Iron fist of the Red Army. Creation of armored troops

On the eve of World War II, the Soviet country had the most powerful armored forces in the world. To match it were the capabilities of domestic industry, which proved the ability to fulfill the most ambitious plans and managed to give the army tens of thousands of vehicles. Tank power, numbering several times more units of armored vehicles than all the other armies of the world combined, was reduced to large strike formations - corps and divisions, tactics of their use were developed and well-known combat experience was gained. All of them did not last long, burning in the flame of the fighting of the first months of World War II, but left a noticeable mark on it. stories. In this paper, an attempt is made to examine the short history of the mechanized 1940-1941 bodies. formations, their structure and experience of combat use, traced the fate of the tank and motorized divisions that were part of them, based on archival materials, combat reports, summary reports, forms of units and formations, eyewitness accounts and combatants.

T-27 Tanket at the 1934 May Day Parade on Red Square. Well visible parted armored caps

The first tanks appeared in the Red Army during the civil war. These were captured vehicles captured in battles and then used against former owners. For the first time in battle, they were used during the Soviet-Polish war of 4 in July 1920, when in the Polotsk area 33 tank “Ricardo” 3 tank squadron of the 2 squadron supported the offensive 1920 SD. By the end of the 55, the Red Army already had 10 automobile and 17 avtankovanki detachments, armed with the British Mk.V, French Renault FT.1921 and armored vehicles. In May, 105, by order of the PBC, the Office of the Chief of the Armored Force of the Red Army was created, to which armored trains were also subordinate, the number of which was within 120-29 units. Total Republic Armor Forces had about 208 thousands of personnel in the 1923 units. During the post-war transition to peacetime states in the summer of XNUMX, the Armored Forces were disbanded. Detachments of armored vehicles were transferred to the cavalry, and tanks and armored trains to infantry and artillery, respectively.

In the same year, all avtotankovye detachments are reduced to a separate tank squadron (the name itself says that many military experts saw a great similarity between tanks and warships and the methods of their use). In 1924, the squadron was transferred to the regimental system. The tank regiment consisted of the 2 tank battalion (line and training) and service units, a total of 356 people, 18 tanks. In subsequent years, several more tank regiments of three-battalion composition were deployed. The period of the search for the most effective organizational forms of tank forces began, which dragged on for 20 years, right up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. And during the war and after it, the organizational structure of the armored forces repeatedly underwent numerous changes.

The development of armored troops was hampered by the lack of their own models of armored vehicles. So, by 1927, the Red Army Tank Park was represented by the entire 90 by the machines of the trophy brands “Ricardo”, “Taylor” and “Renault”.

But the captured cars were already rather worn out, and since there were no new arrivals from abroad, the question arose of creating our own models of armored vehicles. To this end, in April 1924 was created the Military Technical Directorate (VTU) of the Red Army. November 22 The VTU 1929 was transformed into the Army Mechanization and Mechanization Directorate (UMMA). He was headed by the commander of the 2 rank (with 1935) I.AHalepsky. Later, his position became known as the head of the Armored Directorate Directorate (ABTU) of the Red Army. This Directorate did a great deal to create the USSR tank forces, although the fate of Khalepsky himself was sad - he was arrested in 1937, and shot in 1938.

Back in 1927, under the leadership of the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, M.N. Tukhachevsky, an 5-year plan for the development of the armed forces up to 1932 was developed, but, strangely enough, the original tanks were not mentioned in it. However, then it was still not clear what they should be and how soon the industry would master their production. The error was corrected, and in the final version of the plan it was planned to release 1075 tanks during the five-year plan.

18 July The 1928 of the Revolutionary Military Council adopted the “System of tank, tractor, car, armor armament of the Red Army”, compiled under the leadership of Deputy Chief of General Staff V.K. Triandafilov, known as a staunch supporter of “armor case”. She acted until the end of the 30-s in several successive editions for each five-year period.

30 July 1928. Sovnarkom approved the first five-year plan for the development and reconstruction of the Armed Forces of the USSR for 1928-32. According to him, by the end of the five-year period, in addition to the release of 1075 tanks, it was necessary to form an additional 3 new tank regiment. In July, 1929, this plan was revised upwards - by the end of the five-year plan, there should have been 5,5 thousands of tanks in the Red Army. In reality for 1929-1933. The industry issued 7,5 thousands of tanks.

By 1932, the Revolutionary Military Council already provided for armored troops: 3 mechanized brigades (ICBMs), 30 mixed tank battalions (32 light and 34 medium tanks in each), 4 heavy tank battalions (35 tanks in each) of the Reservation Command (13 tanks in each) of the Main Command (XNUMX) ) and XNUMX mechanized regiments in cavalry.

The two-turreted machine gun T-26, known as tanks of the 1931 sample. They were adopted by the Red Army by the order of the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR from February 13 1931.

Double-tower T-26 with partially welded towers. Produced by the Leningrad plant "Bolshevik" T-26 in the first place arrived in the part of the Leningrad Military District.

The appearance in large quantities of our own armored vehicles allowed us to start creating new organizational structures for tank forces. 17 June 1929. The Revolutionary Military Council, at the suggestion of V.K.Triandafilova, adopts a decree which said: “Taking into account that the new genus weaponswhich are the armor of force, is not well studied in terms of its tactical use (for independent and in conjunction with infantry and cavalry), and in the sense of the most profitable organizational forms, recognize the need to organize in 1929-1930. constant experimental mechanized unit. ”A month later, the document was approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), and among other things, the minimum production program for 3,5 of thousands of tanks was specified during the first five-year plan.

In pursuance of the resolution, an experienced mechanized regiment was formed in 1929, consisting of a battalion of MC-1 tanks, a BA-27 armored division, a motorized rifle battalion, and an air squadron. In the same year, the regiment took part in the exercises of the Belarusian Military District (BelVO).

