Myths of the Great Patriotic. Did Stalin have prostration in the first days of the war?

The fact that the political leadership of the USSR in the first days of the Great Patriotic War had a crisis was not in doubt since the 20th Congress of the CPSU. After that, testimonies of the direct participants were published, and starting from the 80s. last century and documents confirming the fact of the crisis.

The question of a crisis usually comes down to the fact that I.V. Stalin lost for some time the ability - or desire - to rule the state in the difficult conditions of wartime.


In his memoirs A.I. Mikoyan gives (as the words of VM Molotov) the definition of such a state of Stalin:

“Molotov, however, said that Stalin had such prostration that he was not interested in anything, had lost the initiative, was in a bad state”
[62].

However, questions about the duration of this state, the degree of depth of so-called. “Prostration”, and indeed its very existence in the form in which it is described in the memoirs of the former comrades of I.V. Stalin - A.I. Mikoyan, V.M. Molotov (according to A.I. Mikoyan), N.S. Khrushchev, L.P. Beria (from the words of NS Khrushchev), requires a rethinking of something, and in some - reflection.

First of all, let's define the terms of Stalin's “prostration”. There are several versions of its duration.

The first version says that Stalin fell into “prostration” in the very first days of the war, disappeared at a dacha outside Moscow and did not show up from there until the Politburo members came to him with a proposal to create a GKO (moreover, Stalin was afraid that they had come to arrest him). ), but the members of the Politburo did not arrest him, but were persuaded to head this body of supreme power in a belligerent country.

This myth was born N.S. Khrushchev during the XX Congress of the CPSU, when N.S. Khrushchev said the following.

“It would be wrong not to say that after the first heavy failures and defeats on the fronts, Stalin believed that the end had come. In one of the conversations these days, he stated:

- That Lenin created, we have irrevocably lost all this.

After that, for a long time, he actually did not manage military operations and did not start matters at all and returned to the leadership only when some members of the Politburo came to him and said that such measures should be taken without delay in order to improve the situation on the front. "
[63].

And in his memoirs N.S. Khrushchev adhered to this version; moreover, he creatively developed it.

“Beriarasskazil the following: when the war began, members of the Politburo gathered at Stalin. I do not know whether all or only a certain group that most often gathered from Stalin. Stalin was morally utterly depressed and made the following statement: “The war began, it develops catastrophically. Lenin left us a proletarian Soviet state, and we pissed him away. ” Literally put it. “I,” says, “give up leadership,” “and left. He left, got into the car and went to the Middle Dacha
[64].

This version has been taken up by some historians in the West. PA Medvedev writes:


«History that Stalin in the first days of the war fell into a deep depression and refused to lead the country "for a long time," N.S. Khrushchev in February 1956 in his secret report "On the cult of personality" at the XX Congress of the CPSU. Khrushchev repeated this story in his Memoirs, which his son Sergey recorded at the end of the 60s on tape. Khrushchev himself at the beginning of the war was in Kiev, he did not know anything about what was happening in the Kremlin, and in this case he referred to the story of Beria: “Beria told the following ...”. Khrushchev said that Stalin did not rule the country for a week. After the XX Congress of the CPSU, many of the serious historians repeated the version of Khrushchev, it was repeated in almost all Stalin's biographies, including those published in the West. In a well-illustrated biography of Stalin, published in the USA and England in 1990 and serving as the basis for the television series, Jonathan Lewis and Philip Whitehead, without reference to Khrushchev and Beria, wrote about the 22 day of June 1941. “Stalin was in prostration. During the week he rarely left his villa in Kuntsevo. His name disappeared from the newspapers. For 10 days, the Soviet Union had no leader. Only 1 July, Stalin came to his senses. (J. Lewis, Philip Whitehead. “Stalin.” New York, 1990. C. 805)
[65].

But still, most historians were not so gullible and besides N.S. Khrushchev was operated on with other materials as well, since the middle of the 1980s. more and more of them appeared - archives became available, some memoirs were published in editions devoid of an opportunistic revision.

What can not be said about some domestic historians, for example, about the authors of the textbook “The Course of Soviet History, 1941 – 1991” А.К. Sokolov and VS Tyazhelnikov, published in 1999, in which students are offered the same mythical version:

“The news of the beginning of the war shocked the leadership in the Kremlin. Stalin, who received information about an impending attack from everywhere, regarded them as provocative, pursuing the goal of drawing the USSR into a military conflict. He did not rule out armed provocations at the border. He knew best of all to what extent the country was not ready for a “big war”. From here - the desire to pull it off in every possible way and the unwillingness to admit that it still broke out. The Stalinist reaction to the attack of the German troops was inadequate. He still hoped to limit it to the framework of military provocation. Meanwhile, with every hour more clearly loomed the enormous scale of the invasion. Stalin fell into prostration and retired to a cottage near Moscow. Deputy ChairmanVnarkom V.M. was instructed to announce the beginning of the war. Molotov, which in 12 hour. Day 22 June spoke on the radio with a message about the perfidious attack on the USSR by fascist Germany. The thesis of the "perfidious attack" clearly came from the leader. It seemed to them that the Soviet Union did not give a reason for war. And how could it be explained to the people why a recent friend and ally violated all existing agreements and agreementsI

Nevertheless, it became obvious that some action should be taken to repel aggression. The mobilization of the military 1905 – 1918 was announced. of birth (1919 – 1922 were already in the army). This made it possible to put an additional 5,3 million people under the gun, who immediately went to the front, often right into the thick of battles. An evacuation council was established to remove the population from the areas covered by the fighting.

June 23 was formed Headquarters General Command, headed by the People's Commissar of Defense Marshal S.K. Tymoshenko. Stalin actually declined to lead the strategic leadership of the troops.

The environment of the leader behaved more decisively. It took the initiative to create an emergency government body with unlimited powers, which was proposed to be headed by Stalin. After some hesitation, the latter was forced to agree. It became clear that it was impossible to evade responsibility and it was necessary to go to the end together with the country and the people. June 30 was formed State Defense Committee (GKO) "
[66].

Recently, however, thanks to the efforts of some researchers [67], who have been working on this issue, as well as the publication of the Journals log of visits by I.V. Stalin [68] the myth that Stalin, on the first or second day of the war, "fell into prostration and retired to a cottage outside Moscow," where he remained until the beginning of July, was destroyed.

