Military Review

Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized corps in battle

103
From the first day of the war, the mechanized corps became involved in fierce battles with German troops. They did not have to break through the defenses of the enemy, enter the breakthrough and act in the rear, as was envisaged by the pre-war plans. The main type of their combat activity was the infliction of counterattacks against the broken strike groups of the enemy, which in itself was considered unlikely before the war.


In the first days of the war, the combat activities of mechanized corps were determined by the order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 3, given in 22.07 22 in June 1941. He read:

"1. The enemy, striking the main blows from Suwalki ledge to Olita and from the Zamost region at the front of Vladimir-Volynsky, Radzehov, auxiliary blows in the directions of Tilsit, Siauliai and Sedlitz, Volkovysk during June 22, suffered heavy losses, I have achieved some success in these areas ... 2. I order:

a) The armies of the northern front continue to firmly cover the state border, the border on the left is the same;

b) the armies of the North-Western Front, firmly holding the Baltic Sea coast, put a powerful counter-attack from the Kaunas region into the flank and rear of the enemy's Suvalki grouping, destroy it in cooperation with the Western Front and by the end of 24 June capture the Suwalki region, the border on the left is the same;

c) The armies of the Western Front, holding back the enemy in the Warsaw direction, inflict a powerful counterattack by forces of at least two mechanized corps and aviation front into the flank and rear of the Suvalki enemy group, destroy it together with the North-Western Front and by the end of June 24 take control of the Suwalki area ...

d) The armies of the South-Western Front, firmly holding the state border with Hungary, concentric strikes in the general direction on Lublin by the forces of the 5 and 6 army, no less than 5 mechanized corps, and all front aviation to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping advancing at the front Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopil, by the end of 24 June, to seize the Lublin region, to secure itself from the Krakow direction;

e) The armies of the Southern front will not allow the enemy to invade our territory; when the enemy attempted to strike in the Chernivtsi direction or force the Prut and Danube rivers with powerful flank strikes by ground forces in conjunction with aviation to destroy it with two mechanized corps on the night of June 23 to concentrate in the Chisinau region and the forests north-west of Chisinau. "


This directive of NPOs reflected the desired rather than the actual state of affairs at the front. Chief of the General Staff G.K.Zhukov, who was at that time in the headquarters of the South-Western Federal University, did not take part in its preparation, and in a telephone conversation with his deputy, Vatutin, said: "But we still don’t know exactly where and with what forces the enemy strikes. is it better to understand what is happening at the front before the morning, and even then to take the necessary decision. " However, the issue was already resolved by Stalin and Tymoshenko.

The mechanized corps did not achieve much success in these battles, but they managed to slow down the advance of enemy troops in the main strike directions, although at the cost of huge losses. In the first weeks of the war, the mechanized corps lost almost everything Tanks, the majority of the personnel - the result of this was a directive letter from the Supreme Command Headquarters of July 15, 1941, which provided for the abolition of mechanized corps. Tank divisions were transferred to the command of the army commanders, motorized divisions were reorganized into infantry.

Tankers choose a place for the crossing. The commander of the division of amphibious tanks KOVO Art. Lieutenant Gunnikov and machine commander Podhalzin.


BT-7 sample 1937 g. 7-th micron MVO at the exercises in October 1940 g.


Northwest Front

The troops of the Baltic Military District on the eve of the war included the 3 and 12 mechanized corps. The advance to the border of the 12 th mechanized corps began on the order of the district commander Mr. F. I. Kuznetsov on June 18. After the outbreak of hostilities, the mechanized corps commanders received an order from the front commander to strike a counterstrike against the enemy grouping that had broken through: "12 th mech-corps-to eliminate the 23 th TD tanks of the enemy in Kreting, the main forces of the corps to deploy on the Teltyai-Povant front to strike the flank and to the enemy rear, breaking through to Taurogen, the 3 th mechanized corps, leaving the 5 th TDD at the disposal of the commander of the 11 th army, 2 th TD and 84 md on the night of June 23 to go ahead in advance on the Rosyena district to strike 12 interop MK with 9 th artillery brigade of the PTO on the enemy ". The 12 th mech body and units of the 10 th rifle corps from the Varniai region, Uzhventis and the 2 Tank Division of the 3 n MK together with the 48 rifle division from the Keidaniia area, Raseiniai were to defeat the forces at Skaudvili by destroying them by striking the Skudvil forces. German grouping. But, due to poor organization and support, the 23 — 24 June counterstroke was reduced to hasty, not coordinated in place and time actions.

Fighting northwest (June 22 -15 July 1941)


ABPT SZF Commander P.P. Poluboyarov described these events in the following way:
"The advancement of troops for the counterblow took place under conditions when the first echelon divisions of the 8 Army retreated under the onslaught of the enemy ... The divisions of the 12 mechanized corps were still heavily attacked by enemy aircraft. In the area of ​​Fryanai, an unexpected collision of 23 units occurred- the enemy’s tank division with the enemy. They managed to cut off the rear of its 46 tank regiment from the combat units. Nevertheless, the regiments of this division were able to concentrate in time for the counter attack in the area of ​​Laukow. As for XNU The MX Tank Division, then its units reached the designated areas three hours late, part of its forces turned out to be a reflection of the enemy’s tank attacks in the Kelme region, and the 28-rd corps also fought fierce battles with the enemy. wake up at night. The actions of the 202 Mechanism Corps have practically turned into a counter battle without proper preparation. "


The 2-th tank division of the 3-th MK, along with parts of the 48-th and 125-th rifle divisions, counterattacked the enemy in the morning of June 23, but didn’t bring any territorial success. On June 24, a fierce oncoming tank battle unfolded in the direction of the counterstrike. At the front, approximately about 60 km and in depth to 25 km, in battles on both sides simultaneously participated up to 1000 tanks. By the evening of the 2-I tank division was surrounded by German troops and 26 June defeated.

On the eve of the war: BT-7 LenVO at the May Day parade of 1941. The May blizzard was then perceived by many as a bad omen ...


BT-5 and BT-7 on pre-war exercises.


27 June was crushed headquarters 12 th mechanized corps. Comcor N.Shestopalov captured (instead of him with the 1.07 commander of the 12 corps assigned pk V.Ya. Grinberg). July 4 Corps launched in reserve the front.

But looking from the other side - Chief of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Halder:
The "Army Group Troops" North "on almost the entire front (with the exception of the 291 Infantry Division, advancing on Liba-wu, reflected enemy enemy counterattacks, which the Russian 3 Panzer Corps allegedly conducted with the support of several mechanized brigades. Despite this, the reinforced right wing of the army group managed to advance to Wielkomir (Ukmerge). On this front, the Russians also fight hard and fiercely "(June 24 record). June 25 Halder makes the following entry:" It is clear that only 3 tank body The motivator, who was in the area from the very beginning, was defeated by the Reinhardt tank corps and that the Manstein tank corps was so far east that it forced the Russians to begin withdrawing from the Western Dvina. The enemy retired in an organized manner, covering the withdrawal with tank formations. "The results were insignificant and the losses in tanks are great. Only the 12 th mech body to 29 June lost up to 80% materiel. Already from 25 June, the mechanized corps conducted rearguard battles in separate units, covering the withdrawal of the 8 th, 11 th and 27 th armies of the NWF.

As a result of the breakthrough of the 4 tank group, the NWF troops retreated in divergent directions - the 8 army to Riga, the 11 army to Polotsk, and the road to Daugavpils and to the crossings of the Western Dvina turned out to be open. Already in the morning of June 26, the 8-I tank division of the 56-m Manstein approached Dau-gavpilsu. In order to eliminate the breakthrough from the Moscow Military District, the 21 th mechanized corps, Mr. DDLe-Lyushenko, was transferred to the NWF, receiving an order to cover the direction of the Pils direction, and to destroy enemy forces in the Rezekne area with a part of the forces. In the morning of June 28, 21-th micron compounds that had total 98 tan

Kov, went on the offensive. The result of the three-day fighting was the halt of the German offensive until July 2, up to the approach of the main forces of the German 4 tank brigade. The commander of the 56 motorized corps, Manstein, described these events in his memoirs: “As it was possible to foresee, the enemy pulled fresh forces not only from Pskov, but also from Minsk and Moscow. Soon we had to defend the enemy from the northern bank of the Dvina. supported by one tank division. In some areas the case took a serious turn ... Finally, on July 2 we were able to speak again after the third mechanized unit arrived in the corps - the SS division "Totenkopf", and on the left of us the 41 tank corps passed guilt at Yakobshtad-ta (Jekabpils). "



Pictures taken by German war correspondent Arthur Grimm on the morning of June 22 near the village of Suden. The SdKfz 251 / 1 armored personnel carriers and the troika of 1, etc., pass by the burning BT. SdKfz 251 / 1 are equipped with mounts for launching rockets.


In July, to disrupt the intentions of the Germans to break through to Novgorod, the 1 th mechanized corps, Mr. M. D. Chernyavsky, was sent to NWF and was part of the Leningrad Military District before the war. At this point, there was only one 3 tank division in it, and even that without one tank battalion, wn and back. Even before the war, 17 of June, the 1-I tank division was withdrawn from its composition. The 30 June corps became part of the NWF, and the next day the 163-md was transferred to the 27-th army. The 5.07 units of the 1 Mechanism Corps, after a hard battle, occupied the city of Ostrov, but by the evening were forced to leave it. 14 — On July 15, a corps struck a blow at the 8-th tank division of the 56 nth missile near the town of Sol'tsy, dropping it to 40 km. This counterattack had the effect of stopping the German offensive on Leningrad until the main forces of the 18 German Army reached the line of the Luga River and the 4 TF was fully put in order. But the 1 Mechanic Corps itself ceased to exist as a tank formation, having lost most of the tanks.

By mid-July, all four mechanized corps operating in the NWF zone, as a result of huge losses (from 22 June to 9 July - 2523 tank) turned into weakened infantry units, covering the withdrawal of troops of the front, and were soon disbanded.

Western operations (June 22 - July 10 1941).


The Western Front

Here, directive No. 3 of the NPO Tymoshenko in the evening of June 22 set the task for the mechanized corps commanders to surround and knock out a group of Germans by strikes in the Grodno area in the direction of Suwalki together with the NWF troops. The 24 Army Mechanized Corps of the 6 Army, the 10 Mechanical Corps of the 11 Army and the 3 Cavalry Corps were involved in the counterstrike. The general leadership of the mechanized group was entrusted to the Deputy Front Commander, General I.V.Boldin.

The 11 th mechanized corps of General DK Mostovenko already 22 June entered the battle on the right flank of the Western Front, the connection with him was lost. The 6 th mechanized corps of General MG Khatskilevich 23 June began to advance from the region of Bialystok in the direction of Grodno, suffering losses from the strikes of German aircraft. The 4-i and 7-i tank divisions reached the line of deployment by noon on 23 June, where they were met with strong anti-tank fire and were attacked by aircraft. As a result of the fierce battle, they managed to drop the units of the Wehrmacht that had broken through to the southeast of Grodno and by the evening reached the defense zone of the 27 Infantry Division of the 3 Army. The next day, after the Germans captured Grodno, the 6 Mechanic Corps struck to the north. Encountering a powerful anti-tank defense, the corps suffered heavy losses.

In the afternoon of June 24, the tank divisions of the 6 th mechanized corps were re-targeted south-east of Grodno, where they engaged in combat with the 3 th tank group of Goth in the evening, trying to stop its advancement in the Minsk direction. Having entered the 8 th and 20 th army corps into battle, on June 25 the enemy succeeded in dismembering the divisions of the 6 th mechanized corps, which were forced to wage scattered battles that were not connected by a common idea. General Boldin with his headquarters was surrounded and lost contact with the command of the 6-th mic. The commander of the Polar Division, Pavlov, on the evening of June 25, gave the order to the commander of the 6 corps: “Immediately interrupt the battle and follow the forced march, following night and day, concentrate in Slonim” (which 24-th of General von Arnim captured on June 17). The 6 th and 11 th mechanized corps, which operated against the two army corps of the German 9 th army, suffered significant losses and, due to the lack of adequate logistics, were left without fuel and ammunition at the height of the battlefield. Under the blows of the German troops, they, together with parts of the 3 Army, were forced to retreat to the side of Nalibokskaya Forest, which led to the formation of a large gap between the flanks of the NWF and RF. At the end of June, the divisions of 6 and 11 of the mechanized corps were surrounded by troops west of Minsk.

BT-7 on the march. The tank is equipped with a pair of headlights "combat light" on the mask of the gun to highlight the target when shooting at night.


T-26 model 1939 g. With a conical turret and a tower with a sloping armor-box. On the tank, which belonged to NIIBT, the on-board number was unusual, not only on the turret, but also on the front hull sheet.


