The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 15)
The materials of the cycle use materials from the personal site of the historian M. Solonin; materials from the books of historians M.I. Maltyuhova and S.L. Chekunov; materials from the book "1941 year: lessons and conclusions", published by a group of authors.
In the previous part, we considered the period from spring 1940 to April 1941. It was shown that intelligence of the General Staff of the General Staff, the NKGB and the NKVD (border troops) significantly overestimated the number of German formations at the border. In March-April 1941, according to the estimation of the General Staff, it was believed that Germany could allocate up to 200 divisions for an attack on the USSR. As of the end of April, a lot of TB and TP were found at the border, which were reduced to conditional etc. According to intelligence, there were both so on and so on, but not one was found tank groups and not a single mk.
The high command staff of the spacecraft knew that the basis for a quick war (blitzkrieg) should be mobile (tank) groups, aviation and landing troops.
Our intelligence did not know that the main striking force of the German forces in the East was eleven microns from the 12 available in the Wehrmacht. 10 of them to 22.6.41 were combined into four tank groups and concentrated near the border.
Were there any German microns during this period at the border? Below are a few German documents, which partially reflect the activities that reduce the likelihood of the discovery of these associations by Soviet intelligence.
RCB 48 tk (48 microns): "Since arriving in Zamoć 22.4.41 command is under the direct control of the 6 Army. For reasons of secrecy, the command is called "headquarters of the 48 construction fortress". In addition to corps units and 2 of 64 hell, the corps has no divisions or units of military subordination that must be subordinated to the corps during Operation Barbarossa. Such connections are subordinate to the responsible for the given territory 3 TK, and later 55 AK. Also, the works of the theater of future combat operations - road works, the construction of defensive fortifications near the Bug River at the same time to disguise the occupation of the initial lines - the command of 48 TK has no direct relation...
[Since 48 MK has no connections, it is not involved in road construction and fortification construction. Parts of 3 TK were probably involved in these works.]
3.6.41. The corps can finally issue an “Order to take command from 10.06 and a march to the center of concentration” to the connections subordinate to it from 10 June. In addition to a review of the situation and movement management, the order contains the order of construction for the upcoming actions
6.6.41. Gradually arriving for discharge parts given an abbreviated order of the march. It is also preparing to transfer the 19 of June KP Corps to the bend of the Bug at Sokal ...
10.6.41. According to the daily order, the corps commander takes command over the subordinate units at last. On the same day, an order is issued to strengthen defense measures in case of an unexpected Russian attack.
20.6.41. ... After most orders are given in the morning, it becomes calmer in the afternoon. The last meeting arrives NSH 6-th Army, Colonel Heim and the commander of 11 etc. Nomination to the initial positions is still going on without deviations from the plan.
21.6.41. The commander of the 1 Group, Colonel General von Kleist, takes command of the corps. KP Tank Group is transferred to the forest at Wolka Labunska... [52 km from the border]. "
The 48 headquarters is located near the 22 border on April 1941, disguised as a building site. Subordinate divisions arrive from June 10. For two months, the corps headquarters was not detected by our intelligence services.
Directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops (plan "Barbarossa"): "OKH intends to redeploy by this time all the working headquarters of army groups, armies and tank groups to the East to prepare and implement the necessary measures. In order to maintain secrecy, the said headquarters should be located in areas already located in the East. Army Group “B” troops or armies ... The command groups of armies and armies accept the lanes that they are assigned, in accordance with the directive on concentration, observing at first the masking measures...»
Command 6 th Army. Nomination instructions Barbarossa 2.5.41: "Secrecy: ... Required Attractions [military personnel] for reconnaissance should be masked by exercises and territorial activities. Corps Command is responsible for that intelligence at the border was carried out only under camouflage (unobservable from abroad). To do this, you should immediately create barriers on all roads and paths leading to the border in cover areas that can be crossed only by officers (for example, sappers) who have special pass command corps. Any involvement of the civilian population is prohibited. Orders for the nomination of troops can not be issued completely, and work out only excerpts (in stages)... »
21.05.41 meeting at the 6 Army Headquarters: "Exit to the original position. Do not cross forbidden lines. Artillery to withdraw to the position only in the last 3-4 nights, namely, starting from west to east. Entering infantry positions must be completed 2 hours before the attack. Masking the original positions! Question materials! Supply is impossible, self-sustainment (cover, capes, etc.). Reserves far back and bury.
Air protection of the initial positions is especially important, since it is possible that Russians will start a war in the air before the offensive begins... »
There are forbidden lines for which parts are not displayed. Great importance is attached to the masking of positions, reserves are relegated far back. The German generals envisage measures that should be carried out in the event that the Russian command is able to unravel their plan and take action in the air. Everything is done to ensure that Soviet intelligence (including visual detection) does not detect the combat units and units of the focusing group ...
RCB 17 Army: "21.6.41 20-00. The troops read the appeal of the Fuhrer to the "Soldiers of the Eastern Front"
20-00. 52 AK has been instructed to carry out distracting activities in the area of Przemysl, even if the main corps offensive operation is canceled.
3-15 [22.6.41] 17 army moves to the starting position for the offensive according to the deployment plan of "Barbarossa"... »
An interesting phrase about the distracting actions of 52 AK. It turns out that in the event of the cancellation of the outbreak of war, the corps (or its parts) are destined to depict provocative actions at the border. Even in 20-00 21.6.41 there is a possibility that the war will not start.
Command 48 TK: "13.06.41. Corps order to prepare for an offensive and actions at the beginning of the attack ...
a) General provisions: By itself, the exit to the starting positions cannot remain hidden from the enemy. Thus, operational surprise is impossible. It is all the more necessary to keep the enemy in the dark about the day of the attack. therefore Any rash actions should be strictly avoided when taking initial positions., warehousing material and ammunition, wiring communication equipment and instructing.
Any crossing of the Bug for reconnaissance purposes is prohibited ... In relation to individual aircraft or to small connections of reconnaissance aircraft flying across the border, there is a ban on fire ...»
ZhBD 3 td (from the composition of 24-th u):13.06.41 Divisions report arrival in a new area of concentration ... Parts in forest camps are persistently complaining about the torment of mosquitoes ...
14.06.41 East of the restraining line is prescribed a thorough disguise....
20.6.41 Released from the зыdzyn district [64 km from the border] in accordance with the order of the division commander, the units are leaving ... to the area of initial positions ...
21.6.41 In the 23-30, parts report on the readiness and occupation of the last starting positions ...»
RCB 57 micron: "14.6.41 Tracked vehicles 12-th TD arrived at the point of temporary deployment. The first parts of the 19 th TD are unloaded and follow the march to the designated point of temporary deployment.
16.6.41 Wheel equipment 18-md arrived at the point of temporary deployment.
17.6.41 ... All parts of 19 td arrived at the point of temporary deployment.
18.6.41 Half 18 md leaves the temporary dislocation point and marches to halt at Ekersberg (Okartovo). The rearguard is located there 19.6 to 4-00 ...
20.6.41 12 td occupies the prescribed starting position ... 29-th TP division, along with other parts of the 16-00 resumes movement along the established route. 19 td moves along the route from the former point of temporary dislocation with a halt on both sides of the route of movement of tanks ...
21.6.41 Around 7 in the morning, redeployment of the hull control from Mikolajki to a new KP in the Seiny area begins [9,5 km from the border] ... 20-00 from 19, etc., was informed by telephone that her planned march southwest of Orzhes [133 km from the border] due to the wedging of two SS connections on the road intended for the movement of tanks, it becomes questionable ... With 21-00, 19 etc. continued to move in the area of Litsk-Suwalki ...»
The German command widely used various measures of strategic and operational camouflage. The headquarters of the new associations arriving in the East (possibly tank units) were located at the location of military units and institutions already located there. In order to mislead the Soviet command, the commander of Army Group Center 24.3.41 ordered the construction of various fortifications along the USSR border, supposedly intended to defend against a possible Soviet offensive. An order is offered not to hinder Soviet aerial reconnaissance overseeing the work being done. The defenses were erected by the Germans so that they could be used as starting points for an offensive against the USSR.
A.P.Sudoplatov: "In the spring of 1941, the Germans more than once managed to replay Soviet residencies in Berlin, Sofia, Bucharest, Bratislava, Ankara. Our main mistake was to exaggerate the role of the German ambassador in Moscow, Count Schulenburg, who, at meetings, invariably stressed the interest of the Germans in developing economic relations with the Soviet Union.... »
From the recording of the conversation of I.V. Stalin with U. Cherchell 15.8.41: "He (Churchill) warned Stalin about the upcoming attack on the USSR. His first message about this was very brief and had as its basis the events in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941. [3.4.41]. On the day when Pavel signed a neutrality pact with Hitler, the Germans issued an order to send 3 from 5 etc., located in the Balkans, to Krakow ... Tov.Stalin replies that we never doubted it and that he wanted to get another six months to prepare for this attack...»
Since the summer of 1940, the German command was able to carry out misinformation measures as a result of which the Soviet intelligence of all departments delivered the RM about a significant overestimation of the number of German formations concentrated at the USSR border. It should be noted that the term “concentrated at the border” or “concentrated at the border strip” is somewhat conditional. The “discovered” reconnaissance divisions were actually located at a distance from 20 to 150 km from the border. Some of the connections were even deployed at a distance of 480 km. Why there was an excessive overestimation of the German connections. This topic will not be considered in this cycle - it is still waiting for its researchers ...
The concentration and deployment of a group of German troops to attack the USSR began in mid-February 1941. The transfer was carried out in six echelons. The troops destined for the shock groups were transferred to five echelons, the sixth one was the reserve of the main command (OKH). The transfer of troops was carried out mainly by railway transport as covertly as it could be done. At the final stage, some td relocated under their own power. On the transfer of one division spent from 2 to 7 day.
