The death of the transport "Armenia" on November 7, 1941. Fall of the Crimean defense

The death of the transport "Armenia" on November 7, 1941. Fall of the Crimean defense

The torpedoes were suspended under the fuselage and fired by an electric drive. The low speed of the aircraft and the altitude above sea level when releasing torpedoes, the need to maintain a straight and stable course and pitch made the torpedo bomber a good target. Given the large glass surface of the canopy for the pilot and navigator-gunner, the HE-111 needed to have very strong nerves to maintain its combat course and achieve the required torpedo release distance.

But even after this, great luck was required when the aircraft left the attack line; the “belly” of the aircraft was practically exposed to the air defense fire of the attacked target, which, along with the imperfection of the torpedo design, made the torpedoing efficiency low.

In June 1941, the second group of the 26th Squadron (II./KG 26), whose pilots had received special training in torpedoing and whose aircraft were adapted for this, was based in Crete. The color coding of elements of group II aircraft is red and white, the area of ​​​​responsibility is the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal. It included the 6th squadron of torpedo bombers operating in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

In August-September 1941, the 6th squadron (commanded by senior lieutenant Horst Krupka), which consisted of 12–16 aircraft, each of which could carry 2 torpedoes under the fuselage or bombs, was relocated to the Romanian city of Buzău with alternate airfields in the cities Jiliste and Bulgarian Balchik. Then it becomes operationally subordinate to the 8th Aviation Corps.

Combat mission: “...operating against naval targets, industrial and port facilities on the Black Sea... supporting the advance of ground units in the direction of the Caucasus... With daily reconnaissance over the sea, to which to fly with torpedoes or bombs".

In the same August, the use of torpedo bombers by Nazi Germany was noted by the services of the Black Sea fleet.

HE-111, H6 with a torpedo over the Crimean coast

The tactical techniques of the torpedo bombers were as follows: the plane, using the camouflaging properties of the sea (clouds, sun), walked along our line of communication or tacked in the area of ​​​​the expected meeting with targets in “free flight” at an altitude of 100–200 meters, being in the air for 5 -6 hours. When a convoy or single transport was detected, the aircraft made a maneuver and entered from the dark part of the horizon or from the sun, at an altitude of 15–20 meters from a distance of 5–10 cables (900–1 m) with a heading angle to the target of 850–70 degrees and launched a torpedo.

Along with single and paired sorties, group sorties were also used for hunting: torpedo bombers together with bombers.

The following tactical technique of dive bombing was used: the bombers approached the target at an altitude of 4–000 m in two or four groups of 4–500 aircraft, dived to 2–3 m, dropping bombs, exiting the dive ended at 1–500 m with departure towards the sea.

That is, bombing required no clouds or low clouds, but with a cloud base of at least 1 meters. At the same time, if the weather conditions above the target did not allow a dive, conventional bombing was carried out, but against coastal area targets. The bombing accuracy on ships was low, but on coastal stationary targets it was good. A considerable part of the bombs were not dropped with any aim at all, and a significant percentage of them did not explode. The main type of German aerial bombs is SC with a caliber of 500, 500, 250 and 100 kg.

Conducting intensive reconnaissance, often with torpedoes/bombs, German aircraft HE-111, Ju-88, DO-215 almost continuously illuminated our communications from an altitude of 5-7 thousand meters. And Romanian seaplanes explored the central part of the sea, staying afloat for a long time.

During August - October 1941, 192 reconnaissance sorties were recorded, which, having discovered ships, called bombers or torpedo bombers by radio. Therefore, it was very difficult for caravans to pass unnoticed. Only fog and clearly bad weather made it possible for ships and transports to pass without being attacked.

Most of the “Caucasian” convoys were subjected to 4–6 attacks during the transition aviation. At the same time, the departure of ships from the coastline of Crimea, right up to the middle of the Black Sea, reduced the risk of being attacked by aircraft of the “coastal” aviation units of the 4th Fleet of Germany, based in the time period of interest to us at the airfields of the cities of Nikolaev and Kherson.

