The death of the "Armenia" transport. The culprits of the tragedy
Dry cargo ship "Captain Plaushevsky"
I will quote separately from the special message:
“The audit established that the flight of fighters that took off had a number of shortcomings. On the plane Jr. Lt. Stepanova, 3 machine guns did not work (my comment is out of 4), the walkie-talkie did not work, there was no map.”
The poor technical condition of the aircraft, their weapons and the poor training of the majority of pilots was noted in 1943 in the “Report on the combat work of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force units of the 62nd AB.” What was said above.
Case “Combat operations of the 6th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment”:
“On November 7.11.41, 2, in the area of the city of Yalta, the motor ship “Armenia” was torpedoed; this ship was covered by 153 I-500 aircraft, which were flying at an altitude of 2 meters above clouds of 3-600 points. The torpedo bomber came in from the shore and dropped a torpedo in a low-level flight from a distance of XNUMX meters, after which it went into the clouds and disappeared. The ship sank. In this case, the fighters were indiscreet and walked far to the side.”
In April 1942, the Chief Prosecutor of the Navy sent an appeal to the People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N.G. Kuznetsov, in which, based on a memo by the head of the 3rd Department of the Black Sea Fleet, Kudryavtsev, a liberal approach was indicated in determining responsible officials. The result is the initiation of a criminal case into the death of the “Armenia” transport.
The fates of I. A. Burmistrov and the commander of patrol boat 0122 N. F. Volovikov were partially restored. The fate of the pilots is unknown to me. The names and fates of the 6–8 people who survived are unknown to me (as of spring 2020).
At the same time, in the archives of the Navy there is a file that is still classified as “Top Secret”, where on pages 84–95 there is a report on the death of the motor ship “Armenia”. The FSB archive contains materials regarding this tragedy. But to my deep regret, according to the response of the Archive Service of the Ministry of Defense, “archival documents (ciphergrams) containing information constituting state secrets about the activities of the military prosecutor’s office and military courts remain in secret storage.”
In a private conversation, I was informed that in this case there is no name of the survivors and there is nothing in addition to what I discovered in other cases of storage. Nevertheless, the issue of declassifying documents has been started, and it is being considered by the High Command of the Navy. My repeated written appeals to the FSB Archive Service led to practically nothing, general replies.
Almost a lyrical digression.
At the end of 2012, having filled out a form through the website of the Federal Military Archive of Germany, where I indicated my full name and purpose of the research, I received permission to work in the reading room. Arriving in the city of Freiburg in January 2013, I find two hefty carts with pre-requested documents, a separate office, a rack for cards, a kettle, sugar and crackers.
After some time, I had a conversation in Russian over a cup of tea with a “man in civilian clothes.” So, about this and that, with the main emphasis - am I definitely researching materials not for a commercial purpose? Because if yes, then the issuance of materials becomes paid.
I dispelled his fears and, of course, expressed my pleasant surprise at the ease with which I was allowed access to the archival documents. My interlocutor at first didn’t even understand the essence of my surprise, and then, after thinking, he said, “the archive contains such a huge array of documents that staff members would never study it. Therefore, they are immensely grateful to all those who come to the archive and get acquainted with the documents. After all, after this they will tell you what they have learned stories to their relatives, friends, and those to their friends. And even if out of these 100 relatives and friends, 2-3 people later go to their archive for their stories, they will be happy.
And further. It was the year of the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad. In the spacious lobby of the reading room, large-format photographs from the archives were exhibited. The photographers, with talent and intuitive perception of smells and sounds, captured the unimaginably inhuman living conditions of women, children, the elderly, their biblical suffering against the backdrop of military equipment, shell explosions, and Wehrmacht soldiers.
I peered at these photographs and realized that the one who took these photographs was not an employee of Goebbels’s propaganda machine, he was crushed by what was visible even then, and he was not on the side of the soldiers, his fellow tribesmen, but who brought suffering and death to these peaceful people.
I’m not talking about the “whitewashing” of fascism, I’m talking about the attitude towards one’s history. To everything that has been done - sinful and righteous.
What after?
The destroyer Soobrazitelny on November 6, 1941, at 22:00, left mooring lines and left Sevastopol for Kerch. On November 8 at 8:52 I entered the internal roadstead of Tuapse.
