Myths of the Great Patriotic. "Die aktion kaminsky": Lokot "self-government" and the creation of the RONA brigade
For Russian revisionist historians story The Lokot Autonomous Okrug and the Bronislav Kaminsky Brigade formed there have long become a kind of “Lesser Land”. Just as in the era of "stagnation" of the 18 Army on the Novorossiysk bridgehead, they began to become almost the main event of the Great Patriotic War, nowadays there is a clear tendency to consider the creation of local self-government in the village of Lokot in Bryansk, as a kind of "alternative" to the struggle against the invaders who came to our land.
Of course, such a point of view in Russian society is frankly marginal; its supporters can be found perhaps among the half-crazed "true Orthodox" sectarians, celebrating Hitler's birthday, neo-Nazis, grouped around the magazine "Seeding" neovlasovtsy and pragmatically fulfilling foreign grants "liberals." But in historiography, the apologetics of the “Lokotskaya alternative” paradoxically turns out to be dominant - simply because almost exclusively revisionists prefer to write about it. And they are actively writing: so far, four books and several dozen [96] articles have been published about Lokotsky Okrug. At the same time, however, there is no significant increase in factual information: in most cases, the collaborationist press published in Lokot and individual reports of Soviet partisans are used as the main source. Another sign of revisionist historiography is the almost complete abandonment of the study of the crimes of the RONA formations committed during punitive operations against the Soviet partisans. But the partisans in the works of revisionists always appear to be bloody bandits.
The published article does not claim full disclosure of all topics related to the history of the Lokotsky district of the Kaminsky brigade. Behind the brackets is the participation of the RONA brigade in the fight against the Belarusian partisans near Lepel, the participation of the “Kaminists” in the suppression of the Warsaw uprising and many other equally interesting stories. Writing the complete history of the Kaminsky Brigade is a matter for the future, albeit near. In the meantime, try to find answers to questions related to the so-called. Lokot District. What really was this administrative entity? Are the Kaminsky formations and not the Soviet partisans really "masters of the Bryansk forests"? Did the “Kaminists” participate in the Nazi genocide against the population of the occupied regions?
1. Operational environment
To begin with, we will clarify the situation in the Nazis occupied Bryansk. This territory was occupied at the beginning of October 1941. After crushing the troops of the Bryansk Front, 2nd tank Guderian’s army went further - to Tula and Moscow. And the commander of the rear of the army faced the difficult task of organizing an occupation order in the occupied territories.
An analysis of German documents by American historians shows that the main problem of the rear commander was a shortage of troops.
“After advancing warheads further east, responsibility for command and security in this region was assigned to the command of the rear echelon units. The forces at their disposal were barely enough to occupy large centers and protect the main lines of communication. ”
[97].The main lines of communication were, of course, railways. There were a lot of them in the region. From the west, two railways led to the region: Gomel-Klintsy-Unecha-Bryansk from the south-west and Smolensk-Roslavl-Bryansk from the north-west. From Bryansk railways diverged in four directions. To the south went the railway line Bryansk-Navlya-Lgov-Kharkov. From Lgov to the east went the railway to Kursk. To the southeast of Bryansk there was a railway to Oryol; to the northeast to Kaluga, in the north to Kirov and Vyazma. Another railway line directly connected Orel and Kursk.
The considerable length of the railways itself made their defense rather difficult. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Bryansk region was covered with dense forests, in which the "encircling" of the defeated Bryansk Front found shelter, as well as guerrilla groups and sabotage groups organized by local party authorities and state security bodies. According to the report of the chief of the NKVD department in the Oryol region, a total of 4 guerrilla units totaling 72 people, 3257 guerrilla group totaling 91 people and 356 human sabotaged groups 114 people [483] were left in the occupied territory. It was also important that, in contrast to the partisans of the border areas, who were thrown into the rear of the enemy with little or no training in the summer of 98, the Orlov partisans had time to reconcile. More than half of them, moreover, were trained in special schools, first of all - in the Operational Training Center headed by Colonel Starinov. The result was not slow: during October - mid December only 1941 guerrilla units totaling 8 people [356] disintegrated. The rest continued to fight.
The commander of the 2 Army could oppose little to the partisans: part of the rear division of the Army Group Center, a guard battalion and a battalion of military police. On October 29, a regiment from the 56 Division [100] was removed from the front to help these forces.
In addition, in the Bryansk region there were units of the Einsatzgruppen group “B” - first the Sondercommand 7 – 6, and then the Sondercommand 7 (located in Klintsy) and the Einsatzcommand 8 (operated in Bryansk) [101]. Their main task was the destruction of "undesirable elements", in the first place - the Communists and the Jews.
These units did not remain idle: almost immediately after the occupation, about seven thousand people were shot in the area of the Bryansk-2 railway station, a significant number of whom were Jews [102]. In Orel, during the first month of the occupation, an 1683 man [103] was shot and hanged. Smaller executions were carried out in other settlements. “They shot in whole groups, [by] 30 – 50, arrests and executions, at the oxygen plant, the bodies of the executed were lying around for several days,” the resident of Bezhitsa (Ordzhonikidzegrad) later recalled. - So the whole 41 and the beginning of 42 went on. It was enough for one statement of some devotee scoundrel, and the person ceased to exist ”[104].
Mass executions, as well as the arbitrariness that remained unpunished by the German soldiers (in full accordance with the famous decree “On Military Justice”) [105] quickly turned the urban population against the occupiers. This is well traced by German documents examined by American historians. In December, 1941 noted in one of the reports:
“Cities are centers of partisans, which, as a rule, the rural population (peasants) rejects”
[106].The peasants were really a bit more loyal to the invaders than the city dwellers, for the simple reason that they had not yet felt the Nazi occupation order. But about the rejection of the partisans by the peasants, the authors of the report expressed the wishful thinking. There was no total rejection; some peasants helped the partisans as “their own”, some, fearing reprisals or disliking the Soviet authorities, refused to help the partisans. The general model of behavior for the winter 1941 did not exist.
The lack of full support from the rural population did not prevent the Soviet partisans from actively acting. According to the 4 Division of the Directorate NKVD of the Oryol Region, by mid-December Oryol partisans destroyed the enemy’s armored train, the 1 tank, the 2 armored vehicles, the 17 trucks, killed the 82 enemy officers, the 176 soldiers and 1012 traitors. In addition, 19 wooden bridges, 11 railway bridges, 2 pontoon bridges and 1 demolition of railway tracks [3] were destroyed. Perhaps these data were somewhat overestimated (the Suvorov principle of “write more, which the basurman didn’t regret” has not been canceled), however, there’s no doubt that the partisans caused the occupants serious trouble.
After all, otherwise, the command of the 56 army would not have to remove the regiment of the 2 division from the front.
By the end of 1941, the "partisan threat" to the invaders increased. In the southern part of the Bryansk forests between the railway Bryansk-Navlya-Lgov and the Desna River, partisan detachments from the neighboring Kursk Region and Ukraine began to leave (connections of Kovpak and Saburov). In the north of the region, Soviet troops liberated Kirov, thereby cutting the Bryansk-Vyazma railroad. There was a gap in the front line, through which there was help to the partisans. The concentration of partisans in the Bryansk region increased, and with it increased the activity of hostilities.
German security units became smaller, because after the defeat near Moscow, every bayonet was important at the front. The regiment of the 56 division was sent to the front of the December 10; the tasks of protecting the occupied territory were assigned to the regional administration based in Bryansk, which had a guard battalion, a police battalion and several field gendarme groups [108]. Actually, the German units were supplemented by local collaborators: in the settlements of Bryansk there were burgomasters appointed by the Germans, and with them - small groups of armed “militia” formed in the last months of 1941. One of the first such detachments was formed in the village of Lokot.
