Military Review

Romanian disaster

Romanian disaster

100 years ago, in December 1916, most of Romania was occupied by the troops of the central powers. Towards the end of December, German-Austrian and Bulgarian troops occupied most of the territory of Romania. 24 December The 3-I Bulgarian army, advancing along the right bank of the Danube, approached the towns of Brailov and Machin. 25 December, after fierce fighting, the 9-I German army broke through the Russian-Romanian positions and began to move towards the city of Focsani, already in the east of the country near the border with Russia.

On New Year's Eve, the Russian High Command had to urgently deploy troops to the borders of the Seret River (Siret), which runs just east of the former Russian-Romanian border. Their main goal was to stop the further advance of the German-Austrian and Bulgarian troops, who continued the pursuit of the retreating Romanian army. These days, Bulgarian and German troops besieged cities in eastern Romania - Braila, Machin and Tulcea. Further advance of the enemy would have created a threat to the already Russian territories, Southern Bessarabia and even Odessa.

Thus, the hopes of the Romanian elite to profit at the expense of Austria-Hungary were buried. The Romanian army was defeated, Romania itself was almost completely occupied, and the Russian Empire had to urgently create a new southern front, the huge human and material costs for which further aggravated the internal situation in the country.


Romania gained complete independence from Turkey in 1878, thanks to Russia's victories over the Ottomans. But of all the Balkan countries, Russian influence here was minimal. At the same time, the Romanian elite from the very beginning believed that Romania was deprived and claimed the territory of its neighbors, for which there was a significant percentage of the Romanian population, in particular, Austria-Hungary.

Before 1910, Romania had no chance to profit at the expense of its neighbors. However, at this time Bucharest received such an opportunity because of the sharp aggravation in the Balkans. In addition, the Romanian government needed to relieve internal tension in the country (the burden of socio-economic problems led to a political crisis). Thus, the peasant war 1907 of the year shook the whole of Romania and the authorities were forced to begin withdrawing land from large owners in order to transfer it to the poorest strata of the peasantry. A successful war seemed a convenient way out for sewage of social energy.

In 1912, the First Balkan War began. Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro together defeated Turkey, which lost its European possessions. However, the division of the skin of the "Turkish bear" ended in a fight already among the winners. Serbia and Bulgaria did not share Macedonia, besides Greece also had its interests there. The Bulgarians had the strongest army and thought to achieve a quick victory over the Serbs. Bulgaria in June 1913 of the year launched the Second Balkan War. However, the war with Serbia turned into a clash with a whole coalition. Serbia was supported by Montenegro. Greece came out against Bulgaria, then Turkey and Romania. Turkey decided to use the Second Balkan War to partially compensate for losses in the First.

Bucharest decided to use a favorable situation, when the Bulgarian army was tied by the war back in the First Balkan War, although before Romania and Bulgaria were considered allies. Bucharest began to put pressure on Sofia, demanding to change the border line in South Dobrudja in its favor. With the start of the Second Balkan War, Bucharest finally decided to oppose Sofia, since almost the entire Bulgarian army was tied up on the western border. 14 July 1913, the Romanian troops crossed the border in the Dobruja area and moved to Varna. The Romanians were waiting for fierce battles, but they were lucky, Sophia did not expect a “knife in the back”, almost all Bulgarian troops fought on the Serbian and Greek fronts. The Romanian cavalry, meeting no resistance, headed towards Sofia. 29 July, due to the hopelessness of the situation, the Bulgarian government signed a truce.

Romania got the opportunity to feel like a leading regional power. 10 August 1913, peace was signed in Bucharest. Serbs entrenched in Macedonia, the Turks returned part of the possessions in Europe - Edirne-Adrianople. A new Bulgarian-Romanian border was established in the Dobrudja region in favor of Romania. Bulgaria pledged to tear down military fortifications on the border with Romania. Thus, Romania received Southern Dobrogea with an area of ​​6960 km² and a population of 286 thousand people. However, Romania received the enemy in the face of Bulgaria. In addition, territorial disputes in the Balkan Peninsula were not resolved by this war. Almost all countries had complaints about their neighbors. This was one of the prerequisites of the First World War.

Romanian neutrality

At the beginning of World War I there were two parties in Romania: supporters of the Central Powers and the Entente. King Carol I (1881-1914), from the German Catholic house of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, gathered the crown council and proposed, on the basis of the existing union treaty, to enter the war on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary. However, almost all the members of the crown council were in favor of declaring neutrality, so the king could only agree. The leader of the supporters of "armed neutrality" was the country's prime minister Ion Bratianu (Ionel Brattianu). He said at the council meeting: “In all likelihood, the war will be long. Let's wait as events unfold. We will have another chance to say our word. ” The news that Italy (a member of the Triple Alliance) will remain neutral only strengthened this position.

Thus, the Romanian elite showed patience and decided to wait for a better moment. October 10 King Karol passed away. The throne was occupied by his nephew Ferdinand (reigned in 1914-1927), who, unlike his uncle, held neutral positions. In Bucharest, they understood that an alliance with Berlin in the event of a victory would allow Bessarabia (Moldova) to be taken away from Russia, and an alliance with the Entente promises Austrian Bukovina and Hungarian Transylvania. Transylvania was a bigger prize, in terms of economic potential, territory and the Romanian-speaking population. On the other hand, in Bucharest, German power was feared.

It is also worth noting that the Romanian elite as a whole focused on France, spoke French. In Romania, they proudly called themselves the “Latin sister” of France, and Bucharest - “little Paris”. Another "Latin sister" was considered Italy. But the main economic partner was the German Empire, the second - Austria-Hungary. They consumed the goods of Romanian agriculture, supplied industrial equipment. The military cooperation with the Germans was also close, that is, the Romanians had a good idea of ​​the strength of the German army.

