The death of the transport "Armenia" on November 7, 1941. Background and history
Chapter 1.
foreword
The death of the transport "Armenia" on November 7, 1941 is one of the largest disasters at sea in stories humanity. According to various estimates, more than 6 people could have been on board at the time of death.
Six thousand people died at once - healthy and wounded, adults and children, who were on board individually and with entire families. This is probably akin to an atomic explosion. Just half an hour ago, people were glad that they had left the burning city, slowly but surely being filled with the enemy, with death. It seemed that all the worst was behind us, here was the warmth of the ship’s premises, the even, quiet rumble of the ship’s engines, the slight soothing vibration of the bulkheads.
And suddenly a high-pitched screech of something terrible, invisible in the damp cold sky. A dull blow, from which the body of the ship, which just a minute ago seemed solid, swayed, shuddered convulsively and began to roll inexorably. At that same second, the lighting disappeared, the ship's premises, turning into chilling crypts, crushed human souls with universal primeval horror.
The screams of people, which just a moment ago had burst their eardrums, were devoured by the roar of the rushing water and its cold, indifferent silence. Only four minutes were allotted to people...
Only four minutes to feel the warmth of sinless children’s bodies pressed to you forever in a rush of salvation.
The famous parade ended on Red Square in Moscow, the participants of which went straight to the front, to defend our Motherland.
I was infected with this tragic story in 2011 by Alexey Markov, a native of Yalta, a city where the story of the death of the “Armenia” transport is passed on from mouth to mouth from many “eyewitnesses” (city residents, Crimean partisans) of those times. I put the word eyewitnesses in quotation marks intentionally, but more on that later.
When I got acquainted with information on the topic on the Internet, I was shocked and surprised not only by the stated number of deaths (3 thousand, 5 thousand, 10 thousand), but also by conspiracy theories, and most importantly - by sweeping, unsubstantiated accusations against the captain of "Armenia" » Vladimir Yakovlevich Plaushevsky.
And the deeper I plunged into the wilds of the Internet, the more my desire to learn about this history on the basis of factual materials and archival files became stronger. Thus began my most interesting journey of searching for the truth: nine years of disappointment and apathy from dead ends, joy from discoveries and good meetings with amazing people.
Cargo-passenger ship "Armenia"
In 1926, the Central Bureau of Maritime Shipbuilding developed a general project for cargo and passenger ships for transportation on the Black Sea - the Krymchaks series. General dimensions of the vessels: maximum length 108 m, width 16 m, draft 6 m, displacement 5 tons. The metal riveted body was divided into 770 waterproof compartments. The ships could carry about 9 passengers in cabin accommodation and 518 on deck. In addition, the cargo holds could hold up to 462 tons of cargo. The power of the main engines allowed it to reach a speed of 1 knots (about 000 km/h).
According to this project, Abkhazia, Adzharistan, Armenia and Ukraine were built at the Baltic Shipyard. "Armenia" was launched in 1928 and after completion at the quay wall and sea trials in 1931 it entered the Odessa-Batumi-Odessa line.
The beginning of research on the topic of the sinking of the motor ship "Armenia" raised in front of me the eternal questions that torment any Russian person: who is to blame and what to do?
As he worked, this culprit first acquired the contours of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, then increased in size, captured space, time and turned into Russian reality, where no one is to blame, it just happened that way. And at the same time, parallels with the present day began to appear clearly.
That is why I will begin to describe the events, conditions, and state of affairs in the Black Sea theater of military operations from a slightly earlier date and much more broadly, paying attention to the background and scenery of this terrible tragedy. They are a little scattered in the context of the story, but they allow you to see the big picture.
Chapter 2.
The situation in the Black Sea theater of military operations, starting from 15.10.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.
Evacuation of Odessa, arrival in Sevastopol
At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the majority of civilian ships - passenger, cargo, fishing and port fleet - were mobilized and transferred to the Black Sea Navy the fleet. On the motor ships "Armenia" and "Abkhazia", according to the "Project for the re-equipment of the m/v Armenia and Abkhazia", work was carried out to install technological openings, re-equip the premises and reinforce the hull, as a result of which two semi-automatic 156-K type guns of 157 mm caliber at a distance of 21 mm from the side. One gun is placed on the deck of the lower bridge in the area of frames 45–1 in the center plane.
