Myths of the Great Patriotic. The Tale of Lost Communication
Strictly speaking, the Soviet historical science on the pages of the works of respected authors provided enough information to get an adequate picture of the events of 1941. However, the correct phrases about the lead in deployment drowned in a stream of simpler and more understandable theses: “Soviet means excellent”, “Sorge warned” and “repression among the highest command composition ”. The most transparent explanation was, of course, “surprise attack”. It was also interpreted at the most primitive level - sleepy soldiers and commanders awakened by artillery preparation in the morning of June 22 and sleeping in their underwear. Perplexed and not understanding what was happening, people could be taken "warm". It is clear that the explanation for the subsequent defeats of the summer and fall of 1941, such as the failure of the mechanized corps counterattacks, the breakthrough of the "Stalin line" and the encirclement near Kiev and Vyazma, was not explained by running around in underpants.
In addition, data on the total number of troops of the Red Army without taking into account its spatial location was most often cited. Since, from the point of view of these general figures, the Germans did not have a numerical superiority, they began to look for the causes of the catastrophe in problems that lie outside the plane of the operational and strategic situation. Moreover, the figures of the size of the Soviet tank and aviation fleet that became well-known forced us to look for something great and terrible. Something terrible and unusual had to happen so that in the collision of two equal (from the point of view of rather abstract figures) one of them began to rapidly roll back. It was as if some small but important detail had broken down in a large mechanism called the army of a large country.
Generally speaking, the motive for finding a small part, due to which everything collapsed, was a weak hope for a simple change in history. If the part was small, then it could be fixed. The Red Army would have survived under enemy attacks and the war would not have swept across the entire European part of the country, mutilating and killing people and entire families. An accompanying product of detecting this small detail would be the appointment of a switchman responsible for its absence or malfunction. In a word, the driving force of research was a ray of hope. Understanding the inevitability and inevitability of the disaster was too heavy a burden.
The search for the details, because of which everything happened, has not ceased for six decades. In modern times, there appeared the swirling theories about the "strike" of the army, whose personnel was dissatisfied with the Soviet government. Accordingly, the political system became a factor that allowed at one stroke all the beatings. It is assumed that the king-father on the throne instead of the ungodly general secretary would be a reliable defense against all ills. Previously, people were more creative. As a recipe for happiness, it was proposed to bring the troops into combat readiness. The thesis was advanced that if the few divisions of the covering armies were alerted a day or two earlier, the situation would have changed fundamentally. This memoir was fueled by the memoirs of some of our commanders, sustained in the spirit of "well, we would give them if they caught up with us." But in the technocratic society of the late USSR, a version about a flaw in technical quality became very popular. The role of the terrible flaw of the Red Army was given to communication. Indeed, even at the household level, it was clear that the troops, scattered and unmanaged, had little to do.
Famous Soviet historian V.A. Anfilov described the state of communication in the early days of the war with blue-black paint: “The position of the units of the 3 Army was aggravated by the difficulties of organizing troop control, since the wired communication was broken in the first hour of the war. There was no radio. Troop control was carried out only through delegates of communication. The army headquarters had no connection with the front for two days ”(V.A. Anfilov.The beginning of the Great Patriotic War (June 22 - mid-July 1941). Military history essay. - M .: Voenizdat, 1962. C. 107). This is not even a modest painting with a brush, it is an energetic painting of the area with a roller with black paint. After reading this, people interested in war had to be terrified and understand everything at once about the causes of 1941 disasters. It only remained sympathetically to pokokok language and an expression to repeat: "Within two days!"
In 1962, when the quoted book by Anfilov was published, few had the opportunity to examine the situation from different angles through documents. Now there are very different times. The notorious "two days" is quite possible to try to touch and feel. In the Western Front combat log we find the following lines: “At about 13 – 14 hours, beginning. 3 A headquarters opert. and Colonel Peshkov reported: “The 8.00 units of Major General Sakhno (56 sd) fought in the area of Lipsk - Sopotskin” (TsAMO RF, f. 208, op. 2511, d. 29, l. 22). The following is a detail of the situation in the 3 Army's band, which occupies almost a typewritten page. What two days of lack of communication does Anfilov tell us?