The 14 th mechanized corps of General S.I. Oborin, part of the 4 th army of General A.A. Korobkov, received a military order on the evening of 22 June by the commander of the troops of 4 th army №02, which read: "14 th mechanized corps (22 th and 30 th TD, 205 th honey) from the morning of June 23 strike from the line of Kryvljani, Pelische, Khmelevo in the general direction of Vysoké Litovsk with the task to destroy the enemy east of the Western Bug River by the end of the day. " At six o'clock in June 23, units of the 14 th mechanized corps, the 28 st and 75 sd units launched counterattacks against the 47 th, 24 mk and 12 th army corps. By the beginning of the attack, the 30-I tank division had up to 130 tanks, 22-I, etc., around 100. During the battle, the division suffered heavy losses from artillery, aviation and tank fire. Under the threat of encirclement as a result of a roundabout from the north by the forces of the German 17 Panzer Division, Sov. the troops were forced to retreat. The total losses of the 14 mechanized corps in tanks amounted to 120 vehicles. The counter-strike had no success, and the 4-I army was dismembered by Guderian's troops and began to withdraw in the direction of Slutsk. The 14 Mechanic Corps covered its waste. By June 28, only the X-NUMX of the T-2 tank remained in it, the hull was withdrawn to the rear and disbanded. General S.I. Oborin was blamed for the failure (26 was wounded, and the command of 25.06 was taken over by p-to I.V. Tugarinov), he was arrested and then shot.

T-26 makes its way through the thicket. Spare support and support rollers are mounted on the fender.


T-26 units of Captain Khomyakov move through the village under Yelnya. Western Front, July 1941


Tankers look around before entering the line.


T-34 under the guise of anti-tank artillery goes on the attack. Western Front, July 1941


The 13, 17 and 20 mechanized corps were still in the process of formation by the beginning of the war, so they were used as infantry units in the battles, remaining without tanks by July.

At the beginning of July, the 5 th mechanized corps of General I.P. Alekseenko, previously destined for the USP, and the 7 th mechanized corps of General V.I. Vinogradov from the Moscow Military District, which included 924 and 715 tanks, respectively, became part of the troops of the Western Front. They were included in the 20 Army, General P.A. Kurochkin, who received the order of the Commander of the Polar Division: "Holding firmly the boundaries of the river Western Dvina, Dnieper, on the morning of July 6 1941 go into a decisive offensive to destroy the enemy's lepel group." The depth of the blows was determined for the 5 th mechanized corps to 140 km, and for the 7 th - to 130 km. On the morning of July 6, the 5, 7 th mechanized corps entered the battle. At first, their actions developed quite successfully: both corps, overcoming the resistance of the enemy, reached the area north and south of Senno. The enemy advanced the 17 and 18 tank divisions here. For two days, our corps repelled the onslaught of these compounds, thus delaying the advance of the entire 3 tank enemy group to the Dnieper ... However, the counterstrike of the mechanized corps did not develop. The Nazis threw large aviation forces here, and our corps was in dire straits, suffering losses. They were forced to begin withdrawal in harsh conditions under the blows of enemy tanks and aircraft.

Column T-26 pushed to the position for a counterattack.


Stuck in dirt and abandoned BA-20M.


Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized corps in battle
Tank part, covered on the road with an air strike. High accuracy of German dive bombers is noticeable: the dispersal of bombs does not exceed a few meters, and most of the BT-7 and KB are destroyed by direct hits.


The retreating artillery unit after the attack of the German tank crews.


Screened KV-1 "Hit the Fascists."


The BA-10 column is being advanced from Chisinau to the western border. 24 June 1941


Tractor "Komsomolets", inherited the Germans with ammunition.


Major General of the tank forces A.V. Borzikov in a report to the head of the Red Army GABTU assessed their actions: “The corps (5 and 7) fight well, the only bad thing is that the headquarters are slow and cumbersome, and it’s bad that many machines get the enemy because of a malfunctioning trifling. Neither the division, nor the mechanized corps, nor the army, nor the front are able to organize the repair, evacuation. There was no lock to cover the mechanized corps from the air, because of the enormous losses it could not fulfill. reasons, mechanized corps entered into battle at different times, p As an approach to the battlefield.

The main objective of the counterstrike was the defeat of E. Kleist's 1 tank group, which broke through at the junction of the General M. I. Potapov's 5 army and General I. N. Muzychenko's 6 army. The counter tank battle unfolded in the area of ​​Lutsk, Dubno, Exactly from June 23.; From the side of Lutsk and Dubno, 1-th mechanized corps of Rokossovsky and 9-th mechanized corps of General N.V. Fek-lenko were attacked on the left flank of 19-ytr. From the south, from the Brody region, the 15 th mechanized corps of General I.I. Karpezo and the 8 th mechanized corps of General DI Ryabyshev attacked Radekh and Be-Restechko. June 23 German troops continued their attack on Lutsk, Berestechko, widening the gap between the 5 and 6 armies. On the same day, a counterstrike began. In the morning, in the area of ​​Radekhov at the front of 70 km width, the 15 th mechanized corps launched an offensive, but, having suffered heavy losses, was forced to withdraw. Instead of taking part in striking the 4 tank group, the 1 th mechanized corps, Mr. A. A. Vlasov, was sent to eliminate the enemy’s breakthrough at the junction of the 6 and 26 th armies in the Mostis region (except for 32 th, which acted in conjunction with 15-m MK). The 24 th mechanized corps from the Voinitsa – Boguslavskaya line advanced on the 22 offensive on June, advanced by 7 — 10 km to Lokache. But, acting independently, without air support, the corps lost more than 50% of tanks and retreated to its original positions. The 41-th tank division of the 22-th MK did not participate in the counterstroke at all.

Fighting southwest (June 22 -15 July 1941).


In the "Description of the fighting 22 th mechanized corps YuZF for the period from 22 to 29.06.1941 g." it says so:
"24 June 1941 19-I tank division in 13.30 counterattacked the attacking units of the enemy in the height of 228.6, Aleksandrovka, Mar-Kovitsy. The T-26 tanks, the 45 units, the BA-10 armored vehicles, and 12 units were launched in the attack. Most of these tanks were destroyed by the enemy and disabled. When the tanks reached the forest area to the south of 228.6, north of Kanevichi, the enemy’s infantry began to retreat, and strong artillery and gunfire were opened from the forest, followed by medium and heavy tanks. Strong tank tank started th, which lasted for 2,5 hours. The tanks left after the battle began to break out of battle.The infantry began a disorderly retreat ... 19-I, etc., retired to the line of the river Serge. In this battle, the commander of 22-th mk Mr. Kondrusev was killed (he was replaced Chief of Staff Mr. Tamruchi) ...

In the morning of June 25 launched an offensive from the north of the 9 and 19 of the mechanized corps, throwing parts of the German 3 into the south-west from Rovno. But it was not possible to build on success because the blow from the south, due to the unavailability of the troops, was postponed the next day. June 26 th troops and 1 th army and 6 th 9 th MK from the north, 19 th and 8 th MK from the south, entered into a counter tank battle with 15 th, 9 th 11 th and 14 th Germans. The 16 and 9 of the mechanized corps during 19 — 26 of June fought with the 27 subunit, but under the air strikes they were forced to retreat to the area west of Rovno. The 3 Mechanic Corps struck the 8 TD, advancing 16 km. On the night of 12, he was taken out of combat and began concentrating on 27.06-m sk. "


German soldiers pass by tanks subjected to bombardment. Northwest Front, July 1941.


Abandoned on the street of the Lithuanian city T-38.


Operational summary of the headquarters of the South-Western Federal Unit No. 09 from 26.06.1941 reported:
“The 8 th mechanized corps in 9.00 26 June hesitantly attacked the enemy’s mechanic units from the Brody area in the direction of Berestechko and, lacking sufficient support from aviation and from the neighbor’s left, 15 micron, was stopped by the enemy in the initial area for the attack. without executing an order to attack. By 15, 9.00 - the beginning of the attack - the MK was not yet concentrated in the initial area for the attack. " The headquarters of the South-Western Front, seeing the low impact of the counterstrikes, decided to strengthen the defense at the Lutsk-Kremenets line by the front-line reserve (26.06, 31, 36-th) and prepare for a new powerful counterstrike. The bid did not approve this decision, ordering to continue the attacks in the morning of June 37. The departing 27 divisions of the MK were turned back, but their efforts were not supported by other MKs, and the 8 Mechanic Corps itself was surrounded. The commander of 8, Mr. DI.Rya-Byshev, in a combat report from 8, reported: "The situation is difficult for the units, please support the aircraft on June 28.06.1941. The enemy units are on the Verba and Dubno roads. Tanks that entered the area Dubno, cut off from the 28 Division, it’s not known what the situation is, aviation is heavily bombarding. The 7 Division suffered heavy losses. "


Anti-aircraft SAU Sd Kfz 10 / 4 with 20-mm automatic cannon Flak 30 firing at Soviet tanks. Small-caliber rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns on semi-tracked and automobile chassis proved to be a formidable opponent of lightly armored BT and T-26.


Tanks Pz Kpfw III Ausf E broke into the Soviet artillery battery.


Counterstrike mezhkorpusov SWF for a week delayed the attack of the 1-th tank group and thwarted the enemy's plans to break through to Kiev and surround the 6-th, 12-th and 26-th SWF army on the Lvov ledge, but failed to achieve a breakthrough in the hostilities.

One of the main reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet mechanized corps in this battle was the lack of communication and interaction between them. The commander of the 9 th mechanized corps K.K. Rokossovsky:
"... with the information of the troops on the situation at the front, the situation was very bad. We had to extract information ourselves. And if we could more or less learn and guess about the events in our area, then what had happened or was happening in the area of ​​other South-Western armies We did not know anything about the front. Apparently, the headquarters of the 5 Army also did not know anything, because it did not inform us. The corps’s communication with the headquarters of the 5 Army was often absent, but it periodically stopped with its neighbors. "


Burnt T-34 of the 1940 model of the year. Western Front, July 1941.


Wrecked and burned trucks, BT-7 and KB tanks after the battle of Great. KB of early releases with an F-32 gun and a shielded turret. North-Western Front, Pskov Direction, August 1941


T-28, failed after the explosion of the gun.


V.S. Arhipov, commander of the reconnaissance battalion of the 43 tank division of the 19,
"... the link was our weakest link. And not only the link between the two groups of mechanized corps that struck from the south (8 and 15 and MK) and from the north (9 and 19 and MK), but communication of the higher headquarters with these groups - the headquarters of the South-Western Front ... and the headquarters of the 5 Army. Weak radio communication with long interruptions was the reason for the lateness of information sent from the front line to the higher headquarters. Therefore, the decisions that were made at the headquarters and queues, were transferred to the front, often did not correspond to the changed combat situation, for example, on the evening of June 26, when, after crushing The right wing of the German 11 th TD and defeating one of its tank regiments, our division went to Dubno, none of us knew that from the south, inflicting huge losses on the other connections of the 48 of the German motorized corps, we were successfully advancing towards 8. the mechanized corps of General DI Ryabyshev ... a similar situation repeated the next day, when all three corps — the 36 th rifle, 8 th and 19 th mechanized — again attacked the Dubna direction. Again, we and our neighbors, the arrows of the 36 corps, reached the approaches to Dubno, but did not know that the 34-I tank division of I.Vasiliev from the 8-th mechanized corps had already broken into the city. Thus, the 26 and 27 of June Soviet tank wedges twice and very deep - up to 30 km - crashed into both flank of the German 48-th micron. However, the lack of communication between these wedges and mutual ignorance did not allow us to bring the matter to a logical end - to the environment of the 48-th micron between Brody and Dubno. "
The 34 Panzer Division, which occupied Dubno, was surrounded by German troops and defeated - all the tanks were destroyed, the commander of the regiment I.Vasilyev was killed.

Tank Pz Kpfw II Ausf F, broken by artillery fire and half sunken in a river.


The Red Army soldiers at the captured light staff armored car Sd Kfz 261. Westward, August 1941


In general, the leadership of the fighting mechanized corps left much to be desired. Orders of commanders of different levels often contradicted one another. This is clearly seen in the example of the 8-th Mechanized Corps. Here is an excerpt from a brief overview of the actions of mechanized front connections for the period from 22.06 to 1.08.1941:
“22 June 1941, without having allowed the corps to execute an order of the 26 army, the front commander appoints a new area of ​​concentration and subordinates the corps of the 6 army. The commander of the 6 army, not taking into account that the corps makes a march, following the order of the South-Western Front commander, gives a new area of ​​concentration. By virtue of this order, the commander had to turn the marching units in a new direction. On June X, the commander of the 24 army was transferring the corps to a new area. On June 6, by order of the commander of the front No. 26, the corps was being transferred to the new region. not participating in hostilities, and making "super-forced" marches in a vicious circle, following successively the orders of the commanders of the 0015 and 26 armies and fronts, the corps passed an average 6 km, leaving 495% of the available fighting on the roads during marches of the material part, exhausting the remaining material part and the driver's staff. June 50, carrying out the orders of the front No. 26 and 0015, the commander of the unit, without concentrating all the units, enters his corps into parts without reconnaissance of the enemy, without finding out its location and strength. As a result of this, the units run up against strong VET and swamps and suffer considerable losses without completing the assigned task. The corps' actions from the air were not covered, interaction on the frontline was not organized. Nervousness of higher staffs in the management and setting of tasks, the abundance of orders not related to one another, the failure to comply with elementary statutory norms in organizing and conducting marches were the main reason for the loss of body capability of the corps and the loss of materiel. "


Repulsed by Soviet troops Pz Kpfwlll Ausf G with 50-mm Kwk L / 42 cannon.


