As Skobelev almost took Pleven
140 years ago, 11-12 September 1877, the third storming of Pleven took place. During the stubborn and bloody battle of the Russian-Romanian troops have achieved some success. The breakthrough of the Skobelev 11 squad of September in the southern direction could decide the outcome of the battle in favor of the Russian army. But the higher Russian command refused to regroup the forces to the south and did not support the Skobelev detachment with reserves. As a result, the next day the Turks counterattacked and rejected our troops. The third assault on the Turkish fortress ended with the defeat of the Allies.
Preparation of the assault
Simultaneously with the organization of the Lovcha attack, the Russian high command was preparing a new assault on Pleven. Against the Turkish strongholds they planned to throw the Russian-Romanian Western detachment: 52,1 thousand Russian and 316 guns, 32 thousand Romanian and 108 guns. Total - 84,1 thousand people 424 guns. The army of the Turkish commander Osman Pasha consisted of 32 thousand men and 70 guns. The Allies had great superiority in manpower and artillery. However, the task was very difficult. The Turks turned Pleven into a strong fortified area, consisting of a system of redoubts and trenches. The approaches to the fortifications were sweeping. The most powerful fortifications were in the northeast and south.
The bad experience of the first two storming of Plevna showed that without the preliminary destruction of the enemy defense, the fortress cannot be taken. Therefore, it was decided to subject the enemy positions to heavy bombardment and only then go to the assault. The artillery was tasked with destroying enemy fortifications, crushing Turkish artillery, and demoralizing the garrison. The general idea of using artillery was stated as follows: “Set up strong artillery, including 20 siege guns, and pre-attack infantry, prolonged shelling of enemy fortifications, while gradually approaching the enemy’s position of infantry, supporting it by advancing at close distances the masses of field artillery and, finally defeating the enemy fortifications and artillery with the mass of our artillery shells, then attack with infantry. " However, this task could not be solved, since there were no large caliber guns and ammunition for the destruction of the Turkish fortifications. But the Russian command did not take this into account. Thus, already at the planning stage, serious mistakes were made.
In 6 hours 26 August (September 7) 1877, the artillery preparation began. It lasted four days, on August 29 (September 10). On the right flank, 36 Romanian and 46 Russian guns participated in it. In the center - 48 Russian guns. On the left flank preparation was not made. The fire was sent to the most important fortifications of Pleven, but it was not effective enough. Artillery could not destroy the redoubts and trenches and upset the enemy's defense system. At night, we approached the Turkish fortifications and the next day continued shelling of enemy positions. Tangible results again not achieved. During the shelling, the Turks left the fortifications to shelters or to the rear, and at night they returned and corrected all the destruction.
August 27 (September 8) Romanian troops seized the enemy's front trench from the Grivitsky Redoubt. Of great importance was the advancement of Russian troops on the left flank, where two ridges of the Green Mountains were occupied on the southern approaches to Pleven. A detachment of cavalry under the command of General Loshkarev advanced to the fortified camp from the west. Attempts by Turkish troops to counterattack to reject the enemy to their original positions did not reach the goal.
August 28 (September 9) artillery preparation continued. Long shelling of the fortress led to a large consumption of ammunition. “Although our batteries have advanced,” wrote DA Milyutin, “they are generally successful, but the positive result is not yet noticeable, and meanwhile, the head of artillery, Prince Masalsky, is already complaining about the excessive use of charges and the difficulty of replenishing them in a timely manner. Volatile and mobile parks barely have time to bring ". General Zotov instructed not to hurry with the beginning of the storming of the enemy’s fortified area, but “patiently give the artillery more and more to do its job of destroying the barriers, moral exhaustion and material disorganization of the defender.” It was decided to continue to bring the batteries to the positions of the enemy, where the terrain allows artillery preparation to continue for some time. However, four days of enhanced artillery preparation did not give serious results. However, at the August 29 Military Council (September 10) it was decided to launch an assault the next day.
Thus, 26 August (7 September) - 29 August (10 September) Russian and Romanian guns fired on Turkish fortifications. Despite the duration of the artillery preparation and the large number of shells fired, the Turkish garrison failed to inflict tangible losses, the damage to the fortifications of Pleven were also insignificant, the Turks easily restored the damaged buildings in the intervals between the shelling of their positions.
By this time, the Allied forces were covering Plevna from the north, east, and south. The right wing was made up of Romanian troops, having on the heights to the north and north-east of Grivitsa 3-th and 4-th infantry divisions, and 2-th division in reserve. In the center, between Grivitsy and Radishevo, there was the 9 corps, and between Radishevo and Tuchenitsy stream - the 4 corps. The left wing was a detachment of Prince Imeretinsky, who occupied the area between Tuchenitsky stream and the village of Krishin. The general reserve of the Western detachment was behind the 4 corps south of Radishevo.