Therefore, Bucharest waited quite a while. The course of hostilities did not give an answer, for whom in the end will be the victory. In 1914, the German plan immediately brought France out of the war failed, the Russians were defeated in East Prussia, but they defeated the Austro-Hungarian army in Galicia. Austria-Hungary suffered a terrible defeat, lost vast territories, including Bukovina, and survived only with the help of Germany.

During the 1915 campaign of the year, Russia suffered a defeat on the Eastern Front, lost the previously captured Austrian regions, and retreated from the Kingdom of Poland, but withstood. In the Balkans, Austro-German troops defeated Serbia and Montenegro, these countries fell, the remnants of their armies were evacuated. Bulgaria acted on the side of the Central Powers, which worsened the military-strategic position of Romania. On the other hand, Italy came out against the Central Powers, which distracted part of the forces of Austria-Hungary.

During the 1916 campaign of the year, Russia delivered a second crushing blow to Austria-Hungary. The Austrian front survived only because of the strategic mistakes of the supreme Russian command and the full support of Germany, which was forced to save an ally, transferring all relatively free units from other sectors of the Russian front and from the French front. In Bucharest, it was decided that the time for the march against Austria-Hungary had come. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was exhausted. Agriculture, from which mobilization took almost half of the labor force, could not provide the country. Recently, abundant Austria-Hungary led a half-starved existence. The population expressed discontent. The Hungarian Independence Party spoke from radical positions, demanding immediate peace. The ensuing assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister and the death of the Austrian emperor Franz Joseph’s political longevity (he ruled from 1848) became the forerunners of the decline of the Hapsburg Empire.

In general, before the entry into the war, Romania lived well. Germany and Austria-Hungary needed Romanian grain, other agricultural products and gasoline. Bucharest greatly benefited from deliveries to the Central Powers, which lasted almost until entry into the war. From a geopolitical point of view, Russia and Austria-Hungary, the main potential competitors of Romania in the region, on whose lands Bucharest claimed, exterminated each other and their empires clearly went to ruin. Romania had to wait quite a bit longer and it could almost without a fight get Bessarabia (after the revolution and the collapse of the Russian Empire), and then Transylvania, since the Entente was clearly stronger than the Central Powers in its military and economic capabilities, Germany and Austria-Hungary were already on the verge of exhaustion, especially the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But Bucharest could not resist. Russia's victories over Austria-Hungary were impressive. The internal crisis in Russia could develop for a long time. The depletion of the military-economic, human resources of the Central Powers became more and more obvious. As a result, Romania embarked on a military adventure, which led the country and the army to a catastrophe and surprising political consequences.

Romanian King Ferdinand

Entente Policy

With the beginning of the war, the powers of the Entente and the Central Bloc tried to win over Romania to their side. The country had a convenient geographical position: from the east and south-west it bordered with the members of the Entente - Russia and Serbia, and from the south and north-west - with Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, who fought on the German side. Thus, its territory could be used as a springboard for aggression against the Entente, or the Central Powers. Romania also had a large army (albeit poorly prepared), and in Rome and Paris they wanted to divert the Austro-German troops from the French and Italian fronts with the Romanian demonstration, to link the Austro-German troops in the Balkans. In addition, Romania was important as a resource base, in particular, as a supplier of agricultural products.

Russia, on the whole, doubted the usefulness of the Romanian kingdom, preferring to maintain its neutrality. True, Russia since the autumn of 1915 has put diplomatic pressure on Bucharest, due to the onset of the Austro-German and Bulgarian troops in Serbia. The Western powers of the Entente, in connection with the threat of losing the Balkans, also stepped up their policies. Petersburg offered Bucharest a military alliance, or at least permission for the transfer of Russian troops on Romanian soil, to assist the retreating Serbian army. However, Bucharest was bargaining time. As a result, the Russian Foreign Ministry cooled Romania, began to listen more to the military, who insisted on ensuring the neutrality of Romania.

A significant part of the Russian generals rightly doubted the combat capability of the Romanian army. The Russian military said: “If Romania comes out against us, Russia will need the 30 divisions to defeat it. If Romania comes out against Germany, then we will also need 30 divisions to save it from defeat. What is there to choose from? ”However, Russia's voice was not the main one. Soon the Russian General Headquarters resigned to the fact that France wanted to engage Romania in active hostilities.

Thus, in general, the performance of Romania was beneficial to France and Italy, diverting the forces of Germany and Austria-Hungary, creating an advantage for the armies of the Entente on the French and Italian fronts. In addition, the performance of Romania on the side of the Entente and its francophile sentiments of the Romanian elite strengthened the position of France, England and Italy in the post-war structure of the Balkan Peninsula, weakening Russia's political positions in the region. The benefit of Russia from the performance of Romania was dubious, apparently, the Russian Empire in its position at that time was more beneficial to the neutrality of Romania.

Romania decides to go to war

In the summer of 1916, the Entente powers again pressed Romania. With the major success of the Russian army on the South-Western Front, the immediate action of the Romanian army against Austria-Hungary promised a decisive defeat of the Hapsburg empire and a major strategic victory for the Entente over the Central powers. In addition, the battle of the Somme began, England and France needed to divert Germany to the East.

As a result, Bucharest, in a special note to the allies from 4 in July, 1916, agreed in principle to take the side of the Entente. But he set a number of conditions: 1) mobilization in Romania will only begin when the first train arrives in the country weapon and ammunition for the Romanian army from the allies. France and Russia must pledge to supply all necessary military supplies to Romania throughout the war; 2) Entente powers should give guarantees that the general attack on the Central Powers will not be stopped; 3) the Russian army will keep its positions in Galicia and Bukovina; 4) Romania will cover from a possible strike Bulgaria. At the same time, Bucharest also had extensive territorial claims.

It is clear that such an extensive list of the conditions of Romania demanded a certain time for coordination and buried the hopes of the Russian command for the immediate strike of the Romanian army on Austria-Hungary. As a result, the most advantageous moment for the performance of Romania against the Austro-Hungarian Empire was missed.

