Myths of the Great Patriotic. Why did the Stalingrad prisoners die?
From time to time on the Internet and in the periodical press, in articles dedicated to the next anniversary of the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad, there are references to the sad fate of German prisoners of war. Often their fate is compared to the fate of millions of Red Army men who were tortured in German camps. Thus, unscrupulous propagandists are trying to demonstrate the identity of the Soviet and Nazi regimes. Quite a lot has been written about the attitude of the Germans to Soviet prisoners of war. As for the Soviet side, the USSR, which did not sign the Geneva Convention 1929 in its time “On the content of prisoners of war” (the reasons for not signing it are known, but are not subject to this article), announced that it would comply with it same days after the start of World War II.
At the initial stage of the war, the maintenance of prisoners of war did not arise for the simple reason that they were too few. From 22 June to 31 December 1941, the Red Army captured 9147 people, and by 19 November 1942, when the counteroffensive at Stalingrad began, enemy 10 635 enemy soldiers and officers entered the rear camps for prisoners of war. Such an insignificant number of prisoners of war made it possible to easily supply them according to the standards given in the table below.
The prisoners were needed by the Soviet command not only as a labor force, not only as a source of information, but also as an object and subject of propaganda.
The norms of the daily allowance of foreign prisoners of war and Soviet prisoners in the USSR in 1939 – 1946 (in grams)
Already in one of his first directives 24 on June 1941, the head of the Main Political Propaganda Department of the Red Army, Army Commissar of 1 rank, Mehlis demanded:
By December 24 such cases were already 64. December 20 from the IV Army Corps received a report that "because of the loss of strength, two soldiers died." It is worth noting that hunger kills adult men before they have complete dystrophy. They generally suffer hunger worse than women. The first victims of malnutrition in besieged Leningrad, for example, were precisely working and working men who received more rations than employees or dependents. 7 January recorded death rate from hunger was already 120 people per day.
Paulus and his subordinates were well aware of the catastrophic situation of their troops. On December 26, in the telegraphic conversation with Colonel Fink, the rear commander of the 6 Army outside the ring, wrote to the commander of the surrounded grouping Major von Kunowski in telegraphic conversation:
However, no prayers could correct a continuously deteriorating situation. In the period from 1 to 7 in January, a ration was issued per person in the LI package per day in 281 g gross, with a standard in 800. But in this case the situation was relatively good. On average, in the 6 Army, bread distribution was reduced to 50 — 100. Soldiers on the front line received 200. Amazingly, with such a catastrophic shortage of food, some warehouses inside the “pot” literally burst with food, and in this form fell into the hands of the Red Army. This tragic curiosity is due to the fact that by the end of December, due to an acute shortage of fuel, freight transport had completely stopped, and the riding horses had died or were killed for meat. The supply system inside the "boiler" was completely disorganized, and often the soldiers died from starvation, not knowing that the saving food was literally a few kilometers away. However, in the 6 army there were fewer and fewer people able to walk such a short distance. In 20 January, the commander of one of the companies, which was to make a half-kilometer march, despite the shelling from the Soviet side was absent, told his soldiers: "Those who fall behind will be left to lie in the snow and it will freeze." January 23 the same company for the four-kilometer march took time from morning to night before night 6.
Since January 24, the supply system in the “boiler” has completely collapsed. According to eyewitnesses, nutrition has improved in some areas of the environment, since there has already been no consideration of the distribution of food. The containers dropped from the planes were plundered, and there was simply no way to organize the delivery of the rest. The command took the most draconian measures against the marauders. In the last weeks of the existence of the “boiler” by the field gendarmerie, dozens of soldiers and non-commissioned officers were shot, but the majority of the insurgents who were distraught from starvation did not care. On the same days, soldiers received 38 g of bread in other areas of the “pot”, and a can of Kola chocolate (several round tiles of tonic chocolate the size of a palm) was divided into a 23 person.
From January 28, food was issued in an organized manner only to soldiers on the front line. In the last days of the boiler’s existence, most of the sick and wounded, who were already around 20 Ltd. in December, did not receive any food at all in accordance with the order of Paulus. Even taking into account the fact that a significant number of the wounded were taken by plane, the headquarters of the 6 Army, which did not control the situation, believed that there were 26 – 30 thousands of them on January 40. Walking wounded and sick mobs wandered in search of food throughout the shrinking cauldron, infecting soldiers who were still sick.
According to unconfirmed reports, cases of cannibalism were noticed on January 12, 20.
Another scourge of the army surrounded at Stalingrad was cold. This is not to say that late autumn and winter of 1942 – 1943. in the Volga steppes were some particularly extreme. So, December 5 air temperature was 0 degrees. On the night from December 10 to 11, it dropped to minus 9, and December 15 rose to zero again. In January, it became very cold. During the month, the temperature at night ranged from minus 14 to 23 degrees of frost. 25 – 26 on January, when the agony of Paulus’s army began, the thermometers dropped to minus 22. The average daily temperature in January ranged from zero to five degrees below zero. At the same time, the Stalingrad steppe constantly blew a sharp and damp cold wind. Another feature of the Volga steppes, like any other, is the almost complete absence of trees in them. The only place from which theoretically it would be possible to deliver fuel (wood or coal) was Stalingrad. However, there was nothing to deliver it. As a result, another "silent killer" joined the famine. Under normal conditions, when a person can warm up and rest, when he normally eats, a long stay in the cold does not pose any danger to him. The situation in Stalingrad was different. Of course, the German command took into account the lessons of the winter 1941 / 42. For the Wehrmacht were developed warm cotton sets, fur hats with earflaps and a mass of devices for heating dugouts. Part of this wealth fell into the 6 army, but all the soldiers did not have warm clothes. However, as the inhabitants of the “boiler” died out, it became easier and simpler to get the clothes, because the corpses do not need them anymore. In fact, by the time Paulus surrendered, the needs of those surrounded in warm clothing were met, and many times over. However, in order to warm up, a person needs fire, and it was too difficult to get it. Cold and damp doing their job. Frostbite and frostbite, exacerbation of chronic diseases, problems of the immune system, pneumonia, kidney disease, furunculosis, eczema - this is just a small list of diseases that a person is suffering from constant hypothermia. Especially hard in the cold accounted for wounded soldiers. Not even a very significant scratch could result in gangrene. The horror was that the soldiers, who were even injured of moderate severity, were subject to immediate evacuation to the rear. The original concept of "Medicine Blitzkrieg" did not assume that the Wehrmacht would fall into the boilers from which it was impossible to remove the wounded, and excluded the battalion and regimental first-aid posts from the evacuation system. On the front line, in the army, there were only first aid equipment and almost no qualified surgeons. Thus, the wounded were doomed to death.
At the end of September, next to the soldiers of the 6 Army, or rather, directly to them, the harbingers of another misfortune appeared: lice. Biological species head louse (Pediculus Humanus Capitis), clothes louse (Pediculus Humanus Corporis) can parasitize only on humans. Perhaps a few lice carriers arrived in Stalingrad with the army, perhaps Wehrmacht soldiers got infected by local residents or in the city’s creepy conditions when using other people's things. Lice breed with terrifying swiftness. For a week, one individual can bring 50 LLC larvae. Amazingly, the Germans, whose level of medicine was significantly superior to the Soviet, could not beat the lice. The fact is that they used chemical powders against parasites, while in the Red Army, which had the sad experience of the Civil War, the main means of fighting insects was the treatment of clothes with steam, haircut "zero" and a bath. Of course, the lice "did not pardon" anyone, but they "Germans" especially German soldiers. Naturally, in the Stalingrad steppes it was difficult to arrange a bathhouse and roast clothes. In addition, the apathy, in which German soldiers gradually fell, does not contribute to the observance of elementary rules of personal hygiene. That is why, since October, the 6 Army has been trimmed. On one of the late autumn days, 1,5 kg (!) Lice were taken from twelve prisoners of war in a field hospital, which on average yielded a figure in 130 g per person. Thus, with an average weight of imago lice - 0,1 mg, individuals were taken from one wounded person to 130 LLC! Single mortality from typhus and other infectious diseases was observed in the Paulus group before the environment. In the last weeks of the existence of the “cauldron”, patients had strayed to Stalingrad, which gradually turned into a real typhoid hearth. Even before the beginning of the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, the Soviet command was aware of what the prisoners of war and intelligence reports were about in general, what was happening in Paulus’s army, but no one could have expected how bad things are there. Since November 19, the influx of prisoners has increased dramatically. It turned out that many of them are in a rather exhausted state, they are lousy and suffer from hypothermia. A few weeks later, the Commissar of Internal Affairs, Lawrence Beria, concerned about the high mortality rate among the prisoners, ordered his subordinates to investigate its causes. We note that Lawrence Pavlovich was hardly guided in his actions solely by the principles of humanism. First, the high mortality of prisoners of war could be used by enemy propaganda. Secondly, every dead German or Romanian could not, because of his death, be subsequently used at work, and working hands, even the hands of prisoners of war, were at that moment extremely necessary. Finally, thirdly, competitors and detractors could doubt the organizational skills of the Commissioner General of State Security.