2. The beginning of "Lokot self-government"
Lokot is a small town in the Brasovsky district of the Oryol (nowadays Bryansk) region. Before the war, the population of this village was several thousand people; approximately another 35 thousand lived in the rural area adjacent to Lokot and the regional center of Brasovo. There were no large industrial enterprises here: the area was agrarian [109]. The only symbol of modernization was the railway between Lokot and the district center Brasovo, which ran from Bryansk through Navlya, Lokot and Dmitriev to Lgov. Next to Navly, a branch branch went from the railway going through Khutor Mikhailovsky to Konotop. At Konotop, this branch was connected to the Kiev-Lgov-Kursk railway. Thus, the railways passing through the Brasovsky District were important communication lines connecting Bryansk with Kursk and Ukraine in the shortest possible way. And in the settlements adjacent to the railways, the occupying power, for obvious reasons, was established first.
In the village of Lokot German troops entered October 4; on the same day, they were offered their services by a physics teacher at a local technical school, Konstantin Voskoboynik, and an engineer at the Lokot Distillery, Bronislav Kaminsky. The services offered were accepted: Voskoboynik was appointed head of the Lokotsky volost administration, and Kaminsky was appointed his deputy. The control allowed to have a detachment of “people's militia” of 20 men armed with rifles. Two weeks later, on October 16, the invaders allowed Voskoboynik to increase the “people's militia” detachment to 200 people, and create “self-defense groups” [110] in the villages. The reason for which this decision was made is simple: to the west of Lokot, in the area of Trubchevsk, the German troops closed the boiler, which was hit by units of the 13 and 3 armies of the Bryansk Front. A strong detachment of the "people's militia" in Lokot was necessary in order to catch the Red Army soldiers who had emerged from the encirclement.
At the same time, on October 12, the occupation authorities officially approved the administration of the Lokotsky Volost, which together with Voskoboynik and Kaminsky included the former head of the Brasovsky District Education Department, Stepan Mosin, and the felon Roman Ivanin [16], who became the police chief.
Having been recognized by the occupiers, the head of the council, Voskoboinik, was filled with Napoleon’s plans and on November 25 issued a manifesto announcing the creation of the Viking People’s Socialist Party. The manifesto promised the destruction of collective farms, the free transfer of arable land to the peasants and the freedom of private initiative in the revived Russian national state [112].
By December 1941, 5 cells of the new batch were organized in the area; in addition, Voskoboynik sent his deputies to Kaminsky and Mosin with propaganda trips to neighboring areas. According to legend, the head of the council addressed those leaving with the words: “Do not forget that we work not for one Brasovsky district, but for the whole of Russia. History will not forget us. ”[113] However, the propaganda of the "Manifesto" among the population was not the main goal of Mosin. His main goal was to meet with the leadership of the German rear services, which were supposed to approve the creation of the party.
Judging by the German documents, Mosin went to bow to the head of the rear of the 2 th army twice. According to the memorandum of officer 1 from the 2 Army headquarters, Lieutenant A. Bossi-Fedrigotti, during the second visit, Mosin on behalf of Voskobojnik asked the command of the army for permission to operate the party. Instead of permission, the German officers referred several questions for Voskoboynik that perfectly show the priorities of the occupying authorities:
1. How does Voskoboynik feel about the partisans?
2. Is Voskoboynik ready to conduct propaganda against the partisans?
3. Is Voskoboynyk ready to actively participate in the fight against partisans?
Mosin answered all these questions positively and even promised to cooperate with the attached army with the Abwehr command [114].
Upon the return of Mosin, Voskoboinnik undertook several demonstrative anti-partisan actions. A trial was organized on the nurse of the Lokot hospital Polyakova, who was accused of sheltering medicines for the partisans and shot [115].
Several operations against partisans were also undertaken. In the course of one of them in the village of Altukhovo partisans were killed and 20 local residents were arrested; in the course of the other, a partisan group [116] was dispersed not far from Lokot.
The Lokot detachment of the “people's militia” was hastily retrofitted, and the recruitment methods of the “militiamen” were very peculiar. These methods can be judged by the history of the head of the Brasovsky district executive committee, Mikhail Vasyukov. Before the arrival of the Germans, Vasyukov, in accordance with the directive of the district committee, went into the forest to partisans, but could not reach the detachment, and after two weeks of wandering, he returned to his family in Lokot. Vasyukov was arrested, then they were allowed to go home, but December 21 was arrested again. “They put in jail. By three in the morning, 3 was shot in my cell in front of my eyes. After the execution of these citizens, I was summoned to Ober-burgomaster Voskoboynik, who told me:
“Have you seen? Either work with us, or we will immediately shoot you. ” Due to my cowardice, I told him that I was ready to work as a foreman. To this, Voskoboynik answered me that now is not the time to be engaged in construction, but to take weapon and together with the Germans to take part in the struggle against the Soviet regime and, in particular, against the Soviet partisans. So I was enrolled in a police squad, in which I participated twice in punitive expeditions against Soviet partisans ”
[117].The pinnacle of the anti-partisan activities of Voskoboynyk was the order sent to the partisans in the surrounding villages to surrender:
“I suggest that all partisans operating in the Brasovsky district and its immediate environs, as well as all those associated with them, should hand over all their weapons to the elders of the nearest villages within a week, not later than January 1 of January 1942, and appear for registration in the Office of the district head in the village. Cubit. To be in small groups - 2 – 3 of a person, call the fighter to be sentry and inform him about the goals of his coming. All those who did not appear will be considered enemies of the people and destroyed without mercy.
It is time to stop the disgrace and begin to organize a peaceful working life. Any tales about the return of the Soviet regime to the occupied areas are absurd baseless rumors that are spread by malicious Soviet elements with the aim of disorganizing citizens and maintaining a state of disorder and uncertainty in the circles of the wide working population.
The Stalinist regime died irrevocably, it is time to understand everything and take the path of a safe working life. Rumors about the total extermination of partisans and communists are reckless. Only the most malicious representatives of the party and Soviet apparatus, who do not want themselves and do not allow others to take a peaceful labor path, can face danger.
This order is the last warning.
In villages where this order was received late, registration of the partisans may be delayed until January 15, 1942, of the year. ”
[118].It is time to stop the disgrace and begin to organize a peaceful working life. Any tales about the return of the Soviet regime to the occupied areas are absurd baseless rumors that are spread by malicious Soviet elements with the aim of disorganizing citizens and maintaining a state of disorder and uncertainty in the circles of the wide working population.
The Stalinist regime died irrevocably, it is time to understand everything and take the path of a safe working life. Rumors about the total extermination of partisans and communists are reckless. Only the most malicious representatives of the party and Soviet apparatus, who do not want themselves and do not allow others to take a peaceful labor path, can face danger.
This order is the last warning.
In villages where this order was received late, registration of the partisans may be delayed until January 15, 1942, of the year. ”
It should be noted that until mid-December 1941, the Bryansk partisans did not pay special attention to collaborators, preferring to attack German units and garrisons. The above-mentioned report of the chief of the 4 division of the UNKDZ in the Orel region, according to which by the 14 December, 176 enemy officers, 1012 soldiers and only 19 traitors [119] were killed by partisans clearly demonstrates the partisan priorities. However, the situation changed in December. The Germans tried to shift the burden of the struggle with the partisans to local formations, and the partisans, attacking collaborators, tried to deprive the occupants of this backup. By 20 December, the 41 traitor [120] was destroyed by partisans of the Oryol region, and by 10 in May 1942, the 1014 police officers and traitors [121] were destroyed.
The turn of the Lokot board came, to which the order of the Voskoboynyk to the partisans contributed in no small measure. The partisans did not surrender, but instead decided to defeat the garrison stationed in Lokot.
In the account of revisionist historians, the partisans' attack on the Lokot government acquires a truly epic character. We are told that the attack happened because the Soviet authorities were scared of the “Lokotskaya alternative”, commanded by partisans by the operational group of the NKVD in the Oryol region Dmitry Yemlyutin, that the partisans suffered huge losses and that only a random bullet that hit Voskoboynik allowed the partisans to leave Lokotya [X UM I’m ].