The minesweeper "Gruz", after examining the area where the transport "Armenia" was destroyed, proceeded to its destination in Tuapse, where on November 8 at 15:17 it anchored.
Artillery 100-mm installation B-24 (Novorossiysk embankment)
According to the Operational Report of the OVR, on 9.11.41 SKA No. 051 went to sea to meet and escort the transport “Ukraine” from the Kherson lighthouse. On 11.11.41/0122/XNUMX the report mentions the combat duty of SK No. XNUMX at sea.
That is, everything flows and develops according to its own military laws.
And about military laws for us today, living peacefully, discussing morality, sitting at home on a cozy sofa, and extolling the value of human life above duty to the Motherland. As an example, the logbook of patrol boat No. 055.
On November 1941, XNUMX, for two weeks now Sevastopol had been completely surrounded by the enemy, the commander’s wife boarded a stationary boat in Balaklava for the purpose of further evacuation to the Caucasus. Previously, she had escaped from occupied Odessa by hook or by crook. Further quotes:
“At 22:00 the division commander Art. Lieutenant Vershavin and ordered the passenger to be thrown out immediately. Because, they say, the commander does all sorts of (obscene) things on the boat. And send her back to where she came from, that is, to Odessa.”
At 22:05:
“The chief of staff arrived and also ordered an immediate ejection.”
26.10.41:
“06:00 a passenger was removed from the board.”
This is who now dares to put himself in the place of this captain, husband, man - defender of civilians, his family.
So war has its own view of morality and duty.
thinking
I think it is necessary to discuss the discrepancy in the brands of the aircraft responsible for the tragedy.
According to the report of the commander of patrol boat No. 0122, these were Heinkel torpedo bombers. And according to the pilots’ report, this is a Yu-88. German archival documents clearly speak about the HE-111 and torpedoes. Let me remind you that for a sunken ship, the crew of the plane was entitled to a cash bonus, a certificate and the right to put a victory sign on the fuselage. Therefore, you can’t just appropriate someone else’s victory; they won’t simply give it away.
Consequently, it is more logical to rely on German archival documents, especially since they coincide with the report of the commander of the Investigative Committee.
Further. The degree of cloud cover and the height of the lower edge did not allow dive bombing - the main and more effective method of a non-group attack on ships when crossing the sea. Weather conditions were most favorable to the tactical techniques of torpedo bombers: flight, loitering at an altitude of 100–200 meters, and attack from low level flight.
Of course, we must not forget about the fact, confirmed by entries in the combat logs of the Black Sea Fleet and the memoirs of the captain of the Voroshilov transport ship, of a torpedo attack on the Voroshilov and Kommunist transports in the area of Cape Sarych.
Regarding the pilots' version. As I see it, there may be two main reasons for this statement.
Firstly, these two twin-engine aircraft were very similar to each other. In the fleeting minutes of an air battle with insufficient flight experience, it is probably not difficult to confuse. This is, so to speak, an objective prerequisite.
But there is also a subjective one. The pilots did not take into account the circumstances and chose to guard the echelon above the clouds, which was a violation of the “Instructions for Covering Ships.” This is their direct fault.
And if we talk about bombers, then their choice of echelon was justified, therefore, the guilt is not so obvious.
As a justification for pilots, it can be said that protection against air raids aviation a ship that does not specialize in air defense is a very difficult combat mission, requiring careful planning and significant forces and resources.
A striking example of this is the sad story of the raiding operation of the Black Sea ships fleet under the name "VERP" to the ports of Kerch and Yalta in October 1943, when the leader of the destroyers "Kharkov", the destroyers "Besposhchadny" and "Sposobny" involved in the operation, despite strong air cover, were sunk by German aircraft. And this was in the middle of 1943, when the balance of power on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War and morale were already on the side of the Soviet Union.
To put an end to the dispute: a torpedo or a bomb caused the death of the "Armenia", it can, of course, be further examined. But is it worth doing this, “treading on” the ashes of thousands of innocent people killed, I have great doubts here.
