Military Review

Is the "old" well forgotten to become the "new"? (Part-3) Original questions or a little analytics


1. “Who is to blame for this?”, That is, what is the reason for the inconsistency of the domestic armored personnel carrier with modern requirements. “What is to be done?”, That is, if there is a way to catch up and overtake the naïve adversaries?

“The enterprises of the military-industrial complex are to blame!” - there will be an overwhelming response, which is only partially valid. In fact, the work of most defense enterprises is structured as follows.

Despite the reforms carried out in the environment of state defense enterprises, their essence was mostly reflected only in a change of names (for example, a company instead of a federal state unitary enterprise) and a change in the type of leadership (subordination). Enterprises still do not have a single drop of independence - it is up to the state to decide whether to develop or produce it, giving out tasks for conducting R & D. Trade domestically with private firms or individuals in armaments (with the exception of hunting weapons and products of national economic consumption) in the Russian Federation is generally prohibited, and exporting products to a foreign customer by enterprises is possible only through a single intermediary - ROSOBORONEXPORT, the only enterprise in the Russian Federation that has the right to international arms trade (not counting aviation) The intermediary is rather mediocre, despite the fact that he takes for his "services" not just a percentage, but the real part of the contract value. Often, ROSOBORONEXPORT sells to customers what is no longer being produced, and enterprises are required to climb out of their skin, but fulfill the requirements of an intermediary. His word is the law, although he is only a sales representative.

Having a state license for the right to develop and manufacture a certain type of military products, an enterprise whose bright heads of the collective receive brilliant thoughts on promising samples of another type of product simply cannot realize them because it does not have the right (legal grounds) to do so.

It is possible to implement such ideas by transferring intellectual property to the licensed enterprise. But this way is disadvantageous to neither one nor the other: the former may lose authorship, will not be able to control the quality, make changes or prevent changes to the design documentation, lose the appropriate part of the payments and profits; the latter receive a slap in the face, for “lovers” are invading their patrimony, who intend to overlap their own ideas. And that if you do not remember about the financial side of the project.

There are a great many regulatory documents governing the process of developing and putting products into production (GOST, OST, MI, and so on). In accordance with these documents, designers will have to perform the hardest and most voluminous junk work, from which foreign manufacturers are exempt. A cloud of paper rolls across the country in pursuit of a ton of signatures, and this time, this is money, this is not a fact that everyone will (everyone) sign. A simple example is that a foreign model of armored vehicles has an operation manual like a cell phone: it is about the same in volume and similar in content; Domestic: has several volumes of detailed descriptions with scientific text. Thus, the state only complicates the work of the domestic defense industry.

But now, let's imagine that somehow a brilliant idea was approved “at the top” or “top” simply foresaw it itself, and “our” enterprise received an R & D (R & D) task. Certain funds are allocated to OCD. Hardly all the funds will be spent on targeted spending, because the company still has many other projects for which the money was either not allocated at all, or was allocated in insufficient quantities, or was simply overspending (the funds were spent, they did not meet the limits of the allocated funds need to submit). God forbid, if the management of the enterprise goes to meet the "geniuses", and does not try to reanimate the "bending" project.

But all the money went to implement the idea. Innovators immediately focus on all the most advanced and modern and ... They fall into a dead end! For there is for designers innovators and such a blocking abomination, as the "List of spare parts and products, consisting on the supply in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." In such a list (the exact name does not matter in principle) all consumables, spare parts and the like are recorded that were produced serially and used in military products already in service. Accordingly, everything that does not fall into this list should either be excluded by designers in favor of recorded analogs, or go through a debilitating rudimentary procedure of approval and listing on this list. Well, the innovative designer will not be able to change the old poor unreliable interior lights with incandescent bulbs for ultra-modern LED lights with motion sensors without losing months of time and millions of nerve cells to add these fixtures to the list and organize their military acceptance (which is a little lower). Again, foreigners have a full indulgence in this matter.
If in the West the manufacturer presents the finished product for military tests, which at the end of the tests decide on the suitability and compliance with the requirements of the products presented, the domestic system is far from such simplicity, "transparency" and perfection. We have military acceptance, which cynically "makes the brain" to designers at all stages of development ...

Yes, there are quite a few conscientious military representatives, and without them it is sometimes impossible to test an experimental product at all, but the question is that, purely as a structure, domestic military acceptance is organized, so to say, wrong.

Namely - all decisions, protocols, CD should be consistent with the acceptance. Included in the product item that is not in the "list", we have completely stopped the development process. Military representatives do not take over the acceptance of purchased parts - they should already come to them with a military acceptance, organized at the manufacturer of the part. In general, the positive conclusion of the military representative on the product means that this product meets all the requirements, including in terms of design and completeness of the design and operational documentation presented by the military department to products of this class. What does this lead to? Instead of high-class (even domestic) instruments for acquiring onboard equipment, only those who have passed military acceptance go, even if they are inferior in all respects. In addition, the main effect of such actions deserves a separate paragraph. Namely - the impact of military acceptance on the final cost of the product.

Let “our” enterprise test and have already prepared for production a “brilliant” object of armored vehicles. The instrument composition of the product includes 20 devices for various purposes (communications equipment, observation of the terrain, computers, and so on). Each device passed military acceptance. After the product has been assembled, the process of “acceptance” takes place to the customer (Defense Ministry in the person of military representatives). Any acceptance does not cost for free, and as a result, the product rises in price by the amount of the military representative’s fee. That is, the state itself pays for what it buys (already bought). In other words, it buys from itself already purchased product. With a cost of 10 mln. Rub. for 1 units of this sample of armored personnel carriers, the military representatives are able to “wind up” at least 1 million rubles. to the final cost.

But this is only the tip of the iceberg. After all, the purchased devices also passed acceptance, and, therefore, also rose in price at their manufacturing plant. But the acceptance of the armored vehicle BTVT raises the cost of not just the new body of the armored personnel carrier manufactured by “our” enterprise, but with all the devices. That is, the state buys from itself twice. And this is not the limit.