In May, the 1930 g. Regiment deployed to the 1 th mechanized brigade, later received the name of KB Kalinovsky - the first commander of the brigade. Its initial composition is a tank regiment (two-battalion composition), a motorized infantry regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, an artillery division, and specialized units. The brigade had 60 MC-1, 32 wedgies, 17 BA-27, 264 vehicles, 12 tractors. In 1931, the organizational structure was strengthened. Now the 1-I MBR included:

1) shock group - a tank regiment consisting of two tank battalions and two self-propelled artillery battalions (due to the lack of SAU, they are equipped with towed 76-mm cannons on auto-thrust);

2) reconnaissance group - a battalion of tankettes, an armored battalion, an auto-gun battalion, and an artillery division;

3) artillery group - 3 division 76-mm cannons and 122-mm howitzers, air defense division;

4) infantry battalion on vehicles.

The number of troops was 4700 people adopt: 119 tanks, 100 tankettes, 15 armored vehicles, 63-propelled anti-aircraft machine gun, 32 76-mm cannon, 16 122-mm howitzers, 12 76-mm and 32 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 270 car, 100 tractors.

T-26 battalion on field exercises. Middle tank model 1932, with cannon and machine gun armament, characterized by the installation of 37-mm guns in the right turret. The riveted design of the towers and the arrangement of the inspection slits are clearly visible.

The double-turbo T-26 of sample 1931 r. Overcomes the ford. White stripes on the towers served to quickly determine the belonging of the tank and meant the car of the second company. The same intermittent stripes of red color were applied to the tanks of the first company, the black ones - to the third company.

At the same time (1932), the 4 tank regiment of the three-battalion formation was formed: 1 in Smolensk, 2 in Leningrad, 3 in the Moscow Military District, 4 in Kharkov, and 3 of the separate territorial tank battalion. In the cavalry formations, the 2 mechanized regiment, the 2 mechanized division, and the 3 mechanized squadron were created. However, this was only the beginning. In the spirit of the then rise, much larger measures were envisaged.

1 August 1931 The USSR Labor and Defense Council adopted the “Great Tank Program”, which stated that advances in tank construction (increased production of tanks - 170 units in 1930, the emergence of new models of BTT) created strong prerequisites for a radical change general operational tactical doctrine on the use of tanks and demanded decisive organizational changes of the armored troops in the direction of creating higher mechanized formations capable of independently solving tasks both on the battlefield and throughout the opera Noah depth of modern combat front. New fleet material created the prerequisites for the development of the theory of deep combat and operations. ”The plans were matched by the name: in the very first year it was supposed to give the army 10 thousands of vehicles. The same decree set up a commission to develop the organization of armored troops (ABTV), which at the 9 meeting in March 1933 recommended to have mechanized corps consisting of mechanized brigades, RGK tank brigades, mechanized regiments in cavalry, tank battalions in rifle divisions in the Red Army.

Along with changes in the organizational structure of the ABTV, the views on the use of tanks also changed. In 20-s, the main principle of combat use of tanks was considered to be their close interaction with the infantry. At the same time, already in the “Temporary instruction on the combat use of tanks” of 1928, it was envisaged to use tanks as the so-called freely maneuvering group of the forward echelon, operating outside the fire and visual connection with the infantry. This provision was included in the Field Manual of the Red Army in 1929.

Double-towed T-26 11 Mechanism Corps on Uritzky Square in Leningrad during the celebration of the 14 anniversary of the October Revolution.

Demonstration of one of the first T-26 in Naro-Fominsk.

At the end of the 20-s, thanks to the work of V.K.Triandafilov and the chief inspector of tank forces (1-th deputy head of UMMA) K.K.Kalinovsky, the “Theory of modern armies in modern warfare” was formulated (better known as “Theory of deep combat and operations ”), the essence of which was expressed by the solution of two tasks:

1. Breaking the front of the enemy with a simultaneous strike on his entire tactical depth.

2. Immediate entry into the breakthrough of mechanized forces, which in cooperation with aviation must advance to the entire depth of the enemy’s operational defense until the defeat of his entire group.

At the same time, this military doctrine, with all its progressiveness, was an obvious reflection of the then prevailing sentiments and the “proletarian strategy of crushing” proclaimed by Stalin and Voroshilov, without assuming a different picture of events, which played a tragic role a decade later.

The death of Triandafilov and Kalinowski in 1931 in a plane crash interrupted their fruitful activities.

From the beginning of the 30-s, a new stage of development of the theory of the use of ABTV begins. These problems were discussed in the pages of the magazines “Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army”, “Armored magazine”, “Military Thought” and others. An active part in the discussion was taken by S.N. Ammosov, A.Ye.Gromychenko, P.D.Gladkov, A.A.Ignatiev, P.A. Rotmistrov, I.P. Sukhov and others. The result was the creation of the official theory, enshrined in the manuals on the combat use of ABT 1932-1937. and in the field regulations of the Red Army 1936-1939. They provided for the three main forms of combat use of tank forces:

a) in close cooperation with the infantry or cavalry as groups of their direct support (tank groups SPE, NPC);

b) in tactical interaction with rifle and cavalry units and formations as their distant support groups (DPP tank groups);

c) in operational interaction with large all-arms associations (army, front) as part of independent mechanized and tank formations.

Large-scale tasks required new organizational structures. A major step was the emergence of qualitatively new, more powerful tactical formations — mechanized corps, which made it possible to realize the demands put forward. 11 March 1932. The Revolutionary Military Council decided to form two mechanized corps of the following composition:
- mechanized brigade on T-26;
- 3 tank battalion;
- shooting and machine gun battalion (SPB);
- artillery division;
- engineer battalion;
- anti-aircraft machine gun company.
- mechanized brigade on BT (composition is the same);
- A shooting-machine-gun brigade (SPBR);
- reconnaissance battalion;
- engineer battalion;
- flamethrower battalion;
- anti-aircraft artillery division;
- technical base;
- a traffic control company;
- air squadron.

Machine gun and cannon T-26 in the classroom for driving.

