The saga of the company mortar in the Red Army. What was the fundamental mistake of Kraskomov
Crew of the Soviet 50-mm company mortar mod. 1940 during the fighting in Stalingrad
Previous part: "The saga of the company mortar in the Red Army. Application practice, experience».
Part 3
50mm mortar crew. Staffing table
According to states No. 04/620, 04/621, 04/626-04/630, 04/632-04/635, 04/651, 04/653-04/655 dated December 31.12.1935, 1, there is 3 grenade launcher compartment in a rifle platoon: squad leader and XNUMX soldiers, each of them is armed with a “mortar for throwing rifle grenades” - so in the document, in modern literature - rifle grenade launcher of the Dyakonov system.
Rifle grenade launcher of the Dyakonov system
Preparing to fire from a Dyakonov system grenade launcher in open areas
Grenade launcher in a rifle cell
According to State No. 04/29-04/38 dated September 13.09.1939, 1, the platoon is already armed with 50 mortar of 4 mm caliber, a crew of 50 people (I remind you: the 01.09.1938 mm mortar was adopted for service on September 1939, 1, in 780 1940 were produced pcs., in 27 - 805 units).
According to State No. 04/401 dated April 5, 1941: the platoon had 1 mortar squad, armed with a 50-mm company mortar and consisting of a commander and three soldiers. The crew commander, with the rank of junior sergeant or sergeant, is armed with a pistol and has a compass. Three mortarmen are Red Army soldiers, armed with three-line Mosin rifles. One of them carries a mortar, the rest each have two trays with mines in their packing devices. Each tray contains 7 minutes. Total wearable reserve - 28 minutes.
According to State No. 04/601 dated July 29, 1941, the platoon has 1 mortar squad of 4 people.
Thus, 3 rifle grenade launchers of the Dyakonov system were replaced with a 50-mm mortar, the number of Red Army soldiers in the mortar compartment remained the same. But no changes were made to the governing documents to take into account the specifics of the use of mortars.
Guiding documents on the use of 50-mm mortars in the pre-war period (before 1941) and during the Great Patriotic War
Experts will say that 50-mm mortar crews should fire from behind cover, and they will be right; this is exactly what the service’s short manual for the RM-41 mortar, dated 1942, recommends: “... openly located mortars, as well as mortars that have been in the same firing position for a long time, are easily detected by the enemy. Therefore, you need to carefully select each position and try to place the mortars behind cover, skillfully using the folds of the terrain for this, and change the firing position more often.”
The document was written in blood - based on the experience of the battles of 1941. Let us consider how the military leaders of the Red Army understood the use of company mortars from the moment they were put into service in the late 1930s.
Tactics and Application weapons rifle units during this period were regulated by the Infantry Combat Regulations (BUP-38) dated December 08, 1938, which was in force until November 1942.
The actions of the mortar (grenade launcher) squad of a platoon in battle are set out in the 4th chapter of BUP-38, articles 173–186.
Article 173. “The grenade launcher squad owns a formidable weapon to defeat the enemy hiding behind the folds of the terrain and inaccessible to machine gun and rifle fire.
Grenade launcher compartment usually operates as part of a rifle platoon, used for concentrated fire only for live group targets and can fire through its infantry while complying with established safety rules.”
Grenade launcher compartment usually operates as part of a rifle platoon, used for concentrated fire only for live group targets and can fire through its infantry while complying with established safety rules.”
The general provisions recommend the concealed location of the compartment (Articles 174 and 175).
Article 174: “The grenade launcher squad carries out its tasks from firing positions - the main and reserve ones, ensuring the location of grenade launchers hidden from enemy observation.
Firing position area indicates to the grenade launcher compartment rifle platoon commander; The squad leader must indicate the location of each grenade launcher.
If it is necessary to quickly open fire, the firing position is selected by the squad commander, and the grenade launcher locations are selected by the grenade launchers.”
Firing position area indicates to the grenade launcher compartment rifle platoon commander; The squad leader must indicate the location of each grenade launcher.
