Military Review

Iron fist of the Red Army. Tank park on the eve of the war

To this day, the total tanks in the Red Army on the eve of the war. For a long time in domestic literature it was said about him with one phrase: "The Soviet Army had in service tanks of various types, of which 1861 were T-34 and KV tanks. The bulk of the vehicles were light tanks of outdated designs." Only recently have numbers begun to appear that really estimate the number of tanks available in the Red Army, but they also diverge, due to the difference in data in different archival sources (one of the reasons for this is the well-known domestic attitude to reporting and objectivity in reporting).

Major-General LG Ivashov ("VIZH" №11'89) calls the number of 23457 tanks, of which 30% is combat ready. The publication of the General Staff "The neck of the secrecy was lifted ..." (M., 1993) determines their number in 22600 units (heavy - 500, medium - 900, light - 21200). These data are doubtful in some respects: first, for many years the number of KB tanks at the beginning of the war was 636, and there were still heavy T-35 tanks that were released around 60. In total, the number of heavy tanks results in significantly more 500. Secondly, 1225 T-34 (also a well-established figure) plus a few hundred T-28 (in 3, etc., 38, in 8, 68, in 10, 61, etc.) are not equal 900. The percentage of serviceable tanks is defined in 27. But in general, we can say that in this book the security classification has not been removed.

The greatest confidence is caused by the "Summary list of the quantitative and qualitative composition of tanks and self-propelled guns located in military districts, at rembazas and warehouses of NGOs as of 1 June 1941 g." N.P.Zolotova and S.I.Isaeva ("VIZH" №1 G93). According to her, the Red Army was armed with 23106 tanks and SPGs. Of these, combat-ready - 18691 or 80,9%. But this number is not final - from 31 May to 21 June 1941, 206 new tanks were shipped from the factories (KB - 41, T-34 - 138, T-40-27). Here, tanks belonging to 1 and 2 categories are classified as combat vehicles, according to the Manual on Accounting and Reporting in the Red Army:

1-I category is a new, not being in operation, meeting the requirements of technical conditions and completely usable property for its intended purpose;

2-I category - the former (being) in operation, it is completely serviceable and usable for its intended purpose. This also includes property that requires troop repair (routine repairs carried out by the forces of the unit itself).

The authors stipulate that there is no reliable information revealing the state of the Red Army tank park on June 22. But of all the data encountered, these appear to be the most plausible, although they contradict many well-established indicators, especially the quality status of Soviet tanks (agree that the difference between 27% good and 80,9% is quite large).

BT-5 on the autumn 1939 tactical maneuvers

T-26 model 1933 on the teachings of the Moscow Military District in the winter of 1937. By the beginning of the war, the T-26 continued to serve as the “workhorse” of tank units and formations, remaining the most popular machine of the ABTV Red Army.

Despite the arrival of new tanks, by June 1941, the system still had more than 500 tanks BT-2.

The total number of tanks here included machines of mechanized corps, tank regiments of cavalry divisions, tank battalions of airborne corps and rifle divisions. Evaluating the number of cars in the western direction, it should be borne in mind that the tank forces of KOVO, PribOVO, OdVO, LenVO and ZapVO with the beginning of the war were replenished with equipment transferred from rear districts.

Table No. 4. Quantitative and qualitative composition of the Red Army Tank Park to 1 June 1941

BT-7 and T-26 on the outskirts of the village during the pre-war exercises.

A tankman in a protective suit and gas mask inspects a tank after a training chemical attack.

And how did the German command assess the state of the ABTA of the Red Army? Before the war, the main command of the Wehrmacht determined the number of tank divisions in 7, plus 38 tank (mechanized) brigades. The inaccuracy of this information was caused by the fact that the formation of the mechanized corps continued, and the regular material part was missing. Already after the start of the war, German Army Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces G. Halder made the following entry in his service diary: “The number of tanks available to the enemy is assumed to be 15000 vehicles. This corresponds to 35 tank divisions. Of these, 22 was detected on the front. the enemy was greater than expected "(25.07.1941). On the whole, the Germans' ideas about the number of tank forces opposing them in the western districts were quite reliable, and it remains to be surprised how they risked starting a war by putting their 3329 tanks, most of them light, against this armada.