In the 1 tier, from 20.2 to 15.3.41, 7 nt was redeployed to the border. At the same time, from the West, three PD were sent to the Balkans and the 7 divisions were redeployed to Germany, and from Germany the 15 divisions were sent to the West.
In the period from 16.03-10.04.41, 2 divisions were deployed as part of the 19-echelon (18 front and 1 etc.). At the same time, 9 PD, intended for the occupation service, was sent to the West from Germany, and a PD from Denmark arrived in Germany.
In connection with the Balkan campaign, the number of divisions deployed as part of the 3-th and 4-th echelons according to plan, was reduced, and the 5-th - increased. The transfer of the 3 echelon as part of the 17 divisions was carried out by 11.04-21.05.41. Most divisions came from the West, and two from Germany.
All 43 divisions that arrived as part of the first 3's trains, in the interests of operational camouflage, were located west of the line Königsberg (94 km from the border), Warsaw (145 km), Tarnów (130 km). The minimum distance between two points is given. The distance to the direction of input of the connections is somewhat larger and is 143, 177 and 150 km, respectively.
In the middle of May, 8 pd of the 14 wave was sent from Germany to the West. With 22.05, Germany’s rail transport was moved to an accelerated traffic schedule, and the concentration of troops in the East increased sharply. The transfer of the 4 echelon as part of the 11 front and 9 guard divisions was carried out from 22.05 to 5.06. At the end of May, 5, 15, created in the spring of 1941, was sent to the West from Germany to carry out the occupation service. On 5 June, there were 89 divisions in the three army groups.
5-th echelon was transferred to the East from 6.06 to 18.06 (14 td, 12 md, 2 pd, 3 lpd and 2 mbr). It should be noted that 26 td and md from the 30 mobile units allocated for the attack on the USSR, began to redeploy to the border only with 6.6.41.
The transfer of the 6 echelon, which included the 28 divisions and the 1 reserve OKH brigade, began on June 19 and continued for several weeks after the start of the war.
From 10.06, the attacking echelon troops were withdrawn to the original areas from 7-20 km to 20-30 km from the Soviet-German border, and from 18.06 they began to move to their original position in the dark with strict observance of masking. Simultaneously with the German troops, the Allied forces of Germany were deployed.
The figures show the change in the number of German troops in total at the border of the USSR (already familiar to the readers in the previous section) and separately for PribOVO and Zapovo. Let me remind, dear readers, that the dependencies shown in the figures are intended only for data visualization, since they are valid only for control points.
From the figures, we again see a clearly overestimated number of German divisions according to intelligence reports.
L.M.Sandalov: "In April, 1941, the concentration of German troops near our border was no longer a secret. The May news bulletin of the General Staff warned districts and armies: “Throughout March and April, the German command carried out a reinforced transfer of troops to the border strip from the USSR from the western front and from the central regions of Germany... »
L.M.Sandalov speaks about the concentration of the German troops in accordance with the Republic of Uzbekistan RU GSH. It is worth paying attention to the fact that on the 25.4.41 near our border in the same areas that were considered by September 1940 of the year (without Romania) in the Republic of Uzbekistan RU GSH listed 87-91 German Division. By September 1940, this number was 83-90. These data were mainly confirmed by the intelligence services of the NKGB and the border troops of the NKVD (they even overestimated them slightly).
Thus, it can be said that after eight months, the German grouping near our border (before Slovakia), according to our intelligence estimates, reached a number that was fixed in September of the 1940 year.
Taking into account the troops on the territory of Romania, the number of invasion groups according to the RS GSH at 25.4.41 was 95-100 connections. To parry this threat from Romania were part of the spacecraft deployed on the southern section of KOVO and OdVO. In September 1940, these units were not counted to counter the threat due to the absence of German troops in Romania. Therefore, by the end of April, the military-political leadership of the USSR was also not afraid of the invasion of Germany (and its allies) into our territory, as in September-October of the 1940 year. For the same reason, the German troops, according to the assessment of the leadership of the NKO and the General Staff, were not enough for a full-scale war with our country! That is why it is decided to transfer the 16 Army to the Transcaucasus, and not to the western borders.
Thus, the version of the literary figure O. Yu. Kozinkina (without proper documentary and memoir confirmation) does not hold water: “...Or maybe it was all easier - no one in the South Caucasus was going to ... In Georgia, the troops from Chita to drive at all ?? Because… [in threat] from Turkey did not believe in principle, and the attack was expected precisely from Germany - for the summer of 41... ”It should be noted that, prior to 14.6.18, the specified writer was in principle unaware that the 16 Army had originally been sent to Transcaucasia.
In April, 1941, two sd will relocate from the MBO to ZOVOVO.
Directive of the NPO to the Military Council of the Moscow Military District 29.4.41: "I order: To send 10.5.41 and 231 units to 224 in Zapovo with full staff, staffed with good quality personnel ... Unload division points and exact time of dispatch (with a calculation of division arrival no later than 10.5.1941) coordinate with the Military Council... »
These divisions are sometimes considered the “first swallows” for the subsequent more large-scale troop movement. However, already in May, both divisions begin to disband, and personnel are sent to staff other units.
P.A. Sudoplatov: "The leadership of the NKO and the General Staff sought to prevent the creation by the enemy on our borders of a grouping that would have an overwhelming superiority over the spacecraft. Achieving at least a balance of power on the border was the most important direction of the military policy of deterring Hitler from throwing at Russia... "Let's check this statement of Pavel Anatolyevich about"prevent overwhelming superiority».
It is well known that in the western border of VO there existed troops of the 1 th echelon of the covering armies, the 2 th echelon, a reserve of districts and troops of the GDK. As mentioned above, according to intelligence data on our border, there were 25.4.41-89 German divisions on 94. This number did not include the 6 divisions (in the Danzig-Poznan-Thorn area) located at a distance of 309-424 km from the border. The figure shows the number of divisions in the 1 and 2 echelons of the covering armies of the western border VO.
It can be said that 89-94 was opposed to the German connections by the 91 KA division. It should be noted that in the territories of the districts there were additionally associations and connections of the reserves of the districts and the RGCs, which could be used to build up our grouping at the border and to deter the enemy. It turns out that by the end of April 1941, the number of German and Soviet divisions at the border is comparable. Below we will conduct a similar estimate for the number of divisions for June 1941 of the year.
On intelligence report from 5.5.41, the number of German divisions increased to 103 – 107 (including 6, located in the Danzig-Poznan region). It also indicates that “Probably the further strengthening of the German troops in Norway, the North-Norwegian group of which in the future can be used against the USSR through Finland and the sea... "Ie The risk of invasion from Finland and Northern Norway is quite high.
An increase in divisions against PribOVO and ZAPOVO occurred on the 3 compound, and against KOVO and OdVO on 4-5. During this period, CK is transferred from the North Caucasian Military District to the composition of the reserves of the High Command.
Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander KOVO 13.5.41: "People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR ordered:
1. Adopt and place in camps in the district one office [34 ck] with corps and one up, four twelve-thousandth SD and one GDS from the composition of the North Caucasian Military District.
2. Send by rail to OdVO 32 cd... »
In the second half of May 1941, the 9 ck control from the SCWO with body parts and 106 cd will be redeployed to the Crimea (OdVO), where it additionally includes 156 cd and 32 cd, and the corpus received the name “9 st special cc”.
In mid-May, a draft document was prepared: “Considerations of the General Staff of the Spacecraft for the strategic deployment plan of the Armed Forces. At present, Germany, according to the data of the Spacecraft Directorate, has deployed ... around 230 DD, 22 TD, 20 md, 8 air and 4 cd, and only about 284 divisions. Of these, on the borders of the Soviet Union, as of 15.5.41, concentrated to 86 DD, 13 td, 12 md and 1 cd, and only to 112 divisions.
It is assumed that ... Germany, in the event of an attack on the USSR, will be able to put up against us - up to 137 pd, 19 td, 15 md, 4 cd and 5 airborne divisions, and only up to 180 divisions ...»
Thus, up to the number of German divisions 180 needed for an invasion, 62 connections are still lacking.
A.P.Sudoplatov: "The development of military plans, including offensive large-scale operations, was a common practice for all the major powers of the major powers of Europe and Asia in the 1930-1940-s. It has never been a secret for us that such plans are also being developed by Nazi Germany. Another thing is a political decision to unleash a war and to put into practice the plans of the military command ... Zhukov and Vasilevsky proposed to preempt the Germans in the strategic deployment of troops in the event Germany started military operations. This is a famous handwritten document dated 15.5.41 ...
Considerations about the oncoming battle, Stalin and the people's commissar of defense Tymoshenko based the directives on the troops on the 22 day on June 1941, when an attempt was made to stop the Germans with a counter strike and strike them with the main attack on the South-West direction. Zhukov, in my opinion, changes his memory when he writes in his memoirs that the Bids directive on conducting a decisive counterattack was completely unexpected for him. After all, it was about carrying out those activities that he, as the Chief of the General Staff and Major General Vasilevsky, suggested that Stalin be carried out in the event of a war ... Moreover, the May considerations of Zhukov and Vasilevsky were in fact our first draft plan of military operations in the event of a war Germany... »
When analyzing the RM in the GSH RU, there were problems with the identification of German units and formations connected with their mass transfers at the border and with the movements carried out during the exercise.
Special post RU GSH KA in NKGB 21.5.41: "The German command reinforces the grouping of troops in the border with the USSR, making massive troop movements from the interior of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and the Balkans. This gain raises no doubt. but along with the actual increase in troops in the border strip German command is simultaneously engaged in maneuvering, transferring separate parts in the border area from one locality to another, so that in case of their assessment we had the impression the German command needed.