Actually, the attack on Lokot was commanded not by Emlyutin, but by the commander of the Ukrainian partisan unit, Alexander Saburov (also, by the way, the Chekist). Beginning in December, Saburov targeted German garrisons and police strongholds in the south of the Bryansk forests. The extract from the log of hostilities Saburov:
“December 2 - the defeat of the police garrison in Red Sloboda. December 8 - abduction of the district administration in the district center Suzemka. December 26 - the defeat of the garrison in Suzemka. 1 January 1942 - destroyed the police station in Selechno. January 7 - a large garrison was eliminated in the village of Lokot ”
[123].The attack on the Lokot administration was no different from the attack on the garrison in Suzemka; partisans simply destroyed the collaborators.
It is also not true that the attack on the Elbow turned to defeat for the partisans. The memories of one of the partisans who participated in this operation are well known:
“The commanders of the partisan detachments“ For the Motherland, ”named after Stalin and named after Saburov, agreed to conduct a joint attack on Lokot. On the eve of the raid, Christmas Eve was chosen, which was zealously celebrated by the Hitlerite bandits.
And on the night of Christmas, from 7 to 8 in January of 1942, the consolidated partisan detachment on the 120 sledge set off. In the village Igrtskoe made a halt. The frost was not Christmas, but the Epiphany, the partisans were chilly. The residents of Igritsky warmed them, fed them, and the detachment moved on through the villages of Lagirevka and Trosnaya. The frost was growing stronger, it was intensified by the blowing northeast wind. Mela snowing. In order not to get frostbite, many partisans ran for sleds.
The enemy in Lokot did not wait for the partisans, so we drove into the village without a shot. The horses harnessed to the sled, put on a lime avenue. The guerrillas immediately besieged the building of the forest technical school, where the main forces of the garrison were stationed, and the house of the burgomaster of the trooper. They began shelling, grenades flew through the windows of buildings.
Occupants and policemen opened up indiscriminate return fire from machine guns and machine guns on partisans. During the shootout, we saw someone out of the house where Voskoboinik lived, on the veranda someone came out and shouted: "Do not give up, beat them."
Next to me, lying in the snow and firing a light machine gun from my fellow villager, Misha Astakhov. I drew his attention to the veranda and told him to turn the machine gun there. After the second short line, we heard on the veranda the fall of the body and the fussing of people. Just at that moment, the enemy’s fire intensified and this distracted us from Voskoboinik’s house.
The shootout continued until dawn. Together with A. Malyshev, I tried to set fire to the burgomaster’s house. We dragged an armful of straw to the wall and began to light it. But the straw was wet and did not catch fire. Meanwhile, it became light. The building of the forestry technical college was not succeeded, although it was riddled with bullets. The enemy began to press from other sides. And the command decided to end the combat operation. Without losing a single person killed and capturing several wounded, we left "
[124].And on the night of Christmas, from 7 to 8 in January of 1942, the consolidated partisan detachment on the 120 sledge set off. In the village Igrtskoe made a halt. The frost was not Christmas, but the Epiphany, the partisans were chilly. The residents of Igritsky warmed them, fed them, and the detachment moved on through the villages of Lagirevka and Trosnaya. The frost was growing stronger, it was intensified by the blowing northeast wind. Mela snowing. In order not to get frostbite, many partisans ran for sleds.
The enemy in Lokot did not wait for the partisans, so we drove into the village without a shot. The horses harnessed to the sled, put on a lime avenue. The guerrillas immediately besieged the building of the forest technical school, where the main forces of the garrison were stationed, and the house of the burgomaster of the trooper. They began shelling, grenades flew through the windows of buildings.
Occupants and policemen opened up indiscriminate return fire from machine guns and machine guns on partisans. During the shootout, we saw someone out of the house where Voskoboinik lived, on the veranda someone came out and shouted: "Do not give up, beat them."
Next to me, lying in the snow and firing a light machine gun from my fellow villager, Misha Astakhov. I drew his attention to the veranda and told him to turn the machine gun there. After the second short line, we heard on the veranda the fall of the body and the fussing of people. Just at that moment, the enemy’s fire intensified and this distracted us from Voskoboinik’s house.
The shootout continued until dawn. Together with A. Malyshev, I tried to set fire to the burgomaster’s house. We dragged an armful of straw to the wall and began to light it. But the straw was wet and did not catch fire. Meanwhile, it became light. The building of the forestry technical college was not succeeded, although it was riddled with bullets. The enemy began to press from other sides. And the command decided to end the combat operation. Without losing a single person killed and capturing several wounded, we left "
Even if the casualties of the partisans are understated by a memoirist, the attack on Lokot cannot be called unsuccessful. The guerrillas attacked the garrison and left before the main enemy forces arrived. The final report of Saburov speaks about 54 destroyed policemen [125]. Not so little - because the number of "people's militia" Voskoboynik by that time was two hundred people. The death of the head of the board of Voskoboynik, albeit a random one, should also be written into the asset of the partisans.
3. Beginning of Kaminsky
The attack of the partisans on the Elbow and the death of Voskobojnik turned out to be serious problems for his deputy, Bronislav Kaminsky. The guerrillas clearly demonstrated their strength; dissatisfied with this apparent failure, the Germans could refuse to Kaminsky in the appointment to the post of head of the council. In order to get an appointment, it was necessary to prove to the occupiers their usefulness.
The very next day after the partisan raid, Kaminsky announced mobilization to the “people's militia”. Before that, the “militia” consisted of local volunteers and those who did not want to go to the “encircling” prisoners of war camps. Now, all men of military age were called up, and in case of refusal they were threatened with reprisals.
“Voskoboynik was killed by partisans, and all power in the area passed to Kaminsky and his deputy Mosin, who announced the mobilization of men between the ages of 18 and 50 on the same day,” recalled Mikhail Vasyukov, already quoted by us. “By about January 20, a man of 700 scored, most of whom were mobilized by force, under pain of reprisals against them or their family.”
[126].The threats were confirmed by illustrative examples: in retaliation for the death of Voskoboinik, many hostages from among the local residents [127] were shot. Deputy
Kaminsky Mosin personally participated in the torture of the arrested former policeman Sedakov. Sedakov died under torture, and his body was hung in the center of Lokot [128].
After that, Kaminsky went to Oryol to the rear commander of the 2 Tank Army. Just at that time, the collaborator Mikhail Oktan was in the headquarters of the 2 Tank Army, in the future - the editor of the Orel newspaper Rech.
“At the headquarters I met Kaminsky, who was called there in connection with the death of the head of the Lokot district of Voskobojnik,” recalled Octane. “We lived in the same room, and as a translator, I attended several meetings with Kaminsky with the rear commander ... General Haman. After receiving permission to return to the region, Kaminsky promised to bring it in line with the tasks of the German military administration: to militarize it in such a way as to protect the rear of the German army and increase food supplies for the German troops. ”
[129].In the face of the ever increasing partisan threat, Kaminsky’s promises looked seductive. Kaminsky was approved as the head of the district administration and, returning to Lokot, continued the “militarization” of the district. In January, 1942 was the people's militia totaled 800 people, in February 1200, in March 1650 people [130]. The fighting capacity of these units was at least dubious (even at the end of the year, German officers stated that the “militants of engineer Kaminsky could not repel major attacks” [131]), but the involvement of local residents in the “people's militia” to some extent guaranteed that they would not leave to the partisans.
Kaminsky, by the way, had no particular confidence in the population of his district. This is clearly indicated by the orders given by the new head of the council.
One of his decrees Kaminsky banned movement between the villages of the district and imposed a curfew. According to another, residents of the Lipovaya Alley and Spring Street adjacent to the building were to leave their homes within three days. In their place, Kaminsky settled the loyal police officers, thus insuring himself against a new assault by partisans [132].
The executions were intensified in the building of the stud farm turned into a prison - to such an extent that a special executioner was needed. And he was found. In January, the emaciated girl came to Lokot 1942 - the former nurse Tonya Makarova, who had left the entourage near Vyazma. After months of wandering through the woods, she seemed to be a little offended. The Lokot "militiamen" drunk a girl, put her behind a machine gun and took the sentenced into the yard.