T-35 on Manezhnaya Square in Moscow 7 November 1940. The convoy contains tanks of different types, produced in small series - with cylindrical and conical towers, straight and inclined sub-tower boxes, and without hand-held antennas of radio stations.

T-35 release 1939 g. With a conical tower and thickened armor. It is worth noting the placement of machine gun masks in bullet-resistant spherical segments.

Almost all of our huge tank fleet (see tab. 5) was lost in the battles of summer-autumn 1941. The total losses of Soviet tanks also remain in question. Figures from various sources, including reports of parts and formations submitted in the confusion of retreat, vary considerably, so here are the official data of the General Staff, published in 1993 g .:

Table No. 5. Loss of armored and mechanized troops in 1941

Table No. 6. Loss of armored vehicles in 1941 operations

A large amount of equipment was simply abandoned during the withdrawal of Soviet troops. So, only in a warehouse in Dubno, German troops seized 215 tanks, 50 anti-tank guns and a lot of other property. In the 10 Tank Division of the 15, the MK was abandoned during the retreat of 140 tanks (for comparison, combat losses amounted to 110 vehicles). In the 8 tank division of the 4, the crews destroyed 107 tanks, 10 went missing, 6 got stuck in the swamp and was abandoned. Knowing all this, it is already possible not to be surprised at the average daily loss of the SWF in an 292 tank. There was no such level of losses even in the largest tank battles of the war, for example, in the Battle of Kursk, this figure ranged from 68 (in the Oryol offensive operation) to 89 (in the Belgorod-Kharkiv offensive operation).

Heavy tank KV-1, adopted by the Red Army Army Aviation 19 December 1939. In the photo-KB-1 December 1940 release with a gun L-11 and a welded turret in the courtyard of the Kirov factory.

T-34 of model 1941 produced by STZ, which mastered the production of Thirty-Fours from the beginning of 1941. In the photo are tanks with an F-34 cannon and simplified rollers (without rubber bands) introduced at the beginning of the war. A characteristic feature of the Stalingrad machines is the armored case assembled "in thorn".

T-34 sample 1941, the plant number 112 "Red Sormovo". Almost on all Sormov tanks of the first series, the M-17T gasoline engine was installed due to the catastrophic shortage of B-2 diesel engines at the time of the evacuation of the plants beyond the Urals. The tank captured in the photo in the training unit lived to the end of the war and remained on the move as early as 1947.

The tank commander Irshavsky sets the combat training task for driver mechanics. Tankers are dressed in black overalls, winter jackets, gloves with sockets and helmets of two types - hard and soft, with glasses-canned goods. An obligatory piece of equipment in the pre-war years was a shoulder bag with a gas mask.

Продолжение следует ...
Articles from this series:
Iron fist of the Red Army. Creation of armored troops
Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized enclosures
Iron fist of the Red Army. Tank park on the eve of the war
Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized corps in battle
Iron fist of the Red Army. Motorized and tank divisions
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  1. Nicholas C.
    Nicholas C. 21 March 2013 09: 01 New
    According to the wording, the article, in my opinion, is anti-Russian with fraud. References to 1989-1993, as if all of this has not been intensively studied since. It seems to me now to write on this topic, without mentioning in the context of such specialists as Svirin, a generally bad tone.
    1. Nayhas
      Nayhas 21 March 2013 10: 09 New
      Those. non-Russian citizens of Russia, she does not hurt? Well, okay.
      1. Nicholas C.
        Nicholas C. 21 March 2013 10: 25 New
        Quote: Nayhas
        Those. non-Russian citizens of Russia, she does not hurt?

