The saga of the company mortar in the Red Army. Removed from service as having failed to live up to the hopes placed on it
Ending. Previous part: "The saga of the company mortar in the Red Army. What was the fundamental mistake of Kraskomov».
The main unmasking signs of 50-mm mortars
Among other things, mortars, when used, had characteristic unmasking features, which also reduced the survivability of crews on the battlefield.
Characteristic unmasking signs for 50-mm mortars are a flash of a shot and a plume of smoke rising to 1,0...1,5 m (these signs are clearly visible on videos on YouTube, which show the use of American 60-mm mortars).
In addition to these signs, the 50-mm mortar model RM-38(40) produced a dust suspension when fired, because when fired, part of the powder gases came out of the mortar barrel (chamber) through the outlet in the remote valve, which was directed downward. forward, while the escaping gases hit the ground (snow), raised dust (snow) and unmasked the position. On the Shamarin mortar (RM-41), this drawback is eliminated; the powder gases escaping through a remote valve are ejected forward and upward along the gas outlet tube.
Assessing the visibility of a mortar crew on the battlefield
Let's try to evaluate the visibility of a 50-mm mortar crew compared to a single fighter, using standard targets. The sizes and shapes of the targets were chosen by the military based on combat experience and certain statistical calculations. We use them as a given.
In the figure on the left is a chest target, which imitates a single enemy fighter preparing to shoot in a prone position, figure area S = 0,20 m2. The right target will replace us with a mortar crew, which is correct, just take a closer look at the previously given photographs of the crews (see paragraph 3.2), the area of the figure is S ≈ 0,48 m2. That is, the visibility of a mortar crew, prepared to fire and located in a lying rifle chain, is approximately 2–2,5 times higher than that of a single shooter lying nearby.
Taking into account the fact that machine gunners and riflemen are ordered to first knock out commanders and the most dangerous targets (machine gun and mortar crews), it is obvious that the l/s squads of the 50 mm mortar are among the first to be knocked out as the most dangerous and large target.
4 output: in a duel situation (who can hit the enemy faster) between mortar and machine gun crews at a distance of up to 800 m*, the first has very low chances of survival.
*The effective firing range of a machine gun is up to 800–1 m.
Tactical niche for 50 mm mortars
Everyone has it weapons has its own tactical niche, the task of company mortars in an offensive - do not allow the defenders to take their positions and open fire on the attackers, when large calibers move from artillery preparation (to strikes along the defense line) to accompaniment of the attack (fire is transferred to the flanks and into the depths of the defense).
With frontal fire from 50-mm mortars, the radius of safe removal of our infantry at a firing distance of up to 500 meters is 156 meters (up to 100 m, the range of destruction by mine fragments + 56 m, the maximum radius of deviation from the aiming point along the length when firing from a distance of 500 m - see p. #). That is, under the cover of an artillery barrage, infantry can approach the enemy line of defense at a distance of up to 400 meters, then supported by mortar fire up to 180–200 meters, then an attack occurs under the cover of machine gun fire. At this time, mortars hit the flanks and the second line of trenches.
As a result, the 50-mm mortar has a narrow niche in the offensive (up to 500 meters range of actual fire), and if there is not enough fire from large barrels, then company mortar crews have to work in the zone of small arms fire, i.e. suffer heavy losses: i.e. because this is a more noticeable target than single shooters, and in order to hit the target, the crew needs a lot of time to take the target “fork”.
In defense A mortar platoon operates, as a rule, as part of a mortar company. The platoon must equip, in addition to the main firing position, at least 3 spare positions and create a supply of ammunition there. The platoon commander must prepare in advance the data for conducting barrage fire on the areas of stationary barrage fire assigned to him, from all firing positions. As a rule, in defense, 50-mm mortars at a range of up to 500 m act very effectively (with precision) against enemy personnel located both in open areas and hidden in the folds of the terrain.
Summary results
The 50-mm mortar system was objectively better and superior in all respects to the Dyakonov grenade launcher, which it replaced. Those wishing to get acquainted with the performance characteristics of the Dyakonov grenade launcher, see [ul=https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Granatomet_Dyakonov]here[/url].
1. 50-mm mortars compared to the Dyakonov grenade launcher were more an effective weapon against enemy personnel, both in open areas and hidden in natural folds of terrain at distances of up to 400–500 m when operating in defense.
2. Company mortars were structurally an initially inaccurate system, the aiming step was structurally set to 50 m (then the distance was set by manipulating the remote ring) - therefore, to “target the target location” it took at least 10–12 minutes, plus the same amount was required to reliably hit the target.
The fact is that at the final section of its trajectory the mine falls vertically, its power is limited (the radius of high-explosive action and scattering of fragments), so you need to know the distance to within a few meters. And the mortar commander determined the distance by eye, and for each target the guidance was specified by sighting (the notorious “fork”).