Imported products do not undergo the procedure of military acceptance, they pass only input control and tests, the ones that have already been “our” sample before its production. Who does not believe - an example from my own experience. The cost of the APU (auxiliary power plant, power plant) is 400 thousand rubles. After acceptance - 700 thousand rubles. After its installation on BTVT, the complete assembly of BTVT, BTVT passes acceptance and its cost increases, that is, the cost of the APU becomes already about 750 thousand rubles. What the state gets for these extra 350 thousand rubles, I hope everyone understands. But you could take for 750 thousand rubles. such an APU ... If you simplify with an example, when you buy a cell phone and check its operation, compliance with the delivery set (approved by the manufacturer) of the package contents, then neither you from the store nor the store takes money from you for this work (acceptance). In the defense situation is the opposite.

How is this "event" called in the language of the Criminal Code? That's right - money laundering. If the military mission would be engaged only in escorting and testing, there would be no disputes and questions - there would be only gratitude and admiration, and so - a mess!
Fully private firms in the Russian Federation can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The situation is even more complicated for them - the state does not like competitors and it is incredibly difficult to obtain licenses for the right to develop and manufacture "popular" types of products. Therefore, they have to mask their products for consumer goods (for example: not “machete knife for survival”, but “economic knife”) or find a partner enterprise abroad and transfer production there.

Conclusion: so that the idea was born into the world in the Russian metal in its native fatherland, its designers will have to carry a hard cross, and this path will be thorny and cunning.

Domestic samples of armored vehicles intended for full-scale hostilities. When the need arose to act against partisan ambushes, the military did not issue a task to the designers to develop special equipment. The command considered it acceptable to use standard armored personnel carrier models. Well, constructors (especially in Soviet times) cannot initiatively develop new models (absolutely new ones, not modifications). Who will give them money? Production area? Enterprises are state-owned. The fact that they are OAO (and the like) are the same balls, only in profile. After all, private capital involves investment in profitable production. Production for the needs of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is associated with insane risks and costs, which most likely will not pay off. Now I think it is clear why the model range of our defense plants is not updated with the same frequency as, say, a Mitsubishi Lancer car.

The battle chariots and tours were very good for their time, but it’s shameless to demand resistance to RPG shots from them. In other words, to complain about the BMP and BTR, created by the demands made in 60-70-s of the last century, that they do not withstand RPGs and bullets of large caliber, it is the same as to make claims to the elephant, that it does not fly, to ask the astronomer vertebral hernia removal sequence. Designers coped with their task. They made a technologically advanced model of armored vehicles for specific (submitted by the military) goals.

What can be done here? As in all times - to teach everyone, to give way and pass on experience to the young and talented, and not to blame for their “leakage” abroad of their homeland. A person with ideas and a desire to create a new tank is very difficult to live with the prospect of translating them after several years of “successful” participation in the project to create an “iron kaput”. Many simply put up with the inevitable self-realization, many “flow away”, and still others go to other areas of activity.

2. Time passes, nothing stays the same.. So why are we scolding the technique of the end of the last century's 60? The new generation of warriors need new weapons. Why not criticize for weak armor penetration arrows, reeds, broadswords? True - this is a weapon of another era. The Cold War is also a whole epoch. Modern realities impose modern requirements.

And what is the modern requirements for armored personnel carriers? Correct, if I am mistaken:
1) High security (within class and type).
2) High mobility, maneuverability.
3) Sufficient firepower to complete the assigned tasks.
4) Transportability and mobility (modern rapid deployment team structure).
5) Computerization and application of modern optoelectronic, computational, and television and radio equipment.

And how do these requirements differ from “non-modern”? Nothing. In BTVT always tried to use advanced instruments and equipment. Just the adding machine at one time was the limit of perfection, just like the atmospheric engines ... The aircraft fleet did not change at all and in the next 20 years minimum will remain as such. That is, nothing new is presented to armored vehicles, but only the duty to keep up with the progress in the element base and in the corresponding information technology equipment.

But the trouble is, some specific requirements, not described in the five points listed above, are striving to prevail over each other as modern requirements. These are incoming: in paragraph 1 - increased security, in paragraph 4 - requirements for limiting weight and dimensions tankdesigned for a typical rail freight platform.

Of course, many will argue, but what about mine protection? How is resistance to RPG from all sides and the roof? The answer is simple - these are the special requirements of local conflicts for specialized equipment.

What is so allocated a local conflict? First, the limited space, as a rule, covering one or two theaters of war. Again, one of them is urban fighting. The second most common mountain or desert terrain. Second, the limited military contingent in the conflict zone. Thirdly, the informational and material superiority of one side over the other, as a result of which direct clashes of the same type of technology do not occur. It is destroyed by a more developed side with inaccessible means for the enemy (aircraft, missile strikes). The lagging side is lagged behind only one tactic - guerrilla warfare, which is characterized by sabotage activities and the organization of various prepared ambushes.

The first example is two different in nature the US war against Iraq. In the Desert Bure, American mechanized units suffered losses from engineering obstacles (minefields), enemy aircraft and armored vehicles. In the second campaign, losses were inflicted only as a result of ambushes. Again, it is not correct to consider a controlled landmine as a minefield. This is a pure ambush when a visually observable object of interest is affected.

An example of the second. During the five-day war, not a single unit of armored vehicles was lost from the detonation of a mine. With the rapid oncoming fight minefield just did not have time to put.

And now the technical points. The average explosive mass in an anti-mine mine is 7 kg. Until the middle of the last century, they were stuffed with TNT. Now it is a minimum of TG-50, PVV or A-IX-I. There is a requirement to increase the mine defense to the level of keeping the blast on a mine with a power of 7 kg in TNT equivalent (TE) outdated before it was born.