On December 30, Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ivan Serov presented his patron with a memorandum stating:
This memorandum generated a rather harsh reaction at the very top of the Red Army command. Already 2 January 1943 was issued an order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 001. He was signed by the deputy commissar, the head of the commissar service of the Red Army, Colonel-General AB and the commissary service AB Khrulev, but there is no doubt that this paper did not escape the attention of the Supreme Commander himself:
Looking ahead, it makes sense to clarify that during the entire 1943, to establish a normal evacuation of prisoners of war from the front did not succeed. It is necessary to assume that such an important order was given too late, and it would be foolish to expect that it could be properly executed in less than a month when the stream of exhausted and sick prisoners of war fell upon the Red Army.
In the first days of January 1943, the commander of the Don Front, Colonel-General Rokossovsky, together with a representative of the General Headquarters, Colonel-General Artillery Voronov, recalled the ancient times two days before the start of the operation to eliminate the “boiler”, with the approval of Moscow, they turned to the German 6- commander Army, Colonel-General Paulus with an ultimatum of the following content.
Paulus rejected the ultimatum (according to Rokossovsky's memoirs, the Soviet voter-envoys fired at the German branch of the region, and the 10 in January, 1943 on the outskirts of Stalingrad, hell broke loose ...
Soon Shteydle himself joined this dreary flow. Stalingrad still had street battles at that time, the city was literally flooded with soldiers and officers who did not know what to do now. Someone cherished the hope of independently getting out of the cauldron, someone wanted to understand what was going on and get clear orders, and someone just hoped to find food and shelter in the city. Neither the others nor the third have achieved their goals. In the second half of January, Stalingrad turned into an island of despair shelled from all sides.
Finally, from January 30 to February 2, the remnants of the German troops defending themselves in the cauldron laid down their arms. To the surprise of the Soviet military (who estimated the surrounded grouping at about 86 thousands), only 10 22 Germans (including the 1943 general and around 91 officers) were captured from 545 in January to 24 in February, and there were also tens of thousands the dead. The condition of the prisoners was terrible. More than 2500 people were unconscious, 500 percent had dystrophy, almost all suffered from beriberi and were in a state of extreme physical and mental exhaustion. Lung inflammation, tuberculosis, and heart and kidney disease were widespread. Almost 70 percent of prisoners had frostbites of the 60 and 2 degrees with complications such as gangrene and general blood poisoning. Finally, about 3 percent were in such a hopeless condition that there was no way to save them. Among other things, the prisoners received the troops unevenly throughout the entire month of January, and the order to create a large front camp was given on the 10 of this month. Although the camp, more precisely, several camps-distributors, united in the management number 26, with the center in the village of Beketovka, began to function already in the first days of February, it was certainly not possible to properly arrange it.
But for the beginning of the captives it was necessary to withdraw from Stalingrad and somehow deliver to the camps, which were from the city approximately at a distance not exceeding the daily transition of a military unit consisting of healthy people. Today, Beketovka has already entered the city limits of Volgograd. On a summer day, walking from the city center to the area takes about five hours. It will take more time in winter, but for a healthy person such a “journey” will not become too difficult. Another thing - the Germans exhausted to the limit. Nevertheless, they had to be urgently withdrawn from Stalingrad. The city was almost completely destroyed. There were no premises suitable to accommodate a huge number of people, the water supply system was not functioning. Typhus and other infectious diseases continued to spread among the prisoners. Leaving them in Stalingrad meant doom to death. Long marches to the camps also did not promise anything good, but at least left the chances of salvation. At any moment the city could turn into an epidemic center, and deadly diseases spread to the Red Army soldiers, who in Stalingrad also gathered a huge number. Already February 3 – 4, capable of moving around the Germans, who were still waiting to be shot, built in columns and began to withdraw from the city.
Some modern researchers compare the withdrawal of prisoners of war from Stalingrad with the "death marches" in Southeast Asia, during which thousands of American and British prisoners of war died at the hands of the Japanese. Is there any ground for such comparisons? More likely no than yes. First, the atrocities of the Japanese are supported by concrete and numerous evidence. Secondly, the Americans and the British were captured healthy or relatively healthy (as, incidentally, the Red Army was captured by the Germans). In the case of Stalingrad, convoys had to deal with people, much of whom were actually dying. There is anonymous evidence that some of the completely weakened prisoners, who could no longer move, were shot by escorts. At the same time, the military doctor Otto Rühle in his book Healing in Elabuga tells that all fallen German soldiers were transplanted to sledges and taken to the camp. And this is how Colonel Steidel describes his way to the camp:
At the same time, Steidel emphasizes the correct behavior of the convoy and the fact that the soldiers fired civilians into the air as they tried to approach the convoy.
Prisoners in Stalingrad continued to arrive until February 22 1943. On this day there were 91 545 enemy soldiers in the city and its environs, some of whom were already dead. In the first days with the placement of prisoners, there were big problems. In particular, the Beketov camp was not equipped with sufficient space. Turn again to the memories of Steidel:
Stalingrad prisoners were sent not only to the outskirts of the destroyed city. In general, the site was supposed to leave the wounded, sick, and another 20 LLC people who were supposed to deal with the restoration of Stalingrad. Others were subject to distribution to camps located in other parts of the country. So, the surviving officers and generals were placed in the suburban Krasnogorsk, Elabuga, Suzdal and in the Ivanovo region. It turned out that those who were taken out of the Stalingrad region, made up a significant part of the survivors. Most of the prisoners waited a sad fate. At first, the wounded died. At the time of the capture, at least 40 LLC was needed for immediate hospitalization. However, camp number 108 was not originally equipped with hospitals. They began their work only on February 15. By February 21, medical aid had already received 8696 prisoners of war, of whom 2775 had been frostbitten, and 1969 needed surgical operations for injuries or illnesses. Despite this, people continued to die.
The mass mortality among prisoners of war seriously disturbed the leadership of the USSR. In March, a joint commission of the People's Commissariat of Health, NGOs, the NKVD and the Executive Committee of the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies was formed, which was supposed to examine the camps of the Office of Camp No. 108 and determine the causes of such high mortality. At the end of the month, the commission examined the camp in Khrenovoe. The inspection report stated:
Another commission, which examined the Velsk prisoner-of-war camp in a few days, recorded in its act:
The commission’s general conclusions stated that many prisoners of war arrived in camps with diseases that were irreversible. Anyway, by 10 in May 1943. 35 099 the first inhabitants of the Becket camps were hospitalized, 28 098 people were sent to other camps, and 27 078 people died. Judging by the fact that after the war no more than 6000 people returned to Germany, captured at Stalingrad, among whom there were many officers whose stay in captivity took place in relatively comfortable conditions, it can be assumed that most of the “Stalingradians” captured by the Red Army did not survive 1943. From the mistakes made in the winter of 1943, when the Soviet side had to take a large group of prisoners of war, conclusions were made. Already in mid-May, the NKVD Directive of the USSR on the need to take measures to improve the sanitary conditions of prisoners of war was sent out to all camp chiefs.
In the future, no excesses like Stalingrad in the Soviet prisoner of war camps took place. In total, over the period from 1941 to 1949 in the USSR, more than 580 thousands of prisoners of war of different nationalities died or died of various causes - 15 percent of the total number of prisoners. For comparison, the loss of Soviet prisoners of war amounted to 57 percent. If we talk about the main cause of death of the Stalingrad prisoners, then it is obvious - this is Paulus’s refusal to sign the 8 surrender of January. There is no doubt that in this case, many German soldiers did not survive, but most would have managed to escape. Actually, if a significant part of the captured German generals and officers did not see how indifferent their own command is to their fate, and then they did not feel the selflessness with which ordinary Soviet people, their enemies, fought for their health, they would hardly have to participate in the creation of the Free Germany Committee.
At the initial stage of the war, the maintenance of prisoners of war did not arise for the simple reason that they were too few. From 22 June to 31 December 1941, the Red Army captured 9147 people, and by 19 November 1942, when the counteroffensive at Stalingrad began, enemy 10 635 enemy soldiers and officers entered the rear camps for prisoners of war. Such an insignificant number of prisoners of war made it possible to easily supply them according to the standards given in the table below.
The prisoners were needed by the Soviet command not only as a labor force, not only as a source of information, but also as an object and subject of propaganda.
The norms of the daily allowance of foreign prisoners of war and Soviet prisoners in the USSR in 1939 – 1946 (in grams)
Already in one of his first directives 24 on June 1941, the head of the Main Political Propaganda Department of the Red Army, Army Commissar of 1 rank, Mehlis demanded:
“... systematically photograph prisoners, especially paratroopers in their clothes, as well as German captured and shot down by our troops Tanks, planes and other war trophies. Immediately and regularly send pictures to Moscow. Send also the most interesting prisoner polls and documents. All this will be used for propaganda purposes. ”
In leaflets that were addressed to German and Finnish soldiers, they were guaranteed life and good treatment. However, Soviet propaganda had no noticeable influence on the enemy. One of the reasons for such a failure was the repeated cases of the killing of German prisoners by Red Army soldiers. There were relatively few such cases, but it would be a big mistake to be silent about them or try to find an excuse for them, especially since the facts of the inhumane attitude of Soviet soldiers to German prisoners were immediately widely “promoted” by Nazi propaganda. Subsequently, it was the fear of death at the hands of the “ruthless enemy” that caused the death of many Wehrmacht soldiers, who preferred death from starvation and typhus to Soviet captivity.
