Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized corps in battle
In the first days of the war, the combat activities of mechanized corps were determined by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 3, given in 22.07 22 in June 1941. He read:
a) The armies of the northern front continue to firmly cover the state border, the border on the left is the same;
b) the armies of the North-Western Front, firmly holding the Baltic Sea coast, put a powerful counter-attack from the Kaunas region into the flank and rear of the enemy's Suvalki grouping, destroy it in cooperation with the Western Front and by the end of 24 June capture the Suwalki region, the border on the left is the same;
c) The armies of the Western Front, holding back the enemy in the Warsaw direction, inflict a powerful counterattack by forces of at least two mechanized corps and aviation front into the flank and rear of the Suvalki enemy group, destroy it together with the North-Western Front and by the end of June 24 take control of the Suwalki area ...
d) The armies of the South-Western Front, firmly holding the state border with Hungary, concentric strikes in the general direction on Lublin by the forces of the 5 and 6 army, no less than 5 mechanized corps, and all front aviation to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping advancing at the front Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopil, by the end of 24 June, to seize the Lublin region, to secure itself from the Krakow direction;
e) The armies of the Southern front will not allow the enemy to invade our territory; when the enemy attempted to strike in the Chernivtsi direction or force the Prut and Danube rivers with powerful flank strikes by ground forces in conjunction with aviation to destroy it with two mechanized corps on the night of June 23 to concentrate in the Chisinau region and the forests north-west of Chisinau. "
This directive of NPOs reflected the desired rather than the actual state of affairs at the front. Chief of the General Staff G.K.Zhukov, who was at that time in the headquarters of the South-Western Federal University, did not take part in its preparation, and in a telephone conversation with his deputy, Vatutin, said: "But we still don’t know exactly where and with what forces the enemy strikes. is it better to understand what is happening at the front before the morning, and even then to take the necessary decision. " However, the issue was already resolved by Stalin and Tymoshenko.
The mechanized corps did not achieve much success in these battles, but they managed to slow down the advance of enemy troops in the main strike directions, although at the cost of huge losses. In the first weeks of the war, the mechanized corps lost almost everything Tanks, the majority of the personnel - the result of this was a directive letter from the Supreme Command Headquarters of July 15, 1941, which provided for the abolition of mechanized corps. Tank divisions were transferred to the command of the army commanders, motorized divisions were reorganized into infantry.
Northwest Front
The troops of the Baltic Military District on the eve of the war included the 3 and 12 mechanized corps. The advance to the border of the 12 th mechanized corps began on the order of the district commander Mr. F. I. Kuznetsov on June 18. After the outbreak of hostilities, the mechanized corps commanders received an order from the front commander to strike a counterstrike against the enemy grouping that had broken through: "12 th mech-corps-to eliminate the 23 th TD tanks of the enemy in Kreting, the main forces of the corps to deploy on the Teltyai-Povant front to strike the flank and to the enemy rear, breaking through to Taurogen, the 3 th mechanized corps, leaving the 5 th TDD at the disposal of the commander of the 11 th army, 2 th TD and 84 md on the night of June 23 to go ahead in advance on the Rosyena district to strike 12 interop MK with 9 th artillery brigade of the PTO on the enemy ". The 12 th mech body and units of the 10 th rifle corps from the Varniai region, Uzhventis and the 2 Tank Division of the 3 n MK together with the 48 rifle division from the Keidaniia area, Raseiniai were to defeat the forces at Skaudvili by destroying them by striking the Skudvil forces. German grouping. But, due to poor organization and support, the 23 — 24 June counterstroke was reduced to hasty, not coordinated in place and time actions.
ABPT SZF Commander P.P. Poluboyarov described these events in the following way:
The 2-th tank division of the 3-th MK, along with parts of the 48-th and 125-th rifle divisions, counterattacked the enemy in the morning of June 23, but didn’t bring any territorial success. On June 24, a fierce oncoming tank battle unfolded in the direction of the counterstrike. At the front, approximately about 60 km and in depth to 25 km, in battles on both sides simultaneously participated up to 1000 tanks. By the evening of the 2-I tank division was surrounded by German troops and 26 June defeated.