A few decades later, Makarova, arrested by the state security organs, will tell about his first execution. “The first time she was taken to the execution of the partisans was completely drunk, she did not understand what she was doing,” said investigator Leonid Savoskin. - But they paid well - 30 brands and offered cooperation on an ongoing basis. After all, none of the Russian policemen did not want to dirty themselves; they preferred that the execution of the partisans and their family members was performed by a woman. The homeless and lonely Antonina was given a bed in a room at a local stud farm where she could spend the night and store a machine gun. In the morning she voluntarily went to work. ”[133].
In the meantime, the partisans were making more and more bold attacks. On February 2, a unit of partisan detachments under the command of the aforementioned Alexander Saburov attacked the city of Trubchevsk and occupied it after the 18-hour battle. The guerrillas behind whom there was a battlefield, counted 108 killed policemen; a few hundred more simply ran away. The local burgomaster fell into the hands of partisans. After that, partisans left the city, but February 10 returned and burned the local timber mill [134].
Literally a few dozen kilometers from Lokot 20, in January, the German unit stumbled upon the Yemlyutin partisan detachment. After a long battle, the Germans had to retreat. A few days later, another partisan detachment, also subordinate to Emlyutin, raided the Poluzhye station on the Bryansk-Unecha railway, defeated the local garrison and destroyed six wagons with ammunition. Here, however, the guerrilla's luck was over: a train with German soldiers approached the station. In the ensuing battle, the commander of the detachment, Philip Strelets, was killed, and the remnants of the detachment were forced to retreat from the station [135].
The worst trouble for the invaders happened in the north of the region: there the combined forces of the partisans liberated the city of Dyatkov and the areas adjacent to it, thus creating a partisan edge [136] beyond the control of the Germans.
Troops to fight the partisans, as usual, was not enough. “The Army Group was hoping to eliminate the threat of the partisan movement as soon as the situation on the front was consolidated,” Field Marshal von Kluge, commander of Army Group Center, wrote in late February. “However, recent developments have shown that these hopes are unfounded because the tense situation at the front did not allow the detachments related to the rear services to be withdrawn from the front” [137].
Against this background, the situation in Lokot and its surroundings looked at least acceptable to the occupiers. After the Christmas raid, no major attacks on this territory took place, and forced mobilization into the “people's militia” deprived the partisans of human resources and promoted separation of part of the population from the partisans.
In this regard, the command of the rear of the army decided to encourage Kaminsky and his comrades. February 23 from the command of the 2-th tank army Kaminsky received two orders. According to the first, Kaminsky was allowed to appoint elders in his subordinate villages (previously only elders could appoint elders, which, by the way, puts an end to the reasoning of revisionists about the “autonomy” of the Lokotsky district). According to the second order, Kaminsky received the right to reward people who distinguished themselves in the struggle against partisans with land, giving out from two to ten hectares. Cows and horses could also be transferred to the property [138].
Just a few days after receiving these orders, Kaminsky was summoned to Orel, where he was announced that he would transfer under his control the neighboring Suzemsky and Navlinsky districts. Kaminsky came from Orel, full of bright anticipations.
“In February, 1942, I entered Kaminsky’s office on business issues,” later recalled the head of the district forestry A. Mikheyev. - In a conversation with me, Kaminsky said that he went to the German General Schmidt, who allowed him to expand the functions of the district council. First, convert Brasovsky district to Lokotsky district, and then consider Lokot village as a city. At the same time, Kaminsky stated that the German occupation authorities agree to expand our functions, including the creation of a “Russian national state”, if we actively assist the Germans in the struggle against the Bolsheviks. Immediately, Kaminsky expressed his opinion that under the current situation, as he said, there is a chance for me - Mikheev, after the end of the war in favor of the Germans, to become the minister of forestry of the government to be created in Russia ... At the same time he told me about the goals and objectives of the anti-Soviet NSTPR organizations and said that all members of this party will receive the appropriate portfolios, and who is against, he will be hijacked to Germany "
[139].It goes without saying that Kaminsky saw himself as the head of the “Russian state” subordinate to the Third Reich. He even published an order in which he called himself the burgomaster of the not yet existing Lokot County [140]. All the more his disappointment should have been.
In the first half of March, the Bryansk partisans struck a new blow. This time it was sent to the railways, vital to the invaders. The blow was devastating.
“The Bryansk-Dmitriev-Lgovsky and Bryansk-x [chimes] Mikhailovsky railways were put out of operation, Yemlyut and Saburov reported to Moscow. “All along the way, all the bridges are blown up.” The railway junction x [chickens] Mikhailovsky partisans destroyed. The Germans are trying to restore the railway traffic in the section Bryansk-Navlya, but these attempts are disrupted by the partisans ”
[141].German sources confirm this information:
“In March, 1942, the partisans stopped traffic on the Bryansk-Lgov railway and prevented the Germans from using the Bryansk-Roslavl railway line. On the main highways (Bryansk-Roslavl, Bryansk-Karachev, Bryansk-Zhizdra) the threat was so great that it was possible to move along them only in large columns. ”
[142].What happened was directly related to Kaminsky: the partisans paralyzed exactly the railway line that went through Lokot and its subordinate territories.
For Kaminsky, the time has come to show the combat capability of their formations.
4. Terror as a way to fight the partisans
The combat capability of the Lokot "people's militia" was not so great as to conduct independent anti-partisan operations. Therefore, Kaminsky units acted in cooperation with Hungarian units abandoned in the fight against partisans. Their first joint operation turned into mass killings of civilians. This was later told by the head of the forestry department Mikheyev mentioned above:
“In the spring of 1942, police detachments headed by Mosin, with the participation of the Magyar units, in the village of Pavlovichi shot 60 people and 40 people burned alive”
[143].On April 11, the village of Ugreevishte, Komarichsky district, was burned, and about 100 people were shot. In the Sevsky district, the punishers destroyed the villages of Svyatovo (180 houses) and Borisovo (150 houses), and the village of Berestok was completely destroyed (170 houses were burned, 171 people were killed) [144].
The shown cruelty towards innocent people led to the growth of discontent in the ranks of the “people's militia”. The “policemen” began to run over to the partisans.
From order No. 118 for Lokot County from 25 on April 1942:
“... along with fighters and commanders who courageously fought for their future, in some cases elements of panic and cowardice, insecurity and desertion also appeared, such as the former chief of the Shemyakinsky detachment Levitsky, and sometimes cowardice and desertion turned into open betrayal, as was the case 20 of April with. from the side of 4 fighters-prisoners of war of the Farm-Kholmetsky detachment. A similar betrayal was also allowed in the Svyatovsk detachment by fighter Sergei Zavchenkov Sergey Gavrilovich, who 22 of April with. did not fulfill the orders of the commander and left the post on the railway bridge. Thereby he did a great service to the enemy, for which he was shot on the same day by order of the burgomaster ”
[145].The peak of this process was the uprising of the “militiamen” of the villages of Shemyakino and Tarasovka, brutally suppressed by Kaminsky with the help of the Hungarian units. This episode is described in detail in the post-war testimony of Mikhailovsky Govyadov, Chief of the Mikhailovsky Police:
“It was like this: in May, 1942, a company of police officers stationed in the villages of Shemyakino and Tarasovka, rebelled - killed its commanders, cut off communications and went to the partisans. In retaliation for this, Kaminsky organized a punitive expedition, including the Magyars. This expedition was headed by a deputy. Mayor Mosin, Head of the Military Investigation Department Paratsyuk and representative of the Voice of the People newspaper - Vasyukov ... ”
[146].Punishers seized the village after stubborn battles with former police officers and partisans who came to their aid. After that, the massacre of the locals began.