Despite the fact that from December 1941 to the end of April 1942, the Red Army was almost in continuous offensive, it failed to capture a large number of prisoners of war. This is explained by the fact that parts of the Wehrmacht either retreated in time or quickly unblocked their surrounded units, preventing the Soviet troops from destroying the “boilers”. As a result, the first large encirclement that the Red Army managed to complete was the encirclement of the German 6 Army near Stalingrad. 19 November, the 1942 began the Soviet counteroffensive. A few days later the encirclement ring was closed. The Red Army proceeded to the gradual elimination of the “boiler”, at the same time discouraging attempts to break through it from the outside.
For Christmas, 1942, the attempts of the German command to break through the Soviet defense and establish contact with the surrounded ones ended in failure. The chance to escape from the "boiler" was also missed. There was still the illusion that the inhabitants of the “boiler” could be supplied by air, but the Stalingrad “boiler” differed from Demyansky and Kholmsky in size, remoteness from the front line, and most importantly in the number of surrounded groups. But the most important difference was that the Soviet command learned from its mistakes and took measures to combat the "air bridge". Before the end of November, the air force and anti-aircraft artillery destroyed several dozen transport aircraft. By the end of the Stalingrad epic, the Germans had lost 488 "transports" and bombers, as well as about 1000 flight crews. At the same time, even on the calmest days, the defenders did not receive their 600 tons of supply per day due to them.
It should be noted that the problems with the supply of the Paulus group began long before the start of the Soviet operation "Uranus". In September, 1942, the actual ration of food that the soldiers of the 6 Army received, was about 1800 calories per day for needs taking into account the loads - 3000 – 4000. In October 1942, the command of the 6 Army reported to the OKH, that since August "living conditions in the entire range of the 6 Army are equally bad." The organization of additional food supplies at the expense of requisition of local sources was no longer possible (in other words, all that soldiers of the gallant Wehrmacht stole from the civilian population was eaten). For this reason, the command of the 6 Army asked to increase the daily ration of bread from 600 to 750 grams. The constantly increasing physical and mental exhaustion of soldiers and officers was superimposed on supply difficulties. By the time the Soviet counteroffensive began, these difficulties seemed terrifying, but the real horror began after 19 November. Continuous battles with the advancing Red Army, a slow retreat to Stalingrad, the fear of death, which increasingly seemed inevitable, constant hypothermia and malnutrition, gradually turning into hunger, quickly undermined morality and discipline.
Malnutrition was the biggest problem. From November 26, the food ration in the “cauldron” has been reduced to 350 g of bread and 120 g of meat. December 1 bread production rate had to be reduced to 300. December 8 bread production rate was reduced to 200. It is worth recalling that the minimum bread rate issued to workers in the besieged Leningrad in November - December 1941 was 250. However, the time the Germans got to their lean rations of horse meat welds.
A hungry person quickly loses the ability to think, falls into apathy and becomes indifferent to everything. The defenses of the German troops quickly fell. 12 and 14 December, the command of the 79 Infantry Division reported to the headquarters of the 6 Army that, due to the lengthy battles and insufficient food supplies, the division could not hold its position any longer.
For Christmas, for a few days, front-line soldiers were given additional 100 g. It is known that at the same time, some soldiers in the “cauldron” received no more than 100 g of bread. (For comparison: the same amount - children and dependents of Oranienbaum received at least in besieged Leningrad.) Even if this is not the case, such a “diet” for quite a long time for thousands of adult men experiencing extreme physical and mental stress meant only one thing - death. And she was not long in coming. From November 26 to December 22, 6 deaths were reported in the 56 Army, “in which nutritional deficiencies played a significant role”.
In leaflets that were addressed to German and Finnish soldiers, they were guaranteed life and good treatment. However, Soviet propaganda had no noticeable influence on the enemy. One of the reasons for such a failure was the repeated cases of the killing of German prisoners by Red Army soldiers. There were relatively few such cases, but it would be a big mistake to be silent about them or try to find an excuse for them, especially since the facts of the inhumane attitude of Soviet soldiers to German prisoners were immediately widely “promoted” by Nazi propaganda. Subsequently, it was the fear of death at the hands of the “ruthless enemy” that caused the death of many Wehrmacht soldiers, who preferred death from starvation and typhus to Soviet captivity.
Despite the fact that from December 1941 to the end of April 1942, the Red Army was almost in continuous offensive, it failed to capture a large number of prisoners of war. This is explained by the fact that parts of the Wehrmacht either retreated in time or quickly unblocked their surrounded units, preventing the Soviet troops from destroying the “boilers”. As a result, the first large encirclement that the Red Army managed to complete was the encirclement of the German 6 Army near Stalingrad. 19 November, the 1942 began the Soviet counteroffensive. A few days later the encirclement ring was closed. The Red Army proceeded to the gradual elimination of the “boiler”, at the same time discouraging attempts to break through it from the outside.
For Christmas, 1942, the attempts of the German command to break through the Soviet defense and establish contact with the surrounded ones ended in failure. The chance to escape from the "boiler" was also missed. There was still the illusion that the inhabitants of the “boiler” could be supplied by air, but the Stalingrad “boiler” differed from Demyansky and Kholmsky in size, remoteness from the front line, and most importantly in the number of surrounded groups. But the most important difference was that the Soviet command learned from its mistakes and took measures to combat the "air bridge". Before the end of November, the air force and anti-aircraft artillery destroyed several dozen transport aircraft. By the end of the Stalingrad epic, the Germans had lost 488 "transports" and bombers, as well as about 1000 flight crews. At the same time, even on the calmest days, the defenders did not receive their 600 tons of supply per day due to them.
It should be noted that the problems with the supply of the Paulus group began long before the start of the Soviet operation "Uranus". In September, 1942, the actual ration of food that the soldiers of the 6 Army received, was about 1800 calories per day for needs taking into account the loads - 3000 – 4000. In October 1942, the command of the 6 Army reported to the OKH, that since August "living conditions in the entire range of the 6 Army are equally bad." The organization of additional food supplies at the expense of requisition of local sources was no longer possible (in other words, all that soldiers of the gallant Wehrmacht stole from the civilian population was eaten). For this reason, the command of the 6 Army asked to increase the daily ration of bread from 600 to 750 grams. The constantly increasing physical and mental exhaustion of soldiers and officers was superimposed on supply difficulties. By the time the Soviet counteroffensive began, these difficulties seemed terrifying, but the real horror began after 19 November. Continuous battles with the advancing Red Army, a slow retreat to Stalingrad, the fear of death, which increasingly seemed inevitable, constant hypothermia and malnutrition, gradually turning into hunger, quickly undermined morality and discipline.
Malnutrition was the biggest problem. From November 26, the food ration in the “cauldron” has been reduced to 350 g of bread and 120 g of meat. December 1 bread production rate had to be reduced to 300. December 8 bread production rate was reduced to 200. It is worth recalling that the minimum bread rate issued to workers in the besieged Leningrad in November - December 1941 was 250. However, the time the Germans got to their lean rations of horse meat welds.
A hungry person quickly loses the ability to think, falls into apathy and becomes indifferent to everything. The defenses of the German troops quickly fell. 12 and 14 December, the command of the 79 Infantry Division reported to the headquarters of the 6 Army that, due to the lengthy battles and insufficient food supplies, the division could not hold its position any longer.
For Christmas, for a few days, front-line soldiers were given additional 100 g. It is known that at the same time, some soldiers in the “cauldron” received no more than 100 g of bread. (For comparison: the same amount - children and dependents of Oranienbaum received at least in besieged Leningrad.) Even if this is not the case, such a “diet” for quite a long time for thousands of adult men experiencing extreme physical and mental stress meant only one thing - death. And she was not long in coming. From November 26 to December 22, 6 deaths were reported in the 56 Army, “in which nutritional deficiencies played a significant role”.
By December 24 such cases were already 64. December 20 from the IV Army Corps received a report that "because of the loss of strength, two soldiers died." It is worth noting that hunger kills adult men before they have complete dystrophy. They generally suffer hunger worse than women. The first victims of malnutrition in besieged Leningrad, for example, were precisely working and working men who received more rations than employees or dependents. 7 January recorded death rate from hunger was already 120 people per day.
Paulus and his subordinates were well aware of the catastrophic situation of their troops. On December 26, in the telegraphic conversation with Colonel Fink, the rear commander of the 6 Army outside the ring, wrote to the commander of the surrounded grouping Major von Kunowski in telegraphic conversation:
"I ask by all means to make sure that tomorrow we were delivered 200 tons of planes ... I never sat so deep in shit in my life."
However, no prayers could correct a continuously deteriorating situation. In the period from 1 to 7 in January, a ration was issued per person in the LI package per day in 281 g gross, with a standard in 800. But in this case the situation was relatively good. On average, in the 6 Army, bread distribution was reduced to 50 — 100. Soldiers on the front line received 200. Amazingly, with such a catastrophic shortage of food, some warehouses inside the “pot” literally burst with food, and in this form fell into the hands of the Red Army. This tragic curiosity is due to the fact that by the end of December, due to an acute shortage of fuel, freight transport had completely stopped, and the riding horses had died or were killed for meat. The supply system inside the "boiler" was completely disorganized, and often the soldiers died from starvation, not knowing that the saving food was literally a few kilometers away. However, in the 6 army there were fewer and fewer people able to walk such a short distance. In 20 January, the commander of one of the companies, which was to make a half-kilometer march, despite the shelling from the Soviet side was absent, told his soldiers: "Those who fall behind will be left to lie in the snow and it will freeze." January 23 the same company for the four-kilometer march took time from morning to night before night 6.