Practical training on driving tanks on simulators is conducted by Senior Lieutenant G.V. Ley (center) and N.S. Gromov. May 1937

In April, the 1932 of the USSR Defense Committee on the report of the Revolutionary Military Council adopted a resolution on the formation of mechanized corps. The first mechanized corps was deployed in the Leningrad Military District on the basis of the 11 of the Red Banner Leningrad Infantry Division (SD) in the autumn of 1932. The 11 of the MK included 31, 32 ICBM and 33-I SPBR. At the same time, the formation of the 45 of the MK (45, 133 ICBM, 134 SPBR) began in the Ukrainian VO on the basis of the 135 of the Red Banner Volyn SD.

In the same year, 1932 began the formation of five separate ICBMs — the 2 — in the Ukrainian VO; 3, 4, 5 - in BelVO; 6 is in OKDVA; two tank regiments, four mechanized cavalry battalions, 15 tank and 65 tank battalions for rifle divisions.

Due to the aggravation of the situation in the Far East, the 11 th mechanized corps, or rather one 32 th ICBM (31 th ICBM and 33 th SPBR remained in the Leningrad Military District), was transferred to the Soviet-Mongolian border in Transbaikalia, where 20 joined it -MBR, formed in 1933 in the Moscow Military District and then transferred to the area of ​​Kyakhta - which became the location for the entire 11 of the MC.

By January 1 1934, the Red Army had 2 mechanized corps, 6 mechanized brigades, 6 tank regiments, 23 tank battalions and 37 separate tank companies of infantry divisions, 14 mech regiments and 5 mechanical divisions in cavalry. The staffing of all of them was at the level of 47% of the standard.

The crew is engaged in maintenance of the T-26. Despite the entire picture of the picture, resembling social-realistic sculptures, the repair is not carried out with a fake tool; Summer 1934

T-26 on drills overcomes coppice. The tank belongs to the 1 -th company of the 1 -th battalion. Summer 1936

In 1933, the Red Army’s development plan was adopted for the 2 5th five-year plan, which provided for 1 in January 1938. 25 mechanized and tank brigades (were reformed from tank regiments). Therefore, two more mechanized corps were formed in 1934 - the 7 in the LenVO on the basis of the 31 and the 32 and the 5 in the MVO were reformed from the 1 and in the name of KB Kalinovsky. In the following year, 1935, the mechanized corps was transferred to new states, because experience has shown that they are not mobile and poorly managed due to lack of communication facilities. The low reliability of the equipment and the poor training of personnel led to the failure of a large number of tanks on the march. The number of corps units was reduced, and the supply and technical support functions were transferred to the brigades, which was very essential to accompany the activities and cover all the needs of operating combat units.

To increase mobility, the T-26 tanks in the hulls from February 1935 were replaced by more high-speed wheeled-tracked BTs. Now the mechanized corps consisted of a command, two ICBMs, an SPBR, a separate tank battalion (reconnaissance) and a communications battalion. Statewide, he had to have 8965 manpower, 348 BT tanks, 63 T-37, 52 chemical tanks (this was the name of the flamethrower tanks at that time) OT-26. Total 463 tank, 20 guns, 1444 vehicles. These measures made it possible to increase the mobility of the mechanized corps, but they did not solve the problems of controlling the units.

Separate mekhbrigad began to have in its composition:
- three tank battalions;
- shooting and machine gun battalion;
- combat support battalion;
- repair and restoration battalion;
- motor company;
- communications company;
- reconnaissance company.

Statewide, the brigade had 2745 people, 145 T-26, 56 artillery and chemical tanks, 28 BA, 482 vehicles and 39 tractors.

Without the participation of tanks - the embodiment of power and strength of the Red Army - in the 30-s. Not a single holiday, from the revolutionary celebrations to the celebration of the foremost, was complete. The photo shows the battalion T-26 of the Leningrad Military District in front of the Winter Palace 7 in November 1933.

Double-turbo T-26 overcomes a barrage of log bollards. May 1932

By 1936, ABTV grew qualitatively and quantitatively - and if 1927 had 90 tanks and 1050 vehicles in their composition, then 1935 had more than 8 thousand tanks and 35 thousand cars.

In 1936, the tank fleet of the ABTV Red Army consisted of the following vehicles:
- reconnaissance amphibious tank T-37 - the main tank of the service of providing all mechanical connections and means of infantry combat reconnaissance;
- combined-arms tank T-26 - the main tank of quantitative strengthening of the RGC and the tank of combined-arms troops;
- operational tank BT - tank of independent mechanical connections;
- T-28 - tank quality reinforcement RGC, designed to overcome the heavily fortified defensive zones;
- T-35 - tank of high-quality reinforcement of the GDG during the breakthrough of especially strong and pre-reinforced bands;
- chemical tanks; *
- sapper tanks;
- control tanks and teletanki with radio control.
* So then it was called flamethrowing machines and tanks, designed to conduct a chemical war with contamination of the area of ​​agents and its degassing.

Great harm to the development of armored troops brought Stalinist repression, which caused great damage to command and technical personnel. The following persons were arrested and shot: the commander of the 45 of the MK division commander A.N. Borisenko, the commander of the 11 of the MK division commander Ya.L.Davidovsky, the commander of the 8 ICBM commander D.A. Schmidt, the commander of the ICBM of the Ural VO MM division commander M.M. Bakshi, head of the ABTA OKDVA division commander S.I. Derevtsov, first chief of the ABTU of the Red Army I.A. Khalepsky, who replaced him in this position division commander G. G. Bokis and many, many others.

In 1937, the 3 5-year plan for the development and reconstruction of the Red Army was adopted for 1938-42. They provided for:

1) preservation of the existing number of tank formations - 4 corps, 21 tank brigade, as well as three separate MBRBs on armored vehicles (formed in 1937 in Transbaikalia IN for operations in desert-steppe terrain, then redeployed to Mongolia, each had 80 BA. Based (1939 g.) 7-I MBRD - Dzamin-Ude, 8-I - Bain-Tumen, 9-I - Undurhan).