Yes, the rebels more often make IEDs out of trotyl drafts, and the average explosive mass of such IEDs was 6-8 kg in TE (according to US statistics in Iraq). And what to do in case of war with an industrialized enemy, producing modern mines with special armor-piercing warheads, equipped with high-powered explosives? And what will prevent the rebels from adding an extra pair of trotyl checkers to the IED? And what will limit the partisans in the production of improvised explosives and the equipment of their IEDs also in greater numbers? Lovers rely on the size - the dimensions of the standard TNT 200 gram checkers are approximately equal to a pack of cigarettes. Let self-made explosives be less powerful, let its volume in the equivalent of the power of the previously described checkers be larger. This larger volume will result in perhaps two or three extra movements of the shovel? Alter already converted samples of armored vehicles? Thus, it is wrong to say about the demand of the defense ministry as a modern requirement for armored vehicles, to put it mildly.

The equipment, which must withstand the detonation of a mine, is primarily intended for occupation, and not for hostilities. Most of the armor of the machine goes to protection from the explosion of the mines of the bottom, rather than booking the rest of the body from at least small-caliber shells.
In the case of tracked vehicles, it is practically not attainable to achieve the minimum level of removal of the bottom from the surface (increased clearance) for tracked vehicles (openness of tracked tracks, tensioning and driving stars to enemy fire from small arms and artillery weapons, significant lengthening of tracks, causing an increase in their mass and, accordingly, the load on the chassis).

Protection of the bottom from the action of mines tracked vehicles will be associated with the necessary strengthening of the bottom armor, which, accordingly, will lead to a significant increase in the mass of the car, in comparison with wheeled vehicles of the same class and type.

Undermining a tracked vehicle on a mine is overwhelmingly associated with a loss of mobility. Consequently, it is necessary to pay special attention to protecting the crew from the subsequent after blasting of a car on a roundabout with small arms, including large-caliber ones. This will lead to additional weighting.

In urban conditions, it is easier to deprive a tracked armored vehicle of mobility by damaging the tracks due to the small distance of the fire collision. Also, no protection can save an armored vehicle from an incendiary bottle, the compositions of which may have the ability to burn through the armor. And the use of incendiary mixtures is most relevant in urban environments.

Put the following. A typical RPG plant produces 60000 RPGs per year. The armored plant produces the 200 BTR in the year. The question is: will the BTR withstand at least a tenth of the 300 RPGs falling on it, or is it easier to destroy the RPG production plant, cut off the supply channels to the militants, than build up its armor?

Conclusion: local war requirements are requirements for a special type of armored vehicle. Supplementing the requirements for all models of armored vehicles with the requirements developed on the basis of experiments of local hostilities is possible, but not expedient in full. The problem of defense is solved by elementary with the help of KMT.

3. In general, the best way to protect an armored personnel carrier from RPG hits and landmine explosions is not to fall under the attack of an RPG and not to run into uncleared land mines. This does not mean that the equipment should be buried deep under the ground beneath the concrete floor of the bomb shelter. On the contrary, the APC should be able to find threats in advance, at a safe distance, and destroy them or avoid their actions. That is, equipping models of BTVT SAZ (which are “Soft-kill”) is a modern requirement that is relevant for newly developed models of BTVT and for upgrading those in service.
The roadblock in the city of the BTR, lined with concrete blocks and sandbags, of course, easy to destroy from the RPG from the roof or window of the nearest house. The same APC, without any fortification, standing in the middle of a large field (or in a desert with a flat relief) will become an insurmountable obstacle for infantry, even if all the fighters are hung with various RPGs. The effective range of his KPVT over an RPG is hundreds of meters, and he can change position relatively quickly if necessary, unlike infantry. Suddenly appearing armored vehicles can be hit with their own anti-tank weapons or artillery support.

Avoid ambush impossible. To avoid losses, hitting a professionally and competently prepared ambush is impossible. To reduce the percentage of casualties to a minimum at the moment is achievable in practice (and has already been confirmed) with regular armament on armored vehicles currently in service through the rational management of the unit by commanders on the basis of the experience of combat operations.
No hanging of the armor will give such an effect as one intelligent commander, who will save the unit from “pofigism” and “relaxed”, which begins even at the desk during training sessions. Example. One of my colleagues thought about the situation for a very long time: “How can you accidentally shoot your own boys at the same machine gun. How is it necessary to be a down? ”The answer was found, when right in the sanitary“ loaf ”he himself became the same down. Thank God, these were teachings, and the machine gun shot from half a meter into my foot as a blank cartridge, although in the classroom it was said that the finger should be removed from the trigger, especially if I removed it from the safety catch.

In addition, when a tank rushes at you or near you, from which you cannot hide behind walls and not get lost on two floors of the house, whatever you have in your hands: RPG, AARC, ATGM, heroism quickly evolves into outstanding earth-moving qualities. The tank does not scare - the tank presses. And if he has a thermal imager or radar RNDC ... Then you have to live 2200 meters, related to the flight time of the projectile (5000 if the tank has a CCV).

Conclusion: There are no effective means and methods for protecting columns from ambush attacks, which guarantee a probability close to 100 of percent to avoid losses among personnel of military personnel moving in a convoy. The appearance of a new technical means or method of advancement of columns will cause a similar response from the partisans and terrorists. Non-contact ways of dealing with typical threats to armored personnel carriers are promising ways to increase their security.

4. Options for improving protection and increasing the survivability of armored vehicles (based on materials from various publications and authors).

1) Additional hinged armor
The use of additional mounted tank armor can have a significant undesirable effect on the overall characteristics of the tank. Reduced maximum speed and mobility, reduced power density and increases the load on the suspension.
Special mounted kits appear to enhance survivability in urban environments, although initially the tank was not designed for fighting in populated areas (especially with dense buildings of large floors), since its armament cannot perform typical combat missions, being in close contact with infantry. To compensate for the shortcoming in the form of improper use of additional armor plates is irrational.