* * *

Another version of Stalin's “prostration” is such that “prostration” did not last a week, but a few days, at the very beginning of the war, June 23 – 24. The fact that 22 on June 1941 on the radio was made by Molotov, and not by Stalin, sometimes they try to prove that Stalin did not speak because he was confused, could not, etc.

Khrushchev writes (already from himself, and does not convey the words of Beria) about the first day of the war:

“Now I know why Stalin did not speak then. He was completely paralyzed in his actions and did not collect his thoughts "
[69].

But what Mikoyan writes about 22 June 1941 g.:
“We decided that we should speak on the radio in connection with the start of the war. Of course, it was suggested that Stalin do it. But Stalin refused: "Let Molotov speak." We all objected to this: the people would not understand why at such a crucial historical moment they would hear an appeal to the people not from Stalin, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, the Chairman of the Government, but his deputy. It is important for us now that an authoritative voice be heard with a call to the people - all to rise up for the defense of the country. However, our persuasion came to nothing. Stalin said that he could not speak now; he would do it another time. Since Stalin stubbornly refused, they decided to let Molotov speak. Molotov's speech was made at 12 on the 22 of the day of June.

Of course, that was a mistake. But Stalin was in such a depressed state that at that moment did not know what to say to the people. ”
[70].

A.I. Mikoyan writes about 24 Jun:

“We slept a bit in the morning, then everyone began to check his affairs on his own line: how is mobilization going, how is industry switching to military order, how is it with fuel, etc.

Stalin in a depressed state was at a dacha in Volynsky (near Kuntsevo) ”
[71].

But Mikoyan writes about 22 June:

“Then he [Molotov] told how, together with Stalin, they wrote an appeal to the people, with which Molotov delivered a speech on June 12 at 12:00 AM from the Central Telegraph.

- Why me, not Stalin? He did not want to speak first, it is necessary that there be a clearer picture of what tone and what approach. He, like a machine gun, could not immediately answer everything, it is impossible. Man after all. But not only man - this is not entirely accurate. He is both a man and a politician. As a politician, he had to wait and see something, because his manner of speaking was very clear, and at once it was impossible to orient yourself, to give a clear answer. He said that he would wait several days and speak out when the situation on the fronts was cleared up.

- Your words: “Our cause is just. The enemy will be defeated, victory will be ours ”- have become one of the main slogans of the war.

- This is the official speech. I composed it, edited, all members of the Politburo participated. Therefore, I can not say that these are just my words. There were amendments and supplements, of course.

- Stalin participated?

- Of course, still! Such a speech simply could not miss without him, to approve, and when they say, Stalin is a very strict editor. What words he entered, the first or last, I can not say. But he is also responsible for editing this speech.

* * *

- They write that in the first days of the war he was at a loss, his speech was lost.

- I was confused - I can not say, I was worried - yes, but I did not show it outside. Stalin had his difficulties undoubtedly. What did not worry - ridiculous. But he is not portrayed as he was, as a repentant sinner is portrayed! Well, this is absurd, of course. All these days and nights he, as always, worked, he had no time to be lost or speechless to lose. ”
[72].

Why Stalin didn’t speak on the first day, at 12 o'clock in the afternoon, giving Molotov this right, it was clear - it was not yet clear how the conflict was developing, how wide it was, whether it was a full-scale war or some kind of limited conflict. There were suggestions that some statements and ultimatums might follow from the Germans. And most importantly, there were grounds for believing that the Soviet troops would do with the aggressor what they were charged with — inflict a crushing retaliation, transfer the war to the enemy’s territory, and it is possible that in a few days the Germans would request a truce. After all, confidence in the ability of the Soviet Armed Forces to cope with a surprise attack was one of the factors (along with an understanding of the incomplete readiness of the troops for a big war and the inability, for various reasons, to start a war with Germany as an aggressor), which gave Stalin reasons to refuse to develop a preemptive strike according to the Germans in 1941

But what to answer the words of A.I. Mikoyan and N.S. Khrushchev? After all, the words of V.M. Molotov is not enough. Of course, it is possible (yes, in general, and it is necessary) to scrupulously analyze the activities of the Soviet leadership in the first days of the war, to collect cross eyewitness testimonies, memoirs, documents, newspaper reports. But, unfortunately, in the framework of this article is impossible.

Fortunately, there is a source with the help of which it is possible to ascertain whether Stalin was “completely paralyzed in his actions,” was “in such a depressed state that he did not know what to say to the people,” etc. This is the Journal of Records visitors of the cabinet I.V. Stalin [73].

Journal of visitors to the office of I.V. Stalin testifies:

21 Jun - 13 people are accepted, from 18.27 to 23.00.

22 Jun - 29 people taken from 05.45 to 16.40.

23 Jun - 8 people are accepted from 03.20 to 06.25 and ^ 18.45 people to 01.25 24 June.

24 Jun - 20 people taken from 16.20 to 21.30.

25 Jun - 11 people are accepted from 01.00 to 5.50 and 18 people from 19.40 to 01.00 26 June.

26 Jun - 28 people taken from 12.10 to 23.20.

27 Jun - 30 people taken from 16.30 to 02.40

28 Jun - adopted by 21 people from 19.35 to 00.50

29 of June.

Tables can be fully seen in the annex to the article.

Good; if Stalin was not in prostration from the very beginning of the war until July 3, when did he fall into it? And what is this prostration or depression, because the depressed state may be of varying severity. Sometimes a person experiences depression, but at the same time performs his duties, and sometimes a person falls out of life for a while completely, without doing anything at all. These are very different states, such as waking or sleeping.

The same Journal records visitors cabinet I.V. Stalin testifies that until June 28 inclusive, Stalin worked intensely (like everyone, presumably, military and civilian leaders). The 29 and 30 Jun entries are missing in the Journal.

A.I. Mikoyan writes in his memoirs:

“29 June in the evening at Stalin in the Kremlin gathered Molotov, Malenkov, me and Beria. Detailed data on the situation in Belarus has not yet been received. It was only known that there was no connection with the troops of the Belarusian Front. Stalin called the People’s Commissariat of Defense Tymoshenko. But he couldn’t say anything good about the situation in the West. Alarmed by this course of action, Stalin invited all of us to go to the Defense Commissariat and deal with the situation on the spot. ”
[74].

