Myths of the Great Patriotic. Was Stalin an ally of Hitler?
В historical and predominantly near-historical publications and discussions of recent times, the opinion is quite widespread that the USSR from August 23, 1939 was an ally of Germany, which manifested itself primarily in the joint seizure of Poland with Germany. The following text is intended to demonstrate to the readers that a review of the details of the Polish campaign does not provide a basis for such conclusions.
First of all, it should be noted that, in spite of the common misconception of the USSR, I did not bind myself with any official obligations to enter the war with Poland. Neither the secret agreement to the non-aggression treaty between Germany and the USSR, of course, nothing of the kind was written in the treaty itself. Nevertheless, already 3 September 1939. Ribbentrop sent the German ambassador to the USSR FW Schulenburg to ask Molotov, “would not consider the Soviet Union desirable for the Russian army to act at the right moment against the Polish forces in the Russian sphere of influence and, with On its part, it occupied this territory ”, adding at the same time that it“ would also be in Soviet interests ”[1]. Similar veiled requests from Germany for the entry of Soviet troops into Poland took place later [2]. Molotov, another 5 of September, replied to Schulenburg that “at the appropriate time” of the USSR “it will be absolutely necessary to begin concrete actions” [3], however, the Soviet Union was in no hurry to go over to actions. There were two reasons for this. The first 7 of September was perfectly formulated by Stalin: “The war is on between two groups of capitalist countries (poor and rich against colonies, raw materials, etc.). For the redistribution of the world, for domination of the world! We don't mind a good fight and weaken each other ”[4]. Germany followed a similar course of conduct during the Winter War. Moreover, the Reich at that time also, to the best of its possibilities, trying not to annoy the USSR especially, supported Finland. So, at the very beginning of the war, Berlin sent a party of 20 anti-aircraft guns [5] to the Finns. At the same time, Germany allowed the delivery of Fiat G. 50 [50] fighters from Italy to Finland in transit through its territory. However, after the USSR, which became aware of these shipments, 6 December declared an official protest to Reich, Germany was forced to stop transit through its territory [9], so only two cars managed to get to Finland in this way. And yet, even after that, the Germans found a rather original way of assisting Finland: at the end of 7, Goering’s negotiations with the Swedish representatives led Germany to start selling its weapons to Sweden, and Sweden owed the same amount weapons from Finland to sell [8].
The second reason why the USSR preferred not to force the start of hostilities against Poland was reported to the IDO of the German leadership when, during a conversation with XuNburg 9 in September, Molotov "stated that the Soviet government intended to take advantage of the further advancement of the German troops and declare that Poland was falling apart and that, as a result, the Soviet Union should come to the aid of Ukrainians and Belarusians who are “threatened” by Germany. This excuse will present the intervention of the Soviet Union plausible in the eyes of the masses and give the Soviet Union the opportunity not to look like an aggressor ”[9]. By the way, the further fate of this Soviet excuse for attacking Poland well illustrates how ready the USSR was to make concessions to Germany.
15 September Ribbentrop sent Schulenburg a telegram in which he spoke of the Soviet Union’s intention to present his invasion of Poland as an act of protecting kindred peoples from the German threat: “Specifying the motive of such a class is impossible. It is the exact opposite of real German aspirations, which are limited to exceptionally well-known zones of German influence. It also contradicts the agreements reached in Moscow, and finally, contrary to the desire expressed by both parties to have friendly relations, he will present both states as enemies to the whole world ”[10]. However, when Schulenburg conveyed to Molotov this statement of his boss, he replied that although the pretext planned by the Soviet leadership contained a “hurtful note for the Germans”, the USSR does not see any other reason for sending troops into Poland [11].
Thus, we see that the USSR, on the basis of the above considerations, did not intend to invade Poland until it exhausted its potential to resist Germany. During a regular conversation with Schulenburg on September 14, Molotov said that for the USSR “it would be extremely important not to begin to act before the administrative center of Poland - Warsaw” [12] falls. And it is quite probable that in the case of effective defensive actions of the Polish army against Germany, and even more so in the case of a real, rather than formal, entry into the war of England and France, the Soviet Union would have completely abandoned the idea of joining Western Ukraine and Belarus. However, the allies de facto did not render Poland any help at all, and alone she was not able to offer any tangible resistance to the Wehrmacht.
By the time Soviet troops entered Poland, both the military and civilian Polish authorities had lost any control threads in the country, and the army was disparate, with no connection to the command or to each other, groups of troops of varying degrees of combat capability. By September 17, the Germans reached the line Osovets – Bialystok – Bielsk – Kamenetz-Litovsk – Brest-Litovsk – Wlodawa – Lublin – Vladimir – Volynsky – Zamost – Lviv – Sambir, thus occupying about half of Poland’s territory, occupying Krakow, Lodz, Gdansk , Lublin, Brest, Katowice, Torun. Warsaw has been under siege since September 14. On September 5, President I. Moscitsky left the city, and on September 13, the government [9]. On September 11-16, the Polish leadership negotiated with France for asylum, September 17 - with Romania about transit, and finally left the country on September 14 [8]. However, the decision to evacuate, apparently, was made even earlier, since already on September 15 the US ambassador to Poland, accompanying the Polish government, sent a message to the State Department, which, in particular, stated that “the Polish government is leaving Poland ... and through Romania ... goes to France ”[7]. Commander-in-Chief E. Rydz-Smigly stayed in Warsaw the longest, but he also left the city on the night of September 10, moving to Brest. However, Rydz-Smigly didn’t stop there for a long time either: on September 13 the rate was moved to Vladimir-Volynsky, on the 15th to Mlynov, and on the 16th to Kolomyia near the Romanian border [17]. Of course, the commander in chief could not normally lead the troops in such conditions, and this only exacerbated the chaos that arose as a result of the rapid advance of the Germans and the confusion at the front. The problems with communication were also superimposed on this. So, the headquarters in Brest had a connection with only one of the Polish armies - “Lublin” [XNUMX]. Describing the situation at that moment in the headquarters, the deputy chief of the General Staff, Lt. Col. Yaklich, reported to the Chief of Staff Stakhevich: “We have been constantly searching for troops and expelling officers to restore communications ... With the internal organization in Brest Fortress, there’s a big booth that I must liquidate myself. Constant raids aviation. In Brest, flight in all directions ”[18]. However, not only the leadership left the country: on September 16, the evacuation of Polish aircraft to Romanian airfields began [19]. The most efficient Polish ships fleet: the destroyers Blyskawica, Grom, and Burza were relocated to English ports on August 30, 1939. Initially, they were supposed to act as raiders on German communications, disrupting German merchant shipping [20], but any Polish ships did not achieve success in this matter, and their absence in the ports of Poland negatively affected the combat effectiveness of the Polish fleet. On the other hand, it was the basing in Britain that saved these destroyers from the fate of the rest of the Polish fleet and made it possible to continue the struggle with the Germans as part of the Naval Forces after the defeat of Poland. During its only major counter-attack on the river. Bzure, which began on September 9, the Polish troops in the armies of Poznan and Pomozhe already lost the initiative by September 12, and were surrounded by German troops on September 14 [21]. And although some parts of the encircled armies continued to resist until September 21, they could no longer influence the outcome of the war. In the face of Poland’s apparent inability to defend its western borders, on September 10, the General Staff issued a directive according to which the main task of the army was “pulling together all troops in the direction of Eastern Poland and ensuring connection with Romania” [22]. Characteristically, this directive was the last combined-arms order of the commander in chief, however, not all of them received it all because of the same problems with communications. After this order was issued, Rydz-Smigly himself, as mentioned above, left Brest and moved just in the direction indicated in the directive - closer to Romania.
Thus, in view of the effective actions of the Germans, the disorganization of the army and the inability of the leadership to organize the defense of the state, by September 17 the defeat of Poland was absolutely inevitable.
Photo # 1
Photo # 2
It is significant that even the English and French general staffs in the report prepared by 22 September noted that the USSR began the invasion of Poland only when its final defeat became apparent [23].
The reader may ask: has the Soviet leadership had the opportunity to wait for the complete collapse of Poland? The fall of Warsaw, the final defeat of even the remnants of the army, and perhaps completely complete occupation of the entire Polish territory by the Wehrmacht, followed by the return of Western Ukraine and Belarus to the Soviet Union in accordance with the Soviet-German agreements? Unfortunately, the USSR had no such possibility. If Germany really occupied the eastern regions of Poland, the likelihood that it would return them to the Soviet Union was extremely small. The leadership of the Reich until mid-September 1939 discussed the possibility of creating puppet governments [24] in the territories of Western Ukraine and Belarus. In the diary of the OKH chief of staff, F. Halder, in the recording of September 12 there is such a passage: “The commander-in-chief arrived from a meeting with the Fuhrer. Perhaps the Russians will not interfere in anything. The Fuhrer wants to create the state of Ukraine ”[25]. It was the prospect of the emergence of new territorial formations in the east of Poland, which Germany was trying to intimidate the Soviet leadership in order to speed up the entry of Soviet troops into Poland. So, September 15 Ribbentrop asked Schulenburg to “immediately pass on to Mr. Molotov” that “if Russian intervention is not launched, the question will inevitably arise whether there is a political vacuum in the area to the east of the German zone of influence. Since we, for our part, do not intend to take any actions of a political or administrative nature in these areas, standing apart from the necessary military operations, without such intervention by the Soviet Union [in Eastern Poland], conditions may arise for the formation of new states ”[ 26].