20 July Romania, with which representatives of the Entente were negotiating to enter the war, banned the export of grain to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Germany under the pretext of threatening famine in the country. Also, in all resorts in Romania, they stopped taking vacationers to prepare places for the wounded. On July 23, in the French city of Chantilly, the Romanian military attache, Colonel Rudeanu, concluded an agreement on behalf of his government with delegates of the Allied main headquarters of the Entente. Bucharest pledged to put 150 thousand army to attack Bulgaria, which was supposed to begin simultaneously with the Allied offensive on the Front of Thessaloniki.

Interestingly, almost all the demands of Romania, voiced by Prime Minister Ion Bratianu, have found the support of the French government. The French ambassador in Petrograd, Maurice Palaeolog, did not hesitate to express his words and warned the Russian government about a possible “deep disappointment of France” if Romania’s negotiations with the Russians did not lead the country to enter the war on the side of the Entente. Palaeologus stressed that, since France shares all the fair wishes of Romania, the entire responsibility for the possible failure of the negotiations will be placed on Russia. The Russian ambassador to Paris, Alexander Izvolsky, actively supported this position.

At the same time, the alliance with Romania almost collapsed at the very last moment. On July 26, the governments of the Entente countries received news that Romanian Prime Minister Bratiano decided to abandon his earlier commitment to enter the war on their side as soon as possible. For this, Bratiano began secret negotiations with the Bulgarian king, Ferdinand. Bucharest did not want to fight with Bulgaria, and planned to concentrate all forces on Transylvania. Earlier, the Romanian government promised to open military actions against the Central Powers in exchange for entering the Russian corps into Dobrudja. Russia promised to fulfill these conditions, but instead of an offensive, Romania began secret negotiations with Bulgaria, which fought on the German side. The Romanian government did not hide the fact that it did not want to fight with Bulgaria, but was ready to attack Austria-Hungary in order to get Transylvania. This position discouraged the Allies, as they were preparing an offensive against Bulgaria from Greece.

However, at first England, and then France agreed with Romania. On August 1, French Prime Minister Aristide Briand made concessions to Britain and Romania, rejecting the demand for an immediate Romanian attack on Bulgaria. He telegraphed to the French ambassador in St. Petersburg, Maurice Palaeologu, the following: “I agree with Sir Edouard Gray and General Joffre that we could not ultimately demand the immediate declaration of war by Bulgaria on the part of Romania, because it is very likely that the Germans will force the Bulgarians to immediately attack Romanians, and then the Russian units [in Dobrudja] always have time to start military actions. ” 5 August, Chief of the Russian General Staff, General Mikhail Alekseev, agreed with this opinion. On the same day, French President Raymond Poincaré sent a telegram to St. Petersburg, in which he called on Emperor Nicholas II to agree to conclude an agreement with Romania on the latter’s entry into the war against Austria, without the requirement to speak out against Bulgaria. Under concerted pressure from various sides, the Russian tsar capitulated.

Thus, the original plan, according to which Romania was to attack Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, received 50 thousand Russian corps in aid, and the support of the Allied army of the Allies, collapsed. Bucharest did not want to fight Bulgaria for fear of losing Dobrudzu, but was ready to strike Austria-Hungary in order to capture Transylvania. Bucharest buried a simultaneous strike plan on Bulgaria from Romania and Thessaloniki. Russia under the pressure of England and France resigned to this. On August 9, Tsar Nicholas agreed to the proposal of France to refuse to demand Romania to declare war on Bulgaria, for the sake of Romania’s immediate launch against Austria-Hungary.

17 August 1916 in Bucharest, a secret convention was signed between Romania on the one hand, Russia, England, France and Italy, on the other. The agreement provided for Romania’s entry into the war, for which, if victorious, it promised to join Transylvania, Bucovina (not only southern, where Romanians prevailed, but also northern, where there was more West Russian population) and lands of the Hungarian plain as far as Tisza, although on the shores of this there was no river of Romanian population. At the same time, Romania did not commit to fight with Bulgaria.

Romania itself did not have a military industry (at that time there were three factories that produced light weapons), so the Allies pledged to supply the Romanians with weapons, ammunition and equipment. French and British weapons for the Romanian army were taken across the North Atlantic to Murmansk, then by rail through the whole of European Russia. Also, the Allies promised to cover Romania from Bulgaria. For this, a Russian auxiliary corps was sent to the Romanian Dobrudja. And the Western allies promised to launch a decisive offensive by the Anglo-French army of Salonica no later than 8 days after Romania began active hostilities.

Head of the Romanian Government Ion Bratianu

Romanian army. Plans

The Romanian army was large: 600-650 thousand people. But the Romanian army had poor combat training, few modern weapons, there were extremely poor communications in the country, which sharply worsened the maneuver by forces. There was almost no railway network. There was almost no military industry either. The army had only 1300 guns, half of which were outdated and about 800 machine guns, which they did not know how to use and carried in a train. The army did not have heavy artillery. There was almost no training, they took care of the ammunition, there were not enough guns, uniforms, shoes, there was no entrenching tools. The quality of the Romanian officers and generals left much to be desired, the Romanian military caste preferred to spend time in the taverns and the society of “cheerful girls” rather than in dust and dirt, teaching the soldiers. The Romanian command had no serious combat experience and was not prepared to conduct a modern war. The supply was very bad, and what went into the army was simply being plundered.

The borders of Romania were unprofitable in a military-strategic sense. In the south, along the Danube and further along a straight line from Turtukaya to the Black Sea, there was a border with Bulgaria; in the west and north-west, Romania bordered Austria-Hungary across the Carpathians. And in the direction of Focsani, the Austrian possessions strongly went eastward, as if forming a bag between Wallachia and Moldova. Such a frontier line, apart from its length, was also inconvenient because the enemy could cut off all Wallachia with a protrusion to the side of Orsovo with a blow to Focsani or from Dobruja. Thus, the extended Romanian borders in the southern and western directions were vulnerable and were not provided with either strong military cover or powerful fortresses that would have delayed the onslaught of the enemy.