In the Luftwaffe combat logs, the combat reports of the pilots were recorded briefly: first, the type (military, cargo, high-speed, etc.) and displacement of the ship, then the location of the attack, if not far from the coast, then to coastal landmarks, if at sea, then indicated square; further they noted the number of bombing runs, the type of ammunition used, the place where it hit the water or some part of the ship; manifestation of impact: fire, flooding. The latter was rarely noted. Usually it was said that bombs hit the ship and then it was mentioned that due to strong air defense fire, the flooding could not be recorded.

For each sinking of a ship or transport, the crew of the aircraft, depending on the displacement, was given a monetary reward and a certificate, and a corresponding sign was applied to the plane of the vertical keel.

The operational reports of air units addressed to the high command for the month reflect: a military or transport vessel sunk/damaged and its displacement. There is no mention of the ship's tail number or name!

The first losses from a Soviet air raid by torpedo bombers HE-111 H-6 were recorded on 25.02.1942/6/26 at the Saki airfield, where 1./KG 28 and 1942./KG XNUMX relocated in January XNUMX with operational subordination to the Crimean Air Command and from where they began raids on sea transport communications, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Sochi.

The Germans in their notes note the good infrastructure of the airfield and excellent conditions for quartering and treatment in the sanatoriums of the city of Saki.

Having studied two main works of German authors-researchers of the combat path of torpedo bombers (A. Steenbeck “Trace of the Lion” (Die Spur des Löwen) 368 pp. and R. Schmidt “Attention - Torpedo Attack” (Achtung – Torpedos Los), 382 pp.), I am forced to note that during this period of time the main volume of combat work of 6./KG 26 related, as already mentioned, to the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.

In these two large works, only a few pages describe the events on the Black Sea. For 1941 - a couple of paragraphs containing general data. There is no mention of “Armenia”. In 1942, after the relocation to the airfield in Saki, life at the airfield and, in general terms, combat work are described in somewhat more detail.

After the collapse of the defense of Sevastopol in early July 1942 and the practical cessation of transport links on the Black Sea in September 1942, the 6th Torpedo Squadron was withdrawn from the Black Sea theater of operations.

Chapter 5.
Perekop-Ishun defensive battles, fall of the Crimean defense

On August 25, 1941, at the headquarters of military intelligence and counterintelligence (Abwehr) of the 11th Army of the Wehrmacht, a meeting was held on the topic “Organization and deployment of partisan units in Crimea,” from which it follows that the Abwehr envisions the Soviets dividing the entire territory of Crimea into three areas for the deployment of partisan detachments with its own airfields and a total number of 10–000 personnel.

The belief is expressed that the partisans, together with the regular troops of the Red Army, will create strong defensive lines along the northern wooded spurs of the Crimean Mountains. And taking into account the possibility of the Soviet Union transporting personnel and ammunition by sea, this will create great difficulties for the Wehrmacht in capturing the southern coast of Crimea in the near future.

Therefore, understanding the strategic importance of the capture of the Crimean Peninsula, the German high military command entrusts this mission to one of the best military leaders of the Wehrmacht, Colonel General E. Manstein, who arrived in the city of Nikolaev on September 17 and took command of the forces of the 11th Army (OAK 11), 3 49st Romanian Army with the XNUMXth Romanian Mountain Corps. Manstein was given the task of capturing the peninsula with access through the Kerch Strait to Kuban.

On October 17, units of the Primorsky Army under the command of Major General Ivan Efimovich Petrov on the transports “Armenia”, “Abkhazia”, other transports and ships of the Black Sea Fleet, together with the personnel and command of the Odessa Defense Region, arrive in Sevastopol. The military leaders who brilliantly organized the all-round defense of Odessa are faced with a number of circumstances in the Crimea that caused them “great bewilderment and anger”.

This was due, first of all, to the lack of not only unity of command, a general strategic plan for the defense of Crimea, but also some kind of peaceful order. The stripes in command did not add positive factors either.

A few days after arriving from Odessa in Crimea, Major General I.E. Petrov was informed of order No. 0020 dated 20.10.41 on the inclusion of the Primorsky Army in the 51st Army. At the same time, there were no directive instructions on the transfer procedure and personalities. There is an order, but it is impossible to carry it out.