If it is necessary to quickly open fire, the firing position is selected by the squad commander, and the grenade launcher locations are selected by the grenade launchers.”
Article 175. “For firing positions of grenade launchers, reverse slopes, hollows, basins, ravines, pits, shell craters, buildings, etc. are used.
There should be no landmarks visible to the enemy near the firing position.
There must be a covered path to the firing position for bringing ammunition.”
There should be no landmarks visible to the enemy near the firing position.
There must be a covered path to the firing position for bringing ammunition.”
Platoon commanders in their actions on the battlefield were guided by Chapter 4 of BUP 38, which clearly regulates the actions of the grenade launcher squad commander and his subordinates.
On attack:
Article 177. The squad leader, having received an order from the platoon commander, must clarify the direction indicated to him, find out the presence of firing positions for grenade launchers and covered approaches to them, give the order (Articles 11 and 12) and lead the squad in the indicated direction.
Article 178. The squad must advance in leaps, sequentially occupying firing positions, without losing visual contact with the platoon commander and rifle squads and being in constant readiness to open fire.
Article 178. The squad must advance in leaps, sequentially occupying firing positions, without losing visual contact with the platoon commander and rifle squads and being in constant readiness to open fire.
On defense:
Article 184. During the offensive of the enemy infantry, the grenade launcher squad is obliged to prevent the accumulation with pre-prepared sudden fire, first of all hitting the enemy located in shelters and in covered approaches.
During an enemy attack, the grenade launcher compartment must fire at the second echelons of the enemy, helping to repel the attack.
During the period of fighting inside the platoon area, the grenade launcher squad is obliged to hit the enemy spreading along covered approaches to the rear.
When the platoon withdraws, the grenade launcher squad from the new line must cover the retreat of the rifle squads with its fire.
During an enemy attack, the grenade launcher compartment must fire at the second echelons of the enemy, helping to repel the attack.
During the period of fighting inside the platoon area, the grenade launcher squad is obliged to hit the enemy spreading along covered approaches to the rear.
When the platoon withdraws, the grenade launcher squad from the new line must cover the retreat of the rifle squads with its fire.
Among the duties of a platoon commander in battle, there is paragraph e) in Article 10: “continuously manage the battle of your unit, organizing and maintaining constant communication with subordinates, superiors and neighbors”.
At the same time, there is a requirement in Article 235. "In all cases of hostilities the platoon commander must see his entire platoon and have reliable communication with the company commander". That is, the platoon commander cannot allow the mortar (grenade launcher) squad to lag behind the advancing platoon formations by more than 50–70 m: the distance at which commands given by voice are clearly visible*.
* Radio communication at the platoon/squad level was not yet available, control of flags immediately attracted the enemy’s attention, signals with colored flares were intended for communication with higher command. Sound signals with a whistle were not used in the Red Army.
Next, the commander of the mortar squad must organize the delivery of mines, or, on the orders of the platoon commander, the mortar men walked as simple arrows into the general chain of the platoon.
Please note that by this time the Red Army already had experience in operating mortars with a caliber of 82 mm or more. The rules for their application are described in Chapter 7 of BUP-38, Articles 223–231.
Article 223.
“…. The tasks of the mortar in all types of combat are:
a) destruction (suppression) of enemy fire weapons and manpower located openly and in shelters, on slopes, in hollows, in the forest, in bushes, etc.;
b) destruction of artificial obstacles (wire fences).”
Article 226. “The firing position of a mortar, as a rule, is a closed cover depth of at least 1,5 m), must be selected on slopes, in deep folds of the terrain, in ravines and hollows, in craters from large-caliber shells, in forests - in small clearings , behind buildings, etc.”
Article 227. “To perform his task, the mortar commander must know the mission of the supported rifle unit, the main direction of fire and the targets.”
Article 229. “The mortar commander, having received a combat mission... is obliged to outline the direction of movement of the mortar, lines and hidden approaches to them for subsequent positions as the infantry moves forward.