Further more. V.A. Anfilov writes: "With the headquarters of the 10 Army, the front lost contact with the very beginning of the German attack" (V.A. Anfilov.The beginning of the Great Patriotic War (June 22 - 1941 mid July). Military history essay. - Moscow: Voenizdat, 1962. C. 107). However, the Chief of Staff of the 10 Army, Major General Lyapin, after leaving the encirclement, said something quite different. Returning from the Belostok “boiler”, he wrote to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Western Front, Malandin: “Communication with the 22.6 front staff was satisfactory not only by radio, but also by Morse telegraph and even occasionally appeared by HF. The corps headquarters finally lost 28.6 communication around 22.00 – 23.00 while Starm was preparing to move from Volkovysk to Derechin ”(TsAMO RF, 208, op. 2511, xNUMX, l. 29). That is, the headquarters of the 22 Army had a fairly stable relationship with the front headquarters and subordinate troops. Chaos came, already when it was all over (June 10) and the encirclement ring closed.
Former commander of the Western Front D.G. During interrogation at the NKVD, Pavlov also assessed the state of communication in the early days of the war, which was far less dramatic than the post-war historian. Being a stone's throw from the execution, he said: “The RF test showed that this connection with all the armies was interrupted. At about 5.00 by long-distance telephone, bypass lines reported to Kuznetsov on the situation. He said that the enemy’s forces were holding them back, but that Sapotskin was on fire, since an especially strong artillery firing had been fired at him, and that the enemy in this sector had gone on the offensive while we were repulsing the attacks. At about 7, the clock sent a radiogram to Golubev [the commander of the 10 army] that a gun-firing was going on all the front and all the enemy’s attempts to penetrate our territory were repulsed by him. ”Thus, the front headquarters did not have RF communications, which itself on its own is not a problem. HF, i.e., closed telephone communication using high frequencies, was not the most common form of communication. Such communication is carried out by connecting a group of low-power long-wave transmitters tuned to different waves with gaps between them in 3 – 4 kHz, to ordinary telephone wires. The high frequency currents created by these transmitters propagate along the wires, exerting a very weak effect on radio receivers not connected to these wires, while at the same time providing a good, free from many interference reception at special receivers connected to these wires. Such luxury in the war could not afford to always. Radio and telegraph, the so-called direct printing apparatus BODO, were used more often in the troops. Accordingly, contrary to Anfilov’s allegations, two independent sources claim that there was a connection with the 3 and 10 armies at the front headquarters. Reports were received and orders were sent.
The main problem of the Western Front was not the link, but the “window” in the North-Western Front line, through which the HNOMX 3 Panzer Group broke through to Minsk. The Germans were concentrated against the weakest Soviet special military district by far superior forces, including two tank groups. Without difficulty, having crushed the parts of the 8 and 11 armies defending the border, the German tank groups penetrated deep into the building of the Soviet troops in the Baltic States. The 4-I tank group moved north towards Leningrad, and the 3-I tank group turned east and southeast and from the North-Western Front invaded the rear of the Western Front D.G. Pavlova. Even if the connection between the headquarters of the Western Front and its subordinate armies was ideal, Pavlov could no longer prevent the breakthrough of the 3 tank group.
The Western Front is no exception to the rule. The failures of the Southwestern Front troops in June 1941 were also attributed to communication problems. Anfilov writes: “For example, the 36 th rifle, 8 th and 19 th mechanized corps did not have radio communication during the offensive in the Dubno region” (V.A. Anfilov, World War II (22 June - mid-July 1941 g .). Military history essay. - M .: Military Publishing. 1962. C. 170). It is not clear how the radio communication between the mechanized corps could help in the battle of Dubno. Even the presence of modern satellite "Inmarsat" could hardly help the commanders of the 8 and 19 of the mechanized corps. By the time the offensive mission was received in the direction of Dubno by the 8-m mechanized corps D.I. Ryabyshev 19 Corps N.V. Fecklenko has already been dropped to the outskirts of Rivne. The 19 Corps was attacked by the III Motorized Corps, bypassing Lutsk. Under the threat of encirclement at the outskirts of Dubno, the 43 I tank division of the corps N.V. Fecklenko was forced to retreat to the east. So, according to the unexpectedly received “Inmarsat” from the advisers from the future, Feklenko could only cheerfully inform Ryabyshev about his departure.