In addition to the above-mentioned 51st Army, there were several more military formations on the territory of Crimea: Crimean troops under the command of Vice Admiral G.I. Levchenko (from 22.10.41/XNUMX/XNUMX) and, of course, the Black Sea Fleet with its Main Naval Base in the city of Sevastopol , with rear and other units scattered across the peninsula.

The absence of a unified command was reflected not only in the insufficiency of strategic plans (there were plans, but for the most part they were staff calculations that did not take into account the real state of the troops: the number of troops, the availability of weapons, they did not consider the negative scenario for the development of events and the organization of rear defensive areas, including including on the border of the Kerch Peninsula, which is geographically advantageous for this), but also in elementary multi-departmental material responsibility for weapons, ammunition, fuel, food.

This led to the fact that the ground units were catastrophically short of weapons, including small arms, and material and technical supplies, while the Black Sea Fleet was engaged in exporting its “surplus” from Sevastopol to the Caucasus.

From the memoirs of Colonel General Pavel Ivanovich Batov, a participant in the Spanish Civil War:

“After listening to the report, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko (approx. People's Commissar of Defense) informed me that I had been appointed to the post of commander of the Crimean ground forces and at the same time commander of the 9th corps. At the same time, the marshal did not say a word about what the relationship with the Black Sea Fleet should be, or what to do first if it is necessary to urgently put Crimea on alert as a theater of military operations. He only briefly mentioned the mobilization plan of the Odessa Military District, which organizationally included the territory of Crimea.”

It was June 20, 1941.

The Perekop Isthmus, connecting Crimea with the mainland, has a frontal width of 8 to 23 km and a depth of up to 30 kilometers. Highways and railways pass through it. The narrowest place is in the north, at that time near the village of Perekop (today the city of Krasnoperekopsk), where in ancient times the isthmus was blocked by the so-called Perekop shaft.

A little to the south is the small town of Armyansk. Even lower there are five fairly large lakes. The passages between them were called the Ishun defensive positions - after the name of a nearby village. Measures to organize defensive structures on the isthmus with two strong centers in the villages of Chervony Shepherd, Armyansk and the main line of defense along the Perekop Wall P. I. Batov, at that time the commander of the Crimean troops, began in late July - early August.

The main work was carried out by the 1st and 2nd military field construction departments, headed by General N.F. Novikov, with the involvement of the population of nearby villages, Simferopol and specialists from the Kerch Metallurgical Plant named after. Voikov, who manufactured and installed large metal gouges and hedgehogs in tank-hazardous areas.

The Red Navy equipped minefields of powerful sea mines, which, however, did not explode in large numbers during subsequent battles due to the shallow depth of the electrical detonation wires. During the construction of the pillboxes, guns taken from ships being repaired in Sevastopol were used.

In connection with subsequent orders from the commander of the 51st Army regarding the deployment of troops, the main fortification work was carried out in the Perekop - Armyansk zone. Their depth was built based on the numerical composition of the units deployed on this defensive line - 5 incomplete battalions on the Crimean Val, one in Chervony Shepherd, one on the Lithuanian Peninsula (east of Armyansk) and two battalions, at the insistence of the commander of the 51st, in the field at a distance of six to eight kilometers north of Armyansk. At the same time, the task was not set to build a defense in depth; no forces and resources were given.

The strengthening of the Ishun positions was carried out hastily later, as the enemy advanced. The defensive work began to be subjected to enemy air raids, which were still rare, in early August, and on September 2 and 4 - massive, with an emphasis on the city of Armyansk.

Combat clashes with the advanced units of Manstein after they crossed the Dnieper River in the Kakhovka region on August 31 began in the tenth day of September. The total number of Red Army troops on the isthmus was only about 7 thousand, there was a regular divisional 122-mm howitzer, 76-mm, 45-mm field artillery and 120-mm mortars. This did not allow creating the required fire density. There were no separate anti-tank and anti-aircraft units. From armored formations - 5th tank a regiment armed with T-34 (10 units) and 56 T-37, T-38 tankettes with a 7,62 mm machine gun, having only bulletproof protection.

On August 14, 1941, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the USSR formed the 51st Separate Army on the territory of Crimea with direct subordination to the Headquarters under the command of Colonel General F.I. Kuznetsov, a participant in the Soviet-Finnish War, before the war the commander of the Baltic Military District.