The mortar is moved in all cases when solving a fire mission from the occupied position becomes impossible (lack of observation, target range exceeding the mortar’s firing range, as well as the threat of losing contact with the supported rifle unit).”
Article 231. “In defense for a mortar, it is necessary to select and equip the main and reserve firing positions and create a supply of ammunition.
From the main firing position, located deep in the area, the mortar must fire to attack enemy infantry.
This position must be disguised especially carefully; it is equipped with a shelter for personnel and a cellar for ammunition.
From a forward (reserve) position, a mortar can cover military outposts with fire and hit the advancing enemy..."
“…. The tasks of the mortar in all types of combat are:
a) destruction (suppression) of enemy fire weapons and manpower located openly and in shelters, on slopes, in hollows, in the forest, in bushes, etc.;
b) destruction of artificial obstacles (wire fences).”
Article 226. “The firing position of a mortar, as a rule, is a closed cover depth of at least 1,5 m), must be selected on slopes, in deep folds of the terrain, in ravines and hollows, in craters from large-caliber shells, in forests - in small clearings , behind buildings, etc.”
Article 227. “To perform his task, the mortar commander must know the mission of the supported rifle unit, the main direction of fire and the targets.”
Article 229. “The mortar commander, having received a combat mission... is obliged to outline the direction of movement of the mortar, lines and hidden approaches to them for subsequent positions as the infantry moves forward.
The mortar is moved in all cases when solving a fire mission from the occupied position becomes impossible (lack of observation, target range exceeding the mortar’s firing range, as well as the threat of losing contact with the supported rifle unit).”
Article 231. “In defense for a mortar, it is necessary to select and equip the main and reserve firing positions and create a supply of ammunition.
From the main firing position, located deep in the area, the mortar must fire to attack enemy infantry.
This position must be disguised especially carefully; it is equipped with a shelter for personnel and a cellar for ammunition.
From a forward (reserve) position, a mortar can cover military outposts with fire and hit the advancing enemy..."
3 output:
Before the Great Patriotic War, Kraskomov lacked an understanding of the difference in the use of a grenade launcher and a light mortar, primarily due to the lack of experience in mass combat use by 1938, when the document was adopted.
At the same time, for the sake of objectivity, it must be taken into account that the production of company mortars was mastered only in 1939. At the time of writing BUP-38, the Red Army had no experience in the combat use of company mortars, since they had not yet been adopted for service at that time.
The battles of the Soviet-Finnish War, apparently, did not provide the required amount of material, and most likely, so many shortcomings in the military training of units were identified that they did not get around to understanding the tactics of using company mortars and adjusting them in regulatory documents.
Only in the fall of 1941, based on the realities of summer battles, was it decided to withdraw 50-mm mortars from the company.
Order “On the reorganization of mortar units into battalions and divisions” No. 0405 October 12, 1941
“The existing organization and combat use of mortars, dispersed among small rifle units, does not provide the necessary fire action against the enemy.
Mortars operating alone lose a lot in terms of fire. Mortar fire, which has a great moral impact and material damage, and is not used massively, does not produce the desired results.
The same fire from a group of mortars, centralized in the hands of one commander, due to its power and destructive effect on the enemy, always leads to the rapid suppression and destruction of him, predetermining the success of the battle of rifle units.
The ease of carrying mortars, the simplicity and accessibility of choosing firing positions make it possible to maneuver a group of mortars from one direction of battle of a battalion or regiment to another, which can achieve fire superiority over the enemy in a short time.
The existing organization of mortar units does not meet these beneficial requirements and is flawed.
I order:
1. Abolish the existing regular organization of dispersed mortar units.
2. Remove mortars from rifle companies and battalions and in each rifle regiment the regiment commander* has at his disposal a mortar battalion of 3 companies, each company has 4 platoons, and a platoon has 4 mortars.
In a mortar company, have two platoons of 4 “50 mm mortars” and two platoons of 4 “82 mm mortars”. There are a total of 16 mortars in a mortar company; there are 48 mortars in the mortar battalion..."