In addition, recently, the German command in the border with the USSR is carried out a series of exercises military units which are also associated with the movement of troops. Therefore, in order to avoid mistakes in the assessment of the grouping and it is easier to figure out which parts, where they come from and where they come from, I kindly ask you to indicate in your intelligence reports:
1) where the troops come from (from France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Germany, etc.);
2) when and through which points the troops pass;
3) which troops (infantry, artillery, tanks, etc.);
4) in what quantity (regiment, division);
5) numbering of these units (regimental number, division);
6) which corps and armies include the detected troops;
7) when and where they arrive... »
Special message NKGB USSR People's Commissars of State Security of the Belarusian, Lithuanian, Karelian-Finnish and Moldavian SSR, heads of the UNKGB for the Leningrad and Odessa regions 24.5.41: “RU GSH KA reports that the German command, reinforcing the grouping of troops in the border with the USSR, the band due to the massive transfer of troops from the interior of Germany, the occupied countries and the Balkans ... However, along with the actual increase in troops in the border zone, the German command engaged and maneuvering...»
The number of 200 German divisions on our border passes through the Republic of Moldova, and the number of 180 divisions is the arithmetic average between the values in the Republic of Moldova.
Special Message NKGB 25.5.41: "19.5.41 in conversation ... The student reported the following: Germany has now concentrated on the Soviet border 160-200 divisionssupplied with a large number of tanks and aircraft...
War between the Soviet Union and Germany is unlikely, although it would be very popular in Germany, while the current war with England is not approved by the population.
Hitler cannot take such a risk as war with the USSRfearing a violation of the unity of the National Socialist Party. Although the defeat of the USSR in the event of war is beyond doubt, Germany would have had to spend about 6 war for weeks, during which supplies from the East would stop, it would take a long time to organize Germany’s supply, and during that time England would be using America much stronger. Summer would have been lost for Germany, and a hungry winter would come again.
German Armed Forcescollected at the border must show Soviet Union determined to act if forced to do so. Hitler hopes that in this connection Stalin will become more accommodating and will stop all sorts of intrigues against Germany, and most importantly, he will give more goods, especially Oil...»
«Lyceum student"(Burrnins, agent of German intelligence" Peter "). One of the messages of "Peter" we met in the 2 part. In winter, in the Republic of Moldova, received from the "Lyceum" said: "Information about the upcoming landing of the Germans in England "Lyceum" received from a senior lieutenant... "For the" senior lieutenant, "referred to in the message, Hitler himself pretended to be in charge of this agent. Through the "Lyceum" Hitler convinced Stalin that Germany would not attack the USSR if it was not compelled to do so.
Thus, the number of divisions in disinformation was named by Hitler himself, and it surprisingly (or according to German intelligence) coincided with the number as estimated by our GSH in March-April 1941 of the year.
All the Republic of Moldova from the "Lyceum" were sent to Stalin. Perhaps the information from this source coincided with the vision of events by Stalin. But, P.A. Sudoplatov writes: “In Moscow, they knew that the "Lyceum" is a double agent. The assessment of this agent was rather complicated: on the one hand, valuable information came from him, but on the other hand, it contained many rumors and conjectures, underlined from journalistic and diplomatic circles ...
On the erroneous instructions of the Kremlin, we threw misinformation about what allegedly Stalin was a consistent supporter of the peaceful settlement of the agreements, in contrast to the military circles of the USSR that adhere to tough positions of military confrontation in Germany. This was followed by the infamous TASS statement from 14 June 1941 of the unfounded rumors about the war with Germany... »
Hitler did not need assurances that "rumors that the USSR is preparing for war with Germany are deceitful and provocative". He was already convinced of the correctness of his actions related to the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union. On the latest report from Peter, received by 2.6.41, which spoke about the peaceableness of the Soviet Union, Hitler wrote: “Liar!"- and ordered him to arrest ...
In previous installments, the author referred to the Aviators case. Let us dwell on it a little more. In April, 41-th discussion of the accident occurred in parts of long-range aviation. The result of this discussion was the Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of 9.4.41. The following people were found guilty: Tymoshenko’s Commissar for Defense, Rychagov, Chief of the RA Air Force, Proskurov, Commander of Long-Range Aviation, Mironov, Head of the Operational Flight Operations Division of the Air Force Headquarters. The most severe punishment was provided for Mironov: "Bring to court for a clearly criminal order that violates the elementary rules of the flight service". In addition, the Politburo proposed to remove from office and bring Proskurov to court. As for Rychagov, he was removed from office "as undisciplined and unable to cope with the duties of the head of the Air Force". People's Commissar Tymoshenko got off with a reprimand.
The 4.5.41 Politburo makes a new decision: "Suggest to the Prosecutor of the USSR ... regarding the Lieutenant-General Aviation Proskurov and Colonel Mironov to consider their case in court and, bearing in mind their merits in the spacecraft, limit themselves to public reprimand... »
7.5.41 held a meeting of representatives of the High Command of the Air Force and the leadership of the NKAP, at which the head of the Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force, Filin, delivered a report. In the report, he analyzed in detail the work of the institute, showing the flaws and revealing their causes. He pointed out the flaws in the work of the aviation industry, expressed in the presentation of not tested and not fully tested airplanes for state tests: Yak-1, Yak-4, LaGG-1, Su-2, Ap-2, Pe-2 and EP-2. It was unpleasant that the end of the report took on the character of a sharp controversy between Filin and Stalin.
In a message from the "Lyceum", who got on the table to Stalin in the evening 25 or in the afternoon of May 26 said: "The Finnish-Soviet war also showed that Soviet aircrew does not know how to fight. The Finns had a maximum Xnumx airplanes, and from the Soviet side participated 2500which nevertheless could not put the Finnish fleet out of action and failed to disorganize the transport... »
It is impossible to exclude the likelihood that such a mention of the incapacity of the Air Force KA from the mouth of a German officer could cause an extremely negative reaction of Stalin. 27 May Arrested Owl. The arrests continued until June 22 and after the start of the war. To a greater degree they touched the leaders of the Air Force, the training center for flight personnel, the scientific research institutes and high-ranking pilots who have experience of war in Spain and Mongolia. The defeat of the spacecraft aviation in the first days of the war could confirm Stalin’s suspicions that he correctly decided to crack down on inept leaders ... In the event that this version has the right to exist, then the tankers should follow the aviators.
"Lyceum": "Soviet tanks operating in Finland were of extremely poor quality, and often broke on the way. Even in the Baltics, where there was no war, all roads were filled with broken tanks during the occupation of the KA Baltic States. Is it possible to fight with such equipment with German tanks, which are not afraid of thousands of kilometers of Saharan sands?.. "
In June, one of the last (published) reports of the GS GS - Intelligence Summary No.5 (in the West): "The total number of German army in the 1.6.41 defined in 286-296 divisions, incl .: motorized - 20-25, tank - 22, mountain infantry - 15, parachute - 4-5, airborne - 4-5, divisions "SS "- 18.
The German command continues to concentrate troops in the border zone with the USSR, making massive redeployment of units from the depths of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and the Balkans.
The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova and Dobrudzhu) on 1 June reaches 120-122 divisions, including: 14 etc and 13 md. German troops are distributed along the following lines:
a) in East Prussia 23-24 divisions, including: 18-19 pd and 3md, 5 tp (two TD) and 7 kn;
b) in the Warsaw sector (against ZAPOVO) 30 divisions, including: 24 pd, 1 md, 1 td and 6 tp (total 4 td), one cd and 8 pp;
c) in the Lublin-Krakow district (against KOVO) [Lublin - 76 km from the border, Krakow - 205 km] 35-36 divisions, including: 24-25 rd, 5 md, to 6 td and 5 CP;
d) in the area of Danzig [309 km], Poznan [424 km], Thorn [385 km] - 6 rd, 1 kn;
e) in Slovakia (in the area of Duplin [67 km], Presov [92 km], Mikhalovce [25 km]) - 5 divisions (according to the latest data, some of them, allegedly, left Poland);
f) in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;
g) In Moldova and Northern Dobrogea - 17 divisions, including: 4 md, 1 mountain and 2 etc.
120-126 divisions are concentrated against England (on all fronts), of which: in Norway - 17 (of which 6 are located in the northern part of Norway), in Africa - 8, in Italy - 9, in Greece (with the island of Crete) - 10 in Yugoslavia (Belgrade, Sarajevo, Nis) - 2, on the north-west coast of France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark - 57-60, inside the occupied part of France - 9-10, on the border with Spain - 10.
The reserve of the main command is 44-48 divisions, of which: in the center of Germany - 16-17, in the area of Breslau, Moravsk-Ostrava, Katowice - 6-9, in the center of Romania - 11, in Bulgaria - 11 ...»
From the summary you can see:
1) The total number of divisions concentrated on all fronts against England and our western borders are comparable;
2) part of the divisions concentrated against the USSR is located at a sufficiently large distance from the border (200-424 km);
3) to the estimated number of divisions required for an 180 invasion, there are not enough 58-60 connections (33%);
4) there is a fairly small number of full-fledged ones: against PribOVO, there is no bloke at all, there are only five mt (for other RMs there is also a certain amount of mb); against ZOVOVO - 1 td and six tp; against KOVO - to 6 td (some of them are created from five TP and two TB); against odvo - up to xnumx td.
The figures below show the placement of German units and formations according to the data of this report on the section of the border between ZOVOVO and KOVO. In the next part, we will consider the later RMs in terms of the deployment of German troops north of the Lomza-Ostroleka line and on the border with Romania.