Photo # 3
Photo # 4
Although, as can be seen from this instruction, Germany, of course, denied its participation in the possible creation of “independent” states in Eastern Poland, it must be assumed that the Soviet leadership did not harbor any illusions on this score. However, even despite the timely intervention of the USSR in the German-Polish war, certain problems due to the fact that the German troops managed to take part of Western Ukraine to 17 September, still arose: September 18 deputy chief of staff of the OCW operational management V. Warlimont showed the acting military attache of the USSR in Germany to Belyakov a map on which Lviv was located west of the demarcation line between the USSR and Germany, that is, entered the future territory of the Reich, which was a violation of the secret additional protocol to the Non-Aggression Treaty regarding the division of spheres of influence in Poland. After claims by the USSR, the Germans stated that all the Soviet-German agreements remained in force, and the German military attache Kestring, trying to explain this drawing of the border, referred to the fact that it was a personal initiative of Warlimont [27], but it seems unlikely that the latter drew maps based on some of his own considerations that run counter to the instructions of the Reich leadership. It is indicative that the need for a Soviet invasion of Poland was also recognized in the West. Churchill, who was then the first Lord of the Admiralty, said in an address on radio on October 1 that “Russia is pursuing a cold policy of its own interests. We would prefer the Russian armies to stand in their current positions as friends and allies of Poland, and not as invaders. But to protect Russia from the Nazi threat, it was clearly necessary for the Russian armies to stand on this line. In any case, this line exists and, therefore, the Eastern Front has been created, which Nazi Germany will not dare to attack ”[28]. The position of the Allies on the question of the entry of the Red Army into Poland is generally interesting. After the USSR 17 September declared its neutrality towards France and England [29], these countries also decided not to aggravate relations with Moscow. On September 18, at a meeting of the English government, it was decided not even to protest against the actions of the Soviet Union, since Britain was pledged to defend Poland only from Germany [30]. September 23 Commissar of Internal Affairs L. AP Beria informed the People's Commissar of Defense K. Е. Voroshilov stating that “a resident of the USSR NKVD in London reported that on September 20 p. Mr. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of England sent a telegram to all British embassies and press attaches, in which it indicates that England not only does not intend to declare war on the Soviet Union now, but should remain in the best possible way ”[31]. And on October 17, the British declared that London wanted to see a modest-sized ethnographic Poland and that the return of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus is out of the question [32]. Thus, the Allies, in essence, legitimized the actions of the Soviet Union in Poland. And although the motive of such flexibility in England and France was primarily their unwillingness to provoke a rapprochement between the USSR and Germany, the fact that the allies chose such a course of conduct indicates that they understood how tense relations between the Soviet Union still remain and the Reich and that the August agreement - just a tactical maneuver. In addition to political overtures, Britain also tried to establish trade relations with the USSR: On October 11, at the Soviet-British negotiations, it was decided to resume deliveries of Soviet forests to Britain, which were suspended due to the fact that after the start of the war, Britain began to delay Soviet vessels with cargo for Germany.
Summing up the interim results, we can note that at the beginning of September the Soviet Union was not only eager to help Germany in any way to fight the Polish Army, but also deliberately delayed the start of the “liberation campaign” until the moment when complete defeat Poland became quite obvious, and further delay with the introduction of Soviet troops could end up in that Western Ukraine and Western Belarus in one form or another would fall under the influence of Germany.
And now let's proceed to the consideration of the details of the interaction of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. So, on September 17, the Soviet forces were Ukrainian forces (commanded by the commander of 1 rank S. TO. Tymoshenko) and Belarusian (under the command of the commander of 2 rank M. AP Kovalev) fronts invaded the eastern parts of Poland. By the way, it is interesting that, although the liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus was only a pretext for the entry of Soviet troops into Poland, the Soviet troops mostly treated the people of these territories as liberators. In the order of the Military Council of the Belorussian Front, the troops of the front about the goals of the Red Army’s entry into the territory of Western Belarus from September 16 emphasized that “our revolutionary duty and duty is to render urgent assistance and support to our brothers Belarusians and Ukrainians in order to save them from the threat of devastation and beating from enemies ... We are not going as conquerors, but as liberators of our brothers Belarusians, Ukrainians and workers of Poland ”[34]. By the directive of Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov, the Military Council of BNO of 14 September was instructed to “avoid bombarding open cities and towns not occupied by large enemy forces” and not to allow “no requisitioning and unauthorized preparation of food and fodder in occupied areas” [35]. In the directive of the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army army commissioner 1-rank L. 3. Mehlis was reminded “of the strictest responsibility for looting under martial law. The commissars, political instructors and the commander, in parts of which at least one shameful fact will be admitted, will be severely punished, up to giving the Military Tribunal to the court ”[36]. The fact that this order was not an empty threat is well illustrated by the fact that during the war and after its termination, the Military Tribunal issued several dozen war crimes convictions, which, unfortunately, did take place during the Polish campaign. [37]. Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army V. Stakhevich noted: “Soviet soldiers do not shoot at ours, in every possible way demonstrate their position” [38]. Partly because of this attitude of the Red Army, Polish troops very often did not resist her, surrendering to captivity. It was this result that ended most of the clashes of the units of the Red Army and the Polish Army. An excellent illustration of this fact is the ratio of soldiers and officers of the Polish troops who were killed in battles with the Red Army and captured by the Red Army: if the former numbers just 3500 people, then the latter are 452 500 [39]. The Polish population was also quite loyal to the Red Army: “As evidenced by documents from, for example, the 87 Infantry Division,“ in all the localities where parts of our division passed, the working population met them with great joy, as genuine liberators from the oppression of Polish lords and capitalists as deliverers from poverty and hunger. " We see the same in the materials of the 45 th infantry division: “The population is happy everywhere and meets the Red Army as a liberator. A peasant from the village of Ostrozhets Sidorenko said: “Soviet power would have been established sooner, otherwise Polish nurses sat on our necks for 20 for years, sucking the last of us out of blood, and now the time has finally come when the Red Army has freed us. Thank you comrade. To Stalin for the liberation of Polish landlords and capitalists from bondage ”[40]. Moreover, the dislike of the Belarusian and Ukrainian population towards the “Polish landowners and capitalists” was expressed not only in a benevolent attitude towards Soviet troops, but also in open anti-Polish uprisings in September 1939. [41]. September 21 Deputy Defense Commander X. NUMX commander - rank G. AND. Kulik reported to Stalin: “In connection with the great national oppression of Ukrainians by the Poles, the latter have a lot of patience and, in some cases, there is a fight between Ukrainians and Poles, even threatening to cut out the Poles. An urgent appeal of the government to the population is necessary, as this can turn into a big political factor ”[42]. And Mehlis, in his report on September 20, indicated such an interesting fact: “Polish officers ... fear Ukrainian peasants and the population, who became more active with the arrival of the Red Army and deal with Polish officers, as fire. It got to the point that in Burshtyn, Polish officers sent by the corps to school and guarded by a minor guard asked to increase the number of guards as prisoners, fighters, in order to avoid possible reprisals against the population ”[43]. Thus, the Red Army carried out peacekeeping functions in a certain sense in the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. However, even after these regions joined the USSR, their Belarusian and Ukrainian population did not change their attitude towards the Poles, although this began to manifest itself in a slightly different form. For example, during the eviction from the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, precipitators and forest guards in February 1940. the local population of these regions received this decision of the Soviet government with great enthusiasm. Beria Stalin’s special report on this matter states that “the population of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR react positively to the evictions of forest guards and forest guards. In a number of cases, local residents provided assistance to the operational groups of the NKVD [44] in the detention of escaped osadadniki. The same, but a little more detail, is also stated in the report of the Drohobych regional trio of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR about the same events: “The eviction of osadnik and workers of the guard of the forests by the majority of the peasants of the region. I was happy to be approved and fully supported, which is eloquently indicated by the fact that a large number of rural assets participated in the operation (3285 people). ) ”[45]. Thus, at least part of the population rejection of Western Ukraine and Belarus from Poland was really perceived as liberation. But let us go back to examining the peculiarities of the Soviet-German interaction, which began with the fact that at two o'clock in the morning 17 September Stalin summoned Schulenburg, announced the introduction of Soviet troops in Poland and asked "not to fly the German planes from now on east of the Bialystok - Brest-Litovsk - Lemberg [Lviv] line. Soviet aircraft will begin bombing the area east of Lemberg today [46]. The request of the German military attache to Lieutenant-General Kestring about the postponement of the hostilities of the Soviet aviation, so that the German command could take measures to prevent the incidents involving the bombardment of the areas occupied by the Wehrmacht, remained unsatisfied. As a result, some German units were hit by Soviet aviation [47]. And in the future, the most striking episodes of the Soviet-German relationship were not joint actions to destroy the remnants of the Polish troops, as the Allies should have been, but similar excesses that led to casualties on both sides. The most notable such incident was the clash of Soviet and German troops in Lviv. tank brigades. The reconnaissance battalion of the 24th battalion was introduced into the city. However, at 8 in the morning, units of the 30nd German Mountain Infantry Division stormed the city, and the Soviet battalion was attacked, despite the fact that initially it did not show any aggression. The brigade commander even sent an armored vehicle with a piece of a lower shirt on a stick towards the Germans, but the Germans did not cease fire. Then the tanks and armored vehicles of the brigade returned fire. As a result of the ensuing battle, Soviet troops lost 2 armored vehicles and 2 tank, 1 people killed and 3 wounded. The losses of the Germans amounted to 4 anti-tank guns, 3 people killed and 3 wounded. Soon, the shooting was stopped and a representative of the German division was sent to Soviet troops. As a result of negotiations, the incident was resolved [9]. However, despite the relatively peaceful resolution of this conflict, the question arose of what to do with Lviv. On the morning of September 48, the German leadership through Kestring transmitted to Moscow a proposal to take the city together, and then transfer it to the USSR, but, having been refused, was forced to issue an order to withdraw its troops. The German command took the decision as “a day of humiliation for the German political leadership” [20]. In order to avoid similar incidents on September 49, a protocol was drawn up at the talks between Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov with Kestring and representatives of the German command, Colonel G. Aschenbrenner and Lieutenant Colonel G. Krebs, regulating the advance of Soviet troops to the demarcation line and the withdrawal of units of the Wehrmacht from Soviet territory occupied by them.
As we see, all measures were taken to ensure that the Red Army and the Wehrmacht didn’t come into contact with each other during the actions in Poland - what kind of cooperation there is. However, it is for cooperation that the 4 and 5 points of this protocol are sometimes attempted to give out, although in general there is nothing special about them. The German side merely undertakes to return to the USSR intact the objects that already belong to it, since they are located on the territory departing according to the secret additional protocol to the Soviet Union. As for the Soviet obligation to assist small German units in the event that the remnants of the Polish troops interfere with their advancement, it is not the USSR’s desire to cooperate with the Wehrmacht, but the unwillingness to have any contacts with it. The Soviet leadership wanted so much as quickly as possible to send the German troops out of its territory, that it was even ready to escort them to the demarcation line.
However, even this protocol, which seemed to minimize the possibility of clashes between the Soviet and German parts, could not prevent further conflicts between them. On September 23, at Vidomlya, the reconnaissance rifle squad 8 was fired at 6 German machine guns, killing 2 man and injuring 2. Soviet troops returned fire with a single tank, whose crew was killed [51]. September 29 in the area of Vohyn 3 German armored vehicles opened fire on the demining battalion 143-sd [52]. On September 30 in 42 km east of Lublin, the 1 th battalion of the 146 spy 179 th ran 44 sd. Eight people were injured [53].