Kievans inspect the captured assault gun StuG III Ausf C, captured from the village of Vita-Pochtovaya and towed to the city. On the self-propelled gun in the center stands the deputy military commissar of the Kiev Fortified District battalion commissar MV Pankovsky. Kiev, August 10 1941.


The situation with the 15 Mechanized Corps was no better.
"Frequent change of tasks to the corps and delivery of orders from the front headquarters and the 6 army with a great delay brought ambiguity, confusion and excessive expenditure of service resources. For example, on June 24 the order was received by the front headquarters to withdraw the 15-th mechanized corps from the Kolesniki-Kholoyuv line to the area southwest of Brody for a joint strike with the 8 micron in the direction of Berestechko, Dubno. Parts of the corps began to carry out this order and were en route, and some had already reached their concentration area. 25 June was followed by an order to the opposite returning parts of the corps to the previously occupied line in order to prepare the offensive in the direction of Radzekhov, Co-Kool together with 4 m. In 23.00 26 June a new order was received by the front headquarters: to defeat the enemy's mechanic group operating on Dubno, striking in the direction of Lopatyn, Berestechko , Dubno. 27 June was received again a new order, radically changing the corps' task: to move to the Zločuvski region, the corps started to execute the order, but a new front order followed: "Despite any difficulties and technical condition of the equipment, 28 June pat in the direction Berestechko. "
Comments are superfluous.

Padded Pz Kpfw And Ausf S. July 1941


Lined by gunners Pz Kpfw 38 (t), known here as "Prague". July 1941


Starting a counter-strike, the 8 Mechanism Corps deeply wedged into the German frontiers, going to the rear of their 11 Armored Division and threatening the enemy’s warehouses deployed in Dubno. The German offensive was delayed for several days, but by July 1 the main forces of the corps were surrounded, left without fuel and ammunition. On the continuation of the counterstroke was no longer speech. Tankers went on the defensive, fighting off trenches of tanks, the fate of the corps was deplorable, as Halder noted a couple of days later, "during long hard fighting the enemy forces were ground and most of his units were broken." June 30 frontline troops received orders to withdraw to the line of fortified areas along the old state border.

In early July, the troops of Army Group South were able to break through the Soviet defenses. July 7 The Germans 11 Panzer Division reached Berdichev, and the 3 Motorized Corps of the 1 Panzer Group and the 6 Army reached Zhytomyr. As a result of this breakthrough, there was a threat of the capture of Kiev and the encirclement of units of the 6 and 12 armies of the SWF south-west of Kiev. Hitler demanded the destruction of possibly larger enemy forces west of the Dnieper in order to deprive him of the possibility of conducting organized operations by large masses of troops east of the Dnieper.

The command of the South-Western Front was forced to take urgent measures to counter the German troops. In the Berdichev area of ​​the counterattack, the consolidated detachments of the 4 and 15 meh-corps divisions conducted. The 16 Mechanic Corps, which was transferred to the Western Front from the South, was also sent here. His divisions fought straight from the trains. From the parts of 4, 15, 16, the Berdichev group was formed under the command of division commander A.D. Sokolov. As a result, the counterattacks managed to force the Germans to go on the defensive, stopping their advance on the White Church. However, only 11-I td Germans, according to German data, lost more than 2000 people in battles. At the cost of a bloody battle, they managed to delay the advance of the Army Group Center to the south for a whole week (18.07.1941 of the city of Halder fixed the problem of the flank of the 1 tank group: "He is still marking time in Berdichev and Belaya Tserkov."). In battles, Berdichev especially distinguished 8-I and 10-I tank divisions, forging the main forces of the Kleist tank group for a week. At this time, heavy battles were fought in the Novograd-Volynsky area, where troops of the 5 Army of the South-Western Front struck counterattacks along the northern flank of the German group, which came to Kiev. The main striking force of the 5 army was three mechanized corps: 9-th Mr. AG Maslov (19.07 replaced KK Rokossovsky), 19-th Mr. N.V. Feklenko and 22-th Mr. VS Tamruchi, who had a total of 30 — 35 tanks (in 19-mk - 75 tanks).

However, the forces of the mechanized corps were exhausted by counterattacks, and the group under Korosten was forced to go on the defensive (as the Germans noted, “tanks are no longer observed”).

By this time, only the shadow of the former power remained from the mechanized corps. According to the inquiries of the headquarters of the Southwestern Directorate General Command on the state of rifle and tank divisions of the front from 22 July 1941, "tank divisions counted: less than 1 thousand people - about 20% of all divisions, according to 1-2 thousand people - about 30%, 3-5 thousand people - about 40%, 10 — 16 thousand people - 10% of all divisions. Of the 12 tank divisions, only two have 118 and 87 tanks. Most of the rest have only a few tanks. " In the second half of August, units of the 5 Army, including the mechanized corps, moved beyond the Dnieper.

Attack cavalry with the support of T-26.


In general, the actions of the mechanized corps in the first week of the war against the enemy’s strike forces to change the course of events were unsuccessful in any of the strategic directions. The German command, assessing the actions of the Soviet troops in the application of counterattacks, noted:
"Before the Army Group South, the enemy was at a height in matters of general management and conduct of offensive operations of operational scale. In this respect, the enemy showed himself with a bad side. Army control at the tactical level and the level of combat troop training is mediocre. "


South Front

In the LF band, Soviet mechanized corps had tremendous superiority over the enemy — 769 tanks of the 2 and 18 of the mechanized corps were opposed by Romanian 60. The ratio was 12,8: 1. But the front commander Tyulenev believed that his troops were opposed by the German 13 tank and motorized divisions, although in fact they did not exist. Here, in June — July, the 2 th mechanized corps of General Yu.V. Novoselsky was most active. Together with the 48 rifle corps of General R.Ya. Malinovsky, he inflicted counterattacks on the German and Romanian troops at the turn of the Prut River. On July 8, a blow to the joint between the 4 of the Romanian and 11 of the German armies. The 2 of the Mechanized Corps stopped the enemy's advance. 22 July The 2 th mechanized corps struck a counterattack from the Christianovka area to Uman along the 11 th and 16 th German tank divisions, throwing them away at 40 km, eliminating the threat of the 18 th encirclement.

The 18 th mechanized corps 30 of June from Ackermann was taken to the Vopnjarki district for staffing and on July 4 was transferred to the South-West Federal District. On July 19, he joined the 18 Army and launched a counterstrike on the right flank of the 52 Army Corps of the 17 Army south of Vinnitsa, having 387 tanks. On July 25, divisions of the 17 Army broke through the defenses in the 18 mk and 17 sk zones in the Gaisin-Trostyanets area. Until 30 in July, the 18-th mechanized corps occupied the defense of Gaivoron, and in August was transferred to Pavlograd.

At the end of July, the 2 divisions of the mechanized corps tried to help the 6 and 12 armies of the LF in the vicinity of Uman, but failed to break through the front of the German troops. In addition, the tank units of the Law Faculty had suffered significant losses by this time, although their combat potential was still quite large. According to the report of the Assistant Commander of the LF for ABTV Mr. Shtevnev from 31 in July 1941, in the LF mechanized corps there were:
in 2, mk of combat-ready: 1 KB, 18 T-34, 68 BT, 26 T-26, 7 flame-throwers, 27 T-37, 90 BA-10, 64 BA-20 (all tanks - 147 BA-22.06, 489 BA-XNUMX (all tanks - XNUMX BA-XNUMX, XNUMX BA-XNUMX (all tanks - XNUMX BA-XNUMX, XNUMX BA-XNUMX XNUMX);
18 MK: 15 BT and T-26, 5 T-28, 2 flamethrower, 1 BA-10, 4 BA-20 (total tanks - 22, on 22.06. - 280);
16 MK: 5 T-28, 11 BA-10, 1 BA-20 (on 22.06. - 608 tanks);
24 MK: 10 BT, 64 T-26, 2 Flamethrowers, 10 BA-10, 5 BA-20 (total tanks - 76, on 22.06. - 222).

It also said:
"As a result of the exhaustion of material resources, accidents, breakdowns require an average overhaul: for 2-mk mk - to 200 units, in 18-mk m - to 200 units."


The state of the mechanized corps can be judged by the combat report of the headquarters of the 6 Army of the Law Firm from July 26:
"The 16 th mechanized corps with minimal remnants: 240 th MD, 15 th and 44 th etc., of which an infantry detachment was formed by force to the battalion, mtsp, by force to the battalion. The 16 th mechanized corps does not represent anything at all real power. "


Repair of the T-26 by the crew and the workers' brigade. On the days of the retreat, it was possible to bring the damaged vehicle out only if it kept running - there was nothing to tow the failed tanks and there was no time.


Odessa tanks-tractors on the basis of STZ-5 with armored steel from the ship. The front armored tractor is armed with infantry machine guns DP. Pay attention to the figure of a sailor - the fleet was actively involved in the manufacture of these machines, and they were often taken by sailors to battle.


Repair of BT-2 in the workshop of one of the plants in Leningrad.


KV-1 with a welded turret and an F-32 cannon.


Crew masks your T-34 in cover.


The mechanized corps stationed in the inner districts were disbanded after the start of the war, and on their basis ten tank divisions of the new organization were created. The main reason for the reorganization of the mechanized corps who had taken the German blow was “the complete exhaustion of the material part”.

When considering the events of the first weeks of the war, the question arises why, possessing a huge quantitative superiority in tanks (in the ZF band, the ratio was 2,7: 1, the UZF - 5,6: 1, and LF - 12,8: 1), having tanks that are not inferior, or even superior German, Soviet armored troops suffered such a crushing defeat to their fighting qualities? To explain it with the superiority of the enemy in military equipment and the suddenness of the attack, as was done before, will be very unconvincing. Therefore, we present here the considerations of the commanders of the tank forces, the direct participants in the events described.

P. P. Poluboy moat, commander of the ABTV SZF:
"Most of the counterattacks were inflicted by our troops frontally, often scatteredly, without concentrating the main efforts on decisive directions, on the enemy’s undeveloped and strong enemy groupings. Air reconnaissance worked well for the enemy. Hitler's pilots quickly revealed regroupings and concentration of our troops, especially they followed movements tank connections. "


KK Rokossovsky, in June 1941, the commander of the 9-th mechanized corps of the South-Western Front:
"The troops of this district (KOVO) from the very first day of the war turned out to be completely unprepared to meet the enemy. Their deployment did not correspond to the position created at our border as a clear threat of a possible attack. Many units did not have the required set of ammunition and artillery, the latter were taken to the landfills located near the border itself, and left it there. No plans were made for 22 June, so the troops were taken aback in the full sense of the word. The loss of communication between the district headquarters and the troops ruined the difficult situation. Good tank crews died in an unequal battle, selflessly playing the role of infantry in battles. Even when the directions of the main strikes inflicted by the German troops and their grouping and forces were clearly established, the district command was unable to take responsibility and take a cardinal decision to save the situation, save most of the troops from complete defeat, ottyanuv them in the old fortified area. "


The tank battalion of Major Baranov takes up positions in the area of ​​the Crimean shaft. Open hatch in the upper tower hatch is designed for flag communication and launch signal flares. October 1941 of the year.


We will not deal with the causes of defeats that are strategic in nature - a lot of literature has been devoted to them, especially in recent years. The reasons for the failures of the operational-tactical level were assessed back in 1941. In documents that were not intended for wide use, they were stated with exhaustive completeness. As an example, we give the report of the Assistant Commander of the Troops, Mr. Tank Troops, Volsky, Deputy NKO of the USSR, Mr. Fedorenko of 5 August 1941. It deals with the actions of the mechanized corps of the South-Western Front, but its conclusions are applicable to corps of other fronts. In this document, the main reasons for the rapid breakdown of tank units are:

"1. From the very first day of the war, the mechanized corps were misused, because all were given to the armies ...