Since January 24, the supply system in the “boiler” has completely collapsed. According to eyewitnesses, nutrition has improved in some areas of the environment, since there has already been no consideration of the distribution of food. The containers dropped from the planes were plundered, and there was simply no way to organize the delivery of the rest. The command took the most draconian measures against the marauders. In the last weeks of the existence of the “boiler” by the field gendarmerie, dozens of soldiers and non-commissioned officers were shot, but the majority of the insurgents who were distraught from starvation did not care. On the same days, soldiers received 38 g of bread in other areas of the “pot”, and a can of Kola chocolate (several round tiles of tonic chocolate the size of a palm) was divided into a 23 person.
From January 28, food was issued in an organized manner only to soldiers on the front line. In the last days of the boiler’s existence, most of the sick and wounded, who were already around 20 Ltd. in December, did not receive any food at all in accordance with the order of Paulus. Even taking into account the fact that a significant number of the wounded were taken by plane, the headquarters of the 6 Army, which did not control the situation, believed that there were 26 – 30 thousands of them on January 40. Walking wounded and sick mobs wandered in search of food throughout the shrinking cauldron, infecting soldiers who were still sick.
According to unconfirmed reports, cases of cannibalism were noticed on January 12, 20.
Another scourge of the army surrounded at Stalingrad was cold. This is not to say that late autumn and winter of 1942 – 1943. in the Volga steppes were some particularly extreme. So, December 5 air temperature was 0 degrees. On the night from December 10 to 11, it dropped to minus 9, and December 15 rose to zero again. In January, it became very cold. During the month, the temperature at night ranged from minus 14 to 23 degrees of frost. 25 – 26 on January, when the agony of Paulus’s army began, the thermometers dropped to minus 22. The average daily temperature in January ranged from zero to five degrees below zero. At the same time, the Stalingrad steppe constantly blew a sharp and damp cold wind. Another feature of the Volga steppes, like any other, is the almost complete absence of trees in them. The only place from which theoretically it would be possible to deliver fuel (wood or coal) was Stalingrad. However, there was nothing to deliver it. As a result, another "silent killer" joined the famine. Under normal conditions, when a person can warm up and rest, when he normally eats, a long stay in the cold does not pose any danger to him. The situation in Stalingrad was different. Of course, the German command took into account the lessons of the winter 1941 / 42. For the Wehrmacht were developed warm cotton sets, fur hats with earflaps and a mass of devices for heating dugouts. Part of this wealth fell into the 6 army, but all the soldiers did not have warm clothes. However, as the inhabitants of the “boiler” died out, it became easier and simpler to get the clothes, because the corpses do not need them anymore. In fact, by the time Paulus surrendered, the needs of those surrounded in warm clothing were met, and many times over. However, in order to warm up, a person needs fire, and it was too difficult to get it. Cold and damp doing their job. Frostbite and frostbite, exacerbation of chronic diseases, problems of the immune system, pneumonia, kidney disease, furunculosis, eczema - this is just a small list of diseases that a person is suffering from constant hypothermia. Especially hard in the cold accounted for wounded soldiers. Not even a very significant scratch could result in gangrene. The horror was that the soldiers, who were even injured of moderate severity, were subject to immediate evacuation to the rear. The original concept of "Medicine Blitzkrieg" did not assume that the Wehrmacht would fall into the boilers from which it was impossible to remove the wounded, and excluded the battalion and regimental first-aid posts from the evacuation system. On the front line, in the army, there were only first aid equipment and almost no qualified surgeons. Thus, the wounded were doomed to death.
At the end of September, next to the soldiers of the 6 Army, or rather, directly to them, the harbingers of another misfortune appeared: lice. Biological species head louse (Pediculus Humanus Capitis), clothes louse (Pediculus Humanus Corporis) can parasitize only on humans. Perhaps a few lice carriers arrived in Stalingrad with the army, perhaps Wehrmacht soldiers got infected by local residents or in the city’s creepy conditions when using other people's things. Lice breed with terrifying swiftness. For a week, one individual can bring 50 LLC larvae. Amazingly, the Germans, whose level of medicine was significantly superior to the Soviet, could not beat the lice. The fact is that they used chemical powders against parasites, while in the Red Army, which had the sad experience of the Civil War, the main means of fighting insects was the treatment of clothes with steam, haircut "zero" and a bath. Of course, the lice "did not pardon" anyone, but they "Germans" especially German soldiers. Naturally, in the Stalingrad steppes it was difficult to arrange a bathhouse and roast clothes. In addition, the apathy, in which German soldiers gradually fell, does not contribute to the observance of elementary rules of personal hygiene. That is why, since October, the 6 Army has been trimmed. On one of the late autumn days, 1,5 kg (!) Lice were taken from twelve prisoners of war in a field hospital, which on average yielded a figure in 130 g per person. Thus, with an average weight of imago lice - 0,1 mg, individuals were taken from one wounded person to 130 LLC! Single mortality from typhus and other infectious diseases was observed in the Paulus group before the environment. In the last weeks of the existence of the “cauldron”, patients had strayed to Stalingrad, which gradually turned into a real typhoid hearth. Even before the beginning of the counter-offensive near Stalingrad, the Soviet command was aware of what the prisoners of war and intelligence reports were about in general, what was happening in Paulus’s army, but no one could have expected how bad things are there. Since November 19, the influx of prisoners has increased dramatically. It turned out that many of them are in a rather exhausted state, they are lousy and suffer from hypothermia. A few weeks later, the Commissar of Internal Affairs, Lawrence Beria, concerned about the high mortality rate among the prisoners, ordered his subordinates to investigate its causes. We note that Lawrence Pavlovich was hardly guided in his actions solely by the principles of humanism. First, the high mortality of prisoners of war could be used by enemy propaganda. Secondly, every dead German or Romanian could not, because of his death, be subsequently used at work, and working hands, even the hands of prisoners of war, were at that moment extremely necessary. Finally, thirdly, competitors and detractors could doubt the organizational skills of the Commissioner General of State Security.
On December 30, Deputy Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ivan Serov presented his patron with a memorandum stating:
“In connection with the successful actions of the Red Army units in the South-Western, Stalingrad and Don fronts, the transfer of prisoners of war takes place with great difficulty, with the result that there is a greater mortality among prisoners of war.
As established, the main causes of death are:
1. Romanian and Italian prisoners of war from 6 — 7 to 10 days before their surrender did not receive food due to the fact that all the food coming to the front went first to the German units.
2. When capturing our units, the prisoners of war are driven on foot along the 200 – 300 km to the railway, while their supply with the rear units of the Red Army is not organized and often along the way of the prisoners of war along the way, 2 – 3 do not feed them for days.
3. The concentration points of prisoners of war, as well as the reception centers of the NKVD, should be provided with food and clothing on the route by the Red Army rear headquarters. In practice, this is not done, and in some cases, when loading trains, prisoners of war are given out flour instead of bread, and there are no dishes.
4. The organs of military communications of the Red Army submit wagons for sending prisoners of war that are not equipped with bunks and stoves, and 50 – 60 people are loaded into each wagon.
In addition, a significant number of prisoners of war do not have warm clothes, and the trophy equipment of the rear services service and armies is not isolated for these purposes, despite the instructions of Comrade. Khruleva on these issues ...
And finally, contrary to the Statute on Prisoners of War, approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and ordered by the Red Army Glavvoensanpura, wounded and sick prisoners of war are not taken to front-line hospitals and sent to reception centers. ”
As established, the main causes of death are:
1. Romanian and Italian prisoners of war from 6 — 7 to 10 days before their surrender did not receive food due to the fact that all the food coming to the front went first to the German units.
2. When capturing our units, the prisoners of war are driven on foot along the 200 – 300 km to the railway, while their supply with the rear units of the Red Army is not organized and often along the way of the prisoners of war along the way, 2 – 3 do not feed them for days.
3. The concentration points of prisoners of war, as well as the reception centers of the NKVD, should be provided with food and clothing on the route by the Red Army rear headquarters. In practice, this is not done, and in some cases, when loading trains, prisoners of war are given out flour instead of bread, and there are no dishes.
4. The organs of military communications of the Red Army submit wagons for sending prisoners of war that are not equipped with bunks and stoves, and 50 – 60 people are loaded into each wagon.
In addition, a significant number of prisoners of war do not have warm clothes, and the trophy equipment of the rear services service and armies is not isolated for these purposes, despite the instructions of Comrade. Khruleva on these issues ...
And finally, contrary to the Statute on Prisoners of War, approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and ordered by the Red Army Glavvoensanpura, wounded and sick prisoners of war are not taken to front-line hospitals and sent to reception centers. ”
This memorandum generated a rather harsh reaction at the very top of the Red Army command. Already 2 January 1943 was issued an order of the People's Commissar of Defense No. 001. He was signed by the deputy commissar, the head of the commissar service of the Red Army, Colonel-General AB and the commissary service AB Khrulev, but there is no doubt that this paper did not escape the attention of the Supreme Commander himself:
“No. 0012 January 1943
The practice of organizing the direction and maintenance of prisoners of war at the front and on the way to the rear camps establishes a number of serious shortcomings:
1. Prisoners of war long delayed in the units of the Red Army. From the moment of captivity to the arrival at the loading points, prisoners of war walk on 200 – 300 kilometers and receive almost no food, as a result of which they arrive sharply exhausted and sick.
