-sergeant major? Or do you not believe these words of Zhukov, but believe only those that are needed in your sensational theory?

      If you were a real intelligence officer of the former GDR, then you would know that the question of the time of the German attack finally became known in the General Staff after the Dortmund signal passed through the German armed forces, which was revealed by radio intelligence. That’s why Golikov urgently reported to the country’s leadership on June 21 that the war would begin in the coming hours.
      General Golikov ordered the preparation of a report to six addresses. It said that Germany would attack the USSR on the night of June 21-22. At 21.00 the reports reached the desk of Joseph Stalin, Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and People's Commissar of Defense Semyon Timoshenko. As a result, Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 1 of June 22, 1941, signed by Zhukov and Timoshenko, was born.

      https://www.saratov.kp.ru/daily/26845/3887285/
  59. +1
    18 August 2018 09: 54
    Quote: V.S.
    Not a mistake, but a fraud

    Don’t shout, Olga Yurievna, but give the facts. We, users of the Military Review forum, will see what exactly you understood in those documents with your womanish mind.
    Give facts, not women's gossip
    1. -10
      31 August 2018 19: 05
      Quote: RuSFr
      We, users of the Military Review forum, will see what exactly you understood in those documents with your womanish mind.

      You will demonstrate your ambition on German forums, but here you are just a descendant of those German fascists whom our soldiers could not completely destroy. Don't forget about this, especially when your vile little mind is not able to understand who writes what on this forum.
  60. +1
    18 August 2018 09: 57
    Quote: V.S.
    "" A significant difference is only in the number of divisions against the ZF: according to the Form there are 40, and according to the summary - 31.

    According to the author, Blank is a later document, ""

    It’s hard to remember Sandalov’s words - what did they know from 45 German divisions by June 21 - AGAINST ZAPOVO?

    The author showed why the data on German divisions in the materials of the ZapOVO intelligence department increased. How exactly do you confirm Sandalov’s words?? Or can you push your theories on gullible readers in the words of one phrase????
    Give me the facts, you liar Kozinkin
    1. VS
      -3
      18 August 2018 14: 38
      you neymets - so refute Sandalov’s words))) They were given the exact figure against ZAPOVO - over 45 divisions))) and madam correctly decided that she would not notice them - for her nonsense that our intelligence was shitty - they believed the misinformation of the Germans))) And Stalin was - didn’t trust ANYONE, but apparently believed Hitler)))
  61. 0
    18 August 2018 10: 00
    Quote: V.S.
    I'm not Vasily

    Kozinkina, you are lying right in front of people!!!! Still, they see that after the letters BC you have the word “Vasily” written. Vasily is Vaska, that means. You can’t put two words together anymore???? The name is good, it was voiced in a famous Soviet film: “like our camel”
  62. 0
    18 August 2018 10: 01
    Quote: V.S.
    facts that she is unable to understand and digest

    Are you talking about yourself, who can’t connect different facts except the cytocurrents from the three most truthful books about the war?????????????77
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 14: 42
      I realized that you are also smarter than Marshal Zakharov and the officers of the VNU General Staff - that they wrote research on the subject of the Second World War that was CLOSED for many years)))

      There is one difference between them and your kind and madam - they didn’t invent - who “THOUGHT” what in the General Staff or the Kremlin - after reading a “couple” of reports from the RU General Staff)))

      Study the topic not according to fantasies and conjectures - who thought what according to the RU reports - but according to FACTS)))
      See WHAT REALLY was done in the districts according to the ORDERS of NGOs and the General Staff in the pre-war days - what Stalin sanctioned, of course)))
  63. 0
    18 August 2018 10: 05
    Quote: V.S.
    "During two evening meetings on June 9, decisions were made on the start of the main deployment. As a result of these meetings, the 16th army was redirected to Ukraine, directives were sent to the border districts on the beginning of the promotion of deep divisions (Pavlov and Kuznetsov received directives personally in Moscow, sent to KOVO Feldsvyaz), the commander of PribOVO received personal instructions to bring the district to combat readiness.
    All decisions were made precisely late in the evening on June 9 And the directives to Pavlov and Kuznetsov were issued on the 11th. After returning to PribOVO, a withdrawal plan was drawn up, then Kuznetsov turned to Moscow in encryption, where he described the actions being taken and asked for approval. "

