The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. Part of 18. Air defense
Introduction. In previous installments, it was shown that intelligence to 22.6.41 provided incorrect information to the country's military-political leadership. The coincidence of the actual number of German formations concentrated near our border at dawn of 22 June, with the number of divisions given in the Republic of Moldova was a purely random event. The leadership of the NKO and the General Staff expected for a full-scale war with the USSR to be concentrated up to the 180 German divisions.
The reconnaissance did not reveal the mobile attack mototank groups of the enemy, as well as the withdrawal of all German forces to the initial positions for the offensive. It can be assumed that the German command was aware of the inertia of the transfer of intelligence information in the KA-NKVD-NKGB system of the USSR, the transfer of which was up to 1-1,5 days.
On the example of the Navy and when looking at events from the Center, the author tried to show that there is not a single fact showing concern about the possible start of a full-scale 22 war in June by the leadership of NGOs and the General Staff.
In the 18 and 19 parts, we will look at publicly available documents and memories of veterans, mainly about air defense. Based on the submissions, try yourself to conclude that the actions in the air defense units before 18 June may indicate an expectation of a full-scale war (and not individual provocations) at dawn 22.6.41. Also, the author will offer to look at the events already reviewed in PribOVO from a different angle.
Air defense. 25.1.41 is issued Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the organization of air defense". The Resolution states: "1. The area threatened by an air attack shall be the territory located from the state border in depth 1200 km. Items and facilities that are outside 1200 km from the state border may be covered by air defense systems by a special decision of the USSR Government ...
4. The leadership of the Air Defense Force shall be assigned: a) in the center to the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Defense Directorate, subordinate to the people's Commissar of Defense; b) in the districts - to the assistant commander of the district troops for air defense... "
The Decree defines the cities that need to be covered with air defense corps (Moscow, Leningrad, Baku), divisions (Kiev, Lviv) and brigades (Odessa, Riga, Minsk, Belostok, Vilnius, Kaunas, Khabarovsk, Batumi and Drohobych). It also speaks of the formation of 23-x zenap to cover less important cities and 146 ambush with 48 separate chambered machine-gun companies to cover the most important enterprises, power stations, railway nodes and bridges, artillery warehouses with 500 – 2000 capacity of cars, airfield nodes, etc. d.
To effectively use air defense systems, it is necessary to timely detect enemy aircraft. Before the war, this task was assigned to the service of VNOS and radars, of which there were few. Observation posts (NP) VNOS were divided into battalion (BP), company (RP) and NP platoons. In peacetime, only BP and RP were deployed. Thus, the level of operational readiness in the air defense system can be judged on the number of deployed NP VNOS.
During the period of danger and in time of war, the above positions of VNOS were supplemented by NP regiments and divisions of ground forces. In addition, there were subunits and units of a higher level of air-defense facilities subordinate to the command of fleets and flotillas. The main element of the VNOS service was the NP, which usually consisted of seven people: a chief, a deputy and several observers. A telephone served as a means of communication and only in rare cases was a radio station.
For example, in accordance with the Plan of the Western Air Defense Zone, the 2 Company VNOS (8 separate battalion (aboutVNOS) in peacetime could be in three levels of alert, which were called the "Regulations". By 3 position the calculation was constantly serving only on RP. On 2 position exhibited 18 NP, which served 50% personnel. Posts were exhibited for a time not exceeding 4 hours. On 1 position on the NP prepared for work arrived 100% of personnelwhat was assigned no more 8 hours. In the event of the outbreak of war, most of the NPs provided for the construction of 15 ... 20-meter towers. Construction logs were stockpiled and stockpiled in advance.
T.P.Kargopolov (Head of the Communication Service Department of the Military-Electric Academy, from 08.1941 - Head of Communication of the North-Western direction): “Corps and divisions of PribOVO had communications units and subunits equipped with communications according to the timesheets. In addition to the command communication in PribOVO, before the war, the communication of the VNOS service was widely organized. For this connection, radio stations were allocated from all parts, duty was established... ”The lack of information does not allow one to say: how well the posts of VNOS OdVO, KOVO and ZOVOVO were equipped with radio stations. July 2, at the headquarters of the South-Western Front, addresses the issue of the lack of efficiency in the transmission of information on the air situation and on the equipping of the VNOS posts with radio stations.
The VNOS system of the border districts (with its full deployment) created a continuous field of visual observation of the airspace in the border area of 150-250 km depth and around the country's most important objects of 60-120 km depth.
N.N.Voronov (with 19.6.41 - head of the Main Department of Air Defense of the Spacecraft): "There are always a lot of difficulties in a new job, but this time they were especially numerous. Most worried that some military comrades did not understand the meaning of air defense in modern conditions. From the very first days, much seemed to be delivered in a different way than it should be ... The air defense command and control system was very unclear. So, for example, the entire VNOS service was under the direct supervision of the Main Directorate of Air Defense ..., and all active air defenses were subordinated to the commander of the military establishment and only for special training issues - to the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Defense. This ... did not contribute to clarity and efficiency in managing... "
Please note that the head of the General Staff allowed the leadership of various air defense units deployed in the border districts along different lines of command and control: the air-defense units were subordinated to the Air Defense Directorate, and anti-aircraft artillery, searchlight units and air forces were assigned the task of air defense, IN.
P.A. Sudoplatov: "Our losses were largely due to the low level of combat readiness of the Air Force and air defense to repel the attack. In violation of the basic provisions of the charters on the protection of airfields and strategic warehouses were not even deployed duty firing means... »
The organization of air defense airfields left much to be desired. Of the standard air defense systems at the airdromes, there were three quad anti-aircraft machine-gun mounts that were part of the airdrome-technical battalion. Installations were not available in all battalions. In addition, the battalion could provide work aviation at the main airfield and additionally at 1-2 field sites. Therefore, anti-aircraft machine-gun installations were not enough to cover aircraft at airfields, on field sites, and also to carry out air defense of airfield structures (fuel and weapon depots, etc.).
The directive of NGOs from 25.4.41 provided for the formation of anti-aircraft artillery batteries for the defense of airfields and other objects of the 166 Air Force, but this solution was practically not implemented due to the lack of military equipment. 7.6.41 GSH again raises the issue of the allocation of air defense batteries to cover the airfields, but again there is a shortage of anti-aircraft weapons. Inland districts will only respond to this document from June 22-23.