Romanian troops with part of the 9 Army Corps (1 Brigade of the 5 Infantry Division) were to attack from the north-east in order to capture the Grivitsky redoubts. The troops of the 4 Corps received the task of attacking Pleven from the southeast, directing their main efforts to master the redoubt of Omar Bey-Tabia. The detachment of General MD Skobelev, allocated by their troops of Prince Imeretinsky, was to attack the enemy from the south. The start of the assault was scheduled for the 15 watch. The following tasks were assigned to the artillery: “At dawn, with all the batteries, open the most reinforced fire at the enemy fortifications and continue it until 9 in the morning. In 9 hours at once and suddenly stop all shooting at the enemy. At 11, the hours of the day reopen the intensified artillery fire and continue it until one o'clock in the afternoon. From an hour to 2,5 hours again stop on all batteries, and in 2,5 hours again to begin the reinforced cannonade, stopping it only on those batteries, the action of which can be prevented by advancing troops. ”
The drawback of the operation plan was that the disposition was sent out just a few hours before the assault began, and the troops did not have enough time to organize the attack carefully. The direction of the main strike was also incorrectly chosen (as during the previous assaults). The Allies planned to assault Plevna from the three most fortified sides. The opportunity to bypass the maneuver was not used, to attack the Turkish garrison from the western direction, where the Turks had almost no fortifications. The day of the third assault was also unsuccessfully chosen due to weather conditions. All night and half day 30 August (11 September) 1877, there was a downpour, then it was replaced by drizzling rain. The soil was sodden, which prevented the movement of artillery and troops, visibility was poor. Storm was necessary to postpone. But it was a royal name day, and no one dared to make such an offer. In his memoirs, the former chairman of the committee of ministers, P. A. Valuev, wrote that “if it were not for the 30, we would not have stormed Plevna”.
Assault
In 6 hours 30 August (September 11) 1877, the artillery preparation began. Thick fog covered the battlefield and prevented the gunners. As a result, a good plan for the use of artillery on this day was not fully implemented. Artillery could not fully support the advancing infantry.
On the right flank of the 15 watch, Romanian troops launched an attack on two Grivitsky redoubts, which were located at a distance of about 400 meters from each other. Bearing heavy losses from gunfire and artillery fire, the Romanians attacked the fortifications three times, but did not succeed. The undeveloped Romanian soldiers, having met the stubborn resistance of the enemy, were confused. Then the 1 th brigade of the 5 th infantry division under the command of Lieutenant General M. V. Rodionov was promoted to help them. With the arrival of the Russians, the Romanians cheered up and went into battle again. Russian-Romanian troops launched a fourth attack and, at the cost of heavy casualties, captured the Grivitsky Redoubt No. 1. The Turks tried to repel the redoubt, but they were rejected. Further allies could not move forward. The Turks took measures to strengthen the defense in this direction. “Grivitsky Redoubt remained behind us,” wrote DA Milyutin, “but the Turks managed to build new fortifications against him, while ours, sowing into the redoubt, did not do anything all day to firmly establish themselves in it, and did not even import artillery into it. "
At the central section, due to an error, the attack did not start at 15 hours, as was the plan of the operation, but around noon. Russian troops came under heavy fire from the redoubt of Omar. The Russian command consistently threw the regiment after the regiment into battle, but without success. Russian troops suffered heavy losses - about 4,5 thousand people. As a result, the Russian regiments went over to the attack at different times, engaged in battle in parts, acted frontally. Such attacks are easily repelled by the enemy. The infantry offensive itself was poorly prepared by artillery. The strongest Turkish fortifications in this direction - the redoubt Omar was not destroyed.
Fight on the Romanian part of the redoubt at s. Grivitsa. G. Dembitsky
The Russian troops achieved the greatest success on the left wing, where Skobelev's detachment operated. Here the enemy held positions that the chief of staff of the Western detachment and his actual leader, General P. D. Zotov, considered Pleven's “strategic-tactical key”. They stretched from southwest to northeast, from a group of redoubts in the area of the village of Krishin to the redoubts of Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga. Ahead of this position, Turkish troops occupied the third ridge of the Green Mountains. Skobelev considered the capture of the redoubts Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga (they were later called the Skobelev's) as the main task. At dawn, artillery preparation began, and at 10 hours our troops launched an offensive and shot down the enemy from the third ridge of the Green Mountains. The Turks retreated.
General Skobelev began to fulfill the main task - the assault on the two main Turkish fortifications in this direction. True, the nature of the terrain was not conducive to the success of Russian troops. In order to reach the redoubts, the advancing troops had to descend along the gently sloping northern slope of the third ridge into a hollow in which Zelenogorsk creek flowed in steep, difficult to reach for artillery banks. Only one bridge was built across the stream. Having crossed the creek, it was necessary to climb a steep slope to a height, where there were strong enemy fortifications No. 1 (Kavanlyk) and No. 2 (Isa-Aga), which were connected by a deep trench. Ahead of the redoubts, on the slope, were rifle trenches.
At around 15 hours, Skobelev's troops launched an assault on enemy fortifications. The Vladimir and Suzdal regiments, which were advancing in the first echelon, suffered heavy losses from the enemy’s fire, and lay down near the Zelenogorsk brook. Skobelev threw a second echelon into the attack - the Revel regiment. Our troops again attacked, but this offensive was also stopped by the strong fire of the Turkish army. Skobelev threw into attack his last, third echelon - Libau regiment and two rifle battalions. And he led the attack. Our troops got to the enemy, melee fighting began. In 16 hours 30 minutes Russian troops took the redoubt Kavanlak, after a stubborn battle, in the 18 hours the redoubt Isa-Aga was occupied. The Turkish troops, having received reinforcements from the reserve, made several attempts to dislodge the enemy, but to no avail. Shooting continued all night.