        Just do not need provocations.
      2. Kars
        Kars 21 March 2013 14: 33 New
        Why, they decided to pay so much attention to Drogovoz.
        The most deserving work on Soviet tanks before 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX in recent times.
        One of the paradoxes of history is that we involuntarily evaluate the events of the distant and not very past by today's standards. So to the distant 1941 approach with the standards of the USSR since its heyday. The book of D. Shein and A. Ulanov allows us to see the real forty-first and tank troops of the Red Army as they met the aggressor at the border 70 years ago. This book has become the fruit of many years of archival research by independent experts. It will make it possible to take a fresh look at the familiar and seemingly unshakable facts and revise the established assessments of known events (Alexey Isaev).

    2. avt
      avt 21 March 2013 10: 47 New
      Quote: Nikolay S.
      It seems to me now to write on this topic, without mentioning in the context of such specialists as Svirin, a generally bad tone.

      Yes. Michael really turned on tanks, “turned.” He worked a lot with archives, and the syllable is good. I like how he approaches the coverage of the topic competently and from all angles. good
    3. kord1215
      kord1215 21 March 2013 13: 07 New
      I will express such a thought. It's not about the number of tanks or their technical condition. Why doesn’t anyone say that at that time in the competition of shell and armor the victory was on the side of the shell. Light tanks had virtually no chance of confronting the Wehrmacht infantry divisions with anti-tank artillery, and they were used precisely in direct ramming attacks. Second, their role as an independent striking force is overestimated. However, the lack of sustainable defense of rifle divisions did not leave them chances for maneuver and retreat.
  2. Avenich
    Avenich 21 March 2013 09: 32 New
    It always amazes me how easy our researchers reward the quantitative indicators of armored vehicles and aircraft before the start of the Great War. What does it have to do with any arguments, suppose they do not take “false goals”. But if the tank weighed from 4 to 10 tons., Then the total mass of steel for the Wehrmacht plants with the number of lost spacecraft of 25000 vehicles will average 125 tons. Sorry, but in the place of the Nazis I would take this iron, apologize and return to the previous borders. Or if you could not wait so much, I would use the entire tank armada against the Soviets, since if you believe the lovers of maximalism and all fuel and lubricant depots, rembases, etc. went to the Wehrmacht.
  3. Gari
    Gari 21 March 2013 09: 41 New
    Tank production during the second world war

    Country of manufacture Produced by the end of the year
    1941 1942 1943 1944 за полугодие 1945
    Germany 3805 6189 10700 18300
    США 6123 27200 38500 20500 11300
    Англия 4841 9233 7500 4600 1700
    СССР 6590 24448 30100 33274 15450

    The data in the table indicate that the Soviet military economy defeated the German military economy. This was achieved despite the fact that Germany was several times superior to the USSR in the production and mining of such types of strategic materials as steel and coal. Annual steelmaking in 1940-1944 kept in Germany (together with the occupied countries and satellites) at the level of 31-32 million tons, and coal mining amounted to 390-460 million tons. In the USSR in 1940, 18 million tons of steel were produced and 154 million were mined. tons of coal. With the loss of important economic regions, steel production decreased to 8 million tons, coal production to 63 million tons. In 1944, steel production increased to 11 million tons and coal production to 121,5 million tons. Thus, having about 3-4 times less steel and 3-3,5 times less coal, the USSR was able to produce almost 2,5 times more military equipment during the war years. 8-11 million tons of steel were used annually in the USSR more efficiently than 32 million tons in Germany. The secret of this "economic miracle" lies in the advantages of the socialist system with its social ownership of the means of production and planned economic management.

    In addition, these figures indicate the delusionality of the recent ratios of tank losses for Germany: the USSR, which "according to the latest data" in some authors reach 1: 6, and sometimes 1:10. As you know, since 1942 the Soviet Army had a constant numerical superiority in tanks. If we admit (in favor of Germany) constant numerical equality, then the ratio of losses should coincide with the ratio of production. Thus, if we discard 1944 (Germany started the war on two fronts), then the ratio for 1941-1943. it turns out 1: 3, or even less, if we take into account that in 1943 the USSR tank fleet significantly outnumbered Nazi Germany.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 21 March 2013 10: 42 New
      Quote: Gari
      ... Germany several times exceeded USSR in production and prey strategic materials such as steel and coal....