Another way is to study the flight books of 6./KG 26 and 1./KG 28. According to my information, most of them have been preserved. During the period under study, the commander of the 26th squadron was Oberst Ernst-August Roth, commander of the II group - Obstlt. Horst Beyling, commander of the 6th squadron - Oblt. Horst Krupka. But, according to German law, they are classified as personal data. Only relatives can get to know them freely. For all the rest, good reasons and a lot of approvals are needed.
I would like to note that patrol boat No. 0122, which accompanied “Armenia” on the Yalta-Tuapse route, was less armed (SK No. 051 returned to Sevastopol after “Armenia” arrived in Yalta). And what is especially important, due to its rolliness, it was not possible to conduct aimed fire when the sea state was over 3 points. In fact, it was 6–7 points, which in turn was the maximum design seaworthiness for the SK.
The main armament of the "Armenia" and the patrol boat - the 21-mm K-45 cannons - did not fully meet the tasks of air defense. So the protection of the “Armenia” by a patrol boat in the current circumstances was purely formal and did not have much practical meaning.
This is how the situation with the death of “Armenia” is described by the son of Ivan Alekseevich Burmistrov, Anatoly, in his book “Flagman”, based on the memories and notes of his father.
I consider eyewitness testimony to be very important, so I provide a long quote. Moreover, they describe events from the beginning of November. Extracts from it were provided to me in the Stavropol library, named after Hero of the Soviet Union I. A. Burmistrov.
At the same time, one must be aware that these are memoirs, not archival documents, and that the book was written in the Soviet years, when it was not customary to openly speak the bitter truth about those military events. For the period described, I. A. Burmistrov was 38 years old, V. Ya. Plaushevsky was 39.
“When the threat of its capture by the Nazis loomed over Feodosia, Burmistrov, having gathered the scattered retreating units of the Primorsky Army units into a combined battalion, broke through the Sudak region to Yalta.
Actually, Yalta was also doomed; its fall was expected any day. The trailing units of the troops retreating from Perekop were moving along the road to Sevastopol, with the Germans following on their heels. Explosions and gunfire were heard in the city, and there was a stench from burning businesses. The pier and embankment were crowded with a restless mass of people waiting for the ships to arrive.
The connection was still working. At the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, Burmistrov was confirmed as the senior naval commander for Yalta, and he immediately got involved in the work. On November 4, the Volga submarine floating base left the port, where among the evacuees was a group of scientists led by Kurchatov.
The courses of all ships leaving Crimea for the Caucasus were laid strictly south to the territorial waters of Turkey, and then to Batum and Poti. This was done in order to maximally protect sea vessels from fascist air raids.
Unfortunately, the military security of the ships was weak. This circumstance played a fatal role in the tragedy that occurred with the motor ship "Armenia".
The handsome ship, which not so long ago made cruises along the Black Sea coast with carefree tourists on board, entered the Yalta port late in the evening of November 3th. On board there were already about 000 wounded, the medical and economic staff of the Sevastopol Naval Hospital and several other parts of Sevastopol.
“Armenia” was accompanied by a symbolic convoy of two patrol boats. Loading has begun. The wounded were raised first. No matter how the orderlies and their volunteer crew assistants hurried, the time was inexorably approaching dawn. A heavy burden of responsibility and real danger weighed on the captain of “Armenia” Vladimir Yakovlevich Plaushevsky. But he could not interrupt the loading and leave, leaving people to their fate.
By the morning, in addition to the wounded, medical and economic units of evacuation hospitals were taken on board the ship. There was a place for everyone whom fear of the enemy gathered on the pier in those days.
Burmistrov approached Plaushevsky:
– When do you plan to go out, Vladimir Yakovlevich?
“We’ll finish loading and set sail right away,” he answered. Burmistrov shook his head doubtfully:
– I wouldn’t recommend it. It hurts dangerously. It's better to wait until dark.
Plaushevsky tiredly covered his eyes with his palm and massaged his forehead.
– I understand, Ivan Alekseevich. But I can’t disobey the order. I received a radiogram from the Chief of Staff, Admiral Eliseev: to leave immediately after loading. In addition, we have the Red Cross flag unfurled. I don’t believe they are capable of such barbarity.
“Well, don’t flatter yourself too much about this, Vladimir Yakovlevich,” Burmistrov objected to him. – Fascism is incapable of mercy.