On October 1, regular negotiations were held between Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov, on the one hand, and Kestring, Ashenbrennrom and Krebs, on the other, on the withdrawal of German and Soviet troops to the final border, which was defined by the Soviet-German Treaty on Friendship and the Border on September 10. Regarding measures to prevent collisions between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, the new decision of the contracting parties generally repeated the protocol of September 21, but to avoid incidents like the September 30 that happened, the following item appeared in the protocol: “With the withdrawal of the Red Army, the Red Army can only fly to the line the rearguard of the columns of the Red Army and at a height not higher than 500 meters, the German Army aviation, when moving to the east of the German Army columns, can only fly to the vanguard line of the German Army columns and at a height not higher than 500 meters ”[54]. So, as we can see, the numerous agreements and consultations that really took place in Soviet-German relations, starting from 17 September, were not aimed at coordinating joint actions of the Soviet and German forces to combat the remnants of the Polish formations, as befits allies , but only on the settlement of various conflicts that have arisen as a result of the collision of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, and on the prevention of new conflicts. It seems quite obvious that in order to prevent the escalation of minor clashes to the size of a real conflict, any states had to act this way. And the measures taken by the Soviet Union and Germany speak not about the allied nature of their interaction. On the contrary, the very fact that these measures had to be taken, and the form in which it was done, perfectly demonstrate to us that the main goal of the parties was primarily to delineate the zones of action of their armies, and to prevent any contacts between them. The author managed to find only two examples that can truly be described as cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany. First, September 1 Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Pavlov conveyed to Molotov the request of the adviser to the German embassy in Moscow G. Hilger said that in Minsk, in his free time, the radio station transmitted for urgent aeronautical experiments a continuous line with interspersed call signs: “Richard Wilhelm 1. O ”, and besides, when the program is being broadcast, the word“ Minsk ”is often used. From resolution B. М. Molotov on the document follows that it was agreed to transmit only the word “Minsk” [55]. Thus, the Luftwaffe could use the Minsk station as a beacon. However, this decision of the Soviet leadership is quite understandable. After all, any mistake of the German pilots operating near the Soviet territory could lead to all sorts of undesirable consequences: from clashes with Soviet fighters to bombing Soviet territory. Therefore, the consent of the Soviet leadership to provide the Germans with an extra reference point is again caused by the desire to prevent possible incidents. The second case is the mutual obligation of Germany and the USSR not to allow “no Polish agitation in their territories that acts on the territory of another country” [56]. However, it is quite obvious that, on the basis of only two of these facts, it is quite problematic to draw far-reaching conclusions about the Soviet-German "brotherhood in arms".
So, summing up, we can draw the following conclusions. In the course of the German-Polish war, the Soviet Union did not intend to render any assistance to Germany. The entry of Soviet troops into Polish territory pursued exclusively Soviet interests and was caused not by the desire to help Germany in any way with the defeat of the Polish army, whose combat capability by that time already uncontrollably sought to zero, namely the unwillingness to transfer the entire territory of Poland to Germany . In the course of the “liberation campaign”, the Soviet and German troops did not conduct any joint operations and did not practice any other forms of cooperation, and there were local conflicts between separate units of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht. All Soviet-German cooperation, in fact, was aimed precisely at resolving such conflicts and creating the previously non-existent Soviet-German border as painlessly as possible. Thus, the allegations that during the Polish campaign the USSR was an ally of Germany are nothing more than insinuations that have little to do with the realities of the Soviet-German relations of that period.
In the context of the discussion of the Soviet-German cooperation, another episode is of interest, which, oddly enough, many publicists serve as the main argument in proving that parts of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in 1939 entered Poland as allies. This is, of course, the “joint Soviet-German parade”, held in Brest on September 22. Alas, most often the mentions of this parade are not accompanied by any details, as if this is a completely obvious fact known to every reader. However, publicists can be understood: after all, if you start to understand the details of the Brest parade, then the idyllic picture of the Soviet-German brotherhood in arms deteriorates somewhat and everything that happened in Brest does not look as clear as many would like. But first things first…
On September 14, units of the German 19 motorized corps under the command of the general of the tank troops G. Guderian occupied Brest. The garrison of the city, headed by General K. Plisovsky, took refuge in the fortress, but on September 17 it was taken. And on September 22, the 29-I tank tank brigade of SM Krivosheina approached the city. Since Brest was in the Soviet sphere of influence, after negotiations between the command of the 19-th MK and 29-th Tbr, the Germans began to withdraw their troops from the city. Thus, initially the parade was, in fact, a solemn procedure for the withdrawal of German units from Brest. It remains to answer two questions: was this action a parade and what role was assigned to it by the Soviet troops?
In the Charter of the infantry 1938 g. To the parade apply rather stringent requirements.
Of course, none of this was observed in Brest. At least there is no evidence of this. But there is evidence to the contrary. In his memoirs, Krivoshein writes that Guderian agreed to the following procedure for withdrawing troops: “At 16 hours, parts of your corps in a marching column, with standards in front, leave the city, my units, also in a marching column, enter the city, stop on the streets, German shelves are passing by, and they salute with their banners to passing parts. Orchestras perform military marches ”[57]. Thus, based on the words of Krivoshein, no parade in the canonical sense of the word in Brest was even close. But let's not be formalists. Suppose that a joint parade can be considered any joint event, during which two commanders receive the parade of the troops of both armies passing by. However, even with such a loose interpretation of the term “parade” with the identification of an event in Brest, problems arise precisely as a parade. It follows from the above quotation of Krivoshein that there was no joint passage of troops along the same street. Kombrig clearly says that the parts should not intersect. In the memoirs of Guderian, there is also a mention of the events in Brest: “Our stay in Brest ended with a farewell parade and a ceremony with the exchange of flags in the presence of the brigade commander Krivoshein” [58]. As we see, the general also did not say a word about participation in the parade of Soviet troops. Moreover, it does not even follow from this phrase that Krivoshein somehow participated in the parade. Rather, he was next to Guderian as an observer, which is quite consistent with the purpose of the presence of the brigade commander at all this event - monitoring the withdrawal of German troops. Indeed, it is completely incomprehensible on what grounds Krivoshein is so persistently trying to write to the host parade. No ceremonial accompanying this post was not observed, and the fact of the presence of the brigade commander during the passage of the German troops says nothing. In the end, at the parade in honor of Victory Day, too, there are many foreign delegations in the crowd, however, to name them, oddly enough, does not occur to anyone. But back to the Soviet parts. The historian O.V. Vishlev, citing the German edition of the “Great German March against Poland” 1939 of the issue, again asserts that there was no joint parade. First German troops left the city, then Soviet [59] entered. Thus, we do not have a single written source that would tell us about the joint passage of Soviet and German troops through the streets of Brest.
Now we turn to the documentary sources. Of all the photographs taken by 22 in September in Brest [60], which the author managed to find, only four captured Soviet troops stationed on the roadways of Brest streets. Let's analyze them in more detail. In photos No. 1 and 2 we see a column of Soviet tanks. However, these photos were taken clearly before the parade: in the place where the stand will stand later (under the flagpole), it is not there; columns of German troops are, and how vigorously the Wehrmacht fighters twist their heads around, clearly shows that they are not even in readiness for the solemn march. The fact of the presence in the city of some Soviet units is completely understandable: Krivoshein, naturally, came to Guderian not in proud solitude, but accompanied, probably, by headquarters and guards or, if you like, an honorary escort. Apparently, the arrival of this escort we see in these photos. In the photo number 3 we again see the Soviet tank column, but in a completely different place. It also has nothing to do with the parade: there are no German troops on the sides of the road, but locals walking idly - as many as you like. But with the photo number 4 all the more complicated. On it, we finally find at least some attribute of the parade - the German orchestra. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the photograph depicts the parade, again: we cannot see the rostrum, and the musicians, instead of providing the parade participants with musical accompaniment, are inactive. That is, with the same success, the photo could have been taken during the preparation for the parade, but before it began. Viewing newsreels, which today thanks to the World Wide Web is available to anyone who wishes, will also not reveal anything new to us. Frames again with the Soviet tank column (the same) are on two commercials that the author managed to find. However, they didn’t see the parade, but the passage of tanks through the streets of Brest, in which not a single German soldier or command was visible, but there are townspeople welcoming parts of the Red Army. Thus, out of the total amount of cinema and photographic materials, only one photo was taken, possibly, during the participation of Soviet troops in the parade. And perhaps completely at another time, and the Soviet troops there have no relation to the parade - we have no reason to assert this. Simply put, the entire version of the “joint parade” is based on a single photograph, and that one cannot be confidently attributed to the time of the parade. That is, there is no clear evidence of the participation of Soviet troops in the “joint” parade of apologists of the theory of the Soviet-German “brotherhood in arms”. Their opponents also have no evidence to the contrary, however, nobody has yet canceled the ancient formula ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat.
Summarizing, we can say that the fact of holding a joint parade in Brest is unproved. And the most plausible, as it seems to us, picture of what happened in the city looks like this: first Krivoshein arrives in Brest with headquarters and a tank escort column, then the commanders settle all the problems associated with the withdrawal of German troops. After that, probably, Soviet troops enter the city, however they keep their distance from their German colleagues. Parts of the Wehrmacht solemnly pass by the podium with Guderian and Krivoshein. After that, the general gives the combriga a flag and leaves after his corps. Then the Soviet troops finally occupy the city. At least, this version is consistent with all available sources. But the main mistake of historians, who rush to the Brest parade as a written bag, is not even that they are trying to pass off an event as an obvious fact, the reality of which is very doubtful. Their main mistake is that even if this parade really was, this fact in itself does not say anything. In the end, the Russian and American armed forces in our time also organize joint parades [61], but it does not occur to anyone to declare Russia and the United States allies. The joint parade can serve only as an illustration of the thesis about the allied nature of relations between the USSR and Germany in September 1939, but not its evidence. And this thesis is wrong, regardless of whether there was a parade or not.
1 Telegram of the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador in Moscow on 3 in September 1939 // To be announced. USSR - Germany 1939 – 1941. Documents and materials. - M., 2004. C. 89.
2 Telegram of the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador in Moscow on September 8 1939 // Ibid. C. 94.
3 Telegram of the German Ambassador in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany from September 5 1939 // Ibid. C. 90.
4 Diary of the ECCI Secretary-General G. M. Dimitrov // Materials of the site http: // bdsa. ru.
5 Vihavainen T. Foreign aid to Finland // Winter war 1939 – 1940. Book one. Political history. - M., 1999. C. 193.
6 Zefirov, MV. Aces of World War II: Allies of the Luftwaffe: Estonia. Latvia. Finland. - M., 2003. C. 162.
7 Baryshnikov V.N. On the issue of the German military-political assistance to Finland at the beginning of the Winter War // Proceedings of the website http: // www. history. pu. ru.
8 Baryshnikov V.N. On the issue of the German military and political assistance of Finland at the beginning of the Winter War // Proceedings of the website http: // www. history. pu. ru.
9 Telegram of the German Ambassador in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany from September 10 1939 // To be announced. USSR– Germany 1939 – 1941. Documents and materials. C. 95 – 96.