In fact, the squad Skobelev opened the way to the very Pleven. Before the troops of the detachment and the city there were no longer any Turkish fortifications. A situation arose in which the further development of the offensive gave the entire city to the Russians. In the ranks of the Turkish army began to panic, the enemy soldiers were tired of fierce battle. However, Skobelev's detachment also needed serious reinforcements. The soldiers fought in the morning, were tired, many have not slept for 2-4 days. The detachment lost a lot of people, the troops had to be reduced to national teams with random commanders at the head. Everywhere there were mountains of corpses. There was a moan of wounded who could not be removed. Ammunition was running out. All reserves have been used. The soldiers could not even dig in, as there was no trenching tool, but “despite the fatigue, hunger, fatigue in battle, the soldiers felt the need to dig in and did not regret for the remainder of their forces. They dug, or rather, picked the ground with bayonets, scaffolds, scraped it with manners, shook their hands, only to hide from three sides like something, as it were ” I.) For the device barriers used even the corpses of their own and Turkish soldiers.
Further development of events depended on who would be more accurate in assessing the situation and directing reserves to this area. Skobelev timely demanded the sending of reinforcements, but he was categorically denied this. Neither the commander-in-chief, nor Nepokochitsky agreed to expose the Bulgarian highway, they did not believe that the Turks would dare to expose other directions in order to reject Skobelev's detachment. The higher Russian command had the opportunity to regroup the forces to the south and take the city itself. But the Russian command refused to regroup the forces to the south and did not support Skobelev's detachment with reserves, believing that the assault failed and there was no point in supporting the success of the Russian general. Although the introduction of fresh reserves on the left Russian flank, it was still possible to correct the mistakes of the plan of attack and the failure of the troops of the right flank and center, having achieved, albeit an unnecessarily expensive price, a decisive victory. Thus, the Russian command did not understand the benefits of the current situation created in connection with the breakthrough of the flank of the Turkish defense and Skobelev’s exit to Plevna itself, did not use a real opportunity to win a decisive victory. The breakthrough of fresh Russian troops into Plevna itself decided the outcome of the battle for the entire fortified area. So, the Russian command itself refused a sure chance of victory.
31 August (12 September) 1877 was not conducted on the right flank and in the center of active hostilities. The Turks launched one attack on Grivitsky redoubt number 1, but it repelled. The Turkish commander-in-chief, Osman Pasha, in contrast to the Russian command, correctly assessed the situation and given the great danger from the Skobelev detachment, which occupied the two most important fortifications of the Turkish army from Plevna itself, decided to throw large forces against it. Osman Pasha almost strengthened his right flank, transferring 15 fresh battalions from various defense sectors and from the general reserve of the Pleven garrison to the 4 area. The fulfillment of the intention of the Turkish commander contributed to the inaction of the main forces of the Russian-Romanian army in other areas. With this, Skobelev’s squad was not even supported by strong reinforcements, so that he would keep these fortifications in the hands of the Russian army, which would help in the future offensive. Krylov, who temporarily commanded the 11 corps, sent to the redoubts only the weakened 1300 of September and the weak (XNUMX man) Shuya regiment. In addition, the regiment was late, it had to be used only to cover the retreat of the Skobelev detachment. Together with Shuisky, Krylov also sent the Yaroslavl regiment, but Zotov took him to his general reserve.
In the morning of August 31 (September 12), the Turks launched a decisive counterattack on Skobelev's redoubts. Our troops fought off four Turkish attacks. Then the Turkish commander ordered to pull off all reserves to the fifth attack, reducing to the extreme the composition of the garrisons in trenches and redoubts in all other positions. To inspire the counterattacks, it was ordered to carry the green banner in front of them, and the mullahs in the camps to chant prayers. Behind the attacking troops, Osman Pasha set up a battery and two cavalry regiments, ordering them to shoot at anyone who decided to retreat.
In the meantime, after repelling the fourth Turkish attack, the position of the left-wing Russian wing became hopeless. In his report, Skobelev described the state of the redoubts in such a way: “Redoubts represented a terrible picture by this time (3 pm 5 hours). The mass of Russian and Turkish corpses lay in heaps. The interior of the redoubt was especially filled with them. In the deep trench linking the redoubts, the enemy's longitudinal shots were laid at once by dozens of people, and piles of corpses filling the trench alternated with still-living defenders. On the redoubt of number 2, part of the parapet, turned to the city of Pleven, was composed of corpses. At the 1 Redoubt, three guns of the 5-th battery of the 3-th artillery brigade were partly distorted and deprived of servants and horses. The remaining two guns 2-th artillery brigade, also deprived of servants, I ordered to take away earlier. The gun standing in the redoubt was also destroyed. I took the rings out of the gun in case they fell into the hands of the Turks. ” The situation was Russian and in the rear of the redoubts. Kuropatkin wrote about this: “The section of the position between the third crest and the redoubts presented a picture too, with thousands of wounded and corpses lying on this section. Hundreds of bodies ... that were mixed with Turkish corpses, decomposed and contaminated the air. "
The last fifth attack in 16 hours was headed by the Turkish commander Osman Pasha himself. During the defense of the redoubt Kavanlyk, his commandant, Major F. Gortalov, was heroically killed. However, despite the heroism and fortitude of the Russian soldiers, the Turkish army was able to recapture the redoubts. Russian troops moved away in an orderly manner, taking the wounded away.
