The unexpected war of Nazi Germany with the USSR. 13 part
Introduction
In the 13 and 14 units, some views of the top commanders of the spacecraft on the initial period of the war will be presented, which, in the opinion of the author, were their fallacy. These errors should have influenced the decisions that were made by the leadership of the spacecraft on the eve of the war.
In the 11-th part, it was shown that the actual hostilities of the German military in the first days of the war differed from the vision of the leadership of the spacecraft's actions of the enemy in the initial period. About it delusion The guidance of the spacecraft was noted in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukova, A.M. Vasilevsky, S.M. Shtemenko, I.Kh. Bagramyan (on the statement of MP Kirponos).
Second delusion there was a lack of understanding of the tactics used by the Air Force in the initial period. At a meeting of the highest command personnel of the spacecraft (hereinafter - SVKS) In December 1940, seemingly correct opinions were repeatedly voiced regarding the Air Force. After all, they spoke precisely about what will happen on June 22 ... The question arises: if they knew how to act at the beginning of the war, then why was the defeat allowed? aviation? The opinion of very narrow-minded people is the result of betrayal. Probably, these people judge by themselves similar ... Let's consider some speeches of the command staff at the SVKS, held in late December 1940.
P.V. Levers, (Head of the Main Command of the Air Force KA): "The main purpose of an offensive operation is to defeat and destroy enemy personnel. With the solution of this problem, all the others are easily resolved. An example in this regard is the defeat of the Allied armies in Belgium and France in 1940. The depth of the modern front-line operation will be approximately equal to 300 km. The pace of progress on average for the entire depth of the operation will be approximately 12-15 km per day of battle. The duration of the operation to the depth of 300 km at the rate of advance of 12-15 km will be 25-30 days ... "
The report of the Commander of the Air Force once again sounds like mantras, the words about the slow movement of troops in modern operations. The implementation of the specified parameters of the offensive operation could be considered by the command of the spacecraft and as a possible scenario for the actions of the German troops in the initial period. Therefore, similar scenarios of the outbreak of hostilities were used in war games taking place in the winter and spring of 1941. Let us return to the consideration of the report of P.V. Rychagova: “Based on the nature and stages of modern offensive operations, the objectives of the Air Force will be: 1) winning air supremacy; 2) interaction with ground forces on the battlefield; 3) cover the troops and individual areas ... The conquest of air superiority ... is achieved: 1) destruction of enemy aircraft on airfields while simultaneously striking its rear ... The most difficult thing to do is to first task because for its implementation, it is necessary to catch enemy aircraft at its aerodromes, and this, with modern depth of basing and the ability of aviation to maneuver along aerodromes, is a great difficulty. Most of these raids will comprehend the failure. The best way to defeat aviation on earth is simultaneous attack on a large number of aerodromes possible basing of enemy aircraft. This will not allow the enemy to provide concentrated resistance to the fighters ... Of course, such a task cannot be accomplished in one flight, but requires a series of repeated blows ... "
D.T. Kozlov (Head of the Main Department of Air Defense): "When striking an enemy air force, first of all, it is necessary to destroy the aircraft, which has the most modern material part, since the defeat of this aircraft immediately gives superiority in the air. On the French front, the Germans first attacked the airfields, which were the most modern French aircraft. And in the first days of the war they knocked this aircraft out of order, and then, naturally, having technical superiority, they got superiority in the air ... The strike from the first day on the aviation forces attracts them to the airfield and makes it impossible to operate in the air.... »
M.M.Popov (commander of the 1 th Red Banner Army): "May 10, according to far incomplete data, as a result of a raid on the airfields of France and England on the first day, about 300 aircraft were destroyed. These attacks were repeated on 11 and 12 in May, and according to some, apparently exaggerated, data was put out of action near 1000 aircraft ... I will allow myself to turn again to the experience of the Germans when they 1 on September after raids on Polish airfields left piles of debris on them... »
Ya.V. Smushkevich (Assistant Chief of the General Staff for the Air Force): "The Germans 10 May 1940 produced simultaneous raid on French airfields to a depth of 400 km and swept over 100 airfields with its raid. If there was a connection and good organization, such a raid could result in a big defeat of German aviation, because the said raid was carried out in small groups without fighter jets and meeting these groups in certain areas with fighters could result in the destruction of these groups.... »
Smushkevich recognizes the disarming strike of German aircraft on the airfields of the Allies, but specifies that "in the presence of communication and good organization [this raid could end] the defeat of the German aircraft... "He, what does the Air Force of the Red Army mean? It turned out that everything was very bad with communication, notification and control of the air forces of the border districts 22.6.41 ...
At the same meeting, Ya.V. Smushkevich spoke about night and blind flights, about constant readiness shelves ... The wrong actions of the Soviet 22.6.41 aviation cannot be blamed for him: on June 8 he was arrested. But his opinion (probably, and the opinion of other commanders) ceased to listen even before the SVKS. The majority of readers are familiar with the memoirs of Marshal AE Golovanov. Remember the first chapter, “Conversation on New Year's Eve”? Ya.V. Smushkevich invited Golovanov to write a letter to Stalin ...
A.E.Golovanov: "In general, the questions about which Yakov Vladimirovich spoke, really matured and had important state significance, but I considered them, at least, indecent, to put them, as he suggested, straight in the forehead. All this I expressed immediately Smushkevichu. In conclusion, asked why he himself, the inspector general of the Air Force, would not take up this business? He is twice a Hero of the Soviet Union, a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, he is of great authority among the pilots, behind his shoulders Spain and Khalkhin Gol! After a short silence, Yakov Vladimirovich replied that he does not have such an opportunity now, and it is unlikely that serious attention will now be paid to his report... "The arrests initiated in May 1941 in the case of" aviators "(senior commanders of the Air Force KA) led to the eradication of any initiative of the not yet arrested Air Force leaders, to fear of provocation and to execute only orders that 22.6.41 did not always reach the connections and parts ...
Let us recall how the work of the air forces of the border VO was envisaged in accordance with the “Cover Plans ...”. All directives for the development of "Plans ..." signed by the leaders of the spacecraft. Specialists of the General Staff and Districts took part in their development. In all directives the same words: “Before the 15 mobilization day it is allowed to spend: ... fighters - 15 departures; near bombers - 10 departures; long-range bombers - 7 departures; scouts - 10 departures... "It turns out on average one flight of a fighter per day, and the rest of the aircraft should fly even less often. Again we see the expected sluggish fighting in the early days of the war. This is the vision of the leadership of the spacecraft, the General Staff and the leaders of the Higher Education Authority were forced to agree with it.