I would not like the reader to get the impression that my task is to expose the Soviet historian Anfilov. For its time, his books were a real breakthrough in the field of research into the initial period of the war. Now we can even say more - the books of Anfilov were based on collections of documents published in 1950's. The claim regarding the interaction between 36-m small, 8-m and 19-m mechanized corps is pure tracing from the directive of the Military Council of the South-Western Front No. 00207 from 29 June 1941. It pointed out the deficiencies in the actions of the troops in the first days of the war . In the original, the thesis about the connection between the buildings is as follows: “No one organizes connections with a neighbor. The 14-I cavalry and 141-rifle divisions were between themselves in 12 km, did not know about the location of each other; the flanks and the joints are not provided and are not covered by intelligence, which the adversary uses to penetrate. Radio is used poorly. There was no radio communication between the 36 rifle corps and the 8 rifle mechanized corpus, the 19 rifle mechanized corpus due to the lack of waves and call signs. ” Note that we are talking about organizational issues, and not about the technical impossibility of communicating by radio as such. It should also be said that this claim is not even the first one by its number. The first point of the directive was the command of the front that pointed out shortcomings in the conduct of intelligence.
V.A. Anfilov situation dramatically dramatized. The connections of the South-Western Front received all the necessary orders, and communication problems in no way can explain their failure. In some cases, it would be better if they did not receive these orders. I will try to illustrate this thesis with a concrete example.
After a lot of winding on the roads of the Lvov ledge, the command of the South-Western Front managed to bring the 26 of June into the battle of the 8 th mechanized corps. However, the headquarters of the front did not develop the results achieved on that day. Instead of orders to continue the offensive, the mechanized corps received an order to ... withdrawal from the line of rifle corps. This is how the content and circumstances of the receipt of this order are described by the commander of the 8 Mechanized Corps, D.I. Ryabyshev, in a report on the corps, hot on the heels of the events, in July 1941 was: “In 2.30 27.6.41, Major General Panyukhov arrived at the commander of the 8 th mechanized corps and handed him the following oral order from the commander of the Southwestern Front: “The 37 th rifle corps defends itself at the front of Pochayuv Nova, Podkamen, Zolochiv. The 8 motorized corps will withdraw beyond the infantry line of the 37 rifle corps and reinforce their battle formation with their fire weapons. Exit start immediately. "
A similar order was received by the 15 th mechanized corps that had launched a counter-attack: “Based on the order of the South-Western Front No. 0019 from 28.6.41. [An error in the document, more correctly than the 27 th. “A.I.] by the morning of 29.6.41, it was ordered to retreat to the line of the Zolochov Heights beyond the defensive line of the 37 Infantry Corps in order to clean up themselves.”
What happened? In the memoirs of I.Kh. Bagramyan (more precisely, in the memoirs of Ivan Khristoforovich, subjected to “literary refinement” with the addition of dialogues that no one can remember after a few years) this serves as a rejection of the strategy of counterattacks by mech-corps in favor of building a “stubborn defense” rifle corps. However, this thesis is not documented. In the operational report for June 26, a derogatory assessment was given to the 36 Infantry Corps: "Due to lack of organization, poor agglomeration and insufficient availability of artillery shells in combat with the enemy in the Dubno area, they showed low combat capability." It would be strange to assume that with the help of these "low combat capability" units, the front head of staff, Maxim Alekseevich Purkaev, a man of the old school, was going to hold German armored divisions. The reason for the withdrawal of mechanized corps from the battle is completely different. The main mistake of the front command was the incorrect assessment of the direction of the development of the German offensive. Accordingly, the front command decided to withdraw the mechanic units beyond the line of building the rifle corps for the application of counterstrikes. And, despite all the problems with communication, which frightened us in the post-war research, the relevant orders were taken to the mechanized corps. Began their withdrawal from the battlefield and retraction.