In ZOVOVO, KOVO, OdVO, it was problematic to isolate the air defense batteries from the defense of cities, which should be protected in accordance with the Decree of the CPC. In accordance with the “Cover Plans ...”, the districts were supposed to additionally provide air defense for the warehouses, troop concentrations, road and railway bridges, and railway stations through which the troops were to arrive for subsequent deployment. Therefore, in the districts to cover the objects defined in the "Plans for the cover ...", anti-aircraft battalions (batteries) were withdrawn from the troops (cd and ck).
Air defense divisions (in some cases, batteries, companies, platoon), so were individually involved in the protection of important objects. There were no batteries in the VO, even to cover the main airfields. A certain part of the main airfields was covered by air defense units engaged in anti-aircraft defense of the cities, near which these airfields were located.
PC from the headquarters of LVO (16.4.41): "Commander 19 ck. Back to 142 sd to change the backside of 115 sd to leave on air defense w / Hitola’s node... »
PC from 11 ck (15-30 21.6.41): "Commander 8 Army. 125 and 48 sd anti-aircraft weapons are not fully equipped. According to your order, the back cabinet is returned back to Shavli. Thus the grouping of artillery and reserve regiments remains uncovered by anti-aircraft weapons. I ask for permission to remove 39 from Shavli and cover the combat order of the corps... "
The 133 detachment of the machine gun battalion from the 10 air defense brigade for the defense of the objects had to be unleashed in a row and platoon manner. RCB 133 zen.otd.pul.bat: "18.6.41. Received PC to martial status №2 ...
19.6.41. A military order was received to send a company of DShK to Ponevezhets to defend the front headquarters ...
20.6.41. The task of the battalion is the same. The companies were engaged in the schedule
21.6.41. A military order was received to send one company to the town of Trishkiai. security warehouse №618 ...
21.6.41. A military order was received to send one platoon in Lunachai to defend a warehouse ...
22.6.41 The task of the battalion is the same. Aviation fighting over Riga was not... "
In PribOVO, they even seized one antiaircraft 40-mm “Bofors” cannon battery from the parks of national divisions and raised an assigned squad familiar with this technique.
In VO, the situation was aggravated by the conduct of live firing in the camps of air defense units in accordance with plans approved by the General Staff. Anti-aircraft artillery battalions and batteries were taken to camps, weakening the cover of objects. In case of bringing the air defense units and formations on high alert, considerable time was required for the return of these units to the permanent deployment sites (RPM) and their subsequent installation in firing positions (OP).
General G.K. Zhukov, in addition to managing the work of the General Staff, was also responsible for directing the work of the Central Department of Air Defense, the Communications Directorate, the Fuel Supply Directorate and the General Staff Military Academy. The absence of a centralized order from the General Staff from its chief to transfer air defense compounds to operational readiness No. 2 indicates once more that June 20-21 GK Zhukov did not particularly expect the war: it is likely to blow ...
It should be noted that the head of the General Staff “overwhelmed the work” of all the structures supervised: anti-aircraft defense (troops and airfields were not covered, there was a big shortage of projectiles for anti-aircraft systems of the 37 and 85-mm caliber, and at meetings only the lack of large-caliber projectiles was mentioned) , communications (before the war, the order was not issued to deploy army regiments of communication. The hardware for them was largely destroyed in warehouses or was given to the Germans. Also, in peacetime, there was no order to deploy individual battalions and communications companies). The decision to transfer instructions on bringing the border forces of the VO into combat readiness only through encryption, without informing the Military Councils of the districts of the very meaning of Directive No. XXUMX, indicates its incompetence or disbelief at the beginning of the war at dawn on June 1. The disadvantages associated with the location of the warehouses and the amount of fuel and lubricants in the districts were often mentioned in different forums and the author will not repeat.
In accordance with the orders of the People's Commissars of the NKO and the NKVD No. 0188 and No. 0277 from 28.5.41 is introduced “Instructions for interaction and relationship between the air defense organs of non-profit organizations and the local anti-aircraft bodies of the NKVD of the USSR'"1. Exercise introducing an air-threatened position on the territory of the USSR produced on the instructions of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Chief of (PG) Air Defense... »
Further, the Instructions talk about the procedure for imposing a threatened position on an air attack in the territories and about the interaction of the air defense agencies of the NKO with the local anti-personnel bodies of the NKVD. In the Instructions there is only one point, on the basis of which the assistant commander for air defense can enter a blackout: “In wartime, the commanders of the respective zones and areas, as well as the heads of the NKO air defense units, make decisions on changing the blackout regime in their zone, area or point based on the specific current air situation. The commanders of zones and districts and the heads of the NKO air defense stations give instructions on changing the dimming mode to the appropriate NKVD local anti-aircraft defense authorities for execution... »
The fact is that martial law in border areas was not announced even after sending Directive No. XXUMX, which was sent only to military units of NGOs, NKVMF and did not affect the organs of the NKGB, the NKVD, the Soviet and other civilian authorities. In his memoirs, the head of the Air Defense Department of the Spacecraft does not say a word that he was aware of the commencement of events in the air defense section in accordance with Directive No. XXUMX, and therefore parts of the VNOS operated in peacetime mode (mostly BP and RP were deployed). This led to the fact that enemy aircraft were detected only near objects and time to respond to anti-aircraft artillery units, and even more so to air defense fighters almost did not remain. And in what case can this fact take place? According to the author, only in the event that provocations are expected and a significant aggravation of the situation will not occur in the future. The guns will talk, and the case will be handed over to diplomats to determine the economic concessions of Germany by the USSR.
Completely different events occur in the air defense units of the NKVMF, which we considered in the 12 part. I would just like to add about the air defense units of the Black Sea Fleet. The 61 th zenap of the Crimean sector of the air defense of the Black Sea Fleet for 3 watches 22 June turned into readiness №1. 22.6.41 11 Battalion VNOS Black Sea Fleet deployed 54 NP on the territory of the Crimea peninsula. The battalion was armed with radars of the type RUS-1 and RUS-2.
RUS-1 stationed:
- one set - Cape Chersonesos (transmitting facility), Cape Tarkhankut, Evpatoria, Landslide (receiving stations);
- the second set - Cape Ay-Yudag (transmitting installation), Feodosia, Alushta, Yalta (receiving stations).
РУС-2 was deployed in Sevastopol in the Round Bay and on Cape Fiolent.