2) Modular design
It is worth noting that this property of armored vehicles is offered by designers as advanced, profitable, indispensable for modern technology. But, no country, even adopting and purchasing equipment with a modular design, uses or even thinks about using this advantage. No module was purchased separately! For example, the Bundeswehr of Germany (and the Armed Forces of the Netherlands) purchasing the Boxer acquired the KSHM, BTR and ambulance variants, although, logically, they would have to buy all the Boxers in the BTR version and buy the required number of required modules (KSM and medical).

Thus, this property allows only to change the modules of the fighting compartments (cargo, sanitary, command), removing them from the machines with damaged compartments of management and installing them on machines with damaged modules of the fighting compartments. What actually makes this property useless. Acquisition of technology, the development of a modular design of which funds were spent, is unprofitable. It is the same as buying a car for operation in the conditions of the Far North with a powerful two-zone conditioner, and in a hot climate with a preheater, heated windows and mirrors, and heated seats.

There were no special problems in the conversion of the BTR-80 to the KSHM. A design involving the installation of modules naturally leads to a weighting of the structure (universal base chassis frame; additional fixing points to impart rigidity, since the body is no longer carrying, but the common frame is missing; module body reinforcements; module floor and attachment points). Do not forget also that part of the equipment of the machine (spare parts and other accessories) are mounted on the sides and stern of the armored vehicle, additionally serving as protection elements. All this “good” is now to be placed on the base chassis, if there is no desire to constantly outweigh it from module to module or purchase in quantities equal to the number of modules.

There is a variant of modular protection, that is, weights of thicker plates to replace thin ones, selected in accordance with the assignment. As well as screens, mine trawls, modules of dynamic protection blocks and so on. As manufacturers say so “gizmos” - to install the entire kit on the tank requires less than half a day. Very handy! And how will it look in the same mountain-desert terrain? - Yes, the same as with the modules of combat compartments.
Any life-loving tank commander with a sufficiently developed self-preservation instinct will, by default, hang up armor all the way until “there is no way to cling to the bottom of the road.” Or, for example, so. An order to fire support the advance of the motorized infantry and the suppression of the firing points they identified in the village in the valley from the dominant height from a decent distance. Powerful protection blocks for this task are unnecessary, but armor is not needed here at all - you can at least use the usual “bare” mortar, and all modules will remain in storage. After 10 minutes, an order is received to develop successful offensive actions of the infantry and dislodge the enemy from the locality. When will motorized infantry get help? When will the armor modules be brought up, or will motorized riflemen be exchanged for several burned tanks with tankers? The author supports the position of a cheerful commander - armor protection should initially ensure the fulfillment of any assigned combat tasks related to the type of armored vehicles.

3) Increasing the thickness of body armor Rational tilt angles
Starting from the 1970-s to the present, in the TTZ, combat armored vehicles of the types BMP, BTR, BRDM and light tank being created in NATO countries introduce fire protection requirements for the 14,5-mm machine gun. And for the BMP - to protect the onboard projection of the machine from a distance of 100-200 m (STANAG 4569 Level 4). Accordingly, the thickness of the sides of combat vehicles in a monolithic version of steel armor is 35-45 mm (the last figure is the bottom board of the Marder 1 infantry fighting vehicle). This was one of the reasons for the almost double combat margins of the main NATO BMP Marder A3 (forehead - 30 mm steel) and М2А3 "Bradley" (forehead - 6,5 mm steel + 6,5 mm steel + 25 mm aluminum alloy) relative to the Soviet BMP.

Against 30-mm guns such armor can no longer cope. I recall right away: “If there is no difference, why pay more?”. That BMP-1, that МХNUMXА2 "Bradley" after the shelling of the thirty will turn into a colander. Ahzarit looks like a winner. But due to the lack of his own weapons, he will be a target with the infantry locked inside him. And against the fire of tank guns, even the defense of Akhzarit will be powerless.

Conclusion: It is advisable to increase the armor of the BMP or BTR up to a certain limit - to the level of protection against typical means of dealing with light armored vehicles and armament of enemy light armored vehicles, that is, from large-and-medium-range SS 30-mm automatic cannons.

4) Layout
Variants of the design of armored personnel carrier, when MTO is located in the front of the case, the machines are now considered as the most advanced and promising. But how does such a solution contribute to increased security? The answer is only in frontal projection from artillery ammunition and missiles. From mines, this decision does not save. As already noted, you can press the button for an explosion of a radio-fuse at any time, for example, right under the combat or control compartment. The situation is similar with magnetic and pin fuses of anti-bottom mines in which there is a moderator.

There are opponents of such a composition, claiming that a machine made according to this scheme loses mobility when it is hit in the forehead. Visible bias such judgments. With the defeat in the forehead of the machine with the front compartment control mobility is also lost - either the nasal fuel tanks light up or the driver is struck. Since the problem is in the protection of the crew and landing force, the answer to the question of which layout is better is obvious - with the frontal position of the logistic support.

5) Remote Assisted Auxiliary Weapon Module
The fact that a machine gun paired with a cannon is a big zone of low booking is no longer a secret. Therefore, the desire to remove him away worthy only of encouragement. He can only fight with the living force of the enemy. Of course, there is only one rational place to install such a module - on the roof of the tower (hull), but you have to choose between the caliber of the paired machine gun or the caliber of the above-mentioned (anti-aircraft) machine gun of the tank commander, since even one module for one machine gun will take place for two.
However, the module reduces the capabilities of the tank in the fight against manpower, as the twin and anti-aircraft machine guns could operate in different directions. But we already spoke about the tasks of the tanks. "To moisten" manpower behind the tank and on the flanks of the work of the BMP and BTR, in the village - the infantry. Also, nothing prevents to install a "full-size" combat remotely controlled module with a variety of rocket-cannon armament, which is already installed on light armored vehicles.