2) creation instead of training brigades - eleven training tank regiments.

3) switch to reinforced tank platoons with five cars instead of the previous three.

4) establish the nominal number of tanks at the level: light tank brigade - 278 tanks BT, tank brigade - 267 T-26, heavy tank brigade - 183 (136 T-28, 37 BT, 10 chemical), T-XNXX brigade, T-XNXX brigade, T-XNXX brigade; -35, 148 BT and 94 chemical), tank regiment - from 35 to 44 tanks.

5) to enter into the composition of each rifle division a tank battalion of two company staff (T-26 and T-38), and a tank regiment in the cavalry division.

6) eliminate the division of names into mechanized and tank units, while retaining one name - tank.

7) light tank brigades (including those in tank corps) are transferred to a new organization:
- 4 tank battalion for 54 linear and 6 artillery tanks in each;
- reconnaissance;
- motorized rifle battalions;
- support units.

In 1938, all the mechanized corps, brigades, and regiments were renamed tank with numbering change - for example, the 32-I MBR of ZabVO turned into the 11-th TBR. By the beginning of the 1939, the Red Army had a 4 tank corps (TK) - 10 - in the LenVO, 15 - in the ZapVO, 20 - in the ZabVO, 25 - in the QUO. According to the staff, the corps had 560 tanks and 12710 manpower.

Machine gun T-26 model 1931 g. With one turret on the exercises BelVO 1936 g.

T-26 Narofominsk Brigade during the 1936 summer exercises

In August, 1938, the OKDVA tank crews had to fight. During the conflict in the area of ​​Lake Hassan, the 2-I MBR participated in battles with the Japanese (formed in April 1932 in Kiev, transferred to the Far East in 1934, in October 1938 was transformed into 42-LTBR).

In the summer of 1939, the 6-i and 11-i ZabVO-tank brigades took part in the conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol as part of the 1-i army group. They played a major role in the entourage and defeat of the Japanese army 6, showing high fighting qualities. There were losses - so 11-i TBR lost in the battles of 186 tanks, of which 84 - irrevocably. For these battles, the 11-I TBR was awarded the Order of Lenin and was given the name of commander Yakovlev, who died in battle. The 6-I TBR became Red Banner.

Fighting 1938-1939's. showed shortcomings in the organization of troops. 8-22 August 1939 was discussed by a special commission chaired by the deputy NGO G.I. Kulik. It consisted of S.M.Budenny, B.M. Shaposhnikov, E.A. Shchadenko, S.K.Timoshenko, M.P.Kovalev, K.A. Meretskov and others. She decided:

“1. Leave the tank corps, excluding from its composition a rifle-and-brigade brigade. To exclude the shooting and machine-gun battalion from the tank brigade.

2. In the offensive, with the development of a breakthrough, the tank corps must work for infantry and cavalry. Under these conditions, tank brigades operate in close connection with infantry and artillery. The tank corps can sometimes act on its own when the enemy is upset and unable to defend. ”

It was recommended to use tank brigades armed with BT tanks for independent operations, and brigades of T-26 and T-28 tanks to reinforce the rifle troops. It is not difficult to notice in this the reinforcement in the leadership of the Red Army of the role of the "cavalrymen" of the Stalinist entourage, who replaced the knocked-out command cadres. Be that as it may, the next military company soon made it possible to test the capabilities of the tank forces almost in full accordance with the original purpose and almost under field conditions.

Presentation of the Order of the Red Banner Armor Courses to improve the command personnel. Leningrad, 1934

The T-26 of the 1933 model became the most popular version of the tank, issued in the number of 6065 units, including 3938, equipped with a 71 radio station -TK-1 with a hand-held antenna. Signal flags remained on the remaining tanks.

In September, 1939 participated in the march to Western Ukraine and Western Belarus: the Belarusian Front included the 15 tank corps (2, 27 LTBR, ​​20 IACB) commanded by division commander MP Petrov, 6 - I light tank brigade p-ka Bolotnikov and other parts; The Ukrainian Front consists of the 25 tank corps (4, 5 LTBR, ​​1 MRBR), I.O. Yarkin, 23, 24, 26 I light tank brigades.

The march showed that the corps commanders with great difficulty led the actions of tank brigades, and their mobility left much to be desired. This was especially true of the connection of IO Yarkin, whose tank crews were lagging even from infantry and cavalry, because of the indiscriminate command they found in their rear areas, and sometimes clogged the roads with blockages of their vehicles. Obvious was the need for “unloading” cumbersome associations and the transition to more “manageable” and operatively moving forms. Based on this, the Main Military Council 21 in November 1939 recognized the need to disband the controls of the tank corps and the machine gun brigades. Instead of corps, a more flexible structure was introduced - the motorized division (the obvious influence of the German “ally” experience on the Polish company - the Wehrmacht units quickly proved their effectiveness). In 1940, it was planned to form 8 of such divisions, and in 1941, the following 7, which were supposed to be used to develop the success of a combined-arms army or as part of a cavalry-mechanized group (front-line mobile group). The tank corps controls and corps were disbanded by January 15 1940. However, tank brigades remained. 22 August 1939 of the NKO KE Voroshilov sent a report to Stalin in which he proposed to form 16 tank brigades equipped with BT tanks, 16 TBR T-26 RGK on 238 tanks in each, 3 TBR T-28 RGK on 117 T tanks 28 and 39 BT, 1 TBR T-35 RGC from 32 T-35 and 85 T-28. These proposals were approved and a tank brigade was adopted as the main unit of the armored troops troops. The number of tanks in the state was later changed - in the light-tank brigade - 258 vehicles, in heavy - 156. By May 1940, 39 tank brigades and 4 motorized divisions were deployed - 1, 15, 81, 109.