In the premises of the officer's bath and office there are artillery magazines for 1 shells, plus three first-shot fenders of 420 shells for each gun. Loading artillery magazines and supplying ammunition is provided manually. In addition to all this, the magnificent salons and restaurants have been converted into dressing rooms and operating rooms. The regular strength of the ship included 60 artillerymen, 6 machine gunners, auxiliary gun personnel, and 5 medical workers.
As a result, by order of 08.08.1941 No. 00162 “On the enrollment of ambulance transports “Armenia” and “Abkhazia” into the Black Sea Fleet, they are included in the Black Sea Fleet as ambulance transports and are maintained under staff No. 25/41-“A”.
It should be noted that “Armenia” in almost all documents (journals of the chief of staff of the Black Sea Fleet, logs of service chiefs, ship logs), with the exception of the fleet sanitary service, is referred to as the transport or motor ship “Armenia”. I purposefully searched in archival documents for references to the painting of Black Sea Fleet ambulances in the white color of hospital vehicles. Have not found.
After being awarded the rank of captain-lieutenant, Vladimir Yakovlevich Plaushevsky is appointed commander of the m/v “Armenia” - “born in 1902, native of the city of Odessa, non-party member, participant in the Civil War, married, has a daughter.” In August 1941, he was mobilized into the Navy by the Ilyichevsk regional military registration and enlistment office of Odessa (I have not yet been able to find out whether he was the captain of this ship before the war).
Since that time, “Armenia” has actively begun to participate in the transportation of military and civilians, weapons and ammunition on the route Odessa - Sevastopol - ports of the Caucasian coast. At the same time, it is repeatedly attacked aviation enemy, from which, thanks to skillful maneuvering and anti-aircraft fire from ship artillery, he emerges victorious (from the award list of V. Ya. Plaushevsky).
I read one of the episodes that clearly characterizes V. Ya Plaushevsky as a person and as a commander - brave, not afraid to take responsibility for himself, who put expediency at the forefront, who acutely feels the pain of others, in the file “Watch Log of the Border Guard Boat - 147” - Transition Novorossiysk - Odessa 25.09.1941/157/147 (this is the delivery of the second echelon of units of the XNUMXth infantry division, see below) guarding this PK-XNUMX.
“02:45 passed abeam of Cape Sarych, 03:10 “Armenia” set course 270° and went to sea. To the semaphore (request from PC-147): “Where are you going?”, he answered: “I’m going to Odessa, I won’t go to Sevastopol.” PK-147, unable to contact Sevastopol, asks "Armenia" to request a change of convoy. He receives the answer: “I don’t have the opportunity, I’m following the previous course.” On October 26 at 04:30 “Armenia”, guarded by PK-147, passes the target of the Odessa lighthouse. Thus, a howitzer artillery regiment and reconnaissance battalion 157 were delivered to besieged Odessa. d. and 15 tanks, which the defenders of Odessa so desperately needed.
An explanation needs to be given here.
In our case, PK-147 (border boat) together with “Armenia” had to go to Sevastopol to change the escort - PK-147. But this is a waste of many hours of time - a delay in the delivery of such long-awaited and literally vital cargo for his native Odessa. So V. Ya. Plaushevsky used “military stratagem”.
He really had an order to deliver the cargo to Odessa, and entering Sevastopol was already an order from the PC commander. So the question arose before Plaushevsky - to go to Sevastopol and waste time here, for which they would pay with their lives there, in Odessa. Or use a “military” trick and partially deviate from the straightforward execution of the order. Of course, citizenship (not a military captain) and Odessa prowess played an important role in this episode. And he was only 39 years old then. Whether he then had the opportunity to contact Sevastopol or not is no longer important. The winners are not judged.
At the beginning of September, Romanian-German troops press the defenders of Odessa due to the retirement of personnel and weapons, from the eastern side they come within artillery range and begin shelling the outer roadstead of the port. Which greatly complicates the supply of ammunition, replenishment and evacuation of the wounded. The command of the Odessa Defense Region (OOR) pushes the personnel of economic units to the front line, regroups troops and with incredible efforts restrains the enemy. There are no internal reserves left for defense.