Mortars operating alone lose a lot in terms of fire. Mortar fire, which has a great moral impact and material damage, and is not used massively, does not produce the desired results.
The same fire from a group of mortars, centralized in the hands of one commander, due to its power and destructive effect on the enemy, always leads to the rapid suppression and destruction of him, predetermining the success of the battle of rifle units.
The ease of carrying mortars, the simplicity and accessibility of choosing firing positions make it possible to maneuver a group of mortars from one direction of battle of a battalion or regiment to another, which can achieve fire superiority over the enemy in a short time.
The existing organization of mortar units does not meet these beneficial requirements and is flawed.
I order:
1. Abolish the existing regular organization of dispersed mortar units.
2. Remove mortars from rifle companies and battalions and in each rifle regiment the regiment commander* has at his disposal a mortar battalion of 3 companies, each company has 4 platoons, and a platoon has 4 mortars.
In a mortar company, have two platoons of 4 “50 mm mortars” and two platoons of 4 “82 mm mortars”. There are a total of 16 mortars in a mortar company; there are 48 mortars in the mortar battalion..."
What is not in the order - thus, the responsibilities for training l/s materiel and tactics of use, selecting firing positions and supplying ammunition for 50-mm mortars were transferred from the rifle company commander to a specialist - the mortar platoon commander (officer).
NPO Order No. 306 of October 8.10.1942, XNUMX
Based on the experience of fighting during 1942, in order to strengthen companies and battalions, both in the offensive and in defense, mortar battalions of regiments and mortar divisions of divisions were liquidated in a number of divisions. At their expense, platoons of 50-mm mortars were created in rifle companies.
This was established by NKO Order No. 306 of October 8.10.1942, XNUMX, which consolidated these changes for all divisions operating at the front; at the same time, the removal of mortars from units was prohibited by order of senior commanders.
“Seventh. Each company will be given a platoon of 50-mm mortars (three pieces) from the battalion. Finally assign a company of 82-mm mortars (9 pieces) to the rifle battalion and a battery of 120-mm mortars (6 pieces) to the rifle regiment and do not allow their removal by regimental commanders from the battalion and division commanders from the regiment...”
All these changes were reflected in BUP-42.
BUP-42, understanding the experience of the battles of 1941–1942. in the guidance document
The actions of a mortar platoon are described in paragraphs 400 to 430. All functions for controlling the actions of a mortar platoon in offensive and defensive operations are assigned to the platoon commander. The commanders of the units to which the platoon is attached only assign fire missions and do not interfere with the actions of the platoon commander.
Article 406. “A mortar platoon is an indivisible fire unit.”
Article 409 “The commander of a mortar platoon establishes contact with the commander of a rifle unit and carries out the fire tasks assigned to him.”
Article 409 “The commander of a mortar platoon establishes contact with the commander of a rifle unit and carries out the fire tasks assigned to him.”
Military specialists of the Red Army, based on combat experience, realized that 50-mm mortars were not just a replacement for Dyakonov grenade launchers with more advanced weapons. A new type of weapon was introduced into the rifle company, which has its own tactical specifics of use. To fully realize its fire potential, it was necessary to create a separate unit headed by a specialist: an artillery officer, which was enshrined in BUP-42.
Personnel training system
A company mortar was superior to a cannon or howitzer in one thing - simplicity; it was believed that it was enough to train one crew commander*. The remaining members of the crew were required to carry “this fool” and feed her mines as ordered. A trained specialist, a sergeant, determined the distance and gave information based on a tip, but if he was out of action, then there was no one to shoot accurately.
A mortar, like a heavy machine gun or an artillery gun, is a collective weapon that requires special knowledge when aiming at a target, maintenance, as well as quite a long training in tactics and application skills. That is, the commander of an infantry unit had to have special knowledge, train, and control the use and maintenance of weapons by his subordinates. This was not taught to commanders of rifle companies and platoons at that time. And according to BUP-38, all this was assigned to the conscript sergeant.
Let me remind you that according to the staffing schedule for 1941, each infantry platoon had 1 mortar crew under the command of a conscript sergeant.