German aircraft 22 June made several sorties in small groups. It turns out: despite the correct words in the reports, few understood from the high command of the spacecraft that the Germans would fight this way from the first hour of the war, destroying and blocking our aircraft at the airfields ...
And how should the German Air Force have fought according to our command? Let's remember two documents PribOVO. Telegram from Commander PribOVO 8-10 22.6.41: "The commander of the 7 garden ... The commander ordered the fighter aircraft to be protected to repel a powerful enemy air raid. Spend carefully. A large group raid is expected... »
Intelligence headquarters SZF around 12-00 22.06.41: "The enemy has not yet brought into action significant air forces, limited to the action of individual groups and single aircraft.... "Again, incorrect information and forecast gave intelligence. Probably, the appearance of armadas consisting of several hundred bombers and fighters was expected. As in some books of that time, and very similar to the plans for the use of armadas of armored vehicles ...
In conclusion, I will cite the words of one of the leaders of the Air Force: “About driving our parts into battle. Driving instruction aviation division we are missing. Such instruction we need... "Divisional system on the enemy under the cover of dozens of fighters. Probably, the "experienced" Germans also had to fight in the understanding of our command personnel ...
Consider the excerpts from the final speech of the Commissar of Defense. S.K.Timoshenkowhich is to sum up the results of the commanders' speeches at the Special Forces Command StationIn the field of operational art ... major changes are underway ... Massive application such means as Tanks and dive bombers, in combination with motorized and motorcycle troops, in cooperation with parachute and landing landings and mass aviation - provided ... a high pace and strength of modern operational offensive... German td in 1939-40 preempted pulling ... reserves... It was not by chance that the Germans applied a new construction for a breakthrough with td ahead ... They correctly took into account that the strength and success of the modern offensive is at a high rate and the continuity of the offensive...
The infantry base remained the same ... powerful, but the role of the infantry during the attack changed. From the percussion means, it turned into the base of an armored percussion wedge, which cut into the depth of the enemy’s territory with its point. Independence of actions of high-speed mobile groupsconsisting of various types of formations (tank, mechanized, motorized, motorcycle), due to their organizational structure ... Operations in the West revealed that a deep blow based on the interaction system of aviation, high-speed motor-mechanized formations and the main army infantry, has one dangerous link, consisting in the possibility of a gap between the actions of aviation and high-speed connections. The question has found its effective resolution. in the use of airborne troopsthat fill the gap between the attack of aviation and the approach of high-speed connections ...
In June, the 1940 of the year and in the offensive ... on the Somma river on the shock axes German td (near 400-500 tanks) attacked 3-4 km on the front ... According to German views, which were reflected in recent events in the West, the attack itself is thought of as massive use of aviation and parachute units to paralyze the operational depth of defenseas a massive use of artillery and aircraft on the battlefield in order to ensure the suppression of the entire depth of tactical defense, like massive use of mechanized compounds, paving with the support of aviation and artillery, the road to the main forces of the infantry and independently developing success. But all this refers to the breakthrough of such weak defensive lines as the Weygand line...
The experience of modern wars shows that the scope of large front-line operations ... was expressed by the following indicators: the width of the offensive strip 80-150-300 km; Depth of a single operation 60-250 km ...; the rate of attack in operations reached 10-15 and more than a km per day ... Preparing a front-line operation at a new strategic stage requires dozens of days - months. Preparation of the subsequent operation within one stage can be calculated in days, maximum - weeks....
In 1940, in France, during the operation on the river. The Germans deployed the somm at the front to 350 km ... two army groups with a large composition of 95-120 pd and 8-10 td, which meant the Germans more than doubled the strength ... Historical experience and theoretical studies show that the average speed of advance of a modern strike army is about 10-15 km per day (sometimes 40-50 km)... »
A fairly competent understanding of the defense breakthrough with the use of mobile large moto-tank groups with the interaction of different troops. From the speeches of the highest commanders at the SVKS, it is clear that in general they understood how German generals could fight. Only embarrassing, the statement about the concentration of up to 103 ... 130 of German divisions at the front to 350 km. Of course, a historical fact is voiced. Several speakers say the same thing. One thing is not clear: did the higher command personnel consider that the Germans would attack our country only by creating such large groups? The low average speeds of advance of the shock forces are mentioned again.
What misconceptions, according to the author, are mentioned in the considered fragment of the speech of the People's Commissar of Defense?
First of all, it is the interval between subsequent operations, between which preparation is required, which is calculated in days and weeks. And while other speakers, referring to the experience of the Germans, spoke about the continuity of the German offensive with the transition from one operation to another in one phase. In the final speech, the Commissar of Defense voiced the point of view of the leadership of the spacecraft. It turns out that if the enemy was able to break through somewhere and moves at a pace of up to 40 km / day, then after a while he will stop and prepare for a new offensive, waiting for the infantry masses. Below is one of the speeches, which refers to a different vision of a continuous offensive.
M.A. Kuznetsov (NSH of the Far Eastern Front): "The operations of the Germans in Belgium and France were divided into two stages: the first strike in the Netherlands, Belgium and Northern France, and the second strike - a breakthrough on the river Seine, bypassing Paris, encircling the main forces of the French army, defeating it in pieces. At the same time, these two operations went one to the other almost without any break, successively ... The enemy was smashed in pieces, and the superiority of forces on the German side was small... »
Following delusion - it is a reappraisal of the importance of parachute and landing troops when interacting with moving strike forces and when breaking through fortified bands. And, as a result, there should be a lot of parachute troops. According to the theory, everything is correct, but the technical capabilities of the German army for the mass use of parachute troops were not enough. At the initial stage of the war, when dealing with one of the tasks, they acted similarly, but with much smaller parachute and reconnaissance and sabotage forces supported by intelligence officers and the 5 th column. And what did the intelligence report about these compounds?
Intelligence RU GSH KA 11.3.41: "The increase in parachute and landing divisions continues. If by the end of active operations in the west there were one parachute and one airborne division in the composition of the German Armed Forces, then there are now 3 parachute and 3 airborne divisions... »
In May 1941 of the year in the Republic of Moldova, the total number of German parachute divisions is estimated at 8-10. This was misinformation, which was distributed in accordance with the instructions of the German command: "Of particular importance is the dissemination of misinformation information about the air corps, which would indicate its intention to use it against England.... "In fact, in Germany there was only 7-I Airborne Division and 22-I PD was considered air-landing.