From the pictures you can see:
1) most of the German troops are stationed far enough from the border;
2) among the tank units deployed against KOVO, there are also five TP and two TB,
reduced to conditional td.
Consider a few messages received by the "wiretapping" in the German embassy, which refer to the misinformation "throw" employees from Berlin.
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “NKGB USSR reports the following excerpts for 5 June this year.
If we will to attack through Polandthen here they still have stronger troopsbut…
We want Ukraine. This is the most important thing for us, and we need to manage in war with what we have ...
They will be forced to fight Japan...
We need to clear only Ukraine...
Question how can we transfer troops across the Black Sea. And another question, how do we send Russians to the wrong line? I've sent a letter in which I spoke. about Armenia. So the Russians will go there, and we will hit on the other side... »
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “NKGB USSR reports the following excerpts for 6 June this year.
So we can cross the border. We know the fact that here, too, preparation is in full swing.
Yes.
What we learn in Berlin is just gossip. No one knows about this. I think the Russians will be impressed by the fact that we will call them into battle in about three weeks...
Yes.
... If we perform in June, it will be good. If this is delayed for July and August, it will be late. There will be just a harvest ...
What about the Turks?
They are very weak. We will bombard and England will also bomb Russia.
But this is not a bombardment, but a fighter protection... »
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “9 June this year The embassy in Moscow received a telegraphic order to prepare the embassy for evacuation within 7 days. On the same day, in the evening, in the basement of the embassy, the archival documents of the embassy were burned ..."17 ... June 18, the war did not start ...
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “14.6.41
... I also in that report stressed the need attack on Ukraine. It primarily. It is necessary to accelerate the pace and not to miss the moment (not heard) along this line. offensive from Finland...
Attention to Ukraine - this is a very important area. I (not heard) another lead is necessary to strike on this line.
We need to change the policy. Russians, like others, are very afraid. Russians are especially afraid of us. This is immediately evident. They now do not represent a large force (not heard) of danger to us. I think we must act and not delay. Our success shows our strength ...
Mr. General, information has been received that since last Sunday mobilization began.
Yes?
But they do it with great care.... »
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “TASS report from 13 June this year. It was welcomed by many embassy staff with satisfaction and was regarded as sign of settling relationships between the USSR and Germany. However, the short-term calm 14 came on June of this year. again replaced by excitement and confusion and hasty fees for departure to Germany... »
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “16.6.41 ... I am personally very pessimistic and, although I don’t know anything concrete, I think that Hitler is plotting a war with Russia. At the end of April, I personally met with ... and completely openly told himthat his plans for a war with the USSR are sheer madness, that now is not the time to think about a war with the USSR ...»
K.A. Meretskov: "MP Kirponos, having taken the matter very seriously, ordered to take up field positions in the border UR KOVO and began to pull up the troops of the 2 echelon. In Moscow received a message about this. The movement of connections from the 2 echelon was allowed, but at the direction of the General Staff, the KOVO forces had to leave the field and move back ...»
PC Military Council KOVO 10.6.41: "The head of the border guards of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR reported that the heads of the UR were instructed to occupy the predpole. Report to the People's Commissar of Defense for the report, on what grounds did parts of UR KOVO receive orders to occupy the predpole. Such an action could provoke the Germans into an armed conflict and is fraught with all sorts of consequences. Cancel such an order immediately and report on who specifically gave such an arbitrary order. Zhukov»
PC Commander KOVO 11.6.41: "People's Commissar of Defense ordered:
1) Without a special order, do not occupy the pre-field band with field and Lauvian units. The protection of structures organized by the guard service and patrols.
2) The orders for the occupation of the predvolya by the Urals units that you issued are immediately canceled.
Execution check and report to 16 June 1941. Zhukov»
According to the memoirs of K.A. Meretskov, the initiative to start the movement of 2-echelon troop cover closer to the border came from the commander of the KOVO troops. The private initiative of the district command is again mentioned, rather than orders from Moscow. The commander managed to defend this decision, but the predpole had to be left. Judging by the presence of two PCs on different days, the Military Council of KOVO tried to clarify its position, perhaps, to cancel the order to withdraw troops from the field line. We will consider a similar situation later in relation to PribOVO, when one PC of the Chief of the General Staff to cancel the order turned out to be little ...
According to intelligence data, as of 1.6.41, near our border there are concentrated (without 6 divisions in the area of Danzig-Poznan-Thorn) 114-116 German connections. June 10 The 16 army is turning to Ukraine.
13 Jun directed Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander KOVO: "To increase the combat readiness of the district troops to 1.7.41, all subdivision divisions and corps control with corps [we are talking about 15-sd included in 31 ck, 36 ck, 37 ck, 49 ck and 55 ck] transfer closer to the state border in the new camps ...
Border divisions should be left in place, bearing in mind that their withdrawal to the state border, if necessary, can be made only on my special order.
Troop movements kept in complete secrecy. Marsh to make tactical exercises at night. With the troops to withdraw fully transportable reserves of fire equipment and lubricants ... Do not take families. Execution to deliver by hand to 1.7.41.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.Timoshenko Head of the General Staff of the Spacecraft General of the Army G.Zhukov»
The decision is made to transfer fifteen sd from the KOVO reserve to the zone where the unions belonging to the 2 echelon of the covering armies are deployed. If you believe PASudoplatov, then the redeployment was carried out to compensate for the increase in the German group. Let's look at how the German grouping at the border has changed.
Between 25.4 and 1.6.41 against the KOVO and OdVO troops, the German group increased by the 21-22 divisions. After reducing the danger of invasion of German troops from Turkey, for the 16 Army, there is a change in the direction of redeployment from the Caucasus to Ukraine. It should be noted that in ZakVO there still remains a solid grouping of troops as part of 15 divisions (including 2 td and 1 md). 16-I army can partially replace the backup sk, which received an order to relocate closer to the border.
Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander KOVO 12.6.41: "On the territory of KOVO, in the period from 15.6 to 10.7.41, the 16 Army will be composed of: Army administration with service units; 5 micron (13, 17 td and 109 md); 57 TD; 32 ck (46, 152 cd, 126 body an). Arriving units and formations should be included in the KOVO troops with subordination in all respects to the KOVO Military Council... »
After the arrival of the reserve reserve in the zone of troops of the 2 th echelon cover, our group near the border (together with the troops of the 1 th and 2 th echelons) in KOVO will make 45 divisions. In total with OdVO divisions, this number will amount to 56 connections. 56 compounds KOVO KVO and OdVO in early July, will oppose 61-62 German.
The assessment of the number of troops confirms the words of P. A. Sudoplatov about the striving of the leadership of NGOs and General Staffs. prevent «creating an enemy on our borders groups that would have an overwhelming superiority over the spacecraft". You can prove the validity of other versions, allegedly referring to your rich military experience, but you should not believe such people without facts. But there are no such facts in the public domain. According to the author, the troops approached the border precisely in order to deter German generals from attacking our country. Only it was completely useless - Hitler had already mastered manic idea about the victory over the Soviet Union - "the colossus on clay feet." He pulled Germany into a disastrous adventure.
Relocatable compounds, therefore, in addition to a certain amount of ammunition, dragged along with training equipment and even sports equipment. True, the family did not take, probably not because they were waiting for war. And because there was no place to place them in field camps, and the question arose of feeding them ... Therefore, the families were left in the PPD. The terms of moving to the border of the indicated 5-ty sk disprove the thesis that the start of the 22 war of June was certainly expected. They did not have time to arrive at the border by 22 in June. At this number, they were in 200-250 km from the border. The fantastic version of the literary figure O. Yu. Is puzzling. Kozinkin that the leadership of the spacecraft was preparing an immediate preventive strike against the German troops.
As mentioned above, on 22.6.41 31, 36, 37, 49 and 55 ck were located far from the border (around 5-6 daily crossings), unlike the larger number of German troops in the border area. These troops were located closer to the border. In addition, according to intelligence data, there was a huge number of mobile German troops near our borders: 30-31 td and md, which also, like front office, had to be equipped more than our divisions and corps.
Above it was said about the report of the “Lyceumist”, from which Stalin could once again learn about the unreliability of the Soviet tank technology and the not very good ability of the Stalin falcons to fight with Goering's aces. Well, what a clever person will attack a much stronger enemy with spread fingers. But, this version of the specified writer everywhere promotes. If below the names of his works add the words: "A look at the events from the rear“It would even be interesting to leaf through them in order to understand the vision of a paramilitary man from the rear ... Let's see what happened in other directions.
Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander ZOVOVO 12.6.41: "On the territory of Zapovo in the period from 17.6 to 2.7.41 will arrive: 51 ck consisting of: body control with body parts, 98, 112 and 153 cd; 63 ck consisting of: body control with body parts and 546 cap, 53 and 148 sd; 22 engineering regiment ... Formations arriving on the territory of the district are not included in the SECO and the military council of the district is not subject to... »
The six subdivisions arriving on the territory of Zapov are not included in the district, since From 25.4 to 15.5.41, the grouping of German troops increased by 2 divisions and remained unchanged. 30 German connections are fended off by our 28. Overwhelming superiority is not observed. In addition, there are connections to the county reserves. It seems to be all right. In the event of a further increase in the number of German divisions, it will be possible to increase our grouping near the border by moving the reserve corps or corps of the 13 Army.
In PribOVO, from 25.4 to 15.5.41, the grouping of German troops also increases by 2 divisions and does not increase further. Against the 23-24 of the German connections in the 1-m and in the 2-th echelons posted 22 KA divisions. It is planned to transfer the 11 and 16 units to the border, as well as hull management from the LVO, to the border.
Thus, the words of P.A. Sudoplatov can be fair not only in relation to KOVO and OdVO, but also in relation to ZOVOVO and PribOVO.