    Where are the facts? Scans, links to documents??
    Another great Soviet poet and singer wrote: “Where are the facts, Zin? These terrible images are making you go crazy, Zin.”
    Give me the facts, liar Kozinkin, and we’ll see what you saw there and what’s there
    The author gives facts and since there is a discussion, then answer with facts too, and don’t sound like a woman
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 14: 44
      I quoted the words of S. Chekunov)) Blow on the militar and ask HIM where he got this from)) But - madam fully respects this researcher))) But - I’m afraid of YOU, as well as her - for his stupid articles here - in TsAMO immediately will send)) .. God forbid if not to cherus...)))
  64. +1
    18 August 2018 10: 09
    Quote: V.S.
    - wow .. hooray))) NGOs and NKMF - where Kuznetsov, with his consent to the KBF PROPOSAL, introduce readiness No. 2 - AUTHORIZED THIS - - DIFFERENT ministries

    Well, what are you writing like Baba Kozinkin?
    Admiral Golovko, after shelling the German intruder, reported this to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District. He didn’t write a word that he reported this to the People’s Commissariat of the Navy? Why, liar Kozinkin???
    Yes, because, your stupid face, the Northern Fleet was operationally subordinate to the LVO. And the People's Commissariat of the Navy was also subordinate to the NPO. That is why Kuznetsov rushed to Tymoshenko as his boss, and not vice versa
    Or provide contrary facts based on documents, Olga Yurievna
    1. VS
      -3
      18 August 2018 14: 48
      for you, operational subordination is equal to direct subordination?? And who told you that he didn’t inform his MINISTER too??)))
      The border guards also promptly obeyed the military..)) after they began to enter the border zone on June 12)))

      For the idiots - Tymoshenko, as Minister of Defense, WAS NOT the head of the MINISTER OF THE NAVY)))

      And HOW he arrived at the NGO that night - the admiral fully showed))) True, there are THREE versions of those memoirs)))
    2. -9
      31 August 2018 19: 14
      Quote: RuSFr
      Admiral Golovko, after shelling the German intruder, reported this to the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District. He didn’t write a word that he reported this to the People’s Commissariat of the Navy? Why, liar Kozinkin???
      Yes, because, your stupid face, the Northern Fleet was operationally subordinate to the LVO.

      You're lying, verbiage - the fleet was not operationally subordinate to the district, but merely interacted. That is why Golovko was obliged to report incidents to the district through the interaction line, so that district commanders knew the situation and took action.
      Quote: RuSFr
      And the People's Commissariat of the Navy was also subordinate to the NPO.

      Stop lying, amateur - first study the regulations on the People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy, and when they were separated, so that you are not mistaken for another city madman.
  65. 0
    18 August 2018 10: 13
    Quote: V.S.
    yeah - and so the admiral introduced the readiness of t No. 2 on his own initiative))) contrary to the tyrant))) - from June 16-17 .. And at the same time both the Air Force and Air Defense entered No. 2 - contrary to the tyrant)))

    Where are the facts to the contrary Olga Yuryevna????
    If you leafed through the memoirs of Admiral Kuznetsov, then the stupid woman should have seen that in March there was already such a situation when Kuznetsov gave the command to open fire on German planes without asking Stalin’s permission. Do you think no one reported to Kuznetsov about Admiral Golovko’s arbitrariness? Should they report and then what does Stalin’s permission have to do with it??? At least turn on your head sometimes, you need it to think, not write what comes to you
    And who reads your women's nonsense - what kind of moron do you have to be to believe you????????????7
  66. +2
    18 August 2018 10: 15
    Quote: V.S.
    The fact that Voronov was not accepted by Stalin means that HIS report was not so relevant on the day of June 21

    I told you to read it syllable by syllable - you’ll pass for smart. There is NO word in either the article or Voronov’s memoirs that he asked to see Stalin. There is no need to invent or check what actually happened.
    Voronom asked for an appointment with Tymoshenko or Zhukov.
    Read syllable by syllable, liar Kozinkin
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 14: 50
      and to hell with him - with Voronov - where did he go)) This in NO WAY confirms madam's nonsense that they did not expect an attack)))
  67. 0
    18 August 2018 10: 17
    Quote: V.S.
    girl - why don’t you quote the words of Admiral Kuznetsov and Chadayev that at NOON Stalin gives the command for the air defense of the Moscow Military District - to introduce increased air defense. for air defense

    Olga Yuryevna are you talking about yourself? Why don’t you, grandma, look at the air defense magazines????
    Elki-winder, writes that he doesn’t come up with versions at all, but here he is pushing a false version without even checking it. And with all the honest people!!!!
    Who reads your invented nonsense, Olga Yuryevna Kozinkina??????????777
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 14: 53
      grandpa - in your old age your orientation has changed or something - is it a genetic thing among you Germans or something - the de-ederalization of the nation is rushing with terrible force??)))