3. The practice of using these weapons in the summer and autumn of 1941 was ineffective – squads of company mortars were staffed as part of a platoon. Therefore, mortar crews went on the attack together with l/s platoons, instead of covering their movement - using mortar fire to suppress the enemy’s defensive activity: forcing him to take cover, and not observe and fire at the attacking chains (I remind you: the platoon’s offensive zone is up to 150 m – clause 252 of the Red Army Charter of 1938).
The Germans primarily knocked out commanders, mortar and machine gunners, as well as ammunition carriers in the attacking chains. After which the attacking chains, having lost their commanders and fire support, lay down, and the attack often fizzled out.
The platoon's defense area - up to 300x250 m (ibid., paragraph 297) allowed the mortar crew to equip several cells in order to quickly change position while repelling an attack or conducting harassing fire. But the change of position and tactics of using mortars also depended on the qualifications of the platoon commanders, which directly affected the life expectancy of the soldiers of the mortar crew.
4. The commander of the mortar squad, without binoculars (not required by the state), gave target designation, relying only on the vigilance of the eyes. At distances up to 300–400 m, this gave acceptable results; at longer distances, the pointing accuracy was significantly lower.
For more accurate targeting (in range), observation of the results of hits must be carried out from the side of the mortar, at a distance of up to 50–100 m. But in an offensive battle, in open areas, this is impossible - there is no reliable connection that does not attract the attention of the enemy, between commander/observer and mortar crew.
Deviations to the left/right were observed by the gunner himself, using landmarks on the ground or a mechanical sight, the length of the aiming line of which was less than 150 mm (like a pistol).
Consequently, the The crew of the Soviet 50-mm mortar did not have an effective aiming and targeting system, especially at distances greater than 400–500 m.
5. Unmasking when fired. The most widely used model "Wasp" 50-mm mortar had a significant design flaw - when fired, part of the powder gases came out of the mortar barrel (chamber) through the outlet in the remote valve, which was directed downward and forward, while the escaping gases hit the ground (snow), raised dust and unmasked the position.
6. Was mistake of the Red Army specialists in organizational terms: they tried to use company mortars based on the tactics of using rifle grenade launchers, when the grenade launchers were directly in the ranks of the attackers/defenders, not standing out in any way from other Red Army soldiers. And in the light mortar in those days, the fathers-commanders of the Red Army saw a kind of miracle weapon, located in the first line of infantry chains, “supplementing the company’s fire system and allowing it to independently carry out some tasks without involving artillery units for this.”
7. Training. Massive training of conscript personnel in the use of a 50-mm company mortar began only in the spring of 1941.
8. Logistics. The stock of mines carried by the squad (4 people) was up to 56 pieces. = 14 min * 4 people, provided that each mortarman, in addition to personal military equipment, ammunition and weapons, carried two trays of mines.
A mortar is an imprecise weapon: to aim a “fork” at a group target (machine gun, mortar, enemy squad/platoon), an experienced crew usually spends at least 8–12 minutes. Then the same number of mines - to defeat/suppress the target. That is, it took up to 24 minutes to destroy/(suppress activity) one target.
Consequently, in an offensive battle, the mortar crew could destroy 2, maximum 3 targets, after which the carried ammunition would be completely exhausted. Carrying mines without capping (trays) is prohibited. Additional trays for mines are not included in the kit (a total of 8 trays for 1 mortar), so the commander of the mortar (squad) must, with the permission of the platoon commander, ensure that the mortar is supplied with mines from the company ammunition supply point, which in battle conditions was unsafe, without a guarantee of delivery of ammunition.
In fact, when mortar men moved in advancing chains, the mortar initially became a useless load after hitting 2...3 targets (or firing in their direction).
A two-wheeled cart was used to transport mortars, mines and other dowry property. There was no economic unit in the Red Army company, so the carts were part of the battalion economic platoon. That is, the company ammunition supply point could not promptly replenish ammunition; all supplies had to be made in advance. Moreover, in the event of a company movement, the company sergeant major had to find an opportunity to transport all the ammunition and property of the company. Priority was given to cartridges and grenades, as well as clothing, mines were loaded last.
Generalization
The 50-mm mortar system, adopted for service in the summer of 1938, initially did not meet the objective requirements for portable mortars on the battlefield during the Great Patriotic War - a weak mine, a low range of effective fire.
During testing, before putting the company mortar system into service, the military did not have an understanding of how to properly use the new weapon - they replaced the Dyakonov grenade launcher, because when using it, the Mosin rifles failed after about 200-250 grenade shots. This was also the reason for the adoption of a 50-mm mortar, and not a 60-mm mortar: the military believed that a company mortar (and its crew) should be part of the unit, therefore the weight of the mortar and mines should be minimal, and its crew should not more than 2–3 people.