10 Telegram of the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador in Moscow on September 15 1939 // Ibid. C. 101.
11 Telegram of the German Ambassador in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany from September 16 1939 // Ibid. C. 103.
12 Telegram of the German Ambassador in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany from September 14 1939 // Ibid. C. 98
13 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 - M., 2001. C. 251.
14 ibid.
15 Pribilov V. I. “Capture” or “Reunion”. Foreign historians about 17 September 1939 g. // Site materials http: // katynbooks. narod. ru.
16 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 251.
17 ibid.
18 ibid. C. 252.
19 Kotelnikov V. Aviation in the Soviet – Polish conflict // Site materials http: // www. airwiki. or.
20 Poberezhets S. German-Polish War of 1939. // Site materials http: // wartime. narod. ru.
21 Meltyukhov M. I. Decree. cit. C. 266.
22 ibid. C. 261.
23 Profit Century I. Decree. cit.
24 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 291.
25 Halder F. Occupation of Europe. The military diary of the Chief of General Staff. 1939 – 1941. - M., 2007. C. 55.
26 Telegram of the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador in Moscow on 15 in September 1939 // To be announced. USSR - Germany 1939 – 1941. Documents and materials. C. 100 – 101.
27 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 325 – 328.
28 Churchill W. World War II. Prince 1. - M., 1991. C. 204.
29 Nota of the USSR Government, presented on the morning of September 17 1939, to ambassadors and envoys of states having diplomatic relations with the USSR // To be announced. USSR - Germany 1939 – 1941. Documents and materials. C. 107.
30 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 354.
31 World Wars XX century. Prince 4. The Second World War. Documents and materials. - M., 2002. C. 152.
32 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 355.
33 ibid. C. 356.
34 Order No. 005 of the Military Council of the Belarusian Front to the Front Forces on the Entry of the Red Army into the Territory of Western Belorussia on September 16 // Katyn. Prisoners of the undeclared war (materials of the site http: // katynbo oks. Narod. Ru).
35 Directive No. 16633 of the People's Commissar for Defense K. Ye. Voroshilov and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B. M. Shaposhnikov to the Military Council of the Belarusian Special Military District on the start of an offensive against Poland // Ibid.
36 Svishchev VN. Beginning of the Great Patriotic War. T. 1. Preparing Germany and the USSR for war. 2003. C. 194.
37 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 372 – 380.
38 Profit Century I. Decree. cit.
39 Meltyukhov M. I. Stalin's missed chance. Fight for Europe: 1939 – 1941 Documents, facts, judgments. - M., 2008. C. 96.
40 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 363.
41 Fight against Polish occupation in Western Ukraine 1921 – 1939 // Site materials http: // www. hrono. ru; Meltyukhov MI Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 307.
42 Report of the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR, commander 1 of the rank of G. I. Kulik on combat operations of units and formations of the Red Army in Western Ukraine and the political and economic situation in this region // Katyn. Prisoners of undeclared war.
43 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 367.
44 Special report by L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on the results of the operation to evict precipitators and forest guards from the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus // Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKDC-NKGBGUKR "Smersh". 1939 - March 1946 / Stalin's archive. Documents of the highest organs of party and state power. - M., 2006. C. 142.
45 Report of the Drohobych Regional Three of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR to the People's Commissar of the Ukrainian SSR I. A. Serov on the results of the operation to evict the members of families of precipitators and foresters // Stalin deportations. 1928 – 1953. - M., 2005. C. 126.
46 Telegram of the German Ambassador in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany from September 17 1939 // To be announced. USSR– Germany 1939 – 1941. Documents and materials. C. 104.
47 Vishlev O. V. On the eve of June 22 1941. - M., 2001. C. 107.
48 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 320 – 321.
49 Halder F. Decree. cit. C. 58.
50 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 329 – 331.
51 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 337.
52 ibid. C. 338.
53 ibid. C. 340.
54 ibid. C. 360.
55 Report of the USSR People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs V.N. Pavlov to the USSR People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs V.Molotov // Year of the Crisis. 1938 – 1939. Documents and materials (materials site http: // katynbooks. Narod. Ru).
56 Secret Additional Protocol to the German - Soviet Treaty of Friendship and the border between the USSR and Germany // Katyn. Prisoners of undeclared war.
57 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 336.
58 Guderian G. Memories of a Soldier. - M., 2004. C. 113.
59 Vishlev O. V. Decree. cit. C. 109.
60 For a selection of photos and videos about events in Brest, see http: // gezesh. livejournal. com / 25630. html.
61 9 May 2006 The crew of the US Navy destroyer "John McCain" participated in the Victory Parade in Vladivostok, along with Russian sailors.
First of all, it should be noted that, in spite of the common misconception of the USSR, I did not bind myself with any official obligations to enter the war with Poland. Neither the secret agreement to the non-aggression treaty between Germany and the USSR, of course, nothing of the kind was written in the treaty itself. Nevertheless, already 3 September 1939. Ribbentrop sent the German ambassador to the USSR FW Schulenburg to ask Molotov, “would not consider the Soviet Union desirable for the Russian army to act at the right moment against the Polish forces in the Russian sphere of influence and, with On its part, it occupied this territory ”, adding at the same time that it“ would also be in Soviet interests ”[1]. Similar veiled requests from Germany for the entry of Soviet troops into Poland took place later [2]. Molotov, another 5 of September, replied to Schulenburg that “at the appropriate time” of the USSR “it will be absolutely necessary to begin concrete actions” [3], however, the Soviet Union was in no hurry to go over to actions. There were two reasons for this. The first 7 of September was perfectly formulated by Stalin: “The war is on between two groups of capitalist countries (poor and rich against colonies, raw materials, etc.). For the redistribution of the world, for domination of the world! We don't mind a good fight and weaken each other ”[4]. Germany followed a similar course of conduct during the Winter War. Moreover, the Reich at that time also, to the best of its possibilities, trying not to annoy the USSR especially, supported Finland. So, at the very beginning of the war, Berlin sent a party of 20 anti-aircraft guns [5] to the Finns. At the same time, Germany allowed the delivery of Fiat G. 50 [50] fighters from Italy to Finland in transit through its territory. However, after the USSR, which became aware of these shipments, 6 December declared an official protest to Reich, Germany was forced to stop transit through its territory [9], so only two cars managed to get to Finland in this way. And yet, even after that, the Germans found a rather original way of assisting Finland: at the end of 7, Goering’s negotiations with the Swedish representatives led Germany to start selling its weapons to Sweden, and Sweden owed the same amount weapons from Finland to sell [8].
The second reason why the USSR preferred not to force the start of hostilities against Poland was reported to the IDO of the German leadership when, during a conversation with XuNburg 9 in September, Molotov "stated that the Soviet government intended to take advantage of the further advancement of the German troops and declare that Poland was falling apart and that, as a result, the Soviet Union should come to the aid of Ukrainians and Belarusians who are “threatened” by Germany. This excuse will present the intervention of the Soviet Union plausible in the eyes of the masses and give the Soviet Union the opportunity not to look like an aggressor ”[9]. By the way, the further fate of this Soviet excuse for attacking Poland well illustrates how ready the USSR was to make concessions to Germany.
15 September Ribbentrop sent Schulenburg a telegram in which he spoke of the Soviet Union’s intention to present his invasion of Poland as an act of protecting kindred peoples from the German threat: “Specifying the motive of such a class is impossible. It is the exact opposite of real German aspirations, which are limited to exceptionally well-known zones of German influence. It also contradicts the agreements reached in Moscow, and finally, contrary to the desire expressed by both parties to have friendly relations, he will present both states as enemies to the whole world ”[10]. However, when Schulenburg conveyed to Molotov this statement of his boss, he replied that although the pretext planned by the Soviet leadership contained a “hurtful note for the Germans”, the USSR does not see any other reason for sending troops into Poland [11].
Thus, we see that the USSR, on the basis of the above considerations, did not intend to invade Poland until it exhausted its potential to resist Germany. During a regular conversation with Schulenburg on September 14, Molotov said that for the USSR “it would be extremely important not to begin to act before the administrative center of Poland - Warsaw” [12] falls. And it is quite probable that in the case of effective defensive actions of the Polish army against Germany, and even more so in the case of a real, rather than formal, entry into the war of England and France, the Soviet Union would have completely abandoned the idea of joining Western Ukraine and Belarus. However, the allies de facto did not render Poland any help at all, and alone she was not able to offer any tangible resistance to the Wehrmacht.
By the time Soviet troops entered Poland, both the military and civilian Polish authorities had lost any control threads in the country, and the army was disparate, with no connection to the command or to each other, groups of troops of varying degrees of combat capability. By September 17, the Germans reached the line Osovets – Bialystok – Bielsk – Kamenetz-Litovsk – Brest-Litovsk – Wlodawa – Lublin – Vladimir – Volynsky – Zamost – Lviv – Sambir, thus occupying about half of Poland’s territory, occupying Krakow, Lodz, Gdansk , Lublin, Brest, Katowice, Torun. Warsaw has been under siege since September 14. On September 5, President I. Moscitsky left the city, and on September 13, the government [9]. On September 11-16, the Polish leadership negotiated with France for asylum, September 17 - with Romania about transit, and finally left the country on September 14 [8]. However, the decision to evacuate, apparently, was made even earlier, since already on September 15 the US ambassador to Poland, accompanying the Polish government, sent a message to the State Department, which, in particular, stated that “the Polish government is leaving Poland ... and through Romania ... goes to France ”[7]. Commander-in-Chief E. Rydz-Smigly stayed in Warsaw the longest, but he also left the city on the night of September 10, moving to Brest. However, Rydz-Smigly didn’t stop there for a long time either: on September 13 the rate was moved to Vladimir-Volynsky, on the 15th to Mlynov, and on the 16th to Kolomyia near the Romanian border [17]. Of course, the commander in chief could not normally lead the troops in such conditions, and this only exacerbated the chaos that arose as a result of the rapid advance of the Germans and the confusion at the front. The problems with communication were also superimposed on this. So, the headquarters in Brest had a connection with only one of the Polish armies - “Lublin” [XNUMX]. Describing the situation at that moment in the headquarters, the deputy chief of the General Staff, Lt. Col. Yaklich, reported to the Chief of Staff Stakhevich: “We have been constantly searching for troops and expelling officers to restore communications ... With the internal organization in Brest Fortress, there’s a big booth that I must liquidate myself. Constant raids aviation. In Brest, flight in all directions ”[18]. However, not only the leadership left the country: on September 16, the evacuation of Polish aircraft to Romanian airfields began [19]. The most efficient Polish ships fleet: the destroyers Blyskawica, Grom, and Burza were relocated to English ports on August 30, 1939. Initially, they were supposed to act as raiders on German communications, disrupting German merchant shipping [20], but any Polish ships did not achieve success in this matter, and their absence in the ports of Poland negatively affected the combat effectiveness of the Polish fleet. On the other hand, it was the basing in Britain that saved these destroyers from the fate of the rest of the Polish fleet and made it possible to continue the struggle with the Germans as part of the Naval Forces after the defeat of Poland. During its only major counter-attack on the river. Bzure, which began on September 9, the Polish troops in the armies of Poznan and Pomozhe already lost the initiative by September 12, and were surrounded by German troops on September 14 [21]. And although some parts of the encircled armies continued to resist until September 21, they could no longer influence the outcome of the war. In the face of Poland’s apparent inability to defend its western borders, on September 10, the General Staff issued a directive according to which the main task of the army was “pulling together all troops in the direction of Eastern Poland and ensuring connection with Romania” [22]. Characteristically, this directive was the last combined-arms order of the commander in chief, however, not all of them received it all because of the same problems with communications. After this order was issued, Rydz-Smigly himself, as mentioned above, left Brest and moved just in the direction indicated in the directive - closer to Romania.