Kuznetsov, expecting an enemy attack from all directions (an amphibious landing in the area of ​​Evpatoria, Alushta, Sudak, in the center of Crimea from the air and, of course, a breakthrough of the Crimean isthmus), disperses troops throughout the entire peninsula. In numbers it looked like this: out of 95 thousand bayonets, 40 thousand were deployed to defend the coast from seaborne landings, 25 thousand - inside the Crimea from airborne assaults and as an operational reserve, 7 thousand - on Perekop.

So, for example, the 321st Division remained inactive throughout the Perekop-Ishun battles in Yevpatoria, awaiting an amphibious assault, and was then almost completely destroyed by superior enemy forces that broke through Ishun. At the same time, the 184th division stood in the Sudak area, preparing to repel a ghostly naval landing.

As P.I. Batov recalls:

“It was impossible to convince the army commander that a thunderstorm was heading towards Perekop, and all forces needed to be concentrated here,”

even in mid-September, when in the Pre-Crimea region they managed to capture a German liaison officer with a topographic map indicating the actual movement of Wehrmacht units to Crimea across the isthmus.

For the sake of truth, it should be noted that Kuznetsov’s actions strictly complied with the directives of the Supreme Command Headquarters both at the very beginning of the war and those that had not changed by the end of August. Although already in mid-August it was well known that the enemy did not have at least any significant naval forces in the Black Sea necessary for landing troops from the sea.

In his memoirs, P.I. Batov bitterly cites numerous intelligence reports and messages from local party workers:

“A landing party is being prepared in Constanta, aerial reconnaissance has detected 10 enemy transports... direction to Crimea,”

“the Italian fleet proceeded through the Dardanelles to the Black Sea for landings in Odessa and Sevastopol”,

“37 transports with troops left the ports of Bulgaria and Romania in an unknown direction,”

“Information was received about airborne landings in the area of ​​the Alushta Pass, in the rear of Sevastopol and amphibious landings on the Kerch Peninsula.”

From the memoirs of Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union I. S. Isakov (at the beginning of the war, First Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy):

“The Germans did not have real capabilities for landing (tonnage, cover, support from the sea), even if they were able to allocate 2-3 divisions for the landing...
But, apparently, everyone was infected with the psychosis of the landing force, and the sea one at that. The Black Sea Fleet should have been the first to eliminate such sentiments.”

With all the tragedy of the then situation, the command of the 51st Army, as responsible for the defense of Crimea, had to make the necessary adjustments to the original plans and tasks in connection with the changing operational-strategic situation - the advance of the enemy on the Southern Front, because of which the Crimean Isthmus was in his rear. But this was not done.

As a result, in the direction of the main attack of the Germans, along the Perekop – Armyansk – Simferopol railway line, there was actually only one 156th Infantry Division under the command of General P.V. Chernyaev.

Of course, these arguments of mine can be attributed to the opinion of the “couch strategist”. But this is what the head of the operational department of the Primorsky Army, Colonel N. I. Krylov (after the war, Marshal of the USSR), writes in his memoirs:

“On the morning of the 19th (approx. 19.10.1941/51/XNUMX) I was in Simferopol. The headquarters of the XNUMXst Army, where it was necessary to clarify instructions received by telephone, as well as to fill out requests for vehicles, fuel, ammunition and much more, occupied, as if in peacetime or in the deep rear, an ordinary institutional building in the center, marked, however, with wire barrier along the sidewalk.

At the sight of this barbed wire on a crowded street, one involuntarily thought: what kind of game of war?

The sergeant in the commandant's office, writing out a pass for me, warned: “Only now, Comrade Colonel, there are only officers on duty in the departments - today is Sunday!

In the headquarters corridors I met our artillery chief, Colonel Ryzhi N.K., who was no less surprised than I was by the local order. He complained that there was no one to resolve the issue of ammunition with.”

So, the most severe military operations are already taking place hundreds of kilometers away, and it’s the weekend at the headquarters of the army responsible for the defense of Crimea!