Entries for 29 June in the Journal, from which it would follow that the named persons were in the Kremlin in the evening by Stalin. Maybe A.I. Mikoyan made a mistake and the one he wrote about the meeting concerns 28 June, when Malenkov, Molotov, Mikoyan and Beria gathered at Stalin's party that evening, with the last three leaving the office at 00.50 the night of June 29? But then other witnesses are mistaken, writing about the visit of Stalin and members of the Politburo to the People's Commissariat of Defense on June 29. It remains to assume that for some reason the records of Stalin's visits by Molotov, Malenkov, Mikoyan and Beria were not made in the Journal of visitors.

29 June 1941 was issued by the Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line areas on the mobilization of all forces and means to repulse the German fascist invaders. However, most likely it was prepared on the evening of June 28.

According to G.K. Zhukov,
"June 29 I.V. Stalin twice came to the People's Commissariat of Defense, to the Headquarters of the High Command, and both times reacted extremely sharply to the current situation in the western strategic direction. ”
[75].

0 evening visit, about what happened during and after it, is well known. And with the second visit (or the first in chronology) is unclear. What was discussed when he was, there is no evidence. Maybe the first visit to the People's Commissariat of Defense took place on the night of 29 June (early morning), it was not yet known about the surrender of Minsk, and therefore members of the Politburo, and I.V. Stalin including, went away to sleep.

It should be noted that the People's Commissariat of Defense was on Frunze Street. And the Headquarters of the Main Command, where, according to Zhukov, Stalin also came twice during

29 June, was, since its inception, in the Kremlin office of Stalin. This is the beginning of the bombing of Moscow, it was transferred from the Kremlin to the street. Kirov (and, moreover, an underground center for strategic management of the Armed Forces was prepared at the Kirovskaya metro station, where the offices of IV Stalin and BM Shaposhnikov were equipped and the operations team of the General Staff and the departments of the People's Commissariat of Defense were located). But the first bombing of Moscow was on the night of 21 on 22 in July of 1941. It turns out that Stalin, besides having visited the street twice. Frunze, to the People's Commissariat, twice more came to the Kremlin, where the members of the Stavka gathered. Maybe this is the clue that Mikoyan wrote: “On June 10, in the Kremlin, Molotov, Malenkov, I and Beria gathered in the Kremlin at Stalin's evening on Stalin.”

In the day of 29, rumors (including reports of foreign news agencies) about the fall of Minsk became more solid, there was no information from the military about the real state of affairs (by telephone), there was no connection with the troops of the Belarusian Front, Stalin reasonably assumed that the capital Belarus may have already been captured by German troops. And the second (according to Zhukov) for 29 June, the visit of Stalin and members of the Politburo to the People's Commissariat of Defense was no longer so peaceful.

Here is what his direct participant, A.I. Mikoyan:

“Alarmed by this course of action, Stalin invited all of us to go to the Defense Commissariat and on the spot to deal with the situation.

Tymoshenko, Zhukov, Vatutin were in the Commissariat. Stalin kept calm, asked where the command of the Belarusian military district, what is the connection.

Zhukov reported that the connection was lost and could not restore it all day.

Then Stalin asked other questions: why did the Germans break through, what measures were taken to establish a connection, etc.

Zhukov said what measures had been taken, said that they had sent people, but no one knows how long it will take to establish a connection.

About half an hour talked, quite calmly. Then Stalin exploded: that for the General Staff, that for the chief of staff, who was so confused, had no connection with the troops, did not represent anyone and did not command anyone.

There was complete helplessness in the headquarters. Once there is no connection, the headquarters is powerless to lead.

Zhukov, of course, no less than Stalin experienced the state of affairs, and such an cry of Stalin was offensive to him. And this courageous man burst into tears like a woman and ran into another room. Molotov followed him.

We were all in a depressed condition. Minutes through 5 — 10 Molotov brought out the seemingly calm Zhukov, but his eyes were still wet. It was agreed that Kulik would go to contact the Belarusian Military District (this was Stalin’s suggestion), then other people would be sent. This task was given then Voroshilov. He was accompanied by an energetic, brave, and efficient commander Gai Tumanyan. I made a suggestion for an attendant. The main thing then was to restore the connection. Cases at Konev, who commanded the army in Ukraine, continued to develop successfully in the area of ​​Przemysl. By the forces of the Belarusian Front were then without centralized command. Stalin was very depressed.
[76].

This quote is from the manuscripts of the memories of A.I. Mikoyan, stored in RCCHIDNI, i.e. this text can be considered as original. But the story about the same from the book "So it was", published in 1999 by the publishing house "Vagrius":

“Tymoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin were in the Commissariat. Zhukov reported that the connection was lost, said that people had been sent, but how long it would take to establish a connection — no one knows. For about half an hour, they spoke rather calmly. Then Stalin exploded: “What is the General Staff? What kind of chief of staff, who was confused on the first day of the war, has no connection with the troops, does not represent anyone, and does not command anyone? ”


Zhukov, of course, no less than Stalin experienced the state of affairs, and such an cry of Stalin was offensive to him. And this courageous man literally burst into tears and ran into another room. Molotov followed him. We were all in a depressed condition. Minutes through 5 — 10 Molotov brought out the seemingly calm Zhukov, but his eyes were wet.

The main thing then was to restore the connection. It was agreed that Kulik would contact the Belarusian military district — this was suggested by Stalin, and then other people would be sent. This task was given then Voroshilov.

Cases at Konev, who commanded the army in Ukraine, continued to develop relatively well. But the troops of the Belarusian Front were then without centralized command. And from Belarus opened a direct path to Moscow. Stalin was very depressed. ”[77]

According to the publisher, son A.I. Mikoyan, S.A. Mikoyan, the basis of the text of the 3 volume of memoirs, which was at the time of the death of the author in Politizdat.

“The third volume, starting with the period after 1924, was in work at Politizdat, when his father died, he died on October 21 on 1978, not having survived a month before 83 years. A few weeks later I was summoned to the publishing house and informed that the book was excluded from the plans, and I soon learned that this was a personal indication of Suslov, who was a little afraid of his father until his death and now emboldened. A comparison of the father's dictations with the text subjected to the editors' execution showed that in a number of cases the author’s thoughts were distorted beyond recognition. ”
[78].

