Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized enclosures
9 June 1940 of the USSR NPO S.K.Timoshenko approved the plan for the formation of mechanized corps and conveyed his proposals to the SNK of the USSR. 6 July 1940 was issued a decree SNK USSR №1193-464ss, which said:
1. To approve the organization of a mechanized corps consisting of two tank divisions, a motorized division, a motorcycle regiment, one air squadron, a road battalion and a corps communications battalion. To the mechanized corps, to give one air guards as part of the 2 short-bomber and one fighter air regiments.
2. To approve the organization of a mechanized corps tank division and a separate tank division consisting of:
a) 2 tank regiments of one battalion of heavy tanks (each), 2 battalions of medium tanks and a battalion of flamethrower tanks in each regiment;
b) one motorized regiment consisting of 3 infantry battalions and one 6-gun battery of regimental artillery;
c) one artillery regiment in the 2 battalions: one 122-mm howitzer battalion and one 152-mm howitzer battalion;
d) the anti-aircraft division, reconnaissance battalion, bridge battalion and rear service units ...
3. To have a motorized division in the composition and organization approved by the Decree of the Defense Committee of 22 in May 1940, №215ss.
4. Approve full-time staff:
a) control of a mechanized corps with a motorcycle regiment for peacetime - 2662 man, and for wartime - 2862 man;
b) a tank division for peacetime - 10943 man, and for wartime - 11343 man:
c) a motorized division for peacetime - 11 LLC man, for wartime - 12000 man. 5. In total, the Red Army has 8 mechanized corps and 2 separate tank divisions, a total of 8 mechanized corps with a motorcycle regiment and corps, 18 tank divisions and 8 motorized divisions ... "
The existing tank brigades were converted to form tank divisions, mainly in the border military districts. Motorized divisions were created on the basis of infantry. Personnel and command personnel came from disbanded cavalry divisions and corps.
Each mechanized corps in the case of full staffing had tremendous striking power. According to the 1941 staff, it should have been 36000 man, 1031 tank (120 heavy, 420 medium, 316 BT, 17 light and 152 chemical), 358 guns and mortars, 268 BA-10 armored vehicles BA-116, 20 BA-XNX.
The main form of use of a mechanized corps in a defensive operation was the use of powerful counterstrikes to destroy the enemy’s broken groups. The perceptible "dizziness from success", read in these plans, subordinated to the strategy of pre-emptive strike, turned into a tragedy after a few months. Most of the mechanized corps were part of the covering armies, being their main striking force. The rest were subordinate to the district, making up a reserve of front commanders in the event of war. This reorganization, designed to provide the Red Army with an unprecedentedly powerful striking force, ultimately proved unsuccessful both in its inopportuneness (on the eve of the war) and in the impossibility of quickly completing it with available resources. The idea itself turned into a prolonged period of re-formation, rotation of people and equipment, which led to a decrease in the combat readiness of already established parts and formations. The best on the eve of war turned out to be the enemy of the good.
The speed of deployment of mechanized corps was very high, which caused a lot of problems. Due to the lack of new tanks, they had to be taken from tank battalions of rifle divisions and tank regiments of cavalry divisions, depriving these units of the main striking force. As G.K. Zhukov acknowledged in his memoirs, “we did not calculate the objective capabilities of our tank industry. To fully equip new mechanized corps, 16,6 thousands of tanks were needed only of new types, and only 32 thousands of tanks in total. there was no place to take any conditions; technical and command personnel were also lacking. " Nine corps commanded the Red Army a little, though, if they are staffed by state, then more than twice the German army armies in the number of vehicles and could decide the outcome of any battle. But instead of equipping the existing mechanized corps and their combat support in February 1941, the General Staff developed an even broader plan for the formation of armored and mechanized troops, which also included the creation of an 21 corps.
Stalin did not immediately support this plan, approving it only in March 1941. Since April 1941, the mass deployment of mechanized corps began, for which there were no tanks, no command personnel, or trained tank crews. Personnel hastily retrained from other types of troops, which did not have the best effect on the level of newly-made crews who received scanty practice of operating tanks. For this process, the remaining tank brigades and some cavalry divisions were involved (for example, the 27 th m CABE was created on the basis of the 19 cd). But if yesterday's gunners, signalmen and chauffeurs still suited the role of gunners and driver mechanics, there was simply no one to appoint to senior positions (when the consequences of the “purges” of previous years affected). Commanding skills, experience and responsibility were forged by many years of practice, and on the eve of the war many leading headquarters remained incomplete even with leading departments, including operational and intelligence (as was the case with 15, 16, 19 and 22 mechanized corps).
Command personnel prepared the Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization (VAMM) in Moscow and one-year courses with it. For training of the command and technical staff of the middle level, the network of educational institutions of the ABTV was expanded. By 1941, it included the Orlovskoye named after Frunze, the 1-e Kharkov, the 1-e and 2-e Saratov, the 1-e Ulyanovsk tank, the Kiev tank-technical, the Pushkin auto-technical, the Gorky auto cycle, the Poltava tractor school. In February — March, Kazan, Syzran, Chkalovsk, 1941, Ulyanovsk, 2, Saratov Tank, Ordzhenikidzegrad automobile cycling, and Kamyshin tractor schools were deployed.