According to the mobilization schedule, Romania was to deploy 400 thousand army, consisting of 20 strong divisions, 10 priority and 10 secondary. In fact, at the beginning of the war, around 25 divisions (23 infantry and 2 cavalry) were under arms, around 250 thousand in total. The remaining troops were to provide the rear, were in the stage of mobilization and training. Only the first divisions were equipped with rapid-fire artillery and a number of field heavy howitzers; Secondary divisions were armed with weapons of the old type.

The performance of Romania took place with complete disagreement over the direction of the main attack of the Romanian army. England and France met the wishes of Bucharest and shifted the center of gravity of the actions of the Romanian army to Transylvania, placing the cover of Romania from Bulgaria on the Russian army, which was supposed to advance to the Danube. The Russian command stood for the joint actions of the main Romanian forces, the allied army of Thessaloniki and the Russian auxiliary corps, first to put Bulgaria out of action. After that, the enemy in Transylvania, threatened from the north by the Russians, and from the south by the combined forces of the Salonica and the Romanian armies, had to leave this area itself. For this it was necessary to strengthen the Allied army of Salonica so that it could launch a decisive offensive, threatening the rear of the Bulgarian army, which would be tied by the performance of the Romanian army. But the Western powers did not agree to such an increase.

Thus, the French and Romanian points of view won, and 27 August Romania declared war on Austria, having received the complete freedom of a separate command and to help the Russian corps, which in Dobrudja was to join the Romanian army. So the long-time dream of Romania came true - in alliance with the “Latin sisters” France and Italy, she joined the battle to free her compatriots from the rule of Hungary. At the same time, the choice of the direction of the main attack was dictated by the national idea, and not by military-strategic calculations. Instead of striking at the relatively weak and threatened troops of the Entente from Bulgaria’s Thessaloniki region, which did not have the opportunity to actively fight in two strategic directions, Romania left only a relatively small barrier on the Bulgarian border, leaving the main forces to seize Transylvania. For the Russian army, this was not the best moment. By this time, Brusilovsky's breakthrough had already exhausted its strategic potential and the most favorable moment for the Romanians to enter the war had already been lost. After the bloody summer battles, the Russian troops were drained of blood and tired, in need of replenishment and replenishment of ammunition. In general, this predetermined the crushing defeat of the Romanian army.

To be continued ...
Articles from this series:
1916 Campaign

The strategy of the Entente and the Central Powers on 1916 year
"The French Armed Forces will bleed to death in any case - will she keep Verdun or not"
France and England were going to "fight to the last Russian soldier"
Russian soldiers in France
Brilliant victory of the Russian Caucasian army under Erzerum
Keprikeyskoe battle
Assault Erzerum
Defeat of the Turkish Army 3
Trapezund operation
Verdun meat grinder
Verdensky meat grinder. H. 2
Strategic defeat of the German army near Verdun
Naroch operation
Portugal in the First World War
The Fifth Battle of the Isonzo
Trentino operation
As the Russian Caucasian army defeated the Turkish army 3 th in Erzincan battle
Brusilovsky breakthrough
Lutsk breakthrough
Missed opportunities Brusilovsky breakthrough
Kolomeya battle. Battle of the Stokhod River
Kovel battle
How did the best parts of the Russian imperial army die?
Ognot. As the Turkish army tried to take revenge for the Erzerum defeat
The Sixth Battle of the Isonzo
How Romania entered the war
The first attack of the "land armadillos"
How died the color of the English nation. Battle of the Somme
Somme Carnage
As the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet battleship "Empress Maria" died
One of the greatest catastrophes of the Great War
New attempts of the Italian army to break through the Austrian defense

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  1. V.ic
    V.ic 22 December 2016 06: 29
    Rumanesti once again wanted to ride on the neck of Russia. Not a ride.
  2. Uncle Murzik
    Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 06: 47
    Gypsies in a noisy crowd Pushed up a mountain train! wassat
    1. tihiy
      tihiy 22 December 2016 09: 43
      Quote: Uncle Murzik
      Gypsies in a noisy crowd Pushed up a mountain train!

      Romanians, in general, as well as Moldovans, have no relation to immigrants from India
  3. parusnik
    parusnik 22 December 2016 07: 36
    Moreover, the Romanian elite from the very beginning believed that Romania was deprived and claimed in the territory of its neighbors, which had a significant percentage of the Romanian population, in particular, Austria-Hungary.

    Rome stands on the Tiber
    The Romanians are looking to shave
    V.V. Mayakovsky ...
    You can’t say better. The whole point ...
    1. Vitukha
      Vitukha 24 December 2016 10: 53
      But the Russians stole Romanian gold
  4. Hapfri
    Hapfri 22 December 2016 08: 09
    , Romania left only a relatively small screen on the Bulgarian border, leaving the main forces to capture Transylvania