      I KNOW that the air defense of the Moscow Military District led to an increased level of combat. not June 21)) calm down already))

      But - SIE does not in any way refute the words of the admiral - that Stalin gave the command to bring them to B.G. Air defense of the capital - by 75%)))
  68. 0
    18 August 2018 10: 19
    Quote: V.S.
    Researchers of such an important topic as June 22 NEVER hide their names behind nicknames...) ONLY if they are not cutters or stupid falsifiers

    You are not hiding, although you are a liar and a stupid falsifier. And a disguised rezunist, sticking this label on everyone who is trying to check your stupidity. Whose Dollars do you use for vacation abroad?))))
    1. VS
      -3
      18 August 2018 14: 55
      I NEVER HID my first and last name in articles online))) But the cutters always HIDE - hiding behind dog calls most often)))
      SO WHAT IS Madame's first and last name?? And - what foreign country did you find for me??)))
  69. +1
    18 August 2018 10: 22
    Quote: V.S.
    What are you talking about, girl - WHY the hell should Zhukov even leave, especially at the start of the war?

    If Marshal Meretskov, appointed commander of the North-Western direction, was supposed to leave for Leningrad, then where should the commander of the South-Western direction be located and where did Zhukov go in the first days of the war?
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 15: 01
      I’m sure that right now you will tell me the number and date of Stalin’s order on the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff to this “position”)))
  70. 0
    18 August 2018 10: 24
    Quote: V.S.
    Even the division commanders in the Leningrad Military District were told that 120 would attack!! German divisions and not 167 of yours

    I wrote to you - you are a warehouse worker, not a military man
    Give the facts and we'll all see what you saw in them with your woman's mind
    You are in a hurry to read, but the meaning flies away and your head will not understand everything as it should. But you won’t accept requests to read syllable by syllable, so you write all sorts of nonsense
    Give me the facts, liar Kozinkin
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 15: 02
      there is a protocol of one freak division commander in German captivity)) It has been hanging on the net for a LONG TIME))) I cited it in the last article on the net too)))
  71. +2
    18 August 2018 10: 26
    Quote: V.S.
    Yes, you never know, there are a lot of ILLITERATS, the wrong kind of idiots wandered here

    It’s great what you said about those 4,5 hundred people who participated in the previous vote. In principle, you are right: all unrecognized geniuses are in psychiatric hospitals. There is no one opposing their versions....................
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 15: 08
      I’ll tell you a terrible secret - in the Russian Federation there is NO ONE at all who knows what was going on there in the pre-war days))) .. with the exception of me, of course)) One anonymous madam was itching to get involved in the topic - it didn’t turn out so well)) It turned out to be crap, let’s face it - it’s crap that’s pushing through they didn’t expect an attack and IGNORE WHAT WAS REALLY HAPPENING in the districts)) on RU reports he makes up what who “thought” there instead of looking at who DID what in reality)))
      Well, you help her push this stupidity into the heads of those who are not in the know at all))

      But those who read MY books and SEVEN of them were published on the topic around June 22 - on the events of the PRE-WAR days - do not accept madam’s nonsense anymore))

      What she does is especially funny - how proactive commanders and just good people in the PP lead troops))) into the main line of defense and write at the same time that they will start a reinforced concrete vehicle ONLY in case of war))) or - when there is water in the PP)))
  72. +1
    18 August 2018 10: 28
    Quote: V.S.
    And that they were the first to give such an admiral ??))) And you are a wise guy aware that there were TAM exercises and so the fleet was ready and No. 2 and the request was - let me leave this degree))
    But - WHAT does the initiative of the admirals have to do with it if WITHOUT Stalin they COULD NOT do this

    You should know, liar Kozinkin, that the exercises took place only in the Black Sea Fleet.
    And about the fact that the admirals could not do this - it’s a fact, come on Kozinkin is a liar!!!!!!!! You couldn’t take a single toilet from your warehouse without permission from your superiors, but the military may act differently under certain circumstances
    Facts!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 15: 09
      it turned out funny)) keep burning - about proactive military men)))
  73. +1
    18 August 2018 10: 30
    Quote: V.S.
    "" The People's Commissar of Communications is sent on a secondary business trip, in which any representative of the People's Commissariat can cope with the appropriate powers. Even I. Stalin, carefully studying the RM, does not expect a war in the coming days ... ""

    and where did YOU get the idea that that trip was of secondary importance and why did you get the idea that Stalin is not waiting for an attack??)) Are you ignoring the words of eyewitnesses that your nonsense is being refuted?