On September 17, the first echelon of the 157th Infantry Division (S.D.), fully equipped and well trained - the reserve of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command - arrives on board the motor ship "Armenia" from Novorossiysk to Odessa. Largely thanks to this, on September 22, OOR units carried out a successful offensive on the eastern flank in the direction of the village of Dofinovka, capturing a large number of trophies and throwing the enemy back more than 10 kilometers. Thus, depriving the enemy of the opportunity to fire at the Odessa port and the outer roadstead.
On September 23, a division of rocket-propelled mortars (Katyusha) arrived on the m/v Chapaev, which the next morning brought about the end of the world for the invaders. On September 26, "Armenia" delivers 15 tanks and the remaining units of the 157th division - a howitzer artillery regiment and a reconnaissance battalion - to besieged Odessa. The OOR command begins planning a new offensive in the central part of the defense for October 2 and, having already believed in its strength, develops directives for preparing the defense of Odessa in the winter of 1941–1942.
In 1941, on the Black Sea, the main combat unit that acted as combat cover for transports were patrol boats (SK) of the “small hunter” (MO) type of the P-10 project. "Small Hunters" were developed and built since 1935, primarily as border patrol boats (BCs) with the possibility of being used in wartime as submarine hunters.
They had a wooden hull with several waterproof compartments, while buoyancy was ensured when no more than one compartment was flooded. The greatest length of the boat was 26 meters, width - 3,95 m, height from the waterline to the upper deck was only 1,50 m. The artillery armament consisted of two semi-automatic guns of the 21-K type, 45 mm caliber of various modifications, mounted on the forecastle and stern
The magazines held 600 unitary cartridges and 60 cartridges in the fenders of the first shots. The boat had two single pedestal installations of 7,62 mm Maxim machine guns or 12,7 mm DShK (Degtyareva - Shpagina large-caliber). Full speed reached up to 27 knots, depending on the modification. Cruising range at economical speed (20 knots) is 400–450 miles.
The crew consisted of 22 people, while the boat could carry on board up to 40 landing soldiers with standard weapons. The small width relative to the length and the contours of the hull contributed to excessive rolliness on the wave (tendency to roll), which made it impossible to use weapons in sea conditions above three. As we can see, the “small hunters” were significantly inferior to the m/v “Armenia” in terms of combat capabilities and conditions for the use of weapons.
At the very beginning of the war, the border boats of the NKVD troops were transferred to the operational subordination of the fleets, as a rule, to the OVRs (parts of the Water Region Security Service). In the Black Sea, the total number of “sea hunters” was 74. With very modest tactical and technical characteristics, they made a significant contribution to the victory.
The boats were actively used for guarding naval bases, laying mine and smoke barriers, reconnaissance, sabotage and landing operations, and escorting transport during transit. Thanks to the dedication of the personnel and the skillful use of the capabilities of the “sea hunters,” they offered all possible resistance to the enemy, often returning to base with multi-meter holes in the wooden hull.
Nine Black Sea men from the crews of the Ministry of Defense were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (“The Great War of the Black Sea Small Hunters”, V. A. Sutormin, M. E. Morozov).
Due to its relatively short cruising range, while escorting transport ships, as a rule, sea defense shifts were made at a short distance from the base: in the first months of the war, Odessa - Nikolaev, Nikolaev - Sevastopol; after the Germans captured Nikolaev: Odessa - Sevastopol; Sevastopol - Yalta, Yalta - Feodosia; Feodosia - Novorossiysk. At the same time, due to the low silhouette of the MO and the forced dismantling of the mainmast, the radio communication range was greatly reduced.
On October XNUMX, a representative of the naval command, Vice Admiral G.I. Levchenko, arrives in Odessa. He brought a directive from Headquarters on evacuation:
“In connection with the threat of losing the Crimean Peninsula, which represents the main base of the Black Sea Fleet, and due to the fact that at present the army is not able to simultaneously defend the Crimean Peninsula and the Odessa defensive region, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to evacuate the OOR and, at the expense of its troops, strengthen the defense of the Crimean peninsula."
On October 15, Major General I.E. Petrov, commander of the Primorsky Army, approved the “Plan for the withdrawal of army troops from battle and boarding ships” by directive No. 00273.
It follows from the document that “Armenia” with the loading point “Military Pier”, which begins on 15.09.41/23/00 at 16.09.41:02, and ends on 00/95/5 at 500:8, takes on board the main forces of the 500th Infantry Division - 5 people out of 500 people. M/v "Abkhazia" 500 people and XNUMX tons of cargo. (Application).