Therefore, when I read the memoirs of the command of the 51st Army, in which they, discussing the reasons for the rapid seizure of Crimea by enemies, complained about the small number and lack of training of personnel, the lack of anti-tank weapons and other, from their point of view, objective reasons, I recalled the organization of defense Odessa, whose command was able to show persistence and find arguments in appeals to the Supreme Command Headquarters. As a result, additional personnel, tanks and even top secret Katyushas were allocated. And this was on a patch of land located deep in the enemy’s rear.

In this regard, it should be noted that the criminal slowness in the transition to a military footing applies equally to the party structures of Crimea and the NKVD bodies responsible for organizing partisan resistance. At the beginning of the war, good, academically verified plans were developed: the number of partisan detachments, basing areas were determined, commanders were appointed, and the payroll was determined. Inter-squad storage bases for weapons, clothing, medical and food supplies were even made in the mountains of Crimea...

Продолжение следует ...
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +2
    22 November 2023 06: 00
    Isaev has an analysis of Kuznetsov’s actions in Crimea, the moral is this: of course he had troops, only without transport, so he could not send more to Perekop.
    1. +2
      22 November 2023 12: 41
      Mikhail, thank you for your interest in the article. But I have to note that in those days the main method of movement of personnel was on foot, horse-drawn artillery, and not using mechanical vehicles.
      1. +1
        22 November 2023 16: 19
        According to the states of '41, the rifle division was supposed to have 3039 horses, 451 trucks, 99 tractors. Without cars, divisional artillery will not move anywhere, if of course it has a place to be.
  2. +1
    22 November 2023 08: 36
    I live in Sevastopol. I remember the stories of the old men who took part in these events and even then I was surprised at the discrepancy between the official history of the defense of Crimea, Sevastopol and what was said by the front-line soldiers (not at all ordinary ones). I wonder who will write the history of the Northern Military District?
  3. Fat
    22 November 2023 11: 21
    Thank you, Alexey. The note turned out to be amazingly good. I re-read and reflect.
  4. +2
    22 November 2023 14: 01
    In June 1941, the second group of the 26th Squadron (II./KG 26), whose pilots had received special training in torpedoing and whose aircraft were adapted for this, was based in Crete. Color coding of elements of Group II aircraft is red and white
    What kind of color coding is this anyway? For example, the squadron emblem was depicted on a yellow background, the stripe around the fuselage and the rudder were white.
    In August-September 1941, the 6th Squadron (commanded by Senior Lieutenant Horst Krupka), which consisted of 12–16 aircraft, each of which could carry 2 torpedoes under the fuselage or bombs, was relocated to the Romanian city of Buzău.
    According to other data
    6./KG26 to Buzeau (Romania) (09.41), to Saki (12.41). In October 1942 she was transferred to Catania, and on 09.11.42/XNUMX/XNUMX she joined the rest of the group in Grosseto.
    "HE-111 H6 with a torpedo over the Crimean coast" was signed by the author of this photo
    And this is what the He111 N6 looked like with a torpedo under the fuselage. Find a couple of differences.
    Given the large glass surface of the canopy for the pilot and navigator-gunner, the HE-111 needed to have very strong nerves to maintain its combat course and achieve the required torpedo release distance.
    I didn’t quote the previous couple of sentences, apparently you read it in a very bad translation
    this article. But as for the large surface of the “lantern”.... And, for example, the Bristol “Beaufort” and Il-4?

    Yes, the principle and options for using low-altitude torpedo bombers were almost the same for everyone.
    The tactical techniques of the torpedo bombers were as follows: the plane, using the camouflaging properties of the sea (clouds, sun), walked along our line of communication or tacked in the area of ​​​​the expected meeting with targets in “free flight” at an altitude of 100–200 meters, being in the air for 5 -6 hours
    I will not comment on this phrase, just read V. Minakov’s “The Angry Sky of Taurida”. This is purely about aviation.
    1. +1
      23 November 2023 12: 59
      Alexander, thank you for your comments. It’s immediately obvious that you are a great specialist in the field of aviation. I don't claim this.
      1. “Not torpedoes” under the belly in the photo - most likely you are right, I will be more attentive to the details.
      2. I didn’t quite understand the intent of your comment about “color coding”. If you doubt this, then I have reason to assure you that you are wrong. I took this information from the book “Die Spur des Löwen” by A. Steenbeck (368 pages).