Since the memoirs of A.I. Mikoyan is extremely important as a source, it would be necessary to refer to their undistorted version. And the fact that the widespread version is quite distorted can be easily seen by comparing these two quotes. Moreover, in the future, such discrepancies and inconsistencies are so one-sided that there are reasons to assume that these memoirs were prepared by the author for publication during the reign of N.S. Khrushchev. Perhaps the original text was edited at that time, so all additions were made to reinforce the reader that Stalin’s “prostration” was long, many days long, and most importantly, Stalin refused to rule the country. The authorities and his associates had to persuade him to take the reins in his hands.

So, Stalin was convinced of how bad things were at the front, that the army leadership did not justify confidence, lost command of the troops at the most crucial sector of the front, and there was a conflict between political and military leadership, some kind of misunderstanding. Maybe it was in Stalin that he stirred those suspicions that he was guided by revealing and uprooting the military-fascist conspiracies in the army. After all, the repressed warlords were accused of the fact that in the event of war they were going to go over to the side of the enemy, undermine their defenses, deliberately ill command and in every possible way harm. And what happened at the front was like sabotage — the Germans were moving at almost the same pace as in Poland or France, and the leadership of the Red Army, despite the fact that Stalin was regularly assured of being able to hold him in the event of an attack by an aggressor in a decisive counterattack, it proved untenable.

With such (perhaps) thoughts, Stalin left the People's Commissariat of Defense and told his comrades a famous phrase. According to Mikoyan, it was like this:

“When we left the People's Commissariat, he said the following phrase: Lenin left us a great legacy, we, his heirs, pissed away all this. We were amazed by the statement of Stalin. It turns out that we have lost everything permanently? They considered that he said this in the heat of passion ... ”[79].

Molotov remembers the same thing:

“We went to the Commissariat of Defense for Stalin, Beria, Malenkov and me. From there I and Beria went to Stalin to the country. It was on the second or third day [80]. In my opinion, Malenkov was still with us. And who else, I do not remember exactly. Malenkov remember.

Stalin was in a very difficult condition. He did not swear, but he was not uncomfortable.

- How to hold?

- How to hold? As Stalin is supposed to hold on. Firmly.

- But Chakovsky writes that he ...

- What does Chakovsky write there, I do not remember, we were completely talking about something else. He said, "pissed away." It applied to all of us together. This I remember well, that's why I say. “Everybody pissed,” he just said. And we pissed. This was a difficult condition then. - Well, I tried to cheer him up a little.
[81].

Beria, according to Khrushchev, told him that it was like this:

“Beria told the following: when the war began, members of the Politburo gathered at Stalin. I do not know whether all or only a certain group that most often gathered from Stalin. Stalin was morally utterly depressed and made the following statement: “The war began, it develops catastrophically. Lenin left us a proletarian Soviet state, and we pissed him away. ” Literally put it. “I,” he says, “refuse the leadership,” and left. He left, got into the car and drove to the Middle Dacha. We, ”said Beria,“ remained. What to do next? "
[82].

N.S. Khrushchev, citing the words of Beria, is inaccurate. As follows from Mikoyan’s memoirs, Stalin made his statement after leaving the People's Commissariat, after which, together with a group of comrades, he left for his country house. Mikoyan was not at the dacha, accordingly, if Stalin had said: “The war has begun, it develops catastrophically. Lenin left us a proletarian Soviet state, and we pissed him. I refuse leadership ”- at the dacha, Mikoyan would not have heard either the first or second part of it. And he heard the first part about what he wrote in his memoirs.

Khrushchev is inaccurate in the following: Beria allegedly said that he stayed and Stalin left for the dacha, but Beria himself, referring to Molotov in 1953, definitely writes that he and Molotov were at Stalin’s dacha.

But the most important thing is not this; all this could be attributed to the N. S. S. aberration of memory. Khrushchev and its fragmentation, the main thing - the words of Stalin, that he refuses leadership. This is a very important point. Is it permissible to accept Khrushchev’s interpretation of the alleged words of Beria that Stalin really refused leadership?

In all the rest, told in this story, Khrushchev is somewhat inaccurate. Khrushchev's words - not an eyewitness - are not supported by the memories of Molotov and Mikoyan, eyewitnesses. Neither the first nor the second said a word that Stalin refused power. And so it would be more feasible than the word "pissed". This would be accurately remembered and noted, if not Molotov, who to some extent whitewashed Stalin, then precisely Mikoyan, especially if we recall the anti-Stalinist orientation of the editing of his memoirs.

An American researcher I. Kurtukov, dealing with this issue, said that Khrushchev's words are enough to conclude: Stalin at some point 29 – 30 of June 1941 rejected power, you only need to install, he did it under the influence of depression, rashly , or deliberately, in order to test his comrades-in-arms, to force them to ask him to return to power, like Ivan the Terrible made his boyars bow to him.

“It is difficult to say whether it was a sincere impulsive act or a subtle move, calculated precisely on the fact that the Politburo would meet and ask him back into power, but the fact was clearly the place to be”
[83].

Considerations that the memoirs of Khrushchev, due to the apparent dislike of Stalin by their author and the general inclination

N.S. Khrushchev to the distortion of historical truth cannot be recognized as a sufficient reason to make such a conclusion, Mr. Kurtukov disavows as follows: Khrushchev’s memories (more precisely, retelling the words of Beria) consist of the same fragments as Molotov’s memoirs and the note Beria Molotov, just "Khrushchev, these fragments are confused." Kurtukov admits that “Khrushchev works like a deaf phone” and “knows the story only from Beria’s words,” telling her “much later than the events,” but believes that Khrushchev’s words about Stalin’s refusal of power confirm the further development of events.

Let us assume that the events described by Khrushchev are chronologically confused, but they occurred separately. But neither Molotov nor Beria said that Stalin had declared his refusal of power. They have no such fragments.

I. Kurtukov quotes from a conversation between Molotov and Chuyev:

“For two or three days he did not show up, he was at the dacha. He was experiencing, of course, was a little depressed. / ... / It is difficult to say it was twenty-two, or twenty-third, it was a time when they merged one day with another ”(Chuev F. Molotov. Semi-sovereign ruler. - M .: Olma- Press, 2000. C. 399)
[84].

And accompany this quote with a comment:

““ Twenty-second or twenty-third, ”let them not be embarrassed, they surfaced from the Khrushchev version, which Chuyev and Molotov just discussed. Of course, it is impossible to accurately recall the date of events in 43, it is important to confirm the fact of “prostration”
[85].