However, Moscow did not support the decision of the front command. THEIR. Bagramyan recalls:
I run to the meeting room. Seeing me, the bodist woman tapped out to Moscow: “Colonel Baghramyan is with the staff.” I pick up the tape, read: “General Malandin is at the office. Hello. Immediately report to the commander that the Stake has forbidden withdrawal and demands to continue the counterstrike. Not a day to rest the aggressor. Everything ”(Bagramyan I. X. So the war began. - M .: Voenizdat, 1971, S. 141).
Mn Kirponos tried to explain his decisions to the High Command, but could not defend them. Further developments showed that the Headquarters was right in its assessments - the tip of the German tank wedge turned south much later, only after overcoming the “Stalin line”. After receiving the dressing out of Moscow, the headquarters of the South-Western Front began to prepare orders for the return of the mechanized corps to battle.
The order to return to the battle of the 15 of the mechanized corps went to the 10.00 compound headquarters in the morning of June 27. The 37 Corps Panzer Division managed to retreat and spent the day on the march with a turn of 180 degrees. In the battle 27 June, her tanks, of course, did not participate. The throwing of the 15 divisions of the mechanized corps on the roads was explained not by the fact that there was no connection, but by the fact that the connection with it did work. Accordingly, orders were given to withdraw the mechanized corps from the battlefield based on the analysis of the situation, Kirponos headquarters tried to predict the next move of the enemy.
The situation in the 8-m mechanized corps at the time of receiving the order to return to battle was similar. His 12 Panzer Division was extended in a convoy from Brody to Podkamnya (a town in 20 km southeast of Brody). On the other hand, the 7-i motorized rifle and 34-I tank divisions did not have time to get a stop order and remained in the areas occupied by the 26 in the afternoon of June. Early in the morning of June 27, the corps command received an order from the South-Western Front Commander 2121 No. from 27.6.41 to attack the 8 th mechanized corps with 9.00 27.6.41 in the direction of Brody, m. Verba, Dubno. Already in 7.00 27 June Ryabyshev ordered an offensive in a new direction. The offensive was scheduled for 9.00 27.6.41 g. Usually, this episode is narrated by memoirs as the return of the 8 Mechanism Corps into battle in parts by the hysterical order of Commissioner Vashugin, who arrived at the location of the 8 Mechanism Corps at ten o'clock in the morning 27 in June with a squad. Since it was foolish to complain about communication in the conditions of receiving all orders, another popular character, the “party hand”, was used to explain the reasons. The fact that all orders for putting the corps into battle in parts had already been given to the arrival of the hysterical Rottweiler of Marxism-Leninism, tactfully kept silent. In the conditions of the closed archives in 1960, no one had any idea about such inconsistencies. HH Vashugin also shot himself, and it was possible to lay down on the dead man with a calm heart.
However, even according to the recollections, no problems with the transfer of orders to the mechanized corps can be traced. If the order to withdraw to the mechanized corps simply did not reach, there would simply have been no chaos caused by the withdrawal. The connection between the front command and the mechanized corps worked so steadily that the mechanized corps vibrated energetically along with the general line of the defensive operation, with the headquarters of M.P. Kirponos accurate to several hours.
In official documents written by professionals, assessments of the state of communication are much more cautious and balanced. In the brief report of the head of the South-Western Front Communications Department from 27 July 1941, it was said:
a) Wired communications were systematically destroyed, especially nodes and lines in the 5 and 6 armies. The headquarters of the 5 th and 6 th armies - Lviv, Lutsk did not manage to come up with wires through any of the lines.
With the southern group (12-I and 26-I army) communication worked steadily.
b) The communications centers of the People’s Commissariat of Communications after the first bombardments were unable to quickly restore communications; the absence of linear columns and linear parts led to a prolonged breaking of the bond in separate directions.
c) With the mobilization of the first four halves, 28.6.41 was able to ensure the direction of the army along one incomplete company, which ensured the restoration of the destroyed lines and the establishment of wire communications.
d) Radio communication in front-line radio networks was the main means of communication in the directions of the 5 and 6 armies during the period in the absence of wired communication.
e) In the army, corps radio networks, radio communication in the first period, with the paralysis of wire communications, was the only means of communication and ensured the command and control of the troops. ” .