      For coal - yes, for steel - no.
      Before the start of World War II, Germany received about 2/2 of iron ore from Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. Sweden alone produced over 3 million tons of ore annually (and after the outbreak of war). Moreover, the raw materials were first-class. The specific gravity of iron in ore was about 10%.
      Critical was the position of Germany in alloy metals. Almost entirely from abroad. Which cut the military industry in the second half of 1944.
      Well, tank production is not the most metal-intensive area. The fleet ate a lot.
      1. Gari
        Gari 21 March 2013 14: 51 New
        [quote = BigRiver] Annual steelmaking in 1940-1944 held in Germany (together with the occupied countries and satellites) at the level of 31-32 million tons, and coal production amounted to 390-460 million tons.
        Germany occupied almost all of Europe
        And the Soviet Union has sharply increased production since 1942, when half the country was occupied, if it’s not Heroism, then what!
        1. Bigriver
          Bigriver 21 March 2013 14: 58 New
          Quote: Gari
          Annual steelmaking in 1940-1944 held on ...

          I emphasized hi PRODUCTION.
          Two-thirds of the ore was imported.
          In general, their economy was very import-dependent.
          They left the Caucasus - relations with Turkey deteriorated - they lost chrome.
          We rolled back over the Dnieper - lost molybdenum.
          Finland turned away - nickel disappeared :)
          But, the bottleneck is oil. It was Adolf's nightmare :)))
          1. Skavron
            Skavron 21 March 2013 16: 52 New
            Quote: BigRiver
            But, the bottleneck is oil. It was Adolf's nightmare :)))

            Actually, wars do start because of resources. )
  4. Landwarrior
    Landwarrior 21 March 2013 10: 17 New
    Well, what a fashion to compare tanks by quantity ?! Did the authors of this and similar articles replay in RED ALERT? Well, TankRashi doesn’t exist in nature !!!! Well, when they remember that tanks need fuel, ammunition, spare parts, and, excuse me, do you need to eat tankers? In one way, one of the components and no matter how many tanks were, everything will go to dust ...
    1. avt
      avt 21 March 2013 10: 51 New
      Quote: Landwarrior
      Well, what a fashion to compare tanks by quantity ?!

      And so, it’s easier for historians. It’s not necessary to strain and rummage in related industries. Well, bloody totalitarianism is easier to expose. Revealing is always easier and more profitable than digging up the truth.
      1. Landwarrior
        Landwarrior 21 March 2013 11: 20 New
        Quote: avt
        Quote: Landwarrior
        Well, what a fashion to compare tanks by quantity ?!

        And so, it’s easier for historians. It’s not necessary to strain and rummage in related industries. Well, bloody totalitarianism is easier to expose. Revealing is always easier and more profitable than digging up the truth.

        So I look. Rezun's ears I see stick out from all the cracks. wassat
  5. Stas57
    Stas57 21 March 2013 11: 02 New
    Well, what a fashion to compare tanks by quantity?

    absolutely right ....
    so what are we meeting the war with? or rather with whom?
    7-th mechanized corps:
    «The commanding and commanding divisions are staffed at 15 – 20%. Especially poorly equipped with 21 etc.
    The junior staff of the divisions are staffed by an average of 11%».
    + + +
    “In view of the lack of material equipment and weapons, low staffing of commanding officers, and unpreparedness of the rank and file — units of the division are not yet knocked together and are not combat ready.”

    20-th mechanized corps ZAPOV.
    “The rank and file - 84%
    Junior staff - 27%
    Com composition: Higher - 90%, senior - 68%, medium - 27%.
    Engineers - 2,3%
    Technicians —10,4%
    Other personnel - 35% »
    In addition, "a large percentage of the average command personnel are not tank crews requiring special retraining."