In the winter of 1939-1940. tankers got another test - the Soviet-Finnish war, where they had to act in the most unsuitable conditions for tanks. The beginning of the war interrupted the reform and liquidation of the corps. Fighting 10 tank corps (1, 13 LTBR, ​​15 SPBR), 34-I LTBR, ​​20-I tank brigade and other formations were conducted on the Karelian Isthmus. In September, the 20 Brigade 1939 was transferred from Slutsk to the Leningrad Military District and included the 145 T-28 and 20 BA-20, with the 13.12.1939, it tested new heavy tanks - KV, SMK and T-100. Brigade losses in battles amounted to 96 T-28.

The total losses of the Red Army on the Karelian Isthmus during the period from 30.11.1939 to 10.03.1940 amounted to 3178 tanks.

By May 1940, the Red Army had 39 tank brigades - 32 light-tank tanks, 3 - equipped with T-28 tanks, one (14-I heavy TBR) - T-35 and T-28 tanks and three armed with chemical tanks. The 20 cavalry divisions had a tank regiment (total battalion 64), and rifle divisions - 98 individual tank battalions.

But this transformation is not over. On the contrary, in 1940, a new radical restructuring of the organizational forms of ABTV began. In June, 1940 was considered in the USSR NKO in the experience of using tanks at Khalkhin-Gol, as well as combat operations of German tank forces in Europe. The new leadership of the NPO, headed by S.K.Timoshenko, decided in the shortest possible time to catch up and overtake the Wehrmacht in terms of the quantity and quality of armored forces. Tank divisions united in the mechanized corps were to become their main striking force.

T-26 on maneuvers of UkrVO in the summer of 1935. The white top of the towers with a red star, introduced at these exercises, meant that the tanks belonged to one of the sides.

T-26 overcomes a gap in the brick wall.

Tanks, cavalry and artillery on Uritsky Square during the reception of the May Day parade 1936, the commander of the Leningrad Military District. The construction of companies corresponds to the adopted transition to reinforced tank platoons of five vehicles instead of the previous three.

"Stakhanovsky crew" of the armored car BA-6 of the 2 Company of the 2 Battalion of the 18 of the Turkestan Mountain Cavalry Division, awarded the Order of the Red Banner. TurkVO, 1936

Inspection T-26 after the march. By the beginning of the war, tankers often wore cloth budenovki instead of depreciation helmets.

Flamethrower tank OT-26. In the "chemical battalions" mechanized corps there were 52 flamethrowing tank, necessary for breaking through the enemy defense. By the end of 1939, three separate brigades of "chemical tanks" of 150 vehicles were formed in each.

The two near tanks BT-5 in the 1936 photo have welded towers (the first is a commander with a hand-held antenna radio station), the next two are with riveted towers.

Military attaches of foreign countries monitor the BT-5 in Kiev maneuvers. 1935

Cleaning guns BT-7 after firing.

Tankers krasnogradskogo camp them. Frunze of the Leningrad Military District meet the Cheliuskites who have arrived. Summer 1934

Towers "Comintern" towing guns on the May Day parade 1937

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Comments

[avt]

Photos are good , but the article .... well, such a Glavpurovskaya, or something , immediately general and about nothing in particular. ,, In this work, an attempt is made to consider the short history of mechanized corps 1940-1941. formations, their structure and experience of combat use, traced the fate of the tank and motorized divisions included in them, on the basis of archival materials, combat reports, summary reports, forms of units and formations, eyewitness accounts and combat participants. "---------- Swing for a ruble, a blow for a penny, like this in one article and consider everything? In my opinion it did not work, not minus, in general, not for everybody. The article did not catch .

[Smirnov Vadim]

This is the first part.

Продолжение следует ...

[avt]

Quote: Smirnov Vadim

This is the first part.

For the first part, in my opinion, the weaknesses in the structure of the mechanized corps indicated by, for example, Shaposhnikov in terms of controlling such very bulky connections, are poorly reflected. Tukhachevsky's choice of rather weak designs, such as the T-27, T-26, especially in the twin-tower version. And the repair base? And the number of real combat-ready tanks in the ranks for the period before the hostilities and subject to write-off? Where, if the total number of the fleet is given, accounting for combat-ready and manned vehicles? Well, shouldn't the training of personnel be reflected in such a declared topic? It is a complex topic, without a detailed examination of the situation in industry, it is impossible to form a correct opinion on the possibilities and omissions in the construction of armored forces. The claimed topic draws on a whole book. And so far, all in one pile. Let's wait, it might be better, but the first impression is not very But this is my opinion.

[Smirnov Vadim]

You draw conclusions very early on the article.
Wait for the continuation. and then criticize the article!

[avt]

Quote: Smirnov Vadim

Wait for the continuation. and then criticize the article!

Yes, it’s not a question. But here again the vector of a given article is somewhat embarrassing, well, for example .-------- ,, In an offensive with the development of a breakthrough, the tank corps should work for infantry and cavalry. Under these conditions, tank brigades operate in close connection with infantry and artillery. The tank corps can sometimes act independently, when the enemy is upset and incapable of defense. ”

It was recommended to use tank brigades armed with BT tanks for independent actions, and brigades of T-26 and T-28 tanks to strengthen rifle forces. It is easy to see in this the strengthening of the role of the “cavalrymen” of the Stalinist encirclement in the leadership of the Red Army, "---------------- Tell me what has to do with here, the cavalrymen of the Stalinist encirclement" If initially Tukhachevsky T-26 lobbied as an infantry escort tank? Even his statement about the preference for a two-turret structure during a breakthrough was preserved: ,, ... with regards to the Vickers tank I examined, I found it perfectly suitable for the task of escorting when attacking enemy trenches ... by-side advantageously allows to strike a strong side fire when crossing trenches and trenches ... ". Again, bloody Stalin and the horse marshals are to blame, or will we objectively begin to understand everything, according to the stated topic? Sorry, but so far everything is slowly boiling down to such a panegyric that --------------- ,, On the eve of World War II, the Soviet country had the most powerful armored forces in the world. "------ a --------- ,, The Stalinist repressions brought great harm to the development of the armored forces, which caused enormous damage to the command and technical personnel. They were arrested and shot:" -------- - If you tackle this topic from this side, then be so kind as to provide statistics, including a list of repressed under political and other articles and lists of those who came to their place. Taking into account their military education, so that it would be clear who, for example, received a military education, but who, as claimed by the de-Stalinists, jumped from lieutenants to division commanders. Then it will be more correct, more objective or something.