- Stay until evening? The Germans are about to break into the city. And you yourself know that, apart from a handful of border guards, there are no more troops in Yalta. You have to choose the lesser of two evils...
“Well,” Burmistrov sighed. “Then, as they say, with God.”
At 8:00 "Armenia" left the quay wall of the Yalta port and headed for the 43rd parallel. Burmistrov was on one of the boats accompanying the ship. The weather was stormy and the sea was stormy.
However, bad weather did not prevent the fascist torpedo bombers from taking off on another reconnaissance flight. At the beginning of twelve, German pilots spotted the Armenia and dropped their torpedoes. The patrolmen could do nothing to interfere, since aimed fire was impossible due to the strong pitching.
One torpedo hit the bow of the ship. The explosion was so powerful that the resulting hole kept the “Armenia” afloat for barely ten minutes. During this time, Burmistrov managed to pick only a few people on board his boat...
Shocked by what had happened, Ivan Alekseevich returned to Yalta and, through the telephone operator of the city party committee, who by some miracle was still working, reported to the fleet headquarters about the death of the Armenia. And then he returned to the boat and rushed to Sevastopol...
The security boat commander, Senior Lieutenant Kulashov, was immediately taken into action by the special forces. But his steadfastness and the intercession of his comrades did not allow lawlessness to occur. The counterintelligence officers also frayed Burmistrova’s nerves, although he was absolutely not to blame for the tragedy.
Needless to say, the consequences of this disaster were enormous. About 5 people died, only eight were saved. The ranks of leading military doctors have thinned.
The death of the “Armenia” broke the sad record of the first months of the war, when the motor ship “Lenin” carried away two and a half thousand evacuated residents of Odessa into the abyss.”
Actually, Yalta was also doomed; its fall was expected any day. The trailing units of the troops retreating from Perekop were moving along the road to Sevastopol, with the Germans following on their heels. Explosions and gunfire were heard in the city, and there was a stench from burning businesses. The pier and embankment were crowded with a restless mass of people waiting for the ships to arrive.
The connection was still working. At the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, Burmistrov was confirmed as the senior naval commander for Yalta, and he immediately got involved in the work. On November 4, the Volga submarine floating base left the port, where among the evacuees was a group of scientists led by Kurchatov.
The courses of all ships leaving Crimea for the Caucasus were laid strictly south to the territorial waters of Turkey, and then to Batum and Poti. This was done in order to maximally protect sea vessels from fascist air raids.
Unfortunately, the military security of the ships was weak. This circumstance played a fatal role in the tragedy that occurred with the motor ship "Armenia".
The handsome ship, which not so long ago made cruises along the Black Sea coast with carefree tourists on board, entered the Yalta port late in the evening of November 3th. On board there were already about 000 wounded, the medical and economic staff of the Sevastopol Naval Hospital and several other parts of Sevastopol.
“Armenia” was accompanied by a symbolic convoy of two patrol boats. Loading has begun. The wounded were raised first. No matter how the orderlies and their volunteer crew assistants hurried, the time was inexorably approaching dawn. A heavy burden of responsibility and real danger weighed on the captain of “Armenia” Vladimir Yakovlevich Plaushevsky. But he could not interrupt the loading and leave, leaving people to their fate.
By the morning, in addition to the wounded, medical and economic units of evacuation hospitals were taken on board the ship. There was a place for everyone whom fear of the enemy gathered on the pier in those days.
Burmistrov approached Plaushevsky:
– When do you plan to go out, Vladimir Yakovlevich?
“We’ll finish loading and set sail right away,” he answered. Burmistrov shook his head doubtfully:
– I wouldn’t recommend it. It hurts dangerously. It's better to wait until dark.
Plaushevsky tiredly covered his eyes with his palm and massaged his forehead.
– I understand, Ivan Alekseevich. But I can’t disobey the order. I received a radiogram from the Chief of Staff, Admiral Eliseev: to leave immediately after loading. In addition, we have the Red Cross flag unfurled. I don’t believe they are capable of such barbarity.
“Well, don’t flatter yourself too much about this, Vladimir Yakovlevich,” Burmistrov objected to him. – Fascism is incapable of mercy.