27 June was crushed headquarters 12 th mechanized corps. Comcor N.Shestopalov captured (instead of him with the 1.07 commander of the 12 corps assigned pk V.Ya. Grinberg). July 4 Corps launched in reserve the front.
But looking from the other side - Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Halder:
As a result of the breakthrough of the 4 tank group, the NWF troops retreated in divergent directions - the 8 army to Riga, the 11 army to Polotsk, and the road to Daugavpils and to the crossings of the Western Dvina turned out to be open. Already in the morning of June 26, the 8-I tank division of the 56-m Manstein approached Dau-gavpilsu. In order to eliminate the breakthrough from the Moscow Military District, the 21 th mechanized corps, Mr. DDLe-Lyushenko, was transferred to the NWF, receiving an order to cover the direction of the Pils direction, and to destroy enemy forces in the Rezekne area with a part of the forces. In the morning of June 28, 21-th micron compounds that had total 98 tan
Kov, went on the offensive. The result of the three-day fighting was the halt of the German offensive until July 2, up to the approach of the main forces of the German 4 tank brigade. The commander of the 56 motorized corps, Manstein, described these events in his memoirs: “As it was possible to foresee, the enemy pulled fresh forces not only from Pskov, but also from Minsk and Moscow. Soon we had to defend the enemy from the northern bank of the Dvina. supported by one tank division. In some areas the case took a serious turn ... Finally, on July 2 we were able to speak again after the third mechanized unit arrived in the corps - the SS division "Totenkopf", and on the left of us the 41 tank corps passed guilt at Yakobshtad-ta (Jekabpils). "
In July, to disrupt the intentions of the Germans to break through to Novgorod, the 1 th mechanized corps, Mr. M. D. Chernyavsky, was sent to NWF and was part of the Leningrad Military District before the war. At this point, there was only one 3 tank division in it, and even that without one tank battalion, wn and back. Even before the war, 17 of June, the 1-I tank division was withdrawn from its composition. The 30 June corps became part of the NWF, and the next day the 163-md was transferred to the 27-th army. The 5.07 units of the 1 Mechanism Corps, after a hard battle, occupied the city of Ostrov, but by the evening were forced to leave it. 14 — On July 15, a corps struck a blow at the 8-th tank division of the 56 nth missile near the town of Sol'tsy, dropping it to 40 km. This counterattack had the effect of stopping the German offensive on Leningrad until the main forces of the 18 German Army reached the line of the Luga River and the 4 TF was fully put in order. But the 1 Mechanic Corps itself ceased to exist as a tank formation, having lost most of the tanks.
By mid-July, all four mechanized corps operating in the NWF zone, as a result of huge losses (from 22 June to 9 July - 2523 tank) turned into weakened infantry units, covering the withdrawal of troops of the front, and were soon disbanded.
The Western Front
Here, directive No. 3 of the NPO Tymoshenko in the evening of June 22 set the task for the mechanized corps commanders to surround and knock out a group of Germans by strikes in the Grodno area in the direction of Suwalki together with the NWF troops. The 24 Army Mechanized Corps of the 6 Army, the 10 Mechanical Corps of the 11 Army and the 3 Cavalry Corps were involved in the counterstrike. The general leadership of the mechanized group was entrusted to the Deputy Front Commander, General I.V.Boldin.
The 11 th mechanized corps of General DK Mostovenko already 22 June entered the battle on the right flank of the Western Front, the connection with him was lost. The 6 th mechanized corps of General MG Khatskilevich 23 June began to advance from the region of Bialystok in the direction of Grodno, suffering losses from the strikes of German aircraft. The 4-i and 7-i tank divisions reached the line of deployment by noon on 23 June, where they were met with strong anti-tank fire and were attacked by aircraft. As a result of the fierce battle, they managed to drop the units of the Wehrmacht that had broken through to the southeast of Grodno and by the evening reached the defense zone of the 27 Infantry Division of the 3 Army. The next day, after the Germans captured Grodno, the 6 Mechanic Corps struck to the north. Encountering a powerful anti-tank defense, the corps suffered heavy losses.