2. All the combat operations of the mechanized corps took place without careful reconnaissance, some units did not know at all what was happening in the immediate vicinity. Aviation intelligence in the interests of MK was not conducted at all. The control of the mech-cases from the side of the combined-arms commanders was poorly placed, the units were scattered (8 microns) and, at the time of the attack, they were cut off from each other. The army headquarters were not prepared at all for the management of such large mechanized units as the mechanized corps ...

3. The army headquarters completely forgot that the material part has certain motochas, that it requires viewing, minor repairs, additional replenishment of fuel and ammunition, and the technical staff and commanders of the ABTO armies did not tell them this, and instead of carrying out the mechanized corps after completing the task they needed the time for this purpose, the combined-arms commanders demanded nothing more than anything else. The mechanic corps had absolutely no cover both on the march and on the battlefield.

4. Information from the top to the bottom, as well as with the neighbors, was put very badly. From the first day the war took on a maneuverable character, the enemy turned out to be more mobile ...

This is all that concerns the general commanders. But there were many shortcomings made directly by the commanders of the mechanized units and formations. These include:

1. The MK, TD and TP staffs have not yet mastered the proper operational and tactical outlook. They could not draw the right conclusions and did not fully understand the idea of ​​the command of the army and the front.

2. There was no maneuverability - there was lethargy, slowness in solving problems.

3. Actions, as a rule, had the character of frontal strikes, which led to an unnecessary loss of materiel and personnel ...

4. The inability to organize the battle formations of the corps in directions, to cover the paths of movement of the enemy, and the latter mainly moved along the roads.

5. There was no desire to deprive the enemy of the possibility of bringing fuel, ammunition. Ambush on the main directions of his actions are not practiced.

6. Not used large settlements for the destruction of the enemy and the inability to act in them.

7. The command, starting from the platoon commander to the big commanders, was bad, the radio was used poorly, the hidden command and control of the troops was badly delivered ...

8. Crew training in material preservation is extremely poorly set. There were cases when the crews left the vehicles with ammunition, there were separate cases when the crews left the vehicles and left.

9. In all parts and formations, there were no evacuation means, and the available ones could provide MK, etc., only in offensive operations.

10. The personnel of the new technology has not mastered, especially KB and T-34, and is completely unaccustomed to the production of repairs in the field.

11. ... The lack of a full organization of evacuation means led to the fact that evacuation of combat materiel ... was absent.

12. The headquarters turned out to be poorly prepared, staffed, as a rule, by combined-arms commanders with no experience in tank units.

13. In higher education institutions (academies) such types of combat that they had to meet were never worked through. "


Abandoned in the BT-7 workshops of the 1935 and 1937 model.


These T-26 and T-40 did not have time to join the battle and went to the Germans right on the railway platforms.


"Thirty", hit by a bomb strike.


It is difficult to add anything to these conclusions, it can only be confirmed by concrete facts. Here are just a few:
In 8-th TD 4-th mk YuZF crews destroyed 107 tanks, including 25 KB, 31 T-34. 18 T-34 disappeared altogether for an unknown reason.
In 10-th TD 15-th mk SFW was thrown at the departure of 140 tanks, of which 34 KB and 9 T-34. 6 machines missing.
7-th TD 6-th mk ZF only 22 June from air strikes lost 63 tank.
13-th TD 5-th mk ZF in the midst of a counterstrike rose due to the lack of fuel. The 6-th, 11-th, 12-th and other microns were found in the same position.
The 5 and 7 of the MK ZF in July launched a counterstrike on the terrain that was completely unsuitable for the actions of the tanks, which led to large losses.
22-I td 14-go mk ZF, deployed in Brest, already in the morning of June 22 lost most of the tanks and artillery as a result of shelling. Were destroyed fuel and ammunition depots.
23-I and 28-I TD 12-th m SZF, participating in the tilzit grouping of the attack, engaged in battle at different times, there was no coordination of actions. The 28 Panzer Division, moreover, was left without fuel and had to be idle for half a day.

KB destroyed by the explosion of ammunition.


T-34 after the battle with German tanks. In the board - a lot of holes, visible traces of fire. The track roller was torn out, and a tower hatch and a fan were demolished by an explosion of ammunition.


To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
Iron fist of the Red Army. Creation of armored troops
Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized enclosures
Iron fist of the Red Army. Tank park on the eve of the war
Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized corps in battle
Iron fist of the Red Army. Motorized and tank divisions
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  1. Russian
    Russian 22 March 2013 08: 48
    0
    We would have a little more time, the Germans would have gotten ahead of us.
    1. Orik
      Orik 22 March 2013 09: 10
      +6
      The Germans were ahead of us in the first place in command and control and combat training.
      1. Andrey77
        Andrey77 22 March 2013 12: 34
        0
        In combat training, no. But in control, or rather in combat use - on two heads.
      2. svp67
        svp67 23 March 2013 18: 49
        0
        And also in the deployment of troops, in a more thoughtful staffing organization ...
    2. Bigriver
      Bigriver 22 March 2013 09: 53
      +2
      Quote: р_у_с_с_к_и_й
      We would have a little more time, the Germans would have gotten ahead of us.

      The formation of the mechanized corps was to be completed in 1943.
    3. Stas57
      Stas57 22 March 2013 09: 56
      +3
      We would have a little more time

      min years 5 with all the problems
      1. Hudo
        Hudo 22 March 2013 11: 37
        +2
        Quote: Stas57
        We would have a little more time

        min years 5 with all the problems


        Hopelessness and despair are the best dope. Managed for four years, but at what a terrible price.
    4. Rustam
      Rustam 22 March 2013 11: 27
      +2
      At the beginning of the war, the Red Army was superior to the Germans in tanks, creating 10 times as it seemed invincible fur of the corps

      But their tragedy was that there was no tactic of their use, but frontal attacks of mostly light tanks without the support of aviation and artillery without tactics of use, unlike the Wehrmacht, which used deep-grab tactics, using mostly medium Pz III tanks, with excellent optics, aviation and artillery

      Having no such tactics as the Germans, the mighty corps mechs were almost completely destroyed by August 1941
      1. Nagaibak
        Nagaibak 22 March 2013 11: 55
        +1
        Rustam "But their tragedy was that there was no tactics for their use and frontal attacks were mainly light tanks without the support of aviation and artillery without tactics of use, unlike the Wehrmacht."
        You forgot to add without infantry support. And our fur hulls were inferior to German mobile joints in the number of vehicles and its carrying capacity.
        1. Andrey77
          Andrey77 22 March 2013 12: 39
          0
          We didn’t have motor vehicles at the beginning of the war (compared to the Germans). The guns were towed on horseback (and sometimes human) traction.
          1. Nagaibak
            Nagaibak 22 March 2013 14: 35
            +1
            Andrey77 "The guns were towed on horse (and sometimes human) traction."
            I would not say that. We have vehicles in the fur. connections was. Googling and see our many crushed columns. But, a lot of cars had to be mobilized from the national economy. The thing is that with the same number of cars ours were less load-carrying. Ie at a time could take less cargo than the German.
            And the STZ-5 tractors that were supposed to tow large-caliber guns? They were slow. The Germans seemed to drag their howitzers 210 mm into the lungs.
        2. Rustam
          Rustam 22 March 2013 14: 06
          -1
          Accurately noticed put plus
          The infantry did not have the means to fight German tanks, anti-tank rifles appeared only in 42, and there were few chances against the PzIII
          1. Nagaibak
            Nagaibak 22 March 2013 14: 53
            +3
            Rustam "The infantry did not have the means of fighting German tanks, anti-tank guns appeared only in 42, and there were few chances against the PzIII with forty-fives"
            The bulk of the losses to the tanks was caused by artillery.
            The German Panzer Division 1941-Society. number of 13700 people. It included a tank regiment number 2600, a motorized infantry brigade of two motorized regiments, two battalions each about 6000 people. This is what I mean by infantry in a mech. A motorcycle regiment of 1078 people and an artillery regiment of three divisions.
            The artillery of the tank division consisted of 24 light field howitzers, 12 150 heavy field howitzers. 4 150 mm heavy infantry guns, two per motorized rifle. regiment. 20 t-75 mm infantry guns, 30 t-81 mm mortar. Actually anti-tank artillery was represented by 48 guns. Number of tanks from 147 to 209 pieces. As you can see more than one tank, you can also add direct-fire air defense guns, which also went as part of the mobile units of the Germans. First of all, they knocked out our KV and T-34. This was especially evident in the battles for Leningrad, the German tank division successfully attacked our troops armed with KV tanks, and it had Czech tanks in its composition.
            It’s just me that it is impossible to consider the causes of defeats separately. It is necessary in the complex.
          2. Avenger711
            Avenger711 22 March 2013 17: 31
            +3
            A stunning statement in its idiocy. If, "cut by the censorship" from a normal battalion anti-tank gun, which even in the 43rd year of the Pz IVG head-on from 500 meters allegedly had no chance against the "three-ruble note", then how could an ATR with armor penetration less than 30 mm from 100 meters , and which in the 42nd merged in the thousands without much effect on German tanks ???
            1. Rustam
              Rustam 22 March 2013 19: 06
              0
              Idiocy, but look that besides 45 the infantry had nothing, there were no anti-tank grenades and the quality of the same 45 shells was below all criticism
              The only rejoicing is the divisional artillery, but it was not so mobile and was quickly opened by the Germans, after which it was airstrike

              We probably read different books with you? And we have different opinions about the actions of the Red Army at the beginning of the war
      2. AK44
        AK44 22 March 2013 15: 52
        -5
        What is the use of such superiority if the fur. the corps was commanded by yesterday's company and battalion commanders. And knowledgeable and experienced commanders with experience in the war in Spain and Khalkhin Gol in the taiga fell down a forest (at best). But actually (forgive me admirers of Joseph Vissarionovich), comrade Stalin did everything so that the war for the USSR began in this way, and not otherwise. And huge losses in people and equipment at the initial stage of the war in the first place - HIS merit!
        1. avt
          avt 22 March 2013 16: 19
          +1
          Quote: AK44
          What is the use of such superiority if the fur. the corps was commanded by yesterday's company and battalion commanders.

          Documents for the registration of personnel in the studio. With surnames and positions. That is when we will stigmatize the “totalitarian” regime. And ala Svanidze doesn’t use his tongue to scratch, here people are poorly poor, but they know the material. But if the positive rating does not go, then yes, you can play with skulls. not understood by the "Stalinists". Here one political officer was already twitching in the spirit of perestroika, and then he demanded to remove himself from the moderators.
          1. AK44
            AK44 22 March 2013 16: 56
            -1
            Well, explain to me the reason for 1941. Who is responsible for this? Is not the head of state?
            1. Kars
              Kars 22 March 2013 17: 14
              +5
              A strange question - Hitler bears responsibility (judicially proven at the Nyurbern process)
              then those who allowed not to observe Germany the Treaty of Versailles are not happy.

              You can also look for who was found guilty of defeating Pearl Harbor and whether Roosevelt suffered a well-deserved punishment.

              and the reasons for 1941 are the time, the backward economy of tsarist Russia, the loss in World War I. There are many reasons for it. Every action has it.
              1. igordok
                igordok 22 March 2013 17: 59
                0
                Unfortunately, only one "plus", no longer deliver. I agree in everything. And the question "Who is to blame" got so much angry . Thank you.
              2. AK44
                AK44 22 March 2013 18: 44
                -7
                Hitler is an aggressor, that’s understandable. But where did Stalin look? Didn’t he know that almost the entire German army gathered on the border with the USSR? Or maybe he turned on a duck, that concentrating their troops near our border, the Germans were preparing to capture the British Isles? Do not be an idiot! Do not forget also that in those days in the Union EVERYTHING was done only with the knowledge and command of Stalin. The defeats of 41-42 are a consequence of his mistakes and miscalculations.
                By the way, the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty was signed by Trotsky, the second person in the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Stalin from the same gang. And under Nicholas 2, no matter how they scolded him, the Germans did not reach Moscow and Tsaritsyn. And the Bolsheviks, in exchange for power, sold the Germans Russia with giblets. Or am I wrong?
                1. Kars
                  Kars 22 March 2013 19: 01
                  +2
                  Quote: AK44
                  But Stalin was looking where

                  Rezun is so tearing up telling how the USSR drove the second echelon to the western borders. It is strange that you do not remember this. Increase in the rate of rearmament, etc.
                  Quote: AK44
                  Don't be an idiot

                  Well, I don’t want to compare this to you.
                  Quote: AK44
                  By the way, the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty

                  He would not have been if tsarism had achieved victories on the fronts.
                  Quote: AK44
                  Or maybe he leaned on a duck

                  No, he wasn’t seduced, but what could he do of what he didn’t do? In the period from the moment of the surrender of France, he did his best to delay the war.