Intelligence also suggested: "What ... Germany, in the event of an attack on the USSR, will be able to stand against us ... 5 Airborne Divisions... "Five divisions are a huge mass of paratroopers, equipment and armaments, which will require the transfer of hundreds of transport aircraft ... These units were not found on the eve of the war. In the Republic of Moldova, on the eve of the war, units of paratroopers were only noted at our 2-3 border. Numerous connections of paratroopers with a mass of transport aviation were not brought to our borders. And our intelligence agents were obliged to observe the zones of their possible appearance. There are no specified forces - it means there is still time before the start of the entry of mobile groups into the battle ...
Fourth delusion - this is an exaggeration of the importance of the fortified zone, the confidence that the border divisions will have time to occupy their defense sectors in time. The first echelons of active defense will also be able to hold German troops for some time. In the speech of S.K.Timoshenko we saw the following statement: “But all this refers to the breakthrough of such weak defensive lines as the Weygand line". Can this phrase be understood in the sense that if the Germans encounter a stronger line of defense, including reinforced concrete structures, then their troops cannot quickly break through this line? For example, our defensive line on the western border? Of course, we know that some XR in June 1941 have not yet begun to build. As of 21.6.41 3685 Structures were still under construction or were built, but not equipped with weapons and equipment ...
S.K.Timoshenko also spoke about defense: “It is also important to note that if earlier military actions usually began with a counter attack, now this is not always possible. At the present time, the borders of large states, especially in the most important directions, are already surrounded by reinforced concrete fortifications. Despite this, and now [probably still talking about past events] it is still possible to circumvent these fortifications. So, for example: the German army did not dare to attack and break the Maginot line. Not hoping for a successful breakthrough, she chose to bypass the French Maginot Line, regardless of the neutrality of the Netherlands and Belgium ... However, there may be cases whenno entry of permanent reinforced concrete strips will be impossible, and the war will have to start with a breakthrough modern long-term fortified strip.
Many of the provisions expressed here need more precise definitions and significant amendments. First of all, about the right of defense to exist due to its unsuccessful experience in recent wars. A number of successful breakthroughs in the 1939-1940 war in the West. spawned at some researchers the idea of a crisis of modern defense. Such a conclusion is not justified. It cannot be made from the fact that the Germans did not meet the necessary resistance from the Polish and French fronts, which could be provided to them with the proper use of existing defenses by the opponents. The defensive line of Weygun, for example, being hastily and not quite up-to-date equipped ... And yet, despite its multiple superiority, the Germans spent more than a week to overcome only this obstacle with a fight... »
The author had the impression that the People's Commissar of Defense implies our defensive line along the western border, on the breakthrough of which the Germans can spend more than a week. Consider an excerpt from the "Notes ...", which was prepared before 9.11.40 (long before SVKS).
Note KNOVO NSH on the deployment plan for 1940 year: "Along the entire border stretches the line of fortified positions, consisting of field-type fortifications and unfinished construction of long-term UR (Vladimir-Volynsky, Strumilovsky, Rava-Russky and Peremyshlsky). In 1940, 370 of reinforced concrete structures were built in all the UAs, and, in addition, 160 reinforced concrete structures were built in the system of field defense units in the assumption. The defensive line along the line of the state border provided the armament of the constructed structures, in combination of long-term and field-type defense units, is the frontier on which the troops of concentration and deployment can rely. For a long and deep defense, it is necessary with the beginning of the spring 1941 of the year or directly with the beginning of the deployment to build two more lines... ”Reading the extract, you can imagine at least the field line of defense and long-term facilities that can be armed until the spring of 1941. How is this line worse than the Weygun line, inclined on the SIC?
The construction of the UR on the new border began in the summer of 40, and was discontinued in the fall, and since the spring of 1941, it has been continued. In the spring of 1941, about 140 thousand people and a huge amount of equipment work on the construction of the UR. Many units and unions were left without the sapper and engineer battalions. The construction plan provided for 1940-41. to complete the construction and equipment of the first line of defense units and URov strong points. In subsequent years, it was planned to build a second line of defense. About half of the long-term facilities should have been armed with artillery: DOT-2 and DOT-4 casemates.
The installation of DOT-2 (76-mm tank gun L-11) has been tested since March 1939. In May of the same year, an order was issued for the manufacture of 200 DOT-2 installations. More 200 installations were planned to be ordered in the 1941 year.
The installation of DOT-4 (45-mm gun and twin machine gun DS) was tested in February 1939 year, after which it was adopted. According to the plan, plant number 8 was supposed to begin the delivery of guns in October 1939, but actually began delivery in November, and by the time 1.1.40 had already accumulated guns at the factory. The first 324 installations were shipped to parts and warehouses in January of 173. In the first quarter of 1940, the plant had to pass 1940 installations of DOT-400, however it passed 4 - 1940 installations in January and in February - 90. Then until November 29, nothing surrendered.
Strangely, somehow: the military from the department of the URS GSH are not in a hurry with the production of DOT-4 installations and not only do not increase their production, but do not even plan it for the 1941 year.
The DOT-2 installations have been ordered ridiculously few and they are also missing from the plans for 1941.
В A decree SNK USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "About the plan of military orders for 1941 г... "7.2.41 said:"To approve the plan of military orders ... for 1941 year ... "There are no case installations in this Decree. There is only a line on armament for the URAs: “Instruct the Defense Committee to consider the order of NPOs for arming the URAs within two weeks and, within the limits of the possibility, to place this order in industry... "That is, before this order was not worked out by the military and production workers.
Special message 5.5.41: "We send the contents of the telegrams of the British Ambassador to the USSR Cripps ... from 23.4.41, the city of ... Militarythat are beginning to be a force outside the party, are convinced that war is inevitable, but they are eager to postpone it at least until winter... "Our military"crave a postponement of war at least until winter", but not "at least"Is it until spring 1942 of the year? If you look at the construction of long-term facilities, it is very likely that the leadership of the spacecraft did not want to wait for the June 1941 war. Consider the memories of two veterans.