6) “One of the options for further improving a simple BTR is to leave this base machine virtually unchanged, but to supplement and support it with a second support vehicle on the same chassis on which powerful turret armament is installed”
The advantage of such an order would be that each type of machine would perform only one task, on which it would specialize, so that combat control of this pair would be easier than control of a powerful multi-purpose strike complex. These machines could be used together if required, or be separated and perform their different tasks in different parts of the battlefield. ”

Another time we remember what the BMP, BTR, tank. It is not necessary to produce armored personnel carriers with tank weapons and tanks without weapons for the landing. Everything is already invented. The main thing is to correctly dispose of them.

5. Some experts believe that tanks have lost their meaning. Being only an offensive weapon of close (contact) combat, moreover, it is not always sufficiently effective (sensitive losses in certain local conflicts), tanks have no prospects for the future battlefield.
The arsenal of anti-tank weapons, which have become very effective and turned into mass weapons, is constantly expanding and improving. Overcoming the defense of the enemy, saturated with such weapons, will turn into an intractable problem for tanks. Tanks will incur unacceptably high losses, and their use will become inappropriate. True, it does not indicate how to replace the tanks, if necessary, to conduct active hostilities. As the existing parity in the range of tank weapons over anti-tank is not specified. Moreover, it is unclear how to do without tanks, if the enemy did not refuse them. One thing is mine explosives and the shelling of RPG columns from ambushes, and quite another reflection of a frontal attack.

“The main tanks are quite universal weapons, but in difficult conditions on the modern battlefield, their capabilities are not limitless. Having a small crew, functionally tied to the machine, the tanks are of little use for the tasks to complete the battle: the destruction of the remnants of the enemy forces and the mastery of his territory. Possessing powerful, but essentially single-channel armament, tanks do not effectively solve the tasks of fighting “tank-dangerous” manpower. ” But, after all, it is for these purposes that the light armored vehicles supporting the tanks are intended: BTR, BMP.

“The ammunition of tanks is relatively small, so they are of little use for the performance of tasks typical of artillery - defeat area targets, including areas saturated with poorly observed“ tank-dangerous ”manpower.” Again, for these tasks have already created a special technique. Why should a tank generally perform tasks of towed or self-propelled artillery? Does shooting for closed positions at a distance over 5 kilometers require multi-layer combined armor, low silhouette and high mobility?

"In promising concepts (on the subject of" Armata "), it is proposed to abandon mechanical overlapping systems by targeting and firing at all and bring the tank’s armament into a separate reserved module." Even if this module is booked at the same high level as the manned crew compartment, it will be most vulnerable to enemy fire.

“The weapons module will also contain means of reconnaissance of targets and observation of the battlefield.” Then what is the use of maximum crew protection if a gun module is suddenly struck? The crew is blind, disarmed, the tank becomes disabled and loses its orientation in space. Each of these properties of armored vehicles (firepower and the ability to detect a target) strongly affects the further survivability of the tank on the battlefield. The crew remains to either wait for the execution in the armored capsule, or leave the car. If on the battlefield, the enemy created the conditions for defeating the relatively poorly protected, but still highly armored gun module of the tank using their fire weapons, then the crew’s prospect of leaving the car and getting to the shelter or another tank in a combat-ready state or simply alive seems unlikely. In other words, the crew of such a wrecked tank will still be amazed. Depriving the enemy tank crews is much more profitable than a tank that can be repaired or rebuilt. The production cycle of the “new” tanker is much longer. Who is right in assumptions as practice will always show in the near future.

Moreover, one should not forget that armored vehicles, and first of all tanks, are the most protected component of the ground forces when using nuclear weapons, which no nuclear power has yet refused. On the contrary, the number of members of the “nuclear club” has increased and is likely to continue to grow. The positions of tanks for protection against chemical weapons (chemical, biological) are even more solid.

Arsenal of anti-tank weapons is growing. But it can be used not only exclusively against tanks, but against fortifications, buildings and structures, vehicles, manpower, and so on. Created to fight tanks, these funds will cause guaranteed losses to everything that is protected at least a little weaker. The evolution of the means of protection, although slower than the means of destruction, is evolving. While the development of some areas of weapons has almost stopped (the increase in the power of the blasting and the effectiveness of throwing explosives).

Naturally, it is impossible to create an absolutely invulnerable tank, as well as an absolute destructive tool. Tanks will suffer losses that may be higher than in past wars. However, this is a consequence of the changed nature of the struggle on the modern battlefield. Tanks will remain the most protected weapons, the losses of other means of struggle will be much higher.

It is also believed that the threat of hostilities with the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely and the design of armored vehicles with the expectation of hostilities in the conditions of mass use of nuclear weapons is not advisable. However, the tense geopolitical situation in the world calls into question this thesis. North Korea and Iran have been on the verge of a long time. Pakistan and India have not settled their conflicts. In addition, Pakistan is also not popular in the west, thanks to the assistance of terrorists. China is no longer afraid to threaten Japan and the United States. In other words, we have five nuclear powers that are actively trying to impose their opinions on Europe and the United States (even if two are not confirmed, but they do not have to detonate bombs - it is enough to infect the area with uranium). Really, in the effort to protect themselves from the NATO coalition forces that are superior at times, will these countries not take advantage of the “cores”?

As long as the United States, their henchmen and the like do not voluntarily join the Russian Federation with the best wishes, handing us all their nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as a sign of goodwill and pure intentions, the Armed Forces of Russia must possess weapons capable of performing any combat missions and fighting in any conditions, including when an enemy uses weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.

Losses were, are and will be. The only way to protect the crews and assault forces of the armored vehicles from the fire of any anti-tank weapons, including tank guns, is to drive them under the armor of the asylum from a nuclear explosion. But you can't stop an enemy like this, you won't win. The best defense is attack. You cannot win cards or chess without exchanging cards or figures. Wins the one who will cause more losses, and not the one who will try to avoid them; who will create more casualties, not remedies. There is no impregnable fortress. All the fortresses that once stormed in the wars fell. At the same time, no one built his fortress around this fortress. Why was the T-72 born when T-64 and even T-80 were already? To have more means of struggle, cheaper and more massive, albeit inferior in performance.