    It was better for us - the main enemy is Austria-Hungary, not Bulgaria.
  5. Hapfri
    Hapfri 22 December 2016 08: 16
    Communists, but what about proletarian internacism? You’re blaming your class struggle brothers. The Nazi communist is a terrible product of democracy.
    Romanians were smarter than us. They didn’t hurt the bad revolution, they lived - they didn’t grieve, they had a wonderful climate, home-made wine ...
    1. Uncle Murzik
      Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 08: 27
      The scariest generation of liberal democracy! With their consent and participation there are maidans and the collapse of countries! The communists pulled Russia out of the liberals and thereby saved it and made it a mighty power from Russia !!!! second in the world, and in many ways the first!
  6. antivirus
    antivirus 22 December 2016 08: 52
    Maurice Paleolog, not embarrassed in expressions, warned the Russian government of a possible "great disappointment of France" if Romanian negotiations with the Russians did not lead to the entry of this country into the war on the side of the Entente.
    how weak we were to keep from the 19th century. Conquered or Returned?
  7. soldier
    soldier 22 December 2016 10: 48
    Why did the author think that Russia was defeated in the 1915 campaign? More than an allegation. And what is the balance of power in the Romanian campaign in stages, what are the strategic plans of the Germans and the Austrians? Maybe it will be continued
    1. Uncle Murzik
      Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 11: 58
      The defeats of 1915 cost Russia 1,5% of its territory, 10% of railways, 30% of its industry. One fifth of the empire’s population either fled or came under occupation. The number of refugees has reached ten million [2].
      According to General N. Golovin, in the summer campaign, the Russian Army lost 1,4 million people killed and wounded, i.e. an average of 235 thousand per month, when the average monthly loss for the entire army is 140 thousand. 976 thousand people were captured in the campaign, 160 thousand each. per month, with an average of 62 thousand people for the entire war. [3]
      1. soldier
        soldier 22 December 2016 12: 24
        Russia could not be pulled out of the war. And with the resource dominance of the Entente, this meant that the German bloc fighting on 2 fronts would collapse sooner or later. That is, strategically this is the key to victory for the Entente. Moreover, the respite of 1915 allowed the Anglo-French to lay the foundation for military-technical (quantitatively, primarily) dominance over the Germans.
        The army, with all the losses, was saved.
        The Russian army, having lost 3 million, inflicted losses on the enemy of 2 million 350 thousand people (this is for all armament problems, etc.). Data of the 2nd Bureau of the French General Staff
        1. Uncle Murzik
          Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 12: 39
          did CSKA Russia win the company in 1915? belay "We are not retreating - we are advancing in a different direction" loland please skip the data link of the 2nd Bureau of the French General Staff? apparently you are one of those optimists who write that Russia did not suffer defeat in the Russo-Japanese War wassat
          1. Rotmistr
            Rotmistr 22 December 2016 12: 44
            Based on the digital - material indicators, the Red Army lost the campaign of 1941. Isn’t that so? But in the end - it's the other way around. Also with the 1915 campaign
            1. Uncle Murzik
              Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 13: 02
              Rotmistr and that someone disputes that the Red Army as a whole lost the company in 1941! I, unlike you, are objective! lolall three years on the German front in the first world Russia suffered defeats, victories were against the Austrians and Turks!
              1. Rotmistr
                Rotmistr 22 December 2016 13: 23
                And the Germans also beat - starting with Gumbinnen and ending with the Mitavian breakthrough in December 1916
                1. Uncle Murzik
                  Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 13: 56
                  The German army was defeated in the Battle of Gumbinnen-Goldap. The Germans lost about 15 thousand people killed, wounded and captured (the main losses were suffered by Mackensen Corps - more than 10 thousand people). Russian troops lost 16,5 thousand people. With the full advantage of the Russian army, Samsonov was defeated after this small victory!
                  1. Rotmistr
                    Rotmistr 22 December 2016 14: 55
                    And in the beginning there was a victorious battle at Orlau-Frankenau, where the German 20th Corps was spread. And the main losses of Samsonov are not in field battles, but because of the boiler. And in boilers, as history shows, losses increase many times
                  2. Rotmistr
                    Rotmistr 22 December 2016 14: 58
                    And about the balance of power under Gumbinnen, where the Russian army, as you say, had an advantage (Radus Zenkovich. Sketch of the oncoming battle): 74,4 thousand German bayonets with 224 machine guns versus 63,8 thousand Russian bayonets with 252 machine guns ; 408 Russian guns against 408 light and 44 heavy German guns.
                    Your puncture?))
                    Maybe the rest of the calculations are the same?
                    1. Uncle Murzik
                      Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 18: 22
                      The forces of the parties in the ensuing battle were as follows. The 1st (commander Herman von Francois) and the 17th (August von Mackensen) army corps, as well as the 1st reserve corps (Otto von Belov) went on the attack from the German side — only 6 divisions consisting of 62 battalions with 370 guns . They were reflected by parts III (commander Nikolai Alekseevich Yepanchin), IV (Eris Khan Aliyev) and XX (Vladimir Vasilievich Smirnov) of the Russian army corps (5 divisions consisting of 70 battalions with 364 guns) .and from the German side there were parts of the landver (reservists) which fighting capacity did not differ! Battle of Gumbinnen | Military historical portal ...
             ›145-bitva-pri-gumbinneneYou don’t need to explain what the combat readiness of the units is! one division of the personnel army is worth three divisions of reservists laughing
                      1. Rotmistr
                        Rotmistr 22 December 2016 20: 46
                        What else is the warspot? Look at the work of the Soviet specialist: Radus-Zenkovich, L. A. Sketch of the encounter based on the experience of the Gumbin operation in August 1914 - M.: Literary and Publishing Department of the Political Directorate of the RVSR, 1920.
                        By the way, in this article about the Romanian campaign, there is not a single reference to the source. Where the numbers come from is not clear. Believe in the word. Maybe the author also freely refers to them as you are Uncle Murzik? Or also one Internet?
                      2. Uncle Murzik
                        Uncle Murzik 23 December 2016 07: 34
                        hi darling Rotmistr where I wrote about numerical superiority? belay I wrote about the quality superiority of our troops that entered Germany! We had a manpower army, and the Germans used mainly landwehr units (reservists), the main combat-ready armies were sent to France! you have a one-sided idea of ​​superiority lol If you don't like this source, take at least Vika "The battle ended with the defeat of one Russian and three German divisions, the Russians lost 16500 people, the Germans - 14800 people"! As soon as the Germans transferred more combat-ready units to the eastern front, our army began to suffer defeat! this does not mean that our soldiers and officers fought badly in this, the fault of the incompetent generals and leadership who did not draw any conclusions from the defeats in the Russo-Japanese War! I understand you when you want to pass off the defeat of one or two German divisions for the defeat of the German armies! and I agree with you there were some local successes! hi
          2. soldier
            soldier 22 December 2016 12: 47
            Russia was a shield behind which the Allies hid for a whole year. She puffed up in 1915 for herself and for that guy. Kindly - Lieutenant Colonel Larsche. Some statistics of the war of 1914-1918
            1. Uncle Murzik
              Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 13: 04