In this case, one cannot but agree with I. Kurtukov’s opinion on the dating of the quotation, and in this case it makes sense to reproduce this quotation without cuts:

“- Of course, he was worried, but he didn’t look like a rabbit, of course. For two or three days he did not show up, he was at the dacha. He worried, of course, was a little depressed. But it was very difficult for everyone, and especially for him.

- Allegedly Beria was with him, and Stalin said: “Everything is lost, I surrender.”

- Not this way. It is difficult to say whether it was twenty-two or twenty-three, such a time when it merged one day with another. “I give up” - I did not hear such words. And I consider them unlikely. ”


Indeed, the memory of Molotov dates back to Beria’s visit to Stalin’s dacha on the night of 29 on 30 of June 1941 of the year, and Molotov directly confirms that he did not hear Stalin’s refusals from power. And since he, unlike Khrushchev, on the retelling of the alleged words of Beria that I. Kurtukov is building evidence that Stalin didn’t renounce power, was an eyewitness, his testimony will be, in any case, not worse. And most likely, more thoroughly.

I. Kurtukov summarizes his work as follows:

“On the morning and afternoon of 29 on June 1941, Mr. Stalin worked: he signed some documents and visited the People’s Commissariat of Defense, recognizing there the dismal news.

In the evening of 29 on June 1941, after visiting the People's Commissariat, Stalin, Molotov, Beria, and others go to the Middle Dacha, to Kuntsevo, where the Secretary General made a historical statement that “we all pissed away” and that he was leaving power.

30 June 1941 Mr. Molotov gathered in his office members of the Politburo, they outlined the decision to establish the State Defense Committee and went to Stalin to the country with a proposal to head this committee.

Stalin probably retired during this time, accepted the offer of his comrades, and since July 1, 1941 returned to the usual rhythm of labor activity. ”


Version I. Kurtukova is quite believable with the exception of a few fragments:

♦ Stalin said “we all pissed away” not at the dacha, but after visiting the Defense Commissariat, before leaving for the dacha;

♦ Stalin returned to "the usual rhythm of work" not on July 1, but on June 30, since he took an active part in the work of the newly created T-bills service, conducted telephone conversations, made personnel decisions, and so on;

♦ the fact that Stalin said that he was “leaving power” looks like a somewhat intuitive conclusion, because the source (Khrushchev’s memoirs), on the basis of which such a definite conclusion is made, is extremely unreliable, and is also refuted by Molotov’s memories. One would assume that such a phrase could have sounded in one form or another (for example, “I was tired”), but it is hardly correct to say so categorically that Stalin voluntarily gave up the leadership and said: “I am leaving.”

* * *

So, in the evening of June 29, perhaps already at night of 30, Stalin, Molotov, and Beria (and, possibly, Malenkov) arrived at Stalin's Middle Summer Cottage in Kuntsevo, where they had a conversation about the content of which Beria wrote in 1953 in his Molotov's note:

“Vyacheslav Mikhailovich! [...] You remember very well when at the beginning of the war it was very bad and after our conversation with Mr. Stalin at his Middle Country House. You put the question squarely in your office in the Council of Ministers that you need to save the situation, you must immediately organize a center that will lead the defense of our homeland, I fully supported you and suggested that you immediately call M-GM Malenkov to the meeting, and later a short time came other members of the Politburo, who were in Moscow. After this meeting, we all went to Mr. Stalin and convinced him of the immediate organization of the Country Defense Committee with all the rights. ”
[86].

This note should be perceived, along with the visitor logs of the Stalinist cabinet, as the most valuable source on this issue, since people usually write their memoirs safely and are not particularly afraid of memory incoherence, and even if the memoirist embellishes something, it will cause only the displeasure of those who know how it really was. But Beria wrote a note trying to save his life, and there was no way to lie to him about the facts - he, of course, flattered the addressees, but circumstances contributed to sincerity.

It can be assumed that it was during this conversation that Stalin’s depression had reached an extreme point. Of course, the conversation was about the plight of the country. It is unlikely that the conversation could not affect the recent visit of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the management of the army. It may be that the conversation has come about the fact that not all enemies were still withdrawn from the army, because repressions in the Armed Forces continued. In June 1941, Smushkevich, Rychagov, Stern were arrested, and after the start of the war, Proskurov and Meretskov were arrested. There was also a tendency to build branching "conspiracies", as some of those arrested, such as Meretskov, in addition to being linked to the "Stern case", were also trying to be tacked on to Pavlov, who was arrested several days later and who was still in the front. Once the country is in a difficult situation, there must be those responsible for it, and who is more suited to the role of scapegoats than the military, who did not cope with their duties. Against this background, Stalin might have fears that the military could spiral out of control, try to change political leadership, carry out a coup d’état, or even enter into negotiations with the Germans. In any case, it was clear - to try to get out of this difficult situation, you need to continue to fight, and for this you need to resume command and control and control of military commanders - full and unconditional.

* * *

30 June, probably hours in 14, in the Molotov office met Molotov and Beria. Molotov told Beria that it was necessary "to save the situation, we must immediately organize a center that will lead the defense of our homeland." Beria “fully supported him” and proposed “to immediately call G. Malenkov G. M. to the meeting”, after which “after a short period of time other members of the Politburo who were in Moscow also came”.

Mikoyan and Voznesensky were invited to Molotov about 16 hours.

“The next day, at about four o'clock, Voznesensky was in my office. Suddenly they call from Molotov and ask us to come to him.

Come on. Molotov already had Malenkov, Voroshilov, Beria. We caught them talking. Beria said that it is necessary to create a State Defense Committee, which will be given full authority in the country. To transfer to him the functions of the Government, the Supreme Council and the Central Committee of the Party. We agreed with Voznesensky. We agreed to place Stalin at the head of the T-bills, they did not speak about the rest of the T-bills. We believed that in the name of Stalin there was so much power in the minds, feelings and faith of the people that it would facilitate our mobilization and leadership of all military actions. We decided to go to him. He was in the Middle cottage "
[87].