At 1-30 June 22, the radars of the VNOS battalion, located at Cape Tarkhankut and Fiolent, found planes bound for Sevastopol. Thus, the timely detection of German aircraft in the air near Sevastopol was facilitated precisely by radars, which gave a lot of time for making a difficult decision to open fire by the leadership fleet...
N.N.Voronov: "A wide network of VNOS posts reported in detail about all the flights of German reconnaissance aircraft over the territory of our border districts. These data were put on special cards and immediately reported to the General Staff. Very often we were answered: “We already know. Do not worry…" Late evening [21.6.41] VNOS began to receive messages from the western borders that the Germans had an increased noise of motors in various directions ... We passed information to the General Staff. However no new orders have been received. All night we did not sleep. News from the borders came more and more alarming. Around 4 hours received the first message about the bombing of the enemy aircraft of Sevastopol. Soon through VNOS information was received on the air raids on Vindava and Libau.... "
It turns out that Directive No. 1 contradicts the above instruction, since martial law has not been introduced. In the Instructions there is a mention that the structure of the MNP, the indication of the introduction of a threatened position comes through the NKVD. In this case, the assistant commander for air defense required make surethat such an order has come. The inconsistency of the Directives of the NKO and the NKVD with the required actions on the alarm led in Sevastopol and in Leningrad to the fact that the blackout was introduced not by signals, but by administrative methods: by simply turning off the breakers. This required more time for the event. A similar situation should occur in other cities.
Looking at the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense, it is clear that if the activities are affected by other people's commissariats besides the NPOs, then this issue is discussed at a meeting of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR with the issuance of the relevant Decree. In this case, the introduction of a threatened position on an air attack was possible only after receiving approval from the country's leadership. It is possible that the country's leadership and NPOs considered that it was necessary to introduce this provision only in a part of the territory of the border districts without the involvement of the MPO teams and civil organizations.
In the books describing air defense troops in the initial period of the war, there is the text: “By the morning of June 22, almost all the anti-aircraft artillery units of the air defense, located in a strip of width 200-250 km along the western border of the USSR, turned on the OP... »
What is alarming in this text? The first is the phrase: "By the morning of June 22 at the alarm signal ... turned on the OP". And until the morning of June 22, anti-aircraft artillery units were not deployed at the OP and were located in the RPM and at the test sites?
And second, in accordance with the Decree of the CPC: "The zone threatened by the air attack [should] be considered as the territory located from the state border in depth 1200 km... "
The logical question is: if, according to some literary figures, the leadership of NGOs is waiting for a full-scale 22 war of June, then why is an air attack expected only in the zone 200-250 km depth? And not to great depth? According to the author, this is due to the expectation of provocations by German generals in certain areas.
The indecision of the highest command of the spacecraft contributed to the suppression of the initiative of the majority of district and army commanders. The leadership of PribOVO, in contrast to the command of the SV and the Military Councils of other districts, took on this responsibility in part.
Some literary figures (for example, science fiction writer Kozinkin) claim in their writings that even before the war with Germany, the air defense and district air forces had been transferred to operational readiness (OG) No. XXUMX, allegedly, according to certain directives of the General Staff. However, no one can submit a link to this document. This is an invisible document or a non-existent (made-up) document. Many people know about this document or are sure that it exists. In the documents that are in the public domain, or in the memoirs of the war veterans, there is practically no mention of the introduction of exhaust gas No. 2 for air defense formations and units (except for PribOVO). In the rest of the VO, only on-duty batteries are on combat duty, but this is not a mandatory sign of exhaust gas No. XXUMX - this may be the exhaust gas No. XXUMX. All of these versions are based only on documents by PribOVO or in other words - based on their conjectures ...
What is the difference between different degrees of exhaust gas? Naturally, it manifests itself in the amount of anti-aircraft artillery weapons at the OP, prepared to ensure the opening of fire, in the standards for bringing all ground-based weapons to a combat position. The main difference is that in the case of the ExAct No. XXUMX, all ground facilities are deployed, which are serviced by reduced personnel. When the assigned structure in the air defense unit rises and arrives, they are transferred to FH No. XXUMX. In case of exhaust gas No.2, not all air defense weapons can be displayed on the OP.
In the presented cycle, the author substantiates his point of view that many orders of the PribOVO commanders were their personal initiative. For example, the transfer of air defense PribOVO to OG No. XXUMX is a personal initiative of the NS PribOVO PS Klenov and commander of the troops F. I. Kuznetsov. What are the reasons for this, and in general, were these commanders inclined to take personal (private) initiative on the eve of the war?
Consider the well-known Order to the troops of PribOVO No. 0052 from 15.6.41 “On the masking of airfields and equipment”. Order out four days until a similar order from the Commissar of Defense: "Airplanes at airfields should be dispersed and camouflaged in forests, bushes, not allowing formation in a line, but at the same time maintaining full readiness for departure. Parks tank units and artillery to disperse, place in the forests, carefully camouflage, while maintaining the ability to assemble in due time on alarm... »
We have already encountered a similar situation in the NKVMF, when the degree of OG No. XXUMX was actually introduced in the Federation Council per day before entering this degree on the CBF and BSF. It is no coincidence that the majority of publicly available literary sources distort the date of the introduction of EG No. 2 on the SF from June 18 to June 19, since this goes against the accepted theory of the realization of events.
The author has already said that, probably, a similar initiative was made by the leadership of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet before the NKVMF and the People's Commissar allowed the Baltic Fleet to switch to OG No. XXUMX. Perhaps only after this, the People's Commissar gives instructions to the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet about the preservation of OG No. XXUMX after the end of the exercise. In this case, the People's Commissar ventured to endorse the initiative from the bottom of the two fleets and referring to their arguments (on the introduction of OG No. XXUMX) ordered the retention of OG No. XXUMX for the Black Sea Fleet.
It is possible that the order of the People's Commissar of Defense against June 19 was, by analogy, a consequence of the reaction of the NKO and the General Staff to the initiative of the PribOVO Military Council. Is it possible? Looking at the events in the NKVMF, you can answer: perhaps ... True, there are two more versions: this is a simple coincidence of facts or the good intuition of the Pribovo management about the future desires of the command of the spacecraft ...
It is very strange that no similar documents in other border HE. To not write individual literary figures: none of them will not provide you with a single disproving document or a link in the archive to it. They will present a lot of information (speculation), not supported by concrete evidence ...