              soldier "It seems that the losses of Germany and its allies in both world wars have long been calculated, including with a breakdown by the main fronts - Western and Eastern. But losses do not always reflect the true picture of the intensity of battles, the tension of the nation in one direction or another, and most importantly - the dangers and “values” of the adversaries, for example, a significant part of the prisoners captured by the Western allies in April-May 1945 were our legitimate prey.
              Therefore, I decided to figure out - and what forces was Germany (and its allies) forced to exert in the West and East during these wars?
              Introduced the unit - division-month (such as man-day). To take into account the Allied divisions, I applied a lowering coefficient (it is clear that their combat effectiveness was lower than that of the German ones) - 0,75 for the 1st MV and 0,5 for the 2nd (the increased role of equipment and maneuver operations made the gap larger), except for the Finnish army - it was considered equal to German. It did not take into account individual brigades, the confrontation during the Strange War of 1939-40, operations in Poland and Yugoslavia (the Germans did not clash with the troops of the Western allies there), the Italian and Serbian Fronts of the 1st MV (except for the forces opposing the Anglo-French) and troops opposing the Romanians on the Eastern Front; cavalry divisions are not counted. In the 2nd MV, it took into account various infantry (including motorized, mountain, etc.) and tank divisions. The calculations were carried out according to Zayonchkovsky (1st MV) and Müller, ours, Gillebrandt (2nd MV). Naturally rounded, but the general ratio and order of numbers are correct.
              World War I:
              Eastern Front (with the Caucasus, August 1914-December 1917, inclusive):
              2200 German division-months, 1500 (3/4) Austro-Hungarian, Turkish and Bulgarian division-months (including 350 - Caucasian Front), TOTAL - 3700 division-months against Russia
              Western Front (with Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Thessaloniki, Palestine, Italian Front - opposing only the Anglo-French!):
              6300 German division months (including 4400 - until January 1918) and 450 other division months (with a 3/4 coefficient, incl. 300 - until January 1918), TOTAL - 6750 division months against the Entente and Americans (including 4700 - until January 1918)
              TOTAL Germany and its allies set up 10450 division months (8400 - until January 1918), incl. about 2/3 - against the West (55% against the West until January 1918). Separately in Germany - a total of 8500 German division months (6600 until January 1918), including almost 75% against the West (2/3 against the West until January 1918)
              Thus, the West took over the bulk of the troops of the Central Powers, especially the German ones - the most combat-ready and won, Russia was opposed by a smaller part of the enemy's troops, but she lost the war "Distribution of forces by Germany and its allies ...
              1. soldier
                soldier 22 December 2016 13: 27
                And where does the division? We talked about losses))
                And as for the divisions, it’s better to have the German transfer and distribution of forces than General Bois has not analyzed
                And interest is all differently considered
                And when they considered the Austrian divisions, they forgot about individual brigades))
                separate infantry brigades are forgotten. For example, the statement of the historical department of Vienna in 1929 on the distribution of Austro-Hungarian forces along the fronts indicates the presence of 1914 infantry divisions and 39 (!) Separate brigades on the Russian front by September 15. Researchers in their calculations (the same A. M. Zayonchkovsky) practically did not take this fact into account. But 2-3 brigades with attached artillery are equivalent to an infantry division.
                1. Uncle Murzik
                  Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 13: 40
                  under the editorship of G.F. Krivosheeva. Numerical strength and losses ...
         ›Statistical research› 15! read this article! if you believe the statistics of the demographer B. Ts. Urlanis then in 1915 the Germans lost 900 thousand people on the eastern front! lol
                  1. soldier
                    soldier 22 December 2016 13: 43
                    French data - Germans lost 1915 million on the Eastern Front in 1, Austrians - 1 million 252 thousand
                    1. Uncle Murzik
                      Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 14: 06
                      respected army man From 1870 to 1899, 16 boys were born in Germany; almost all of them served in the army and about 000% were killed. The greatest losses were suffered by German youth born in 000-13. Many thousands of Germans, but the dear army soldier says the encyclopedia! Came home with disabilities: 1892 1895 Germans lost a leg in the war, 44 657 people lost an arm, 20 people lost both legs, 877 people both arms. 1264 Germans lost their sight in the war. By the end of 136, more than a million soldiers had already died - 2547 in 1916, 241 in 000, 1914 in 434. laughing
                2. Uncle Murzik
                  Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 13: 43
                  respected army man in this analysis, both the brigade and the transfer of forces of General Buis are counted! lol
                3. Uncle Murzik
                  Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 13: 52
                  dear soldier, well, you are probably smarter than Zayonchkovsky, Millar, Gillebrandt! We are pleased to honor your work! belay
                  1. soldier
                    soldier 22 December 2016 14: 00
                    Now you have to make fun))
                    You still need to count your bookkeeping))
                    Buoy materials - data from the 2nd Bureau of the French General Staff, as well as statistics from Lieutenant Colonel Larsche))
                    And Zonchkovsky has brigades - just don’t forget about them, but plus them to the Austrian divisions.
                    And make an amazing discovery)))
                    1. Uncle Murzik
                      Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 14: 13
                      dear CSKA except Colonel Larshe you probably have nothing! belay he apparently also did not read the encyclopedia! lol and this is not my accounting, follow the link "Calculations were carried out according to Zayonchkovsky (1st MV) and Müller, ours, Gillebrandt (2nd MV). Naturally rounding up, but the general ratio and order of numbers are correct."
                      1. soldier
                        soldier 22 December 2016 14: 23
                        Muller, Urlanis is literature.
                        And the data of the French General Staff is the source. So, in principle, no one is needed except Lieutenant Colonel Larshe))
                        And by the way - besides him, there are still bricks of the Reichsarchive and Kriegsarchive and the funds of the Russian State Archive of Broadcasting. It is also possible to calculate losses on the main operations.
                      2. Uncle Murzik
                        Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 14: 29
                        dear CSKA well you are funny historians, statisticians, with world recognition! laughing is it literature belay Well, the French lieutenant colonel, of course it is more visible from Paris! lol
                  2. soldier
                    soldier 22 December 2016 14: 52
                    We are also happy to honor yours.
  8. Cartalon
    Cartalon 22 December 2016 10: 57
    General Aleksey had to use Romania’s entry into the war for a mortal blow to Austria or Bulgaria, and he sent one corps to the Danube and that’s all, the company ultimately failed for 16 years, he was good as a front, but he didn’t act as the actual commander in chief pulled, maybe just physically.
  9. soldier
    soldier 22 December 2016 11: 38
    E. Ludendorf, speaking of the first victories of the German arms over the Romanians, wrote: "Our victory there became possible only due to their (i.e., Russian troops) absence."
    And by the way, even during the offensive of the Southwestern Front in 1916, the whole army (9th) was forced to serve the interests of a new direction - the Romanian.
    I would very much like to hear about the resuscitation of the Romanian front by the efforts of Russia
  10. alatanas
    alatanas 22 December 2016 12: 30