There are questions - was the creation of the State Defense Committee discussed with Stalin during the night conversation? It is impossible to completely deny that the creation of the GKO was coordinated - between Stalin, Beria and Molotov, or between Stalin and Molotov - a step. There is no direct evidence, as well as refutations, but if we recall that Molotov, without Stalin’s knowledge, did not undertake any global initiatives and was always just a performer, it is strange why he suddenly decided on such an extraordinary action to create a government authority with dictatorial powers. It is also possible that June Molotov spoke with Stalin by telephone and even discussed the creation of the GKO at least in general terms. Or maybe in the conversation Stalin made it clear without specifying that such a body is necessarily needed. But Molotov and Beria urgently developed a plan, explained its essence to everyone and came to Stalin with a ready-made solution. This version (that the creation of the GKO was an initiative of Stalin) was advanced by I.F. Stadnyuk.

“Stalin returned to the Kremlin early in the morning of June 30 with the decision: to concentrate all power in the country in the hands of the State Defense Committee headed by him, Stalin. At the same time, the “trinity” in the People's Commissariat of Defense was disconnected: on the same day Tymoshenko was sent to the Western Front as his commander, Lieutenant General Vatutin, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was appointed Chief of Staff of the North-Western Front. Zhukov remained at his post as chief of the General Staff under the vigilant eye of Beria.

I am deeply convinced that the creation of the State Defense Committee and service movements in the military leadership is the result of a quarrel that ousted June 29 in the evening in the office of Marshal Tymoshenko ”
[88].

The fact that the creation of the GKO somehow resulted from a quarrel in the Defense Commissariat can hardly be questioned. But the fact that Stalin arrived in the Kremlin on the morning of June 30 and began to create a T-bills was extremely unlikely.

In any case, even if Molotov initiated the creation of the GKO, this cannot indicate that Stalin voluntarily gave up power, but that Stalin was depressed by the lack of concentration of power in his hands in such difficult, wartime and this said Molotov with Beria during a meeting at the dacha, this may well testify. And Molotov (who told Chuev that he “supported” Stalin just these days) correctly understood the task. Moreover, the GKO was not something extraordinary.

17 August 1923 from the Council of Labor and Defense of the RSFSR the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR (STO) was formed. His chairmen were successively Lenin, Kamenev and Rykov, and from December 19 1930 - Molotov.

“April 27 1937 (almost simultaneously with the organization of narrow leading commissions in the Politburo) The Politburo decided to establish the USSR Defense Committee under the SNK of the USSR. The new committee actually replaced the Soviet Labor and Defense Council (which was abolished by the same decision of April 27) and the joint Politburo and SNK defense commission that worked with 1930. The Defense Committee, chaired by Molotov, included seven members (VM Molotov, I.V. Stalin, L.M. Kaganovich, K.E. Voroshilov, V.Ya. Chubar, M.L. Ruhimovich, V.I. Mezhlauk) and four candidates for membership (Ya.B. Gamarnik, A. I. Mikoyan, AA Zhdanov, N.I. Ezhov). Thus, the Defense Committee in its composition largely coincided with the narrow governing commissions of the Politburo. Compared with the previous defense commission, the Defense Committee had a more substantial staff. In December, 1937 adopted a special decision of the Defense Committee on this occasion, which was later approved by the Politburo, which stipulated that the Defense Committee’s apparatus should prepare for consideration by the Committee of issues of mobilization deployment and arming the army, preparing the national economy for mobilization, and checking the execution of decisions Defense Committee. To supervise the execution of decisions, a special main inspection of the Defense Committee was created, gaining broad rights, including through the abolishing Gosplan Defense Department and the military control groups of the Party Control Commission and the Soviet Control Commission. ”
[89].

From the moment of the existence of the Soviet country, there was a body whose function, in addition to defense tasks, was to control the economy, and in the event of war it was supposed to organize the defense of the USSR. The composition of the KO practically coincided with the party elite, that is, in the event of war, the party should have organized the defense of the country and commanded the military — she too. And it was not for nothing that the SRT was transformed into a KO in April 1937, before the beginning of the process of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization (“the Tukhachevsky case”), which, according to the investigation, planned a military coup on 15 in May 1937. The Army was to be “cleaned”, and without Party leadership over the army this seemed difficult.

The head of the Defense Committee before 7 in May 1940 was Molotov, who replaced Litvinov as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, while Molotov replaced Voroshilov. Members of the Defense Committee were, in particular, Kulik, Mikoyan and Stalin. In 1938, the Main Military Council of the Red Army was created, of which I.V. became a member. Stalin.

Later, as Stalin moved towards combining the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, i.e., concentrating in his hands both the party and Soviet branches of power in the country, the construction of a new, extra-constitutional a body that, if necessary, could take all the power in the country - establish a practical dictatorship

"September 10. The Politburo of 1939 approved a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.), Which more clearly divided the functions of the Defense Committee and the Economic Council, primarily in the defense sphere. / ... /

The tendency to strengthen the role of the Council of People's Commissars was especially clearly manifested in the pre-war months. 21 March 1941 was adopted by two joint resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the reorganization of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which significantly expanded the rights of the government leadership. [...]

The final legitimization of the transfer of the rights of the CPC as a collective body to the supreme leaders of the CPC took place thanks to the decision of the CPC and the Central Committee of March 21 on the formation of the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars. This new authority, although not provided for by the USSR Constitution, was "vested with all the rights of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR" on the basis of a decree of March 1941. [...] V.M. Molotov, HA Voznesensky, A.I. Mikoyan, HA Bulganin, L.P. Beria, L.M. Kaganovich, AA Andreev.

In fact, the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars assumed a large part of the duties that had previously been performed by the Defense Committee and the Economic Council under the CPC. Because of this, the Economic Council was completely eliminated by a decision from the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars, and the composition of the Committee of Defense was reduced to five people. The functions of the Defense Committee were limited to the adoption of new military equipment, the consideration of military and naval orders, the development of mobilization plans with the submission for approval by the Central Committee and the SNK […]

On May 7, the Politburo approved the new composition of the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR: Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I.V. Stalin, First Deputy Chairman of SNK HA Voznesensky, Deputy Chairman of SNK V.M. Molotov, A.I. Mikoyan, HA Bulganin, L.P. Beria, L.M. Kaganovich, L.Z. Mehlis, as well as Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), Chairman of the CPC under the Central Committee AA Andreev. 15 May 1941. The Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and Chairman of the Committee for Defense at SNK K.E. Voroshilov and N.M. Schvernik. 30 May 1941 - Secretaries of the Central Committee of the Central Committee of Political Affairs (b) AA Zhdanov and G.M. Malenkov. [...]