      And here is a complete set of emblems of the 26th squadron

      Below there is a publication number by which you can order the book and, of course, as someone who fully speaks German, you will become familiar with the original source. Unfortunately, I don’t speak German as well as you do.
      3. Glazing area. The volume of your knowledge is respectful.
      4. "Tactical techniques...". If you have any doubts here, then I suggest you enter into a debate with the authors of analytical works Materials on summarizing the war experience of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force units (120 pages) case 97, op. 133, f. 1080 and Report of the Chief of Staff of the Black Sea Fleet Air Defense on combat operations (165 pages) file 45, op. 5, fund 1087 in the Gatchina branch of the TsAVMF. The archive contains similar reports from many naval services; they have been written since 1944.
      1. +1
        24 November 2023 13: 40
        Quote: Alex Krymov
        4. "Tactical techniques...". If you have doubts here too,

        I have no doubt, I have read and I have some complaints about your presentation.
        ...walked along our line of communication or tacked in the area of ​​the expected meeting with targets in “free flight” at an altitude of 100–200 meters, being in the air for 5–6 hours.
        They approached the target or search area at an altitude where there was the lowest fuel consumption, precisely at cruising speed, and already approaching the target area they descended, if they were traveling with low-altitude torpedoes, to these same 100-200 meters, and already being in the area they carried out a search and attack, descending to the height of the torpedo release. After the attack, it either gained altitude, or vice versa, having missed the target, the plane left the affected area at an extremely low level, after which it gained altitude and left. But they didn’t stay the entire flight at an altitude of 100-200 meters. Flying at low altitude to a target and moving away from it was usually practiced by Il-2 attack aircraft, and even then in the initial period, but again, Il-2s did not fly such distances, and did not spend so much time in one sortie. And they pressed themselves to the ground as they approached the front line....
        Quote: Alex Krymov
        Below there is a publication number by which you can order the book and, of course, as someone who is fully fluent in German, you will familiarize yourself with the original source, as they say
        Thanks for the tip, about 8 years ago a friend brought me to look through this publication. I have enough of what I have for this aircraft.

        There is also a Heinkel He 111 [The Crowwood Press], so I didn’t take it
        Quote: Alex Krymov
        The volume of your knowledge is respectful.

        Basically the same as yours... hi
        Quote: Alex Krymov
        I don’t quite understand the intent of your remark about “color coding”.

        You wrote
        Color coding of elements of Group II aircraft is red and white
        , So I wanted to clarify which elements of the aircraft were coded red and which were white? It’s just that in the materials that I have there is not a word about this moment, there are only such tables

        List of parts operating on the He 111H and their codes
        Part: Title: Code: Part: Title: Code:
        KG 1-Hindenburg - V4. KG 51- Edelweiss Geschwader - 9K
        KG 4- General Wever - 5J. KG 53- Legion Condor - A1
        KG 26- Lowen Geschwader - 1H. KG 54- Totencopf Geschwader - B3
        KG 27- Boelke - 1G. KG 55- Griefen Geschwader - G1
        KG 40- - F8. KG 100- - 6N

        Staffel letter codes
        Staff color I-th gr. II-th gr. III gr. IV gr. V-th gr.

        White 1st = H : 4th = M : 7th = R : 10th = U : 13th = X
        Red 2nd=K: 5th=N: 8th=S: 11th=V: 14th=Y
        Yellow 3rd = L: 6th = P: 9th = T: 12th = W: 15th = Z
        Also with mutual respect. hi
        PS For some reason, as the comment goes to “print”, the tables are shifted, but I think it will be possible to figure it out.
        1. +1
          24 November 2023 22: 12
          Alexander, the promise.