P.V.Afanasyev (PribOVO): "...General Staff, District Military Councils required from stuffed construction of long-term facilitiesand not knowledge of the combat readiness of the troops. So, at this time, construction is more important, then, there is still time, and it’s still far from the beginning of the war, because they know better. And, indeed, a simple calculation of the time required for at least one of the cycles, for the concrete concreting of the structure, followed by then the monthly period of the process of the concrete setting, showed that at the top, the calculations are based on a relatively long preservation of peaceful relations with the belligerent neighbor, that in the coming months the war is not expected... »
B.V. Bychevsky (LVO): “20 June [NSHLO] urgently called me by phone from Vyborg: “Come immediately”. Three hours later I was in his office:
- The situation, brother, has become more complicated. Finns on the Karelian Isthmus are activated. We will begin combat cover of the border. Clear?
- Not really.
- Prepare the sappers to install minefields at the border.
- but I have all the people engaged in concrete work, Dmitry Nikitich.
- So take off!
— And from Moscow on this account have instructions? I believe that the laying of concrete can not be stopped...
Nikishev angrily interrupted:
- You never know what you think! Now there is no time to wait for instructions;... »
Again, we see a private initiative of one of the leaders of the LVO, the NSh of the okrug, acting without instructions from the CA leadership ... Regularly reports were sent to the construction of the facilities to Moscow. In addition, in the construction of long-term structures, the method of continuous pouring of concrete was used to eliminate the occurrence of cracks, which did not allow the concrete works to be completed until the building structure was fully completed.
Note Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff... 15.5.41: "At the same time, it is necessary to speed up the construction and arming of the UR in every possible way, to begin the construction of the UR in 1942 on the border with Hungary, and also to continue the construction of the UR along the line of the old state border... "Strange, yes? And to us "taldych"That the war by the leadership of the spacecraft was expected in June, and the document says about the construction of the SD in 1942 year ...
20.5.41 comes out new Decree SNK about armament for SD. The Resolution referred to the volume and timing of the production of weapons and equipment for the bunkers. 16.6.41 is out new ruling: "The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) Note that the supply of weapons to SDs under construction is not satisfactory. In order to accelerate the bringing into combat readiness of the UR, the SNK of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) Decree:
1. Before obtaining weapons from the industry, allow NPOs to take machine guns for parts of the UR: a) at the expense of the "NZ" rear units - 2700 DP; b) from mobzapasa Far Eastern Front - 3000 DP and 2000 machine guns "Maxim", with the return in the fourth quarter of 1941 year.
...Produce ... at 1941 45 mm of DOT-4 casemate installations ...2078 pc. with the delivery of their NGOs: in the II quarter. - 200 installations, in July - 200 installations, in August - 300 installations, in September - 400 installations, in October - 400 installations, in November - 378 installations, in December - 200 installations ...
11. Oblige the People's Commissariat of Weapons to make machine guns, sights and periscopes for bunkers in quantities and in time [total in 1941]: DP machine guns - 6575 ..., DT machine guns - 3440*..., the Maxim machine gun on the Sokolov machine - 6943**..., DS Machine Gun (without a machine) - 2071 ..., CT scopes - 17000..., periscopes PER-27 - 1580... Periscopes PDP-2 (PER-50) - 3220...
* Including 500 by order of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (No. 1393-566cc / s)
** Including 4 500 by order of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (No. 1393-566cc / s)... »
The initiative to make such a decision always comes from the organization concerned, which is NCOs. The ruling goes beyond 5,5 days before the outbreak of war. Instead of preparing the troops of the border HE in the expected attack of Germany, exorbitant time and production volumes of the weapons and equipment that cannot be used at the start of the war are set. Arms shipments are added for SARs from the Far East, which also require a long time.
On the eve of the war in PribOVO, on the orders of the General Staff, the formation of pullets for URs begins. They pull out people (including commanders, who are a large shortage of troops) and resources from formations and formations to form units that in any case will not have time to fully equip them before 22 June. And most importantly, for these parts there are no fortifications. Of course, they can occupy built concrete boxes, but for them there is no weapon. From the word - absolutely ... The considered picture about the situation in the SD is possible only in one case - when the spacecraft leadership does not expect the start of the full-scale 22 war of June. Provocations, perhaps, are waiting ...
The same mythical forces as the German 8-10 parachute divisions were regiments and divisions heavy tanks. Intelligence searched for them before the start of the war, tried to track their transportation or movement. Not found. But what about without a heavy td break through the Soviet fortified strip? Perhaps, the German generals, under the guise of provocation, are preparing only reconnaissance by force? .. This was yet another misconception of the SC leadership. At the SVKS, much was said about the use of heavy tanks in breaking through fortified lanes and when the MK approached.
K.A. Meretskov: "For the organization of the breakthrough of the defensive line is required triple supremacy… In the presence of heavy tanks they will make up the 1 th tank echelon. His task is to break down the anti-tank (PT) defense, suppress and destroy the PT guns ... If ... heavy and medium tanks are assigned to military units, then they constitute the 2-th tank echelon. He advances after the first and destroys the PT guns ... Third and subsequent tank echelons make up light tanks, they destroy fire weapons, machine guns, and thus lead the infantry, continuously supporting it in the breakthrough ... This is the way we broke the Mannerheim line.... »
M.F.Terekhin (commander 5 mk): "Building a battle formation td: 1-th echelon - heavy tanks that break through the entire tactical depth and go into the operational depth of the enemy... "A similar statement by General Pavlov at the SVKS we reviewed in part 3.
In the spring of 1940, the leadership of the USSR was pleased to learn of the start of the campaign in France and Norway, which was supposed to postpone the war between the USSR and Germany. But suddenly the allies were defeated in a short period of time. France capitulated, and British troops were evacuated, abandoning all heavy weapons. During the short-term campaign, Germany became the owner of French tanks, among which were tanks equipped with thick armor. Also, as trophies, the Germans got most of the equipment of the British mechanized division.
The ease with which the German Armed Forces dealt with the allied thick armored tanks suggested that the KA leadership thought that the Germans had powerful PT artillery and powerful heavy tanks. Soviet intelligence regularly reported on the presence of heavy tanks in the German tank forces. In fact, in the German tank forces, T-IV tanks armed with an 75-mm cannon were considered heavy tanks.