[Bigriver]

Quote: avt

... Tell me what has to do with this, the cavalrymen of the Stalinist encirclement '' If initially Tukhachevsky T-26 was lobbied as an infantry escort tank? Again bloody Stalin and horse marshals are to blame ...
... while everything is slowly being reduced to such a panegyric that --------------- ,, On the eve of World War II, the Soviet country had the most powerful armored forces in the world.

Vickers 6 tons, it seems, thanks to the shot Halepsky appeared.
Yes, to support pehtura. But, the same Halepsky, brought Christie from America - the future BT, for long-range action.
Finally, yes. Drogovoz is a good reference publication showing the development of the states. But, the drain of voids in it: (((
How can we talk about the formation of ABTV, not to mention the theory of their application: // There was a big hole in this all the 30s. Hence, every two years, there is a "dance" with the states: regiments-brigades-corps-brigades, etc. And Comrade Drogovoz chose the easy way - Stalin was to blame, he shot the tank commanders.
Well, damn it, I would have taken it and told in detail about the whole practice of using ABTV in the 30s. Since the conflict on the CER. After all, not a single case of competent and effective use. Even in the Polish campaign, without a database, planned and on time, simple marches could not be realized.
And the reader looks at the numbers and thinks: oh, yes ... That was power ...

[avt]

Quote: BigRiver

Vickers 6 tons, it seems, thanks to the shot Halepsky appeared.

I do not argue, but the deputy commissar for armament was all the same Tukhachevsky, because it was not the last thing that depended on him what would be adopted for service. I just quoted his words about the T-26. But in the photo there is Cardin Lloyd, pushed by the same Tukhachevsky with open armored caps, because even in the parade nichrome is not visible, it is impossible to drive. After all, he personally wrote the script for the film promoting this miracle, they were stuck 3295 pieces and quickly written off to training. in 1931-1934! When everything was bought abroad for gold and bread! So what ? Again, the horse Stalinists "got screwed !?

[Bigriver]

Quote: avt

... but in the photo there is Cardin Lloyd, pushed by the same Tukhachevsky with open armored caps, because even at the parade nichrome is not visible, it is impossible to drive. So what ? Again, the horse Stalinists "got screwed !?

IMHO, the matter is not only in yesterday's second lieutenant Tukhachevsky. In general, the entire military science of the Soviet Union was weak. And proceeded from yesterday's premise: overcoming a positional crisis. Well yes. Theoretically, a tank brigade of 250 tanks, with the support of tra-la-la .., and interaction with ta-ta-ta, is capable of breaking through the enemy's layered defense. Well, they will reach the operational rear for 50 kilometers. And then what? It was assumed that a series of such attacks on the front could itself bring down the enemy’s defenses. Any maneuver on the ground, and all the more coordinated and coordinated in time with the neighbors - was fantastic for us.
The Germans, to be honest, showed us the class. It’s good that we were good students.

[anip]

Quote: BigRiver

IMHO, the matter is not only in yesterday's second lieutenant Tukhachevsky.

Not only. But largely thanks to Tukhachevsky, tens of thousands of tanks were riveted, which turned out to be insolvent in 1941 without support vehicles, tow trucks, repair shops, etc. And he also wanted to rivet 100 thousand tanks and 100 thousand planes. Okay, Stalin did not let him do this, correctly motivating that the country's economy could not stand it. Tukhachevsky is credited with the fact that he allegedly developed a strategy for tank attacks with tank corps, well, yes, he developed it with those corps that are unsecured. That is, all of his developments were adventurous, as adventurous as his campaign against Warsaw in 1920. Plus, his subsequent participation in the conspiracy of the military.
So it is still unknown how the Second World War would have ended, the USSR would have won and, if won, with what losses, if Tukhachevsky had not been shot.

[bask]

Quote: BigRiver

Quote: avt
... Tell me what has to do with this, the cavalrymen of the Stalinist encirclement '' If initially Tukhachevsky T-26 was lobbied as an infantry escort tank? Again bloody Stalin and horse marshals are to blame ...
... while everything is slowly being reduced to such a panegyric that --------------- ,, On the eve of World War II, the Soviet country had the most powerful armored forces in the world.
Vickers 6 tons, it seems, thanks to the shot Halepsky appeared.
Yes, to support pehtura. But, the same Halepsky, brought Christie from America - the future BT, for long-range action.
Finally, yes. Drogovoz is a good reference publication showing the development of the states. But, the drain of voids in it: (((
How can we talk about the formation of ABTV, not to mention the theory of their application: // There was a big hole in this all the 30s. Hence, every two years, there is a "dance" with the states: regiments-brigades-corps-brigades, etc. And Comrade Drogovoz chose the easy way - Stalin was vi

[Son]

Waiting, sir! These are not conclusions yet, but a confirmation of your opinion, to the corresponding comment ...

[Kars]

The truck is different. But you can read for review.
The writer is basically anti-Soviet, with a small complex of underworship.
Interesting critical series--
Tank sword of the country of the Soviets
Large fleet of the country of the Soviets
Soviet Union Air Shield

[Alone]

Amount of course is impressive. Interesting article.

[Bigriver]

[quote = avt] [quote = BigRiver] ... So what? Again, the horse Stalinists "got bogged down!? [/ Quote]
Drogovoz wrote under Yeltsin :))) It seems, 1999.