“Upon arrival at the scene, the punishers shot about 150 people, family members of policemen who went to the partisans, and part of the policemen who were captured in Shemyakino and Tarasovka,” said M. Govyadov. - Among the shot were women, children and old people. In July, 1943, by order of Kaminsky, a commission was created, chaired by Mosin, to excavate the graves of Soviet citizens who were shot by them, in order to attribute these actions to the partisans and embitter the RONA soldiers against the partisans. I know that this commission traveled, excavated, drafted a corresponding act, which was published along with a large article in the newspaper “Voice of the People”, which stated that the execution of these persons was allegedly carried out by partisans ”
[147].There was nothing particularly specific about the actions of the Kamin people. Exactly the same crimes against civilians were marked by Hungarian punishers operating in the neighboring Sevsky district. Evidence of this in large numbers are preserved in the Russian archives.
“The fascist accomplices of the Magyars entered our village Svetlovo 9 / V-42,” said Anton Ivanovich Krutukhin, a peasant. - All the inhabitants of our village hid from such a pack, and they, as a sign that the residents began to hide from them, and those who could not hide, shot them, raped several of our women. I myself am an old man of 1875. I was born and was also forced to hide in the cellar ... Across the village there was shooting, buildings were burning, and the Magyar soldiers looted our things, stealing cows and calves. ”
[148].In the nearby village of Orliya Slobodka at that time all residents gathered in the square.
“Magyars arrived and began to collect us into one (nrzb) and expelled in with. Korostovka, where we spent the night in the church - women, and men separately at school, - remembered Vasilisa Fedotkina. “In the afternoon of 17 / V-42, we were driven back to Orlyia village where we stayed overnight and tomorrow, that is, 18 / V-42 were gathered into a heap near the church where we were re-sorted - we were driven to the village with. Eagle Slobidka, and the men left with them "
[149].20 on May around 700 Hungarian soldiers headed from Orlia to the nearest village. On the collective farm "4-th Bolshevik Sowing" they arrested all the men.
“When they saw the men of our village, they said that they were partisans,” said Varvara Fedorovna Mazekova. - And this same number, i.e. 20 / V-42, seized my husband Mazekov Sidor Borisovich, the birth of 1862 and my son Mazekov, Alexei Sidorovich, the year of birth of 1927, and after these tortures they tied their hands and threw them in a hole, then they lit straw and burned in a potato pit. On the same day, they are not only my husband and son, they also burned 67 men "
[150].After that, the Magyars moved to the village of Svetlovo. Villagers remembered the pogrom, arranged by the punishers some ten days ago. “When my family and I noticed a moving wagon train, we all inhabitants of our village fled to the Khinelsky forest,” recalled Zakhar Stepanovich Kalugin. However, it did not do without murder here: the old men who remained in the village were shot by the Hungarians [151].
Punishers pacified the surrounding villages for a week. Residents fled to the forest, but they were found there.
“It was in May of the 28 X-day of the year 42,” said a resident of Orlia Slobodka, Evdokia Vedeshin. - I and almost all residents went to the forest. There were these thugs following. They are in our place where we (nrzb) with our people shot and tortured 350 people including my children were tortured, daughter Nina 11 years, Tonya 8 years, little son Vitya 1 year and son Kohl of five years. I stayed alive under the corpses of my children. ”
[152].Abandoned villagers burned out.
“When we returned from the forest to the village, it was impossible to recognize the village,” recalled Natalya Aldushina, a resident of the long-suffering Svetlova. “Several old men, women, and children were brutally murdered by the Nazis. The houses were burned, large and small cattle were hijacked. The pits in which our things were buried were dug up. In the village there is nothing left but black brick. The women who remained in the village talked about the atrocities of the fascists "
[153].Thus, in only three villages in the 20 days the Hungarians killed at least 420 civilians. It is possible that there were more dead - we do not have complete data on this. But we know that these cases were not isolated.
The Kaminsky formations, as we have already had the opportunity to see, acted in the same spirit as the Hungarians, often in close cooperation with them. Here is another evidence:
“In June, 1942,” recalled M. Goyadov, already mentioned, “after the raid by the partisans on p. Mikhailovka when 18 policemen and 2 Germans were killed. Mikhail Berdnikov, at the head of a detachment in 100 with more than one person, arrived in the Mikhailovsky District and committed atrocities against the civilian population. In the village of Mikhailovka, on the orders of Berdnikov, an 2 man was hanged, the 12 houses of partisans were robbed and burned. After the massacre in Mikhailovka detachment went to the village. Veretennikovo, Mikhailovsky District, where a member of the guerrilla family members was shot to death by 50, almost the entire village was burned and cattle were stolen. On the same day, a detachment set fire to 15 houses in the village of Razvete and robbed a partisan family. ”
[154].There were purely military successes. In May, after the two-hour battle, the Kamintsy, together with the German and Hungarian units, beat out partisans from the villages of Altukhovo, Sheshuyevo and the Red Plowman. The guerrillas suffered serious losses, the enemy seized three anti-tank guns, two 76-mm guns, four easel machine guns "Maxim", 6 of company mortars, two 86-mm mortars and a lot of ammunition. The Germans, in turn, lost the 2 tank and one armored car [155].
German observers Kaminsky actions were rated positively.
“Kaminsky openly guarantees that without the consent of the German officials he will not turn his military unit into a political tool,” stated the officer of the Abwehr Bossi-Fredrigotti. - He understands that at present his tasks are purely military in nature. It seems that with skillful political treatment Kaminsky will be useful for the German plans for the reorganization of the East. This person can become a propagandist of the German "new order" in the East "
[156].This "new order" has already been fully felt by the inhabitants of the villages destroyed by the Hungarians and the Kamians.
5. New round of terror
The actions of the Kaminsky units were aimed at splitting the population of the occupied territories, at fomenting a war between those who were mobilized into the "people's militia" and those who supported the partisans. This was very useful for the occupiers, and to a certain extent it was possible.
"He [Kaminsky] created an island inside a vast partisan region in the Bryansk-Dmitrovsk-Sevsk-Trubchevsk region, which impedes the expansion of the partisan movement, links the activities of powerful partisan forces and provides an opportunity for conducting German propaganda among the population," wrote the Berlin commander 2 tank army general schmidt. - In addition, the area supplies food for the German troops. Thanks to the successful deployment of Russian troops under the leadership of Kaminsky, it became possible not to attract new German units and save German blood in the fight against partisans. ”
[157].It was decided to expand the territory controlled by Kaminsky; 19 July 1942 Schmidt signed an order to transform Lokotsky District into a “self-governing administrative district consisting of Lokotsky, Dmitrovsky, Dmitrievsky, Sevsky, Kamarichesky, Navlinsky and Suzemsky districts” [158].
Looking at the map, it is easy to make sure that the territory around the Bryansk-Navlya-Lgov and Bryansk-Navlya-Khutor Mikhailovsky districts were given over to Kaminsky’s control. It was in these areas that the so-called "South Bryansk Partisan Territory" operated. Thus, Kaminsky was transferred territories de facto controlled by partisans (in May – June, partisan sabotage stopped traffic along the Bryansk-Lgov railway line once again), but in connection with the railways passing through them, very important for the occupiers.
The calculation was, in general, a win-win: Kaminsky could establish control over the territories transferred to him — fine. It can not - will not be worse. True, the Germans did not particularly rely on the Kaminsky formation. In the run-up to the creation of the Lokotsky District, the occupiers of the German and Hungarian units conducted one of the first large-scale anti-guerrilla operations in the south of Bryansk, called the “Green Woodpecker” (“Grünspecht”). Kaminza in this operation participated as an auxiliary force.
The results of the operation “Green Woodpecker” are extremely fragmentary information, however, it seems that it was quite successful for the invaders and their accomplices. Without this, the creation of the Lokot District would hardly have been possible.
It goes without saying that the German command did not let the German command take control of the Lokot district. The German commander Ryubzam was appointed military commander of the district, whose task was to coordinate the combat actions of the Kaminsky formations with the German and German units. Directly to Kaminsky, Major von Veltheim [159] was appointed as a liaison officer and military adviser. In addition, a guard battalion, a point of contact, police officers, a military gendarmerie and an Abvergroup-107 unit headed by Major Greenbaum [160] were located in Lokot.