Pilot passenger airliners understand that in the event of an accident, it will fall along with the plane "on the ground itself." But this does not interfere with the crews who are well prepared and not passive in emergency situations to deal with danger with honor. This is true not only for pilots and submariners. If you hope in advance that your tank is much worse than its counterparts, then you are not a tanker, but a substance with the letter “G” that does not sink.

The fact that the domestic armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD escorted the columns and stormed the city, carrying the infantry stuck to the roof, and poorly protecting the crews - not their fault. Just no other technology. Of course, you can even praise Hamer, but even the Israelis themselves, whose budget Germany feeds, are going to create something more budgetary. Compare the number of the Armed Forces and the Tsahal. We can also create heavy armored personnel carriers, but then the rest of the majority of the army will have to move behind the tanks on our own two feet. And how great it would be to convert the 50000 T-55 and 30000 T-72 into Akhzarit counterparts ... And pack all of Europe!

Well, to put it in a modern, accessible language, it’s certainly incredibly cool to have thousands of floating airborne tank-braemo-imro-btro-self-propelled guns in service, much like having a Ferrari with a cross-country UAZ in its garage, the boot of a minivan with no cost more “Lada” and so that it takes no more parking space than the “Oka”. Thus, while agreeing that this is absurd, it is worthwhile to face the truth and draw the appropriate conclusion.

Domestic BMP, BMD, BTR meet the requirements for them. Current requirements for them are no different from the requirements of previous years. “Modern requirements”, which are so actively imposed on them by the public, are the requirements for a new special anti-backlash vehicle capable of overcoming minefields by the method of detonation and independently fighting with armored vehicles, manpower and aviation of the enemy.

PS Once, I learned from a television announcement about the imminent broadcast of a television program, which included a video about my “work”. When I looked at the report, I simply didn’t know what to do - laugh or cry. Guys! Do not watch campaign materials such as "Military Secrets." In such programs of common sense at best ten percent, and then if you know what to listen to.

Used sources
Many of the DSP books, but, thanks to the “independent” Ukraine, there is a chance to pamper yourself even with a living paper copy, which our neighbors kindly declassified.
1) Tactics. - M .: Voenizdat, 1987 g;
2) V. Belogrud. Tanks in the battles for the Terrible. Part of 1,2;
3) Yu. Spasibukhov. M1 "Abrams" (to know what these tons of iron death are and no longer make honest people laugh, hinting or speaking openly about their superiority);
4) The magazine "Technics and weapons", articles:
- Major General O. N. Brilev;
- S.Suvorov;
- V. Chobitok. Fundamentals of Theory and история development layout of the tank (MANDATORY).
5) Losik OA Article: “Do tanks have a future?”
6) Melee weapons of Russia.
7) Engineering ammunition. T. 1
8) B.V. Profits. Hand grenades. Directory.
9) Engineer's Sergeant textbook (the earlier, the better).
10) BMP-1. THAT and RE (various years of release).
11) BMP-3. THAT, RE, an album of drawings and drawings.
12) T-72B. Re.
13) T-90. THAT, RE, an album of drawings and drawings.
14) Soviet military encyclopedia. T. 1-8.
15) Experience of fighting in the mountain-desert terrain. Part 1 - M .: Voenizdat. 1981
16) "Features of the conduct of combat operations of the Soviet troops in the mountain-desert terrain" (from the experience of combat use of units of the airborne troops in the Republic of Afghanistan).
17) Report of the former Chief of Staff of the North Caucasian Military District Lieutenant-General V. Potapov. The actions of formations, units and subunits of the Special Forces during a special operation to disarm illegal armed formations in 1994-96 on the territory of the Chechen Republic.
Articles from this series:
Is the old well forgotten to become the new? (part-1)
Is the old well forgotten to become the new? (part-2) At the call of honor and duty
Is the old well forgotten to become the new? Part-3. Native questions or some analytics
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  1. ramsi
    ramsi April 12 2013 08: 50 New
    nicely finished. Although practical issues remain
    1. Fox
      Fox April 12 2013 10: 58 New
      Quote: ramsi
      nicely finished. Although practical issues remain

      a case from life. USSR, mid-30s. tractor driver courses. final exams passed, diplomas received. The teacher asks if there are any questions about the tractors? One gets up and says: “Yes, everything is clear! ... just where to harness the horse? .. .
      1. ramsi
        ramsi April 12 2013 12: 13 New
        yes, something like that ...
        1. PSih2097
          PSih2097 April 13 2013 00: 38 New
          Блин, вот собрать все статьи "Хорошо ли забыто "старое", чтобы стать "новым"?" вместе и оправить Рогозину, Путину (хотя этому точно пох...) и Шойгу и вот пусть на основании данного анализа дрюкнут ГАБТУ причем раком и без вазелина, с вопросом какого Х... анализом техники занимается левый (которому не платят за это зарплату, не имеет степеней и.т.д.) человек, причем на открытом сайте. Может людей поменять местами пора, спецов БВТ с сайта в ГАБТУ, а тех на помойку?
          1. Mohomax
            Mohomax April 18 2013 12: 23 New
            I completely agree, we need to work on the state, we need new fresh thoughts and people who are not spoiled with money honors, etc. I read all three parts, but I do not completely apologize for my tendency to laziness. But even from what I read, I realized that in the conditions of a full-scale war, our armored vehicles would feel at ease for this and such models as 72 were created. I think that few people would refuse to see the procession of our tanks along the roads of Europe or America. but a large number of tanks of 54 t 55 are in my opinion it is not very expensive to keep at least in a ready condition for this case. And all this tendency to increase protection should at least be accompanied by an increase in mobility and combat power
  2. Begemot
    Begemot April 12 2013 09: 10 New
    Everything is very familiar, especially from a paper loony bin. It seems that nothing has changed in 25 years, I suspect that it has even gotten worse. All that officials begin to lead is turning into insanity.
    1. Letun
      Letun April 12 2013 16: 49 New
      Exactly. Not that the reformers are reforming in our country. Not that...
    2. aksakal
      aksakal April 12 2013 19: 44 New
      Quote: Begemot
      Everything is very familiar, especially from a paper loony bin. It seems that nothing has changed in 25 years, I suspect that it has even gotten worse. All that officials begin to lead is turning into insanity.