“M/v “Armenia” arrived at the base on 17.10.1941/6/35 at 7:00. Placed for unloading at 25:5, the place of unloading was the pier of the artillery workshop, unloading by a ship's crane, 000 people were involved in unloading. Name of cargo: 72 military personnel, wounded - 28 people, guns - 24 pieces, trailers - 5 pieces, vehicles - 3 pieces, anti-aircraft guns - 165 pieces, various cargo - XNUMX tons.
“Abkhazia” – 6 military people, 000 tons of ammunition, 300 guns, 9 vehicle, 1 tons of miscellaneous cargo.”
“Abkhazia” – 6 military people, 000 tons of ammunition, 300 guns, 9 vehicle, 1 tons of miscellaneous cargo.”
This is clear evidence that the order (loading plan, see above) can be very different from reality. And the most important thing - this is the only documentary evidence that the motor ship "Armenia" could take on board more than 6 people, plus up to 000 tons of cargo (this is about 12 modern fully loaded trucks).
Here we need to pay attention to the brilliantly planned and brilliantly executed operation by the OOR command to evacuate military units, weapons and civilians from Odessa. And this is despite the enemy’s overwhelming numerical superiority in personnel and all types of weapons.
The German-Romanian troops were able to realize the situation only on the second day after the Red Army left and dared to enter Odessa. This is especially evident against the backdrop of the failed evacuation of British troops from France in 1940 - the Dunkerque operation. There, in four days, the British and French lost about 300 ships, left the Germans with a large amount of weapons and equipment (63 thousand vehicles alone), and 100 thousand soldiers and officers were captured.
At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, 95 transport ships were transferred to the Black Sea Fleet upon mobilization. By March 1942, when the USSR Prosecutor's Office was forced to deal with the issue of disposal of transports, 18 remained in service! Some of them were damaged and were in the ports of the Caucasus for repairs.
The frequency of reports to Moscow about the destruction of transports in the Black Sea theater of military operations was such that even the failures of the Red Army on land faded. And there were, of course, many reasons for this.
Chapter 3.
Condition of the Red Army troops in Crimea
Black Sea Fleet
According to the structure of the Navy and the Black Sea Fleet in particular, it includes a military communications service (VOSO), which is responsible for all transportation (sea, river, rail, etc.) for the needs of the fleet. It is this service that receives requests from shippers and consignees.
VOSO representatives are located in all ports and transport hubs in the rear of the fleet. Specialists know the assigned number of transports, its capacity, draft, the specifics of cargo operations (the presence of their own cargo equipment, the need for port cranes, the required number of dockers).
It is these forces, the circulatory system of the complex organism of the fleet, that must ensure the uninterrupted transportation of goods, without which there is no need to talk about combat readiness. Failures in the work of this service lead to unjustified losses on the front line, the death of the wounded in hospitals, and the low combat effectiveness of hungry and naked soldiers.
Meanwhile, in the pre-war years, issues of ensuring navigation in possible wartime were not addressed. By the beginning of the war, there were no ready-made documents regulating and ensuring navigation at the Black Sea Fleet headquarters.
There were no pre-worked recommendations on the navigation regime in wartime, the system of relationships between transport ships and convoy ships, VOSO connections with other parts of the fleet were not established, and not a single practical exercise was conducted on the interaction of the commercial fleet with the military fleet.
“Issues of organization and tactics for covering one’s communications before the war were not worked out in the process of combat training of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force.”
The organization of communications within the convoy had great difficulties due to the variety of communication means used. Mobilized civilian ships had long-wave radios, and third-rank warships (the main escorts) had short-wave radios.
So during the transition, the only means of communication between ships was flag and light semaphore. The professionalism of the former civilian sailors who were urgently trained for this purpose left much to be desired. In the summer of 1941, several attempts were made to perform training anti-torpedo maneuvers as part of a convoy.
There were shipwrecks. Therefore, in the future we had to abandon this. Transitions were carried out, as a rule, in a simple wake formation.
Not the least role in the loss of ships was played by the low qualifications of naval officers when drawing up convoys, which included ships with different maximum speeds and, accordingly, maneuvering capabilities.