As we can see, contrary to popular belief, radio communications were used to control the 5 and 6 armies operating in the direction of the main attack of the German troops. It was at the junction between these armies that the E.N. VX Kleist's 1 tank group broke through to the east. Moreover, radio communications were the primary means of controlling the 5 and 6 armies. Army headquarters also made extensive use of radio communications. In the 5 Army's operational reports in June 1941, the refrain sounds: "Communication by delegates and by radio". In mid-July, 1941, when the front of the 5 Army stabilized, the range of communications equipment used was expanded. In one of the reports of the 5 Army, it is stated: “Communication: with the front headquarters — Bodo; with the 15 rifle corps - by radio, delegates and ST-35; with 31 rifle, 9 and 22 mechanized corps - by radio and delegates; with the 19-m mechanized corps and army reserve - delegates. "
You also need to pay attention (paragraph “c” of the document) to the fact that parts of the connection were affected by a common problem for the entire Red Army - lack of mobilization. Mobilization was announced only on the first day of the war and, as we see from the document, 28 Jun was able to maintain the operability of communication lines in wartime mode.
In addition, we sometimes approach 1941 from the perspective of today. When satellites transmit information in real-time on a movie screen, it is difficult to imagine how they fought during the times of pigeon mail and foot messengers. 1940 radio communication should not idealize. Troop radioing was only tactical. For quite objective reasons, the basis of the control system was wire communication. The aforementioned report of the head of communications of the South-Western Front states:
2. Radio communications in the absence of a wired connection can provide control in a limited size (insufficient capacity) ”(Collection of combat documents of the Second World War. Issue No. 36. - M .: Voenizdat, 1958. S. 108).
In other words, with the help of wired communication devices it was possible to “push through” a larger amount of information. This fact we find numerous evidence in the documents of the war. In the operational report from 24 June 1941, the chief of staff of the Western Front Klimovsky complained: “Radio communication does not ensure the transmission of all documents, since the encryption is checked several times”. Therefore, for effective management needed a workable wired connection.
In many respects, we find similar theses in the report of the North-Western Front Communications Administration on July 26 1941.
The work of radio communication in it is characterized by the following words:
The break of wire communication was qualified by all as loss of communication.
Radiograms were sent to 1000 and more groups. From abroad Zap. The Dvina was a gradual improvement in the use of radio communications and its recognition as the main type of communication from the staffs ”(Military Documents Collection of the Second World War. Issue No. 34. - M .: Voenizdat, 1957. C. 189)
Why reluctant to use, it is clear from the above - on the radio it was difficult to transmit large amounts of information.
It must be said that the Soviet pre-war charters rather carefully assess the possibilities and scope of application of radio communications. Field Charter 1929, determined the mode of operation of radio:
As we can see, rather stringent restrictions are imposed on the use of radio communications. Moreover, these restrictions are not recommendatory, but prohibitive in nature (“strongly forbidden”). Of course, the provisions of the charter 1929 g. Can be attributed to obscurantism and outdated views on the place of radio communications in combat conditions. However, Soviet military experts monitored progress, and the corresponding theoretical base was put under their positions on radio communications.
For the purity of the experiment, I will quote a statement relating to the period before 1937. It is considered to be largely unreasonable that after cleaning the 1937 – 1938. in the Red Army came the dark ages. Accordingly, an opinion after 1937 may be considered a manifestation of obscurantism. However, even before the purges of great enthusiasm regarding the transfer of troops to the radio control was not observed. The head of the Red Army communications department, R. Longwa, reviewing the prospects for the development and use of radio and wired tools for command and control, wrote in 1935:
Superficial observation could lead to the erroneous view that radio displaces wired communications and that under military conditions it will completely and completely replace wire.