Under Stalin, there was a further expansion of the rights of the Bureau of the Council of Commissars. For example, 30 in May 1941 was abolished by the Defense Committee at SNK and instead a permanent Commission on Military and Naval Affairs was organized at the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR consisting of: Stalin (chairman), Voznesensky (deputy chairman), Voroshilov, Zhdanov and Malenkov ”
[90].

In general, at the beginning of the war, the party and the Soviet — in general, all power belonged to the same people, and the main thing over them was I.V. Stalin.

When Molotov proposed the creation of GKO, he did not propose anything new. He proposed the creation of a temporary, emergency body, “which will give full power in the country. To transfer to him the functions of the Government, the Supreme Council and the Central Committee of the Party ”. And the power in the GKO should belong to the "Five Politburo" - Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Beria [91]. But this new body, in fact, formally united the already existing party and Soviet bodies.

So, at about 16 hours Mikoian came to Molotov with Voznesensky, took some time to discuss, then decided to go to Stalin to the country. Here is how a visit to the dacha looks like in Mikoyan's “original” memories:

“We arrived at the dacha to Stalin. Caught him in a small dining room sitting in a chair. He looks at us inquiringly and asks: why did you come? He looked calm, but some strange, no less strange was the question he asked. After all, in fact, he himself had to convene us.

Molotov, on behalf of us, said that it was necessary to concentrate power so that everything would be quickly resolved in order to put the country on its feet. At the head of such a body should be Stalin.

Stalin looked surprised, did not express any objections. Good speaks.

Then Beria said that 5 members of the State Defense Committee should be appointed. You, Comrade Stalin, will be in charge, then Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and I (Beria) ”
[92].

But as in the "rule".

“We arrived at the dacha to Stalin. Caught him in a small dining room sitting in a chair. Seeing us, he kind of pulled himself into a chair and looked at us inquiringly. Then he asked: “Why did they come?” He looked wary, some strange, no less strange was the question asked by him. After all, in fact, he himself had to convene us. I had no doubt: he decided that we had come to arrest him.

Molotov, on our behalf, said that it was necessary to concentrate power in order to put the country on its feet. To do this, create a State Defense Committee. “Who is in charge?” Asked Stalin. When Molotov replied that he, Stalin, was in charge, looked surprised, did not give any reasons. "Good," says later. Then Beria said that 5 members of the State Defense Committee should be appointed. “You, Comrade Stalin, will be in charge, then Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and me,” he added.
[93].

The question arises as a matter of fact - and perhaps Stalin was going to convene everyone? Would come to the Kremlin, who should be convened. Stalin often came to the Kremlin to watch 7 at night, for example, 23 June he came to 18.45, 25 June - to 19.40, and 28 June - to 19.35.

A group of comrades arrived to him just by this time, and even earlier. Moreover, why would Stalin go to the Kremlin and collect everyone there, if he most likely knew that members of the Politburo were going to join him in such a large composition, at a time when they were about to leave the Kremlin. Probably, they talked with Stalin, before going to him.

The words that, they say, Mikoyan "had no doubts: he [Stalin] decided that we came to arrest him" are the same type with Khrushchev's words:

“When we came to his dacha, I (Beria says) saw in his face that Stalin was very scared. I suppose Stalin wondered if we had come to arrest him for refusing his role and doing nothing to organize a repulse against the German invasion? ”
[94]. And do not cause anything but lasting doubt.

Further, it is quite possible that the comrades (Beria and Molotov) gave Stalin's depression (in a conversation at the dacha on the night of 29 on June 30) much more important than Stalin himself gave her and what it really was. How many people in the evening wave their hands and say - everyone is tired, and in the morning they continue to do their work quietly? Of course, Stalin hardly ever showed his feelings to his comrades, and their more or less vivid manifestation (and there were enough reasons) could seriously frighten Molotov and Beria, but this does not mean that Stalin felt exactly what they attributed to him. From this point of view, Stalin's surprise at the unexpected visit is quite understandable. Maybe Stalin, after leaving his comrades, decided to drink some wine, sleep, and get down to business the next day. And then the next day - such a delegation.

“Molotov, on behalf of us, said that it was necessary to concentrate power so that everything would be quickly resolved in order to put the country on its feet. At the head of such a body should be Stalin.

Stalin looked surprised, did not express any objections. Good speaks.

Then Beria said that 5 members of the State Defense Committee should be appointed. You, Comrade Stalin, will be in charge, then Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov, and I (Beria).

Stalin remarked: then we must include both Mikoyan and Voznesensky. Total 7 people approve.

Beria again says: Comrade Stalin, if we all deal with the State Defense Committee, then who will work at the Council of People's Commissars, the State Planning Committee? Let Mikoyan and Voznesensky do all the work in the Government and the State Planning Commission. Voznesensky spoke out against Beria’s proposal and proposed that there be seven people in the composition of the T-bills taking into account those mentioned by Stalin. Others on this topic are not expressed. Later it turned out that before my arrival at Molotov’s office with Voznesensky, Beria arranged that Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov and he (Beria) agreed to this proposal among themselves and instructed Beria to submit it to Stalin. I was excited that we were dragging on time, because the question concerned my candidacy. He considered the dispute inappropriate. He knew that, as a member of the Politburo and the Government, I would still bear great responsibilities.

I said - let 5 be a man in the T-bills. As for me, apart from the functions that I perform, give me wartime duties in those areas in which I am stronger than others. I ask you to appoint me as a specially authorized GKO with all the rights of the GKO in the field of supplying the front with food, clothing and fuel. So decided. Voznesensky asked for guidance on the production of weapons and ammunition, which was also accepted. Manual on the production of tanks was entrusted to Molotov, and the aviation industry and aviation in general - to Malenkov. For Beria was left the protection of order inside the country and the fight against desertion "
[95].

After discussing these issues, a decree was formed on the formation of a GKO (Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council on 30 June 1941), then Stalin, already being the head of the GKO, took up personnel matters.

Zhukov G.K. writes in his memoirs:
“June 30 called the General Staff I.V. Stalin and ordered to call the commander of the Western Front, Army General D. Propulsion Pavlova "
.

He was removed from the command of the Western Front D.G. Pavlov. Instead of Pavlov, SK was appointed commander of the Western Front. Tymoshenko. Vatutin was appointed chief of staff of the North-Western Front. Also on this day, June 30, the State Defense Committee adopted a number of resolutions on the mobilization of women and girls to serve in the air defense forces, communications, internal security, on military highways, etc.