General MD D. Skobelev on horseback. N. D. Dmitriev-Orenburg
Results
Thus, the third assault on Plevna, despite its high military prowess, dedication and resilience of Russian and Romanian soldiers and officers, ended in failure. Allied forces suffered serious losses. Killed 13 thousand Russian and 3 thousand Romanians. Especially serious losses were on the left wing: troops lost killed and wounded 6,5 thousand people, which was 44% officers and 41% soldiers and noncommissioned officers of the troops of Skobelev and Imeretinsky. The Turks identified their losses in 3 thousand people. Apparently, underestimated.
The failure of the third assault was caused by a number of reasons, based on the mistakes of the highest Russian command. Many mistakes were passed “by inheritance” from the first and second storms of Pleven, that is, they did not bother to carry out work on mistakes. Among the reasons for the failure of the assault: weak intelligence of the location of the Turkish army and its defense system; underestimation of the forces and means of the enemy; the patterned attack on the same lines on the most fortified sections of the Turkish fortified area; the lack of maneuver by the troops to attack Pleven from the west, where the Turks had almost no fortifications; refusal to transfer the main efforts to a more promising direction, where Skobelev's detachment successfully broke through; the lack of interaction between groups of troops attacking in different directions (when some troops attacked, others stood) and precise control of all Allied forces. In addition, they could not organize a full-fledged artillery preparation with the involvement of large caliber guns - the Turkish fortifications were almost not damaged during the shelling, the Turks quickly restored. Unsuccessfully chose a day to attack.
As historian N. I. Belyaev noted: “The Third Pleven clearly showed that during the 2,5 month of the war the Russian high command had not learned anything, had not considered anything from their previous mistakes, and had managed to add new ones to the old mistakes. Ultimately, it is necessary to recognize that the third storming of Plevna was not based on real calculation, but was based only on the courage of the Russian soldier, on the unexpected appearance of favorable accidents, on “maybe” (N.I. Belyaev. Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 years.).
A negative role was played by the lack of a unified command. Formally, the Western detachment was headed by the Romanian Prince Karl, in fact, the chief of troops was the chief of staff of the detachment, General Zotov. Romanian troops were under the authority of their general, Chernates. Under Plevna were the Russian emperor Alexander II, the war minister D. A. Milyutin, the commander-in-chief of the Danube army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. Everything did not allow for precise control of the Allied forces.
The unfortunate outcome of the third assault on Plevna forced the highest Russian command to change the way of dealing with the enemy. 1 (13) of September, Tsar Alexander II arrived near Pleven and convened a military council, at which he asked whether the army should remain under Plevna or whether it is necessary to retreat beyond the Osma River. Lieutenant-General P. D. Zotov, Chief of Staff of the Western Detachment, and Lieutenant-General Prince N. F. Masalsky, Army Chief Artillery, spoke in favor of the retreat. For the continuation of the struggle for the fortress, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Danube Army, Major-General K. V. Levitsky, and War Minister D. A. Milyutin advocated.
The situation was not so dangerous as some generals saw. Allied Russian-Romanian troops in the Balkans numbered 277 thousand people. The Ottoman Empire had 350 thousand army, but could only put up about 200 thousand people against the allies. The main grouping of the Russian army, consisting of more than 100 thousand people with 470 guns, was located at Calafat, Lovcha and Pleven. The enemy opposed these troops 70 thousand soldiers and 110 guns standing in the area of Vidin, Orhaniye and Pleven. Therefore, Milutin insisted on the continuation of actions in the Pleven area. At the same time, he proposed a new way of dealing with the enemy. In his opinion, it was necessary to abandon the direct assaults of Pleven and break the resistance of the enemy with the help of the blockade. Milyutin rightly noted that the current army, and without having large-caliber artillery mounted fire, will not be able to reliably crush and destroy enemy fortifications, therefore, victory in a frontal assault is unlikely. In the case of a complete siege, you can achieve quick success, as the Turkish army has no reserves for long-term combat. Indeed, the enemy was already in a bad position. 2 (14) September 1877, Osman Pasha informed the High Command that shells and food were running out, there were no reinforcements, and the losses had greatly weakened the garrison. The Turkish commander noted that the army was set “to retreat, but it is very difficult to retreat”.
As a result, Alexander II supported the point of view of Milutin. The leadership of the Western squad had replacements. Assistant commander of the detachment of the Romanian Prince Charles, an engineer-general, General E. I. Totleben, was called from St. Petersburg. He was a hero of the Crimean War 1853-1856. General Zotov returned to command of the 4 Corps. All cavalry was subordinated to the brave and resolute I. V. Gurko. These changes improved command and control. In addition, the newly arrived Guards Corps joined the Western Squad: 1-I, 2-I, 3-I Guards Infantry and 2-I Guards Cavalry Division, Guards Rifle Brigade. The regular siege of Pleven began, which eventually led to victory.