      - радовались возрождению института военпредов - военной приемки то бишь, т.к. это повышало качество продукции. Напомню - "Булава" отказывалась летать до тех пор, пока не возродилась военная приемка. А оборотной стороной оказалось вот это - воепред не примет готовую сложную продукцию, пока в ней запчасти, не прошедшие такую же военную приемку и не находящуюся в соответствующем реестре. Тем не менее я за сохранение военной приемки, причем даже еще приемку еще более ужесточить... Не доверял и не доверяю я пролетариату, гнилой класс, водку на работе норовит выпить, находясь на кухне в майке-алкоголичке, норовит устроить революцию, а находясь на работе подшофе (а в другом состоянии он на работе не бывает) все норовит деталь, которая закручивается, с материнской помощью забить кувалдой. Причем его мало волнует, что работает он на оборонном заводе и от качества его изделия может зависеть жизнь солдатика, может, даже его сына. Вспомним заживо сваренных из-за гнилой трубы на корабле "Адмирал Кузнецов" am
      А решить проблему оперативного пополнения разрешенного "реестра" можно с помощью целого ряда организационных, административных и управленческих мер, в которых четко регламентировано выявление новых и принципиально новых изделий в каждой области, своевременное (строго ограниченное по времени) их испытание и постановка в "реестр". Каждая задержка занесения в реестр нового отечественного изделия должно влечь за собой расследование причин задержки с объяснительными и дальнейшими оргвыводами.
      1. sscha
        sscha April 12 2013 22: 36 New
        Судя по твоим речам, ты сам из "чинуш". Или танки , подлодки и пр. строили инопланетяне, а не пролетариат? А может это всё построено благодаря твоим "чётким инструкциям"? И гнилую трубу на "Адмирале Кузнецове" не "ЕЖЕ" с Вами принимали?
        Hmmm ... The Reds came_ to destroy the church! White came - we pray for the ruins!
        I hate to endure! am
      2. Was mammoth
        Was mammoth April 13 2013 22: 46 New
        Quote: aksakal
        I didn’t and I don’t trust the proletariat, the rotten class, he tries to drink vodka at work, while in the kitchen in an alcoholic T-shirt, he wants to make a revolution, and while at work he’s a nerd (and he’s not at work in another state), he strives for a detail that spins, with maternal help hammer a sledgehammer.

        Байство это. Люмпенов не путайте с настоящими рабочими. Мало их осталось нынче, и почти все из советского прошлого.Любой манагер получает больше, чем квалифицированный рабочий. А это уже к власти и"бызнесменам"вопрос.
  3. avt
    avt April 12 2013 09: 37 New
    Cry from the heart laughing good Wow! Highly laid out, I repeat, but good work! Plus definitely.
  4. Prohor
    Prohor April 12 2013 10: 06 New
    As the bureaucrat was the most dangerous enemy of Russia, he remained!
    Thanks a lot to the author! good
  5. Alexey M
    Alexey M April 12 2013 10: 11 New
    Well fellow author. Words do not express my enthusiasm. And the ending is purely Russian with the question WHAT TO DO AND HOW TO LIVE.
  6. Parabelum
    Parabelum April 12 2013 10: 19 New
    Все сводится к бессмертному высказыванию Александра Васильевича Суворова:"Воевать не числом, а умением". Полностью поддерживаю автора, лучшая броня - это разум командира.
    1. Artmark
      Artmark April 12 2013 11: 24 New
      Greetings, I agree with you, but when the commander is confident in the armor, the mind will make the necessary decisions! hi
      1. avt
        avt April 12 2013 12: 37 New
        Quote: Parabelum
        the best armor is the commander’s mind.

        Quote: ArtMark
        but when the commander is confident in the armor, then the mind will make more necessary decisions

        The most interesting thing is that both of you are right, it’s like communicating vessels. If you don’t know the possibilities of technology, you won’t take the necessary decision. But there is no commander’s mind — you will never know the advantages and disadvantages of technology and again you won’t take the necessary decision. request
  7. urganov
    urganov April 12 2013 10: 30 New
    "Пока США, их прихвостни и им подобные добровольно не войдут в состав РФ с наилучшими пожеланиями, передав нам всё своё ядерное, химическое и биологическое оружие в знак доброй воли и чистых намерений"
    There are no words. Respect to the author.
  8. Pacifist
    Pacifist April 12 2013 10: 31 New
    Konstantin, unfortunately I do not know about you as a middle name, many thanks for the article (s) of the cycle. I am not an expert in armored vehicles, but let's say I'm keenly interested. Many of my thoughts were confirmed, and much became more clear. Thanks again. good
  9. luiswoo
    luiswoo April 12 2013 10: 46 New
    Domestic infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers comply with the requirements for them. Modern requirements for them are no different from the requirements of past years.