In the afternoon of June 24, the tank divisions of the 6 th mechanized corps were re-targeted south-east of Grodno, where they engaged in combat with the 3 th tank group of Goth in the evening, trying to stop its advancement in the Minsk direction. Having entered the 8 th and 20 th army corps into battle, on June 25 the enemy succeeded in dismembering the divisions of the 6 th mechanized corps, which were forced to wage scattered battles that were not connected by a common idea. General Boldin with his headquarters was surrounded and lost contact with the command of the 6-th mic. The commander of the Polar Division, Pavlov, on the evening of June 25, gave the order to the commander of the 6 corps: “Immediately interrupt the battle and follow the forced march, following night and day, concentrate in Slonim” (which 24-th of General von Arnim captured on June 17). The 6 th and 11 th mechanized corps, which operated against the two army corps of the German 9 th army, suffered significant losses and, due to the lack of adequate logistics, were left without fuel and ammunition at the height of the battlefield. Under the blows of the German troops, they, together with parts of the 3 Army, were forced to retreat to the side of Nalibokskaya Forest, which led to the formation of a large gap between the flanks of the NWF and RF. At the end of June, the divisions of 6 and 11 of the mechanized corps were surrounded by troops west of Minsk.
The 14 th mechanized corps of General S.I. Oborin, part of the 4 th army of General A.A. Korobkov, received a military order on the evening of 22 June by the commander of the troops of 4 th army №02, which read: "14 th mechanized corps (22 th and 30 th TD, 205 th honey) from the morning of June 23 strike from the line of Kryvljani, Pelische, Khmelevo in the general direction of Vysoké Litovsk with the task to destroy the enemy east of the Western Bug River by the end of the day. " At six o'clock in June 23, units of the 14 th mechanized corps, the 28 st and 75 sd units launched counterattacks against the 47 th, 24 mk and 12 th army corps. By the beginning of the attack, the 30-I tank division had up to 130 tanks, 22-I, etc., around 100. During the battle, the division suffered heavy losses from artillery, aviation and tank fire. Under the threat of encirclement as a result of a roundabout from the north by the forces of the German 17 Panzer Division, Sov. the troops were forced to retreat. The total losses of the 14 mechanized corps in tanks amounted to 120 vehicles. The counter-strike had no success, and the 4-I army was dismembered by Guderian's troops and began to withdraw in the direction of Slutsk. The 14 Mechanic Corps covered its waste. By June 28, only the X-NUMX of the T-2 tank remained in it, the hull was withdrawn to the rear and disbanded. General S.I. Oborin was blamed for the failure (26 was wounded, and the command of 25.06 was taken over by p-to I.V. Tugarinov), he was arrested and then shot.
The 13, 17 and 20 mechanized corps were still in the process of formation by the beginning of the war, so they were used as infantry units in the battles, remaining without tanks by July.
At the beginning of July, the 5 th mechanized corps of General I.P. Alekseenko, previously destined for the USP, and the 7 th mechanized corps of General V.I. Vinogradov from the Moscow Military District, which included 924 and 715 tanks, respectively, became part of the troops of the Western Front. They were included in the 20 Army, General P.A. Kurochkin, who received the order of the Commander of the Polar Division: "Holding firmly the boundaries of the river Western Dvina, Dnieper, on the morning of July 6 1941 go into a decisive offensive to destroy the enemy's lepel group." The depth of the blows was determined for the 5 th mechanized corps to 140 km, and for the 7 th - to 130 km. On the morning of July 6, the 5, 7 th mechanized corps entered the battle. At first, their actions developed quite successfully: both corps, overcoming the resistance of the enemy, reached the area north and south of Senno. The enemy advanced the 17 and 18 tank divisions here. For two days, our corps repelled the onslaught of these compounds, thus delaying the advance of the entire 3 tank enemy group to the Dnieper ... However, the counterstrike of the mechanized corps did not develop. The Nazis threw large aviation forces here, and our corps was in dire straits, suffering losses. They were forced to begin withdrawal in harsh conditions under the blows of enemy tanks and aircraft.