Capture of Grivitsky redoubt near Plevna. N. D. Dmitriev-Orenburg
Preparation of the assault
Simultaneously with the organization of the Lovcha attack, the Russian high command was preparing a new assault on Pleven. Against the Turkish strongholds they planned to throw the Russian-Romanian Western detachment: 52,1 thousand Russian and 316 guns, 32 thousand Romanian and 108 guns. Total - 84,1 thousand people 424 guns. The army of the Turkish commander Osman Pasha consisted of 32 thousand men and 70 guns. The Allies had great superiority in manpower and artillery. However, the task was very difficult. The Turks turned Pleven into a strong fortified area, consisting of a system of redoubts and trenches. The approaches to the fortifications were sweeping. The most powerful fortifications were in the northeast and south.
The bad experience of the first two storming of Plevna showed that without the preliminary destruction of the enemy defense, the fortress cannot be taken. Therefore, it was decided to subject the enemy positions to heavy bombardment and only then go to the assault. The artillery was tasked with destroying enemy fortifications, crushing Turkish artillery, and demoralizing the garrison. The general idea of using artillery was stated as follows: “Set up strong artillery, including 20 siege guns, and pre-attack infantry, prolonged shelling of enemy fortifications, while gradually approaching the enemy’s position of infantry, supporting it by advancing at close distances the masses of field artillery and, finally defeating the enemy fortifications and artillery with the mass of our artillery shells, then attack with infantry. " However, this task could not be solved, since there were no large caliber guns and ammunition for the destruction of the Turkish fortifications. But the Russian command did not take this into account. Thus, already at the planning stage, serious mistakes were made.
In 6 hours 26 August (September 7) 1877, the artillery preparation began. It lasted four days, on August 29 (September 10). On the right flank, 36 Romanian and 46 Russian guns participated in it. In the center - 48 Russian guns. On the left flank preparation was not made. The fire was sent to the most important fortifications of Pleven, but it was not effective enough. Artillery could not destroy the redoubts and trenches and upset the enemy's defense system. At night, we approached the Turkish fortifications and the next day continued shelling of enemy positions. Tangible results again not achieved. During the shelling, the Turks left the fortifications to shelters or to the rear, and at night they returned and corrected all the destruction.
August 27 (September 8) Romanian troops seized the enemy's front trench from the Grivitsky Redoubt. Of great importance was the advancement of Russian troops on the left flank, where two ridges of the Green Mountains were occupied on the southern approaches to Pleven. A detachment of cavalry under the command of General Loshkarev advanced to the fortified camp from the west. Attempts by Turkish troops to counterattack to reject the enemy to their original positions did not reach the goal.
August 28 (September 9) artillery preparation continued. Long shelling of the fortress led to a large consumption of ammunition. “Although our batteries have advanced,” wrote DA Milyutin, “they are generally successful, but the positive result is not yet noticeable, and meanwhile, the head of artillery, Prince Masalsky, is already complaining about the excessive use of charges and the difficulty of replenishing them in a timely manner. Volatile and mobile parks barely have time to bring ". General Zotov instructed not to hurry with the beginning of the storming of the enemy’s fortified area, but “patiently give the artillery more and more to do its job of destroying the barriers, moral exhaustion and material disorganization of the defender.” It was decided to continue to bring the batteries to the positions of the enemy, where the terrain allows artillery preparation to continue for some time. However, four days of enhanced artillery preparation did not give serious results. However, at the August 29 Military Council (September 10) it was decided to launch an assault the next day.
Thus, 26 August (7 September) - 29 August (10 September) Russian and Romanian guns fired on Turkish fortifications. Despite the duration of the artillery preparation and the large number of shells fired, the Turkish garrison failed to inflict tangible losses, the damage to the fortifications of Pleven were also insignificant, the Turks easily restored the damaged buildings in the intervals between the shelling of their positions.
By this time, the Allied forces were covering Plevna from the north, east, and south. The right wing was made up of Romanian troops, having on the heights to the north and north-east of Grivitsa 3-th and 4-th infantry divisions, and 2-th division in reserve. In the center, between Grivitsy and Radishevo, there was the 9 corps, and between Radishevo and Tuchenitsy stream - the 4 corps. The left wing was a detachment of Prince Imeretinsky, who occupied the area between Tuchenitsky stream and the village of Krishin. The general reserve of the Western detachment was behind the 4 corps south of Radishevo.