Or an order on the distribution of PribOVO aviation to field sites? In accordance with the Directive of PribOVO headquarters from 18.6.41, an order was prepared by the commander of the Air Force of the District A.P. Ionova about relocation, dispersal and camouflage of aircraft. On the basis of this order, squadrons of some air regiments were redeployed to operational airfields. True, this did not happen hastily, since according to intelligence data of the district of the German troops directly near the border, there were extremely few, mobile mototank groups were absent and therefore no one did not expect the beginning of the war (until evening 21.6.41) at the dawn of June 22.
Something similar happened with the Air Force and in the OdVO. However, the ongoing preparations for the redeployment of PribOVO and OdVO aviation have no common features and dates, nor do they resemble what happened to the BBC in KOVO and Zapovo (we will consider events in these districts in the respective parts). How is this possible within the framework of the AC, where, as some readers say, everything is done only by order from above? This is possible only in the only case if these activities were not centralized and not on a single instruction from Moscow. In other words, on the initiative of individualswho urged the needs of these activities military district councils.
Or an order to deploy anti-aircraft units under the guise of June 17 exercises. Headquarters 2 th zenap 20-00 17.6.41: "In connection with the upcoming 10 Brigade drills, the Air Defense Brigade was ordered to take up a military order with the task of organizing the air defense of Riga ... 2-zenap with 21-00 17.6.41 through 7-00 18.6.41... »
The 10 air defense brigade is being deployed at the OP since June 17, and not all antiaircraft weapons were in positions before the indicated number. The position displays all the means of the brigade.
2 th zenap after the withdrawal of the OP on them and remained until the beginning of the war. The order for the regiment in 5-00 22.6.41 says: "2-th zenap who took an 18.6.41 battle order according to the battle order No. 1 from 17.6.41... "and then the combat task is put to the regiment.
RCB 2 zenap: "3-50 22.6.41. According to reports of VNOS posts that a group of German bombers were moving in the direction of Mitavy, the regiment was alerted and the regiment began to fulfill the task of defending the city of Riga... »
Also interesting is the Order to the troops PribOVO No. XXUMX from 18.6.41: "With the aim of bringing the theater of military operations to the quickest readiness of the district, I order:
1. Lead the air defense commander to the end of 19.6.41 on full alert all district air defense, for which:
a) organize round the clock duty on all posts of VNOS and ensure them continuous communication;
b) make all anti-aircraft artillery and searchlight batteries, assigning round-the-clock duty on batteries, arranging uninterrupted communication with the posts, carefully preparing them in engineering and providing fire-fighting equipment;
c) to organize the interaction of fighter aircraft with anti-aircraft units;
d) to organize uninterrupted communication of VNOS posts with fighter aviation aerodromes ... Before 21.6.41, together with the local air defense, organize: blackout cities: Riga, Kaunas, Vilnius, Dvinsk, Mitava, Libava, Siauliai, fire fighting in them medical assistance victims and identify the premises that can be used as bomb shelters... »
What can be seen in the presented text of the order?
1) The order states that the air defense system is on full alert (OG No. 1). Consequently, the question of raising the bonuses for air defense units is being considered. Such a question is not addressed in any other HE.
2) All VNOS posts and all anti-aircraft artillery in PribOVO are transferred to round-the-clock watch. It turns out that previously not all VNOS posts were on duty around the clock, i.e. were in peacetime mode, when all the NPs are not deployed. Not all anti-aircraft artillery was on the OP. In PribOVO, deployment of VNOS posts, including NP of platoons, is underway. But this should be because the order of the Chief of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the KA? .. The district leadership deliberately goes for this violation
The organization of continuous and uninterrupted communication is provided. This means that to civilian communications as part of wartime events soldiers arrive to monitor the transfer of air messages.
3) It is planned to carry out activities to darken large cities in the Baltic States. The term is later, because This event must be coordinated with the NKVD and the state authorities. We remember that in accordance with the "Instruction ..." the said event can be held by the assistant commander of the district only in wartime, but there is still no wartime anywhere except in the territory of PribOVO ...
On the same day, for the air defense units of Pribovo, a clarifying order is issued on reducing the degree of readiness and on the return of units from the camps. There is an interruption of studies of air defense units in the camps, which is carried out according to plans agreed with the General Staff: “Commander ordered: 1. The air defense units of the zone, the VNOS battalions and the air defense systems of military formations and units accept readiness No. XXUMX (enhanced combat readiness) ...
3. Air defense units located in the camps, including military, immediately return to the PPD ...
6. Availability 18-00 19 June 1941. Execution to convey 20-00 19.7.41... »
And again in the above order there are activities that, according to the above terms, do not have similar actions in KOVO and ZOVOVO. Even in OdVO part of the anti-aircraft artillery units arrives from the camps 22 23 and June.
What is the reason for the decrease in readiness? Most likely, the management of PribOVO did not receive permission to raise the assigned composition for air defense units, and without the additional composition there can only be OG No. XXUMX.
On the basis of the order of the PribOVO headquarters, a Resolution is issued by 20.6.41, which says including. about the darkening of Riga. Information about this is brought to the Chief of the General Staff through the chief of the Main Directorate of Air Defense of the Spacecraft Voronov. Similar information should have been communicated through the NKVD and civilian authorities to the country's leadership. We do not know how Stalin reacted to this ...
N.N.Voronov: "By order of the commander of the troops PribOVO F.I. Kuznetsov, the blackout of cities and individual objects of military significance was introduced. Immediately, by telephone, I reported this to the head of the General Staff G. Zhukov in order to receive permission to conduct such blackouts. and in other border districts. In response, I heard abuse and threats against Kuznetsov. After some time, Commander PribOVO was instructed to cancel this order.... "
The head of the Main Directorate of Air Defense KA directly says that no such measures were taken in other districts.
District leadership lasted about half a day. The next day, the reaction of the Chief of the General Staff follows (which, as we already know, in official duties, among other things, led the Air Defense Directorate and was obliged to know the basic documents): “You without the approval of the Commissar given an order on air defense to put into action provisions №2 - it means to black out in the Baltic Statesthan and damage the industry. Such actions can only be carried out by government decision..»
The head of the General Staff unequivocally says that the introduction of the provision number 2 (FG number 2) is carried out only under the sanction of the People's Commissar of Defense, who did not give such a decision on June 21.