- Stay until evening? The Germans are about to break into the city. And you yourself know that, apart from a handful of border guards, there are no more troops in Yalta. You have to choose the lesser of two evils...
“Well,” Burmistrov sighed. “Then, as they say, with God.”
At 8:00 "Armenia" left the quay wall of the Yalta port and headed for the 43rd parallel. Burmistrov was on one of the boats accompanying the ship. The weather was stormy and the sea was stormy.
However, bad weather did not prevent the fascist torpedo bombers from taking off on another reconnaissance flight. At the beginning of twelve, German pilots spotted the Armenia and dropped their torpedoes. The patrolmen could do nothing to interfere, since aimed fire was impossible due to the strong pitching.
One torpedo hit the bow of the ship. The explosion was so powerful that the resulting hole kept the “Armenia” afloat for barely ten minutes. During this time, Burmistrov managed to pick only a few people on board his boat...
Shocked by what had happened, Ivan Alekseevich returned to Yalta and, through the telephone operator of the city party committee, who by some miracle was still working, reported to the fleet headquarters about the death of the Armenia. And then he returned to the boat and rushed to Sevastopol...
The security boat commander, Senior Lieutenant Kulashov, was immediately taken into action by the special forces. But his steadfastness and the intercession of his comrades did not allow lawlessness to occur. The counterintelligence officers also frayed Burmistrova’s nerves, although he was absolutely not to blame for the tragedy.
Needless to say, the consequences of this disaster were enormous. About 5 people died, only eight were saved. The ranks of leading military doctors have thinned.
The death of the “Armenia” broke the sad record of the first months of the war, when the motor ship “Lenin” carried away two and a half thousand evacuated residents of Odessa into the abyss.”
And now about the rapid flooding of “Armenia” and the small number of survivors
Below is perhaps somewhat unnecessarily detailed information about the theory and practice of fighting for the survivability of a ship. But, I believe, without it it will not be possible to explain the reasons, to dispel the surprise regarding the rapid sinking of the ship and the small number of survivors.
My first education as a marine electrical mechanic was six-month commercial voyages without calling at a port from the Kerch South-Rybpromrazvedka to the Indian Ocean on the RTM “Kerch Komsomolets”, later the Northern Sea Route on the icebreaker “Petr Pakhtusov”, the last time the transition was from the Italian port of Chioggi (Chioggi) to Sevastopol in December 2014 on the river-sea steamer "Russa".
The ship's unsinkability is ensured during design by various solutions, including by dividing the ship's hull into several watertight compartments by vertical bulkheads. Deck passages in these bulkheads are equipped with massive clinket doors - sliding along rail guides, with an electric or emergency mechanical drive with a gearbox.
The size/volume of waterproof compartments is calculated in such a way that if a certain number are flooded at a time (on passenger ships, at least 2, including adjacent ones), the ship not only remains afloat, but also maintains stability (does not capsize - overkill).
As a rule, the volume of water entering the hull from a hole below the waterline is so large that it is not possible to equip the ship with pumps of adequate capacity. Therefore, the hole is first supposed to be sealed, and then the incoming seawater is pumped out.
If the area of the hole is large enough, then from the outside you have to put a “soft patch” on it - thick, multi-layered, tightly woven from ropes, very bulky and heavy. This is in addition to sealing the hole from inside the ship using wooden panels, beams, spacers, and felt.
Placing a patch is a highly labor-intensive operation that requires not only a lot of physical labor, but also teamwork. In this case, the crew members involved in placing the plaster must pull it under the bottom by the under-keel ends, side by side, without seeing or hearing each other. What if this is during a very rough sea and a cluttered deck? Moreover, every minute of delay is cubic meters of water taken into the body.
In the case of the "Armenia" we can assume, firstly, a large area of the hole below the waterline from the torpedo explosion, secondly, the inability to install a soft patch/seal the hole in time, thirdly, the flooding of two bow waterproof compartments (according to construction drawings, on the "Armenia" in the bow there were the first and closer to the engine room the second, under the navigation bridge, cargo holds) or more, if they did not have time/could not batten down the clinker doors; fourthly, the ship lost stability from the large volume of sea water received and strong overload, and finally, deferent to the bow and flooding.