2. A significant part of prisoners of war, not having their own warm clothes, despite my instructions, is not provided from the captured property.
3. Prisoners of war, going from the place of capture to the points of loading, are often guarded by small groups of fighters or not guarded at all, as a result of which they disperse in settlements.
4. Concentration centers for prisoners of war, as well as reception centers of the NKVD, which, in accordance with the instructions of the Red Army Logistics Headquarters and the Main Directorate of Food Supply of the Red Army, should be provided with food, walkers and transport fronts, receive them in extremely limited quantities that do not meet the minimum needs. This does not allow for the provision of prisoners of war in accordance with established allowance rates.
5. VOSO fronts untimely and in insufficient quantities allocate rolling stock to send prisoners of war to rear camps; in addition, they provide wagons that are completely not equipped for human transportation: no bunks, stoves, toilets, firewood and household inventory.
6. Contrary to the provision of prisoners of war, approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and the order of Glavvoensanupra, wounded and sick prisoners of war are not taken to front-line hospitals and sent to reception centers and NKVD camps with general stages.
For these reasons, a significant number of prisoners of war are depleted and die before being sent to the rear, as well as en route.
In order to decisively eliminate the shortcomings in securing prisoners of war and preserve them as labor, I order:
Commander of fronts:
1. Ensure the immediate dispatch of prisoners of war by military units to concentration points. To expedite the sending use all modes of transport, going empty from the front.
2. To oblige the commanders of the units to feed the prisoners of war on the way before transferring them to the reception centers of the NKVD according to the standards approved by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 18747874с. Pillars of prisoners to attach camping kitchens from the captured property and the necessary transport for the transport of products.
3. In accordance with the regulations on prisoners of war, approved by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 17987800 from 1 July 1941, provide all types of medical care to wounded and sick prisoners of war in a timely manner.
Strictly prohibit the direction in the general order of the wounded, sick, frostbitten, and sharply exhausted prisoners of war and their transfer to the reception centers of the NKVD. These groups of prisoners of war should be hospitalized with subsequent evacuation to the rear special hospitals, satisfying them according to the standards established for sick prisoners of war.
4. To allocate a sufficient number of troop guards to escort prisoners of war from the place of capture to the receiving points of the NKVD.
5. In order to avoid long foot crossings, to bring the prisoners of war loading points as close as possible to their concentration sites.
6. When sending prisoners of war, commanders of units hand them over to an escort under an act indicating the number of escort, food stock issued for prisoners of war, and attached to a convoy-level train of property and transport. The act of accepting prisoners of war shall be submitted upon delivery to reception centers.
The chiefs of the convoys to transfer under the act all the documents seized from prisoners of war, for delivery to the receiving points of the NKVD.
7. Daily walking passage of prisoners of war to limit 25 – 30 kilometers. Every 25 – 30 kilometers of the pedestrian walkway, make halts-overnight stays, organize the delivery of hot food, boiling water to prisoners of war and provide the possibility of heating.
8. Leave clothing, shoes, underwear, bedding and dishes on POWs. In the event that prisoners of war do not have warm clothes, shoes and individual dishes, it is obligatory to issue the missing of the captured property, as well as of the things of the dead and dead soldiers and officers of the enemy.
9. Commander of fronts and military districts:
a) in accordance with the orders of the headquarters of the Main Department of the Red Army for the number 24 / 103892 from 30. 11. 42 g. And the Main Department of Food Supply of the Red Army, No. 3911 / ш from 10.12.42, immediately check the security of the NKVD reception centers and food distribution camps, create the necessary stocks at the points and in the distribution camps for uninterrupted power supply of prisoners of war;
b) to fully provide reception centers and distribution camps of the NKVD with transport and equipment. In the case of the mass inflow of prisoners of war, immediately allocate to the points and camps additional necessary transport and equipment.
10. Chief of the VOSO Red Army:
a) ensure the supply of the required number of wagons for the immediate dispatch of prisoners of war to the camps; equip cars with bunks, stoves, toilet bowls and uninterruptedly supply fuel along the line; to use for the evacuation of prisoners of war to the rear echelons, freed from under the composition;
b) to ensure the rapid advancement of echelons in transit along with military transport;
c) to organize in the VOSO Directorate of the Red Army dispatch control over the advance of trains with prisoners of war;
d) establish the norms for loading prisoners of war: in two-axle cars - 44 – 50 people, four-axle - 80 – 90 people. Echelons of prisoners of war to form no more than 1500 people in each;
e) to provide uninterrupted hot meals to prisoners of war and replenishment of the traveling supply of food at all military food and nutritional points for sales issued by military units, reception centers and camps of the NKVD;
e) organize a reliable supply of drinking water to prisoners of war, provide each two-axle wagon with three and four-axle wagons with five buckets.
11. To the head of Glavsanupra of the Red Army:
a) to ensure the hospitalization of the wounded, sick, frostbitten, and sharply depleted prisoners of war in the medical institutions of the Red Army at the front and in the front line;
b) organize their immediate evacuation to rear special hospitals;
c) for medical care of prisoners of war on the way to provide the necessary medical personnel with a supply of medicines. For these purposes also use medical personnel from prisoners of war;
d) to organize on evacuation points the review and verification of passing trains with prisoners of war and rendering medical assistance to the sick person. Not able to follow for health reasons immediately removed from the trains and hospitalized in the nearest hospital, followed by re-sending to the rear special hospital;
e) carry out sanitary processing of prisoners of war with disinfection of their personal belongings along the line of trains;
e) to organize a complex of anti-epidemic measures among prisoners of war (prior to their transfer to the NKVD camps).
12. Prohibit the departure of prisoners of war in not equipped for human transportation and non-insulated wagons, without the necessary reserves of fuel, travel stock of food and household inventory, as well as those who are not dressed or not seasoned.
Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Colonel-General of the quartermaster A. Khrulev. "
The practice of organizing the direction and maintenance of prisoners of war at the front and on the way to the rear camps establishes a number of serious shortcomings:
1. Prisoners of war long delayed in the units of the Red Army. From the moment of captivity to the arrival at the loading points, prisoners of war walk on 200 – 300 kilometers and receive almost no food, as a result of which they arrive sharply exhausted and sick.
2. A significant part of prisoners of war, not having their own warm clothes, despite my instructions, is not provided from the captured property.
3. Prisoners of war, going from the place of capture to the points of loading, are often guarded by small groups of fighters or not guarded at all, as a result of which they disperse in settlements.
4. Concentration centers for prisoners of war, as well as reception centers of the NKVD, which, in accordance with the instructions of the Red Army Logistics Headquarters and the Main Directorate of Food Supply of the Red Army, should be provided with food, walkers and transport fronts, receive them in extremely limited quantities that do not meet the minimum needs. This does not allow for the provision of prisoners of war in accordance with established allowance rates.
5. VOSO fronts untimely and in insufficient quantities allocate rolling stock to send prisoners of war to rear camps; in addition, they provide wagons that are completely not equipped for human transportation: no bunks, stoves, toilets, firewood and household inventory.
6. Contrary to the provision of prisoners of war, approved by the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, and the order of Glavvoensanupra, wounded and sick prisoners of war are not taken to front-line hospitals and sent to reception centers and NKVD camps with general stages.
For these reasons, a significant number of prisoners of war are depleted and die before being sent to the rear, as well as en route.
In order to decisively eliminate the shortcomings in securing prisoners of war and preserve them as labor, I order:
Commander of fronts:
1. Ensure the immediate dispatch of prisoners of war by military units to concentration points. To expedite the sending use all modes of transport, going empty from the front.
2. To oblige the commanders of the units to feed the prisoners of war on the way before transferring them to the reception centers of the NKVD according to the standards approved by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 18747874с. Pillars of prisoners to attach camping kitchens from the captured property and the necessary transport for the transport of products.
3. In accordance with the regulations on prisoners of war, approved by the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 17987800 from 1 July 1941, provide all types of medical care to wounded and sick prisoners of war in a timely manner.
Strictly prohibit the direction in the general order of the wounded, sick, frostbitten, and sharply exhausted prisoners of war and their transfer to the reception centers of the NKVD. These groups of prisoners of war should be hospitalized with subsequent evacuation to the rear special hospitals, satisfying them according to the standards established for sick prisoners of war.
4. To allocate a sufficient number of troop guards to escort prisoners of war from the place of capture to the receiving points of the NKVD.
5. In order to avoid long foot crossings, to bring the prisoners of war loading points as close as possible to their concentration sites.
6. When sending prisoners of war, commanders of units hand them over to an escort under an act indicating the number of escort, food stock issued for prisoners of war, and attached to a convoy-level train of property and transport. The act of accepting prisoners of war shall be submitted upon delivery to reception centers.
The chiefs of the convoys to transfer under the act all the documents seized from prisoners of war, for delivery to the receiving points of the NKVD.
7. Daily walking passage of prisoners of war to limit 25 – 30 kilometers. Every 25 – 30 kilometers of the pedestrian walkway, make halts-overnight stays, organize the delivery of hot food, boiling water to prisoners of war and provide the possibility of heating.