Romanian troops with part of the 9 Army Corps (1 Brigade of the 5 Infantry Division) were to attack from the north-east in order to capture the Grivitsky redoubts. The troops of the 4 Corps received the task of attacking Pleven from the southeast, directing their main efforts to master the redoubt of Omar Bey-Tabia. The detachment of General MD Skobelev, allocated by their troops of Prince Imeretinsky, was to attack the enemy from the south. The start of the assault was scheduled for the 15 watch. The following tasks were assigned to the artillery: “At dawn, with all the batteries, open the most reinforced fire at the enemy fortifications and continue it until 9 in the morning. In 9 hours at once and suddenly stop all shooting at the enemy. At 11, the hours of the day reopen the intensified artillery fire and continue it until one o'clock in the afternoon. From an hour to 2,5 hours again stop on all batteries, and in 2,5 hours again to begin the reinforced cannonade, stopping it only on those batteries, the action of which can be prevented by advancing troops. ”
The drawback of the operation plan was that the disposition was sent out just a few hours before the assault began, and the troops did not have enough time to organize the attack carefully. The direction of the main strike was also incorrectly chosen (as during the previous assaults). The Allies planned to assault Plevna from the three most fortified sides. The opportunity to bypass the maneuver was not used, to attack the Turkish garrison from the western direction, where the Turks had almost no fortifications. The day of the third assault was also unsuccessfully chosen due to weather conditions. All night and half day 30 August (11 September) 1877, there was a downpour, then it was replaced by drizzling rain. The soil was sodden, which prevented the movement of artillery and troops, visibility was poor. Storm was necessary to postpone. But it was a royal name day, and no one dared to make such an offer. In his memoirs, the former chairman of the committee of ministers, P. A. Valuev, wrote that “if it were not for the 30, we would not have stormed Plevna”.
Assault
In 6 hours 30 August (September 11) 1877, the artillery preparation began. Thick fog covered the battlefield and prevented the gunners. As a result, a good plan for the use of artillery on this day was not fully implemented. Artillery could not fully support the advancing infantry.
On the right flank of the 15 watch, Romanian troops launched an attack on two Grivitsky redoubts, which were located at a distance of about 400 meters from each other. Bearing heavy losses from gunfire and artillery fire, the Romanians attacked the fortifications three times, but did not succeed. The undeveloped Romanian soldiers, having met the stubborn resistance of the enemy, were confused. Then the 1 th brigade of the 5 th infantry division under the command of Lieutenant General M. V. Rodionov was promoted to help them. With the arrival of the Russians, the Romanians cheered up and went into battle again. Russian-Romanian troops launched a fourth attack and, at the cost of heavy casualties, captured the Grivitsky Redoubt No. 1. The Turks tried to repel the redoubt, but they were rejected. Further allies could not move forward. The Turks took measures to strengthen the defense in this direction. “Grivitsky Redoubt remained behind us,” wrote DA Milyutin, “but the Turks managed to build new fortifications against him, while ours, sowing into the redoubt, did not do anything all day to firmly establish themselves in it, and did not even import artillery into it. "
At the central section, due to an error, the attack did not start at 15 hours, as was the plan of the operation, but around noon. Russian troops came under heavy fire from the redoubt of Omar. The Russian command consistently threw the regiment after the regiment into battle, but without success. Russian troops suffered heavy losses - about 4,5 thousand people. As a result, the Russian regiments went over to the attack at different times, engaged in battle in parts, acted frontally. Such attacks are easily repelled by the enemy. The infantry offensive itself was poorly prepared by artillery. The strongest Turkish fortifications in this direction - the redoubt Omar was not destroyed.
Fight on the Romanian part of the redoubt at s. Grivitsa. G. Dembitsky
The Russian troops achieved the greatest success on the left wing, where Skobelev's detachment operated. Here the enemy held positions that the chief of staff of the Western detachment and his actual leader, General P. D. Zotov, considered Pleven's “strategic-tactical key”. They stretched from southwest to northeast, from a group of redoubts in the area of the village of Krishin to the redoubts of Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga. Ahead of this position, Turkish troops occupied the third ridge of the Green Mountains. Skobelev considered the capture of the redoubts Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga (they were later called the Skobelev's) as the main task. At dawn, artillery preparation began, and at 10 hours our troops launched an offensive and shot down the enemy from the third ridge of the Green Mountains. The Turks retreated.
General Skobelev began to fulfill the main task - the assault on the two main Turkish fortifications in this direction. True, the nature of the terrain was not conducive to the success of Russian troops. In order to reach the redoubts, the advancing troops had to descend along the gently sloping northern slope of the third ridge into a hollow in which Zelenogorsk creek flowed in steep, difficult to reach for artillery banks. Only one bridge was built across the stream. Having crossed the creek, it was necessary to climb a steep slope to a height, where there were strong enemy fortifications No. 1 (Kavanlyk) and No. 2 (Isa-Aga), which were connected by a deep trench. Ahead of the redoubts, on the slope, were rifle trenches.
At around 15 hours, Skobelev's troops launched an assault on enemy fortifications. The Vladimir and Suzdal regiments, which were advancing in the first echelon, suffered heavy losses from the enemy’s fire, and lay down near the Zelenogorsk brook. Skobelev threw a second echelon into the attack - the Revel regiment. Our troops again attacked, but this offensive was also stopped by the strong fire of the Turkish army. Skobelev threw into attack his last, third echelon - Libau regiment and two rifle battalions. And he led the attack. Our troops got to the enemy, melee fighting began. In 16 hours 30 minutes Russian troops took the redoubt Kavanlak, after a stubborn battle, in the 18 hours the redoubt Isa-Aga was occupied. The Turkish troops, having received reinforcements from the reserve, made several attempts to dislodge the enemy, but to no avail. Shooting continued all night.