As already mentioned, the guerrillas controlled most of the Lokotsky District. “Only 10% of the forest belonged to us,” recalled Mikheev, the head of the forest department. “The remaining 90% were controlled by the partisans” [161]. Kaminsky attempted to change the current situation with brutal terror against the partisans who supported the partisans. In early August, he issued a special appeal:
“Citizens and citizens of villages and villages occupied by partisans! Partisans and partisans, who are still in the forests and individual settlements of the former Navlinsky and Suzemsky districts!
... In the near future, the German and Hungarian units together with the Lokot Police Brigade will take decisive measures to destroy forest gangs. In order to deprive the bandits of the economic base, all the settlements in which the partisans are located will be burned. The population will be evacuated, and the partisan families will be destroyed if their relatives (fathers, brothers and sisters) do not come over to us before 10 in August with. All residents, as well as partisans who do not want to lose their head in vain, without losing a single minute, should come to us with all the weapons they have.
This appeal and warning is the last. Use the opportunity to save your life. ”
[162].... In the near future, the German and Hungarian units together with the Lokot Police Brigade will take decisive measures to destroy forest gangs. In order to deprive the bandits of the economic base, all the settlements in which the partisans are located will be burned. The population will be evacuated, and the partisan families will be destroyed if their relatives (fathers, brothers and sisters) do not come over to us before 10 in August with. All residents, as well as partisans who do not want to lose their head in vain, without losing a single minute, should come to us with all the weapons they have.
This appeal and warning is the last. Use the opportunity to save your life. ”
Words do not disagree with the case.
"During the operation, which took place from October 11 to November 6 1942, the 13 Battalion of the RONA, together with the Germans and Cossacks, committed massacres against the peaceful population of the villages of Makarov, Holshinka, Veretenino, Bolshoi Oak, Ugolyok and others I don’t remember the names of - later told M. Govyadov. - I know that half der. Makarov was burned, and about 90 people were shot from the population. The same number was shot in Veretenino, and the village was finally burned. In the village of Holshinka, part of the population, including women and children, were locked up in a shed and burned alive. In the villages of Big Oak and Ugolek, civilians and mainly partisan families were also shot, and the villages were destroyed. ”
[163].In the villages controlled by Kaminsky, a real regime of terror was established; executions have become very frequent.
“At the end of 1942, the 8 people of the residents of Borschovo, Brasovsky district, were arrested by denunciation,” recalled D. Smirnov, a member of the military field court during “self-government”. - From this group, I remember the chairman of the Borshchovo village council Polyakova with her daughter, 22, a young woman Chistyakov, a resident of the village of Borschovo, Bolyakova, 23, and the rest, I forgot her last name. I know that there were three women and five men. As a result of the trial, the s / c chairman was hanged, his daughter and Chistyakov were shot, and the rest were sentenced to time. In addition, a young girl 20 – 22 was hanged in years, I don't know her last name. She was hanged only because she was upset about the partisans' failures and did not hide it. There were a lot of executions, but I don’t remember the names of those who were executed. All these victims came to light with the help of a whole state of secret agents who worked in self-government ”
[164].Mass executions in the Lokot prison by this time had already become commonplace.
“All those sentenced to death were the same for me,” Antonina Makarova, who later performed the duties of executioner, later told me. - Only their number changed. Usually I was ordered to shoot a group of 27 people - so much partisans could hold a camera. I shot at about a pit about 500 meters from the prison. The arrested were chained to the pit. To the place of execution, one of the men was rolling out my machine gun. At the command of my superiors, I knelt down and shot at people until everyone was dead falling ... I didn’t know those I was shooting. They did not know me. Therefore, I was ashamed in front of them. Sometimes you shoot, come closer, and someone else is twitching. Then again shot in the head so that the person would not suffer. Sometimes a few prisoners had a piece of plywood with the inscription "partisan" on their chest. Some sang before death. After the executions, I cleaned the machine gun in the guardroom or in the yard. The cartridges were in abundance ... It seemed to me that the war would write off everything. I was just doing my job, which I was paid for. It was necessary to shoot not only partisans, but also members of their families, women, teenagers. I tried not to remember this. Although I remember the circumstances of one execution - before the execution, the guy sentenced to death shouted to me: “I will not see you again, goodbye, sister! ..”
[165].It is not surprising that most of the residents of Lokotsky District Kaminsky hated them fiercely. This fact is recorded in German documents. A report dated October 10 of 1942 states in this connection the following.
“People familiar with the current situation (Major von Weltheim, Major Miller, Chief Lieutenant Buchholz) agree independently of each other not only that the population still respects Kaminsky’s predecessor, who was killed by the partisans, but also that they [the local people ] hate kaminsky. They “tremble” before him and, according to this information, only fear keeps them in obedience. ”
[166].Even reading the orders issued by Kaminsky, it is not difficult to notice that the sympathies of the population were not at all on the side of the Lokotskaya administration. September 15 1942 Propulsion Kaminsky issues an order number 51:
“There are more cases when residents of the sub-forest areas go to the forest without the knowledge of local authorities.
There are cases when, under the guise of picking berries, making wood, they are found in the forest with partisans.
On the basis of the foregoing, I order: To stop every walk in the forest of individuals, regardless of the reasons. If it is necessary to go into the forest, somehow: sawing and harvesting timber and firewood, searching for missing animals, I only allow access to the forest in an organized manner, with the obligatory escort of police officers.
Any unauthorized walking into the forest will be considered as a link with the partisans and punished according to the law of war.
Responsibility for the implementation of the order I lay on the volost elders, elders and authorized police.
Order to publish and bring to the attention of the residents of Lokotsky district "
[167].There are cases when, under the guise of picking berries, making wood, they are found in the forest with partisans.
On the basis of the foregoing, I order: To stop every walk in the forest of individuals, regardless of the reasons. If it is necessary to go into the forest, somehow: sawing and harvesting timber and firewood, searching for missing animals, I only allow access to the forest in an organized manner, with the obligatory escort of police officers.
Any unauthorized walking into the forest will be considered as a link with the partisans and punished according to the law of war.
Responsibility for the implementation of the order I lay on the volost elders, elders and authorized police.
Order to publish and bring to the attention of the residents of Lokotsky district "
The order to the locals to go to the forest for firewood solely accompanied by the police itself speaks volumes. However, the order No. 114 of October 31 says more about this:
“I order all elders, volost elders and regional burgomasters to immediately inform the nearest telephone center upon the approach of the gangsters, for which you need to have a horse and a horseman at each village.
I warn you that I will consider the failure to comply with this order as a direct betrayal and betrayal of the Motherland and to bring the perpetrators to court-martial ”
[168].I warn you that I will consider the failure to comply with this order as a direct betrayal and betrayal of the Motherland and to bring the perpetrators to court-martial ”
As we see, even the elders and burgomasters, who had the power of authority, were in no hurry to report the partisans to the center; they had to be forced to do so by the threat of a court-martial.
6. RONA Brigade
For the German command, the hatred of the local population for Kaminsky had absolutely no meaning. For them it was important only how many soldiers Kaminsky could throw against the partisans and whether these units would achieve acceptable success. Simultaneously with the creation of the Lokot district, Kaminsky received permission to reorganize his units into a “police brigade”.
In the autumn of 1942, Mr. Kaminsky announced mobilization in the districts transferred to him (in the “old territories” mobilization, as we remember, has been conducted since January). There were not enough commanders for the new units, and at the end of 1942, the city of Kaminsky, with the consent of the German command, recruited several dozen officers [169] in the prisoner of war camps.
The Kaminsky Brigade received the pathetic name "Russian People's Liberation National Army". As of January 1943, the brigade had 14 battalions with a total of 9828 men (see table). These forces were deployed on the territory of Lokotsky Okrug. In large settlements there were battalions. RONA received weapons from the Germans - as well as military uniforms. The food supply was provided by the county population [170]. Each battalion had a German liaison officer [171].