Stalin did not go to the Kremlin that day, and the next day, July 1, received in his office 23 a person from 16.40 to 01.30 July 2.

* * *

What conclusions can be drawn.

1. Stalin's “prostration”, if by this we consider the inability to fulfill our duties, the loss of life, exactly what was meant in the myth invented by NS Khrushchev was absent altogether. It was not her.

2. Stalin's “prostration”, if by this we consider depressed, expressed bad mood, lasted from 29 to 30 June, and it should be noted that 29 June - on Sunday - Stalin's working day differed from the previous ones only in the absence of entries in the Visitors Log, although Stalin repeatedly traveled on this day to NGOs and SGK.

3. Stalin's refusal of power is confirmed by the words of Khrushchev and refuted by the words of Molotov, if we talk about sources.

Indirect evidence that Stalin did not give up power can be considered:

♦ the absence of any mention of this, besides Khrushchev’s memoirs, which, in comparison with the memoirs of other participants in the events, are extremely tendentious and unreliable;

♦ well-known personal characteristics of I.V. Stalin in no way characterizes him as a person who is able to relinquish power, but on the contrary, extremely power-loving.

application

EXTRACT FROM THE VISITS MAGAZINE OF THE CABINET I.V. STALIN (22 – 28 JUNE 1941 G.)

Myths of the Great Patriotic. Did Stalin have prostration in the first days of the war?






62 "Political Education". 1988, No. 9. C. 74 – 75.
63 Khrushchev N.S. Report at a closed meeting of the XXth CPSU Congress 24 – 25 February 1956 (KhrushchevN.S. about the cult of personality and its consequences. Report of the XXth CPSU Congress / / “News of the Central Committee of the CPSU”, 1989, No. 3 )
64 Khrushchev N.S.Time. People. Power (Memories). Book I. - Moscow: Moscow News PIK, 1999. C. 300 – 301.
65 Medvedev R. Was there a crisis in the leadership of the country in June 1941? // “Public Service”, 3 (35), May – June 2005.
66 Sokolov AK, Tyazhelnikov BC Soviet History Course, 1941 – 1991. Tutorial. - M .: Higher. w, 1999. 415 with.
67 Medvedev R.I. V. Stalin in the First Days of the Great Patriotic War // New and Newest History, No. 2, 2002; Was there a crisis in the leadership of the country in June 1941? // “Public Service”, 3 (35), May – June 2005; Pykhalov I. Velikaya Obolgannaya war. - M .: Yauza, Eksmo, 2005. C. 284 – 303; I. Kurtukov. Stalin's Escape to the Dacha in June 1941
68 Gorkov Yu.A.The State Defense Committee decides (1941 – 1945). Figures, documents. - M., 2002. C. 222 – 469 (APRF.F. 45. On. 1. B. 412. L. 153 – 190, L. 1 — 76; D. 414. L. 5 — 12; L. 12 – 85 on; D. 415. L. 1 — 83 about; L. 84 – 96 about; D. 116. L. 12 — 104; D. 417. L. 1 – 2.
69 Khrushchev N.S.Time. People. Power (Memories). Book I. - Moscow: IIC Moscow News, 1999. C. 300 – 301.
70 Mikoyan A.I. So it was. - M .: Vagrius, 1999.
71 ibid.
72 Chuev F.Molotov. Semi-lord lord. - M .: Olma-Press, 2000.
73 Gorkov Yu.L.State Defense Committee decides (1941 – 1945). Figures, documents. - M., 2002. C. 222 – 469 (APRF.F. 45. On. 1. V. 412. L. 153 – 190. L. 1 — 76; D. 414. L. 5 — 12; L. 12 – 85 vol .; D. 415. L. 1 — 83 v., L. 84 – 96 v., D. 116. L. 12 — 104; D. 417. L. 1 – 2.
74 Mikoyan A.I. So it was. - M .: Vagrius, 1999.
75 Zhukov GK Memories and reflections: In 2 t. - M .: Olma-Press, 2002. C. 287.
76 1941 year. T. 2. - M., 1998. C. 495 – 500 (RCCHIDNI.F. 84. Op. 3. D. 187. L. 118 – 126).
77 Mikoyan A.I. So it was. - M .: Vagrius, 1999.
78 ibid.
79 1941 year. T. 2. - M., 1998. C. 495 – 500 (RCCHIDNI.F. 84. Op. 3. D. 187. L. 118 – 126).
80 This is about 29 June, as Chakovsky’s novel, which describes this visit, is being discussed.
81 Chuev F.Molotov. Semi-lord lord. M .: Olma-Press, 2000.
82 Khrushchev N.S.Time. People. Power (Memories). Book I. - Moscow: IIC Moscow News, 1999. C. 300 – 301.
83 Kurtukov I. Stalin's Escape to the Dacha in June 1941 g…
84 ibid.
85 ibid.
86 Lavrenty Beria. 1953. Transcript of the July Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and other documents. - M .: MF "Democracy", 1999. C. 76 (AP RF.F. 3. Op. 24. D. 463, L. 164 – 172. Autograph. Published: Source, 1994, No. 4).
87 1941 year. T. 2. - M., 1998. C. 495 – 500 (RCCHIDNI.F. 84. Op. 3. D. 187. L. 118 – 126).
88 StadnyukI.F.Spanish Stalinist. - M., 1993. C. 364.
89 Hlevnyuk OVPolitbyuro. The mechanisms of political power in 30-s. - M .: Russian Political Encyclopedia (ROSSPEN), 1996.
90 ibid.
91 Previously (in 1937, for example) Kaganovich and Mikoyan were in the top five, but by the beginning of the war, they were replaced by Malenkov and Beria.
92 1941 year. T. 2. - M., 1998. C. 495 – 500 (RCCHIDNI.F. 84. Op. 3. D. 187. L. 118 – 126).
93 Mikoyan A.I. So it was. - M .: Vagrius, 1999.
94 Khrushchev N.S.Time. People. Power (Memories). Book I. - Moscow: IIC Moscow News, 1999. C. 300 – 301.
95 1941 year. T. 2. - M., 1998. C. 495 – 500 (RCCHIDNI.F. 84. Op. 3. D. 187. L. 118 – 126).
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