Guderian: "France possessed the strongest land army and the largest armored forces in Western Europe. In May, the Anglo-French armed forces in the west had 1940 tanks at their disposal near 4800 tanks, while in the German armed forces, the list included 2800 tanks, including armored cars, and in fact, by the beginning of the offensive, there were approximately 2200. Consequently, the enemy had a double superiority, which was further enhanced by the fact that the French tanks were superior to the German armor protection and caliber of guns, however, being inferior to them in perfect control devices and in speed... "Our intelligence could deliver similar information on different quantity and quality of armored vehicles in the armies of the allies and the Germans ...
The first German heavy multi-turreted tank was Nb.Fz, made in five copies. The 2 tank was made of non-armored steel. They were used as educational and propaganda purposes. Three other heavy tanks were sent to Norway and 19.4.41 passed through the streets of Oslo. In late April, photographs of these tanks were in many European newspapers. In 1940, the installation option on Nb.Fz was considered. New turret with 105-mm gun. It was probably clear to our military that the Germans had to switch from single multi-turbo machines with heavy armor to heavy multi-turret machines, as well as in the spacecraft. And the "illuminated" heavy tanks are outdated technology.
Intelligence RU GSH KA 11.3.41: "It is known that during the attack on France in May, 1940, as part of the German army, was 2-3 td, which included one heavy tank regiment... "The Republic of Moldova is in good agreement with the statements of the military at the All-Union Special Forces on the use of heavy tanks. There is a mention that the presence of heavy tanks in the German Armed Forces helped break up a larger Allied tank group. Heavy tanks are beginning to be seen as a new super-weapon.
Intelligence 5 Office of the Red Army 17.5.40: "...According to the same source, the British army has only about 300 thousand of really trained soldiers, and the rest are poorly prepared. The army has Only 49 heavy tanks... "
The problem of providing space vehicles with modern heavy tanks is discussed in the Government and 28.5.40 comes out Resolution SNK on increasing the release of tanks KV. In June, 1940, the task was given to the design of 57-mm PT gun. In March, 1941, the gun was adopted. Due to the unavailability of the plant for the production of this complex weapon, the shipment of guns to the troops began only in the summer of 1941. The armor penetration of the 57-mm PT gun (at an angle of encounter 90 degrees) at a distance of 1000 and 500 m was 91 and 103 mm, respectively, which could not ensure the defeat of German heavy tanks. The thickness of the armor of these tanks, according to the assumptions of the military, could be at the level of the caliber of their guns or be a little more.
On the initiative of the Chairman of the Defense Council S.Timoshenko, who sent 13.6.40 to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and SNK of the USSR memorandum about "Insufficient power of weapons of new KV and T-34 tanks, as well as other types of promising tanks under design"27.6.40 held a meeting of the CPC and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). At the meeting, 45-mm tank guns were considered unpromising, and for arming heavy tanks, guns of caliber 85 ... 107-mm and howitzers 122 ... 152-mm advanced.
Guderian: "The material part of the newly formed divisions on the orders of Hitler was mainly french cars. This material part in no way met the requirements of the war in Eastern Europe. Insufficient production of machines in Germany, not satisfying the rapidly growing needs, unfortunately, did not allow us to cover this deficit.... "Similar information could be obtained by our intelligence. One cannot exclude the fact that there could be assumptions about the presence of French heavy tanks in the RM.
Special report of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR: "25.2.41 at the station Izbitsa entered the train from 30 cars and platforms, from where the heavy tank unit was unloaded. Tanks are armed with guns and machine guns.... ”Since this part (battalion) of heavy tanks does not figure in subsequent RMs, it was probably about T-IV tanks. Intelligence in this case correctly identified their belonging to the German classification of heavy tanks, but these heavy tanks were not the ones that were expected to see at the border.
Intelligence RU GSH KA 11.3.41: "Recently, information was received on the formation of heavy td... At the moment, in the arsenal of the German army remains basically the same material part, with which the Germans began operations in Belgium and in France. Separate samples of tanks and armored vehicles underwent a slight modernization in terms of increasing armament and armor thickenings. Newly built tank models also tend to increase weight, armor and armor thickness..
Light tanks. ... Attention is drawn to the thickness of the armor (front plates), which can withstand the hit of an 45-mm projectile. Such tanks by the end of 1941 should be built 1590 ...
2. Medium tanks. Information about the construction of new samples is not available ...
3. Heavy tanks. According to information requiring additional verification, the Germans are beginning to build three new models of heavy tanks.
Type V. 36 t weight, 75 mm gun and 2 machine gun, armor up to 60 mm.
Type VI. 45 t weight, 75-mm gun, 20-mm gun and 3 machine gun, armor up to 70 mm.
Type VII. Weight 90 t, 105-mm gun, 2 - 20-mm gun and 4 machine gun [thickness of armor is unknown].
In addition, Renault manufactures produce repair of 72-ton French tanksinvolved in the war in the west. According to the information received in March and requiring verification at the Skoda and Krupp factories production of 60 and 80-ton tanks...
PT artillery. There is a quantitative increase in the artillery PT, an increase in its caliber and the attraction of 20, 37 and 88-mm anti-aircraft guns to fight with tanks. In the battles in the West, "heavy battalion divisions of tanks" of a three-man unit acted; companies had 3 platoons, of which two platoons were armed with 88-mm anti-aircraft guns, and the third - 37-mm PT guns ... Divisions were the means of the main command and were attached to the corps or infantry, etc. on the main areas ... According to the information that needs to be checked, PT divisions of some TD are deployed on PT shelves of a two-division composition; The first division has 3 rotates for 12 37 or 47 mm guns, and the second division has 12 to 21 75 or 88 mm guns... »
The RM from 11.3.41 provides rather frightening data on the presence and development of heavy tanks by the Germans, on the repair of heavy French tanks, and on the presence of entire divisions having such equipment. Why do we need anti-aircraft 88-mm guns in German td? Maybe to fight with our KV tanks? And how should the spacecraft respond to such rearmament of the Germans? That's right, enhancing their tanks.
Resolution SNK USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 15.3.41: "The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) Decide: to approve a production plan for KB tanks in the number of 1941 units for 1200 year, including in the Kirov factory ... 1000 pcs. and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant ... - 200 pcs ... For the preparation of mass production of tanks KB-3... for 1.5.41 to make an 1-th copy of such a tank and, together with NPOs for 15.5.41, conduct its testing and approve drawings and technical conditions for launching into the series... "
The decree says the start of production 500 KV-3 tanks from August 1941 of the year. The tank's armor is 90 mm, the X-NUMX-mm F-76 gun is the most powerful F-34 tank gun at that time (of course, except for the M-34 cannon in the KV-10 tank). The F-2 cannon is weak to arm a heavy tank. According to the military and political leadership of the country, our heavy tanks look weaker than similar enemy vehicles.