Thus, in view of the effective actions of the Germans, the disorganization of the army and the inability of the leadership to organize the defense of the state, by September 17 the defeat of Poland was absolutely inevitable.
Photo # 1
Photo # 2
It is significant that even the English and French general staffs in the report prepared by 22 September noted that the USSR began the invasion of Poland only when its final defeat became apparent [23].
The reader may ask: has the Soviet leadership had the opportunity to wait for the complete collapse of Poland? The fall of Warsaw, the final defeat of even the remnants of the army, and perhaps completely complete occupation of the entire Polish territory by the Wehrmacht, followed by the return of Western Ukraine and Belarus to the Soviet Union in accordance with the Soviet-German agreements? Unfortunately, the USSR had no such possibility. If Germany really occupied the eastern regions of Poland, the likelihood that it would return them to the Soviet Union was extremely small. The leadership of the Reich until mid-September 1939 discussed the possibility of creating puppet governments [24] in the territories of Western Ukraine and Belarus. In the diary of the OKH chief of staff, F. Halder, in the recording of September 12 there is such a passage: “The commander-in-chief arrived from a meeting with the Fuhrer. Perhaps the Russians will not interfere in anything. The Fuhrer wants to create the state of Ukraine ”[25]. It was the prospect of the emergence of new territorial formations in the east of Poland, which Germany was trying to intimidate the Soviet leadership in order to speed up the entry of Soviet troops into Poland. So, September 15 Ribbentrop asked Schulenburg to “immediately pass on to Mr. Molotov” that “if Russian intervention is not launched, the question will inevitably arise whether there is a political vacuum in the area to the east of the German zone of influence. Since we, for our part, do not intend to take any actions of a political or administrative nature in these areas, standing apart from the necessary military operations, without such intervention by the Soviet Union [in Eastern Poland], conditions may arise for the formation of new states ”[ 26].
Photo # 3
Photo # 4
Although, as can be seen from this instruction, Germany, of course, denied its participation in the possible creation of “independent” states in Eastern Poland, it must be assumed that the Soviet leadership did not harbor any illusions on this score. However, even despite the timely intervention of the USSR in the German-Polish war, certain problems due to the fact that the German troops managed to take part of Western Ukraine to 17 September, still arose: September 18 deputy chief of staff of the OCW operational management V. Warlimont showed the acting military attache of the USSR in Germany to Belyakov a map on which Lviv was located west of the demarcation line between the USSR and Germany, that is, entered the future territory of the Reich, which was a violation of the secret additional protocol to the Non-Aggression Treaty regarding the division of spheres of influence in Poland. After claims by the USSR, the Germans stated that all the Soviet-German agreements remained in force, and the German military attache Kestring, trying to explain this drawing of the border, referred to the fact that it was a personal initiative of Warlimont [27], but it seems unlikely that the latter drew maps based on some of his own considerations that run counter to the instructions of the Reich leadership. It is indicative that the need for a Soviet invasion of Poland was also recognized in the West. Churchill, who was then the first Lord of the Admiralty, said in an address on radio on October 1 that “Russia is pursuing a cold policy of its own interests. We would prefer the Russian armies to stand in their current positions as friends and allies of Poland, and not as invaders. But to protect Russia from the Nazi threat, it was clearly necessary for the Russian armies to stand on this line. In any case, this line exists and, therefore, the Eastern Front has been created, which Nazi Germany will not dare to attack ”[28]. The position of the Allies on the question of the entry of the Red Army into Poland is generally interesting. After the USSR 17 September declared its neutrality towards France and England [29], these countries also decided not to aggravate relations with Moscow. On September 18, at a meeting of the English government, it was decided not even to protest against the actions of the Soviet Union, since Britain was pledged to defend Poland only from Germany [30]. September 23 Commissar of Internal Affairs L. AP Beria informed the People's Commissar of Defense K. Е. Voroshilov stating that “a resident of the USSR NKVD in London reported that on September 20 p. Mr. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of England sent a telegram to all British embassies and press attaches, in which it indicates that England not only does not intend to declare war on the Soviet Union now, but should remain in the best possible way ”[31]. And on October 17, the British declared that London wanted to see a modest-sized ethnographic Poland and that the return of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus is out of the question [32]. Thus, the Allies, in essence, legitimized the actions of the Soviet Union in Poland. And although the motive of such flexibility in England and France was primarily their unwillingness to provoke a rapprochement between the USSR and Germany, the fact that the allies chose such a course of conduct indicates that they understood how tense relations between the Soviet Union still remain and the Reich and that the August agreement - just a tactical maneuver. In addition to political overtures, Britain also tried to establish trade relations with the USSR: On October 11, at the Soviet-British negotiations, it was decided to resume deliveries of Soviet forests to Britain, which were suspended due to the fact that after the start of the war, Britain began to delay Soviet vessels with cargo for Germany.
Summing up the interim results, we can note that at the beginning of September the Soviet Union was not only eager to help Germany in any way to fight the Polish Army, but also deliberately delayed the start of the “liberation campaign” until the moment when complete defeat Poland became quite obvious, and further delay with the introduction of Soviet troops could end up in that Western Ukraine and Western Belarus in one form or another would fall under the influence of Germany.
And now let's proceed to the consideration of the details of the interaction of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. So, on September 17, the Soviet forces were Ukrainian forces (commanded by the commander of 1 rank S. TO. Tymoshenko) and Belarusian (under the command of the commander of 2 rank M. AP Kovalev) fronts invaded the eastern parts of Poland. By the way, it is interesting that, although the liberation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus was only a pretext for the entry of Soviet troops into Poland, the Soviet troops mostly treated the people of these territories as liberators. In the order of the Military Council of the Belorussian Front, the troops of the front about the goals of the Red Army’s entry into the territory of Western Belarus from September 16 emphasized that “our revolutionary duty and duty is to render urgent assistance and support to our brothers Belarusians and Ukrainians in order to save them from the threat of devastation and beating from enemies ... We are not going as conquerors, but as liberators of our brothers Belarusians, Ukrainians and workers of Poland ”[34]. By the directive of Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov, the Military Council of BNO of 14 September was instructed to “avoid bombarding open cities and towns not occupied by large enemy forces” and not to allow “no requisitioning and unauthorized preparation of food and fodder in occupied areas” [35]. In the directive of the head of the Political Directorate of the Red Army army commissioner 1-rank L. 3. Mehlis was reminded “of the strictest responsibility for looting under martial law. The commissars, political instructors and the commander, in parts of which at least one shameful fact will be admitted, will be severely punished, up to giving the Military Tribunal to the court ”[36]. The fact that this order was not an empty threat is well illustrated by the fact that during the war and after its termination, the Military Tribunal issued several dozen war crimes convictions, which, unfortunately, did take place during the Polish campaign. [37]. Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army V. Stakhevich noted: “Soviet soldiers do not shoot at ours, in every possible way demonstrate their position” [38]. Partly because of this attitude of the Red Army, Polish troops very often did not resist her, surrendering to captivity. It was this result that ended most of the clashes of the units of the Red Army and the Polish Army. An excellent illustration of this fact is the ratio of soldiers and officers of the Polish troops who were killed in battles with the Red Army and captured by the Red Army: if the former numbers just 3500 people, then the latter are 452 500 [39]. The Polish population was also quite loyal to the Red Army: “As evidenced by documents from, for example, the 87 Infantry Division,“ in all the localities where parts of our division passed, the working population met them with great joy, as genuine liberators from the oppression of Polish lords and capitalists as deliverers from poverty and hunger. " We see the same in the materials of the 45 th infantry division: “The population is happy everywhere and meets the Red Army as a liberator. A peasant from the village of Ostrozhets Sidorenko said: “Soviet power would have been established sooner, otherwise Polish nurses sat on our necks for 20 for years, sucking the last of us out of blood, and now the time has finally come when the Red Army has freed us. Thank you comrade. To Stalin for the liberation of Polish landlords and capitalists from bondage ”[40]. Moreover, the dislike of the Belarusian and Ukrainian population towards the “Polish landowners and capitalists” was expressed not only in a benevolent attitude towards Soviet troops, but also in open anti-Polish uprisings in September 1939. [41]. September 21 Deputy Defense Commander X. NUMX commander - rank G. AND. Kulik reported to Stalin: “In connection with the great national oppression of Ukrainians by the Poles, the latter have a lot of patience and, in some cases, there is a fight between Ukrainians and Poles, even threatening to cut out the Poles. An urgent appeal of the government to the population is necessary, as this can turn into a big political factor ”[42]. And Mehlis, in his report on September 20, indicated such an interesting fact: “Polish officers ... fear Ukrainian peasants and the population, who became more active with the arrival of the Red Army and deal with Polish officers, as fire. It got to the point that in Burshtyn, Polish officers sent by the corps to school and guarded by a minor guard asked to increase the number of guards as prisoners, fighters, in order to avoid possible reprisals against the population ”[43]. Thus, the Red Army carried out peacekeeping functions in a certain sense in the territories of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. However, even after these regions joined the USSR, their Belarusian and Ukrainian population did not change their attitude towards the Poles, although this began to manifest itself in a slightly different form. For example, during the eviction from the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus, precipitators and forest guards in February 1940. the local population of these regions received this decision of the Soviet government with great enthusiasm. Beria Stalin’s special report on this matter states that “the population of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR and the Byelorussian SSR react positively to the evictions of forest guards and forest guards. In a number of cases, local residents provided assistance to the operational groups of the NKVD [44] in the detention of escaped osadadniki. The same, but a little more detail, is also stated in the report of the Drohobych regional trio of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR about the same events: “The eviction of osadnik and workers of the guard of the forests by the majority of the peasants of the region. I was happy to be approved and fully supported, which is eloquently indicated by the fact that a large number of rural assets participated in the operation (3285 people). ) ”[45]. Thus, at least part of the population rejection of Western Ukraine and Belarus from Poland was really perceived as liberation. But let us go back to examining the peculiarities of the Soviet-German interaction, which began with the fact that at two o'clock in the morning 17 September Stalin summoned Schulenburg, announced the introduction of Soviet troops in Poland and asked "not to fly the German planes from now on east of the Bialystok - Brest-Litovsk - Lemberg [Lviv] line. Soviet aircraft will begin bombing the area east of Lemberg today [46]. The request of the German military attache to Lieutenant-General Kestring about the postponement of the hostilities of the Soviet aviation, so that the German command could take measures to prevent the incidents involving the bombardment of the areas occupied by the Wehrmacht, remained unsatisfied. As a result, some German units were hit by Soviet aviation [47]. And in the future, the most striking episodes of the Soviet-German relationship were not joint actions to destroy the remnants of the Polish troops, as the Allies should have been, but similar excesses that led to casualties on both sides. The most notable such incident was the clash of Soviet and German troops in Lviv. tank brigades. The reconnaissance battalion of the 24th battalion was introduced into the city. However, at 8 in the morning, units of the 30nd German Mountain Infantry Division stormed the city, and the Soviet battalion was attacked, despite the fact that initially it did not show any aggression. The brigade commander even sent an armored vehicle with a piece of a lower shirt on a stick towards the Germans, but the Germans did not cease fire. Then the tanks and armored vehicles of the brigade returned fire. As a result of the ensuing battle, Soviet troops lost 2 armored vehicles and 2 tank, 1 people killed and 3 wounded. The losses of the Germans amounted to 4 anti-tank guns, 3 people killed and 3 wounded. Soon, the shooting was stopped and a representative of the German division was sent to Soviet troops. As a result of negotiations, the incident was resolved [9]. However, despite the relatively peaceful resolution of this conflict, the question arose of what to do with Lviv. On the morning of September 48, the German leadership through Kestring transmitted to Moscow a proposal to take the city together, and then transfer it to the USSR, but, having been refused, was forced to issue an order to withdraw its troops. The German command took the decision as “a day of humiliation for the German political leadership” [20]. In order to avoid similar incidents on September 49, a protocol was drawn up at the talks between Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov with Kestring and representatives of the German command, Colonel G. Aschenbrenner and Lieutenant Colonel G. Krebs, regulating the advance of Soviet troops to the demarcation line and the withdrawal of units of the Wehrmacht from Soviet territory occupied by them.