8. Leave clothing, shoes, underwear, bedding and dishes on POWs. In the event that prisoners of war do not have warm clothes, shoes and individual dishes, it is obligatory to issue the missing of the captured property, as well as of the things of the dead and dead soldiers and officers of the enemy.
9. Commander of fronts and military districts:
a) in accordance with the orders of the headquarters of the Main Department of the Red Army for the number 24 / 103892 from 30. 11. 42 g. And the Main Department of Food Supply of the Red Army, No. 3911 / ш from 10.12.42, immediately check the security of the NKVD reception centers and food distribution camps, create the necessary stocks at the points and in the distribution camps for uninterrupted power supply of prisoners of war;
b) to fully provide reception centers and distribution camps of the NKVD with transport and equipment. In the case of the mass inflow of prisoners of war, immediately allocate to the points and camps additional necessary transport and equipment.
10. Chief of the VOSO Red Army:
a) ensure the supply of the required number of wagons for the immediate dispatch of prisoners of war to the camps; equip cars with bunks, stoves, toilet bowls and uninterruptedly supply fuel along the line; to use for the evacuation of prisoners of war to the rear echelons, freed from under the composition;
b) to ensure the rapid advancement of echelons in transit along with military transport;
c) to organize in the VOSO Directorate of the Red Army dispatch control over the advance of trains with prisoners of war;
d) establish the norms for loading prisoners of war: in two-axle cars - 44 – 50 people, four-axle - 80 – 90 people. Echelons of prisoners of war to form no more than 1500 people in each;
e) to provide uninterrupted hot meals to prisoners of war and replenishment of the traveling supply of food at all military food and nutritional points for sales issued by military units, reception centers and camps of the NKVD;
e) organize a reliable supply of drinking water to prisoners of war, provide each two-axle wagon with three and four-axle wagons with five buckets.
11. To the head of Glavsanupra of the Red Army:
a) to ensure the hospitalization of the wounded, sick, frostbitten, and sharply depleted prisoners of war in the medical institutions of the Red Army at the front and in the front line;
b) organize their immediate evacuation to rear special hospitals;
c) for medical care of prisoners of war on the way to provide the necessary medical personnel with a supply of medicines. For these purposes also use medical personnel from prisoners of war;
d) to organize on evacuation points the review and verification of passing trains with prisoners of war and rendering medical assistance to the sick person. Not able to follow for health reasons immediately removed from the trains and hospitalized in the nearest hospital, followed by re-sending to the rear special hospital;
e) carry out sanitary processing of prisoners of war with disinfection of their personal belongings along the line of trains;
e) to organize a complex of anti-epidemic measures among prisoners of war (prior to their transfer to the NKVD camps).
12. Prohibit the departure of prisoners of war in not equipped for human transportation and non-insulated wagons, without the necessary reserves of fuel, travel stock of food and household inventory, as well as those who are not dressed or not seasoned.
Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Colonel-General of the quartermaster A. Khrulev. "
Looking ahead, it makes sense to clarify that during the entire 1943, to establish a normal evacuation of prisoners of war from the front did not succeed. It is necessary to assume that such an important order was given too late, and it would be foolish to expect that it could be properly executed in less than a month when the stream of exhausted and sick prisoners of war fell upon the Red Army.
In the first days of January 1943, the commander of the Don Front, Colonel-General Rokossovsky, together with a representative of the General Headquarters, Colonel-General Artillery Voronov, recalled the ancient times two days before the start of the operation to eliminate the “boiler”, with the approval of Moscow, they turned to the German 6- commander Army, Colonel-General Paulus with an ultimatum of the following content.
“The 6th German Army, the formations of the 4th Panzer Army, and the reinforcement units attached to them, have been completely surrounded since November 23, 1942. Parts of the Red Army surrounded this group of German troops in a tight ring. All hopes for the salvation of your troops by the advance of German troops from the south and southwest did not materialize. The German troops rushing to your aid were defeated by the Red Army, and the remnants of these troops retreat to Rostov. German transport aviationtransporting you a hungry norm of food, ammunition and fuel, in connection with successful, rapid advancement
The Red Army, often forced to change airfields and fly to the location of surrounded troops from afar. In addition, German transport aviation suffers huge losses in aircraft and crews from Russian aviation. Her help to the surrounded troops becomes unreal.
The position of your surrounded troops is difficult. They experience hunger, disease, and cold. The harsh Russian winter is just beginning; severe frosts, cold winds and blizzards are still ahead, and your soldiers are not provided with winter clothing and are in difficult unsanitary conditions.
You, as the Commander, and all the officers of the encircled troops are well aware that you have no real opportunity to break through the encirclement. Your situation is hopeless, and further resistance makes no sense.
Under the conditions of a hopeless situation that has developed for you, in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, we suggest you accept the following terms of surrender:
1. All German forces surrounded by you and your headquarters will cease resistance.
2. You are organized to give at our disposal all the personnel, weapons, all military equipment and military equipment in good condition.
We guarantee to all officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers who have ceased resistance, life and safety, and after the end of the war return to Germany or any country where prisoners of war express their desire.
For all personnel of surrendered troops, we keep military uniforms, insignia and orders, personal belongings, valuables, and the highest officers and cold weapon.
All surrendered officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers will immediately be established normal food. All the injured, sick and frostbite will be given medical assistance.
Your answer is expected in 15 hours 00 minutes, Moscow time, 9 January 1943, in writing, through your personally designated representative, who must follow in a car with a white flag on the road exit KONNY - KOTLUBAN station.
Your representative will be met by Russian trusted commanders in the “B” area of 0,5 km southeast of the 564 junction in 15 00 minutes 9 minutes of January 1943.
If you reject our offer of surrender, we warn that the troops of the Red Army and the Red Air fleet they will be forced to conduct business on the destruction of the encircled German troops, and you will be responsible for their destruction. ”
The Red Army, often forced to change airfields and fly to the location of surrounded troops from afar. In addition, German transport aviation suffers huge losses in aircraft and crews from Russian aviation. Her help to the surrounded troops becomes unreal.
The position of your surrounded troops is difficult. They experience hunger, disease, and cold. The harsh Russian winter is just beginning; severe frosts, cold winds and blizzards are still ahead, and your soldiers are not provided with winter clothing and are in difficult unsanitary conditions.
You, as the Commander, and all the officers of the encircled troops are well aware that you have no real opportunity to break through the encirclement. Your situation is hopeless, and further resistance makes no sense.
Under the conditions of a hopeless situation that has developed for you, in order to avoid unnecessary bloodshed, we suggest you accept the following terms of surrender:
1. All German forces surrounded by you and your headquarters will cease resistance.
2. You are organized to give at our disposal all the personnel, weapons, all military equipment and military equipment in good condition.
We guarantee to all officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers who have ceased resistance, life and safety, and after the end of the war return to Germany or any country where prisoners of war express their desire.
For all personnel of surrendered troops, we keep military uniforms, insignia and orders, personal belongings, valuables, and the highest officers and cold weapon.
All surrendered officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers will immediately be established normal food. All the injured, sick and frostbite will be given medical assistance.
Your answer is expected in 15 hours 00 minutes, Moscow time, 9 January 1943, in writing, through your personally designated representative, who must follow in a car with a white flag on the road exit KONNY - KOTLUBAN station.
Your representative will be met by Russian trusted commanders in the “B” area of 0,5 km southeast of the 564 junction in 15 00 minutes 9 minutes of January 1943.
If you reject our offer of surrender, we warn that the troops of the Red Army and the Red Air fleet they will be forced to conduct business on the destruction of the encircled German troops, and you will be responsible for their destruction. ”
Paulus rejected the ultimatum (according to Rokossovsky's memoirs, the Soviet voter-envoys fired at the German branch of the region, and the 10 in January, 1943 on the outskirts of Stalingrad, hell broke loose ...
“On January 10 in 8 hours of 5 minutes, the Russians begin artillery shelling even more than November 19: 55 minutes are“ Stalin's organs ”howling, heavy guns are rattling - without a break, salvo after volley. Hurricane fire plowed the whole earth. Began the last assault on the boiler.
Then the thunder of guns ceases, white-painted tanks approach, followed by submachine gunners in camouflage coats. We leave Marinovka, then Dmitrievka. All living things are in the valley of Rossoshka. We dig in at Dubinin, and two days later we find ourselves in the area of the Nursery station in Tolova beam. The boiler gradually shrinks from west to east: 15 to Rossoshka, 18 to Voroponovo - Nursery - Gonchar farm, 22 to Verkhne-Elshashsh - Gumrak. Then we rent Gumrak. The last opportunity for aircraft to take out the wounded and receive ammunition and food disappears.
(...) January 16 our division ceases to exist (...).
(...) Decomposition is intensifying. Other officers, such as, for example, the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of our division, Major Vilutski, flee on an airplane. After the loss of the Nursery, the planes land in Gumrak, which the Russians continuously fire at. Other officers after the disbandment of their units secretly flee to Stalingrad. More and more officers want to make their way alone to the retreating German front. These are in my battle group (...). "
Then the thunder of guns ceases, white-painted tanks approach, followed by submachine gunners in camouflage coats. We leave Marinovka, then Dmitrievka. All living things are in the valley of Rossoshka. We dig in at Dubinin, and two days later we find ourselves in the area of the Nursery station in Tolova beam. The boiler gradually shrinks from west to east: 15 to Rossoshka, 18 to Voroponovo - Nursery - Gonchar farm, 22 to Verkhne-Elshashsh - Gumrak. Then we rent Gumrak. The last opportunity for aircraft to take out the wounded and receive ammunition and food disappears.