The combat operations in the summer of 1941 showed that in order to conduct effective fire and preserve materiel, 50-mm mortar crews must be separated into separate units.
Already in the fall of 1941, the mortar squads were removed from the staff of the rifle company - a platoon of 50-mm mortars was created, led by an officer who was part of the mortar company of the infantry battalion.
The commander of a platoon of 50-mm mortars was entrusted with the responsibility of organizing the implementation of the assigned fire mission (on the tactics of using mortars), training the platoon's l/s, supplying the unit's mortars with ammunition on the battlefield, etc.
That is, the organization of fire and the practice of using 50-mm mortars began to be carried out by a professional specialist, and not by conscripts.
The platoon commander had binoculars to monitor the enemy and adjust mortar fire, i.e., the instrumentation was improved.
During the battles of 1941–1942. The military began to understand what a company-level portable mortar should be like - the military demanded an increase in the power of the ammunition, the range of use to 1,5 km and the accuracy of the hit.
To modernize the 50-mm mortar, the following technical measures were required:
– increase the range of use against the enemy to 1 m;
– develop a new sight that allows you to aim at distances of up to 1,5–2 km, i.e. optical;
– increase hit accuracy due to design innovations;
– to construct a more powerful mine, allowing it to hit not only enemy personnel, but also barbed wire, i.e., with a larger area of continuous destruction by fragments and a higher high-explosive effect;
– in order to simplify operation and reduce unmasking signs, abandon the remote crane and switch to the classic mortar design.
Since 1941, the mortar company had 2 platoons with 50 mm mortars and 2 platoons with 82 mm mortars. Infantry commanders (who were supported either by a platoon of 50 mm mortars or by 82 mm mortars) could personally compare the effectiveness of these two mortar systems during battles, and the comparison was not in favor of the 50 mm mortars. Therefore, in their requirements for the 50-mm mortar, they were guided by the characteristics of 82-mm systems.
82-mm mortars fully met the above requirements and were mass-produced by industry. During the war, it was easier for factories to throw all their efforts into producing large-scale standard products of as small a range as possible, rather than scattering their efforts. It was easier to reorient the production of fuses for 50-mm mines to their production for 82-mm ammunition (they may have been the same model, there is no information on the Internet). The mine bodies were not interchangeable.
Therefore, the modernization of 50-mm mortars was abandoned; they were discontinued in June 1943, and the troops began to replace them with 82-mm systems. The 50-mm mortars available to the troops gradually disappeared due to combat losses or were written off during the reorganization of units.
Thus, company 50-mm systems were withdrawn from service for objective reasons, as they did not meet the requirements for portable mortars on the battlefield.
Our time
In connection with the conduct of the SVO, the Internet community is again raising the issue of equipping the rifle company with close-combat artillery weapons - a 60-mm mortar.
This begs the question, in what status and for what?
There is no advance of infantry chains, and is not expected.
Sometimes the power of 152 mm shells is not enough to destroy fortifications, what can we say about a 60 mm mine.
The status of a “roaming mortar” remains, the task of which is to quickly shoot back and run away (change position) before being covered. This is currently being successfully done by more powerful mortar systems with transport support. Their only drawback is that they are not under company command, and to use them the company commander needs to go through a number of approvals, i.e. there is no efficiency.
Another application is as a means of enhancing the firepower of sabotage and assault groups, whose task is to strike a designated target and quickly escape.
Thus, a rifle company does not need a 60-mm mortar - it is intended to solve problems that are not typical for it. But assigning an 82-mm mortar crew to a company is quite acceptable as long as the company is on the defensive. To do this, the company commander must submit a justification report to the battalion commander. That is, this is an issue that can be resolved on a routine basis.
The 60-mm mortar has a narrow niche of application - enhancing the firepower of foot units, when the weight of weapons and ammunition is of decisive importance. That is, for sabotage groups of the GRU and Airborne Forces, as well as for mountain rifle units, where the weight of weapons and ammunition plays a significant role.
Currently, to enhance the firepower of operational groups (special forces), an 82-mm Russian silent man-portable mortar, the 2B25 “Gall”, has been developed, which began entering service with the troops in 2019.
Based on it, a 60 mm caliber mortar is now being created (online information), lighter and more convenient for use by special forces. It is planned that the firing range of the new model will exceed 3,5 km.
To help the infantryman in the pre-war period (before 1941)
Alternative story interests a significant part of the reading public, so I decided to present my thoughts on the modernization of the 50-mm mortar and its use.
The designers of the 50-mm mortar proceeded from the condition that the mortar was fired by an infantryman who had the only device for measuring distances - his eyes.