Major General of the tank forces A.V. Borzikov in a report to the head of the Red Army GABTU assessed their actions: “The corps (5 and 7) fight well, the only bad thing is that the headquarters are slow and cumbersome, and it’s bad that many machines get the enemy because of a malfunctioning trifling. Neither the division, nor the mechanized corps, nor the army, nor the front are able to organize the repair, evacuation. There was no lock to cover the mechanized corps from the air, because of the enormous losses it could not fulfill. reasons, mechanized corps entered into battle at different times, p As an approach to the battlefield.
The main objective of the counterstrike was the defeat of E. Kleist's 1 tank group, which broke through at the junction of the General M. I. Potapov's 5 army and General I. N. Muzychenko's 6 army. The counter tank battle unfolded in the area of Lutsk, Dubno, Exactly from June 23.; From the side of Lutsk and Dubno, 1-th mechanized corps of Rokossovsky and 9-th mechanized corps of General N.V. Fek-lenko were attacked on the left flank of 19-ytr. From the south, from the Brody region, the 15 th mechanized corps of General I.I. Karpezo and the 8 th mechanized corps of General DI Ryabyshev attacked Radekh and Be-Restechko. June 23 German troops continued their attack on Lutsk, Berestechko, widening the gap between the 5 and 6 armies. On the same day, a counterstrike began. In the morning, in the area of Radekhov at the front of 70 km width, the 15 th mechanized corps launched an offensive, but, having suffered heavy losses, was forced to withdraw. Instead of taking part in striking the 4 tank group, the 1 th mechanized corps, Mr. A. A. Vlasov, was sent to eliminate the enemy’s breakthrough at the junction of the 6 and 26 th armies in the Mostis region (except for 32 th, which acted in conjunction with 15-m MK). The 24 th mechanized corps from the Voinitsa – Boguslavskaya line advanced on the 22 offensive on June, advanced by 7 — 10 km to Lokache. But, acting independently, without air support, the corps lost more than 50% of tanks and retreated to its original positions. The 41-th tank division of the 22-th MK did not participate in the counterstroke at all.
In the "Description of the fighting 22 th mechanized corps YuZF for the period from 22 to 29.06.1941 g." it says so:
In the morning of June 25 launched an offensive from the north of the 9 and 19 of the mechanized corps, throwing parts of the German 3 into the south-west from Rovno. But it was not possible to build on success because the blow from the south, due to the unavailability of the troops, was postponed the next day. June 26 th troops and 1 th army and 6 th 9 th MK from the north, 19 th and 8 th MK from the south, entered into a counter tank battle with 15 th, 9 th 11 th and 14 th Germans. The 16 and 9 of the mechanized corps during 19 — 26 of June fought with the 27 subunit, but under the air strikes they were forced to retreat to the area west of Rovno. The 3 Mechanic Corps struck the 8 TD, advancing 16 km. On the night of 12, he was taken out of combat and began concentrating on 27.06-m sk. "
Operational summary of the headquarters of the South-Western Federal Unit No. 09 from 26.06.1941 reported:
Counterstrike mezhkorpusov SWF for a week delayed the attack of the 1-th tank group and thwarted the enemy's plans to break through to Kiev and surround the 6-th, 12-th and 26-th SWF army on the Lvov ledge, but failed to achieve a breakthrough in the hostilities.
One of the main reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet mechanized corps in this battle was the lack of communication and interaction between them. The commander of the 9 th mechanized corps K.K. Rokossovsky:
V.S. Arhipov, commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 43 tank division of the 19,
In general, the leadership of the fighting mechanized corps left much to be desired. Orders of commanders of different levels often contradicted one another. This is clearly seen in the example of the 8-th Mechanized Corps. Here is an excerpt from a brief overview of the actions of mechanized front connections for the period from 22.06 to 1.08.1941:
The situation with the 15 Mechanized Corps was no better.