In fact, the squad Skobelev opened the way to the very Pleven. Before the troops of the detachment and the city there were no longer any Turkish fortifications. A situation arose in which the further development of the offensive gave the entire city to the Russians. In the ranks of the Turkish army began to panic, the enemy soldiers were tired of fierce battle. However, Skobelev's detachment also needed serious reinforcements. The soldiers fought in the morning, were tired, many have not slept for 2-4 days. The detachment lost a lot of people, the troops had to be reduced to national teams with random commanders at the head. Everywhere there were mountains of corpses. There was a moan of wounded who could not be removed. Ammunition was running out. All reserves have been used. The soldiers could not even dig in, as there was no trenching tool, but “despite the fatigue, hunger, fatigue in battle, the soldiers felt the need to dig in and did not regret for the remainder of their forces. They dug, or rather, picked the ground with bayonets, scaffolds, scraped it with manners, shook their hands, only to hide from three sides like something, as it were ” I.) For the device barriers used even the corpses of their own and Turkish soldiers.
Further development of events depended on who would be more accurate in assessing the situation and directing reserves to this area. Skobelev timely demanded the sending of reinforcements, but he was categorically denied this. Neither the commander-in-chief, nor Nepokochitsky agreed to expose the Bulgarian highway, they did not believe that the Turks would dare to expose other directions in order to reject Skobelev's detachment. The higher Russian command had the opportunity to regroup the forces to the south and take the city itself. But the Russian command refused to regroup the forces to the south and did not support Skobelev's detachment with reserves, believing that the assault failed and there was no point in supporting the success of the Russian general. Although the introduction of fresh reserves on the left Russian flank, it was still possible to correct the mistakes of the plan of attack and the failure of the troops of the right flank and center, having achieved, albeit an unnecessarily expensive price, a decisive victory. Thus, the Russian command did not understand the benefits of the current situation created in connection with the breakthrough of the flank of the Turkish defense and Skobelev’s exit to Plevna itself, did not use a real opportunity to win a decisive victory. The breakthrough of fresh Russian troops into Plevna itself decided the outcome of the battle for the entire fortified area. So, the Russian command itself refused a sure chance of victory.
31 August (12 September) 1877 was not conducted on the right flank and in the center of active hostilities. The Turks launched one attack on Grivitsky redoubt number 1, but it repelled. The Turkish commander-in-chief, Osman Pasha, in contrast to the Russian command, correctly assessed the situation and given the great danger from the Skobelev detachment, which occupied the two most important fortifications of the Turkish army from Plevna itself, decided to throw large forces against it. Osman Pasha almost strengthened his right flank, transferring 15 fresh battalions from various defense sectors and from the general reserve of the Pleven garrison to the 4 area. The fulfillment of the intention of the Turkish commander contributed to the inaction of the main forces of the Russian-Romanian army in other areas. With this, Skobelev’s squad was not even supported by strong reinforcements, so that he would keep these fortifications in the hands of the Russian army, which would help in the future offensive. Krylov, who temporarily commanded the 11 corps, sent to the redoubts only the weakened 1300 of September and the weak (XNUMX man) Shuya regiment. In addition, the regiment was late, it had to be used only to cover the retreat of the Skobelev detachment. Together with Shuisky, Krylov also sent the Yaroslavl regiment, but Zotov took him to his general reserve.
In the morning of August 31 (September 12), the Turks launched a decisive counterattack on Skobelev's redoubts. Our troops fought off four Turkish attacks. Then the Turkish commander ordered to pull off all reserves to the fifth attack, reducing to the extreme the composition of the garrisons in trenches and redoubts in all other positions. To inspire the counterattacks, it was ordered to carry the green banner in front of them, and the mullahs in the camps to chant prayers. Behind the attacking troops, Osman Pasha set up a battery and two cavalry regiments, ordering them to shoot at anyone who decided to retreat.
In the meantime, after repelling the fourth Turkish attack, the position of the left-wing Russian wing became hopeless. In his report, Skobelev described the state of the redoubts in such a way: “Redoubts represented a terrible picture by this time (3 pm 5 hours). The mass of Russian and Turkish corpses lay in heaps. The interior of the redoubt was especially filled with them. In the deep trench linking the redoubts, the enemy's longitudinal shots were laid at once by dozens of people, and piles of corpses filling the trench alternated with still-living defenders. On the redoubt of number 2, part of the parapet, turned to the city of Pleven, was composed of corpses. At the 1 Redoubt, three guns of the 5-th battery of the 3-th artillery brigade were partly distorted and deprived of servants and horses. The remaining two guns 2-th artillery brigade, also deprived of servants, I ordered to take away earlier. The gun standing in the redoubt was also destroyed. I took the rings out of the gun in case they fell into the hands of the Turks. ” The situation was Russian and in the rear of the redoubts. Kuropatkin wrote about this: “The section of the position between the third crest and the redoubts presented a picture too, with thousands of wounded and corpses lying on this section. Hundreds of bodies ... that were mixed with Turkish corpses, decomposed and contaminated the air. "
The last fifth attack in 16 hours was headed by the Turkish commander Osman Pasha himself. During the defense of the redoubt Kavanlyk, his commandant, Major F. Gortalov, was heroically killed. However, despite the heroism and fortitude of the Russian soldiers, the Turkish army was able to recapture the redoubts. Russian troops moved away in an orderly manner, taking the wounded away.