In the previous part, we considered the period from spring 1940 to April 1941. It was shown that intelligence of the General Staff of the General Staff, the NKGB and the NKVD (border troops) significantly overestimated the number of German formations at the border. In March-April 1941, according to the estimation of the General Staff, it was believed that Germany could allocate up to 200 divisions for an attack on the USSR. As of the end of April, a lot of TB and TP were found at the border, which were reduced to conditional etc. According to intelligence, there were both so on and so on, but not one was found tank groups and not a single mk.
The high command staff of the spacecraft knew that the basis for a quick war (blitzkrieg) should be mobile (tank) groups, aviation and landing troops.
Our intelligence did not know that the main striking force of the German forces in the East was eleven microns from the 12 available in the Wehrmacht. 10 of them to 22.6.41 were combined into four tank groups and concentrated near the border.
Were there any German microns during this period at the border? Below are a few German documents, which partially reflect the activities that reduce the likelihood of the discovery of these associations by Soviet intelligence.
RCB 48 tk (48 microns): "Since arriving in Zamoć 22.4.41 command is under the direct control of the 6 Army. For reasons of secrecy, the command is called "headquarters of the 48 construction fortress". In addition to corps units and 2 of 64 hell, the corps has no divisions or units of military subordination that must be subordinated to the corps during Operation Barbarossa. Such connections are subordinate to the responsible for the given territory 3 TK, and later 55 AK. Also, the works of the theater of future combat operations - road works, the construction of defensive fortifications near the Bug River at the same time to disguise the occupation of the initial lines - the command of 48 TK has no direct relation...
[Since 48 MK has no connections, it is not involved in road construction and fortification construction. Parts of 3 TK were probably involved in these works.]
3.6.41. The corps can finally issue an “Order to take command from 10.06 and a march to the center of concentration” to the connections subordinate to it from 10 June. In addition to a review of the situation and movement management, the order contains the order of construction for the upcoming actions
6.6.41. Gradually arriving for discharge parts given an abbreviated order of the march. It is also preparing to transfer the 19 of June KP Corps to the bend of the Bug at Sokal ...
10.6.41. According to the daily order, the corps commander takes command over the subordinate units at last. On the same day, an order is issued to strengthen defense measures in case of an unexpected Russian attack.
20.6.41. ... After most orders are given in the morning, it becomes calmer in the afternoon. The last meeting arrives NSH 6-th Army, Colonel Heim and the commander of 11 etc. Nomination to the initial positions is still going on without deviations from the plan.
21.6.41. The commander of the 1 Group, Colonel General von Kleist, takes command of the corps. KP Tank Group is transferred to the forest at Wolka Labunska... [52 km from the border]. "
The 48 headquarters is located near the 22 border on April 1941, disguised as a building site. Subordinate divisions arrive from June 10. For two months, the corps headquarters was not detected by our intelligence services.
Directive on the strategic concentration and deployment of troops (plan "Barbarossa"): "OKH intends to redeploy by this time all the working headquarters of army groups, armies and tank groups to the East to prepare and implement the necessary measures. In order to maintain secrecy, the said headquarters should be located in areas already located in the East. Army Group “B” troops or armies ... The command groups of armies and armies accept the lanes that they are assigned, in accordance with the directive on concentration, observing at first the masking measures...»
Command 6 th Army. Nomination instructions Barbarossa 2.5.41: "Secrecy: ... Required Attractions [military personnel] for reconnaissance should be masked by exercises and territorial activities. Corps Command is responsible for that intelligence at the border was carried out only under camouflage (unobservable from abroad). To do this, you should immediately create barriers on all roads and paths leading to the border in cover areas that can be crossed only by officers (for example, sappers) who have special pass command corps. Any involvement of the civilian population is prohibited. Orders for the nomination of troops can not be issued completely, and work out only excerpts (in stages)... »
21.05.41 meeting at the 6 Army Headquarters: "Exit to the original position. Do not cross forbidden lines. Artillery to withdraw to the position only in the last 3-4 nights, namely, starting from west to east. Entering infantry positions must be completed 2 hours before the attack. Masking the original positions! Question materials! Supply is impossible, self-sustainment (cover, capes, etc.). Reserves far back and bury.
Air protection of the initial positions is especially important, since it is possible that Russians will start a war in the air before the offensive begins... »
There are forbidden lines for which parts are not displayed. Great importance is attached to the masking of positions, reserves are relegated far back. The German generals envisage measures that should be carried out in the event that the Russian command is able to unravel their plan and take action in the air. Everything is done to ensure that Soviet intelligence (including visual detection) does not detect the combat units and units of the focusing group ...
RCB 17 Army: "21.6.41 20-00. The troops read the appeal of the Fuhrer to the "Soldiers of the Eastern Front"
20-00. 52 AK has been instructed to carry out distracting activities in the area of Przemysl, even if the main corps offensive operation is canceled.
3-15 [22.6.41] 17 army moves to the starting position for the offensive according to the deployment plan of "Barbarossa"... »
An interesting phrase about the distracting actions of 52 AK. It turns out that in the event of the cancellation of the outbreak of war, the corps (or its parts) are destined to depict provocative actions at the border. Even in 20-00 21.6.41 there is a possibility that the war will not start.
Command 48 TK: "13.06.41. Corps order to prepare for an offensive and actions at the beginning of the attack ...
a) General provisions: By itself, the exit to the starting positions cannot remain hidden from the enemy. Thus, operational surprise is impossible. It is all the more necessary to keep the enemy in the dark about the day of the attack. therefore Any rash actions should be strictly avoided when taking initial positions., warehousing material and ammunition, wiring communication equipment and instructing.
Any crossing of the Bug for reconnaissance purposes is prohibited ... In relation to individual aircraft or to small connections of reconnaissance aircraft flying across the border, there is a ban on fire ...»
ZhBD 3 td (from the composition of 24-th u):13.06.41 Divisions report arrival in a new area of concentration ... Parts in forest camps are persistently complaining about the torment of mosquitoes ...
14.06.41 East of the restraining line is prescribed a thorough disguise....
20.6.41 Released from the зыdzyn district [64 km from the border] in accordance with the order of the division commander, the units are leaving ... to the area of initial positions ...
21.6.41 In the 23-30, parts report on the readiness and occupation of the last starting positions ...»
RCB 57 micron: "14.6.41 Tracked vehicles 12-th TD arrived at the point of temporary deployment. The first parts of the 19 th TD are unloaded and follow the march to the designated point of temporary deployment.
16.6.41 Wheel equipment 18-md arrived at the point of temporary deployment.
17.6.41 ... All parts of 19 td arrived at the point of temporary deployment.
18.6.41 Half 18 md leaves the temporary dislocation point and marches to halt at Ekersberg (Okartovo). The rearguard is located there 19.6 to 4-00 ...
20.6.41 12 td occupies the prescribed starting position ... 29-th TP division, along with other parts of the 16-00 resumes movement along the established route. 19 td moves along the route from the former point of temporary dislocation with a halt on both sides of the route of movement of tanks ...
21.6.41 Around 7 in the morning, redeployment of the hull control from Mikolajki to a new KP in the Seiny area begins [9,5 km from the border] ... 20-00 from 19, etc., was informed by telephone that her planned march southwest of Orzhes [133 km from the border] due to the wedging of two SS connections on the road intended for the movement of tanks, it becomes questionable ... With 21-00, 19 etc. continued to move in the area of Litsk-Suwalki ...»
The German command widely used various measures of strategic and operational camouflage. The headquarters of the new associations arriving in the East (possibly tank units) were located at the location of military units and institutions already located there. In order to mislead the Soviet command, the commander of Army Group Center 24.3.41 ordered the construction of various fortifications along the USSR border, supposedly intended to defend against a possible Soviet offensive. An order is offered not to hinder Soviet aerial reconnaissance overseeing the work being done. The defenses were erected by the Germans so that they could be used as starting points for an offensive against the USSR.
A.P.Sudoplatov: "In the spring of 1941, the Germans more than once managed to replay Soviet residencies in Berlin, Sofia, Bucharest, Bratislava, Ankara. Our main mistake was to exaggerate the role of the German ambassador in Moscow, Count Schulenburg, who, at meetings, invariably stressed the interest of the Germans in developing economic relations with the Soviet Union.... »
From the recording of the conversation of I.V. Stalin with U. Cherchell 15.8.41: "He (Churchill) warned Stalin about the upcoming attack on the USSR. His first message about this was very brief and had as its basis the events in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941. [3.4.41]. On the day when Pavel signed a neutrality pact with Hitler, the Germans issued an order to send 3 from 5 etc., located in the Balkans, to Krakow ... Tov.Stalin replies that we never doubted it and that he wanted to get another six months to prepare for this attack...»
Since the summer of 1940, the German command was able to carry out misinformation measures as a result of which the Soviet intelligence of all departments delivered the RM about a significant overestimation of the number of German formations concentrated at the USSR border. It should be noted that the term “concentrated at the border” or “concentrated at the border strip” is somewhat conditional. The “discovered” reconnaissance divisions were actually located at a distance from 20 to 150 km from the border. Some of the connections were even deployed at a distance of 480 km. Why there was an excessive overestimation of the German connections. This topic will not be considered in this cycle - it is still waiting for its researchers ...
The concentration and deployment of a group of German troops to attack the USSR began in mid-February 1941. The transfer was carried out in six echelons. The troops destined for the shock groups were transferred to five echelons, the sixth one was the reserve of the main command (OKH). The transfer of troops was carried out mainly by railway transport as covertly as it could be done. At the final stage, some td relocated under their own power. On the transfer of one division spent from 2 to 7 day.