Of course, to solve the issue of control of aviation, mechanical parts and to ensure the interaction of the armed forces at this stage of development of technology is only possible with the help of radio. However, in infantry units in the vast network of rear and military roads, in the air defense alert system, only wire assets can provide continuous, steady communication with all points at a time. Wired tools, moreover, do not unmask the location of controls and much easier ensure the secrecy of transmission ”(History of Military Communications. T. 2. M .: Voenizdat, 1984. C. 271).
Before us, we note, is not the opinion of a theorist, a cabinet scientist, but the practice is the head of the communications department. This man knew from his own experience what the organization of management was through various means of communication. Moreover, the practical experience of the communications troops for 1935 was already quite extensive. Since the adoption of the statute of 1929, the Red Army has already managed to get the first samples of domestic radio stations of the new generation and used them in exercises and maneuvers.
A common thread through various pre-war documents on the use of radio communications is the thought: “it is possible and necessary to use, but carefully.” In the draft Field Regulations 1939 (PU-39), the role and place of radio communication in the control system was defined as follows:
However, in view of the possibility of the enemy intercepting radio broadcasts and establishing, by direction finding, the location of the headquarters and the grouping of troops, it is used mainly only with the start of the battle and in the process of its development.
Permits or prohibits (in whole or in part) the use of the appropriate chief of staff by radio equipment.
During the period of concentration of troops, regrouping, preparation of a breakthrough and in defense before the start of an enemy attack, the use of radio equipment is prohibited.
If radio communication cannot be replaced by other means of communication, for example, for communication with aircraft in the air, with reconnaissance, for air defense, etc., special receiving and transmitting radio stations are allocated for this purpose in the formations and units.
Radio transmission is always done using codes, coded signaling and a cipher. Open radio broadcasts are not allowed, with the exception of the transfer of combat teams in artillery, tank units and aircraft in the air.
Negotiations during the battle on the radio should be made on the pre-compiled headquarters radio communication tables, coded card, code commander's tablet and negotiation tables.
Transmission by radio of operational orders and reports on decisions taken from the division (brigade) and above is allowed only if it is completely impossible to use other means of communication and only with a cipher ”.
Before us is the same set of prohibitive measures: “the use of radio equipment is prohibited,” “if it is completely impossible to use other means of communication and only a cipher”. But it's not even that interesting. In the charter, all those things that were regarded as irrational phobias and strange eccentricities of the red commanders are spelled out in plain text. For example, in the description of the commissioner 8 th mechanized corps N.K. Popel Dubna battles have this episode:
“Our chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Kurepin, turned out to be an extremely cautious comrade,” explained Vasilyev, smiling, “forbade the use of a staff radio station. How would the enemy not traded. Now we are considering whether it is possible to silently shoot out howitzers and attack tanks with engines turned off so that the fascists would not guess about our intentions.
Kurepin stood nearby. In the dark I did not see his face.
- Ivan Vasilyevich, why so. Well, he blundered ... "(Popel N.KV hard time. - M .; SPb .: Terra Fantastica, 2001. C. 118).
I must say that the memoirs of ND. Popili generally contains a lot of inaccuracies, so it is impossible to say exactly whether this conversation took place in reality or is a product of memory aberration. Significantly another, Kurepin's argumentation in the form in which it is retold by Popel, quite closely overlaps with the draft Field Statute 1939 of the city (PU-39). Firstly, it was the chief of staff who decided to use the radio station, and secondly, he pointed out the possibility of its direction finding by the enemy. However, for some reason, the PU-39 itself was not subjected to condemnation and ridicule.
After mentioning in popular memoirs, the idea of a radio phobia as an irrational phobia went to the masses. Pikul reproduced the episode described by Popel almost word for word and added vivid details and generalizations.