Taking into account that “Armenia” is standing on the ground on an even keel without breaking the ship’s hull, it is not difficult to understand that all these events cannot happen in four minutes. Therefore, the timing - 45 minutes, obtained on the basis of the pilots' data, is closer to reality.
From here it is possible to see attempts to lower boats from SK 0122. Moreover, the four minutes indicated by the sailors can only be attributed to the moment of receiving the deferent and before the sinking, and not from the moment the torpedo hit the side.
I find it interesting that I. A. Burmistrov mentioned a strong explosion in his memoirs. Somebody, a submariner who went through the Spanish Civil War, understood the difference in the explosions of a torpedo attack and bombing.
Then, if there was a strong explosion and, taking into account that the cargo holds on the "Armenia" were located in the bow, then we can assume that the torpedo hit led to the detonation of ammunition in the hold, the destruction of the bottom plating and the entry of critical volumes of water.
This option explains:
a) the absence of visible significant damage to the sides of the “Armenia” on the current video footage, at least above the waterline;
b) rapid flooding;
c) visible destruction of the superstructure structures, including the navigation bridge, since it was located above the holds and was damaged by a blast wave, partially directed upward.
The main means of rescue on ships at that time were wooden boats, placed on the sides and launched into the water on “free-hanging” hoists (a system of cables and blocks) of collapsing davits.
During strong sea conditions, the launching boat will inevitably break against the side of the ship - this is a terrible axiom. Since the ship and the launching boat have not only disproportionately different masses, but also different axes of rolling from the oncoming waves. Which leads to inevitable collisions.
Imagine for a moment your attempt to kiss a sledgehammer swinging like a pendulum and moving towards you. Anyone who has had to bunker side by side in a stormy sea will confirm this.
In addition, launching requires not only theoretical knowledge, but also practical skill. On ships and vessels, for this purpose, according to the “Ship Emergency Schedule,” trained responsible crew members are appointed, who, of course, due to the overload of the “Armenia,” simply could not arrive at the boats on time.
The accompanying patrol boat, although it could take on board up to 40 landing soldiers with standard weapons, but, as emphasized above, fell heavily on the wave. So, to the enormous physical difficulties of lifting a person in wet winter clothes to a side height of 1,5 meters (plus a railing of about 80 centimeters), there was added the side of the boat swinging with different amplitudes, which, of course, caused the death of a considerable number of floating people.
And what the “Armenia” and SK hulls did not complete was completed by bad weather – waves of 6–9 meters (6–7 points), strong wind, air temperature about +5°C and a distance from the coast of about 25 km. All this, taking into account the low cloudiness, made the coastline along with the Crimean Mountains invisible. And, therefore, it was simply unknown where, in fact, to sail. And the “swimming” itself, for example, with a life preserver, would take at least a day. Considering that fatal hypothermia of the body at a water temperature of +5 ° C occurs in 15–20 minutes, we understand that the chances of salvation are zero.
Of course, history sometimes shows us the fantastic endurance of people, but even in this case, the person who survived would have fallen into the hands of the enemy - on November 8–9, the entire southern coast of Crimea right up to Balaklava was already occupied by German-Romanian troops.
Undoubtedly, most of the passengers were unable to leave the overcrowded, heavily cluttered rooms and passages of the Armenia, which became an underwater crypt for everyone. All this, of course, is a theory, but it makes it clear that drowning at sea is much easier than being saved.
In relation to the truly considerable number of memories of Yalta residents about the alleged appearance of the flooding of the “Armenia” transport.
There are a few points here.
We already know that “Armenia” lies somewhere 25–30 km from the coast (the port of Yalta, as an exit point with a course of 160 degrees). First, let's pay attention to the visibility of the horizon line at sea. If we take a person standing on the Yalta embankment, then we will take the height of the observer’s eyes to be 8 meters above sea level. Then the visible horizon line will be only about 11 kilometers away.
If for this case we also take into account the height of the “Armenia” superstructure above the water at a conventional 13 meters, then we get the visibility of its upper elements of 24 kilometers. It seems that the “eyewitness” could have seen the tragedy. Moreover, if it was not on the embankment, but in a city located on the southern slope of the Crimean Mountains. Therefore, its observation height could be 50 or 70 meters above sea level.