Also the head of the General Staff says that the introduction OG No. XXUMX automatically leads to the implementation of measures to darken cities, and blackout can be carried out only by decision of the Government. The decision on the blackout (on the introduction of exhaust gas number 2) because it affects different departments should be carried out by decision (decree) of the CPC. Until 21 June inclusive, the government did not consider this issue and, therefore, permission to introduce OG No. 2 did not give ... Therefore, in other districts, parts Air Defense could not be in the degree of OG number XXUMX, but only in FG No. 3 or to be in the PPD or in the camps. It turns out that the command of PribOVO led its air defense units (including VNOS) in OG number 2 on their own initiative knowing that Moscow’s reaction would follow.
Continued SHT from GSH: "Now your order causes a variety of rumors and unnerves the public.
[If less than a day is expected by the leadership of the NPO and the General Staff War, then what does it matter, and if not expected, it is very significant.]
I demand to cancel immediately illegal order and give an explanation for the report to the Commissar. Chief of General Staff, General of the Army Zhukov»
The management of PribOVO, obeying the request of the Chief of the General Staff, cancels the blackout, but OG No. 2 does not remove the air defense from the parts of the basic documents. From the headquarters of PribOVO to the subordinate associations, the deputy chief of the operative department, Colonel Kinosyan, sends a telegram about the cancellation of the blackout.
However, the leadership of PribOVO nevertheless decides to reintroduce the blackout (blackout) of the troops and military garrisons, without affecting the garrisons in the cities. In 14-30 21.6.41, from PribOVO headquarters, the following PCs are sent: “The commander of the 8, 11 and 27 armies. Starting from tonight until a special order to introduce a blackout in the garrisons and locations of troops. Provide motor transport with black-out equipment. To organize a thorough control over the quality of blackout. Pay special attention to the state of camouflage troops and air surveillance. Colonel Carlin". Colonel Karlin is the assistant commander of the district’s air defense forces.
PC entered the 8 Army's headquarters in 19-25, it was decrypted in 20-00 and reported to 20-35 in the NS Larionov. On the fields of PC there is a resolution of Larionov: "21.6.41 20-35 Colonel Smirnov [head of the army headquarters] Specify: what to believe - this PC or transferred by Kinosyan?»
The contradictory instructions, the alarming situation at the border, which is accompanied by the flow of telegrams, leads to the fact that from the above-mentioned PCs they work in the army headquarters until 23-00. Only after the specified time and clarification of information in the PribOVO headquarters are prepared PCs for sending to the headquarters of the corps (sent around 1-45 22.6.41): "Commanders 10, 11 SC 12 MK Colonel Omelchenko. The army commander ordered: starting from tonight to introduce a blackout of the garrisons and the locations of army units. The movement of vehicles with shaded or extinguished headlights. Organize a thorough control of the quality of the blackout. Pay special attention to the state of camouflage troops and air surveillance. Do not produce the blackout of the garrisons of Taurogen and Shavli... »
A few hours after the arrival of the SS from the General Staff in PribOVO about the cancellation of the blackout, the People's Commissar of Defense talks to the Commander PribOVO, which N.N.Yakovlev witnessed about 15 hours (the head of the GAU) witnessed: “21.6.41 about 14 hours arrived in Moscow. Literally an hour later, the People's Commissar of Defense presented himself ... SK Tymoshenko. In the office of the People's Commissar just was the head of the General Staff ... G.K. Zhukov…
During our short conversation from Riga just called the commander of the troops PribOVO General F. I. Kuznetsov. The People's Commissar rather strictly asked him if it was true that they, Kuznetsov, had been ordered to introduce a blackout in Riga. And in the affirmative answer ordered to cancel it... »
Please note that when the People's Commissar speaks with the Commander of PribOVO, it is only about canceling the order to darken Riga. Commissar does not give any other instructions and explanations. The People's Commissar does not address the question of the arbitrariness of the district leadership regarding the introduction of air defense units No. XXUMX, the duty of the representatives of the NKVD anti-aircraft defense, the withdrawal of all air defense weapons at the OP, final equipment of anti-aircraft munitions at the OP, etc. Leadership of non-profit organizations and the General Staff avoided making decisions on "slippery" issues. It only resolved a political issue affecting the economy, while military affairs were left to the District Military Council. Below is the traffic police page of the 2 Brigade of Air Defense PribOVO.
Of stories 250 OSAD RGC (part of the 10 air defense brigade): "1The alarm division of 8.6.41 began at the OP for the defense of the eastern part of Riga... »
Currently, there is almost no information on mobilization in 20-00 21 June in PribOVO, which is mentioned in the OBD. Also, the meaning of the notation “*". However, in the part of the form it is mentioned that 44 headquarters about VNOS (subordinated to the district): “In 20-00 21.6.41, the battalion headquarters received a general mobilization telegram and conscripted the conscription of the battalion. Before the attack, the number of 44 personnel reached: 39 commanders, 420 sergeants and privates... "Total in the list of 459 listed people.
44 about VNOS had a staff of 0050 / 26, for which he was assigned 846 people, and in peacetime, 248 people. The number of assigned composition is 596 people. By the beginning of hostilities at dawn on 22 June, 44 211 people of the assigned squadron arrived at 21 after the announcement of the mobilization. The author managed to find a mention only of two facts of the increase of the assigned composition in the PribOVO XNUMX June air defense units, which were presented above. It turns out that the district administration took a reasonable initiative in planning events in the district for which no orders were given by the NKO or the General Staff.
It should be noted that the historian Mark Solonin in his materials he noted about the events on the eve of the war in PribOVO: “...Nothing like this can be found in the archival funds of the Leningrad, Western, Kiev and Odessa districts (respectively, of the Northern, Western, South Western and Southern fronts). Persistently fails. And it is very strange - how within the framework of one country and one army could such a difference arise in the dates and dates of bringing the troops on high alert?.. "
S.L.Cekunov I allowed to refer to him in terms of the assertion that a number of events taking place in PribOVO before the war have no analogues in other Western districts. It should also be noted that S.S.Chekunov, who currently has the most complete knowledge of the events on the eve of the war, was very skeptical of the materials of the author ...