RONA'S TEAM FOR 16 JANUARY 1943 [172]
In the spring of 1943, the RONA battalions were consolidated into five rifle regiments of three-battalion composition:
The 1 th rifle regiment of Major Galkin - 1,2, 11 th battalion;
The 2 th rifle regiment of Major Tarasov - 4, 6, 7 th battalion;
The 3 th rifle regiment of Major Turlakov - 3,5, the 15 th battalion;
The 4 th infantry regiment of Major Proshina - 10, 12, 14 th battalion;
The 5 th infantry regiment of Captain Filatkin - 8, 9, 13 th battalions.
Each battalion had 4 rifle companies, mortar and artillery platoons. The state of the arsenal required 1 – 2 guns, 2 – 3 battalion and 12 rotary mortars, 8 machine guns and 12 light machine guns. However, in practice, both in personnel and in the armament of individual battalions of uniformity did not exist. As can be seen from the above-mentioned Stroevoy note, their numbers varied within 300 – 1000 fighters, and the availability of weapons depended mainly on the nature of the tasks performed. While some battalions even had armored vehicles, others were armed mostly with rifles and almost had no light and heavy machine guns. Armedivision had 8 tanks (KV, 2 T-34, ZBT-7, 2BT-5), 3 armored vehicles (BA-10, 2 BA-20), 2 tanks, as well as cars and motorcycles, and also motorcycles and bikes. Other parts of the RONA could have armored vehicles, such as, for example, a fighter company that received two BT-7 [173] tanks.
In the spring - summer 1943. Five infantry regiments were stationed: 1 th regiment - pos. Bee (34 km south of Navli), 2 th regiment - pos. Bobrik (15 km south of Elbow), 3 regiment - Navlya, 4 regiment - Sevsk, 5 regiment - Tarasivka-Holmech (west of Lokot) [174].
The Germans evaluated the combat capability of the RONA brigade quite skeptically.
“Looting, despite the harsh bans,” stated one of the German observer officers. “Since the officers took part in them, it was absolutely impossible to keep people under control.” At night, the sentries left their posts for no reason. ”
[175].When in the autumn of 1942, the partisans increased pressure on RONA units, General Bernhard was forced to state:
"Militants of engineer Kaminsky cannot repel major attacks on themselves"
[176].Observers coming from the center also did not express admiration for the brigade.
“Decker had the opportunity to inspect all the battalions,” wrote the Minister for Eastern Territories Alfred Rosenberg. - Four battalions wear old German uniforms. The rest of the battalions look like a wild gang ... "
[177].RONA units did not conduct large independent operations against partisans, they were always supported by Hungarian or German units. So it was during the operation “Green Woodpecker” in the summer of 1942, the operations “Triangle” and “Quadrangle” in the autumn of 1942, operations “Polar Bear I” and “Polar Bear II” in winter 1943 and operation “Gypsy Baron” in spring 1943 th. However, as auxiliary units, Kamintsy who knew the locality and population were effective and — most importantly — according to German estimates, they saved an entire division [178].
But the main thing for the occupants was the unchanged loyalty of the RONA brigade. The best characteristic of this loyalty was the fact that when the Germans began to carry out "recruitment of Eastern workers" on the territory of Lokot District, parts of Kaminsky took a very active part in stealing peasants [179]. But the “recruitment of volunteers” was carried out so vilely that even the Baltic collaborators sabotaged such events in every possible way, saving their compatriots [180].
A similar situation was achieved by continually “cleaning the rows” of RONA. However, the pro-Soviet sentiments among the "people of the Army" and the police were quite strong. This is evidenced by the following fact recorded in the report of the Brasovsky District Committee of the CPSU (b) of 1 in March of 1943 g .:
“... when our plane appeared over the village of Lokot and began to drop leaflets, the police rushed to collect leaflets. The Germans opened fire on a police officer rifle. The police, in turn, opened fire on the Germans "
[181].Even among the district officials there were underground anti-fascist organizations. One of them included Vasiliev, head of the Lokot mobilization department, Firsov, director of Komarichsk secondary school, head. the RONA Akulov ammunition depot, the commander of the first battalion Volkov and others. In total, this organization numbered about 150 people, mostly - RONA fighters. An uprising plan was drawn up in Lokot, 15 in March, 1943 created a group to assassinate government officials, a plan to seize tanks, explode fuel, ammunition, damage communications, and 16 in March prepared a report to the headquarters headquarters brigade "For the Motherland" about the German movement troops and military goods. The ultimate goal of the organization was the destruction of the district administration and the transition to the side of the partisans. However, the underground workers were unlucky. Captured by the guerrillas of the Death to the German Occupants Brigade under torture, he informed Kaminsky of the existence of the Vasilyev group, which was immediately arrested in full force [182].
The lieutenant Babich, the chief of staff of the RONA Guards battalion, attempted to create an underground organization. However, during the recruitment of a squad of new members, he was betrayed. A part of the soldiers of RONA recruited by him was arrested, a part of them managed to escape to the partisans [183].
When, in 1943, the front approached directly to the Lokotsky district, the "People's Army", despite the propaganda that the Reds would destroy all the collaborators, began "to take arms with groups and subunits to side with the Red Army" [184]. Of course, so did those who were not involved in punitive operations against the population.
The Kaminsky Brigade was not able to cope with the partisans who controlled most of the territory of the Lokot District. This is clearly evidenced by the fact that during the operation of the “Gypsy Baron” in May 1943, the Germans had to throw part of the 4 and 18 tank, 107 light infantry Hungarian, 10, 7 motorized, 292, against the partisans 707 and 442 th Infantry and 2 th Special Purpose Divisions. The RONA 50 regiment was only a small part of this group, numbering about 185 thousands of people [XNUMX].
However, the Bryansk partisans failed to completely break even then, although they suffered serious losses.
7. findings
The creation of the “Lokotsky self-governing district” became possible for several reasons, the main of which were the active combat activities of the Bryansk partisans and the lack of forces for their suppression.
In order to save the "German blood", the command of the 2 tank army went to provide the occupants, who demonstrated their loyalty to the invaders, Bronislav Kaminsky, to militarize his subordinate area and fight the partisans - naturally, under German control. The Germans called this operation “Die Aktion Kaminsky” [186], and it should be recognized that it turned out to be quite successful.
The divisions of Kaminsky created from the mobilized peasants did not differ in special fighting capacity, however they prevented the expansion of the partisan movement (people who were able to support the partisans were mobilized into anti-partisan formations) and allowed to divert fewer German divisions to the fight against partisans. The brutality of individual units of Kaminsky, at the root of the partisans who destroyed the families, provoked retaliatory strikes by the partisans against the families of the policemen and contributed to stirring up an internecine conflict, beneficial to the invaders.
In Lokotsky Volost, and then in Lokotsky District, a brutal regime was established, signs of which were constant executions in the Lokotsky prison (after being released there were found pits of about two thousand corpses [187]). Even German documents show that the population of Kaminsky was afraid and hated. Kaminsky never managed to establish control over the entire territory of his subordinate district. Most of it was controlled by partisans, which Kaminsky’s team could not cope with even with the active support of the German and Hungarian units. When they write about Kaminsky as “the master of the Bryansk forests”, this is not even a poetic exaggeration, it is an elementary lie.
Nowadays, it is not surprising to anyone that private companies are participating in the fight against the insurgency in Iraq or Afghanistan, and a significant part of their employees are also recruited from the local population. Out of this fact far-reaching conclusions about the moods of the local population are trying, perhaps, to be propagandists. However, from the fact that the German occupiers managed to create through a middleman a brigade of mobilized residents of the Bryansk region and use it against the partisans, the revisionists for some reason draw far-reaching conclusions about the hatred of the population for Soviet power. However, in reality, the creation of the RONA brigade has nothing to do with the mood of the population.