The fact that the words about direction finding were spelled out in PU-39 were somehow nicely forgotten. The reader was gently prompted to the conclusion: "The Germans have nothing more to do - look for Soviet radio stations." Mocking at the “radio fear” and the possibility of direction finding of working radio stations, for some reason they forget that the Germans had radio intelligence and sometimes achieved impressive results. Of course, it was not only and not so much about the primitive guidance on the Soviet aviation headquarters. One of the most famous examples is the Mius-Front in July 1943. Karl Hollidt’s German 6-Army defending the Donbass was forced to wait for the Soviet offensive and used all means of reconnaissance to guess the likely direction of the strike. Guessing the direction of the strike often turned into a “Russian roulette”, but it was radio intelligence that allowed the Germans to postpone the collapse of the German defense in the southern sector of the Soviet-German front. Until 9 July 1943, no movement of troops or concentration of artillery was noted by German intelligence. But July 10 was a turning point that caused Hollidt’s headquarters to feverishly prepare to repel the enemy’s offensive in the 6 Army’s area of responsibility. In the afternoon of July 10, infantry and tank movements in the XXIX and XVII army corps were marked. Two days later, the movement was seen at the junction of the IV and XVII army corps - in the direction of the Soviet auxiliary strike. The sharpness of the operational situation was added by the fact that due to the weather conditions from 11 to 14 in July, the effective operation of aerial reconnaissance was impossible, and all hope was on ground reconnaissance and radio interceptions. I was doing this in the 6 Army 623-I separate company of radio intelligence. Particular attention from the German scouts caused the movement of reserves. The position of the 2 Guards Army as a strategic reserve of the Soviet command in the depth of building troops on the southern sector of the front was known to the Germans, and its movements were tracked. According to the Hollidt headquarters, 2-i Guards. the army could be brought into battle within three to five days. Analysis of the July 14 radio traffic allowed the Germans to conclude that the headquarters of the 2 th guards. The army has moved and is now behind the positions of the 5 st shock army. When 15 July improved the weather and aerial reconnaissance began, the concentration of Soviet troops was confirmed from the air. 15 July Hollidt visited the headquarters of the 294 Infantry Division and the XVII Army Corps and reported that all intelligence data indicate the imminent start of the offensive precisely on their front. Two days later, on a hot morning on July 17 1943, the thunder of artillery preparation confirmed his words.
Naturally, the Germans took the necessary countermeasures and tightened the reserves to the probable direction of the blow of the Soviet troops. Moreover, decisions were made at the command level of the entire Army Group South. The 2nd SS tank corps of Paul Hausser was removed from the southern face of the Kursk Bulge. The corps was withdrawn from the battlefield and immersed in echelons departing for the Donbass. The timely arrival of SS units played a key role in repelling the Soviet offensive on Mius, which ended at the beginning of August 1943 by driving the Southern Front to its original positions.
Mius-front in this case is a negative example, but one should not think that in the same period there were no directly opposite cases. Those, oddly enough, is a counter-strike 5-th Guards. tank army under Prokhorovka. Due to the strictest radio silence (the radio stations were even sealed), until the very last moment the Germans did not know that the Voronezh Front would launch a counterattack with large masses of tanks. The concentration of tanks was partially dissected by radio intelligence, but there was no specific list of arrivals from the Germans on the evening of July 11. 1943 was not. Therefore, the defensive actions of “Leibstandart” 12 July were largely improvisation, which was favored by a dense battle formations and terrain conditions. In any case, the German radio intelligence did not reveal the appearance of the PA army. Rotmistrov, and its appearance was largely unexpected. Another issue is that this initial advantage was not properly used.
The aforementioned 8 th mechanized body was in the same position as the 5 th guards. tank army under Prokhorovka. He also advanced to deliver a counterattack. Therefore, the radio silence mode was one of the main requirements. German radio intelligence in the summer of 1941 worked, and the intensive use of radio communications would clarify the situation for the enemy. It would be easier for German intelligence to find out who is opposed to them at the moment and the approach of which formations or formations from the depth is expected in the near future. Radio communication, like any other tool, had its advantages and disadvantages.