Starting a counter-strike, the 8 Mechanism Corps deeply wedged into the German frontiers, going to the rear of their 11 Armored Division and threatening the enemy’s warehouses deployed in Dubno. The German offensive was delayed for several days, but by July 1 the main forces of the corps were surrounded, left without fuel and ammunition. On the continuation of the counterstroke was no longer speech. Tankers went on the defensive, fighting off trenches of tanks, the fate of the corps was deplorable, as Halder noted a couple of days later, "during long hard fighting the enemy forces were ground and most of his units were broken." June 30 frontline troops received orders to withdraw to the line of fortified areas along the old state border.
In early July, the troops of Army Group South were able to break through the Soviet defenses. July 7 The Germans 11 Panzer Division reached Berdichev, and the 3 Motorized Corps of the 1 Panzer Group and the 6 Army reached Zhytomyr. As a result of this breakthrough, there was a threat of the capture of Kiev and the encirclement of units of the 6 and 12 armies of the SWF south-west of Kiev. Hitler demanded the destruction of possibly larger enemy forces west of the Dnieper in order to deprive him of the possibility of conducting organized operations by large masses of troops east of the Dnieper.
The command of the South-Western Front was forced to take urgent measures to counter the German troops. In the Berdichev area of the counterattack, the consolidated detachments of the 4 and 15 meh-corps divisions conducted. The 16 Mechanic Corps, which was transferred to the Western Front from the South, was also sent here. His divisions fought straight from the trains. From the parts of 4, 15, 16, the Berdichev group was formed under the command of division commander A.D. Sokolov. As a result, the counterattacks managed to force the Germans to go on the defensive, stopping their advance on the White Church. However, only 11-I td Germans, according to German data, lost more than 2000 people in battles. At the cost of a bloody battle, they managed to delay the advance of the Army Group Center to the south for a whole week (18.07.1941 of the city of Halder fixed the problem of the flank of the 1 tank group: "He is still marking time in Berdichev and Belaya Tserkov."). In battles, Berdichev especially distinguished 8-I and 10-I tank divisions, forging the main forces of the Kleist tank group for a week. At this time, heavy battles were fought in the Novograd-Volynsky area, where troops of the 5 Army of the South-Western Front struck counterattacks along the northern flank of the German group, which came to Kiev. The main striking force of the 5 army was three mechanized corps: 9-th Mr. AG Maslov (19.07 replaced KK Rokossovsky), 19-th Mr. N.V. Feklenko and 22-th Mr. VS Tamruchi, who had a total of 30 — 35 tanks (in 19-mk - 75 tanks).
However, the forces of the mechanized corps were exhausted by counterattacks, and the group under Korosten was forced to go on the defensive (as the Germans noted, “tanks are no longer observed”).
By this time, only the shadow of the former power remained from the mechanized corps. According to the inquiries of the headquarters of the Southwestern Directorate General Command on the state of rifle and tank divisions of the front from 22 July 1941, "tank divisions counted: less than 1 thousand people - about 20% of all divisions, according to 1-2 thousand people - about 30%, 3-5 thousand people - about 40%, 10 — 16 thousand people - 10% of all divisions. Of the 12 tank divisions, only two have 118 and 87 tanks. Most of the rest have only a few tanks. " In the second half of August, units of the 5 Army, including the mechanized corps, moved beyond the Dnieper.
In general, the actions of the mechanized corps in the first week of the war against the enemy’s strike forces to change the course of events were unsuccessful in any of the strategic directions. The German command, assessing the actions of the Soviet troops in the application of counterattacks, noted:
South Front
In the LF band, Soviet mechanized corps had tremendous superiority over the enemy — 769 tanks of the 2 and 18 of the mechanized corps were opposed by Romanian 60. The ratio was 12,8: 1. But the front commander Tyulenev believed that his troops were opposed by the German 13 tank and motorized divisions, although in fact they did not exist. Here, in June — July, the 2 th mechanized corps of General Yu.V. Novoselsky was most active. Together with the 48 rifle corps of General R.Ya. Malinovsky, he inflicted counterattacks on the German and Romanian troops at the turn of the Prut River. On July 8, a blow to the joint between the 4 of the Romanian and 11 of the German armies. The 2 of the Mechanized Corps stopped the enemy's advance. 22 July The 2 th mechanized corps struck a counterattack from the Christianovka area to Uman along the 11 th and 16 th German tank divisions, throwing them away at 40 km, eliminating the threat of the 18 th encirclement.