    Where are the facts Monsieur Vasily???? What eyewitnesses: names, statements, come on, we as a team will look and vote who is the talker!!!!!!!!!!!!!111111111
    Or do you, Olga Yuryevna, just grind something with your tongue and hide behind a phrase, read my nonsense in books?????????7
    Give your version and back it up with facts, liar Kozinkin, why did Stalin personally send the People’s Commissar of Communications on a business trip on the day of the 21st, and urgently recall him back through Voroshilov on the day of the 22nd (when the danger of the situation on the borders was not yet clear)???? ????????????7
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 15: 12
      this trip was PLANNED LONG before June 21)) And STALIN PERSONALLY did not send this man there))) And certainly not the situation around this trip somehow proves that the attack was not expected in the Kremlin)))
  74. +1
    18 August 2018 10: 40
    Quote: V.S.
    The text was malfunctioning and that’s why there are errors, but about air defense - THERE IS a provision and NOBODY crossed it out in the draft

    Why is it not on the scan of the last sheet of draft Directive No. 1? Why did it end up on the second page of the draft and when was it included in the Directive? You don’t have a single fact that you have personally verified.
    Give facts to confirm your words and the author’s deceit. Data
    1. VS
      -5
      18 August 2018 15: 19
      and WHY should information about air defense be on the scan of the THIRD sheet??)))

      paragraph d is crossed out on THIS sheet):
      "d) In the event of any provocations from the Germans or their allies, do not succumb to any provocations, taking all measures to immediately resolve misunderstandings peacefully."

      and paragraph d) about air defense - written in the DRAFT on the second sheet)):

      "d) Bring air defense to combat readiness without additionally raising assigned personnel. Prepare all measures to darken cities and objects."

      If you don’t believe me, ask Chekunov YOURSELF on militera))) - http://militera.borda.ru/?1-3-0-00001243-000-0-0-1521787172 )))
  75. +1
    18 August 2018 10: 43
    Quote: V.S.
    actually - THEY CALLED the districts at THESE hours))) Zhukov - to KOVO at midnight - quickly pass on the directive to the army

    Give us the facts that the inmates at the NPO said something to KOVO about the essence of the transmitted encryption, and did not rush it to quickly send it to the troops.
    The essence is the content of the People's Commissar's order and what should be done in the troops?
    If there are no facts, then the author’s words are confirmed that the People’s Commissar and the beginning of the General Staff did not expect the war at dawn on June 22 and were not afraid of it.
    Facts of liar koiznkin
    1. VS
      -5
      18 August 2018 15: 22
      refute the GKZ memoirs YOURSELF))

      Zhukov assures VIR that it was HE who called Kirpanos at 24.00 and gave instructions - “Approximately at 24 hours on June 21 The commander of the Kyiv district M.P. Kirponos, who was at his command post in Ternopol, reported on the HF that, in addition to the defector reported by General M.A. Purkaev, another German soldier had appeared in our units - the 222nd Infantry Regiment 74 4st Infantry Division. He swam across the river, appeared to the border guards and reported that at XNUMX o'clock the German troops would go on the offensive. M.P. Kirponos was ordered to quickly transmit the directive to the troops to put them on combat readiness")

      What is the essence of the marshal’s words that is not clear to YOU??)))
  76. 0
    18 August 2018 10: 44
    Quote: V.S.
    text written in the Kremlin

    Facts, not speculation, liar Kozinkin.
    Once you lie, who believes you??
    1. VS
      -6
      18 August 2018 15: 23
      have you already proven - with madam - that the text was not written in the Kremlin??)))
  77. +2
    18 August 2018 10: 51
    Quote: Svateev
    Do not recognize inconvenient evidence? What a hackneyed way of falsification!

    I do not recognize unconfirmed words in the memoirs. For example, Zhukov’s memoirs say the following: “The enemy managed to concentrate more than ten thousand bayonets on Mount Bain-Tsagan; Soviet troops were able to concentrate more than a thousand bayonets; the Japanese troops had about 100 guns and up to 60 anti-tank guns. We have a little more than 50 guns, including those supporting from the eastern bank of the Khalkhin Gol River.