In March, 1941, Marshal Kulik, arrived at the artillery plant No. XXUMX in Gorky, setting the task of the plant’s chief designer, VG Grabin, to urgently re-equip the KV-92 tank. According to the memories V.G. Grabina some time later, the following conversation with Stalin took place: “Stalin: Hello, Comrade Grabin. I want to consult with you. It is believed that a heavy tank is armed with a low-power cannon that does not meet the objectives of a heavy tank. At present, the question of rearming it is being considered: instead of the 76-mm cannon, it is proposed to put a powerful 107-mm. I would like to know your point of view on this issue....
Grabin: KWhen our design bureau GAU issued a TTT for the 76-mm cannon for a heavy tank, we carefully studied the issues related to the tanks and their weapons, and concluded that the 76-mm cannon for a heavy tank is unpromising and does not meet the requirements of even today. We believed that a heavy tank should be equipped with a more powerful gun, the projectile of which would pierce the armor, equal in power to the armor of its tank, from a distance of 1000 meters. They expressed their opinion to the leadership of the State Agrarian University and the Abtyuk State Technical University, but no one agreed with us..
Stalin: So you have long had an opinion about the insufficient power of the 76-mm gun for a heavy tank?
Grabin: Yes, Comrade Stalin.
Stalin: Are you sure that the 107-mm cannon can be put in a heavy tank?
Grabin: Yes, Comrade Stalin, I am deeply convinced that the 107-mm gun can be put in
heavy tank. If I understand you correctly, should this gun be higher than 107-mm modernized in its power?
Stalin: You understood me correctly... »
In early May 1941, a prototype ZIS-6 cannon was installed in the turret of the KV-2 tank. 14.5.41 was shot first. The armor-piercing projectile had armor penetration in the 160-175 mm area according to the Soviet measurement method. Serial production of ZIS-6 guns was supposed to begin with 1.7.41. Such a gun had to penetrate the armor of any German heavy tank.
Why did not you think to increase the production of tanks KV-2? Probably one of the reasons for the overweight of the tank, even without additional shielding. The shooting of a naval semi-armored projectile from an 152-mm cannon of the KV-2 tank was practiced at the beginning of World War II due to the lack of howitzer armor-piercing ammunition. The armor penetration of this projectile was about 72 mm of steel from a distance of 1500 meters at an angle of 60 degrees. Direct hits of regular high-explosive grenades or concrete-breaking shells in any enemy armored vehicle of that time could probably be fatal in almost all cases ... But this is purely theoretical. The design and thickness of the armor of German heavy tanks was unknown, and the shells for the 152-mm cannon are very expensive. The People's Commissariat of Weapons did not cope with the plan to launch large-caliber projectiles in 1940 and in the first half of 1941 ...
Three weeks later, the question of Soviet heavy tanks was again being discussed. They should be no worse than German.
Resolution SNK USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 7.4.41 "Shielding of KV-1 and KV-2 tanks, artillery armament and reinforcement of the KV-3 tank and design of KV-4 and KV-5 tanks in 1941 g ":"SNK of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) decide:
I. On the screening of tanks KV-1 and KV-2
1. Recognize the need to make additional reservations for 1 KV tanks and 2 KV tanks by shielding the most vulnerable armor spots (frontal plate and tower), for which:
a) ... to develop and manufacture for the 1.5.41 two prototypes of the 1 KV and 2 KV tanks with an additional armor screen 25 30 mm armor plate thickness. Take into account the possibility of creating gaps between the tank's main armor and the mounted screen;
b) to 15.5.41 to complete the refinement of drawings and technology for shielding and approve them to NPO (GABTU KA);
c) with the 1.6.41, the production of the 1 KV and the 2 KV ... with a screen.
2. Tanks KV 1 and KV 2, located in military units, shield in place, starting the screening with 1.7.41 and ending by 1 Jan. 1942 of the year. The management of this work is to be entrusted to NPOs (GABTU KA). NPO (GABTU KA) to 20.6.41 organize bases for shielding tanks in the troops, equipping them for welding and mechanical work, providing mobile power stations, welding equipment and compressors ...
Ii. About tank KV-3
1. In change of the resolution SNK USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) of 15.3.41:
a) install armor tank XV 3: frontal - 115-120 mm, towers - 115 mm;
b) equip an 3 107 KV tank with a ZN 6 cannon with an initial speed of 800 m / s ... Go to 5.5.41 plant No.92 at the Kirov 107-mm ZIS-6 cannon, install it in the tower of the 3 KV tank, and ... work out the booking system .
3. ... Produced in 1941. 500 pcs. tanks XV 3, armed with 107-mm cannon ZIS-6.
4. … To supply 107-mm guns ZIS-6 to the Kirov Plant for the 1941 program in the following terms: in July - 45 units, in August - 60 units, in September - 90 units, in October - 110 units, in November - 110 pcs. and up to 15.5.41 - 65 pcs ...
Iii. About tank KV-4
1. Oblige the Kirov Plant to design and manufacture an 4 KV tank (with an extended base) on TTT NKO, armed with a ZIS-107 XM gun and with 6-125 mm main armor, with the possibility of increasing the thickness of the tank armor in the most vulnerable places to 130-140 mm (turret, frontal plate) ... To 150 to produce one prototype of the KV 1.10.41 tank, for which:
a) for the 1.6.41 Kirovsky Plant to produce and submit to Izhora Plant drawings for the hull and turret of the KV 4 tank;
b) for the 15.6.41 Kirovsky Plant, submit for the approval of an NPO (GABTU KA) a model and technical design of the KV 4 tank;
c) to the 15.8.41 Izhora plant to produce and deliver to the Kirov factory the hull and turret of the KV 4 tank.