The 18 th mechanized corps 30 of June from Ackermann was taken to the Vopnjarki district for staffing and on July 4 was transferred to the South-West Federal District. On July 19, he joined the 18 Army and launched a counterstrike on the right flank of the 52 Army Corps of the 17 Army south of Vinnitsa, having 387 tanks. On July 25, divisions of the 17 Army broke through the defenses in the 18 mk and 17 sk zones in the Gaisin-Trostyanets area. Until 30 in July, the 18-th mechanized corps occupied the defense of Gaivoron, and in August was transferred to Pavlograd.
At the end of July, the 2 divisions of the mechanized corps tried to help the 6 and 12 armies of the LF in the vicinity of Uman, but failed to break through the front of the German troops. In addition, the tank units of the Law Faculty had suffered significant losses by this time, although their combat potential was still quite large. According to the report of the Assistant Commander of the LF for ABTV Mr. Shtevnev from 31 in July 1941, in the LF mechanized corps there were:
in 2, mk of combat-ready: 1 KB, 18 T-34, 68 BT, 26 T-26, 7 flame-throwers, 27 T-37, 90 BA-10, 64 BA-20 (all tanks - 147 BA-22.06, 489 BA-XNUMX (all tanks - XNUMX BA-XNUMX, XNUMX BA-XNUMX (all tanks - XNUMX BA-XNUMX, XNUMX BA-XNUMX XNUMX);
18 MK: 15 BT and T-26, 5 T-28, 2 flamethrower, 1 BA-10, 4 BA-20 (total tanks - 22, on 22.06. - 280);
16 MK: 5 T-28, 11 BA-10, 1 BA-20 (on 22.06. - 608 tanks);
24 MK: 10 BT, 64 T-26, 2 Flamethrowers, 10 BA-10, 5 BA-20 (total tanks - 76, on 22.06. - 222).
It also said:
The state of the mechanized corps can be judged by the combat report of the headquarters of the 6 Army of the Law Firm from July 26:
The mechanized corps stationed in the inner districts were disbanded after the start of the war, and on their basis ten tank divisions of the new organization were created. The main reason for the reorganization of the mechanized corps who had taken the German blow was “the complete exhaustion of the material part”.
When considering the events of the first weeks of the war, the question arises why, possessing a huge quantitative superiority in tanks (in the ZF band, the ratio was 2,7: 1, the UZF - 5,6: 1, and LF - 12,8: 1), having tanks that are not inferior, or even superior German, Soviet armored troops suffered such a crushing defeat to their fighting qualities? To explain it with the superiority of the enemy in military equipment and the suddenness of the attack, as was done before, will be very unconvincing. Therefore, we present here the considerations of the commanders of the tank forces, the direct participants in the events described.
P. P. Poluboy moat, commander of the ABTV SZF:
KK Rokossovsky, in June 1941, the commander of the 9-th mechanized corps of the South-Western Front:
We will not deal with the causes of defeats that are strategic in nature - a lot of literature has been devoted to them, especially in recent years. The reasons for the failures of the operational-tactical level were assessed back in 1941. In documents that were not intended for wide use, they were stated with exhaustive completeness. As an example, we give the report of the Assistant Commander of the Troops, Mr. Tank Troops, Volsky, Deputy NKO of the USSR, Mr. Fedorenko of 5 August 1941. It deals with the actions of the mechanized corps of the South-Western Front, but its conclusions are applicable to corps of other fronts. In this document, the main reasons for the rapid breakdown of tank units are:
2. All the combat operations of the mechanized corps took place without careful reconnaissance, some units did not know at all what was happening in the immediate vicinity. Aviation intelligence in the interests of MK was not conducted at all. The control of the mech-cases from the side of the combined-arms commanders was poorly placed, the units were scattered (8 microns) and, at the time of the attack, they were cut off from each other. The army headquarters were not prepared at all for the management of such large mechanized units as the mechanized corps ...