The shot occurred when the mine was “self-punctured”, which reduced the shooting accuracy, because when the mine was lowered down the barrel, the mine hit the walls of the barrel - the position of the mine in the barrel when fired (as a result of the puncture of the primer of a propellant cartridge with a powder charge) was randomly insignificant changed.
The firing range was adjusted by a so-called remote valve, located in the breech of the barrel and releasing some of the gases to the outside, thereby reducing the pressure in the barrel. An elevation angle of 45° provided the greatest firing range, reaching up to 800 m, and with the remote valve fully open, the barrel angle of 75° provided a minimum range of 200 m. When firing at all ranges, only one propellant charge (4,5 g of gunpowder) was used.
An additional change in the firing range was also carried out by changing the path of the mine in the barrel in relation to the base of the barrel by moving the striker by rotating the mounting sleeve with a spacer ring, as a result of which the volume of the chamber changed. The firing distance was indicated on the spacer bushing along which the spacer ring rotated.
The sight of the company mortar was mechanical, without optical devices, which significantly affected the consumption of mines when shooting, especially over long distances.
Adjusting the pressure in the mortar chamber by releasing the pressure using a gas valve was not the best solution - to ensure stable shooting accuracy at a given distance, it was necessary to clean the mortar gas valve parts from powder fumes after each battle, for which the mortar was completely disassembled.
A more successful solution was that used on the Japanese Type 92 mortar. The range was adjusted by changing the position of the firing pin in the barrel, to which the mine was lowered, i.e., only the volume of the gas chamber changed => the pressure of the powder gases pressing on the mine changed, with a constant powder charge . Setting the firing distance was done using a flywheel, which the shooter rotated to push up/down a hollow firing pin with a spring-loaded firing pin inside. The firing distance was indicated on a rack connected to the firing pin. When firing at all ranges, only one propellant charge was used.
To fire, it was necessary to lower the pre-cocked striking mechanism, i.e., initially the mine occupied a stable position in the table (I remind you that a shot from the German 50-mm Granatenwerfer 36 mortar, which is considered more accurate compared to the 50-mm Osa, was also fired impact mechanism).
If the hero finds himself in a position that allows him to influence the decisions of the painters, then I consider it necessary:
- Remove mortars from the staff of the rifle company, form a separate unit under the battalion - a mortar company, where to form platoons of 50-mm mortars. For the duration of the combat mission, each rifle company is assigned a mortar support platoon by order of the battalion commander (BUP-42 is our everything).
- Military specialists should understand that 50-mm mortars have a narrow niche for tactical use, and the mortar itself is a cheap intermediate solution with a high mobilization potential (for their production, with the exception of the barrel, the equipment of an ordinary mechanical workshop was sufficient). As the army's logistics capabilities increase, they will inevitably be replaced by 82mm mortars.
- Increase the barrel length to 1,00–1,2 m so as to increase the effective firing range to 800 m, the maximum range will be about 1 m. Increase the weight, rigidity and area of the base plate. This will allow the use of additional weights installed on the base plate (soil bags) to increase the stability of the mortar when fired.
- A mortar shot, as a rule, should be fired using a trigger device - which will allow you to quickly enter corrections for range and deviations to the right/left. In this case, there should be a “rapid fire” mode, when the shot occurs from the self-impaling of a mine.
- To abandon the remote tap, to set the firing range, use the same mechanism as that of the Japanese Type 89 mortar. When firing at all ranges, use only one propellant charge (the crew of 50-mm mortars must be mobile, quickly change position, and not waste time on preparation min to use).
- In the 50-mm mortar, the firing pin was made as a hollow cylinder with a needle at one end, on which the primer of the expelling cartridge was punctured. I propose to think about the design of the firing pin, so that the shank of the mine occupies a more uniform position in the mortar barrel before impaling the primer of the expelling charge.
- Increase the weight and size of the mine, think about “ready-made” fragments. Considering the low technological level of the USSR before the war, I propose to insert a winding of square wire with a notch into the thin-walled cast-iron body of the mine, which will allow the formation of ready-made fragments weighing ≈2 g* when the mine explodes.
* I read on a specialized forum of professional military personnel (in 2010) that when a TNT charge weighing 60 g explodes within a radius of up to 3 m, metal fragments weighing 0,25 g usually cause non-lethal injuries, but fragments weighing more than 2,0 g – more often lethal (I may be mistaken, but I have no other data). - It is advisable to explore the possibility of using an obturator ring on a mine, which will reduce gas breakthrough, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the mine will hit the walls of the barrel less when fired, i.e. the accuracy of the mortar should increase. For this, the Americans use a plastic ring with a high slip coefficient, except for copper, I don’t know of any other suitable material widely used in those days by the industry of the USSR.
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