                  And in general, France is most likely to blame for surrendering to the Germans in a month, and not waging a war to the last drop of blood.
                  Quote: AK44
                  And under Nicholas 2, no matter how they scolded him, the Germans did not reach Moscow and Tsaritsyn

                  Under Nicholas, Russia itself entered the war, defending British interests. At the same time, having suffered shameful defeats in Prussia and Galicia. Despite the fact that Germany ACTIVELY fought on two fronts, and RI fought mainly with Austria-Hungary.

                  Apparently you will have to be an idiot for a long time until you learn the story.
                  1. Nagaibak
                    Nagaibak 22 March 2013 20: 50
                    +5
                    Dear Kars, I will correct you a little
                    Kars "Under Nicholas, Russia itself got involved in the war, defending the British interests. At the same time, having suffered shameful defeats in Prussia and Galicia."
                    As for Prussia, you are right. But the Russian army won the Battle of Galicia in 1914, the Austrians lost 325 thousand people, including 100 thousand prisoners. This victory with leveled the bitterness of defeat in Prussia. The Warsaw-Ivangorod operation was still won by the Russian army, the Germans were forced to retreat to their original positions. And about the fact that in the war with Austria-Hungary the Russian army was luckier - your truth.
            2. avt
              avt 22 March 2013 17: 15
              0
              Quote: AK44
              Well, explain to me the reason for 1941. Who is responsible for this? Is not the head of state?

              laughing That is, there are still no documents. Let's jump off the topic of lieutenants in general positions, appointed by the "bloody tyrant of all times and peoples" ?!
              1. AK44
                AK44 22 March 2013 18: 51
                -4
                Sam did not see did not read. I can’t know the names of the commanders. But I remember the history lessons at school and military school well. Apparently you were taught differently, or you studied poorly. one out of two.
                1. avt
                  avt 22 March 2013 19: 53
                  +2
                  Quote: AK44
                  Sam did not see did not read. I can’t know the names of the commanders.

                  So this is bad, the archives are open, and books based on them are quite enough, and different. In the presence of higher, and even military education, it is quite possible to understand. Although stamping is easier to think than the brain to include. Soviet education was distinguished by the fact that it gave such an amount of knowledge that every cook could manage the state {this is a classic}. But it can be done differently, only then there is no need to be offended if they laugh or call a fool. Live and learn .
            3. Avenger711
              Avenger711 22 March 2013 17: 34
              -1
              Bears for what? For what you write nonsense? The lack of officers where she was, the result of the growth of the army in the 39th a couple of times.
              1. Rustam
                Rustam 22 March 2013 19: 18
                0
                First, learn to communicate normally with people and not poke and show your omniscience! If you can know something better, communicate with people with respect and explain and explain

                And showing your self - it does not color you, more respect for people
              2. AK44
                AK44 23 March 2013 22: 01
                +1
                Your head is delirious. You do not deserve further attention. Less to you!
        2. Bigriver
          Bigriver 22 March 2013 18: 17
          +4
          Quote: AK44

          ... knowledgeable and experienced commanders with experience in the war in Spain and Khalkhin-Gol in the taiga felled the forest (at best).

          In general, then (may the admirers of Joseph Vissarionovich forgive me), comrade Stalin did everything so that the war for the USSR began in this way, and not otherwise. And huge losses in people and equipment at the initial stage of the war in the first place - HIS merit!

          What are the names and positions of experienced and knowledgeable.
          The Spanish experience for the development of operational tactical art has given us practically nothing. And in some ways, he even came up with the wrong conclusions. In particular, about the impossibility of a deep breakthrough of the defensive line by large mechanized formations.
          By and large, one 11th Yakovlev brigade acted on Khalkhin Gol. The forest did not fall ... He died in battle.

          Try not to speak AT ALL. Speak specifically, backing up your value judgments with factual material.
          1. AK44
            AK44 22 March 2013 18: 55
            -2
            Look on the Internet, a ton of information!
      3. Avenger711
        Avenger711 22 March 2013 17: 27
        -2
        Of course, we will not consider mobilization issues, political factors, and the organizational structure of the armies, because it’s much easier to write crap about light tank attacks without artillery support ...
      4. svp67
        svp67 23 March 2013 18: 56
        +1
        The tragedy is that if MK were formed in that state at 100%, they would still be able to do little, because they were too bulky and overloaded with tanks ....
    5. evfrat
      evfrat 22 March 2013 16: 42
      -3
      All that is done - all in the end for the better. And then if we had time ... Now it would not be a fascist swastika banned, but Soviet symbols.
  2. evfrat
    evfrat 22 March 2013 12: 28
    +3
    You can add another problem that has already become chronic in the Russian army - the lack of communications not only between the commanders on the battlefield, but also between the leadership of the formations. We are still fighting in deafness and blindness, August the eighth is another example.
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 22 March 2013 12: 42
      0
      We lagged behind the Germans and Americans decently in radio communications. But there was a wire connection at the level.
      1. evfrat
        evfrat 22 March 2013 16: 38
        +1
        At the level of the last war, you want to say? And what kind of wires, when they ran back, and counterattacks went blind, just throwing the soldiers into the unknown ... In general, I don’t know why this issue has not been resolved so far? Any explanations?
        1. Avenger711
          Avenger711 22 March 2013 17: 34
          -3
          Yes, but you didn’t read them, therefore you write nonsense.
          1. evfrat
            evfrat 23 March 2013 15: 24
            0
            Also say that using the flag system and pigeon mail during the war is a worthy connection. Read Zhukov’s memoirs, he has written a lot about the lack of a normal connection. I do not like Zhukov - German sources to help. They do not like them either - Rokossovsky will do. If I’m wrong, you can write in what, instead of switching to an assessment of my person and what I read.
      2. Avenger711
        Avenger711 22 March 2013 17: 38
        +1
        Yes, the brains of people over the decades of anti-Soviet delirium were “cut out by censorship” so that not only to learn the real situation from the Germans with radio communications, but also to understand that radio communications in operational management is equivalent to going to the front line with a swearing man and a detailed explanation to the enemy that planned to do with it, they are no longer able to. Even now, key communication lines are wired.
      3. AK44
        AK44 22 March 2013 18: 59
        0
        Wired connection is good in the barracks on the nightstand or on duty for parts. And in a real battle? Of course, when there is no radio connection, we were content with what was available.
        1. evfrat
          evfrat 23 March 2013 15: 29
          0
          And it is not clear how it should work when the enemy deeply wedged into defense destroys primarily communication systems. And radio communication was often represented by this mammoth: (Zhukov specifically refers to this device several times in a two-volume book) http://rw6ase.narod.ru/000/rpl_b/bch.html
  3. rodevaan
    rodevaan 22 March 2013 12: 41
    0
    Real Russian heroes, those who survived in 41. They died but the super-subhumans ended up with necks nevertheless.

    There were few tanks that were superior to the Nazi, mostly BT, or T-26. Of course you won’t get much on them. The 34th were superior to the fascist T-2s and T-3s, smashing them like cardboard boxes, but there were very few of them. Plus, the surprise of the attack, the general unpreparedness, chaos and confusion of the first months - all this led to the fact that it was not possible to immediately gather all the power into a fist and at least somehow respond in an organized manner. Hence the big losses, hence the unprepared and ill-conceived counterattacks that did not reach the goal.
    Well, nothing, they survived - they smashed the reptiles and then they drove all this Western-shaped trash back with a Russian club. Almost 90% of all their gangster hordes and their tank and aviation armads were subhuman in the form of fertilizers and scraped up steel and duralumin scrap.

    Moreover, I want to note - in the Great Patriotic War these bastards were hit on the head so that almost 70 years have passed, and they still sit in silence and don’t show their nose, and with the word war, they immediately have a tantrum.
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 22 March 2013 12: 50
      0
      Plus the surprise of the attack, the general unpreparedness, chaos and confusion of the first months
      --
      Excuse me, are you exposing my grandfathers as fools? What a surprise - every student knew about the war with Germany in the 40s. Chaos and confusion - do you judge by yourself?
      1. Nagaibak
        Nagaibak 22 March 2013 15: 02
        +1
        Andrey77 "Excuse me, you make my grandfathers fools? What a surprise - every schoolboy knew about the war with Germany in the 40s. Chaos and confusion are you judging by yourself?"
        Maybe he meant in general the transition from war to peace. And here, anyone will not be prepared. And in any country. Or do you think only with us ... the war has begun, and the officer has the keys to the warehouses with shells, he is on vacation or something like that. And about the chaos .. hehe recently fallen meteorite in the Chelyabinsk region confirmation of what will happen if they attack us. There was no connection, the authorities were silent, rumors, a slight panic. If this action lasted longer, the result would be disastrous.
        1. rodevaan
          rodevaan 22 March 2013 15: 11
          0
          Quote: Nagaibak
          Andrey77 "Excuse me, you make my grandfathers fools? What a surprise - every schoolboy knew about the war with Germany in the 40s. Chaos and confusion are you judging by yourself?"
          Maybe he meant in general the transition from war to peace. And here, anyone will not be prepared. And in any country. Or do you think only with us ... the war has begun, and the officer has the keys to the warehouses with shells, he is on vacation or something like that. And about the chaos .. hehe recently fallen meteorite in the Chelyabinsk region confirmation of what will happen if they attack us. There was no connection, the authorities were silent, rumors, a slight panic. If this action lasted longer, the result would be disastrous.


          - Again, I advise you to read the material that I advised the aforementioned comrade.
      2. rodevaan
        rodevaan 22 March 2013 15: 09
        0
        Quote: Andrey77
        Plus the surprise of the attack, the general unpreparedness, chaos and confusion of the first months
        --
        Excuse me, are you exposing my grandfathers as fools? What a surprise - every student knew about the war with Germany in the 40s. Chaos and confusion - do you judge by yourself?


        “Read literature and history before you reproach me. Firstly, where did you get that I called your grandfathers fools? I just stated what happened. Secondly - find a good book called "Year 41 - Lessons and Conclusions" - and look through it thoroughly - this is historical material that contains our and German reports, reports from the front, as well as the strategic deployment of troops and the situation on the border , before the outbreak of war and during the invasion. In addition, it also provides information on the preparation for counter-attacks and operations of the first clashes, and the conclusions that were made by the commanders of the armies and fronts. Both ours and German. Why do I advise this particular material - these are neutral (and not propaganda modern husks) reports and reports from the fronts with an assessment of the situation, the results of operations and conclusions, with all comments and notes. Then you will understand what I am writing about here.
        1. Andrey77
          Andrey77 23 March 2013 14: 27
          -1
          You indicated to me the book that the witnesses are carrying around the house. Sorry, but you must specify the minimum author and year of publication. I have a permit, I like to delve into the archives.
      3. rodevaan
        rodevaan 22 March 2013 21: 48
        -1
        Quote: Andrey77
        Chaos and confusion - do you judge by yourself?


        - I tell you - read history. This is sitting at a computer and chewing a sandwich with salami, it is good to talk about this and that, to think of yourself as a "great" historian and an all-knowing reader. Such people would have gathered in a heap and there, on the front line at 41, they would have spoken differently.
        When the disarmed fortified areas on the border fought back as best they could, as they could, because they removed all weapons from the old border and didn’t install them on the new one, when almost 870 aircraft were destroyed only on the airfields on the very first day, 133 were shot down in the very first air battles mostly on takeoff.
        Here is an excerpt from the memoirs of the under-hit fascist pilot Knocke, who took part in the first raids on our airfields. He was saved by the fact that at the very beginning of the war with the USSR, this Russophobic pig was transferred to the west, but this cattle, although collected in parts, survived in order to later write their nasty nasty things about us, super-subhuman x-ren. They attacked the airfields - the air defense was not ready for the raid and did not offer any resistance at all, the planes stood at the airfield in a row "uncovered" - that is, they were peacefully serviced by technicians in open space - please shoot. Almost the entire staff slept in the barracks during the raid, and when the fascisoids began to destroy equipment and bomb everything there, whoever ran out in what. Don't you think this is chaos? Is it preparedness?
        1. Andrey77
          Andrey77 23 March 2013 14: 30
          -1
          Opinions Knocker cap knock me little concern.
  4. Stas57
    Stas57 22 March 2013 13: 49
    +4
    rodevaan

    even in the Soviet propaganda machine they didn’t drive like that, although yes, very, very similar.
    statements in this tone, at present, when it is full of different literature, documents are published, they look rather strange

    Andrey77
    The guns were towed on horseback (and sometimes human) traction.

    in almost all Wehrmacht infantry divisions, by state and in real life, the guns were horse drawn (motorized and tank ones didn’t count.)
    despite the fact that we had a large fleet of vehicles, we did not have / had low-normal tractors, four-wheel drive (semi-caterpillar) heavy-duty cars, etc.
    to all, as previously indicated, the lack of personnel, technicians, their level of ownership of the item, the presence of spare parts, fuel and lubricants, etc.
    To all this, the issue is flaccidity, in the fray of the crews of cars, commanders and subordinates in the Wehrmacht. I remind you that sometimes we had to learn to read and write,

    In combat training no

    and in it too

    in the last topic was advice from uv. Kars to honor "Order in the tank forces" by Shein & Ulanov and their book about the First 34k (to the question of the superiority, quantity and quality of 34k)
    I support, it gives a very good idea of ​​the causes of the defeat of the summer of 41, except for the notorious surprise.
    Isaev is also on the fly 41, there are a lot of names, in connection with reprints.
    and ,,,, posted on the website of Solonin (they will not remember by night) documents both Soviet and translated German divisions, etc.
    very useful reading.
  5. igordok
    igordok 22 March 2013 14: 54
    +4
    Commentary on the photo
    "Damaged and burnt-out trucks, BT-7 and KB tanks after the battle at Velikaya. KB of early releases with an F-32 cannon and a shielded turret. Northwestern Front, Pskov direction, August 1941"

    1. The trucks and the crushed Horch are German.
    2. The Great River is far away.
    3. Mostly wrecked tanks - T-26, some of them flamethrower.
    4. Beginning of July 1941

    KV-1 that crushed Horch from a different angle

    On the http://rkka.pskov.ru/Ostrov/ostrov.htm collected photos of this battlefield.