It should be borne in mind that in 1941 Yalta was a small resort town, built along the embankment and just above the current Kirov Street. Darsanovsky Hill (as a hill close to the embankment) was deprived of residential buildings. The village of Ai-Vasil (present-day Vasilyevka) was built up, but it is located an additional 3–4 km from the embankment.
Of course, in this case, one must ask the question - what, exactly, could this “witness” see in what he saw. Since the human eye is not omnipotent, and it, together with the brain activity of imaginative thinking, is able to distinguish individual trees up to 2 meters, at 000–8 meters it ceases to see and recognize large houses.
Therefore, what can be seen at a distance of 25 meters, especially in cloudy weather with strong emotional stress due to the events happening around, let everyone decide for themselves.
But there is something to be said in defense of the “eyewitnesses.”
And this is the death of the minesweeper “Rabotnik” on the outer roadstead of the port of Yalta on November 2, 1941, under more benign weather conditions and conditionally still with the “peaceful” life of the city at a distance almost twice as close as the “Armenia”.
We read in the combat log of the minesweeper "Gruz", the same one who accompanied the motor ship "Armenia" on its last voyage from Tuapse:
“November 2, 41 transition Feodosia - Yalta, we are accompanying the INGUL transport. 10:14 We entered the port of Yalta. 15:00 on the starboard side heading 150° at an altitude of 200 meters, eight Yu-88 and two fighters. 15:15 a group of aircraft attacks the minesweeper Rabotnik. 15:28 "Worker" has a bow bias and a list to starboard. 15:30 we received permission to go to rescue “Worker”. 16:21 "Worker" sank. People are floating on the surface of the water. 16:30 both boats were lowered. 16:32 We are maneuvering at the site of the destruction of the Rabotnik vehicle and taking people on board. Boats and boats also bring people on board. 17:48 64 people saved.”
Let's add. The minesweeper "Rabotnik" was traveling together with SK No. 042 from Sevastopol to Tuapse with a cargo of OVR, with the families of the commanding staff of the Black Sea Fleet and 80 passengers.
And I especially pay attention. That for rescue, the minesweeper “Gruz” lowers boats into the water, and it is on them that people who are afloat are lifted, with the subsequent transfer of those rescued on board the minesweeper. This goes back to the reasons for the small number of those taken aboard the patrol boat directly from the water and with very strong seas five days later during the tragedy of the “Armenia” transport.
But once upon a time,
but once
someone in the world remembered the name
Unknown
soldier!..
Remember!
Through the centuries, through the years,
remember!
About those,
who will never come again,
remember!
Do not Cry!
Stop moaning in your throat
bitter groans.
Be worthy of the memory of the fallen!
Eternally worthy!
(R. Rozhdestvensky “Requiem”).
Dedicated to all children of wars, past and present!
My Mother Lyubov Evgenievna Spasenkova, nee Zhevnovatyuk, as an 8-11 year old Kuban child (Moldavanskoe village, Crimean region) survived all the horrors of the Great Patriotic War. For three years of the German occupation, she huddled with her mother Natalya Dmitrievna Nepokrytava and her younger sister Galya in a dugout they dug, since German soldiers kicked them out of the hut. They ate scraps from their table and potato peels. Then a fascist concentration camp in the city of Pyatikhatki, Dnepropetrovsk region. Then the post-war famine and devastation. Then the “Komsomol” construction projects in the Siberian Kuzbass.
In the early 2000s, I began to have business trips to Germany, after which Mom almost always asked: “Do the Germans still wear iron plaques on their chests?”, and began to tell how a German entered their farm from a hill on the way from Krymsk. She also cried and talked about the crunch of crumbled teeth and the blood gushing from her mother’s mouth after being hit by a fascist with the butt of a carbine. Who did not allow her, for the sake of the laughter of her colleagues, to go to the well to get water for them - the children. I listened and thought with a shudder - what kind of inhuman trauma must a child’s consciousness receive in order to remember this and cry after 70 years!
We, the present ones, have forgotten, we have forgotten, the wishes of our mothers, fathers and grandfathers - "If only there was no war." So fires broke out across the lands not so long ago of our common home. Now the crunch of teeth knocked out by a rifle butt becomes part of the skeleton of today's children, deprived of a peaceful sky above their heads.
Information