Iv. About tank KV-5
Oblige the Kirov Plant ... to design and manufacture for the 10.11.41 the KV-5 tank ... To approve the following main characteristic of the KV-5 tank: a) frontal armor - 170 mm; b) turret armor - 170 mm; c) side armor - 150 mm; d) one gun caliber 107 mm; e) diesel engine - 1,2 ths. ls... »
Pay attention to the timing of shielding tanks KV-1 and KV-2: the beginning of 1.7.41 and the end of 1.1.42. Work should begin on 20 June 1941. Series production of new 107-mm guns also starts on 1.7.41, and the tests of the projectiles for them are required to be completed in the month of June. Probably, the manufacture of shells will begin in July.
The design of the new KV-4 and KV-5 heavy tanks begins in a relatively short time. Work on the creation of this technique does not stop until the beginning of the war and will continue after its start. Work will stop only when it becomes finally clear that the Germans do not have mythical heavy tanks. In addition, the loss of heavy weapons of spacecraft will be catastrophic. After that, all forces will be thrown for the release of weapons. All of the above is possible only in the case of a serious fear of the country's military-political leadership to face unknown enemy tanks.
Guderian: "In the spring of 1941, Hitler allowed the Russian military commission to inspect our tank schools and tank factories, ordering everyone to show the Russians. At the same time, the Russians, inspecting our T-IV type tank, did not want to believe that this was our heaviest tank. They have repeatedly stated that we are hiding from them our newest designs, which Hitler promised to show them. The commission’s perseverance was so great that our manufacturers and officers of the weapons control department concluded: “It seems that the Russians themselves already possess heavier and more advanced types of tanks than we... »
New post on heavy tanks. Special message "Rato" 27.4.41: "From 21 to 23, April, Paris sent 800 light tanks to the east ... Recently, 70-ton tanks from the Renault plant were sent to Katowice - Poland. At the Hotchkiss factory, heavy tanks are being repaired (only Hotchkiss and German), it is supposed to finish the repair of all existing tanks next week, German soldiers say that these tanks will go to Portugal... "Portugal may be misinformation and tanks will be at our border ...
Probably, in April there were other RMs on heavy tanks that are not yet in the public domain. On the basis of these RMs, the issue of the formation of new parts could be considered.
Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and SNK USSR 23.4.41: "The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decide: to approve the formation proposed by the People’s Commissar of Defense:
a) 10-ti PT artillery brigades RGC, each in the composition: management brigade; Xnumx's; staff battery; a mine-sapper battalion and a motor-vehicle battalion ... In service of each brigade to have: 2 cannons mm of model 76 d. (F-1936) - 22; 48 mm anti-aircraft guns - 85; 48 guns mm M-107 - 60... »
The RM from 11 March talked about the German PT shelves, which include anti-aircraft 88-mm guns. Our PT crews also have 85-mm anti-aircraft guns. The brigade has guns and more powerful 107-mm. These guns are introduced into the PT brigade due to their higher armor penetration compared to the 45-mm PT gun. Since the tanks available in the German army have reservations at the level of 50 ... 60 mm, our PT brigades are preparing to meet tanks with a greater thickness of armor. To combat light and medium tanks with enhanced armor in the brigade are 76-mm guns. Everything is logical, according to intelligence.
The problem is different. All of these artillery systems are not quite suitable for use as a PT. Their excessive weight is not the only reason.
In "Short description... "76-mm guns indicated:"Guidance guns allow you to fire, both at ground targets, and at moving ground targets ... A lifting mechanism that serves to impart a tool to elevation angles is assembled on the right side of the upper machine body. The sight and the turning mechanism serving for horizontal pickup are located on the left side of the machine.... »
Thus, two people are involved in targeting the F-22 guns (as well as the F-22USV): one leads in the horizontal plane, and the other in the vertical plane. If the tank goes to the cannon on a perfectly flat surface, then the gunner can hit the target independently. If the tank goes over rough terrain: having angles, lows, small elevations and there are obstacles on the field, then you can probably get somewhere in the tank. But getting into the vulnerable position of the tank is already problematic - the gunner does not have the opportunity to clarify the vertical guidance. On the gun ZIS-3 eliminated this disadvantage. Many of our F-22 guns were captured by the Germans. Turning them into a PT gun, among other rework, the Germans transferred the mechanism of vertical guidance to the placement side of the gunner.
A similar problem was with the 107-mm gun and with the 85-mm anti-aircraft gun. In addition, the anti-aircraft gun was too high and there were not enough armor-piercing shells for it. A few days after the start of the war, it turned out that there were not enough high-explosive fragmentation shells ...
Did the Germans actually develop heavy tanks? At the end of the 30s, it was decided to design a heavy tank to replace the future T-III and T-IV tanks in the future. In January, 1937 was commissioned to develop a prototype 30-ton heavy tank with 50 mm armor (DW I - 1 breakthrough tank). In addition to the DW I, an order was issued to develop a heavier version of the DW II tank. Both prototypes were made in one copy, in 1937 and 1938, respectively. The DW I and DW II tests gave designers practical experience, which was the basis for the VK3001 (H) project and subsequent heavy tanks. By the end of 1938, work on DW projects was discontinued, and 9.9.1938 began design work on creating new prototypes of heavy tanks. The design of the DW I / II tank has grown into a new VK3001 (H) design.
In March, 1941, the firm "Henschel and Sons" produced two prototypes VK3001 (H).
The development of the 36-ton VK3601 (H) began when the armament control formulated the requirements for a heavy tank: its armament should allow piercing from 1500 m distance to 100 mm armor, and its armor had to withstand a hit from a similar caliber. According to other data, in the task it was formulated that the weapon should pierce the armor up to 140 mm from a distance of 1000 meters, and the thickness of the armor was specified in 100 mm.
Porsche AG developed the 45-tonne tank VK4501 (P).
At a meeting in Berghof, 26.5.41 presented to Hitler the models of the VK4501 (P) and VK3601 (H) tanks, which were approved by him. It was decided to allocate funds for their further development. From development to mass production of these tanks took a long time. The military-political leadership of Germany believed that the German Armed Forces would cope with the spacecraft without new tanks. Having started the war in the 1941 year, they did not want to give the spacecraft the opportunity to finally rearm before the 1942 year.
The Germans had a bad idea of the scale of the spacecraft rearmament begun. If they had more information, perhaps the events could have developed differently. For example, they could accelerate the development of their more modern tanks from the 1939 year, or increase the production of military equipment. Well, that did not happen ... Our intelligence delivered information about the development of promising heavy tanks, which could also be tossed as disinformation.