    However, the 11th heroic tank brigade, which had up to 150 tanks, the 7th motorized armored brigade, which had 154 armored vehicles, and the 8th Mongolian armored division, armed with 45-mm cannons, fought in our ranks.

    Thus, our main trump card was armored formations, and we decided to immediately take advantage of this in order to immediately defeat the Japanese troops that had just crossed, preventing them from burying themselves in the ground and organizing anti-tank defense. It was impossible to delay the counterattack, since the enemy, having discovered the approach of our tank units, began to quickly take measures for defense and began to bomb the columns of our tanks. And they had nowhere to hide - for hundreds of kilometers around there was absolutely open terrain, devoid of even bushes.

    At 9:15 a.m. we met with the commander of the 11th Tank Brigade, M.P. Yakovlev, who was with the main forces of the vanguard battalion and led its actions. After discussing the situation, they decided to call in all aviation, speed up the movement of tanks and artillery, and attack the enemy no later than 10 hours and 45 minutes. At 10:45 the main forces of the 11th Tank Brigade turned around and attacked the Japanese troops on the move.

    Here is what Japanese soldier Nakamura wrote about these events in his diary on July 3: [166]

    “Several dozen tanks suddenly attacked our units. We were in terrible confusion, the horses neighed and ran away, dragging the limbers of the guns behind them; cars rushed in all directions. 2 of our planes were shot down in the air. The entire personnel lost heart. In the vocabulary of Japanese soldiers, the words “scary”, “sad”, “lost in spirit”, “became creepy” are used more and more often.

    The battle continued day and night on July 4th. Only by 3 o'clock in the morning on July 5 was enemy resistance finally broken, and Japanese troops began to hastily retreat to the crossing. But the crossing was blown up by their own sappers, who feared a breakthrough by our tanks. Japanese officers threw themselves in full gear straight into the water and immediately drowned, literally in front of our tank crews.

    The remnants of the Japanese troops that captured Mount Bain-Tsagan were completely destroyed on the eastern slopes of the mountain in the area of ​​the decline of the Khalkhin Gol River. Thousands of corpses, a mass of dead horses, many crushed and broken guns, mortars, machine guns and vehicles covered Mount Bain-Tsagan."
    Read in part 3 how it really happened. According to eyewitnesses, Zhukov cried, looking at the large amount of smoke on the destroyed Soviet armored vehicles......
    Personally, I don’t believe everything in the words of the Marshal of Victory. He shifted his mistakes onto other shoulders. To the words of Marshal Rokossovsky about the distortion of events in his memoirs, Zhukov replied: my memoirs, what I want to write. In your memoirs, write whatever you want......
    Zhukov deliberately distorted the events immediately before the start of the war, so it is difficult to believe him

    I admit the inconvenient facts. With Directive 1, everything is murky, but only Sergei Chekunov knows everything about it for sure....... The author expresses only his opinion and writes before that, WARNING that there is no evidence. You can believe it or not, but you cannot call him a falsifier.
    1. VS
      -4
      18 August 2018 15: 26
      ""With Directive 1, everything is murky, but only Sergei Chekunov knows everything about it for sure....... The author expresses only his opinion and writes before that, WARNING that there is no evidence. You can believe it or not, but you cannot call him a falsifier. "

      - that is, YOU have no EVIDENCE that the text was not written in the Kremlin, but you demand it from me with hysterics??)))

      relax - Chekunov confirms - the text was written in the KREMLIN)))
    2. VS
      -5
      18 August 2018 15: 30
      "" I admit the inconvenient facts. ""

      Nnoa)) you, following Madame, are inventing who “THOUGHT” or “believed or did not believe” based not on what HAPPENED in the districts but - after reading a couple of RU reports)))
  78. -6
    18 August 2018 14: 00
    The unexpected war between Nazi Germany and the USSR (Part 17)

    This movie... serial (C) belay
    1. VS
      -9
      18 August 2018 15: 39
      and as befits our TV series - a fairy tale)))
  79. -8
    2 September 2018 14: 01
    aKtoR writes:
    6. Immediately before the start of the war, significant resources were thrown into long-term programs: the deployment of a heavy KV-3 tank, the design of KV-4 and KV-5 tanks, the construction and equipping of hundreds of long-term structures on our border, and the construction of concrete runways at aerodromes .