Ҥ 1. The Red Army units remain on the line reached by 20 on the 20 September 1939 of the year, and continue their movement westward with the dawn of the 23 September 1939 on the year.
§ 2. Parts of the German Army, starting from September 22, are retracted so that, by making every day a journey of about 20 kilometers, finish their retreat to the west bank of the river. The Vistula near Warsaw in the evening of October 3 and Demblin in the evening of October 2; on the west bank. Piss by the evening of September 27, p. Narew, in Ostroleka, in the evening of September 29 and in Pultusk in the evening of October 1; on the west bank. San, near Przemysl, in the evening of September 26 and to the west bank of the r. San, at Sanok and south, in the evening of September 28.
§ 3. The movement of the troops of both armies must be organized in such a way that there is a distance between the advance units of the Red Army columns and the tail of the German Army columns, on average, up to 25 kilometers.
Both sides organize their movement in such a way that by the evening the Red Army units take to the east coast of the river 28 September. Pissa; by the evening of September 30 on the east bank of the r. Narev at Ostroleka and by the evening of October 2 at Pultusk; on the east bank. Wisla at Warsaw in the evening of October 4 and at Deblin in the evening of October 3; on the east bank. San near Przemysl towards the evening of September 27 and to the east bank of the r. San y Sanok and south to the evening of 29 September.
§ 4. All questions that may arise during the transfer of areas, points, cities, etc. to the German Army and the Red Army reception are resolved by representatives of both sides in place, for which special delegates are allocated on each main highway of movement of both armies.
In order to avoid possible provocations, sabotage from Polish gangs, etc. The German command takes necessary measures in cities and places that are transferred to the Red Army units, to their safety, and special attention is paid to the fact that cities, towns and important military defensive and household structures (bridges, airfields, barracks, warehouses, railway junctions, railway stations, telegraph, telephone, power plants, rolling stock, etc.), both in them and on the way to them, would be saved from damage and destruction before transfer and x representatives of the Red Army.
§ 5. When the German representatives appeal to the Red Army Command to assist in the destruction of Polish units or gangs standing in the way of small units of the German forces, the Red Army Command (chiefs of columns), if necessary, select the necessary forces to ensure the destruction of the obstacles on the way of movement.
§ 6. When German troops move to the west, German Army aircraft can fly only to the rearguard line of German troops and at an altitude not higher than 500 meters; Red Army aircraft can only fly to the avant-garde lines of Red Army columns and at an altitude not higher 500 meters. By the occupation by both armies of the main demarcation line for pp. Pissa, Narev, Vistula, r. San from the mouth to the origins of aviation of both armies does not fly over the above line "
[50]. § 2. Parts of the German Army, starting from September 22, are retracted so that, by making every day a journey of about 20 kilometers, finish their retreat to the west bank of the river. The Vistula near Warsaw in the evening of October 3 and Demblin in the evening of October 2; on the west bank. Piss by the evening of September 27, p. Narew, in Ostroleka, in the evening of September 29 and in Pultusk in the evening of October 1; on the west bank. San, near Przemysl, in the evening of September 26 and to the west bank of the r. San, at Sanok and south, in the evening of September 28.
§ 3. The movement of the troops of both armies must be organized in such a way that there is a distance between the advance units of the Red Army columns and the tail of the German Army columns, on average, up to 25 kilometers.
Both sides organize their movement in such a way that by the evening the Red Army units take to the east coast of the river 28 September. Pissa; by the evening of September 30 on the east bank of the r. Narev at Ostroleka and by the evening of October 2 at Pultusk; on the east bank. Wisla at Warsaw in the evening of October 4 and at Deblin in the evening of October 3; on the east bank. San near Przemysl towards the evening of September 27 and to the east bank of the r. San y Sanok and south to the evening of 29 September.
§ 4. All questions that may arise during the transfer of areas, points, cities, etc. to the German Army and the Red Army reception are resolved by representatives of both sides in place, for which special delegates are allocated on each main highway of movement of both armies.
In order to avoid possible provocations, sabotage from Polish gangs, etc. The German command takes necessary measures in cities and places that are transferred to the Red Army units, to their safety, and special attention is paid to the fact that cities, towns and important military defensive and household structures (bridges, airfields, barracks, warehouses, railway junctions, railway stations, telegraph, telephone, power plants, rolling stock, etc.), both in them and on the way to them, would be saved from damage and destruction before transfer and x representatives of the Red Army.
§ 5. When the German representatives appeal to the Red Army Command to assist in the destruction of Polish units or gangs standing in the way of small units of the German forces, the Red Army Command (chiefs of columns), if necessary, select the necessary forces to ensure the destruction of the obstacles on the way of movement.
§ 6. When German troops move to the west, German Army aircraft can fly only to the rearguard line of German troops and at an altitude not higher than 500 meters; Red Army aircraft can only fly to the avant-garde lines of Red Army columns and at an altitude not higher 500 meters. By the occupation by both armies of the main demarcation line for pp. Pissa, Narev, Vistula, r. San from the mouth to the origins of aviation of both armies does not fly over the above line "
As we see, all measures were taken to ensure that the Red Army and the Wehrmacht didn’t come into contact with each other during the actions in Poland - what kind of cooperation there is. However, it is for cooperation that the 4 and 5 points of this protocol are sometimes attempted to give out, although in general there is nothing special about them. The German side merely undertakes to return to the USSR intact the objects that already belong to it, since they are located on the territory departing according to the secret additional protocol to the Soviet Union. As for the Soviet obligation to assist small German units in the event that the remnants of the Polish troops interfere with their advancement, it is not the USSR’s desire to cooperate with the Wehrmacht, but the unwillingness to have any contacts with it. The Soviet leadership wanted so much as quickly as possible to send the German troops out of its territory, that it was even ready to escort them to the demarcation line.
However, even this protocol, which seemed to minimize the possibility of clashes between the Soviet and German parts, could not prevent further conflicts between them. On September 23, at Vidomlya, the reconnaissance rifle squad 8 was fired at 6 German machine guns, killing 2 man and injuring 2. Soviet troops returned fire with a single tank, whose crew was killed [51]. September 29 in the area of Vohyn 3 German armored vehicles opened fire on the demining battalion 143-sd [52]. On September 30 in 42 km east of Lublin, the 1 th battalion of the 146 spy 179 th ran 44 sd. Eight people were injured [53].
On October 1, regular negotiations were held between Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov, on the one hand, and Kestring, Ashenbrennrom and Krebs, on the other, on the withdrawal of German and Soviet troops to the final border, which was defined by the Soviet-German Treaty on Friendship and the Border on September 10. Regarding measures to prevent collisions between the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, the new decision of the contracting parties generally repeated the protocol of September 21, but to avoid incidents like the September 30 that happened, the following item appeared in the protocol: “With the withdrawal of the Red Army, the Red Army can only fly to the line the rearguard of the columns of the Red Army and at a height not higher than 500 meters, the German Army aviation, when moving to the east of the German Army columns, can only fly to the vanguard line of the German Army columns and at a height not higher than 500 meters ”[54]. So, as we can see, the numerous agreements and consultations that really took place in Soviet-German relations, starting from 17 September, were not aimed at coordinating joint actions of the Soviet and German forces to combat the remnants of the Polish formations, as befits allies , but only on the settlement of various conflicts that have arisen as a result of the collision of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht, and on the prevention of new conflicts. It seems quite obvious that in order to prevent the escalation of minor clashes to the size of a real conflict, any states had to act this way. And the measures taken by the Soviet Union and Germany speak not about the allied nature of their interaction. On the contrary, the very fact that these measures had to be taken, and the form in which it was done, perfectly demonstrate to us that the main goal of the parties was primarily to delineate the zones of action of their armies, and to prevent any contacts between them. The author managed to find only two examples that can truly be described as cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany. First, September 1 Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Pavlov conveyed to Molotov the request of the adviser to the German embassy in Moscow G. Hilger said that in Minsk, in his free time, the radio station transmitted for urgent aeronautical experiments a continuous line with interspersed call signs: “Richard Wilhelm 1. O ”, and besides, when the program is being broadcast, the word“ Minsk ”is often used. From resolution B. М. Molotov on the document follows that it was agreed to transmit only the word “Minsk” [55]. Thus, the Luftwaffe could use the Minsk station as a beacon. However, this decision of the Soviet leadership is quite understandable. After all, any mistake of the German pilots operating near the Soviet territory could lead to all sorts of undesirable consequences: from clashes with Soviet fighters to bombing Soviet territory. Therefore, the consent of the Soviet leadership to provide the Germans with an extra reference point is again caused by the desire to prevent possible incidents. The second case is the mutual obligation of Germany and the USSR not to allow “no Polish agitation in their territories that acts on the territory of another country” [56]. However, it is quite obvious that, on the basis of only two of these facts, it is quite problematic to draw far-reaching conclusions about the Soviet-German "brotherhood in arms".