General MD D. Skobelev on horseback. N. D. Dmitriev-Orenburg
Results
Thus, the third assault on Plevna, despite its high military prowess, dedication and resilience of Russian and Romanian soldiers and officers, ended in failure. Allied forces suffered serious losses. Killed 13 thousand Russian and 3 thousand Romanians. Especially serious losses were on the left wing: troops lost killed and wounded 6,5 thousand people, which was 44% officers and 41% soldiers and noncommissioned officers of the troops of Skobelev and Imeretinsky. The Turks identified their losses in 3 thousand people. Apparently, underestimated.
The failure of the third assault was caused by a number of reasons, based on the mistakes of the highest Russian command. Many mistakes were passed “by inheritance” from the first and second storms of Pleven, that is, they did not bother to carry out work on mistakes. Among the reasons for the failure of the assault: weak intelligence of the location of the Turkish army and its defense system; underestimation of the forces and means of the enemy; the patterned attack on the same lines on the most fortified sections of the Turkish fortified area; the lack of maneuver by the troops to attack Pleven from the west, where the Turks had almost no fortifications; refusal to transfer the main efforts to a more promising direction, where Skobelev's detachment successfully broke through; the lack of interaction between groups of troops attacking in different directions (when some troops attacked, others stood) and precise control of all Allied forces. In addition, they could not organize a full-fledged artillery preparation with the involvement of large caliber guns - the Turkish fortifications were almost not damaged during the shelling, the Turks quickly restored. Unsuccessfully chose a day to attack.
As historian N. I. Belyaev noted: “The Third Pleven clearly showed that during the 2,5 month of the war the Russian high command had not learned anything, had not considered anything from their previous mistakes, and had managed to add new ones to the old mistakes. Ultimately, it is necessary to recognize that the third storming of Plevna was not based on real calculation, but was based only on the courage of the Russian soldier, on the unexpected appearance of favorable accidents, on “maybe” (N.I. Belyaev. Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878 years.).
A negative role was played by the lack of a unified command. Formally, the Western detachment was headed by the Romanian Prince Karl, in fact, the chief of troops was the chief of staff of the detachment, General Zotov. Romanian troops were under the authority of their general, Chernates. Under Plevna were the Russian emperor Alexander II, the war minister D. A. Milyutin, the commander-in-chief of the Danube army, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich. Everything did not allow for precise control of the Allied forces.
The unfortunate outcome of the third assault on Plevna forced the highest Russian command to change the way of dealing with the enemy. 1 (13) of September, Tsar Alexander II arrived near Pleven and convened a military council, at which he asked whether the army should remain under Plevna or whether it is necessary to retreat beyond the Osma River. Lieutenant-General P. D. Zotov, Chief of Staff of the Western Detachment, and Lieutenant-General Prince N. F. Masalsky, Army Chief Artillery, spoke in favor of the retreat. For the continuation of the struggle for the fortress, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Danube Army, Major-General K. V. Levitsky, and War Minister D. A. Milyutin advocated.
The situation was not so dangerous as some generals saw. Allied Russian-Romanian troops in the Balkans numbered 277 thousand people. The Ottoman Empire had 350 thousand army, but could only put up about 200 thousand people against the allies. The main grouping of the Russian army, consisting of more than 100 thousand people with 470 guns, was located at Calafat, Lovcha and Pleven. The enemy opposed these troops 70 thousand soldiers and 110 guns standing in the area of Vidin, Orhaniye and Pleven. Therefore, Milutin insisted on the continuation of actions in the Pleven area. At the same time, he proposed a new way of dealing with the enemy. In his opinion, it was necessary to abandon the direct assaults of Pleven and break the resistance of the enemy with the help of the blockade. Milyutin rightly noted that the current army, and without having large-caliber artillery mounted fire, will not be able to reliably crush and destroy enemy fortifications, therefore, victory in a frontal assault is unlikely. In the case of a complete siege, you can achieve quick success, as the Turkish army has no reserves for long-term combat. Indeed, the enemy was already in a bad position. 2 (14) September 1877, Osman Pasha informed the High Command that shells and food were running out, there were no reinforcements, and the losses had greatly weakened the garrison. The Turkish commander noted that the army was set “to retreat, but it is very difficult to retreat”.
As a result, Alexander II supported the point of view of Milutin. The leadership of the Western squad had replacements. Assistant commander of the detachment of the Romanian Prince Charles, an engineer-general, General E. I. Totleben, was called from St. Petersburg. He was a hero of the Crimean War 1853-1856. General Zotov returned to command of the 4 Corps. All cavalry was subordinated to the brave and resolute I. V. Gurko. These changes improved command and control. In addition, the newly arrived Guards Corps joined the Western Squad: 1-I, 2-I, 3-I Guards Infantry and 2-I Guards Cavalry Division, Guards Rifle Brigade. The regular siege of Pleven began, which eventually led to victory.
Capture of Grivitsky redoubt near Plevna. N. D. Dmitriev-Orenburg
Information