          The site editor does not skip short messages)))
          I will fill it with symbols)))
          1. The comment was deleted.
          2. 0
            25 November 2023 13: 22
            Quote: Alex Krymov
            Alexander, the promise.
            Alex, I answered you in a personal message. And this is the plane of the 5th Staffel - a squadron from the second group. 5/ KG26, by the way, there is a caption about this under the photo. The 6th staffel will be yellow, the 4th will be white. Moreover, the 4th, 5th and 6th staffs are included in the 2nd group - the regiment in our opinion is II KG 26. Just look in the PM, if there is anything there, write the answer.
            1. 0
              25 November 2023 14: 23
              I did not receive your letter in a personal message.
              Did you receive mine?
          3. +1
            25 November 2023 15: 43
            Alexander, here is the source of my “color coding”)))

            1. 0
              25 November 2023 17: 46
              Quote: Alex Krymov
              Alexander, here is the source of my “color coding”)))

              In principle, if we take the table that I gave and compare it with what is written in your publication, then in general we don’t dance or sing. Again about the geschwaderwappen - the squadron emblem, here is the screenshot of the page you posted earlier.
              We count 7 emblems on the page - and then the author gives colors only for 4 groups, then it turns out that the last 3 drawings are on the left? But if we compare with the table that I gave above, everything agrees. We start from the top - the first squadron and in order down to the 7th staffel. Again, it gives the color scheme for 4 groups, but what color did the 5th have? If we take the Heinkel He 111 publication [The Crowood Press], then on page 116 we will see a photo of a torn He 111 belonging to the headquarters of the 5th group KG26, as indicated by the letter F. Further, letter by letter, we will begin with the fact that A is the ESQUAD HQ. B-headquarters of the 127st group, C-headquarters of the 111nd group, D-headquarters of the 1rd group, E-headquarters IV and F of course V... Again on page 138 of the edition I cited there is No 111 from the first staffel = 3 Group with whites screw spinners. In your publication he writes that they are black and white. On page 26 there is No 3 from XNUMX/KGXNUMX, which is what the letter L indicates, XNUMX squadron is our first group - according to your publication, the propeller spinners should be black and white, but alas. So this publication is writing something wrong...
        2. +1
          25 November 2023 19: 50
          The editor persistently positions the picture “bookishly”.

          The author himself is surprised at the multi-colored propeller fairings.
          1. 0
            26 November 2023 02: 44
            Quote: Alex Krymov
            The author himself is surprised at the multi-colored propeller fairings.
            Moreover, in the book he does not have a color combination of yellow-black, or black-yellow. I think we have mostly figured it out, but there are nuances and exceptions. hi
  5. -1
    23 November 2023 17: 19
    “lack of anti-tank weapons” - as far as I remember, the Germans had no tanks at all when they captured Crimea.
    1. +1
      23 November 2023 21: 37
      Sergey, good day.
      In another thread, I wrote that while studying the combat logs of spacecraft units for 1941 in the Crimea, I repeatedly came across mentions of German tanks.
      Here's an example

      In one case, it was said about a fire ambush of a spacecraft near some bridge near Simferopol from the direction of Feodosia. At the same time, the author distinguished between tanks and wedges.
      Best regards,
      1. +1
        23 November 2023 23: 09
        I do not dare doubt the authenticity of the document you provided. The only thing left to do is to establish which German tank division these tanks belonged to. It is enough to open Müller-Hillebrandt.
        But there were self-propelled guns in Crimea - the 190th assault gun division, which was subordinate to the 54th Army Corps to support the breakthrough through the Perekop Isthmus. The division took part in both Operation Hunting for Bustards and the assault on Sevastopol.
        The 197th Assault Gun Battalion fought in Crimea since February 1942.
        The 249th Assault Gun Battalion fought in Crimea from mid-March 1942.
        There were 18 cars in the division. That's why they were mistaken for German tanks.
        1. +2
          1 December 2023 14: 49
          Most likely, the “tanks” are the Sturmgeschütz III - a medium-weight German self-propelled artillery unit of the assault gun class from the Second World War based on the PzKpfw III tank. In 1941 and 1942 German tanks did not pose a problem for our artillerymen. But these Sturmgeschütz IIIs are a different matter, they have a smaller profile and thicker armor.
          But who was mistaken for wedges? Perhaps some lighter self-propelled guns.
          1. 0
            1 December 2023 17: 47
            “But who was mistaken for wedges?” - most likely armored cars, or the same Sturmgeschütz III, under fire it’s a piece of cake to confuse a tank and an armored car, and even from a great distance. Our soldiers in 1943 - 45 Why did they burn the Tigers in vain, and often in places where they had never existed?