    “There is a large lack of parts for the engineering staff (according to the staff of 165 engineers, there is 5, security is 3%, V / of technicians put to the 489 staff there is 110 security 22.5%).
    Manning with command personnel at the expense of those who have not finished tank schools extremely complicates matters of combat and special training.
    The regiments of the divisions were not fully equipped with signaling and radio operators, there are no commanders of radio platoons and radio technicians at all (the duties are temporarily performed by non-signalmen or wire commanders).
    The junior command staff of the communications staffed at 30%, the rest of the ISS posts are corporal. The rank and file are manned at 100%. ”
    This is written by the commander of the 9-th mechanized corps of KOVO, Major General Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovsky.

    and what does Mikhail Efimovich say?
    On March 10 of 1941, the commander of the 20th Panzer Division of the 9th Mechanized Corps, Colonel Mikhail Efimovich Katukov, reports on the staffing of the division entrusted to him (recall, the formation of the division began in November 1940): "The commanding staff. There are 1342 people in the state, there are 584 people. or 43%. The situation is especially bad with the staffing of staffs of all degrees ... At the headquarters of regiments ... there is no one to plan and control combat training. The division was staffed by 25% with medical staff ... The sapper companies were not fully staffed with the senior staff. There are not enough signalmen to the 25 staff, not one chemist in any part ... Tank commanders lack of 72% ... The same situation with motorists ... Part of the personnel assigned to the division in their qualities do not correspond to the positions to which they are appointed ... From the 8 tank. the division arrived ml. Political instructor B., expelled from the CPSU (b) by the District Party Committee as early as September 1940 of the year ... To Political Instrument K. OPP [154] 8 tank. divisions presented material for dismissal from the army and at the same time seconded it to us in the division. Now K. has been transferred to the reserve ... Also with the political staff who arrived from the 10 tank. divisions. As can be seen from these examples, parts of the Okrug did not select proportionally the personnel for the acquisition of our division, but a real dropout.
    “Junior command staff. The division is staffed with junior staff at 21%. Incomplete - 1910 people The cover of the incomplete OU KOVO [156] was dressed up, and the division received the rank and file of corporals from the 10 and 15 tank. divisions. The quality of the sent corporals is very low, the latter cannot fulfill the positions of junior command personnel both in their development and in training. Among the sent corporals: 211 people non-Russian nationals poorly fluent in Russian ... illiterate 7 people., illiterate 70 people ... unfit for combat service 20 people. All the corporals sent are now being used as junior command personnel, but they are of little use, since ordinary Red Army soldiers of the 1940 draft are better prepared than they are today. ”
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 21 March 2013 11: 02 New
      I will continue

      In the 10-th Panzer Division of the 15-th MK left during the retreat of 140 tanks (for comparison, combat losses amounted to 110 vehicles). In the 8-th Panzer Division of the 4-th MK crews, 107 tanks were destroyed, 10 went missing, 6 got stuck in a swamp and was abandoned. Knowing all this, one can no longer be surprised at the average daily losses of the SWF in the 292 tank. This level of losses was not even in the largest tank battles of the war, for example, in the Battle of Kursk this figure ranged from 68 (in the Oryol offensive operation) to 89 (in the Belgorod-Kharkov offensive operation).

      say losses? Well, the finale, saying why it happened ----
      among 47 people returned to her there were 26 people ill, illiterate, illiterate, do not speak Russian and cannot be in the school. units ... As a result of such manning, there are currently hundreds of people in units of the division entrusted to me by their physical condition, literacy, and knowledge of the Russian language that are completely unsuitable for service in tank units and are actually ballast, namely:

      Natives of nat. non-Russian republics 1914 people or xnumx.2% Of these, absolutely no Russian speakers 236 people ...

      Illiterate - 211 people, illiterate 622 people, with the formation of 3 – 4 groups of 3571 people.

      Old Ages (26 – 30 years) 745 people

      Formerly tried and convicted - 341 people ...