(...) January 16 our division ceases to exist (...).
(...) Decomposition is intensifying. Other officers, such as, for example, the chief of the operational department of the headquarters of our division, Major Vilutski, flee on an airplane. After the loss of the Nursery, the planes land in Gumrak, which the Russians continuously fire at. Other officers after the disbandment of their units secretly flee to Stalingrad. More and more officers want to make their way alone to the retreating German front. These are in my battle group (...). "
Soon Shteydle himself joined this dreary flow. Stalingrad still had street battles at that time, the city was literally flooded with soldiers and officers who did not know what to do now. Someone cherished the hope of independently getting out of the cauldron, someone wanted to understand what was going on and get clear orders, and someone just hoped to find food and shelter in the city. Neither the others nor the third have achieved their goals. In the second half of January, Stalingrad turned into an island of despair shelled from all sides.
“A countless number of soldiers are moving along the street in front of the barred windows. For many days they have been moving from one trench to another, rummaging in abandoned cars. Many of them came from fortified basements on the outskirts of Stalingrad; they were beaten out by Soviet assault groups; here they are looking for where to hide. Here and there the officer appears. In this commotion, he is trying to assemble combat-ready soldiers. However, many of them prefer to join a division as laggards. Soviet troops are advancing and moving incessantly from one quarter, garden, factory territory to another, capturing position after position. (...) Many are extremely tired in order to do away with this and leave this crumbling front. They continue to fight, as others stand next to them, intending to defend their lives to the last bullet, those who still see the Soviet soldier as a real enemy or fear retaliation.
Around us are the ruins and smoking ruins of a huge city, and the Volga flows behind them. We are fired from all sides. Where a tank appears, there is at the same time visible the Soviet infantry, immediately following the T-34. You can clearly hear the shots and the terrible music of the “Stalin's organs”, which at short intervals firing barrage. It has long been known that there is no defense against them. Apathy is so great that it no longer causes anxiety. It is more important to pull something edible out of the pockets or rusks of the dead and wounded. If someone finds canned meat, he slowly eats them, and cleans the box with swollen fingers, as if it depends on these last remnants whether he will survive or not. And here is another horrible sight: three or four soldiers, crouching, sit around a dead horse, tear off pieces of meat and eat it raw.
This is the position "at the front", at the forefront. The generals know it as well as we do. They are “informed” of all this, and they are considering new defensive measures. ”
Around us are the ruins and smoking ruins of a huge city, and the Volga flows behind them. We are fired from all sides. Where a tank appears, there is at the same time visible the Soviet infantry, immediately following the T-34. You can clearly hear the shots and the terrible music of the “Stalin's organs”, which at short intervals firing barrage. It has long been known that there is no defense against them. Apathy is so great that it no longer causes anxiety. It is more important to pull something edible out of the pockets or rusks of the dead and wounded. If someone finds canned meat, he slowly eats them, and cleans the box with swollen fingers, as if it depends on these last remnants whether he will survive or not. And here is another horrible sight: three or four soldiers, crouching, sit around a dead horse, tear off pieces of meat and eat it raw.
This is the position "at the front", at the forefront. The generals know it as well as we do. They are “informed” of all this, and they are considering new defensive measures. ”
Finally, from January 30 to February 2, the remnants of the German troops defending themselves in the cauldron laid down their arms. To the surprise of the Soviet military (who estimated the surrounded grouping at about 86 thousands), only 10 22 Germans (including the 1943 general and around 91 officers) were captured from 545 in January to 24 in February, and there were also tens of thousands the dead. The condition of the prisoners was terrible. More than 2500 people were unconscious, 500 percent had dystrophy, almost all suffered from beriberi and were in a state of extreme physical and mental exhaustion. Lung inflammation, tuberculosis, and heart and kidney disease were widespread. Almost 70 percent of prisoners had frostbites of the 60 and 2 degrees with complications such as gangrene and general blood poisoning. Finally, about 3 percent were in such a hopeless condition that there was no way to save them. Among other things, the prisoners received the troops unevenly throughout the entire month of January, and the order to create a large front camp was given on the 10 of this month. Although the camp, more precisely, several camps-distributors, united in the management number 26, with the center in the village of Beketovka, began to function already in the first days of February, it was certainly not possible to properly arrange it.
But for the beginning of the captives it was necessary to withdraw from Stalingrad and somehow deliver to the camps, which were from the city approximately at a distance not exceeding the daily transition of a military unit consisting of healthy people. Today, Beketovka has already entered the city limits of Volgograd. On a summer day, walking from the city center to the area takes about five hours. It will take more time in winter, but for a healthy person such a “journey” will not become too difficult. Another thing - the Germans exhausted to the limit. Nevertheless, they had to be urgently withdrawn from Stalingrad. The city was almost completely destroyed. There were no premises suitable to accommodate a huge number of people, the water supply system was not functioning. Typhus and other infectious diseases continued to spread among the prisoners. Leaving them in Stalingrad meant doom to death. Long marches to the camps also did not promise anything good, but at least left the chances of salvation. At any moment the city could turn into an epidemic center, and deadly diseases spread to the Red Army soldiers, who in Stalingrad also gathered a huge number. Already February 3 – 4, capable of moving around the Germans, who were still waiting to be shot, built in columns and began to withdraw from the city.
Some modern researchers compare the withdrawal of prisoners of war from Stalingrad with the "death marches" in Southeast Asia, during which thousands of American and British prisoners of war died at the hands of the Japanese. Is there any ground for such comparisons? More likely no than yes. First, the atrocities of the Japanese are supported by concrete and numerous evidence. Secondly, the Americans and the British were captured healthy or relatively healthy (as, incidentally, the Red Army was captured by the Germans). In the case of Stalingrad, convoys had to deal with people, much of whom were actually dying. There is anonymous evidence that some of the completely weakened prisoners, who could no longer move, were shot by escorts. At the same time, the military doctor Otto Rühle in his book Healing in Elabuga tells that all fallen German soldiers were transplanted to sledges and taken to the camp. And this is how Colonel Steidel describes his way to the camp:
“A group of officers, supplemented by several soldiers and non-commissioned officers, was built into a column of eight people (eight rows). There was a march that demanded the strain of all our forces. We took each other's arms. They tried to restrain the pace of the march. But for those who walked at the end of the column, it was still too fast. Calls and requests to go slower did not stop, and it was all the more understandable that we took with us many with sore feet, and they could hardly move along the well-groomed, glistening like a mirror, ice-cold road. What did I not see as a soldier on these marches! Endless rows of houses, and in front of them - even in small lodges - lovingly groomed gardens and gardens, and behind them playing children, for whom everything that happens either has become commonplace or has remained incomprehensible. And then all the time stretched endless fields, interspersed with forest belts and steep or gentle hills. In the distance, the contours of industrial enterprises looked through. For hours we marched or rode along the railways and canals. All ways of transitions were tested, up to the use of a mountain road at a dizzying height. And then again marches past the smoking ruins, into which the settlements that had existed for centuries were turned. (...) On both sides of our path, snow-covered fields stretched. At least, it seemed to us on that January morning when the frosty air mixed with the descending fog, and the earth seemed to be lost in infinity. Only from time to time it was possible to see closely huddled prisoners of war who, like us, made this march, a march of guilt and shame! (...) After about two hours we reached a large group of buildings at the entrance to Beketovka. ”
At the same time, Steidel emphasizes the correct behavior of the convoy and the fact that the soldiers fired civilians into the air as they tried to approach the convoy.
Prisoners in Stalingrad continued to arrive until February 22 1943. On this day there were 91 545 enemy soldiers in the city and its environs, some of whom were already dead. In the first days with the placement of prisoners, there were big problems. In particular, the Beketov camp was not equipped with sufficient space. Turn again to the memories of Steidel:
“We were placed there in all rooms from basement to attic, mostly in groups of eight, ten or fifteen people. Those who did not at first grab a place for themselves, they had to stand or sit on the platforms of the stairs as necessary. But in this building there were windows, there was a roof, water and a temporarily equipped kitchen. Restrooms were located opposite the main building. In the next building was a sanitary unit with Soviet doctors and nurses. We were allowed at any time of the day to walk around the big yard, meet and talk with each other.
In order to avoid typhus, cholera, plague and everything else that could have arisen with such a crowd of people, a wide campaign of preventive vaccinations was organized. However, for many this event was overdue. Epidemics and serious illnesses were common in Stalingrad. Whoever fell ill, he died alone or among his comrades, where he would have to: in a crowded, hastily equipped basement under the infirmary, in some corner, in a snowy trench. No one asked about why the other died. The overcoat, the scarf, the jacket of the dead did not disappear - the living needed it. Through them, very many were infected. And here, in Beketovka, what we thought was absolutely impossible, but what made the criminal nature of Hitler’s actions, and our own blame for the fact that we didn’t carry out a long-standing solution, was unclear: the physical, mental and spiritual collapse of an unprecedented scale. Many who managed to get out of the Stalingrad hell could not stand it and died from typhus, dysentery or complete exhaustion of physical and mental forces. Anyone who was alive a few minutes ago could suddenly fall to the floor and be in the dead within a quarter of an hour. Any step for many could be fatal. Step into the yard, from where you will not return, step by step for the water, which you will not drink anymore, step with a loaf of bread under the arm, which you will not eat anymore ... My heart suddenly stopped working.