In the 1 tier, from 20.2 to 15.3.41, 7 nt was redeployed to the border. At the same time, from the West, three PD were sent to the Balkans and the 7 divisions were redeployed to Germany, and from Germany the 15 divisions were sent to the West.
In the period from 16.03-10.04.41, 2 divisions were deployed as part of the 19-echelon (18 front and 1 etc.). At the same time, 9 PD, intended for the occupation service, was sent to the West from Germany, and a PD from Denmark arrived in Germany.
In connection with the Balkan campaign, the number of divisions deployed as part of the 3-th and 4-th echelons according to plan, was reduced, and the 5-th - increased. The transfer of the 3 echelon as part of the 17 divisions was carried out by 11.04-21.05.41. Most divisions came from the West, and two from Germany.
All 43 divisions that arrived as part of the first 3's trains, in the interests of operational camouflage, were located west of the line Königsberg (94 km from the border), Warsaw (145 km), Tarnów (130 km). The minimum distance between two points is given. The distance to the direction of input of the connections is somewhat larger and is 143, 177 and 150 km, respectively.
In the middle of May, 8 pd of the 14 wave was sent from Germany to the West. With 22.05, Germany’s rail transport was moved to an accelerated traffic schedule, and the concentration of troops in the East increased sharply. The transfer of the 4 echelon as part of the 11 front and 9 guard divisions was carried out from 22.05 to 5.06. At the end of May, 5, 15, created in the spring of 1941, was sent to the West from Germany to carry out the occupation service. On 5 June, there were 89 divisions in the three army groups.
5-th echelon was transferred to the East from 6.06 to 18.06 (14 td, 12 md, 2 pd, 3 lpd and 2 mbr). It should be noted that 26 td and md from the 30 mobile units allocated for the attack on the USSR, began to redeploy to the border only with 6.6.41.
The transfer of the 6 echelon, which included the 28 divisions and the 1 reserve OKH brigade, began on June 19 and continued for several weeks after the start of the war.
From 10.06, the attacking echelon troops were withdrawn to the original areas from 7-20 km to 20-30 km from the Soviet-German border, and from 18.06 they began to move to their original position in the dark with strict observance of masking. Simultaneously with the German troops, the Allied forces of Germany were deployed.
The figures show the change in the number of German troops in total at the border of the USSR (already familiar to the readers in the previous section) and separately for PribOVO and Zapovo. Let me remind, dear readers, that the dependencies shown in the figures are intended only for data visualization, since they are valid only for control points.
From the figures, we again see a clearly overestimated number of German divisions according to intelligence reports.
L.M.Sandalov: "In April, 1941, the concentration of German troops near our border was no longer a secret. The May news bulletin of the General Staff warned districts and armies: “Throughout March and April, the German command carried out a reinforced transfer of troops to the border strip from the USSR from the western front and from the central regions of Germany... »
L.M.Sandalov speaks about the concentration of the German troops in accordance with the Republic of Uzbekistan RU GSH. It is worth paying attention to the fact that on the 25.4.41 near our border in the same areas that were considered by September 1940 of the year (without Romania) in the Republic of Uzbekistan RU GSH listed 87-91 German Division. By September 1940, this number was 83-90. These data were mainly confirmed by the intelligence services of the NKGB and the border troops of the NKVD (they even overestimated them slightly).
Thus, it can be said that after eight months, the German grouping near our border (before Slovakia), according to our intelligence estimates, reached a number that was fixed in September of the 1940 year.
Taking into account the troops on the territory of Romania, the number of invasion groups according to the RS GSH at 25.4.41 was 95-100 connections. To parry this threat from Romania were part of the spacecraft deployed on the southern section of KOVO and OdVO. In September 1940, these units were not counted to counter the threat due to the absence of German troops in Romania. Therefore, by the end of April, the military-political leadership of the USSR was also not afraid of the invasion of Germany (and its allies) into our territory, as in September-October of the 1940 year. For the same reason, the German troops, according to the assessment of the leadership of the NKO and the General Staff, were not enough for a full-scale war with our country! That is why it is decided to transfer the 16 Army to the Transcaucasus, and not to the western borders.
Thus, the version of the literary figure O. Yu. Kozinkina (without proper documentary and memoir confirmation) does not hold water: “...Or maybe it was all easier - no one in the South Caucasus was going to ... In Georgia, the troops from Chita to drive at all ?? Because… [in threat] from Turkey did not believe in principle, and the attack was expected precisely from Germany - for the summer of 41... ”It should be noted that, prior to 14.6.18, the specified writer was in principle unaware that the 16 Army had originally been sent to Transcaucasia.
In April, 1941, two sd will relocate from the MBO to ZOVOVO.
Directive of the NPO to the Military Council of the Moscow Military District 29.4.41: "I order: To send 10.5.41 and 231 units to 224 in Zapovo with full staff, staffed with good quality personnel ... Unload division points and exact time of dispatch (with a calculation of division arrival no later than 10.5.1941) coordinate with the Military Council... »
These divisions are sometimes considered the “first swallows” for the subsequent more large-scale troop movement. However, already in May, both divisions begin to disband, and personnel are sent to staff other units.
P.A. Sudoplatov: "The leadership of the NKO and the General Staff sought to prevent the creation by the enemy on our borders of a grouping that would have an overwhelming superiority over the spacecraft. Achieving at least a balance of power on the border was the most important direction of the military policy of deterring Hitler from throwing at Russia... "Let's check this statement of Pavel Anatolyevich about"prevent overwhelming superiority».
It is well known that in the western border of VO there existed troops of the 1 th echelon of the covering armies, the 2 th echelon, a reserve of districts and troops of the GDK. As mentioned above, according to intelligence data on our border, there were 25.4.41-89 German divisions on 94. This number did not include the 6 divisions (in the Danzig-Poznan-Thorn area) located at a distance of 309-424 km from the border. The figure shows the number of divisions in the 1 and 2 echelons of the covering armies of the western border VO.
It can be said that 89-94 was opposed to the German connections by the 91 KA division. It should be noted that in the territories of the districts there were additionally associations and connections of the reserves of the districts and the RGCs, which could be used to build up our grouping at the border and to deter the enemy. It turns out that by the end of April 1941, the number of German and Soviet divisions at the border is comparable. Below we will conduct a similar estimate for the number of divisions for June 1941 of the year.
On intelligence report from 5.5.41, the number of German divisions increased to 103 – 107 (including 6, located in the Danzig-Poznan region). It also indicates that “Probably the further strengthening of the German troops in Norway, the North-Norwegian group of which in the future can be used against the USSR through Finland and the sea... "Ie The risk of invasion from Finland and Northern Norway is quite high.
An increase in divisions against PribOVO and ZAPOVO occurred on the 3 compound, and against KOVO and OdVO on 4-5. During this period, CK is transferred from the North Caucasian Military District to the composition of the reserves of the High Command.
Directive of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander KOVO 13.5.41: "People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR ordered:
1. Adopt and place in camps in the district one office [34 ck] with corps and one up, four twelve-thousandth SD and one GDS from the composition of the North Caucasian Military District.
2. Send by rail to OdVO 32 cd... »
In the second half of May 1941, the 9 ck control from the SCWO with body parts and 106 cd will be redeployed to the Crimea (OdVO), where it additionally includes 156 cd and 32 cd, and the corpus received the name “9 st special cc”.
In mid-May, a draft document was prepared: “Considerations of the General Staff of the Spacecraft for the strategic deployment plan of the Armed Forces. At present, Germany, according to the data of the Spacecraft Directorate, has deployed ... around 230 DD, 22 TD, 20 md, 8 air and 4 cd, and only about 284 divisions. Of these, on the borders of the Soviet Union, as of 15.5.41, concentrated to 86 DD, 13 td, 12 md and 1 cd, and only to 112 divisions.
It is assumed that ... Germany, in the event of an attack on the USSR, will be able to put up against us - up to 137 pd, 19 td, 15 md, 4 cd and 5 airborne divisions, and only up to 180 divisions ...»
Thus, up to the number of German divisions 180 needed for an invasion, 62 connections are still lacking.
A.P.Sudoplatov: "The development of military plans, including offensive large-scale operations, was a common practice for all the major powers of the major powers of Europe and Asia in the 1930-1940-s. It has never been a secret for us that such plans are also being developed by Nazi Germany. Another thing is a political decision to unleash a war and to put into practice the plans of the military command ... Zhukov and Vasilevsky proposed to preempt the Germans in the strategic deployment of troops in the event Germany started military operations. This is a famous handwritten document dated 15.5.41 ...
Considerations about the oncoming battle, Stalin and the people's commissar of defense Tymoshenko based the directives on the troops on the 22 day on June 1941, when an attempt was made to stop the Germans with a counter strike and strike them with the main attack on the South-West direction. Zhukov, in my opinion, changes his memory when he writes in his memoirs that the Bids directive on conducting a decisive counterattack was completely unexpected for him. After all, it was about carrying out those activities that he, as the Chief of the General Staff and Major General Vasilevsky, suggested that Stalin be carried out in the event of a war ... Moreover, the May considerations of Zhukov and Vasilevsky were in fact our first draft plan of military operations in the event of a war Germany... »
When analyzing the RM in the GSH RU, there were problems with the identification of German units and formations connected with their mass transfers at the border and with the movements carried out during the exercise.
Special post RU GSH KA in NKGB 21.5.41: "The German command reinforces the grouping of troops in the border with the USSR, making massive troop movements from the interior of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and the Balkans. This gain raises no doubt. but along with the actual increase in troops in the border strip German command is simultaneously engaged in maneuvering, transferring separate parts in the border area from one locality to another, so that in case of their assessment we had the impression the German command needed.