    First from the left: gene. Stefan Toshev - Commander of the 1916rd Front (Dobrudja) of the Bulgarian Army (XNUMX).
    1. alatanas
      alatanas 22 December 2016 12: 51

      gene. Pantelei Kiselov - Commander of the 4th Preslav Division and General Staff. Stefan Noikov (right) visiting the captured Russian armored car Austin II - Skobelev captured on November 17, 1916.
      1. alatanas
        alatanas 22 December 2016 12: 54

        Romanian captured weapons and ammunition after the capture of Tutrakan fortress (1916)
  11. alatanas
    alatanas 22 December 2016 13: 01
    Short story (actions of the Bulgarian army).
    On August 17, Romania signs an agreement with ANTANTA. The 27th begins mobilization and declares war on Austria-Hungary. In Bulgaria, the 3rd Army is being formed under the command of the gene. Stefan Toshev. September 1, Bulgaria declares war on Romania. 2nd 1st Cavalry Division under the command of gen. Ivan Kolev advances in Dobrogea freeing the town of Tervel. On the 4th, the city of Dobrich was liberated; on the 6th, Balchik and Kavarna. Tutrakan (fortress and fortification fortified area) was taken on the 7th, Silistra on the 8th, Mangalia on the 14th, Kyustendzha on the 22nd (seg. Constanta), Medzhidiya on the 22nd (Medjid), on the 25th Chern Voda, 26- Go Khirsovo. On December 18th Babadag was taken, on December 22nd - Tulcha, later Sulina. Thus, the troops occupy the Danube River Delta. Machin was released on January 7st, and Isakcha on the 3th. This ends the liberation of Dobrudge from the Romanians by the Bulgarian 4rd Army within 2 months with the help of one German brigade and XNUMX Turkish divisions (invited to participate by the Germans).
    On the 6th, Bucharest was taken (from Svishtov’s side), the king and the government flee to Yash (Iasi) and Romania leaves the war by signing the Bufteyski and Bucharest peace treaties by the AGREEMENT countries.
  12. soldier
    soldier 22 December 2016 14: 43
    uncle Murzik,
    Scientists write about population, etc.
    And here - dry statistics. Why from Paris? German documents, of course, are taken into account here.
    1. Uncle Murzik
      Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 15: 46
      laughing respected army man, and so it is scientists and statisticians who write the dry truth: l Urlanis, Boris Caesarevich - Wikipedia ›Urlanis, Boris Caesarevich
      Boris Tsesarevich Urlanis (August 28, 1906, Kiev - July 14, 1981, Moscow) - Soviet demographer, doctor of economic sciences, professor; the author of works on economic demography, the general theory of statistics ... ol: Googling Lieutenant Colonel Larsche does not seem to exist at all! dial Lieutenant Colonel Larsche !!!
      1. soldier
        soldier 22 December 2016 16: 03
        That is the main thing for you to google))
        Here is a search. This is what is now called - a scientist from the Internet?))
        Many sources are not in the public domain, you need to work in the library.
        I give full output so that there is no shadow of doubt. Lt. Col. Larsche. Some statistics of the war of 1914-1918 // Military foreigner. 1934. No. 12.
      2. soldier
        soldier 22 December 2016 16: 11
        We will infinitely transfer numbers.
        Can we focus on the Romanian campaign? What interesting things can you say about this?
      3. soldier
        soldier 22 December 2016 16: 19
        In general, I propose to see and chat live. It is always nice to meet interesting people. We will exchange interesting sources - I will bring you Larsche to read, or maybe you will bring something interesting. What do you think?
        1. Uncle Murzik
          Uncle Murzik 22 December 2016 17: 52
          dear soldier in the internet, nothing is not about Lieutenant Colonel LYARSH, not about his statistics! the impression is created "was there a boy" laughing there are normal and well-known sources of Golovin N. N. Russia in the First World War. M., 2006.
          Urlanis B. Ts. Human losses in wars! You have sources other than the mythical Larsche belaygive a link in the internet or will you jump?
          1. soldier
            soldier 22 December 2016 18: 36
            Dear Uncle Murzik
            In the internet, not everything is there
            There is no Reichsarchive and other sources there yet.
            I have this journal in my library and Larsche's article in it.
            I told you which magazine to look at, go to Lenin or Istorichka and find it. Or I can bring it if I see you.
            How else?
  13. soldier
    soldier 23 December 2016 08: 07
    uncle Murzik,
    What are you talking about here?
    Near Gubinnen, some of the best formations of the German army — the 1st and 17th Army Corps — were defeated. And one of them was commanded by the vaunted Mackesen. These are personnel units, I repeat - some of the best in the German army. Read the same Golovin, Evseev, Radus Zenkovich.
    Can list the divisions that were part of them?
    So no need to tell a lie
    A pretty place will succeed - the defeat of two buildings. The place influenced will succeed in the Battle of Marne, and accordingly throughout the war
    1. Uncle Murzik
      Uncle Murzik 28 December 2016 17: 11