* Until 1941, there was no one to teach commanders of 50-mm mortar crews - the weapon was put into service in the summer of 1938, and actually began to enter the troops in 1940.
Let me remind you: in 1939, the industry produced 1 pieces. In 715, 1940 units were manufactured. As of January 27, 805, the GAU KA had 1 mortars on its balance sheet, of which 1941 required routine repairs, 29 needed major repairs, and 340 were subject to write-off.
Infantry lieutenants who graduated from infantry schools who graduated in 50 and 1939 could gain knowledge about the design of a 1940-mm mortar and personal shooting experience. The rest of the platoon and company commanders could only read about their structure in the Manual on Small Arms (NSD-40). Company mortar model 1938, 1940 (50 RM)”, where the design of the mortar is described, but not a word is said about the tactics of their use. BUP-38 describes the tactics of grenade launcher crews armed with Dyakonov mortars and battalion 82-mm mortar crews.
The tactics of using company mortars were just being realized by military theorists, and the combat practice of using troops only received in the Finnish campaign in the winter of 1939–1940, the experience of which was comprehended during 1940.
Only in the spring of 1941 did the troops begin centralized training of 50-mm mortar crew commanders.
Example (information was kindly provided Admiral Benbow, website Alternative story): 159th Rifle Division - On May 16, 1941, an order was received from the headquarters of the Kyiv Special Military District to conduct training for junior reserve command personnel and reserve rank and file at military units at special courses in May-June 1941.
Combat training courses for infantry specialists from the rank and file of the reserve.
Duration of study - 45 days (calculated from the day the person liable for military service arrives at the military unit and until the day of his departure to his place of residence).
Study days – 36 (276 study hours). The duration of the school day is 8 hours, on Saturday – 6 hours. Of these: tactical training – 84 hours, fire training – 130 hours. During firing training, 3 training and 29 combat mines of 7 mm caliber were issued to one crew (50 people).
The practice of firing a mortar, described in the literature about the Great Patriotic War
A. I. Shumilin “Vanka-company”, excerpt:
“That’s it, Seraphim! Fifty meters in front of our trench you will dig tonight two slits for observation и two firing positions for company mortars. We will place slots for observers on the flanks...
On the right NP let's install a stereo tube. You will make an attack for her there. You will open mortar cells in the bushes, here and here. Mortar cells and observation points should be connected by telephone...
Height 220 is in front of us. The German trench encircles it in a horizontal arc. It can be seen perfectly through the stereo tube. Two observers with binoculars on the left flank. The orderly and I are on the right, with the stereo tube. The mortars are in the middle. The distance between us is small, in case of a wire break, we will maintain communication by voice...
Having determined the range and elevation angle, I give the command, and the first sighting mine flies towards the German trench. Mortar cells were dug in the bushes, no flash of fire or emission of smoke was visible from the Germans...
The mortar sneezed again. The sound of the shot was as if someone had hit an empty iron bathhouse with a wooden stick.
I look at the stereo pipe. A small smoke rose in front of the German trash.
- Bring it back to half a division! And give one more carefully, with love!
The left observer confirmed that he was in the trash. When the mine flies into the trash, a burst of smoke during the explosion was not visible.
By evening the shelling stopped completely. In the dark, flashes from shots are clearly visible.”
On the right NP let's install a stereo tube. You will make an attack for her there. You will open mortar cells in the bushes, here and here. Mortar cells and observation points should be connected by telephone...
Height 220 is in front of us. The German trench encircles it in a horizontal arc. It can be seen perfectly through the stereo tube. Two observers with binoculars on the left flank. The orderly and I are on the right, with the stereo tube. The mortars are in the middle. The distance between us is small, in case of a wire break, we will maintain communication by voice...
Having determined the range and elevation angle, I give the command, and the first sighting mine flies towards the German trench. Mortar cells were dug in the bushes, no flash of fire or emission of smoke was visible from the Germans...
The mortar sneezed again. The sound of the shot was as if someone had hit an empty iron bathhouse with a wooden stick.