In addition, recently, the German command in the border with the USSR is carried out a series of exercises military units which are also associated with the movement of troops. Therefore, in order to avoid mistakes in the assessment of the grouping and it is easier to figure out which parts, where they come from and where they come from, I kindly ask you to indicate in your intelligence reports:
1) where the troops come from (from France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Germany, etc.);
2) when and through which points the troops pass;
3) which troops (infantry, artillery, tanks, etc.);
4) in what quantity (regiment, division);
5) numbering of these units (regimental number, division);
6) which corps and armies include the detected troops;
7) when and where they arrive... »
Special message NKGB USSR People's Commissars of State Security of the Belarusian, Lithuanian, Karelian-Finnish and Moldavian SSR, heads of the UNKGB for the Leningrad and Odessa regions 24.5.41: “RU GSH KA reports that the German command, reinforcing the grouping of troops in the border with the USSR, the band due to the massive transfer of troops from the interior of Germany, the occupied countries and the Balkans ... However, along with the actual increase in troops in the border zone, the German command engaged and maneuvering...»
The number of 200 German divisions on our border passes through the Republic of Moldova, and the number of 180 divisions is the arithmetic average between the values in the Republic of Moldova.
Special Message NKGB 25.5.41: "19.5.41 in conversation ... The student reported the following: Germany has now concentrated on the Soviet border 160-200 divisionssupplied with a large number of tanks and aircraft...
War between the Soviet Union and Germany is unlikely, although it would be very popular in Germany, while the current war with England is not approved by the population.
Hitler cannot take such a risk as war with the USSRfearing a violation of the unity of the National Socialist Party. Although the defeat of the USSR in the event of war is beyond doubt, Germany would have had to spend about 6 war for weeks, during which supplies from the East would stop, it would take a long time to organize Germany’s supply, and during that time England would be using America much stronger. Summer would have been lost for Germany, and a hungry winter would come again.
German Armed Forcescollected at the border must show Soviet Union determined to act if forced to do so. Hitler hopes that in this connection Stalin will become more accommodating and will stop all sorts of intrigues against Germany, and most importantly, he will give more goods, especially Oil...»
«Lyceum student"(Burrnins, agent of German intelligence" Peter "). One of the messages of "Peter" we met in the 2 part. In winter, in the Republic of Moldova, received from the "Lyceum" said: "Information about the upcoming landing of the Germans in England "Lyceum" received from a senior lieutenant... "For the" senior lieutenant, "referred to in the message, Hitler himself pretended to be in charge of this agent. Through the "Lyceum" Hitler convinced Stalin that Germany would not attack the USSR if it was not compelled to do so.
Thus, the number of divisions in disinformation was named by Hitler himself, and it surprisingly (or according to German intelligence) coincided with the number as estimated by our GSH in March-April 1941 of the year.
All the Republic of Moldova from the "Lyceum" were sent to Stalin. Perhaps the information from this source coincided with the vision of events by Stalin. But, P.A. Sudoplatov writes: “In Moscow, they knew that the "Lyceum" is a double agent. The assessment of this agent was rather complicated: on the one hand, valuable information came from him, but on the other hand, it contained many rumors and conjectures, underlined from journalistic and diplomatic circles ...
On the erroneous instructions of the Kremlin, we threw misinformation about what allegedly Stalin was a consistent supporter of the peaceful settlement of the agreements, in contrast to the military circles of the USSR that adhere to tough positions of military confrontation in Germany. This was followed by the infamous TASS statement from 14 June 1941 of the unfounded rumors about the war with Germany... »
Hitler did not need assurances that "rumors that the USSR is preparing for war with Germany are deceitful and provocative". He was already convinced of the correctness of his actions related to the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union. On the latest report from Peter, received by 2.6.41, which spoke about the peaceableness of the Soviet Union, Hitler wrote: “Liar!"- and ordered him to arrest ...
In previous installments, the author referred to the Aviators case. Let us dwell on it a little more. In April, 41-th discussion of the accident occurred in parts of long-range aviation. The result of this discussion was the Resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of 9.4.41. The following people were found guilty: Tymoshenko’s Commissar for Defense, Rychagov, Chief of the RA Air Force, Proskurov, Commander of Long-Range Aviation, Mironov, Head of the Operational Flight Operations Division of the Air Force Headquarters. The most severe punishment was provided for Mironov: "Bring to court for a clearly criminal order that violates the elementary rules of the flight service". In addition, the Politburo proposed to remove from office and bring Proskurov to court. As for Rychagov, he was removed from office "as undisciplined and unable to cope with the duties of the head of the Air Force". People's Commissar Tymoshenko got off with a reprimand.
The 4.5.41 Politburo makes a new decision: "Suggest to the Prosecutor of the USSR ... regarding the Lieutenant-General Aviation Proskurov and Colonel Mironov to consider their case in court and, bearing in mind their merits in the spacecraft, limit themselves to public reprimand... »
7.5.41 held a meeting of representatives of the High Command of the Air Force and the leadership of the NKAP, at which the head of the Scientific Research Institute of the Air Force, Filin, delivered a report. In the report, he analyzed in detail the work of the institute, showing the flaws and revealing their causes. He pointed out the flaws in the work of the aviation industry, expressed in the presentation of not tested and not fully tested airplanes for state tests: Yak-1, Yak-4, LaGG-1, Su-2, Ap-2, Pe-2 and EP-2. It was unpleasant that the end of the report took on the character of a sharp controversy between Filin and Stalin.
In a message from the "Lyceum", who got on the table to Stalin in the evening 25 or in the afternoon of May 26 said: "The Finnish-Soviet war also showed that Soviet aircrew does not know how to fight. The Finns had a maximum Xnumx airplanes, and from the Soviet side participated 2500which nevertheless could not put the Finnish fleet out of action and failed to disorganize the transport... »
It is impossible to exclude the likelihood that such a mention of the incapacity of the Air Force KA from the mouth of a German officer could cause an extremely negative reaction of Stalin. 27 May Arrested Owl. The arrests continued until June 22 and after the start of the war. To a greater degree they touched the leaders of the Air Force, the training center for flight personnel, the scientific research institutes and high-ranking pilots who have experience of war in Spain and Mongolia. The defeat of the spacecraft aviation in the first days of the war could confirm Stalin’s suspicions that he correctly decided to crack down on inept leaders ... In the event that this version has the right to exist, then the tankers should follow the aviators.
"Lyceum": "Soviet tanks operating in Finland were of extremely poor quality, and often broke on the way. Even in the Baltics, where there was no war, all roads were filled with broken tanks during the occupation of the KA Baltic States. Is it possible to fight with such equipment with German tanks, which are not afraid of thousands of kilometers of Saharan sands?.. "
In June, one of the last (published) reports of the GS GS - Intelligence Summary No.5 (in the West): "The total number of German army in the 1.6.41 defined in 286-296 divisions, incl .: motorized - 20-25, tank - 22, mountain infantry - 15, parachute - 4-5, airborne - 4-5, divisions "SS "- 18.
The German command continues to concentrate troops in the border zone with the USSR, making massive redeployment of units from the depths of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and the Balkans.
The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova and Dobrudzhu) on 1 June reaches 120-122 divisions, including: 14 etc and 13 md. German troops are distributed along the following lines:
a) in East Prussia 23-24 divisions, including: 18-19 pd and 3md, 5 tp (two TD) and 7 kn;
b) in the Warsaw sector (against ZAPOVO) 30 divisions, including: 24 pd, 1 md, 1 td and 6 tp (total 4 td), one cd and 8 pp;
c) in the Lublin-Krakow district (against KOVO) [Lublin - 76 km from the border, Krakow - 205 km] 35-36 divisions, including: 24-25 rd, 5 md, to 6 td and 5 CP;
d) in the area of Danzig [309 km], Poznan [424 km], Thorn [385 km] - 6 rd, 1 kn;
e) in Slovakia (in the area of Duplin [67 km], Presov [92 km], Mikhalovce [25 km]) - 5 divisions (according to the latest data, some of them, allegedly, left Poland);
f) in the Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;
g) In Moldova and Northern Dobrogea - 17 divisions, including: 4 md, 1 mountain and 2 etc.
120-126 divisions are concentrated against England (on all fronts), of which: in Norway - 17 (of which 6 are located in the northern part of Norway), in Africa - 8, in Italy - 9, in Greece (with the island of Crete) - 10 in Yugoslavia (Belgrade, Sarajevo, Nis) - 2, on the north-west coast of France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark - 57-60, inside the occupied part of France - 9-10, on the border with Spain - 10.
The reserve of the main command is 44-48 divisions, of which: in the center of Germany - 16-17, in the area of Breslau, Moravsk-Ostrava, Katowice - 6-9, in the center of Romania - 11, in Bulgaria - 11 ...»
From the summary you can see:
1) The total number of divisions concentrated on all fronts against England and our western borders are comparable;
2) part of the divisions concentrated against the USSR is located at a sufficiently large distance from the border (200-424 km);
3) to the estimated number of divisions required for an 180 invasion, there are not enough 58-60 connections (33%);
4) there is a fairly small number of full-fledged ones: against PribOVO, there is no bloke at all, there are only five mt (for other RMs there is also a certain amount of mb); against ZOVOVO - 1 td and six tp; against KOVO - to 6 td (some of them are created from five TP and two TB); against odvo - up to xnumx td.
The figures below show the placement of German units and formations according to the data of this report on the section of the border between ZOVOVO and KOVO. In the next part, we will consider the later RMs in terms of the deployment of German troops north of the Lomza-Ostroleka line and on the border with Romania.
From the pictures you can see:
1) most of the German troops are stationed far enough from the border;
2) among the tank units deployed against KOVO, there are also five TP and two TB,
reduced to conditional td.
Consider a few messages received by the "wiretapping" in the German embassy, which refer to the misinformation "throw" employees from Berlin.