    On the http://topwar.ru/13919-podborka-fotografiy-velikoy-otechestvennoy.html#comment-i




    d-452723
    The title photo from this battlefield, though KV-1 is already blown up.

    It seems that the impudent Germans, without cover, ran into our tankmen.
    In German photographs, it was indicated that it had done away with 8,8 tanks, see anti-aircraft guns.
    1. evfrat
      evfrat 22 March 2013 16: 47
      -3
      And besides anti-aircraft guns, nothing pierced him. Neither T-3, nor PTO pak. The feat at Rasseinya hints at kakbe.
      1. igordok
        igordok 22 March 2013 17: 26
        +2
        Quote: evfrat
        And besides anti-aircraft guns, nothing pierced him. Neither T-3, nor PTO pak. The feat at Rasseinya hints at kakbe.


        So it is written in the photographs "FLAK 8,8". So the Germans did not have anything they needed, at the right time, even against the T-26.
        1. Kars
          Kars 22 March 2013 21: 53
          +2
          ____________________
        2. evfrat
          evfrat 23 March 2013 15: 42
          0
          for them, the appearance of this tank (KV-1) in general was an unpleasant surprise.
  6. Chicot 1
    Chicot 1 22 March 2013 16: 48
    +3
    But today (by the way!) Is a holiday - International Tanker Day! .. wink
    It turns out there is one. I congratulate the tankers with all my heart! .. drinks

    Wallpaper in the subject ... T-34 model of 1940. The work of the master of military art Andrei Zhirnov ...
    1. Kars
      Kars 22 March 2013 17: 16
      +5
      Quote: Chicot 1
      International Tanker Day! ..

      did not know.
    2. igordok
      igordok 22 March 2013 17: 36
      +3
      Quote: Chicot 1
      International Tanker Day! ..

      Did not know. He may be international, but congratulations to our tankmen.
      1. Chicot 1
        Chicot 1 22 March 2013 18: 20
        +1
        Duc and I did not know until today ... repeat
        And OURS must be congratulated first and foremost! .. drinks

        Attack KV-1 ...
        1. bask
          bask 23 March 2013 11: 52
          +1
          Quote: Chicot 1
          OURS must be congratulated first and foremost

          Though late, but join. Happy TANKISTA. soldier
  7. Stas57
    Stas57 22 March 2013 17: 59
    +1
    Quote: Chicot 1
    International Tanker Day! ..


    And what about the tanker’s day?
    Significantly, in honor of which event, etc.
    1. Chicot 1
      Chicot 1 22 March 2013 18: 24
      -1
      Where it is from and with what event it is directly connected, I do not know. I saw a festive footnote in the classroom. In such things, this site has not yet given disinformation ...
      1. igordok
        igordok 22 March 2013 21: 32
        +2
        I did not find information about the "International Day of Tankers". But today is International Taxi Driver Day
        On 22 of March taxi drivers around the world celebrate their professional holiday. It was on this day in 1907 that the first cars equipped with special meters appeared on the streets of London. London cabmen called the meter “taximeter” - from the French “taxes” (“board”), and the Greek “metron” (“measurement”). Since then, individual urban transport began to be called a taxi, and cab drivers - taxi drivers.

        Perhaps some misunderstanding arose, but nonetheless the congratulations are valid.
  8. washi
    washi 22 March 2013 18: 07
    +1
    Not thought out organizational structure. Lack of interaction, Lack of application rules (charter), lack of combat training. Only this is enough to call everyone partisan. But there is experience in countering partisans.
    Greetings to fans of the NGSh RKKA Zhukov. On it, most of our losses in the Second World War
    1. evfrat
      evfrat 23 March 2013 15: 45
      0
      of course, because any Vasya could fight in those conditions much better than Zhukov. The same is clear to any Vasya.
  9. Bigriver
    Bigriver 22 March 2013 18: 21
    +4
    Tady, Happy Holiday!
    And we will do all the very arrogant colleagues, kittens :)
  10. Alekseev
    Alekseev 22 March 2013 18: 25
    +3
    The outbreak of the war shows well the complexity of the army of such a compound as a mechanized (tank) corps.
    Some people far from military affairs do not understand how the Red Army, significantly exceeding the number of Wehrmacht tanks, in the early days of the warriors lost thousands and thousands of vehicles during counter-attacks and failed to succeed?
    And will be able to achieve success, say, a mighty wrestler whose "only" burst a small vessel in his head? Or, at least, a nonsense fracture of the big toe?
    So here too, so that a corps, a division (and they also act not on their own, but as part of the formations-armies, fronts) successfully fought in them, maybe not a full set of tanks, but everything that is required: control, combat training, combat , the logistics and technical support must be absolutely "healthy".
    In 1941, this was not so ...
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 23 March 2013 14: 46
      0
      Few remember, but the Germans switched to a new (then, already during the war, all switched to the German) system of organizing shock formations - I carry everything with me. The German Panzer Corps at the beginning of the war "carried" everything with it. From anti-aircraft guns to tank evacuators.
  11. wown
    wown 22 March 2013 18: 39
    +2
    the 6th mechanized corps couldn’t clash with the 3rd TG just physically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!! KMG was advancing in the Lida area, and the 57th and 39th motorized corps were not even there, they were advancing in the Baltic states. After the capture of Vilnius, only the Goth group went to Belarus !!! it happened on June 25 or 26!
  12. Stas57
    Stas57 22 March 2013 19: 33
    +2
    I didn’t want to answer the obvious troll (you’ll excuse me, but loud statements without any accompanying base ,,,), but for the rest it might be interesting-
    AK44
    Well, explain to me the reason for 1941. Who is responsible for this? Is not the head of state?

    that is, Stalin is guilty that up to half of the draft is illiterate, illiterate and poorly fluent in Russian (and this is with those investments in education!)?
    that the main workforce is capable of making any complex piece of work, but is not able to do it on the conveyor?
    that in an agrarian, war-ravaged country, a powerful industrial breakthrough is needed ...
    the list can be continued on a list, this is an objective reality that the country's leadership plunged into on the verge of an impending war, and at the same time it was necessary to solve a bunch of mutually exclusive tasks — for example, how to create a good, modern battle tank, but which low-skilled people will produce, make, service, and fight human resources with little knowledge of the minimum basics ...
    Do not be an idiot! Do not forget also that in those days in the Union EVERYTHING was done only with the knowledge and command of Stalin. The defeats of 41-42 are a consequence of his mistakes and miscalculations.

    brilliant and great strategists, of course, the date of the attack was known in advance; unfortunately, our leadership did not.
    But to mobilize and prepare such an army for invasion for no reason, because it seemed that 15 would begin in May ... By the way, the mobilization began, but the Germans prevented.
    And under Nicholas 2, no matter how they scolded him, the Germans did not reach Moscow and Tsaritsyn. And the Bolsheviks, in exchange for power, sold the Germans Russia with giblets. Or am I wrong?

    wrong.
    Nicholas profiled his empire, and that’s all said, while in the country who just didn’t hang around and do what he wanted, both cute Czechs, and the British, etc.

    Sam did not see did not read. I can’t know the names of the commanders.

    when asking a question, one must be prepared for having to answer a similar one,
    And I repeat, what great military geniuses were cutting down the forest, while "yesterday's company and battalion commanders commanded the mech. corps", by the way, who is this comrot, how did he prove himself?

    Look on the Internet, a ton of information!
    the answer is not a boy but a husband.)
    but without jokes, I would like more serious sources of your knowledge, for a serious analysis of the reference to Google speaks primarily about you.
  13. AK44
    AK44 22 March 2013 19: 33
    -4
    Quote: Kars
    Rezun is so tearing up telling how the USSR drove the second echelon to the western borders. It is strange that you do not remember this. Increase in the rate of rearmament, etc.

    For you Rezun, a historian, trustworthy? For me, definitely not. I wanted to spit on him!
    Quote: Kars
    Well, I don’t want to compare this to you.

    Do not compare, I am very far from your level of idiocy.
    Quote: Kars
    He would not have been if tsarism had achieved victories on the fronts.

    Tsarism could not achieve anything, but the interim government advocated the continuation of the war until victory. And I am sure that they would have won if it had not been for the October Revolution. And there would be no Civil War and its consequences.
    Quote: Kars
    No, he wasn’t seduced, but what could he do of what he didn’t do? In the period from the moment of the surrender of France, he did his best to delay the war.

    Having a huge army, thousands of units of armored vehicles and aircraft, having a united people who believed in him, he could do a lot!
    Quote: Kars
    And in general, France is most likely to blame for surrendering to the Germans in a month, and not waging a war to the last drop of blood.

    They also found an example for me. France, not Russia. GEYROPA in a word, in those days and now!
    Quote: Kars
    Under Nicholas, Russia itself entered the war, defending British interests. At the same time, having suffered shameful defeats in Prussia and Galicia. Despite the fact that Germany ACTIVELY fought on two fronts, and RI fought mainly with Austria-Hungary.

    And in 1916 - the famous Brusilovsky breakthrough! And the cessation of retreats. And the army (like the army of Vlasov) did not surrender to the Germans and did not fight against compatriots.
    Quote: Kars
    Apparently you will have to be an idiot for a long time until you learn the story.

    Check spelling. You have not only a bad history, but apparently it was not good in the Russian language.
    1. Kars
      Kars 22 March 2013 19: 53
      +4
      Quote: AK44
      For you Rezun, a historian, trustworthy?

      Any sources of information are important to me. And second-tier travel is a fact.
      Although for some reason I thought that YOU are resunoid,
      Quote: AK44
      Do not compare, I am very far from your level of idiocy.
      Well, it's vryatli. I'm generally not unlike you.

      Quote: AK44
      Tsarism could not achieve anything, but the interim government advocated the continuation of the war until victory

      again, you idioticly confuse causes with consequences. Why did you get temporary provocation? From the successes of tsarism on the battlefield and in the economy?
      Quote: AK44
      he could do a lot

      But you could not even come up with one event, even one event. A lot is nothing.
      Quote: AK44
      They also found an example for me. France, not Russia

      But she won the First World War. And this is not an example, but a fact. Would you be able to predict such a development of events?
      Quote: AK44
      And in 1916 - the famous Brusilovsky breakthrough! And the cessation of retreats. And the armies (like the Vlasov army) did not surrender to the Germans and did not fight against compatriots

      Well, ring France, too, fought. Just then the Battle of the Somme, Verdun. And in 1941 on the European continent Hitler had no rivals.
      Quote: AK44
      Check spelling

      This is a standard excuse when it is necessary to cover up ignorance of the elementary history of the 20th century.
  14. AK44
    AK44 22 March 2013 19: 40
    -4
    Quote: Stas57
    the answer is not a boy but a husband.)
    but without jokes, I would like more serious sources of your knowledge, for a serious analysis of the reference to Google speaks primarily about you.

    Read Edward Radzinsky. You'll like it. There is no desire to comment on the rest. Tired of crushing the water in the mortar.
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 22 March 2013 19: 43
      +2
      Quote: AK44
      Quote: Stas57
      the answer is not a boy but a husband.)
      but without jokes, I would like more serious sources of your knowledge, for a serious analysis of the reference to Google speaks primarily about you.