In the 12 part, a description of the degrees of exhaust gas for the Navy was presented. In terms of air defense readiness, different terms were used. For example, in the PribOVO documents the term “Readiness No. 2” is used. Naturally, there should be a readiness number 3 and a readiness number 1. The term “Readiness No. 1” is also mentioned in the documents of the 3 Zenap ZakVO.
The terms “1 position” and “1 position”, which corresponded to OG No. 2 and No. 1, respectively, were used in the ZOVOVO, 2 air defense and ZakVO corps. These terms were used in air defense units during the war years.
Cbd 1-I Zenit. Machine-gun Division: "20.8.43 24-00. During the day part of the division were in position number XXUMX. Enemy aviation in the division did not appear ...
22.8.43 8-22. Divisions announced position number XXUMX. 8-24. Position No.1 is declared on 12, 13, 15, 16, 17 shelves and Separate ZPPB. From the West to Moscow at a height of 12000 meter. enemy scout U-86P approached... "
In the 2 Air Defense Corps, which covered Leningrad, the term “Alarm No. XXUMX” is used, which probably corresponds to OG No. XXUMX. During the Soviet-Finnish war and after the declaration of Finland by the USSR war, the terms “Combat option” with numbers from 3 to 1 are used. "Fight option # 1" corresponds to OG # 4.
Temporary standards and activities for specific provisions were worked out in each HE individually. Readiness for opening fire was established by the operational plans of the air defense points. For example, for fighters, the following standards were set for departure: “Willingness number XXUMX. Duty units - at the start of the 1 min in the summer and 3 min in the winter. The duty is set on alert, or with the introduction of a threatened position.
Willingness number XXUMX. The duty unit is on a daily basis 2 minutes in the summer and 10 minutes in the winter.
Willingness number XXUMX. The whole regiment 3 hour in the summer and 1 hours in the winter, on alert... "
Regulations for anti-aircraft artillery: "Position No. 1. All batteries are ready for immediate opening fire.
Position No. 2. In each division, one battery is ready to open fire through 30 with., The rest - through 3 min.
Position No. 3. In each division, one battery is ready to open fire through 30 with., The rest - through 10 min... ».
During the war, standards were somewhat tougher. According to "Command instructions of the Leningrad Army Air Defense ... 1.9.43'"The combat readiness of air defense. To prevent sudden enemy air strikes, establish the following combat readiness of air defense systems:
...fighter aircraft. Willingness number XXUMX. Taking off into the air is no more than 1 a minute.
Willingness number XXUMX. In the summer, take off in 2-3 minutes, in the winter, take off in 4-5 minutes.
Willingness number XXUMX. Departure in 3-15 minutes.
Note. By order of the commander of the fighter flight in each unit, duty units are appointed, regardless of the readiness established for it, which must be in readiness No. XXNX.
Medium-caliber anti-aircraft artillery. Willingness number XXUMX. All 1% funds are in readiness for the immediate opening of fire.
Willingness number XXUMX. One third of all batteries are in alert No. XXUMX. The rest of the rest or are engaged according to plan.
Willingness number XXUMX. One fifth of all batteries are in alert # XXNX. The rest of the rest or are engaged according to plan.
Notes: 1. On duty units readiness to open fire immediately, the rest no more than 1 minutes.
2. For the average caliber set readiness number 4, for which the duty is not assigned. All means FOR the readiness to open fire with no more than 1 minutes. By readiness number XXUMX on all batteries FOR have a reinforced guard.
MZA and anti-aircraft machine guns. Willingness number XXUMX. All 1% funds are on alert for immediate opening fire.
Willingness number XXUMX. Half guns (machine guns) in each battery (company), the platoon is in readiness №2. The rest of the rest or are engaged according to plan.
Willingness number XXUMX. One third of the guns (machine guns) in each battery (company), the platoon is in readiness No. XXUMX. The rest of the rest or are engaged according to plan.... "
Before the war, all ground-based air defense systems were not permanently on the OP. Temporary standards for their deployment were indicated in the "Cover Plans ..." As an example, below is an extract from "Plans ... "KOVO: "1. The Rivne brigade area ... The readiness of ground-based air defense systems when the 3 hours are located in apartments, when entering the camps is 48 hours ... Observation and notification in the territory of the Rivne district of the district is carried out by the 29 on ATTM ...
2. Lviv divisional area ... Readiness of air defense units when parked in apartments for 3 hours, and when entering the camps - 30 hours. Monitoring and notification on the territory of Lviv district of the districts is carried out by 19-th about VNOS ...
3. Stanislavsky brigade district ... Readiness when located in the 1-1,5 apartments for an hour when entering the camps from 21 to 27 hours. Monitoring and alerting is performed by 4-th about VNOS ...
4. Tarnopolsky brigade area ... Readiness with the location of an hour in apartments 3, at the exit to the camps from 6 to 24 hours. Observation is carried out by 43-th about VNOS ...
5. Zhytomyr brigade area ... Readiness when it is located on the 2 hours of apartments, when entering the 15 camps for hours. Monitoring and alerting is performed by 22-th about VNOS ...
6. Vinnitsa brigade district ... Readiness - 1 hour. Monitoring and alerting is performed by 14-th about VNOS ...
7. Kiev divisional area ... Readiness when located in apartments - hours ..., when leaving the camps: 3-I Air Defense Division - 14 hours, 135 and 141 hours - 24 hours. Observation and notification is carried out by the 4-th regiment VNOS... "
The readiness of KOVO ground-based air defense systems to reach their intended positions is:
- when located in apartments - from 1 to 3 hours;
- while staying in camps - from 6 to 48 hours.
For different HE these standards are comparable. Working with the “Plans ...” of different districts, the head of the General Staff was obliged to know the order of time required for the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons from the SP to the SP or from the camps. However, by the end of the day 21 Jun is enough a lot of anti-aircraft artillery units were on the ground. If the head of the General Staff was surethat the war will start at dawn 22 June, then why im Was not the order for their immediate return from the camps? He could give such an order without the sanction of the CPC, since combat training plans are not coordinated with the indicated authority. However, this was done only in PribOVO.
The situation is similar with the artillery units that were engaged in training according to plans approved by the General Staff. The leadership of the NKO and the General Staff did not issue an order for their return to the unions and associations. According to the author, the finding of units on the testing grounds once again indicates that the high command of the spacecraft did not expect the full-scale 22.6.41 war.
In order to assess the state of air defense in western military units, we first consider what happened on the night of June 22 in the air defense units of one of the rear border districts - ZakVO.