In June, all the intelligence services of the Soviet Union near the border did not indicate the presence of units and formations of German heavy tanks. In the requests below, the GSG KA asks for clarification of all available information on the German Armed Forces, incl. and heavy tanks. Such a request, according to the author, is an understanding of the RU GSH, that something is not going the way they imagine it ...
Special Post RU GSH KA in the NKGB USSR 3.6.41: "We ask the means at your disposal to help the GS GSA in checking, identifying and clarifying the following questions:
1. The total number of contingent taken into the German army and its age composition with distribution among the ground forces, SS and CA troops, air forces, reserve ground army and naval the fleet.
2. The organizational structure of the German military units: DD, etc., heavy td, md, gsd, airborne divisions, parachute divisions, corps artillery, artillery units of the GDK, anti-aircraft corps and anti-aircraft divisions, air corps and aviation divisions, chemical units ...
5. On which prototypes of tank, aviation and artillery weapons work the German military industry and the military department; what are the main indicators of these prototypes; that for the second half of 1940 and in 1941 from the new models of weapons adopted in mass production. It is especially important to identify: by tanks: the maximum thickness and strength of armor resistance, types of tanks with maximum weight and weapons and the number of tanks in Germany weighing 45 tons and above ...
6. The dispositions of the headquarters of the German armies and the headquarters of army groups in all German theaters of operations against the USSR, in particular, check the presence of army headquarters and their numbering in Königsberg, Allenstein, Warsaw, Lublin, in the Zamost-Krasnystav-Yankov region, in the Tarnów-Dębiez region -Bohnya, near Zakopane - 75 km south of Krakow. German army headquarters on the territory of Romania, the headquarters of army groups (fronts) in the areas of Lodz-Spala (former residence Moscitskogo1) and Krakow.
7. Recheck the number of German divisions and corps east of the river Oder, i.e. from the line Moravska Ostrava - Bres Lau (Breslav) - Stettin.
It is particularly important to identify the composition of the troops in the most poorly lit areas: Czestochowa, Katowice, Krakow; Lodz, Poznan, Breslau; Poznan, Frankfurt an der Oder, Bresse Lau and Danzig, Stettin, Bromberg (Bydgoszcz)... »
Directive NKGB USSR Commissar of State Security of the USSR Meshiku... 9.6.41: "The conditions of the present situation put forward before all the intelligence agencies of the Soviet Union, as the most important task, the clarification of all questions connected with the preparation of a war against the USSR, and first of all from Germany. Therefore, in your intelligence work, as a task for the near future, there should be a clarification of the following questions:
... 2. Organizational structure of individual German military units: DD, etc., тяжелы С… тР° РЅРєРѕРІС ‹С… РґРёРІРёР · РёР№, md, gsd, divisions of air infantry, parachute divisions, corps artillery, artillery units of the RGK, anti-aircraft corps and anti-aircraft divisions, aviation corps and aviation divisions, chemical units ...
4. What are the new models adopted for the second half of 1940, and in 1941, into service in the German army; tanks, aviation and artillery weapons. РћСЃРѕР ± енно РІР ° жно РІС ‹СЏРІРёС by tanks: the maximum thickness and resistance force of armor, the types of tanks with maximum weight and armament and the number of tanks weighing from 45 tons and above ...»
Special post "Zakharu" 10.6.41: "We received an urgent task of the relevant authorities regarding the identification and clarification of the deployment, organization and armament of the German army. Issues to be developed are the following: ... Organizational structure of the German military units: DD, etc., heavy td, md, gsd, divisions of air infantry, parachute divisions, corps artillery, artillery units of the RGK, anti-aircraft corps and anti-aircraft divisions, aviation corps and aviation divisions, chemical units ...
In this case, especially important to identify: for tanks - the maximum thickness and strength of armor resistance; types of tanks with a maximum weight and weapons and the number in Germany of tanks weighing 45 tons and above... »
The question of the penetration of German tanks is raised by G.K. Zhukov in the first days of the war: “...In 17 hours of 24.6.41, I had a conversation on "Bodo" with the commander of the 5 army, General MI Potapov ... How do your HF and others act? Do armor punched German tanks and about how many tanks lost the enemy on your front?..
Potapov. KV tanks are large 30 units. All are without projectiles for 152-mm guns. I have T-26 and BT tanks, mainly of old brands, including two-turrets. Enemy tanks destroyed by about a hundred ...
Zhukov. 152-mm KV guns shoot 09-30 projectiles, so order to issue concrete-concrete 09-30 projectiles immediately. and put them in motion. You will peel the enemy tanks with might and main... "
The problem with 152-mm shells was that there were almost none in the districts - there were even fewer of them than 76-mm armor-piercing shells ...
Consider another misconception of the spacecraft’s leadership regarding the work of the headquarters. M.D.Gretsov (NSH 2 QC): "In the pre-war manuals, many provisions were set forth without regard for the maneuvering nature of the war, with its quick change of events and tensions. Long verbose orders, detailed charts and timetables, statements and registration journals - all this in the form of cumbersome office work was recommended to the headquarters. And the headquarters in the early days of the war, following these instructions, diligently tapped on typewriters long orders, opt-in reports and, of course, were late. The headquarters, which in their activities were most eager to write and print, inevitably fell into time trouble and did not ensure good command and control of troops ...
One of the most difficult periods of war full of dramatic events was, of course, the initial one. At that time, command and control and staff service were subjected to the most difficult trials and did not always withstand them. The consequences of mistakes and miscalculations made on the eve and at the beginning of the war would not be so tragic for us if our headquarters were more seriously preparing for war and for an unusual, sudden entry into it.
Paradoxical as it may seem, but the fact that our high staffs in peacetime worked very hard on the theory of warfare, diligently and persistently studied, exercising, maneuvering, field trips worked out countless options for all sorts of operations, except for one thing - how to behave in the first day, in the first hours and minutes of the outbreak of war in the face of a sudden attack of the enemy ...
We had developed detailed plans and instructions on what to do on "M" day, i.e. on the day of the announcement of the mobilization, everything was arranged by the minute and in detail, up to when and which units go to the bathhouse, when and where they receive shells, ammunition, etc., and, finally, famous packages were kept in the vaults of each headquarters with a cover plan, in which exactly it was painted, when and where it was necessary for the troops to move. All these plans were. But, unfortunately, they did not say anything about what to do if the enemy suddenly goes on the offensive... »
To be continued ...
Information