[valerei]

I read all the comments. It is good to comment, knowing the history, but then a new type of troops was just being created and no one really knew how to use it. If you read Guderian's memoirs, then they had the same problems. Only we, unlike the Germans, had a tank industry in its infancy (no need to be fooled by the number of tanks built) and tankers with four classes of elementary school. And try to "screw up" the tank, even on exercises, so they immediately sew on sabotage. And the NKVD will always be able to "prove" this fact. Of course, there were some ostentatious tank units, but they did not make the weather. So, at the beginning of the war, the USSR had tank units corresponding to both industry and population.

[avt]

Quote: valerei

I read all the comments. Comment well, knowing the story,

The key phrase is “knowing the history.” That is why such articles are written, analyzed and made conclusions. Moreover, the quality of the conclusions is directly proportional to the objective analysis of reliable facts. And not historical anecdotes, ala ordinary Chonkin, science cost us too much to win.

[bairat]

Quote: valerei

Only we, unlike the Germans, had the tank industry in its infancy (no need to be deceived by the number of tanks built)

By the beginning of the war, there were so many 34s and HFs that had been splashed with proper use that we would have no equal. So everything is in order with the tank industry. The problems were in the field of tactics and application strategies.

[avt]

Quote: bairat

By the beginning of the war, there were so many 34s and HFs that had been splashed with proper use that we would have no equal. So everything is in order with the tank industry. The problems were in the field of tactics and application strategies.

You are deeply mistaken. Everything was not so rosy. The T-34 of the 41st is not the T-34 85 of the 44th, just like the KV, they were still raw cars, there were big problems with the diesel engine, and the KV had a transmission. In addition, a tank is also a trained crew and a unit itself, so to speak, “rolled up.” I'm not talking about the use in mechanized corps. The Germans, unfortunately, solved the same problems more competently and faster than us.

[Skavron]

Quote: avt

HF it was still raw cars

interesting to look at the "raw" German analogue of the KV, KV-2 and T-34 ....

[Kars]

Quote: Skavron

it is interesting to look at the "raw" German analogue of the KV, KV-2 and T-34 ...

Yes, please Panther in 1943 - half of the 200 cash did not go into battle.
Kingtiger 1944 most of the time were not in battle but in repair.

[Bigriver]

Quote: Kars

Yes, please Panther in 1943 - half of the 200 cash did not go into battle.

Moreover, a significant part of the Panther brigade had spontaneous combustion of the engine.

[Skavron]

In 1939 - 1941 I had in mind.

[Nesvet Nezar]

Yes, we are generally worthless. Here are the Americans, and before them the Germans - well done. But here, with grammar and spelling, everything is wonderful))))))

[avt]

Quote: Nesvet Nezarya

Yes, we are generally worthless. Here are the Americans, and before them the Germans - well done.

And you read not my comments, but documents, acts of the ABTU commission on tanks and engines of those years, since there are no problems now with access to them, and you look, we will talk in detail, and there you can figure out the rights yourself or it’s advisable to think for yourself.

[Son]

I agree with you completely, I read a 4-volume book about tanks, unfortunately I didn’t remember either the author or the exact name ... They consider the production and use of tanks for different years .. For example, Volume-1 (pre-war), etc. .
Describes and provides documents on the ability of the country's industry to produce tanks, and the Army to operate ....
It can be said on the knee, they did it manually, the industry just started to create ... And dreamers with projects on the state. means to experiment ... The same, Tukhachevsky - Give thousands of wedges!
Conscription, poorly educated ...

[avt]

Quote: Son

I agree with you completely, I read a 4-volume book about tanks, unfortunately I did not remember either the author or the exact name.

Probably Svirin Mikhail, very intelligent He really understands tanks, he shoveled a lot of documents. Still on armored vehicles Kolomyets walked well.

[Bigriver]

Quote: avt

Probably Svirin Mikhail, very intelligent .

IMHO, the best specialist in the history of Soviet tank and tank building. He has a self-propelled volume.
It's a pity he stopped this business. According to rumors, generally ceased to deal with the topic.

[Skavron]

What about Baryatinsky?

[Skavron]

Judging by the minus, Baryatinsky is not in authority ...

[Bigriver]

Quote: Nesarya Nesvet

Yes, we are generally worthless. Here are the Americans, and before them the Germans - well done.

"Kchemnost", the strength of the people, including in the ability to draw conclusions: from their mistakes, from the positive and negative experience of the enemy, and the ability to change in accordance with the findings.
We have demonstrated this.

[Nesvet Nezar]

Rezun, although a traitor, is close to the truth. We were preparing to export the revolution. Wheeled tanks would conquer Europe faster than Hitler approached Moscow. In vain, Stalin pulled. After France, Hitler had to be beaten on its territory according to the theory of a deep breakthrough. And now we are taught by those who have looked into our mouths all our lives))))

[d.gksueyjd]

Yes, Serdyukov, following the example of a rezun, also wanted to conquer Europe and demanded tanks on wheels!

[Nesvet Nezar]

Thank you for your opinion. It is very important to me.

[d.gksueyjd]

Tanks on wheeled vehicles - heavy armored vehicles. (Tanks on the go-go)
The armored forces of Russia went through evolution, as did the armored forces of other states, and there was a period when other states equaled them.

[416sd]

This is my latest T-26A.
The ones in some images ...
I hope to check it out.
It is somewhat different - I have a front lamp hidden under a protective cap, and the rear grille without an air intake, there is an option with and without, I chose without ...

[Nagaibak]

416sd "I hope to check it out."
Checked out! I respect Ai-Well done!

[anip]

Quote: 416sd

I hope to check it out.

Plus.

[416sd]

Here is another photo

[416sd]

And one more photo ...
The basis is papier-mâché; snow is imitated with wet soda.

[416sd]

And this is even before I put it on the stand

[laurbalaur]

in this form, I liked it more, yet there is no place for diorama in a flower pot! +

[416sd]

As for the pot - the second person I hear from is already, therefore I will certainly take note!