Crf Headquarters Transcaucasian Air Defense Zone: "5-30 22.6.41g. Half of the composition of the 3 units of the air defense corps, two 45 OZAD batteries and 60 detachment of the submarine-machine-gun company were located in the Pumping Camp. Two-thirds of the 415 air defense regiment, 443 air defense regiment, 380, 381, 388 ambush, 61, 62, 63 and 64 zenpulroty were stationed in the Vaziani camps. Two-thirds of the 8 air defense brigade, 151 and 365 fire brigade were launched for artillery fire in the area near the city of Batumi. The commander of the air defense zone, Major General of Artillery, Comrade Tykin, was in Baku, and the National Air Defense Zone, Colonel Comrade Pluzhnikov, in Batumi.
In 5-30 22.6.41. NS ZakVO, Major General t.Tolbukhin personally handed the order to the commander of the 3 air defense corps to deploy units and withdraw them from the camps to combat positions... "
At the OP of the Transcaucasian air defense zone was about 1 / 3 anti-aircraft. At this amount of anti-aircraft weapons, personnel could not be on alert around the clock. The remaining parts on the OP could be only in the Regulation №3.
RCB 485 zenap: "22.6.41 received a mobilization telegram on 20-00. During the 23 and 24 of June, the regiment was mobilized by personnel and vehicles... "
I.G. Melnikov: "I was sent to the Transcaucasian Air Defense Zone, in the city of Batumi, where they identified the 8 zenith artillery brigade, which covered the Batumi refinery and port. In the summer of 1941, we were thrown out ... to the summer camp ... 21 June 1941, we were released to the nearby Batumi. And we, four young lieutenants, went into the city, spent the night there, and on Sunday, without any ulterior motive, we began to slowly go to the unit, and then at noon we heard on the radio that the war with Germany had begun... "
Transcaucasian air defense zone at dawn 22.6.41 continues to live in peacetime mode. It should not be thought that German aviation could not reach the Caucasian coast of the Black Sea. On the night of 23 June, 1941 of the 454 X Zenap guns (Novorossiysk) opened fire on a German reconnaissance aircraft, and then on planes that intended to block the port by laying mines.
And what happened in the air defense units that covered the capital of our Motherland and Comrade Stalin personally?
Commander of the Moscow VO I.V.Tyulenev writes: “В noon Poskrebyshev called me from the Kremlin: “Comrade Stalin will talk to you ...”
In the tube I heard a deaf voice: “Comrade Tyulenev, what about the Moscow air defense?” I briefly reported to the head of the government about the air defense measures taken today, June 21. In response, I heard: “Consider, the situation is restless, and you should bring combat readiness of the Moscow air defense troops to 75%... I got the impression that Stalin received new alarming information about the plans of Nazi Germany. I immediately gave the appropriate orders his air defense assistant, Major General MS Hulk... »
N.G. Kuznetsov (Commissar of the Navy): "Not so long ago I heard from General of the Army I.V. Tyulenev - at that time he commanded the MVO - that June 21 around 2 hours of the day he was called by I.V. Stalin and demanded to increase the combat readiness of air defense... "
Tyulenev claims that at noon, Stalin gave the order to bring the combat readiness of the air defense forces to 75%. What is 75%? This means that 75% anti-aircraft guns must be deployed at the OP. This is something between the availability levels №2 and №1.
We also pay attention to the following circumstances:
1) Memoirs give different times: noon and 2 hours of the day. Tyulenev calls different times of Stalin's call during the story of N.G. Kuznetsova and in his memoirs. A reasonable question arises: did Stalin call Tyulenev in the afternoon at all?
2) In his memoirs N.G. Kuznetsov does not confirm the words of General Tyulenev, but only writes that heard them from the commander of the Moscow Military District. Also N.G. Kuznetsov writes (probably also heard) that around 17 hours to Stalin were caused by Tymoshenko and Zhukov, which does not correspond to the entries in the journal of Stalin's visit: Tymoshenko was in Stalin's office from 19-05 to 20-15. Later, Tymoshenko and Zhukov were in the office from 20-50 to 22-20.
Inaccuracies can be the result of forgetfulness or a conscious distortion of events on the eve of the war by General Tyulenev. We will try to understand this episode. To do this, consider another memories.
Ya.E. Chadayev (manager of the affairs of the USSR SNK): "At about 7 hours of the evening A.N.Poskrebyshev called and asked to come to him to take one document for registration ... Today, the “host” worried about something: he summoned Tymoshenko and Zhukov и just talked with Tyulenev. I asked him what had been done to bring air defense into combat readiness.... »
Chadayev’s memoirs also contain inaccuracies regarding Stalin’s stay with G.K. Zhukov to 19-00. In addition, in the memoirs of Chadayev, Poskrebyshev also mentioned the visit of Stalin by the secretary of the Moscow city committee of the party, Shcherbakov. However, according to the visiting journal, Shcherbakov was also not in the chief’s office. Inaccuracies in the memories raise doubts about the credibility of Chadayev’s other statements.
But everything becomes more or less clear if we assume that in Chadayev’s memoirs the truth about being in the office of Stalin Tymoshenko and Zhukov, and time itself is distorted - 19-00. Then this conversation could occur in the time span from 21-00 to 23-00 ...
The Moscow air defense zone is formed by the order of the NNO 14.2.41 based on the air defense system of the air defense system. Commander Major General MS Hulk. The zone includes: the air defense zone headquarters (headquarters), the 1 body of the air defense, 6 of the air defense system (formed by the order of the NNO 19.6.41 based on the 24 and 78 iad), Kalininsky, Yaroslavsky, Gorky and Tula brigade areas of the air defense.
Let's see what the commander of the 1 Air Defense Corps, which was part of the troops of the Moscow air defense zone, writes about 21.6.41 events. D.A. Zhuravlev: "At three o'clock in the afternoon I went home, and soon with my family I was already at the exhibition ... Nearly one of the pavilions was found by an adjutant: "Comrade General, you are ordered to immediately appear on the command post." I looked at my watch: 18-35... At the KP appeared Gromadin: "Just called the district commander. It is ordered to call from the camps and put in position 20% of all the troops there... »
The call of Stalin Tyulenev could theoretically take place around 18-00, but in this case, the conversation was not set specific dates for bringing anti-aircraft artillery units to combat readiness. In addition, it is a question of returning from the 20% camps of batteries, and not 75%, according to Tyulenev. The headquarters of the 1 Air Defense Corps is working on the issue of outputting these 20% batteries, which will be located on the OP 23 Jun evening only. Further events also occur sluggishly.