I look at the stereo pipe. A small smoke rose in front of the German trash.
- Bring it back to half a division! And give one more carefully, with love!
The left observer confirmed that he was in the trash. When the mine flies into the trash, a burst of smoke during the explosion was not visible.
By evening the shelling stopped completely. In the dark, flashes from shots are clearly visible.”
The excerpt well describes the basics of the combat use of a company mortar in defense:
– separation to the sides of observers with binoculars to adjust fire;
– equipping a position hidden from enemy observers: mortar trenches are dug in the bushes, which hides flashes of shots and the crew itself from small arms fire.
Targeted shooting from a mortar
Compilation of notes that were in the public domain (link not available):
“The goal of zeroing is to bring the aiming point to the center of the target (ideally). A lost and unrestored aiming during sighting turns shooting into a monkey's work. After each shot, you need to constantly make adjustments relative to the settings that were before.
Shooting to kill begins after the aiming point is brought to the center of the target. To maximize the efficiency of ammunition consumption, you need to restore aiming after each shot and when shooting to kill (in most cases this is done). But for a fire attack, you can simply throw mines at maximum speed. Yes, the dispersion will increase, but it will still fly to the target area.
Roughly, an experienced crew starts hitting the target from the 8th mine, a mediocre one - from the 10...12th.
The shooting process is the same:
Primary data preparation: 1 shot.
Directional adjustment: 2–4 shots.
Range fork: 2 shots.
Fork halving: 2 shots.
The last adjustment is the transition to defeat.
After each shot, the UVN* (and UGN*) of the mortar are changed (roughly speaking, the slab is driven into the ground). During shooting to kill, this can be neglected, but during zeroing with adjustments - absolutely not. All this fuss with setting the sight level when installing a mortar is needed so that the gunner can set repeatable UVNs from shot to shot. Otherwise, our UVN will move by several degrees unnoticed by the gunner and randomly shift by the same few degrees after each shot.
* UVN, UGN – vertical aiming angle, horizontal aiming angle.
Strictly speaking, depending on the nature of the soil, after a couple of dozen shots (but if you are very unlucky, more often at the 5th or 6th dozen), the next stage begins - the mortar begins to break up the soil underneath, so that the crew has to strengthen it with logs, stones and other garbage. This is a regular occurrence in stationary positions.
The treatment for this phenomenon, so that you can hit the target, is directly prescribed in the shooting tables and manuals - after each shot the gunner must check the aiming.”
Shooting to kill begins after the aiming point is brought to the center of the target. To maximize the efficiency of ammunition consumption, you need to restore aiming after each shot and when shooting to kill (in most cases this is done). But for a fire attack, you can simply throw mines at maximum speed. Yes, the dispersion will increase, but it will still fly to the target area.
Roughly, an experienced crew starts hitting the target from the 8th mine, a mediocre one - from the 10...12th.
The shooting process is the same:
Primary data preparation: 1 shot.
Directional adjustment: 2–4 shots.
Range fork: 2 shots.
Fork halving: 2 shots.
The last adjustment is the transition to defeat.
After each shot, the UVN* (and UGN*) of the mortar are changed (roughly speaking, the slab is driven into the ground). During shooting to kill, this can be neglected, but during zeroing with adjustments - absolutely not. All this fuss with setting the sight level when installing a mortar is needed so that the gunner can set repeatable UVNs from shot to shot. Otherwise, our UVN will move by several degrees unnoticed by the gunner and randomly shift by the same few degrees after each shot.
* UVN, UGN – vertical aiming angle, horizontal aiming angle.
Strictly speaking, depending on the nature of the soil, after a couple of dozen shots (but if you are very unlucky, more often at the 5th or 6th dozen), the next stage begins - the mortar begins to break up the soil underneath, so that the crew has to strengthen it with logs, stones and other garbage. This is a regular occurrence in stationary positions.
The treatment for this phenomenon, so that you can hit the target, is directly prescribed in the shooting tables and manuals - after each shot the gunner must check the aiming.”
Information