      Unfit for combat service at the conclusion of the garrison medical commission 81 people Unsuitable for service in the tank units and for combat service according to the conclusion of the medical commission of the unit, but have not yet passed the garrison commission - 418 people ... "
      cit by Ulanov, Andrey Andreevich; Shein, Dmitry Vladimirovich. Order in the tank forces

      I recall before the war almost 4 month ... and how will we meet the enemy, not knowing the language, not knowing the technology, not knowing how to read?

      in short, we continue further, as before 41, count the tanks and measure the rivets, forgetting who is sitting in them, wondering where the traitors are, why the world's best tanks in such quantity were profiled,
      1. Stas57
        Stas57 21 March 2013 11: 19 New
        Well, another factor, in addition to the shells mentioned below, their absence, more precisely.

        spare parts and fuels and lubricants

        week before the war
        6-th mechanized corps ZAPOV.

        “For combat vehicles - there are no spare parts for the chassis of the final drive to the T-28 tank. There are no caterpillar drive wheels and half shafts to the BT tank. For other brands of military vehicles supply of spare parts for 60 – 70%.

        For auxiliary machines, the availability of spare parts is extremely insufficient. For the 4th quarter of 1940 of the year, 10% of the demand was received, for the 1th quarter of the 1941th position did not improve.

        Completely lacking revolving units, such as: motors, gearboxes, rear axles for all brands of cars.

        The availability of rubber for M-1 machines is completely absent, as a result of which 30 – 40% of M-1 machines in parts are without rubber. The armored cars BA-20 are not fully provided with a gusmatik.

        Due to the lack of severely deficient spare parts, it is not possible to timely repair vehicles with medium and current repairs. ”

        8-th mechanized corps KOVO.

        “7th Motor Rifle Division. It is equipped with repair tools at 22%. There are no stationary workshops and machine tools in RBW.

        The division is provided with spare parts for the repair of military and wheeled vehicles at 1%. There are no spare parts in NZ for military and wheeled vehicles.

        Rubber trucks and wheeled vehicles are provided at 60%; armored vehicles by 100%. Of the presence of trucks, 200 cars are on pads due to the lack of rubber. Average rubber wear by 70%. ” [38]

        9-th mechanized corps KOVO.

        “The supply of spare parts is unsatisfactory; there are no spare parts in the refinery at all. “There are also no spare parts at the current allowance, with the exception of a number of random non-working parts.”

        In the 39-m tank regiment, tanks were received after overhaul from repair facilities and entered the combat training park. Tanks are not equipped with tools, accessories and spare parts ... The shelf does not have the most necessary spare parts, which does not allow to fix minor damage. The lack of spare fuses leads to attempts to install bugs. On 25% of tanks, tracks are heavily worn and require replacement

        37-I light tank brigade
        “The condition of the material part is the most unsatisfactory. Of the available machines, 20% worked on 100 hours, 10% on 50 hours. The chassis of all cars is completely worn out ... West no parts. There is absolutely no repair base»

        all the same Shein and Ulanov, Order in the tank troops
  6. Bigriver
    Bigriver 21 March 2013 11: 07 New
    In general, you can compare in different ways :)
    Here, I would take Comrade The driver, talking about the number of T-34s and KV-1s, highlighted the issue of training mechanized water commanders, commanders, in general, the crews of these tanks.
    I would say a few words about the presence of armor-piercing shells of 76 mm. This is a real disaster! A number of buildings did not have them at all. And one of the most affluent - 8MK, had azhna a third of the state. They shot at tanks, often royal shrapnel, put up for attack.
    In addition, armor-piercing 45 mm to the BT, T-26 and PTO tank guns also constituted a problem. A large batch, released in the spring of 1941, turned out to be overheated and did not even take a 25 mm Pz-IV rim.
    1. Kars
      Kars 21 March 2013 15: 19 New
      I look here Stas 57 appeared. And put me on the blacklist)))))

      guys who have no difficulty reposting a photo of the 6th German tank division in 1941 in a marching column violating Guderian’s charter.
      1. Skavron
        Skavron 21 March 2013 16: 59 New
        Kars, no question.
        [quote = Kars] I look here Stas 57 appeared. And put me on the blacklist))))) guys who are not difficult to re-post the photo of the 6th German tank division in 1941 in a marching column violating Guderian’s charter. the possibility of the feat of the KV-57 tank crew under the command of Z. Kolobanov.
        1. Stas57
          Stas57 21 March 2013 17: 19 New
          let him read it again and prove to me that the column that day did not go with the authorized distance of 50 meters, all other pictures do not matter.
          photo of the convoy that day or broken after the battle, and I admit my mistake.