YES. Zhuravlev: "While I was negotiating by phone with Lavrynovych on the procedure for selecting units to be sent to positions, he checked which of the batteries had already fired, received a new order: to call from the camp not 20%, but half of all troops...
Somewhere in the middle of the night another order came: to bring to the position the entire anti-aircraft artillery ... In this business rush, no one immediately paid attention to the bell of one of the phones ... And the phone, after a short silence, rang again, long and demanding ... The distant excited voice repeated several times: “Moscow, Moscow, says Minsk . Bomb airfields of Grodno and Lida. Do you hear Moscow?.. "
It turns out that after the 18 watch, the commander of the Moscow air defense zone receives an order from the commander of the Moscow Military Troops Tylenev about the withdrawal of the 20% anti-aircraft weapons at the OP. At this moment, many parts of the air defense are on the range in the suburbs. YES. Zhuravlev with his subordinates checks: which of the batteries can be sent to the SP (which conducted firing at the range), and which still should be left at the range to perform training firing. It turns out that he was not given tight deadlines on the withdrawal of parts at the OP on the night of 22 June. At that time, the leadership of the 1 Air Defense Corps and the Moscow Air Defense Zone do not suspect the start of the war at dawn on 22 June and therefore are not particularly in a hurry: the batteries are not given the command to immediately speak at the OP. About the imminent start of the war does not suspect the person who gave the order Tyulenev. After all, even after receiving a new order on the withdrawal of 50% of air defense weapons to the OP, their withdrawal is planned only by the evening of June 23.
Who is the person giving the orders to the commander of the Moscow Military District about launching anti-aircraft artillery at the OP? This can not be the head of the General Staff Zhukov, otherwise he would certainly have reflected this fact in his memoirs and would not have been petty with a gradual increase in the number of withdrawn air defense forces in the position. This person can not be the head of the Main Department of Air Defense, as he does not know about this indication. In addition, the head of the Main Directorate of the Air Defense Directorate would alert the air defense fighter aircraft. Aviation of the Moscow air defense zone is prepared to repel a possible air raid only after the start of the war.
As General Tyulenev, through whom, perhaps, passes the order on the withdrawal of air defense weapons to the OP, when it gets dark, he leaves home relax and is not going to control the incoming instructions, then this person can not be Stalin.
Who could be the person who gave the first order to withdraw 20% of air defense weapons around 18 hours? General Zhuravlev writes that the instruction came from Tyulenev. After visiting the General Staff on June 21, the commander of the Moscow Military District could learn about the strange movements of enemy troops near the borders and decide to return part of the anti-aircraft weapons to the OP for the defense of the capital. In this case he could secure such an order and calmly go home later not controlling its passage - because the beginning of the war is unknown. The mention of Stalin in his memoirs in this case is fiction.
The second indication of the increase in anti-aircraft artillery weapons to 50%, displayed on the OP, passed somewhere in the period from 20-00 to 23-00. The specified number does not coincide with the number given in the memoirs of Tyulenev - there again lies. The person who issued the second order remains unknown. It could have been Stalin (later in July 1941 of the year he called the commander of the air defense zone directly), he could have been Budyonny (1-th Deputy Commissar of Defense) and any other person. But I repeat - the timing of the rise of air defense units on the night of June 22 is not set.
It should be noted that the withdrawal of the 50% or 100% anti-aircraft weapons to the OP is not yet a transfer of the troops of the 1 Air Defense Corps to the Exhaust Unit No.2 or No.1. This is only a translation from FG No. XXUMX. And what readiness will be assigned after the withdrawal to the OP will be determined by the number of duty forces and the location of the rest of the personnel.
I.V.Tyulenev: "In the evening I was with the People's Commissar of Defense ... S.K.Timoshenko and the head of the General Staff, General of the Army GKZhukov. From them I learned about the new alarming symptoms of an impending war. Guards were also suspicious about the German embassy: employees of all ranks hurriedly drove away in cars outside the city. Later I went back to Zhukov.
“According to reports from district headquarters,” he said, “it’s as if everything is calm.” Nevertheless, I warned the commanders of a possible attack by fascist Germany. These assumptions are supported by our intelligence.... "
[I wonder how many visitors came to Zhukov and how many of them did he pour out his soul? Apparently, he had nothing else to do on the day before the war, or Tyulenev was lying again ... In the morning, a message arrived from Zapov about the removal of wire barriers and columns of German troops going to Suvalkinskiy protrusion, but the Commissar and Chief of the General Staff only calmed Pavlova and did not give away one indication of the upcoming border connections. A little later, Zhukov went to give a speech at a meeting in GAU ...]
I wondered what the balance of power is now - ours and Germans.
“The Germans, as far as I know, do not have a general superiority,” Zhukov said shortly ...
It was already getting dark when I left the headquarters of the Moscow Military District. I got out of the car in a quiet Rzhevsky Lane, where I lived with my family - my wife and two children ...
At 3 o'clock in the morning 22 Jun woke me up phone call. Urgently summoned to the Kremlin. On the way I drove into the General Staff. GK Zhukov on HF talked with the staffs of the border VO. After telephone conversations, he informed me that German aircraft bombed Kovno, Rivne, Sevastopol, Odessa... "
Tyulenev continues to misinform readers. In 3 hours it causes urgently not to the place of service, but to the Kremlin! And he, by the way, calls in the General Staff to talk to Zhukov, waits while he speaks to the districts ... Yes, and the head of the General Staff is good. Such news came, and we need to talk with someone again ... And they say, Stalin is a tyrant, and they were afraid to shiver in his knees. And then some general in no hurry. After all, he does not know whether Stalin is in the Kremlin or not. Of course, they can wait in the Kremlin ...
According to the author, the commander of the Moscow Military District was summoned to the Kremlin after receiving reports of the bombing of Soviet cities. The entire text, placed in the memoirs, is intended to whitewash the chief of the General Staff, whom Tyulenev always tried to protect. It turned out ineptly, but who knew in the epoch of writing these memoirs that it would be possible to get to the documents! ..
To be continued ...
- aKtoR
- The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. 13 part
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 14)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 15)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 16)
The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR (part 17)
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