Sending officers to the troops with orders was not an extraordinary measure caused by circumstances. Recommendations on the organization of control with the help of delegates went to PU-39 after the section on radio communications furnished with prohibitive measures. Red commanders recommended the following:
The headquarters of military units and units should take care of the availability and readiness for action of a sufficient number of mobile means for transmitting orders. ”
Communications delegates were not a companion of unsuccessful operations only. They were widely used to transfer orders in battles and operations that were undoubtedly successful for the Red Army. As an example, we can give an episode relating to the period of the Soviet counter-offensive near Stalingrad. To the south of the city, the mechanized corps of the strike force of the Stalingrad Front were advancing on the steppe. On the night of November 22, the 4 Mechanic Corps received an order from the Deputy Commander of the Stalingrad Front, MM. Popov by the end of the day capture the Soviet and advance the forward detachment to Karpovka. The body at that moment was moving forward in the literal sense of the word blindly. There was no information about the enemy in the direction of the attack either from the headquarters of the 51 Army or from the headquarters of the Stalingrad Front. Applications for aerial reconnaissance were not executed - due to bad weather, aviation was virtually inactive. The corps could only shine its “low beam” - sending reconnaissance detachments on motorcycles and armored vehicles BA-64 in all directions. Communication was also established with the neighbor on the right, the 13 Mechanized Corps. The situation was cleared up to an insignificant degree: vague information was obtained about the front area to the right of the offensive line. On the left, there simply were no neighbors, one seemingly boundless steppe. In such an environment, a counterattack could follow from any direction. A thick "fog of war" hung over the battlefield. It remained to take all precautions and rely on his lucky star. Volsky advanced a strong side guard to the flanks and brought the 60 th mechanized brigade to the reserve.
Soon the already difficult situation was aggravated by lightning "from the stratosphere." At the approach of the corps headquarters to the Upper Tsaritsyn plane, an order was delivered by the commander of the Stalingrad front, A.I. Yeremenko with the task of capturing Old and New Rogachik, Karpovskaya, Karpovka. This significantly changed the original body task. Now he had to turn away from the rendezvous point with the South-Western Front near Kalach and advance to the rear of the troops of the 6 Army near Stalingrad. More precisely, the corps was deployed to crush the fast-built defense of the 6 Army with a front to the west.
Literally half an hour after the arrival of the aircraft from A.I. Yeremenko, the deputy commander of the 51 Army, Colonel Yudin arrived in the corps headquarters by car. The commander of the 4 th mechanized corps was handed the order of the commander 51 (in whose operational subordination was the corps), confirming the previously assigned task. Mehkorpus was supposed to seize the Soviet and reach the line of Karpovka, Marinovka, that is, about the line of the railway from Stalingrad to Kalach. Having appeared with two orders on his hands, Volsky made a compromise decision and turned the 59 mechanized brigade to Karpovka. The attack on Karpovka was ineffectual - the mobile units sent by Paulus occupied the old Soviet fortifications. The rest of the 4 th mechanized corps moved to the Soviet, performing the previous task.
As a result, the Soviet was captured by the 12.20 on November 22 by the 36 th mechanized brigade, together with the 20 th tank regiment of the 59 th mechanized brigade. Car repair shops were located in the city, and more than 1000 vehicles became trophies of the body of Volsky. Were also seized warehouses with food, ammunition and fuel. With the capture of the Soviet, the message of the 6 Army with rear was interrupted by rail.
It is interesting to note that the orders of the 4 th mechanized corps were received by the delegates of communications. Moreover, the orders of different instances contradicted each other. According to Russian historical tradition, it is customary to angrily condemn the use of delegates in the summer of 1941, and even present them as one of the causes of the catastrophe. However, this is an obvious staging of the cart before the horse. Communications delegates were safely used in successful operations of the Red Army. Corps without any problems sent to the command of the desired point without using ideologically seasoned radio.
In conclusion, I would like to say the following. It is impossible to deny the significant shortcomings in the work of communication in the 1941 Red Army. But declaring the connection to be one of the main reasons for the defeat is unwise. The collapse of the communication system was often the result, not the cause, of emerging crises. The headquarters lost contact with the troops when they were defeated in the defense and were forced to retreat. The defeats had a very definite explanation at the operational level, and the absence of any communication problems would hardly have significantly changed the situation.
- Alexey Isaev
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