      army soldier what defeat my friend we had more losses than the Germans! follow the links above! The most intense battle was on the right flank of the Russian army ("northern" in German terminology), where the Consolidated Cavalry Corps was so lacking, as well as in the center of it positions. In the north, the 28th Infantry Division of the Third Army Corps took upon itself the main blow of the German 1st Corps and was pushed back from the occupied line. She was able to resist only with the support of the neighboring 29th division. At the same time, the breakthrough of the German cavalry in the rear of the 1st Army, almost to its headquarters, was repelled and had no significant consequences. The main merit in this belonged to the 116th Maloyaroslavsky regiment. Meanwhile, the 17th corps of General Mackensen and the 40rd corps of General Yepanchin grappled in the center. The Germans were first able to squeeze out the Russian units, which could lead to dangerous consequences, since there was no direct contact between their center and the left flank - the Romintenskaya Forest divided the 30th and 9000th infantry divisions. However, the first breakthrough of the German troops was stopped with significant losses (about 17 people killed, wounded and captured), as two divisions of the XNUMXth Corps tried to knock over three Russians at once, while one of the German divisions was exposed to strong flank fire. The great loss of personnel forced Mackensen to retreat, however, he was hardly pursued.
      Actions in the southern part of the battlefield were limited to skirmishes between the German von Belov reservists and parts of the Russian IV corps. At the end of the day, the losses of the 1st Rennenkampf army amounted to 16,5 thousand people (according to other sources - over 18,8 thousand) killed, wounded and captured, in addition, 40 machine guns, 12 guns and the banner of the 110th infantry were lost Kama regiment. The 8th Army of von Pritvice lost about 14,8 thousand people, 13 machine guns and 12 guns. The Russian army was more battered, but withstood the blow. Von Pritwitz chose to retreat.
    2. Uncle Murzik
      Uncle Murzik 28 December 2016 17: 14
      ha ha ha already an essay by Radus Zenkovich. want to pass off as a document! The bed does not suit a man! lol
      1. Uncle Murzik
        Uncle Murzik 28 December 2016 17: 16
        Continued: Von Pritwitz chose to retreat. The reason for his withdrawal is seen in different ways: A. A. Kersnovsky indicated as such the defeat of the 17th Army Corps, but later authors (for example, S. G. Nelipovich) note that his position was not so deplorable, and the main role in the decision of von Pritvice was played by fears about the movements of the 2nd Russian army under the command of A. V. Samsonov. The German general was preparing to continue the battle, but the threat of the enemy entering the flank and rear forced him to give an order to retreat.
        Depending on the view on the cause of the Germans' actions, the assessment of the entire Gumbinnen battle differs. By such a sign as control over the battlefield, victory in it, of course, belongs to the Russian army. However, the scale of this victory, various authors vary in the range from the missed opportunity to almost completely defeat the entire 8th German army to a happy deliverance from a heavy defeat. It should be noted that the second point of view is not so fantastic, given that the Russian troops needed rest a day before the battle, during the battle they were on the verge of dangerous coverage of their center and right flank by enemy forces and, in addition, according to some reports , used up all the shells. This also explains the caution of Rennenkampf, who gave the army the opportunity to rest the next day and continued to advance only on August 22nd, and again he did it almost blindly. Nevertheless, the fact that the battle of Gumbinnen was the greatest success of the Russian troops for the entire operation remains indisputable, since the stamina of the 1st army and the 2nd maneuvers forced the German troops to retreat and almost led the Germans to lose all of East Prussia.
        1. Uncle Murzik
          Uncle Murzik 28 December 2016 17: 24
          but how could the defeated corps at the end of August Makensen participate in the battles near Tannenberg against the 6th Russian corps and managed to close the ring around the 2nd Russian army of General Samsonov! well, you are an army man and a visionary!
          1. Uncle Murzik
            Uncle Murzik 29 December 2016 03: 17
            one more source: In general, the combat strength of the Russian troops invading East Prussia was measured in 19 calculated infantry divisions, 9,5 calculated cavalry divisions. It is difficult to determine the exact number of these troops — concentration and deployment was not completed; many divisions did not even have divisional convoys. In view of this, many infantry divisions did not reach the nominal strength of 21 thousand people, just as many corps did not have 48 thousand staffed by the state. In general, out of the 800 thousand promised by Yanushkevich, Rennenkampf and Samsonov brought half of them to East Prussia at best. True, half of this was made up of the best cadre troops of the Russian Imperial Army, regiments with a glorious fighting history. Nevertheless, the significant numerical superiority of the Russian armies over the German troops defending East Prussia is undeniable. The German 8th Army, Colonel-General Maximillian von Prittitz, had 3 army army corps (6 infantry divisions), 1 reserve army corps (2 reserve infantry divisions), as well as 3 separate reserve divisions, 1 lander division, 2 lander brigades , 1 personnel cavalry division - only 13 design infantry divisions (of which only 6 personnel) and 1 design cavalry division. In total, in East Prussia, taking into account the serf garrisons, there were about a quarter of a million people, of which the 8th army was about two hundred thousand. The German infantry division in the state was to consist of 16,6 thousand people, the corps - from 45 thousand, but the formations of the 8th Army were not fully equipped. In addition, the landver connections were distinguished by the worst technical equipment, sometimes they did not have machine guns at all, and experienced an acute shortage of modern means of communication. Tragedy in East Prussia 1914. Part 1