It is for this reason that on October 3, 1941, in the area of Novorossiysk, the transport "Dnepr" (aka the Spanish Cabo-san-Austin), sailing in ballast, was sunk by Luftwaffe torpedo bombers, the fastest (18 knots) and largest transport ship on the Black Sea (18 tone, three times larger than “Armenia”), which before the war was considered training.
During the formulation of the combat mission, the commander of the Dnepr transport urged not to include it in the general convoy along with slow-moving ships, but, given its high speed, asked to be allowed to go with the destroyer Smyshleny. The request was ignored.
From the memoirs of the surviving assistant ship commander G.K. Nikiporets:
“At dusk, during the end of the passage of the northern fairway, 4 torpedo bombers fired 1 torpedoes from a low altitude from a distance of 000 meters. The ship's commander, in cramped conditions, maneuvered to evade the torpedoes, but one of them still reached its target. The ship sank. Fleet Commander F.S. Oktyabrsky made a significant entry in his diary regarding this tragedy: “The Nazis prepared their weapon against surface ships."
(V. A. Sutormin “The Great War of the Black Sea Sea Hunters”).
The minefields installed in accordance with the directives at the approaches to ports and roadsteads made their sad contribution to the causes of the death of ships and vessels.
For example, the Main Naval Base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol and the approaches to it were covered by five minefields from organizations of 2 longitudinal and 4 transverse fairways of military controlled (FVK). Due to the inaccuracy of mine placement and wave effects on them, transverse FVKs were considered unsafe and required mandatory pilotage.
That is why the main routes for the movement of ships and ships from the Caucasus to Sevastopol and back were built mainly on the principle of a perpendicular approach to the Crimean coast in the Yalta area with further movement along the coast with the entrance to FVK 1 in the area of Cape Sarych, then to Cape Khersones (OVR observation tower ) and the entrance points to the bays of Sevastopol.
Moreover, in the case of escorting transports by ships of the destroyer class and above, the latter necessarily slowed down their speed and set up paravanes. Vehicles towed on board, by ensuring the angle of attack of the wing, the incoming water flow diverts the towed paravane from the side of the ship, and with it the mines of possible mines. But what was intended to protect sometimes became the cause of death.
One of the tragedies is, of course, the death of the Lenin transport (28 register tons) on July 1941, 4. Exploded at the eastern end of the FVK 430 minefield (near Cape Sarych), it sank at a depth of 1–100 meters. Some 110 people were rescued; the death toll is estimated at 508. The main cause of the tragedy is considered to be the mistake of a military pilot, who was sentenced to death in 1, and in 200, as a result of an additional review of the criminal case materials, he was posthumously rehabilitated.
Material "ITC Special Works"
For a similar reason, the m/v “Krym” and a considerable number of sea hunters and other small watercraft sank in the Novorossiysk area.
From the report of the People's Commissar of the Navy P.P. Shirshov:
“The main reason for the death of most of the ships is the neglect of the naval command to protect the transport fleet:
1. The military pilot service is organized completely unsatisfactorily.
2. Security of ships in ports and escort at sea is not organized.
3. The naval command often unnecessarily accumulates ships in batches in ports and does not provide their security. This creates convenient targets for the enemy to bomb.
4. Naval authorities interfere in the work of shipping companies and ports, creating irresponsibility and confusion...”
1. The military pilot service is organized completely unsatisfactorily.
2. Security of ships in ports and escort at sea is not organized.
3. The naval command often unnecessarily accumulates ships in batches in ports and does not provide their security. This creates convenient targets for the enemy to bomb.
4. Naval authorities interfere in the work of shipping companies and ports, creating irresponsibility and confusion...”
And further statements made are supported by many facts.
For example, the
“The naval command does not feel any responsibility for the death of the transport fleet. The chief of staff of the Poti naval base (Captain 2nd Rank Derevyanko) did not allow the Ingul steamship, which was in distress during a storm, to enter the port and ordered the booms to be closed. The ship sank just outside the port. 25 people died.
The tanker "Yalta" in December 1941, by order of the command of the Poti naval base (comrade Ryumina), was transported from Batumi to Poti and back for 20 days without any need and then cruised between Tuapse, Novorossiysk and Kerch for 15 days, and only after that it was unloaded in Sevastopol.”
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