In the end, the occupants of Die Aktion Kaminsky turned into a huge tragedy for the population of Bryansk. Only in the territory of Brasovskiy district, 5395 people [188] were destroyed by the Nazis and their accomplices, the Kaminists. The number of people killed throughout the territory of Lokotsky District remains unknown to date.
97 Armstrong J. Guerrilla War: Strategy and Tactics, 1941 – 1943 / Trans. from English OA Fedyaev. - M., 2007. C. 87.
98 RGASPI.F. 17. Op. 88. D. 481. L. 104 – 106.
99 ibid.
100 Armstrong J. The Partisan War. C. 87.
101 Chuev S.G. The intelligence services of the Third Reich. - SPb., 2003. Prince 2. C. 33 – 34; Altman, IA Victims of hatred: the Holocaust in the USSR, 1941 – 1945. - M., 2002. C. 261 – 262.
102 Altman IL. Hate victims. C. 262 – 263.
103 "Fiery Arc": The Battle of Kursk through the eyes of Lubyanka. - M., 2003. C. 221; Archive FSB in the Oryol region. F. 2. On. 1. D. 7. L. 205.
104 ibid. C. 412 – 413; Archive FSB in the Oryol region. F. 1. On. 1. D. 30. L. 345ob.
105 ibid. C. 221; Archive FSB in the Oryol region. F. 2. On. 1. D. 7. L. 205.
106 Armstrong J. The Partisan War. C. 146.
107 RGASPI.F. 17. Op. 88. D. 481. L. 104 – 106.
108Armstrong J. Guerrilla War. C. 87.
109 Dallin A.The Kaminsky Brigade: A Case Study of Soviet Disaffection // Revolution and Politics in Russia: Essays in Memory of V. I. Nikolaevsky - Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972. P. 244.
110 Chuev S.G. Damned soldiers: Traitors on the side of the III Reich. - M., 2004. C. 109.
111 Ermolov I. G., Drobyazko S.I. Anti-partisan Republic. - M., 2001. (Hereinafter cited on the electronic version posted on the website rona.org.ru).
112 ibid.
113 ibid.
114 Dallin A.The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 247 – 248. On the position of A. Bossi-Fedrigotti, see: Organs of State Security of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War: Collection of Documents (hereinafter referred to as OGB). - M., 2000. T. 2. Prince 2. C. 544, 547.
115 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov, General Schmidt’s Children: The Myth of “Lokotskaya Alternative” // Motherland. 2006. No. 10. C. 91; TsAFSB.D. H-18757.
116 Dallin A.The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 248.
117 Warsaw Uprising 1944 in documents from the archives of the special services. Warsaw; Moscow, 2007. C. 1204; TsA FSB.D. H-18757. D. 6. L. 198 – 217.
118 The photo of the leaflet is published in the book “The Master of Bryansk Forests” by I. Gribkov.
119 RGASPI.F. 17. Op. 88. D. 481. L. 104 – 106.
120 Russian archive: Great Patriotic War (hereinafter - RAVO). - M., 1999. T. 20 (9). C. 109; TsAMO.F. 32. On. 11309. D. 137. L. 425 – 433.
121 RGASPI.F. 69. On. 1. D. 746. L. 2 – 4; Popov A.Yu. NKVD and partisan movement. - M., 2003. C. 311.
122 See, for example: Gribkov I.V. The owner of the Bryansk forests. C. 21.
123Saburov A.N. Recaptured spring. - M., 1968. Prince 2. C. 15.
124 Lyapunov N.I. On the night before Christmas // Partisans of the Bryansk region: Collection of stories of former partisans. - Bryansk, 1959. T. 1. C. 419 – 421.
125 OGB.T. 2. Prince 2. C. 222.
126 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov. Children of General Schmidt. C. 89; TsAFSB.D. H-18757.
127 ibid. C. 92.
128 ibid.
129 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 249 – 250.
130 Gribkov I.V. The owner of the Bryansk forests. C. 33.
131 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 255.
132 Ibid. R. 250.
133 Tonka-machine gunner (http://www.renascentia.ru/tonka. Htm).
134 OGB.T. 3. Prince 1.C. 139.
135 ibid. C. 139 – 140.
136 OGB.T. 3. Prince 1. C. 266.
137 Partisan movement: According to the experience of the Great Patriotic War 1941 – 1945: Military history essay. - M., 2001. C. 127.
138 Dallin A. The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 251.
139 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov. Children of General Schmidt. C. 89; TsA FSB.D. H-18757.
140 The photo of the leaflet is published in the book “The Master of Bryansk Forests” by I. Gribkov.
141 OGB.T. 3. Prince 1.C. 285.
142 Armstrong J. The Partisan War. C. 133.
143 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov. Children of General Schmidt. C. 92; TsA FSB.D. H-18757.
144 Partisans of Bryansk. - Bryansk, 196. C. 41 – 42; Gribkov KV.Kh ozyain Bryansk forests. C. 36 – 37.
145 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov. Children of General Schmidt. C. 90; TsA FSB.D. H-18757.
146 ibid. C. 91.
147 ibid.
148 GARF.F. P-7021. Op. 37. D. 423. L. 561 — 561
149 ibid. L. 567.
150 GARF.F. P-7021. Op. 37. D. 423. L. 543 — 543
151 ibid. L. 564.
152 ibid. L. 488 — 488
153 ibid. L. 517.
154 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov. Children of General Schmidt. C. 93; TsAFSB.D. H-18757.
155 Chuev SG The Damned Soldiers. C. 127.
156 Dallin A.The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 250 – 251.
157 Dallin A.The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 252.
158 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov. Children of General Schmidt. C. 89; TsA FSB.D. H-18757.
159 Dallin A.The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 250 – 251.
160 Dunayev F. Do not earn a feat: An open letter to the “author of the thesis” (http://www.admin.debryansk.ru/region/histoiy/guerilla/pril3_collaboration. Php).
161 Warsaw Uprising 1944. C. 1196; TsA FSB.D. H-18757. D. 6. L. 198 – 217.
162 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov. Children of General Schmidt. C. 90; TsA FSB.D. H-18757.
163 ibid. C. 93.
164 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov. Children of General Schmidt. C. 92 – 93; TsAFSB.D. H-18757.
165 Tonka machine gunner (http://www.renascentia.ru/tonka.htm).
166 Dallin A.The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 259.
167 Yermolov I. G., Drobyazko S.I. Antipartizan Republic. - M., 2001.
168 Popov A.Yu.KVD and the partisan movement. C. 234; RGASPI.F. 69. Op. 1.D. 909. L. 140 – 148.
169 Dallin A.The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 254.
170 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov. Children of General Schmidt. C. 91; TsA FSB.D. H-18757.
171 Fire Arc. C. 244; Central Bank of the FSB.F. 3. Op. 30. D. 16. L. 94 — 104.
172 Yermolov I. G., Drobyazko S.I. Antipartizan Republic. - M., 2001.
173 Yermolov I. G., Drobyazko S.I. Antipartizan Republic.
174 ibid.
175 Dallin A.The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 255.
176 Ibid.
177 Chuev ST. Damned soldiers. C. 122.
178 Dallin A.The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 255 – 256.
179 Criminal targets - criminal means: Documents on the occupation policy of fascist Germany in the USSR, 1941 – 1944. - M., 1968. C. 246 – 247.
180 ibid. C. 254 – 259.
181 Yermolov I. G., Drobyazko S.I. Antipartizan Republic.
182 Yermolov I. G., Drobyazko S.I. Antipartizan Republic.
183 ibid.
184 Fire Arc. C. 245; Central Bank of the FSB.F. 3. Op. 30. D. 16. L. 94 — 104.
185 Guerrilla movement. C. 207.
186 Dallin A.The Kaminsky Brigade. P. 387.
187 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov. Children of General Schmidt. C. 94; TsA FSB.D. H-18757.
188 V. Makarov, V. Khristoforov. Children of General Schmidt. C. 94; TsAFSB.D.N-18757.
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