So, summing up, we can draw the following conclusions. In the course of the German-Polish war, the Soviet Union did not intend to render any assistance to Germany. The entry of Soviet troops into Polish territory pursued exclusively Soviet interests and was caused not by the desire to help Germany in any way with the defeat of the Polish army, whose combat capability by that time already uncontrollably sought to zero, namely the unwillingness to transfer the entire territory of Poland to Germany . In the course of the “liberation campaign”, the Soviet and German troops did not conduct any joint operations and did not practice any other forms of cooperation, and there were local conflicts between separate units of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht. All Soviet-German cooperation, in fact, was aimed precisely at resolving such conflicts and creating the previously non-existent Soviet-German border as painlessly as possible. Thus, the allegations that during the Polish campaign the USSR was an ally of Germany are nothing more than insinuations that have little to do with the realities of the Soviet-German relations of that period.
In the context of the discussion of the Soviet-German cooperation, another episode is of interest, which, oddly enough, many publicists serve as the main argument in proving that parts of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht in 1939 entered Poland as allies. This is, of course, the “joint Soviet-German parade”, held in Brest on September 22. Alas, most often the mentions of this parade are not accompanied by any details, as if this is a completely obvious fact known to every reader. However, publicists can be understood: after all, if you start to understand the details of the Brest parade, then the idyllic picture of the Soviet-German brotherhood in arms deteriorates somewhat and everything that happened in Brest does not look as clear as many would like. But first things first…
On September 14, units of the German 19 motorized corps under the command of the general of the tank troops G. Guderian occupied Brest. The garrison of the city, headed by General K. Plisovsky, took refuge in the fortress, but on September 17 it was taken. And on September 22, the 29-I tank tank brigade of SM Krivosheina approached the city. Since Brest was in the Soviet sphere of influence, after negotiations between the command of the 19-th MK and 29-th Tbr, the Germans began to withdraw their troops from the city. Thus, initially the parade was, in fact, a solemn procedure for the withdrawal of German units from Brest. It remains to answer two questions: was this action a parade and what role was assigned to it by the Soviet troops?
In the Charter of the infantry 1938 g. To the parade apply rather stringent requirements.
“229. For command of the troops being displayed at the parade, the commander of the parade is appointed, who in advance gives the necessary instructions to the troops.
...
233. Each individual part participating in the parade sends to the commander of the linear parade, under the command of the commander, from the calculation: from the company - 4 linear, from the squadron, battery - to 2 linear, from motor-mechanized parts - each time according to the special instructions of the parade commander . On the bayonet of a linear rifle, denoting the flank of the part, there must be a flag the size of 20 x 15 cm, the colors of the buttonholes of a kind of troops.
234. The troops arrive at the place of the parade according to the order of the garrison and are built at the places designated by linear, after which the linear ones fall into place, left in the back rank of the unit.
...
236. Military units are built into the line of battalions; each battalion is in line with the mouth; in battalions - authorized intervals and distances; between battalions the interval in 5 m. The commander of the unit is on the right flank of his unit; in the back of his head - the chief of staff; next and to the left of the commander is the military commissar of the unit; to the left of the military commissar is the orchestra, which is equal to its first rank in the second rank of the right-flank company. To the left of the orchestra, two steps in the same line, is Assistant No. 1, the denominator and Assistant No. 2, which are equal in the first rank of a right-flank company. The commander of the head battalion is two steps to the left of Assistant No. 2. The rest of the commanders are in their places.
239. Troops at the site of the parade, before the arrival of the host parade, welcome:
a) military units - commanders of their units;
b) all troops of the parade - the commander of the parade and the commander of the garrison.
To greet, the command is given: “At attention, alignment to the right (left, middle)”; orchestras do not play.
240. The host parade arrives at the right flank of the parade. When approaching it to the troops on 110 – 150, the parade commander issues the command: “Parade, quietly, alignment to the right (left, in the middle)”. The command is repeated by all commanders, starting from the commanders of individual units and above. For this command:
a) the troops take the position "quietly" and turn their heads in the direction of alignment;
b) the entire command and commanding composition, starting with the platoon commanders and above, puts a hand to the headdress;
c) orchestras play “Counter march”;
d) the parade commander comes up with a report to the host parade.
When the host parade on horseback, the parade commander meets him on horseback too, holding the sword “high” and dropping it at the report.
During the report of the parade commander, the orchestra stops the game. After the report, the parade commander gives the host to the parade a note on the composition of the troops withdrawn to the parade.
When the host of the parade starts moving, the orchestra of the head part begins to play “Counter march” and stops playing for the duration of the greeting of the part and the response to the greeting.
241. To the greeting of the host of the parade, the units reply: “Hello”, and to the greeting, “Hooray.”
242. When the host parade proceeds to the head unit of the next separate unit, the orchestra stops playing, and the new orchestra starts playing.
243. At the end of the detour, the parade commander issues a command to the parade’s host: “Parade is FREE”.
All commanders, starting with the platoon commander, go out and stand in front of the middle front of their units: platoon commanders - in P / 2 m, company commanders - in 3 m, battalion commanders - in 6 m, unit commanders - In 12 m. The military commissars become close and to the left of the commanders who have come forward.
...
245. For the passage of troops in a solemn march, the commander of the parade gives the command: “Parade, quietly! To the solemn march, on so many linear distances, porotno (battalion), alignment to the right, the first company (battalion) is straight, the rest is direct, in ple-CHO, in steps - MARSH ”.
All commanders of individual units repeat commands, except for the first - “Parade, attention”.
246. At the command "To the solemn march," the commanders of the units and formations with the military commissars go over and stand in front of the middle of the front of the head battalion; behind them in 2 m the chiefs of staff become, and behind the chiefs of staff in 2 m - the denominators with assistants; the linear ones run out of order and occupy the places indicated by them to designate the line of movement of troops by a solemn march; the orchestras of all the individual parts break down their parts and stand against the host parade, no closer than 8 m from the left flank of the troops marching in. "
...
233. Each individual part participating in the parade sends to the commander of the linear parade, under the command of the commander, from the calculation: from the company - 4 linear, from the squadron, battery - to 2 linear, from motor-mechanized parts - each time according to the special instructions of the parade commander . On the bayonet of a linear rifle, denoting the flank of the part, there must be a flag the size of 20 x 15 cm, the colors of the buttonholes of a kind of troops.
234. The troops arrive at the place of the parade according to the order of the garrison and are built at the places designated by linear, after which the linear ones fall into place, left in the back rank of the unit.
...
236. Military units are built into the line of battalions; each battalion is in line with the mouth; in battalions - authorized intervals and distances; between battalions the interval in 5 m. The commander of the unit is on the right flank of his unit; in the back of his head - the chief of staff; next and to the left of the commander is the military commissar of the unit; to the left of the military commissar is the orchestra, which is equal to its first rank in the second rank of the right-flank company. To the left of the orchestra, two steps in the same line, is Assistant No. 1, the denominator and Assistant No. 2, which are equal in the first rank of a right-flank company. The commander of the head battalion is two steps to the left of Assistant No. 2. The rest of the commanders are in their places.
239. Troops at the site of the parade, before the arrival of the host parade, welcome:
a) military units - commanders of their units;
b) all troops of the parade - the commander of the parade and the commander of the garrison.
To greet, the command is given: “At attention, alignment to the right (left, middle)”; orchestras do not play.
240. The host parade arrives at the right flank of the parade. When approaching it to the troops on 110 – 150, the parade commander issues the command: “Parade, quietly, alignment to the right (left, in the middle)”. The command is repeated by all commanders, starting from the commanders of individual units and above. For this command:
a) the troops take the position "quietly" and turn their heads in the direction of alignment;
b) the entire command and commanding composition, starting with the platoon commanders and above, puts a hand to the headdress;
c) orchestras play “Counter march”;
d) the parade commander comes up with a report to the host parade.
When the host parade on horseback, the parade commander meets him on horseback too, holding the sword “high” and dropping it at the report.
During the report of the parade commander, the orchestra stops the game. After the report, the parade commander gives the host to the parade a note on the composition of the troops withdrawn to the parade.
When the host of the parade starts moving, the orchestra of the head part begins to play “Counter march” and stops playing for the duration of the greeting of the part and the response to the greeting.
241. To the greeting of the host of the parade, the units reply: “Hello”, and to the greeting, “Hooray.”
242. When the host parade proceeds to the head unit of the next separate unit, the orchestra stops playing, and the new orchestra starts playing.
243. At the end of the detour, the parade commander issues a command to the parade’s host: “Parade is FREE”.
All commanders, starting with the platoon commander, go out and stand in front of the middle front of their units: platoon commanders - in P / 2 m, company commanders - in 3 m, battalion commanders - in 6 m, unit commanders - In 12 m. The military commissars become close and to the left of the commanders who have come forward.
...
245. For the passage of troops in a solemn march, the commander of the parade gives the command: “Parade, quietly! To the solemn march, on so many linear distances, porotno (battalion), alignment to the right, the first company (battalion) is straight, the rest is direct, in ple-CHO, in steps - MARSH ”.
All commanders of individual units repeat commands, except for the first - “Parade, attention”.