      Read Edward Radzinsky. You'll like it. There is no desire to comment on the rest. Tired of crushing the water in the mortar.

      oh, thank you, now I see that I am not at all interested in having a discussion with you, or as you put it, "crush".

      goodbye, I have lost all interest in you ...
    2. avt
      avt 22 March 2013 20: 09
      0
      Quote: AK44
      Read Edward Radzinsky. You'll like it. There is no desire to comment on the rest. Tired of crushing the water in the mortar.
      laughing Yeah, still Pikul, Akunin.
    3. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 22 March 2013 21: 01
      +2
      AK44 "Read Edward Radzinsky. You will like it. There is no desire to comment on the rest. I'm tired of crushing water in a mortar."
      Hmm ... how everything is running. Radzinsky historian? Hehe ... lying around ...
      1. AK44
        AK44 22 March 2013 22: 06
        -1
        No need to wallow, better enlighten, who is the historian? I read at my leisure.
        1. Gazprom
          Gazprom 22 March 2013 22: 11
          0
          No need to wallow, better enlighten, who is the historian? I read at my leisure
          . Twice here, and three times in the previous topic you were called 3 treasured names of tank specialists (not counting others) - the most suitable for reading an unprepared mind ....
          All of them are online, if it’s a pity to spend money on good books
        2. Nagaibak
          Nagaibak 23 March 2013 08: 49
          +1
          AK44 "No need to wallow, better educate, who is the historian? I will read at my leisure."
          They were indicated to you above. There is a lot of literature, recently there are a lot of archival materials put into circulation. In the indicated list, look for individual authors.
  15. AK44
    AK44 22 March 2013 19: 49
    -3
    Quote: Stas57
    Nicholas profiled his empire, and that’s all said, while in the country who just didn’t hang around and do what he wanted, both cute Czechs, and the British, etc.

    And Stalin almost spooked his empire. And in the vastness of the USSR, who just did not wander around. Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Romanians, Hungarians, Finns, and in my opinion, even Croats.
    I could not resist.
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 22 March 2013 19: 57
      +1
      Quote: AK44
      Quote: Stas57
      Nicholas profiled his empire, and that’s all said, while in the country who just didn’t hang around and do what he wanted, both cute Czechs, and the British, etc.

      And Stalin almost spooked his empire. And in the vastness of the USSR, who just did not wander around. Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Romanians, Hungarians, Finns, and in my opinion, even Croats.
      what a funny you are, in Hitler’s war the chances were almost equal to 0, it was a deliberately losing adventure
      and "just about" ... you know, if my sneakers had a pantograph, they would be a Tatra T3 tram

      come already, Edward Stanislavovich got tired waiting for you.
      1. AK44
        AK44 22 March 2013 20: 54
        -1
        You are however a comedian ... I have the honor, tavarisch hi
    2. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 22 March 2013 21: 03
      +1
      AK44 "And in the vastness of the USSR, whoever has not wandered. Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Romanians, Hungarians, Finns and, in my opinion, even Croats." As you rightly noted, these guys were swaggering. Yes, no doubt. Being in captivity and in felling.
      1. AK44
        AK44 22 March 2013 22: 16
        0
        Accurate
        Quote: Nagaibak
        AK44 "And in the vastness of the USSR, whoever has not wandered. Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Romanians, Hungarians, Finns and, in my opinion, even Croats." As you rightly noted, these guys were swaggering. Yes, no doubt. Being in captivity and in felling.

        And how many Russians did they kill before being captured?
        1. Nagaibak
          Nagaibak 23 March 2013 08: 57
          +1
          AK44 "How many Russians did they kill before being captured?"
          What are you doing? After all, they fought, killed, and did not just hang around as you wrote. They were defeated and captured. Do you think it was not worth fighting with them? Give up Then, of course, many Russians would have remained alive um ... and not Russians either ...
  16. nnz226
    nnz226 22 March 2013 19: 56
    -2
    Interestingly, before the war a bunch of our scientific and technical people went to the factories of Germany, in their memories of this trip, all the participants were surprised that the Germans were showing them "old" armored vehicles, and puffing out their cheeks, they say that knowing that we have T- 34 and KV, looked down on the T-3 and T-4 (I don’t want to switch to the Latin alphabet, I’ll call it Soviet-style). But to pay attention to the thickness of the armor of these tanks (up to 60 mm) versus 15-18 mm in the main mass Soviet BTs and T-26s, the highbrow high-ranking officials lacked intelligence ?! So it turned out that as in the picture: the 20 mm anti-aircraft gun is a terrible enemy of these tanks. And even the 37-mm anti-tank gun breaks through "the armor is strong, our tanks are fast." And the armor-piercing shells of our forty-fives are defective and they don't take German armor! Here our tankers washed themselves with blood in counterattacks and batteries when repelling German tank attacks.
    1. Gazprom
      Gazprom 22 March 2013 20: 22
      -1
      Svirin, Shein & Ulanov. Look, download, read. all questions from these authors have already been dealt with in an accessible, "scientific" form.
    2. avt
      avt 22 March 2013 20: 24
      +2
      Quote: nnz226
      Interestingly, before the war a bunch of our scientific and technical people went to the factories of Germany, in their memories of this trip, all the participants were surprised that the Germans were showing them "old" armored vehicles, and puffing out their cheeks, they say that knowing that we have T- 34 and KV, looked down on the T-3 and T-4 (I don’t want to switch to the Latin alphabet, I’ll call it Soviet-style).

      Well, not everything was supposed to be that way; look for real ABTU documents on tests in Kubinka in the autumn of 1939 of the two and three panzervagenes seized in Poland. There was a trick. They were not only driven, but also fired. The conclusions are very interesting in the letter from the head of ABTU Fedorenko dated 13. Well, the trouble with armor-piercing shells was, it’s a fact. By the way, Vannikov got the same thing for that. But Stalin gave a chance and he continued to engage in ammunition. In general, if possible, look for and read documents, especially on technical issues, and of historians specifically referring to and publishing them in their works. Well, not according to Radzinsky, Pikul and Akunin to study history request Here is the reservation of our tanks, if you look at the documents, you will see that there were attempts to strengthen, but the chassis did not hold. That's where the A-20 and 100ka appeared, ABTU issued a TU in 1937 to increase the armor.
      1. Nagaibak
        Nagaibak 22 March 2013 21: 12
        +2
        avt "Well, not according to Radzinsky, Pikul and Akunin to study history"
        Yeah, while still sternly eyebrowing. Like, you don’t know the elementary! I was so taught! Hehe ...
        1. AK44
          AK44 22 March 2013 22: 28
          0
          And what can you say about Rybakov, Astafiev, Bykov, Simonov? Or are they on a par with Akunin?
          1. Gazprom
            Gazprom 22 March 2013 22: 36
            +1

            And what can you say about Rybakov, Astafiev, Bykov, Simonov? Or are they on a par with Akunin?


            pysdach ...
            You please teach play the violin on TV history of literary work?
            Moreover, a fluid provocation, as well as the entire argument.
            1. AK44
              AK44 23 March 2013 08: 41
              0
              Not to teach, but to read books of people who went through the war, firsthand, as they say. Find out how and what they lived in the war and the true price of victory. In archival documents and official reports from the fronts you will not read this. And where did you see the provocation?
              1. Stas57
                Stas57 23 March 2013 09: 19
                0
                And what can you say about Rybakov, Astafiev, Bykov, Simonov? Or are they on a par with Akunin?

                Rybakov And?
                Astafyev, Bykov, Simonov?

                good literature, and so what? ... No more than optional.

                and of course I won’t read it anywhere else, because it’s literature, no more.
                and here more, for example, the iremember site.
                Here there is not a single opinion of the writer, but a normal sociological sample
              2. Gazprom
                Gazprom 23 March 2013 09: 26
                -1
                provocation in the comparison of art and consumer goods
                1. AK44
                  AK44 23 March 2013 11: 16
                  0
                  I don’t quite understand you. How did I compare art and consumer goods?
          2. Nagaibak
            Nagaibak 23 March 2013 08: 44
            0
            AK44 "Astafiev, Bykov, Simonov? Or are they on a par with Akunin?
            There is no doubt ... hehe, I keep wallowing hehe ... add Jack London to the heap. Not in the subject of course, but it’s fun to learn history from fiction. I won’t say such a thing about Rybakov, but in my opinion he specialized in history, let's say ancient Russia.
            1. AK44
              AK44 23 March 2013 11: 15
              -1
              You have been lying around and giggling since yesterday. Are you drunk or something?
              Quote: Nagaibak
              I won’t say such a thing about Rybakov, but in my opinion he specialized in history, let's say ancient Russia.

              And besides, you are also an ignoramus!
              And what does Jack London have to do with it?
              1. Stas57
                Stas57 23 March 2013 11: 43
                0
                Quote: AK44

                You have been lying around and giggling since yesterday. Are you drunk or something?
                Quote: Nagaibak
                I won’t say such a thing about Rybakov, but in my opinion he specialized in history, let's say ancient Russia.
                And besides, you are also an ignoramus!

                unfortunately for you he is not ignorant
                Rybakov, Boris Alexandrovich
                Soviet archaeologist and historian, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1991; academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences since 1958 of the year). One of the most influential figures in Soviet historiography. The main works on archeology, history, culture of the Slavs and Ancient Russia.
                1. AK44
                  AK44 23 March 2013 21: 49
                  0
                  Are you a lawyer?
              2. Nagaibak
                Nagaibak 23 March 2013 12: 09
                0
                I’m wallowing with laughter ... I haven’t seen more stupid comments on this site. Do you think with your head when you write? It seems that no .. hehe ...
                AK44 "Besides, you are also an ignoramus!"
                do not judge by yourself. You go and you don’t know. I mean-
                Boris A. Rybakov (May 21 (June 3), 1908, Moscow - December 27, 2001, Moscow) - Soviet archaeologist and historian, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1991; academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences since 1958). One of the most influential figures in Soviet historiography. The main works on archeology, history, culture of the Slavs and Ancient Russia.
                Hero of Socialist Labor (1978)
                Order “For Merit to the Fatherland”, III degree (May 31, 1998) - for merits to the state, a great personal contribution to the development of domestic science and the training of scientific personnel [4]
                Three Orders of Lenin
                Order of the October Revolution
                Order of the Red Banner of Labor
                Order of the Badge of Honor (1953)
                Lenin Prize (1976)
                Stalin Prize (1949, 1952)
                Prize named after academician B. D. Grekov
                Full member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, honorary member of the Czechoslovak, Polish and Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Honored Professor of Moscow University. M.V. Lomonosova, Honorary Doctor of Krakow Jagiellonian University.
                A memorial plaque in honor of Boris Aleksandrovich Rybakov hangs in the sixth stream audience of the first humanitarian building of Moscow State University.
                I highly recommend you visit the library. Hehe ... increase your education. And Jack London is a writer. The comrades you mentioned are also writers, they are not historians. I didn’t know that you didn’t know B. Rybakov. This is a shamefully dear friend !!!
                1. AK44
                  AK44 23 March 2013 21: 48
                  0
                  Well done, you know how to use the Internet. But since we are talking about writers, I was referring to AN Rybakov, author of Children of the Arbat, Heavy Sand, etc. It's a shame not to know!
                  1. Nagaibak
                    Nagaibak 24 March 2013 08: 14
                    -1
                    AK44 "Well done, you know how to use the Internet. But since we are talking about writers, I mean Rybakov AN, author of" Children of the Arbat "," Heavy Sand ", etc. It's a shame not to know!"
                    1. We did not go with you.
                    2. I am familiar with the work of the writer Rybakov from school. I do not find anything outstanding in his works. He became known only because he was one of the first to raise the problem of repression. It was fashionable then.
                    3. Dear comrade! You are on the MILITARY-HISTORICAL website, so please, do not use fiction in discussions. Now, if we communicated with you on the LITERARY site, then another matter. And so I watch you are trying to be rude ... trying to cover up your ignorance of the subject ... hehe he should not do this ... here you will not understand ... hehe.
    3. Bigriver
      Bigriver 23 March 2013 08: 15
      +2
      Quote: nnz226
      ... looked down on the T-3 and T-4. But to pay attention to the thickness of the armor of these tanks (up to 60 mm) versus 15-18 mm for the mainstream mass Soviet BT and T-26s for highbrow high-ranking officials or something that wasn’t enough ?!

      You are wrong. Ours did not look down on them. "Three", for example, was very much appreciated by us. The only thing ... They did not believe that this is ALL that the German tank industry has. They believed that there is something newer and hidden from our eyes.
      Then ... At that time the Germans did not have either 60 or 50 mm on their "forehead".
      Reservation happened later. The same "four" for all the time of her life - a dozen modifications. At the time of the "medical examination" - 30 mm. That with a shortage of armor-piercing in the troops is quite serious.
  17. Stas57
    Stas57 22 March 2013 19: 57
    0
    Quote: AK44
    Quote: Stas57
    Nicholas profiled his empire, and that’s all said, while in the country who just didn’t hang around and do what he wanted, both cute Czechs, and the British, etc.