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “NKGB USSR reports the following excerpts for 5 June this year.
If we will to attack through Polandthen here they still have stronger troopsbut…
We want Ukraine. This is the most important thing for us, and we need to manage in war with what we have ...
They will be forced to fight Japan...
We need to clear only Ukraine...
Question how can we transfer troops across the Black Sea. And another question, how do we send Russians to the wrong line? I've sent a letter in which I spoke. about Armenia. So the Russians will go there, and we will hit on the other side... »
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “NKGB USSR reports the following excerpts for 6 June this year.
So we can cross the border. We know the fact that here, too, preparation is in full swing.
Yes.
What we learn in Berlin is just gossip. No one knows about this. I think the Russians will be impressed by the fact that we will call them into battle in about three weeks...
Yes.
... If we perform in June, it will be good. If this is delayed for July and August, it will be late. There will be just a harvest ...
What about the Turks?
They are very weak. We will bombard and England will also bomb Russia.
But this is not a bombardment, but a fighter protection... »
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “9 June this year The embassy in Moscow received a telegraphic order to prepare the embassy for evacuation within 7 days. On the same day, in the evening, in the basement of the embassy, the archival documents of the embassy were burned ..."17 ... June 18, the war did not start ...
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “14.6.41
... I also in that report stressed the need attack on Ukraine. It primarily. It is necessary to accelerate the pace and not to miss the moment (not heard) along this line. offensive from Finland...
Attention to Ukraine - this is a very important area. I (not heard) another lead is necessary to strike on this line.
We need to change the policy. Russians, like others, are very afraid. Russians are especially afraid of us. This is immediately evident. They now do not represent a large force (not heard) of danger to us. I think we must act and not delay. Our success shows our strength ...
Mr. General, information has been received that since last Sunday mobilization began.
Yes?
But they do it with great care.... »
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “TASS report from 13 June this year. It was welcomed by many embassy staff with satisfaction and was regarded as sign of settling relationships between the USSR and Germany. However, the short-term calm 14 came on June of this year. again replaced by excitement and confusion and hasty fees for departure to Germany... »
Note by Deputy People's Commissar of the USSR State Security B.Z. Kobulova JVStalin, V.M.Molotov and L.P. Beria with the text of the conversation obtained by X-NUMX: “16.6.41 ... I am personally very pessimistic and, although I don’t know anything concrete, I think that Hitler is plotting a war with Russia. At the end of April, I personally met with ... and completely openly told himthat his plans for a war with the USSR are sheer madness, that now is not the time to think about a war with the USSR ...»
K.A. Meretskov: "MP Kirponos, having taken the matter very seriously, ordered to take up field positions in the border UR KOVO and began to pull up the troops of the 2 echelon. In Moscow received a message about this. The movement of connections from the 2 echelon was allowed, but at the direction of the General Staff, the KOVO forces had to leave the field and move back ...»
PC Military Council KOVO 10.6.41: "The head of the border guards of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR reported that the heads of the UR were instructed to occupy the predpole. Report to the People's Commissar of Defense for the report, on what grounds did parts of UR KOVO receive orders to occupy the predpole. Such an action could provoke the Germans into an armed conflict and is fraught with all sorts of consequences. Cancel such an order immediately and report on who specifically gave such an arbitrary order. Zhukov»
PC Commander KOVO 11.6.41: "People's Commissar of Defense ordered:
1) Without a special order, do not occupy the pre-field band with field and Lauvian units. The protection of structures organized by the guard service and patrols.
2) The orders for the occupation of the predvolya by the Urals units that you issued are immediately canceled.
Execution check and report to 16 June 1941. Zhukov»
According to the memoirs of K.A. Meretskov, the initiative to start the movement of 2-echelon troop cover closer to the border came from the commander of the KOVO troops. The private initiative of the district command is again mentioned, rather than orders from Moscow. The commander managed to defend this decision, but the predpole had to be left. Judging by the presence of two PCs on different days, the Military Council of KOVO tried to clarify its position, perhaps, to cancel the order to withdraw troops from the field line. We will consider a similar situation later in relation to PribOVO, when one PC of the Chief of the General Staff to cancel the order turned out to be little ...
According to intelligence data, as of 1.6.41, near our border there are concentrated (without 6 divisions in the area of Danzig-Poznan-Thorn) 114-116 German connections. June 10 The 16 army is turning to Ukraine.
13 Jun directed Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander KOVO: "To increase the combat readiness of the district troops to 1.7.41, all subdivision divisions and corps control with corps [we are talking about 15-sd included in 31 ck, 36 ck, 37 ck, 49 ck and 55 ck] transfer closer to the state border in the new camps ...
Border divisions should be left in place, bearing in mind that their withdrawal to the state border, if necessary, can be made only on my special order.
Troop movements kept in complete secrecy. Marsh to make tactical exercises at night. With the troops to withdraw fully transportable reserves of fire equipment and lubricants ... Do not take families. Execution to deliver by hand to 1.7.41.
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S.Timoshenko Head of the General Staff of the Spacecraft General of the Army G.Zhukov»
The decision is made to transfer fifteen sd from the KOVO reserve to the zone where the unions belonging to the 2 echelon of the covering armies are deployed. If you believe PASudoplatov, then the redeployment was carried out to compensate for the increase in the German group. Let's look at how the German grouping at the border has changed.
Between 25.4 and 1.6.41 against the KOVO and OdVO troops, the German group increased by the 21-22 divisions. After reducing the danger of invasion of German troops from Turkey, for the 16 Army, there is a change in the direction of redeployment from the Caucasus to Ukraine. It should be noted that in ZakVO there still remains a solid grouping of troops as part of 15 divisions (including 2 td and 1 md). 16-I army can partially replace the backup sk, which received an order to relocate closer to the border.
Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander KOVO 12.6.41: "On the territory of KOVO, in the period from 15.6 to 10.7.41, the 16 Army will be composed of: Army administration with service units; 5 micron (13, 17 td and 109 md); 57 TD; 32 ck (46, 152 cd, 126 body an). Arriving units and formations should be included in the KOVO troops with subordination in all respects to the KOVO Military Council... »
After the arrival of the reserve reserve in the zone of troops of the 2 th echelon cover, our group near the border (together with the troops of the 1 th and 2 th echelons) in KOVO will make 45 divisions. In total with OdVO divisions, this number will amount to 56 connections. 56 compounds KOVO KVO and OdVO in early July, will oppose 61-62 German.
The assessment of the number of troops confirms the words of P. A. Sudoplatov about the striving of the leadership of NGOs and General Staffs. prevent «creating an enemy on our borders groups that would have an overwhelming superiority over the spacecraft". You can prove the validity of other versions, allegedly referring to your rich military experience, but you should not believe such people without facts. But there are no such facts in the public domain. According to the author, the troops approached the border precisely in order to deter German generals from attacking our country. Only it was completely useless - Hitler had already mastered manic idea about the victory over the Soviet Union - "the colossus on clay feet." He pulled Germany into a disastrous adventure.
Relocatable compounds, therefore, in addition to a certain amount of ammunition, dragged along with training equipment and even sports equipment. True, the family did not take, probably not because they were waiting for war. And because there was no place to place them in field camps, and the question arose of feeding them ... Therefore, the families were left in the PPD. The terms of moving to the border of the indicated 5-ty sk disprove the thesis that the start of the 22 war of June was certainly expected. They did not have time to arrive at the border by 22 in June. At this number, they were in 200-250 km from the border. The fantastic version of the literary figure O. Yu. Is puzzling. Kozinkin that the leadership of the spacecraft was preparing an immediate preventive strike against the German troops.
As mentioned above, on 22.6.41 31, 36, 37, 49 and 55 ck were located far from the border (around 5-6 daily crossings), unlike the larger number of German troops in the border area. These troops were located closer to the border. In addition, according to intelligence data, there was a huge number of mobile German troops near our borders: 30-31 td and md, which also, like front office, had to be equipped more than our divisions and corps.
Above it was said about the report of the “Lyceumist”, from which Stalin could once again learn about the unreliability of the Soviet tank technology and the not very good ability of the Stalin falcons to fight with Goering's aces. Well, what a clever person will attack a much stronger enemy with spread fingers. But, this version of the specified writer everywhere promotes. If below the names of his works add the words: "A look at the events from the rear“It would even be interesting to leaf through them in order to understand the vision of a paramilitary man from the rear ... Let's see what happened in other directions.
Directive of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft Commander ZOVOVO 12.6.41: "On the territory of Zapovo in the period from 17.6 to 2.7.41 will arrive: 51 ck consisting of: body control with body parts, 98, 112 and 153 cd; 63 ck consisting of: body control with body parts and 546 cap, 53 and 148 sd; 22 engineering regiment ... Formations arriving on the territory of the district are not included in the SECO and the military council of the district is not subject to... »
The six subdivisions arriving on the territory of Zapov are not included in the district, since From 25.4 to 15.5.41, the grouping of German troops increased by 2 divisions and remained unchanged. 30 German connections are fended off by our 28. Overwhelming superiority is not observed. In addition, there are connections to the county reserves. It seems to be all right. In the event of a further increase in the number of German divisions, it will be possible to increase our grouping near the border by moving the reserve corps or corps of the 13 Army.
In PribOVO, from 25.4 to 15.5.41, the grouping of German troops also increases by 2 divisions and does not increase further. Against the 23-24 of the German connections in the 1-m and in the 2-th echelons posted 22 KA divisions. It is planned to transfer the 11 and 16 units to the border, as well as hull management from the LVO, to the border.
Thus, the words of P.A. Sudoplatov can be fair not only in relation to KOVO and OdVO, but also in relation to ZOVOVO and PribOVO.
Information