          I look here Stas 57 appeared. And put me on the blacklist)))))

          unfortunately for you Kars, you do not know how to control yourself in personal correspondence, alas, the only reason is that.
  7. Landwarrior
    Landwarrior 21 March 2013 11: 26 New
    Stas57, Bigriverthanks for clarification drinks
  8. Algor73
    Algor73 21 March 2013 14: 57 New
    Of course you can compare. But the loss of tanks in the first weeks of the war is connected, first of all, with the unwillingness of our troops to conduct defensive battles. Nobody was preparing for defense. The lack of communication, the uncoordinated work of the rear services, the small number of commanders capable of action in extreme situations, is the reason. And there were losses, and that is big. True, it’s very difficult to attribute them to combat. Their prerequisites are repression in the commanding milieu and a holy faith in the correctness of party policy.
  9. rexby63
    rexby63 21 March 2013 15: 29 New
    Article minus. The author judges approximately as a certain Mrs. Latynina. And that a hysterical fool can say goodbye, a man does not say goodbye to some, albeit baseless, ambitions. Let revere Ulanova with Shein, Chunikhina. Although their conclusions are not entirely certain, they worked with documents by 120%
  10. Tehb
    Tehb 21 March 2013 15: 46 New
    [quote = Gari] [quote = BigRiver] Annual steelmaking in 1940-1944. held in Germany (together with the occupied countries and satellites) at the level of 31-32 million tons, and coal production amounted to 390-460 million tons.
    Germany occupied almost all of Europe
    And the Soviet Union sharply increased production since 1942, when half the country was occupied, if it’s not Heroism, then what! [/ Quote]

    Sorry Gari. I accidentally slammed a minus for you. On the tablet, I moved down without looking and managed to poke in the negative.
    1. Bigriver
      Bigriver 22 March 2013 06: 45 New
      Quote: TEHb

      Germany occupied almost all of Europe
      And the Soviet Union has sharply increased production since 1942, when half the country was occupied, if it’s not Heroism, then what!

      The assertion that even with the occupation of almost all of Europe, the German economy did not become self-sufficient - does it somehow level the heroism of our rear?
      The absolute superiority of Germany, if we talk about its economy, was not in millions of tons of rolled metal or coal. Before the war, these parameters did not differ significantly. On the contrary, if you look calculation for a number of years in the steel industry - then the numbers will be close.
      The superiority of Germany was ensured in anticipation and the beginning of the war, the highly skilled labor of workers and engineers in industry, technology, and a modern machine park.
      I.V. Have you read Stalin? "Cadres decide everything." With these shots in our defense industry there was a severe famine. With everyone: with engineers and welders, milling machines, turners and more ...
      And this is also a feat.
  11. Andrey77
    Andrey77 22 March 2013 12: 27 New
    The author is familiar with the publications of Isaev. "and it remains only to be surprised at how they ventured to start a war" - but do not be surprised, and re-read Isaev. The strength of the Wehrmacht is not in the tanks, but in the structure of the motorized rifle compound (regiment, in modern terms) of the Wehrmacht.
  12. Snoop
    Snoop 20 December 2013 17: 35 New
    The tanks themselves do not solve anything, and history has shown during the counterattack of our mechanized corps during the border battle, to take the same Dubno. Without the support of aviation, heavy artillery and the lack of sufficient infantry, they played a role. The Germans shot the bulk of our tanks with their anti-tank missiles, bombed them. The other part had to be abandoned.