But, despite all the efforts, the problem of command and technical personnel was very acute. Here are the data on some compounds for June 1941: in the 35-th TD 9-th MKOVO instead of 8 the commanders of tank battalions had 3 (37% staff), the commanders of companies - 13 instead of 24 (54,2%), the platoon commanders - 6 instead 74 (8%). In the 215-th md 22-th mk KOVO, there were not enough 5 battalion commanders, 13 commanders of companies, staffed with junior command personnel - 31%, technical staff - 27%. The 11 th mechanized corps ZapVO was provided with command frames on 36%. In 1940 — 1941 Stalin even went so far as to let some of the repressed commanders out of the camps and send them to the mechanized corps. So, KK Rokossovsky from the prisoner became the commander of the 9-th mechanized corps in KOVO.
Due to the rapid pace of deployment of mechanized corps, it was not possible to organize combat coordination between units and subunits. In December, 1940, speaking at a meeting of the senior commanders of the Red Army, the head of the ABTU, Ya.N. Fedorenko, said: "This year the corps and divisions worked out the issues of entering a breakthrough and an offensive, but this is just an introduction, no combat interaction and cohesion in these matters not yet". The preparation of a tank company in a defensive and offensive battle was supposed to be completed only by May — June 1941, and coordination of the regiment, division, and corps was scheduled for later periods.
By the beginning of World War II, 29 mechanized corps were formed, which had different degrees of manning.
Table No. 1. Mechanized corps of the Red Army
Note, 5,26,27 MK in June 1941 were transferred to border districts as part of the armies of the second strategic echelon.
Most of the mechanized corps did not have the necessary amount of weapons and military equipment. Completion by mid-June 1941 was: for cars - 39%, tractors - 44%, repair tools - 29%, motorcycles - 17%.
On the quantitative composition of the tank fleet of mechanized corps says the following table:
In other sources there are other numbers. So, according to Vladimirsky, 9-mk KOVO had 300 tanks, 19-mk - 450, and 22-mk - 707. As you can see, the difference is quite large.
Table No. 2. The quantitative composition of the tank fleet of mechanized corps by mid-June 1941 g.
The largest number of tanks was in the KOVO mechanized corps, which fully corresponded to Stalin's point of view that in the event of war the Germans would deliver the main blow in Ukraine. Therefore, the southwestern direction was considered the main one. 4 and 8 mechanized corps had only KB and T-34 about 600 units and more 1000 tanks of other brands.
A lot of troubles caused the diversity of the tank fleet of buildings. Many cars were discontinued, they stopped producing spare parts.
Due to the fact that the staffing of the mechanized corps was delayed, the 16 General Staff in May 1941 sent a directive to the troops, according to which, in order to strengthen the anti-tank capabilities of the troops, prior to their receiving tanks, they were armed with 50- and 76-mm DT guns and machine guns for use in case of necessity as anti-tank regiments and divisions. The regiment was supposed to 45 18-mm guns, 45 24-mm guns, 76 machine guns. But the directive of the General Staff was not realized before the outbreak of the war, and the ZNOVO 24 and 17 mechanized corps, whose tank regiments were to receive anti-tank artillery, were generally used in combat as rifle units.
The dislocation of mechanized corps on the eve of the war was advantageous for offensive operations. 6, 11 and 13 mechanized corps were on the Bialystok ledge, 4, 8 and 15 microns were on the Lviv ledge, which allowed in the event of a conflict to strike the flanks of the Lublin group of Germans. The 3 and 12 units were intended for actions against the Tilsit group. The 2 and 18 MC were a threat to the oil fields in Romania. From the north, the 16 th mechanized corps of the 12 th army and the mechanized corps of the district subordination of KOVO hung over Romania. However, the German attack changed the situation - this arrangement of the Soviet troops became a trap for them.
Table No. 3. The ratio of the state-supplied and actually available number of combat vehicles, artillery in the mechanized corps on 13-19 June 1941.
So, 18 MK, located on the territory of the annexed Bessarabia, was literally squeezed into a "corner" between the sea shore and the stretched Dniester estuary. With the release of Romanians and Germans to the Dniester 18 MK would be completely cut off from their own. There was no crossing over the liman estuary that reached 30 km, even floating T-37 and T-38 (more than 130 in the mechanized corps) did not dare to pass through it, and the corps had to retreat almost to meet the approaching enemy. After 100 km march through the sands along the estuary, the corps continued to withdraw, taking the first battle only one month after the start of the war (moreover, in June, the command carried out successful counter-offensive operations on this sector of the front).
- Igor Drogovoz
- Iron fist of the Red Army. Creation of armored troops
Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized enclosures
Iron fist of the Red Army. Tank park on the eve of the war
Iron fist of the Red Army. Mechanized corps in battle
Iron fist of the Red Army. Motorized and tank divisions
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