[Gazprom]

it is strange that not a word (or I missed) is about OBTU-Oryol armored school named after M.V. Frunze.
Forge of Soviet tank crews, first ! armored school of the Red Army

[washi]

The main thing is application and staffing. In 1941 there was nothing.

[Skavron]

Quote: Vasya

application and completeness. In 1941 there was nothing.

those. at 41 and before him did not apply anything?
or was nothing manned?
you already clarify

[Bigriver]

Quote: Skavron

those. at 41 and before him did not apply anything?
or was nothing manned?

Applied. The first attempt on the CER. Further: Mongolia, Spain, Finnish, Poland. Everywhere there was an unsuccessful use, after which, the views on the role and place of ABTV were revised.
On the 41st there was a certain staffing of mechanized corps of the extreme formation.
But.
There were no well-spent rational organizational staffs tested by military operations. And the extreme organizational staff reflected erroneous views on the use and tasks of the MK, was overloaded and in fact made the corps incapable of combat. Therefore, in June-July 41st and tore them into regiments and divisions, which by the beginning of August all "burned out".
And the team came .., move on to the formation of the brigades.
In general, it’s really easy to be smart after :))

[rainer]

Well, with the 1941 mechanized corps, the intrigue looms when the head of ABTU Pavlov was pushed to the ZAPOVO command to push through the idea of ​​the 1941 mechanized corps against which Pavlov objected ...

[Bigriver]

Quote: Rainger

Well, with the 1941 mechanized corps, the intrigue looms when the head of ABTU Pavlov was pushed to the ZAPOVO command to push through the idea of ​​the 1941 mechanized corps against which Pavlov objected ...

Duc, what's the difference, how to call the connection - the corps, division or brigade? The main thing is applicability, adequacy of the organizational staff, theory and practice of military operations.
In the war, having gained experience in operating brigades, we gradually came to the corps, which was essentially a division.
About Pavlov.
It is known that at the end of 1940 a military game took place in the KoVO.
"Blue" (Germans) commanded Zhukov, "Red" (Red Army) Pavlov.
And the Pavlovian side lost.
At the analysis of the game, Stalin asked Pavlov. Not verbatim from memory:
- What are the reasons for the failures of the "red"?
And he gets off with a joke, like:
- Well, in war games everything happens ...
In a word, he was a great strategist. The war is six months later, and he is joking.

[Skavron]

Quote: BigRiver

Mongolia, Spain, Finnish, Poland

And where, besides Spain, was the Red Army defeated?

[Bigriver]

Quote: Skavron

And where, besides Spain, was the Red Army defeated?

Did I say somewhere about the defeat of the Red Army?
We are talking about the experience of using parts and connections ABTV.
In general, there was nowhere for him to appear.
The fact is that the fantastically effective use of tank wedges by the Wehrmacht (in the first years of World War II) was due to ... the impossibility of waging a protracted war by Germany. That is, the ideology of operations was as follows - you need to quickly, with a minimum of cost, "bite out" and digest the enemy army.
That’s why Adolf liked Guderian’s blitzkrieg technology so much.

[Skavron]

Quote: BigRiver

We are talking about the experience of using parts and connections ABTV.Emu, in general, and there was nowhere to appear.

How? Halkin Gol did not use tanks?
During the assault on the Mannerheim line did not use tanks?
But in Poland, in general, there was no war as such with the massive use of tanks.

Quote: BigRiver

that the fantastically effective use of tank wedges by the Wehrmacht (in the early years of the 2nd World War)

Yes, this was against the armies of Europe, which actually did not defend themselves. What is one worthy battle in Europe with the massive use of tanks? Maginot bypass? Well, except that it is. There were no worthy battles anywhere in Europe, compared to the USSR - it was a walk for the Wehrmacht. So, about the German experience of tank driving in Europe, it was somehow not useful in the war with the USSR.

[Bigriver]

Quote: Skavron

How? Halkin Gol did not use tanks?
During the assault on the Mannerheim line did not use tanks?
But in Poland, in general, there was no war as such with the massive use of tanks.

What is one worthy battle in Europe with the massive use of tanks? Maginot bypass? Well, except that it is. There were no worthy battles anywhere in Europe, compared to the USSR - it was a walk for the Wehrmacht. So, about the German experience of tank driving in Europe, it was somehow not useful in the war with the USSR.

Take a break from the generalized image of “tanks”.
They are at war, organizational structures are performing combat missions.
Structures:
- optimally constructed, in accordance with the theory and proven practice of military operations;
- having high combat stability;
- Highly managed at all levels;
- effectively interacting with the combat arms;
- having a rational completeness of supply.
The experience of the operation of such mechanized structures of the Red Army in the 30s showed flaws in all of these positions. Therefore, there was a continuous process of “feeling for” the most important principle - the optimal structure.
For example, an almost bloodless Polish campaign showed extremely bad management, logistics, and the provision of tank formations making a long march.

Regarding the second.
The aim of the Wehrmacht tank group, as a tool of the blitzkrieg, was not a collision with the opposing tank units and formations of the enemy, but the development of tactical success in the operational one.
The aim was to violate the integrity, curtail the enemy’s defense, with the closure of tank mites deep in the rear, and the subsequent “digestion” of the formed boiler in conjunction with aviation and infantry formations.
This German experience gained in Poland and France was repeated with success in Russia.
But, in order for such an experience to appear, mobile cash connections are needed that can operate autonomously in the depths of the enemy’s defense.
The Red Army did not have such compounds by the beginning of the war. They appeared only to Stalingrad.

[Skavron]

Or maybe the reason is simply that the Red Army was not defending itself?

[Gazprom]

Quote: Kars

Quote: Skavron

it is interesting to look at the "raw" German analogue of the KV, KV-2 and T-34 ...

Yes, please Panther in 1943 - half of the 200 cash did not go into battle.
Kingtiger 1944 most of the time were not in battle but in repair.

and the bull tiger was walking with problems