Battle of the Danube
The offensive of the Russian army on the Balkan front in 1877 began with the crossing of the Danube, the great European river. During the previous wars between Russia and Turkey, its army had to force this water line more than 30 times. Moreover, most often the Russian army was supported by a strong Black Sea Fleet, which defended the Russian coast from the blows of the Ottoman fleet, contributed to the offensive of the left (coastal) flank of the army during operations in the Balkans in the area of the quadrangle of fortresses.
From the end of the 18th to the 1856, Russia belonged to the mouth of the Danube, where there were two fortresses - Kiliya and Ishmael. They were the bases of the Danube river flotilla, which made it possible to control the Lower Danube, tow ships with landings, transport materials for building bridges, and ensure the crossing of the Danube. However, after 1856, Russia lost these advantages. After the defeat in the Crimean (Eastern) War, Russia lost Southern Bessarabia at the mouth of the Danube and lost the ability to contain the Danube flotilla. True, with the abolition of the restrictive articles of the Paris Agreement (Russia during the Franco-Prussian War did it unilaterally), Russia was able to restore the Black Sea Fleet. But, of course, in a short time this task was difficult to solve. In addition, the High Command did not take emergency measures to restore the fleet on the Black Sea, considering that a strong fleet was not needed on such a limited theater.
And by the beginning of the war, Turkey, with the support of the Western powers, had created a significant armored fleet. The Russian command was forced to reckon with this factor, as well as the possibility of the appearance of the English fleet on the side of the Ottoman Empire on the Black Sea. In addition, Turkey had a fairly strong Danube river flotilla, which had 77 guns and a crew of about 1 thousand people. This fleet at any time could strengthen the ships of the Black Sea squadron of Turkey, which were based on the Sulina raid. Thus, forcing such a serious water barrier as the Danube required a lot of effort.
The Russian command understood the complexity of the operation and carefully prepared for the offensive. Comprehensive reconnaissance of the river was carried out on a broad front by special groups - nine Russians and three Romanians. Special attention was paid to the Zimnitsa area, where the main forces of the army were going to be shipped according to the plan of the war. The intelligence group on this site was headed by Colonel D. S. Naglovsky. Zimnitsa district, according to Naglovsky, fully satisfied a number of requirements. In particular, the place of crossing was located quite far from the location of the main forces of the Turkish army and a significant part of the Russian army could force the river before the approach of the Turkish troops. The terrain provided an opportunity for the hidden concentration of our troops. The islands of Adda and Buzirescu, dividing the Danube into two branches, facilitated the bridge guidance. After the crossing, the troops could occupy an important junction of roads leading to Ruschuk, Tarnovo and through Pleven to Sofia. From here the shortest direction went through the Balkan mountain range to Adrianople and Constantinople, bypassing the main forces of the Turkish army, located in the quadrilateral fortresses.
True, the crossing of the Danube near Zimnitsa had its own difficulties. The Turks had in the area more than 4 ferries with thousands of soldiers with 6 guns, including 770 men with 2 guns at Sistovo, more 3300 men with 4 guns at Vardam. Turkish commanders had reserves: troops in Tarnovo (4 thousand people), in Ruschuk (more than 21 thousand people) and Nikopol (about 10 thousand people), which were located from the area of the crossing in 50-80 km. The width of the river reached 700 meters, and the southern, steep bank rose above the level of the river to 8-20 meters. As a result, the success of the operation depended on the speed and decisiveness of the Russian army.
The engineering support of the forcing of the Danube was led by the chief of army engineers, Major General A. F. Depp. December 26 1876 (7 January 1877) he compiled an “Approximate Calculation of the Formation of Troops on the Right Bank of the Danube”, which determined the forces and means necessary to overcome the river, and outlined how the troops acted. Since the engineering property was not enough, and it was not possible to find transportation facilities at the site, it was decided in Slatina on r. Olta build wooden pontoons for two bridges, float them into the Danube and lead them to the place of the crossing under enemy fire from Nikopol. These bridges were to become the main means of ensuring the passage of the main forces of the Russian army across the Danube. It was planned to use the iron pontoons of the system of Colonel Tomilovsky for the transfer of the first amphibious detachments. The rest of the assault force Depp proposed to ship with the help of the steamer "Annette." This ship under the English flag was captured from the Flamunda, where he ran aground with two towed barges. The Turks tried to destroy the ship with artillery fire, but the Russians temporarily flooded it, protecting it from destruction of the vehicle.
In January 1877, the commanders of the Danube army were ordered to identify the carpenters to use for building pontoons and bridges. In total, about 2 thousand people were registered. At the same time, materials were collected and shipped to Bessarabia from St. Petersburg, Odessa, Nikolayev and other places for the construction of bridges and booms. The rules for the maintenance of bridges and the movement of troops and cargoes on them were developed, approved and sent out in part. In order to train sappers and pontooners, theoretical and practical classes were organized. Exercises were practiced on launching pontoons into the water, carrying amphibious assault forces, building and building bridges, throwing anchors.