    Here the author misleads readers, because all funding for military programs was included in the budget for 1941 at least in the fall of 1940 (and some programs even earlier), when there was no trace of the Barbarossa plan. Therefore, only those who do not understand at all how military planning is carried out in peacetime can say that “immediately before the start of the war, significant resources were thrown into long-term programs.”
  80. +1
    25 October 2018 19: 23
    Very good valuable quote from valuable author: “Morning 21.6.41. The head of the RU received information from source “X”: “The embassy received a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There has been a meeting at the Tippelskirch since 4 o’clock. The source is convinced that the war will begin in the next 48 hours.”

    During the same period, messages from “Maro” (“Attack scheduled for June 22…”) and “Costa” (“Military clash on June 21 or 22…”) are delivered. That is, Golikov had very good valuable information in the early morning of 21.6.41/20.00/1. But he compiled and signed the intelligence report for the day, and immediately reported to Stalin at 00.30, at the usual time for the report. If he had reported out of schedule, IMMEDIATELY, Directive No. 12 could have gone to the troops not at 12.30 (two hours of this delay were solely on the conscience of Tymoshenko and Zhukov, one hour was spent making a decision at a meeting of senior management), but 21.6.41 hours earlier, at 4 1. What difference would it make? Much. Brest would not have been surrendered in 1941 hours, the bridges would have been blown up, all the missile defenses would have been in action and with ammunition, all the first line MKs would have managed to reach the planned starting lines, the aviation would have been dispersed and ready for battle, like all air defense systems . In Directive No. 21.6.41 there is nothing about occupying the SD on the old border and this is very good. indicative! This refers ONLY to fortified areas and troops on the Molotov Line. T. and Zh. could not help but know that since the end of May they had every right to give orders on this line independently - but they did not give them. Isn't this treason, isn't this a conspiracy? And not only this. The absence of artillery firing since the winter of 22.6.41 and its organization in all districts exactly on the very eve of the war also smells of conspiracy. Tymoshenko knew exactly the state of the artillery, and it was no coincidence that Marshal Kulik was replaced as head of the GAU on XNUMX, and XNUMX. flew to the Polar Fleet to disorganize the administration, which was evidenced by eyewitnesses, in particular, General Boldin. Author - dig our artillery!
  81. -2
    25 October 2018 20: 39
    Author:
    aKtoR
    However, the events reviewed indirectly indicate the opposite: the spacecraft management did not expect the war to start at dawn on 22 on June 1941, and we haven’t met yet a single fact indicating the opposite ...

    This spread of lies is refuted by the published memoirs of General F. Golikov, head of the intelligence department in 1941:
    By June 22, 1941, the RU General Staff of the KA, headed by Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, was able to provide the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff the following documents: a diagram of possible areas of concentration of German troops on the territory of Finland and the use of a group in Norway in the event of a war against the USSR; information about general mobilization capabilities and the likely distribution of German forces across theaters of military operations; a diagram of probable operational directions and possible concentration and deployment of Wehrmacht troops on the Eastern Front; diagram of the grouping of German troops on June 20, 1941; map of the grouping and deployment of the German and Romanian armies on June 22, 1941 From this we can conclude that the efforts made by the leadership of the German Wehrmacht to disinformation and quickly disguise the transfer of troops to the Soviet borders could not completely hide Germany’s preparations for war against the USSR. In the first days of the Great Patriotic War, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, contrary to popular belief, was not removed from his post as head of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army153. Remaining in his previous position, he was sent to Great Britain and the USA to negotiate military supplies for the USSR and the opening of a second front. No other official of the People's Commissariat of Defense could be sent: no one's job responsibilities included relationships with foreign military figures. Thus, we can say with confidence that I.V. Stalin and other top leaders of the state and the People's Commissariat of Defense did not consider F.I. Golikov was guilty of the tragedy of 1941, although at the same time many Soviet generals were not only removed from their posts, but also repressed. After returning from a foreign business trip, General F.I. Golikov commanded armies and fronts on the battlefields of the Great Patriotic War, held responsible positions in the central apparatus of the USSR NGOs, and even again, although for a very short time (from October 16 to 22, 1942), was the head of Soviet military intelligence154. All this, in our opinion, indicates that F.I. Golikov, heading in 1940–1941. The Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army promptly informed the political and military leadership of the USSR about the impending war and no complaints were made against it.

    O.V. Karimov, candidate of historical sciences

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