3. The army headquarters completely forgot that the material part has certain motochas, that it requires viewing, minor repairs, additional replenishment of fuel and ammunition, and the technical staff and commanders of the ABTO armies did not tell them this, and instead of carrying out the mechanized corps after completing the task they needed the time for this purpose, the combined-arms commanders demanded nothing more than anything else. The mechanic corps had absolutely no cover both on the march and on the battlefield.
4. Information from the top to the bottom, as well as with the neighbors, was put very badly. From the first day the war took on a maneuverable character, the enemy turned out to be more mobile ...
This is all that concerns the general commanders. But there were many shortcomings made directly by the commanders of the mechanized units and formations. These include:
1. The MK, TD and TP staffs have not yet mastered the proper operational and tactical outlook. They could not draw the right conclusions and did not fully understand the idea of the command of the army and the front.
2. There was no maneuverability - there was lethargy, slowness in solving problems.
3. Actions, as a rule, had the character of frontal strikes, which led to an unnecessary loss of materiel and personnel ...
4. The inability to organize the battle formations of the corps in directions, to cover the paths of movement of the enemy, and the latter mainly moved along the roads.
5. There was no desire to deprive the enemy of the possibility of bringing fuel, ammunition. Ambush on the main directions of his actions are not practiced.
6. Not used large settlements for the destruction of the enemy and the inability to act in them.
7. The command, starting from the platoon commander to the big commanders, was bad, the radio was used poorly, the hidden command and control of the troops was badly delivered ...
8. Crew training in material preservation is extremely poorly set. There were cases when the crews left the vehicles with ammunition, there were separate cases when the crews left the vehicles and left.
9. In all parts and formations, there were no evacuation means, and the available ones could provide MK, etc., only in offensive operations.
10. The personnel of the new technology has not mastered, especially KB and T-34, and is completely unaccustomed to the production of repairs in the field.
11. ... The lack of a full organization of evacuation means led to the fact that evacuation of combat materiel ... was absent.
12. The headquarters turned out to be poorly prepared, staffed, as a rule, by combined-arms commanders with no experience in tank units.
13. In higher education institutions (academies) such types of combat that they had to meet were never worked through. "
It is difficult to add anything to these conclusions, it can only be confirmed by concrete facts. Here are just a few:
In 8-th TD 4-th mk YuZF crews destroyed 107 tanks, including 25 KB, 31 T-34. 18 T-34 disappeared altogether for an unknown reason.
In 10-th TD 15-th mk SFW was thrown at the departure of 140 tanks, of which 34 KB and 9 T-34. 6 machines missing.
7-th TD 6-th mk ZF only 22 June from air strikes lost 63 tank.
13-th TD 5-th mk ZF in the midst of a counterstrike rose due to the lack of fuel. The 6-th, 11-th, 12-th and other microns were found in the same position.
The 5 and 7 of the MK ZF in July launched a counterstrike on the terrain that was completely unsuitable for the actions of the tanks, which led to large losses.
22-I td 14-go mk ZF, deployed in Brest, already in the morning of June 22 lost most of the tanks and artillery as a result of shelling. Were destroyed fuel and ammunition depots.
23-I and 28-I TD 12-th m SZF, participating in the tilzit grouping of the attack, engaged in battle at different times, there was no coordination of actions. The 28 Panzer Division, moreover, was left without fuel and had to be idle for half a day.
- Igor Drogovoz
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Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized enclosures
Iron fist of the Red Army. Tank park on the eve of the war
Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized corps in battle
Iron fist of the Red Army. Motorized and tank divisions
Information