By the beginning of the forcing of the Danube were made and concentrated in Slatina on the river. Olta pontoons and rafts for two bridges (172 pontoon and 60 rafts). All of these assets, with the bridge accessories immersed in them, were distributed over three echelons. The general leadership of the rafting on Olte, and then on the Danube was headed by the captain of the 1 rank Novosilsky. The mountain river Olta had a fast current, winding fairway with many sleeves, shoals and dams. Therefore, it was a difficult task. But it was decided successfully. The rafts, pontoons and materials for the bridges, accompanied by two sappers' mouths and sailors, were sent from Slatina in the period of June 10-12 (22-24) and on the night of June 14-15 (26-27). All three trains successfully floated to the mouth of the Olta, and then to the Zimnitsa area.
The struggle for supremacy on the Danube
One of the most difficult tasks was the struggle for supremacy on the Danube. The Ottomans had a river flotilla on the river, it was necessary to destroy the Turkish ships or paralyze their activities. The weakness of the Danube Flotilla was that the Turkish ships were dispersed along the Danube: in Sulin - 2 monitor, in Tulcea - 2 armored corvettes and gunboat, in Mach - 2 armed steamer, in Girsov - 2 gunboats and armed naval boat and in a marina - 3 armed with a steamboat; - armed boat, in Ruschuk - 2 gunboats and 2 iron launch, in Vidin - 800 gunboats and armed boat. The presence on the Danube of several Turkish fortresses with strong artillery, a strong flotilla, and the possibility of the appearance of ships of the Turkish fleet on the river from the Black Sea required the Russian command to solve this serious task. The solution of this task was facilitated by the ill-conceived deployment of ships of the Turkish flotilla. The Turkish command sought to establish control on the Danube from the Iron Gate to the Black Sea (more than XNUMX km), which led to the dispersal of the forces of the flotilla. As a result, the Turks could not provide sufficient concentration of forces in any of the sections of the river. Russian sailors had an excellent opportunity to beat the enemy in parts.
The Russian High Command decided, by setting minefields at the mouth of the Danube, to prevent the passage of Turkish ships into the river from the Black Sea. It was planned with the help of mines to isolate individual detachments of the Turkish Danube Flotilla and with the support of coastal batteries to destroy them with attacks of boats armed with pole mine. It was also envisaged to set up defensive minefields above and below the crossing in order to prevent enemy ships from entering it. Therefore, the command began in the autumn of 1876, sending sailors from Kronstadt and Nikolaev. In Chisinau, two of them were formed: 1) a detachment of Guards crew under the command of Lieutenant Commander Tudera (458 people); 2) Black Sea naval squad under the command of Captain 1 of the rank IG Roguli (197 man). Both groups were subordinated to the chief of engineers, Major-General A. F. Depp. Guards crew detachment was intended for action on the Middle Danube, the Black Sea detachment - on the Lower Danube. At the start of the 1877, the 14 steamboats, 5 bots (including 1 diving), 10 rowing boats and 14 boats were available to seamen. The ships were brought from Petersburg and Nikolaev to Chisinau by rail, from where they were taken to the front in various ways.
The means of active struggle against the enemy on the Danube were six mineboats. The fastest and largest were the metal boats "Joke" and "Mina", which had a speed of 14-16 nodes. The rest gave the flow of 6 nodes, against the flow - 2-3 node. None of them had artillery weapons and armor. They were equipped with pole mines, and speedboats, except for the pole ones, were also towed by mines - “cruise ships”. Each boat had a 8 min. The mine charge consisted of 2,5 pounds of gunpowder. When attacking, the boat came close to the enemy ship and hit it with a pole mine or brought a towing mine under the bottom. Thus, the mine attack required the crew great courage, because it was required to approach the enemy ship under fire, close. The detachments of the sailors were intensively engaged in combat training in conditions as close as possible to the combat ones. To improve the theoretical knowledge in the use of mine weapons In Chisinau, a mine officer class and a school of rank and file were created.
In the winter of 1876-1877. and in the spring of 1877, 755 mines, 1800 pounds of gunpowder and 400 pounds of dynamite were brought to Bender fortress, where the mine storage site was created. At the same time, 330 cork belts, 10 warning lights and 10 telescopes were delivered. In April, 1877 was formed a special team of swimmers, divers in the 10 sailors. It was headed by Lieutenant M. F. Nikonov. The main task of the team was to lay mines under Turkish vessels in the places of their stay. Thus, the Russians conducted a whole range of measures to combat enemy ships on the Danube.
After the declaration of war, the Russian sailors set about laying mines on the Lower Danube. One of the first minefields, put at Reni at the mouth of the river. Ceret, was intended to protect the Barboch railway bridge, through which trains with cargoes for the Russian army passed, from artillery shelling by Turkish ships. The barricades were placed from mineboats and rowboats with lines of 5-10 min. The conditions were difficult: a strong current disrupted mines, so the miners often had to put each mine on the 5-8 pood anchor. The barricades were placed under the cover of coastal batteries, located at Reni, Barbosha and Brailov.
To be continued ...
Speech by Montenegro on the Russian side distracted a large grouping of the Turkish army
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