246. At the command "To the solemn march," the commanders of the units and formations with the military commissars go over and stand in front of the middle of the front of the head battalion; behind them in 2 m the chiefs of staff become, and behind the chiefs of staff in 2 m - the denominators with assistants; the linear ones run out of order and occupy the places indicated by them to designate the line of movement of troops by a solemn march; the orchestras of all the individual parts break down their parts and stand against the host parade, no closer than 8 m from the left flank of the troops marching in. "
Of course, none of this was observed in Brest. At least there is no evidence of this. But there is evidence to the contrary. In his memoirs, Krivoshein writes that Guderian agreed to the following procedure for withdrawing troops: “At 16 hours, parts of your corps in a marching column, with standards in front, leave the city, my units, also in a marching column, enter the city, stop on the streets, German shelves are passing by, and they salute with their banners to passing parts. Orchestras perform military marches ”[57]. Thus, based on the words of Krivoshein, no parade in the canonical sense of the word in Brest was even close. But let's not be formalists. Suppose that a joint parade can be considered any joint event, during which two commanders receive the parade of the troops of both armies passing by. However, even with such a loose interpretation of the term “parade” with the identification of an event in Brest, problems arise precisely as a parade. It follows from the above quotation of Krivoshein that there was no joint passage of troops along the same street. Kombrig clearly says that the parts should not intersect. In the memoirs of Guderian, there is also a mention of the events in Brest: “Our stay in Brest ended with a farewell parade and a ceremony with the exchange of flags in the presence of the brigade commander Krivoshein” [58]. As we see, the general also did not say a word about participation in the parade of Soviet troops. Moreover, it does not even follow from this phrase that Krivoshein somehow participated in the parade. Rather, he was next to Guderian as an observer, which is quite consistent with the purpose of the presence of the brigade commander at all this event - monitoring the withdrawal of German troops. Indeed, it is completely incomprehensible on what grounds Krivoshein is so persistently trying to write to the host parade. No ceremonial accompanying this post was not observed, and the fact of the presence of the brigade commander during the passage of the German troops says nothing. In the end, at the parade in honor of Victory Day, too, there are many foreign delegations in the crowd, however, to name them, oddly enough, does not occur to anyone. But back to the Soviet parts. The historian O.V. Vishlev, citing the German edition of the “Great German March against Poland” 1939 of the issue, again asserts that there was no joint parade. First German troops left the city, then Soviet [59] entered. Thus, we do not have a single written source that would tell us about the joint passage of Soviet and German troops through the streets of Brest.
Now we turn to the documentary sources. Of all the photographs taken by 22 in September in Brest [60], which the author managed to find, only four captured Soviet troops stationed on the roadways of Brest streets. Let's analyze them in more detail. In photos No. 1 and 2 we see a column of Soviet tanks. However, these photos were taken clearly before the parade: in the place where the stand will stand later (under the flagpole), it is not there; columns of German troops are, and how vigorously the Wehrmacht fighters twist their heads around, clearly shows that they are not even in readiness for the solemn march. The fact of the presence in the city of some Soviet units is completely understandable: Krivoshein, naturally, came to Guderian not in proud solitude, but accompanied, probably, by headquarters and guards or, if you like, an honorary escort. Apparently, the arrival of this escort we see in these photos. In the photo number 3 we again see the Soviet tank column, but in a completely different place. It also has nothing to do with the parade: there are no German troops on the sides of the road, but locals walking idly - as many as you like. But with the photo number 4 all the more complicated. On it, we finally find at least some attribute of the parade - the German orchestra. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the photograph depicts the parade, again: we cannot see the rostrum, and the musicians, instead of providing the parade participants with musical accompaniment, are inactive. That is, with the same success, the photo could have been taken during the preparation for the parade, but before it began. Viewing newsreels, which today thanks to the World Wide Web is available to anyone who wishes, will also not reveal anything new to us. Frames again with the Soviet tank column (the same) are on two commercials that the author managed to find. However, they didn’t see the parade, but the passage of tanks through the streets of Brest, in which not a single German soldier or command was visible, but there are townspeople welcoming parts of the Red Army. Thus, out of the total amount of cinema and photographic materials, only one photo was taken, possibly, during the participation of Soviet troops in the parade. And perhaps completely at another time, and the Soviet troops there have no relation to the parade - we have no reason to assert this. Simply put, the entire version of the “joint parade” is based on a single photograph, and that one cannot be confidently attributed to the time of the parade. That is, there is no clear evidence of the participation of Soviet troops in the “joint” parade of apologists of the theory of the Soviet-German “brotherhood in arms”. Their opponents also have no evidence to the contrary, however, nobody has yet canceled the ancient formula ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat.
Summarizing, we can say that the fact of holding a joint parade in Brest is unproved. And the most plausible, as it seems to us, picture of what happened in the city looks like this: first Krivoshein arrives in Brest with headquarters and a tank escort column, then the commanders settle all the problems associated with the withdrawal of German troops. After that, probably, Soviet troops enter the city, however they keep their distance from their German colleagues. Parts of the Wehrmacht solemnly pass by the podium with Guderian and Krivoshein. After that, the general gives the combriga a flag and leaves after his corps. Then the Soviet troops finally occupy the city. At least, this version is consistent with all available sources. But the main mistake of historians, who rush to the Brest parade as a written bag, is not even that they are trying to pass off an event as an obvious fact, the reality of which is very doubtful. Their main mistake is that even if this parade really was, this fact in itself does not say anything. In the end, the Russian and American armed forces in our time also organize joint parades [61], but it does not occur to anyone to declare Russia and the United States allies. The joint parade can serve only as an illustration of the thesis about the allied nature of relations between the USSR and Germany in September 1939, but not its evidence. And this thesis is wrong, regardless of whether there was a parade or not.
1 Telegram of the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador in Moscow on 3 in September 1939 // To be announced. USSR - Germany 1939 – 1941. Documents and materials. - M., 2004. C. 89.
2 Telegram of the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador in Moscow on September 8 1939 // Ibid. C. 94.
3 Telegram of the German Ambassador in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany from September 5 1939 // Ibid. C. 90.
4 Diary of the ECCI Secretary-General G. M. Dimitrov // Materials of the site http: // bdsa. ru.
5 Vihavainen T. Foreign aid to Finland // Winter war 1939 – 1940. Book one. Political history. - M., 1999. C. 193.
6 Zefirov, MV. Aces of World War II: Allies of the Luftwaffe: Estonia. Latvia. Finland. - M., 2003. C. 162.
7 Baryshnikov V.N. On the issue of the German military-political assistance to Finland at the beginning of the Winter War // Proceedings of the website http: // www. history. pu. ru.
8 Baryshnikov V.N. On the issue of the German military and political assistance of Finland at the beginning of the Winter War // Proceedings of the website http: // www. history. pu. ru.
9 Telegram of the German Ambassador in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany from September 10 1939 // To be announced. USSR– Germany 1939 – 1941. Documents and materials. C. 95 – 96.
10 Telegram of the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador in Moscow on September 15 1939 // Ibid. C. 101.
11 Telegram of the German Ambassador in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany from September 16 1939 // Ibid. C. 103.
12 Telegram of the German Ambassador in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany from September 14 1939 // Ibid. C. 98
13 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 - M., 2001. C. 251.
14 ibid.
15 Pribilov V. I. “Capture” or “Reunion”. Foreign historians about 17 September 1939 g. // Site materials http: // katynbooks. narod. ru.
16 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 251.
17 ibid.
18 ibid. C. 252.
19 Kotelnikov V. Aviation in the Soviet – Polish conflict // Site materials http: // www. airwiki. or.
20 Poberezhets S. German-Polish War of 1939. // Site materials http: // wartime. narod. ru.
21 Meltyukhov M. I. Decree. cit. C. 266.
22 ibid. C. 261.
23 Profit Century I. Decree. cit.
24 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 291.
25 Halder F. Occupation of Europe. The military diary of the Chief of General Staff. 1939 – 1941. - M., 2007. C. 55.
26 Telegram of the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs to the German Ambassador in Moscow on 15 in September 1939 // To be announced. USSR - Germany 1939 – 1941. Documents and materials. C. 100 – 101.
27 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 325 – 328.
28 Churchill W. World War II. Prince 1. - M., 1991. C. 204.
29 Nota of the USSR Government, presented on the morning of September 17 1939, to ambassadors and envoys of states having diplomatic relations with the USSR // To be announced. USSR - Germany 1939 – 1941. Documents and materials. C. 107.
30 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 354.
31 World Wars XX century. Prince 4. The Second World War. Documents and materials. - M., 2002. C. 152.
32 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 355.
33 ibid. C. 356.
34 Order No. 005 of the Military Council of the Belarusian Front to the Front Forces on the Entry of the Red Army into the Territory of Western Belorussia on September 16 // Katyn. Prisoners of the undeclared war (materials of the site http: // katynbo oks. Narod. Ru).
35 Directive No. 16633 of the People's Commissar for Defense K. Ye. Voroshilov and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army B. M. Shaposhnikov to the Military Council of the Belarusian Special Military District on the start of an offensive against Poland // Ibid.
36 Svishchev VN. Beginning of the Great Patriotic War. T. 1. Preparing Germany and the USSR for war. 2003. C. 194.
37 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 372 – 380.
38 Profit Century I. Decree. cit.
39 Meltyukhov M. I. Stalin's missed chance. Fight for Europe: 1939 – 1941 Documents, facts, judgments. - M., 2008. C. 96.
40 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 363.
41 Fight against Polish occupation in Western Ukraine 1921 – 1939 // Site materials http: // www. hrono. ru; Meltyukhov MI Soviet-Polish wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 307.
42 Report of the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR, commander 1 of the rank of G. I. Kulik on combat operations of units and formations of the Red Army in Western Ukraine and the political and economic situation in this region // Katyn. Prisoners of undeclared war.
43 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 367.
44 Special report by L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin on the results of the operation to evict precipitators and forest guards from the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus // Lubyanka. Stalin and the NKDC-NKGBGUKR "Smersh". 1939 - March 1946 / Stalin's archive. Documents of the highest organs of party and state power. - M., 2006. C. 142.
45 Report of the Drohobych Regional Three of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR to the People's Commissar of the Ukrainian SSR I. A. Serov on the results of the operation to evict the members of families of precipitators and foresters // Stalin deportations. 1928 – 1953. - M., 2005. C. 126.
46 Telegram of the German Ambassador in Moscow to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany from September 17 1939 // To be announced. USSR– Germany 1939 – 1941. Documents and materials. C. 104.
47 Vishlev O. V. On the eve of June 22 1941. - M., 2001. C. 107.
48 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 320 – 321.
49 Halder F. Decree. cit. C. 58.
50 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 329 – 331.
51 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 337.
52 ibid. C. 338.
53 ibid. C. 340.
54 ibid. C. 360.
55 Report of the USSR People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs V.N. Pavlov to the USSR People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs V.Molotov // Year of the Crisis. 1938 – 1939. Documents and materials (materials site http: // katynbooks. Narod. Ru).
56 Secret Additional Protocol to the German - Soviet Treaty of Friendship and the border between the USSR and Germany // Katyn. Prisoners of undeclared war.
57 Meltyukhov M. I. Soviet-Polish Wars. Military-political confrontation 1918 – 1939 C. 336.
58 Guderian G. Memories of a Soldier. - M., 2004. C. 113.
59 Vishlev O. V. Decree. cit. C. 109.
60 For a selection of photos and videos about events in Brest, see http: // gezesh. livejournal. com / 25630. html.
61 9 May 2006 The crew of the US Navy destroyer "John McCain" participated in the Victory Parade in Vladivostok, along with Russian sailors.
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