    And Stalin almost spooked his empire. And in the vastness of the USSR, who just did not wander around. Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Romanians, Hungarians, Finns, and in my opinion, even Croats.
    what a funny you are, in Hitler’s war the chances were almost equal to 0, it was a deliberately losing adventure
    and "just about" ... you know, if my sneakers had a pantograph, they would be a Tatra T3 tram

    come already, Edward Stanislavovich got tired waiting for you.
  18. ng1941
    ng1941 22 March 2013 23: 00
    -2
    In general, everything is as always, on the one hand cheers patriots, on the other Rezunoydy and others like them.
    During the 5 months of the war the personnel army was lost, the enemy reached Moscow, huge resources were seized, who is to blame?
    1) The country was not industrial, the soldiers were entirely new recruits, there was no connection, there was nothing to fight, the problem was with armor-piercing ammunition, in general, no one was to blame (according to the version of the patriots)
    2) Stalin is to blame, did not have time, did not prepare, did not make a mistake (version of the Rezunoids)
    How many tanks were there on June 41 on both sides?
    1) the Germans have about five thousand ("newest and heavy") + 15000 armored personnel carriers + aviation, + tactics of use, + guns (akht akht, etc.).
    2) the Russians have 20000 thousand — light and obsolete — aviation — tactics — no spare parts — no communication (patriots cheers).
    Everything would have worked out had we been the first 20000 tanks to have been rolled into a pancake by the Germans (Rezunoydy)
    ps The only thing that worries is that for 70+ years the perpetrators of that rout have not been named and punished (they trashed them for 5 months !!!).
    pps was anyone punished for the death of the maykop brigade in Grozny in 95?
    1. Kars
      Kars 22 March 2013 23: 10
      0
      Quote: ng1941
      Everything would have worked out had we been the first 20000 tanks to have been rolled into a pancake by the Germans (Rezunoydy)


      The tragedy of 1941 left such a deep wound in the people's memory that the scar continues to hurt even seven decades later - fierce debate about the causes and perpetrators of the disaster has not subsided, and most importantly, could it have been avoided.
      The most sensational alternative was suggested by Viktor Suvorov, who claimed that in the summer of 1941 Stalin himself was preparing to attack Hitler Germany and that if the Red Army managed to strike first, “having caught the Germans on the backswing,” the Wehrmacht would be defeated in a matter of weeks. However, even many of his supporters disagree on this issue, convinced that even in the event of a preemptive strike the Soviet troops would still suffer a crushing defeat, as evidenced by the unsuccessful actions of the Red Army against Finland.
      Whose point of view is closer to the truth? Would Stalin's first strike lead to the triumph of the Red Army - or to a defeat even more terrible than in the current reality? And was such a blow even possible? Leading military historians answer all these questions.

      Quote: ng1941
      The only thing that worries is that for 70+ years the perpetrators of that rout have not been named and punished (they trashed them for 5 months !!!).

      And who would you suggest to shoot? And if my memory serves me, a number of warlords were shot or demoted.
    2. Gazprom
      Gazprom 22 March 2013 23: 13
      0
      ps The only thing that worries is that for 70+ years the perpetrators of that rout have not been named and punished (they trashed them for 5 months !!!).

      Dig out of the graves? and shoot the skull, if preserved ..
      pps was anyone punished for the death of the maykop brigade in Grozny in 95?

      And in Kiev I have an uncle, and I have a big garden ...
    3. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 23 March 2013 09: 02
      0
      ng1941
      "In general, everything is as always, on the one hand, hurray patriots, on the other, Rezunoids and others like them."
      You have reliable data, so share it. I know one thing. It would not be Stalin would have met the war on the equipment purchased abroad. With a predictable result.
    4. avt
      avt 23 March 2013 09: 49
      +1
      Quote: ng1941
      ps The only thing that worries is that for 70+ years the perpetrators of that rout have not been named and punished (they trashed them for 5 months !!!).

      The defeat is when France was defeated and capitulated for forty days. And here they are discussing the lost frontier battle of the summer of 1941. The Soviet army was not defeated! She suffered a heavy defeat during the fighting.
      1. svp67
        svp67 24 March 2013 08: 22
        0
        Quote: avt
        And here they are discussing the lost cross-border battle of the summer of 1941. The Soviet army was not defeated! She suffered a heavy defeat during the fighting.


        You are right. The Soviet Army could not be defeated in those years. It simply did not exist then. And there was the Red Army. The troops of which are part of the Western and South-Western Fronts were defeated and for the most part destroyed ...
    5. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 23 March 2013 10: 38
      0
      ng1941 "ps The only concern is that for 70+ years the culprits of that defeat have not been named and have not been punished (they were smashing for 5 months !!!)."
      Smashed, smashed but not smashed ...
  19. Bigriver
    Bigriver 23 March 2013 08: 56
    0
    Noticed at Comrade. Drohovoza (top) "left" picture: /
    Signature: Tanks Pz Kpfw III Ausf E broke into the Soviet artillery battery
    Nifiga they did not burst. They pulled the guns into a heap, scattered shell casings and photographed them for propaganda in a magazine or newspaper.
  20. Bigriver
    Bigriver 23 March 2013 08: 57
    0
    Noticed at Comrade. Drohovoza (top) "left" picture: /
    Signature: Tanks Pz Kpfw III Ausf E broke into the Soviet artillery battery
    Nifiga they did not burst. They pulled the guns into a heap, scattered shell casings and photographed them for propaganda in a magazine or newspaper.
    1. Nagaibak
      Nagaibak 23 March 2013 10: 35
      0
      BigRiver "Signed: Tanks Pz Kpfw III Ausf E broke into a Soviet artillery battery"
      "Nifiga, they didn't break in. They pulled the guns into a heap, scattered the shells and took pictures for propaganda in a magazine or newspaper."
      You are absolutely right! Photo for any staged. Imagine a picture of how the German reporter Schreibikus, running ahead of his tanks, takes pictures of how their tanks iron our battery. Yeah, and from the back he takes pictures of "our" artilleryman a meter away from a German tank ... hehe ... he still took him "prisoner" ...
      1. Stas57
        Stas57 23 March 2013 11: 08
        0
        Nagaibak
        Bigriver

        but it seemed to me that this is a German guy in the photo, and the tankman in a black jumpsuit,
        went out to look from the nearest tank,
        and the first two most likely just arrived and are looking at it with interest, but the last one seems to be "disassembled".
        judging by the distance between the guns and the lack of prepared positions, they found us on the march.
        There are no corpses - ours were either abandoned or taken away by the Germans (but rather retreated).
        In short, not a fake or staging at all, but a signature curve.
        I would say so- "German tankers are examining the Soviet battery after the battle. The battery most likely was forced to take the battle suddenly."
        1. Nagaibak
          Nagaibak 23 March 2013 12: 43
          0
          stas57 "and it seemed to me that this is a German in the photo, and a tanker in a black overalls, came out to look from the nearest tank."
          You're right! I put the word "our" in quotation marks. Of course the photo is German.
          stas57] "I would say so-" German tank crews are examining the Soviet battery after the battle. The battery was most likely forced to take the fight suddenly. "
          I agree with your opinion.
          1. Bigriver
            Bigriver 23 March 2013 13: 46
            0
            Quote: Nagaibak
            German tank crews examine the Soviet battery after the battle. The battery was most likely forced to take the fight out of the blue. "

            The Germans are considering :)))
            What do we see? Battery battalion F-22 light artillery regiment.
            Firing positions - not equipped, rooks not open.
            We assume that the battery was caught on the march. But!
            The first action that it must perform according to the field charter is to disintegrate equipment-wise along the road (or outside it), with intervals between harnesses up to 100 m.
            This movie hung a stereotype of perception: the guns in the films stand barrel to barrel. It looks beautiful, powerful sometimes :))) But, in fact, such a position in TVET is a sabotage.
            Firstly, the crowding of the battery dooms it to premature death from minimal enemy fire.
            Secondly, effective fire is impossible. The guns interfere with each other.
            1. Stas57
              Stas57 23 March 2013 14: 51
              -1
              Quote: BigRiver
              The first action that it must perform according to the field charter is to disintegrate equipment-wise along the road (or outside it), with intervals between harnesses up to 100 m.

              this was my phrase. I answer, although I do not pretend to be true, purely reasoning-
              I agree, the charter is primary, but the photo probably did not have time to disperse, circumstances are unknown, In any case, IMHO, boldly shift into a heap and scatter in order to take a picture, this is not 5 minutes. And even more so to customize tanks, but to throw shells? I doubt in this theater ...
              They had practical episodes all summer 41, and the photo montage did not lag behind. Although 1 could be pulled up or deployed, in battle, or so that just the first fit in the frame, strange shells under the wheel lie.
              IMHO

              conclusion-Just the unpreparedness and proximity of the positions suggests that ours simply did not have time, and the legs of the 2 gun were buried, this is not a diversion, pure coincidence.
              ZIS-2

              ZIS-3


              We assume that the battery was caught on the march. But!



              but! here you are far from such a caravan as it should according to the charter, drag it away?
              it's true SPM but the weight is about the same.
            2. Stas57
              Stas57 23 March 2013 15: 09
              0
              Quote: BigRiver
              The first action that it must perform according to the field charter is to disintegrate equipment-wise along the road (or outside it), with intervals between harnesses up to 100 m.


              this was my phrase. I answer, although I do not pretend to be true, purely reasoning-
              I agree, the charter is primary, but the photo probably did not have time to disperse, circumstances are unknown, In any case, IMHO, boldly shift into a heap and scatter in order to take a picture, this is not 5 minutes. And even more so to customize tanks, but to throw shells? I doubt in this theater ...
              They had practical episodes all summer 41, and the photo montage did not lag behind. Although 1 could be pulled up or deployed, in battle, or so that just the first fit in the frame, strange shells under the wheel lie.
              IMHO

              conclusion-Just the unpreparedness and proximity of the positions suggests that ours simply did not have time, and the legs of the 2 gun were buried, this is not a diversion, pure coincidence.

              We assume that the battery was caught on the march. But!



              but! here you are far from such a caravan as it should according to the charter, drag it away?
              it's true SPM but the weight is about the same.
  21. ng1941
    ng1941 23 March 2013 10: 47
    0
    and again we move away from the direct question, which was what was required to be proved.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 23 March 2013 13: 55
      +1
      Quote: ng1941
      and again we move away from the direct question, which was what was required to be proved.

      Phew :))
      You come back often! These direct questions are discussed regularly and verbose. For example, I have a word of ches, the language is already tired of speaking on this topic.
      My advice to you. Joke around on similar topics in the archive ("the beginning of the war", "1941", etc.). There is something to read there.

      And the second tip.
      There is a completely professional and unbiased historian, American David Glanz. He worked, including, and in the Russian archives in the early 90's.
      He has all the answers to your questions. Although, not without its American "cockroaches" :))
      I read in this order:
      The colossus is defeated. The Red Army in 1941. M., Yauza. Eksmo. 2008
      The Battle of Titans. How the Red Army stopped Hitler. M., AST; Astrel. 2007
      Soviet military miracle 1941-1943. The revival of the Red Army. M., Yauza. Eksmo. 2008 (with a preface by A. Isaev).

      But, of course, this comrade assumes an initial level of training: knowledge of the materiel, organizational structures, etc.
  22. Stas57
    Stas57 23 March 2013 11: 37
    0
    Quote: AK44

    You have been lying around and giggling since yesterday. Are you drunk or something?
    Quote: Nagaibak
    I won’t say such a thing about Rybakov, but in my opinion he specialized in history, let's say ancient Russia.
    And besides, you are also an ignoramus!

    unfortunately you are an ignoramus
    Rybakov, Boris Alexandrovich
    Soviet archaeologist and historian, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1991; academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences since 1958 of the year). One of the most influential figures in Soviet historiography. The main works on archeology, history, culture of the Slavs and Ancient Russia.
  23. ng1941
    ng1941 24 March 2013 16: 50
    0
    For a year now I’ve been reading BigRiver articles about the beginning of the Second World War, especially in June 41, and they write such compost, their ears fade, and here about 15000 thousand btr, which were cooler than tanks, and about the heavy German tanks that the Germans had on June 22 1941 (Bibis laughing ), and about the reaction of the Allies to our hypothetical invasion, etc. ... sometimes it seems that the author smokes something. And to prove something to someone is impossible, because they are already tired of leaving the direct answer.
    Read: M. Baryatinsky (recommend)
    Suvorov, Stern, Tucker Jones, and various Soviet and German memoirists (both propaganda there), also read Zhukov’s memoirs ...
  24. redwar6
    redwar6 25 March 2013 22: 05
    -1
    I am truly sorry for the tankers who fought on the T-26 and BT series vehicles, eternal memory .. Not tanks and G, with a capital letter.