Soviet women — doctors and nurses — often sacrificing themselves and not knowing peace, fought against mortality. They saved many and helped everyone. And yet it took more than one week before it was possible to stop the epidemic. "
In order to avoid typhus, cholera, plague and everything else that could have arisen with such a crowd of people, a wide campaign of preventive vaccinations was organized. However, for many this event was overdue. Epidemics and serious illnesses were common in Stalingrad. Whoever fell ill, he died alone or among his comrades, where he would have to: in a crowded, hastily equipped basement under the infirmary, in some corner, in a snowy trench. No one asked about why the other died. The overcoat, the scarf, the jacket of the dead did not disappear - the living needed it. Through them, very many were infected. And here, in Beketovka, what we thought was absolutely impossible, but what made the criminal nature of Hitler’s actions, and our own blame for the fact that we didn’t carry out a long-standing solution, was unclear: the physical, mental and spiritual collapse of an unprecedented scale. Many who managed to get out of the Stalingrad hell could not stand it and died from typhus, dysentery or complete exhaustion of physical and mental forces. Anyone who was alive a few minutes ago could suddenly fall to the floor and be in the dead within a quarter of an hour. Any step for many could be fatal. Step into the yard, from where you will not return, step by step for the water, which you will not drink anymore, step with a loaf of bread under the arm, which you will not eat anymore ... My heart suddenly stopped working.
Soviet women — doctors and nurses — often sacrificing themselves and not knowing peace, fought against mortality. They saved many and helped everyone. And yet it took more than one week before it was possible to stop the epidemic. "
Stalingrad prisoners were sent not only to the outskirts of the destroyed city. In general, the site was supposed to leave the wounded, sick, and another 20 LLC people who were supposed to deal with the restoration of Stalingrad. Others were subject to distribution to camps located in other parts of the country. So, the surviving officers and generals were placed in the suburban Krasnogorsk, Elabuga, Suzdal and in the Ivanovo region. It turned out that those who were taken out of the Stalingrad region, made up a significant part of the survivors. Most of the prisoners waited a sad fate. At first, the wounded died. At the time of the capture, at least 40 LLC was needed for immediate hospitalization. However, camp number 108 was not originally equipped with hospitals. They began their work only on February 15. By February 21, medical aid had already received 8696 prisoners of war, of whom 2775 had been frostbitten, and 1969 needed surgical operations for injuries or illnesses. Despite this, people continued to die.
The mass mortality among prisoners of war seriously disturbed the leadership of the USSR. In March, a joint commission of the People's Commissariat of Health, NGOs, the NKVD and the Executive Committee of the Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies was formed, which was supposed to examine the camps of the Office of Camp No. 108 and determine the causes of such high mortality. At the end of the month, the commission examined the camp in Khrenovoe. The inspection report stated:
"According to the reports of the physical condition of the prisoners of war who arrived in the camp, they are characterized by the following data: a) healthy - 29 percent,
b) sick and exhausted - 71 percent. The physical condition was determined by the appearance; prisoners of war who could move independently were in the group of healthy ones. ”
b) sick and exhausted - 71 percent. The physical condition was determined by the appearance; prisoners of war who could move independently were in the group of healthy ones. ”
Another commission, which examined the Velsk prisoner-of-war camp in a few days, recorded in its act:
“The prisoners of war revealed extreme lumpiness, their condition is very depleted. 57 percent
mortality falls on dystrophy, 33 percent. - for typhus and 10 percent. - for other diseases ... Typhus, lumpiness, vitamin deficiency were noted in German prisoners of war during their stay in the vicinity of Stalingrad. ”
mortality falls on dystrophy, 33 percent. - for typhus and 10 percent. - for other diseases ... Typhus, lumpiness, vitamin deficiency were noted in German prisoners of war during their stay in the vicinity of Stalingrad. ”
The commission’s general conclusions stated that many prisoners of war arrived in camps with diseases that were irreversible. Anyway, by 10 in May 1943. 35 099 the first inhabitants of the Becket camps were hospitalized, 28 098 people were sent to other camps, and 27 078 people died. Judging by the fact that after the war no more than 6000 people returned to Germany, captured at Stalingrad, among whom there were many officers whose stay in captivity took place in relatively comfortable conditions, it can be assumed that most of the “Stalingradians” captured by the Red Army did not survive 1943. From the mistakes made in the winter of 1943, when the Soviet side had to take a large group of prisoners of war, conclusions were made. Already in mid-May, the NKVD Directive of the USSR on the need to take measures to improve the sanitary conditions of prisoners of war was sent out to all camp chiefs.
"Moscow 15 May 1943
Ow. top secret
Head of UNKVD _ t.
Cc: Chief of the camp _____ prisoners of war
t. __________________
Considering that the bulk of prisoners of war captured in 1942 / 43 in winter, by the time of their capture were extremely depleted, sick, wounded and frostbite, therefore, the work on restoring the physical condition of prisoners of war and eliminating cases of morbidity and mortality of prisoners of war did not gave due results, the NKVD of the USSR, in addition to the previously given directives, offers:
1. Take the necessary measures to improve the living conditions of prisoners of war. Bring in a exemplary sanitary condition of residential premises and the territory of the camp. Ensure sufficient throughput of baths, de-chambers and laundries, completely eliminate lice among prisoners of war.
2. To improve the treatment of each individual prisoner of war.
3. To organize differentiated medical nutrition for the depleted and sick.
4. Skip the entire contingent of prisoners of war through the medical commission and release from work with enrollment in the health teams of the weakened, giving them 750 grams of bread per day and food increased by 25% until full recovery of working capacity. For prisoners of war who are partially able-bodied, establish a reduction of 25 – 50% of the rate of production with the issuance of the full standard of nutrition.
Medical examinations of prisoners of war should be carried out at least once a month.
5. To take measures for the full and timely supply of camps of prisoners of war with all kinds of allowances, in particular vegetables, vitaminous foods and products for diet.
6. Provide the camp with proper bedding and bedding as required. To ensure the implementation of these measures to prevent mortality and to establish medical care for prisoners of war, the chief of UNKVD t ._______ personally go to the site and take measures to assist the camp.
The status of the POW camp and the implementation of this directive to the Chief of the NKVD t ._______ report regularly to the NKVD of the USSR through the Chief of the POW Office, Major General Petrov.
Deputy Commissar t. Kruglov systematically check the implementation of this directive.
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Commissioner General of State Security L. Beria ".
Ow. top secret
Head of UNKVD _ t.
Cc: Chief of the camp _____ prisoners of war
t. __________________
Considering that the bulk of prisoners of war captured in 1942 / 43 in winter, by the time of their capture were extremely depleted, sick, wounded and frostbite, therefore, the work on restoring the physical condition of prisoners of war and eliminating cases of morbidity and mortality of prisoners of war did not gave due results, the NKVD of the USSR, in addition to the previously given directives, offers:
1. Take the necessary measures to improve the living conditions of prisoners of war. Bring in a exemplary sanitary condition of residential premises and the territory of the camp. Ensure sufficient throughput of baths, de-chambers and laundries, completely eliminate lice among prisoners of war.
2. To improve the treatment of each individual prisoner of war.
3. To organize differentiated medical nutrition for the depleted and sick.
4. Skip the entire contingent of prisoners of war through the medical commission and release from work with enrollment in the health teams of the weakened, giving them 750 grams of bread per day and food increased by 25% until full recovery of working capacity. For prisoners of war who are partially able-bodied, establish a reduction of 25 – 50% of the rate of production with the issuance of the full standard of nutrition.
Medical examinations of prisoners of war should be carried out at least once a month.
5. To take measures for the full and timely supply of camps of prisoners of war with all kinds of allowances, in particular vegetables, vitaminous foods and products for diet.
6. Provide the camp with proper bedding and bedding as required. To ensure the implementation of these measures to prevent mortality and to establish medical care for prisoners of war, the chief of UNKVD t ._______ personally go to the site and take measures to assist the camp.
The status of the POW camp and the implementation of this directive to the Chief of the NKVD t ._______ report regularly to the NKVD of the USSR through the Chief of the POW Office, Major General Petrov.
Deputy Commissar t. Kruglov systematically check the implementation of this directive.
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
Commissioner General of State Security L. Beria ".
In the future, no excesses like Stalingrad in the Soviet prisoner of war camps took place. In total, over the period from 1941 to 1949 in the USSR, more than 580 thousands of prisoners of war of different nationalities died or died of various causes - 15 percent of the total number of prisoners. For comparison, the loss of Soviet prisoners of war amounted to 57 percent. If we talk about the main cause of death of the Stalingrad prisoners, then it is obvious - this is Paulus’s refusal to sign the 8 surrender of January. There is no doubt that in this case, many German soldiers did not survive, but most would have managed to escape. Actually, if a significant part of the captured German generals and officers did not see how indifferent their own command is to their fate, and then they did not feel the selflessness with which ordinary Soviet people, their enemies, fought for their health, they would hardly have to participate in the creation of the Free Germany Committee.
Information