    Not only domestic not соответствую. Засады просто злободневно, вот только об угрозе с воздуха маленько забыли - штурмовая авиация плотно не занималась "коробками" с ВОВ. Штурмовики, хоть крылатые, хоть винтокрылые, сейчас зубасты как никогда - при должном оснащении, им и ПВО не большая проблема. Чего не скажешь о бронетехнике - самостоятельно, от угрозы с воздуха, она практически беззащитна.
    1. papas-57
      papas-57 April 12 2013 21: 03 New
      It is not possible to create an unbreakable tank, armored personnel carrier, infantry fighting vehicle, etc. Even if the armor is 3 meters on each side, there will always be ammunition that will destroy this monster (for example, atomic).
  10. Rider
    Rider April 12 2013 11: 05 New
    even the last part unpleasantly surprised me.
    I do not touch the paper or project structure, in this I am a complete zero.

    but here...
    the main conclusion of the article is that you don’t need to adopt anything new - and it will do (after some modernization)
    how great it would be to remake 50000 T-55 and 30000 T-72 into analogs of Ahzarit ... And ram the whole of Europe!

    may the author forgive me, but in the previous parts of the articles he assured (and absolutely correctly) that the Russian army was not going to conduct offensive actions.
    then why do we need Paris and the English Channel?
    in Chechnya that the whole army sticks out?
    if you don’t have enough money to rearm the heavy army with heavy infantry
    (Believe me, I really realize how cheap it will fly)
    then at least those parts that are housed in the Caucasus.
    because it is there that BMPT is most needed.
    for the rest (in my opinion) it is simply necessary
    armor amplification from all angles and mandatory protection against RPGs, at least in the form of remote sensing and anti-cumulative screens

    also increase the mine resistance of the body and equip the landing with special compensation seats.
    perhaps with this modernization, the beha will lose buoyancy.
    но это как раз такой случай, когда вопрос " а оно нам надо ?" более чем уместен.
    1. Alekseev
      Alekseev April 14 2013 08: 52 New
      What needs to be done in order to achieve
      Quote: Rider
      increasing the armor from all angles and the mandatory protection against RPGs, at least in the form of remote sensing and anti-cumulative screens, also increase the resistance of the body and equip the landing with special compensation seats.

      хорошо знает чукча из популярного анекдота: "однако, new BMP (heavy) it is necessary to do.
      And a certain number of these machines, for suitable tasks, in my opinion, of course need to be done.
      By the way, DZ on the bulletproof armored vehicles of the BMP can not be hung. Guess why. It would have been hung for a long time if ... The anti-cumulative screen reduces the breakdown effect of the jet, for a 10 mm armor this reduction is likely to be too small.
      Effective reinforcement of mine protection requires a significant increase in the reservation of the bottom, sides, alteration of the chassis, which will entail weight gain, require a more powerful engine, etc.
      Do you really think that if there were simple ways to radically increase the security of a lightweight BTT, would designers neglect them?
      Yes, all this is written in the articles of K. Kolobov.
      Repetition is the mother of learning! smile
  11. Rider
    Rider April 12 2013 11: 06 New
    even the last part unpleasantly surprised me.
    I do not touch the paper or project structure, in this I am a complete zero.

    but here...
    the main conclusion of the article is that you don’t need to adopt anything new - and it will do (after some modernization)
    how great it would be to remake 50000 T-55 and 30000 T-72 into analogs of Ahzarit ... And ram the whole of Europe!

    may the author forgive me, but in the previous parts of the articles he assured (and absolutely correctly) that the Russian army was not going to conduct offensive actions.
    then why do we need Paris and the English Channel?
    in Chechnya that the whole army sticks out?
    if you don’t have enough money to rearm the heavy army with heavy infantry
    (Believe me, I really realize how cheap it will fly)
    then at least those parts that are housed in the Caucasus.
    because it is there that BMPT is most needed.
    for the rest (in my opinion) it is simply necessary
    armor amplification from all angles and mandatory protection against RPGs, at least in the form of remote sensing and anti-cumulative screens

    also increase the mine resistance of the body and equip the landing with special compensation seats.
    perhaps with this modernization, the beha will lose buoyancy.
    но это такой случай когда вопрос " а оно нам надо ?" более чем уместен.
  12. Pushkin
    Pushkin April 12 2013 11: 27 New
    What is described in these 3 articles so overturns conventional wisdom, and it is written simply, convincingly (there will always be minor flaws) that raise doubts about Armata and Boomerang. So much is already PR for them, rumors, speculation, hopes that you start to fear - but will it work out complete * OPA ??? And an alternative is not being developed for them, well, not once. Oh, something, I’m scoring, and this is not a joke ...
    Special thanks to the author - such a detailed analysis on the subject of armored vehicles is unlikely to be found in the entire Internet
    1. Alekseev
      Alekseev April 14 2013 08: 36 New
      Quote: Pushkin
      What is described in these 3 articles so overturns conventional wisdom

      Whose opinions? Here the forum users rightly noted that while reading the article they remembered youth and lectures on tactics at the Higher School of Higher Education.
      Another thing is that at the present time, some generals, apparently trying to wave the stool, also flooded the nonsense.
      А их голоса подхватили разного рода "спецы" и журналюги...
      Well, from this, now, there's no getting anywhere. Costs of freedom of speech.
      1. Pushkin
        Pushkin April 14 2013 20: 53 New
        reading an article remembered youth and lectures on tactics

        Это писали к 1ой части. Остальные две части совершенно не про то. Там больше именно про современные "гуманитарные" войны. И про то что абсолютное большинство призывает либо использовать западный опыт чтоб создать свои мрапы, либо покупать их готовыми в нате. Автор толково объяснил, что это для нас тупиковый путь
  13. pensioner
    pensioner April 12 2013 11: 57 New
    Do not watch campaign materials such as Military Secret

    Finally, a complete and not a television program. Prokopenko - to Mars! Well, or in a madhouse. Let there aliens drive a government sheet.
  14. Chaplain
    Chaplain April 12 2013 12: 47 New
    The author is 99% right, the war will remain a war, and the methods of waging it have changed little since 1945. The correct conclusion is this: the best defense is an attack, and the best defense against particular weapons and equipment destruction means sabotage and reconnaissance operations.
  15. Avenger711
    Avenger711 April 12 2013 13: 07 New
    The author apparently did not deal with industry, where it is impossible to put something from an uncertified one in principle.
  16. Nayhas
    Nayhas April 12 2013 14: 52 New
    Analysis of issue number 1 is the most important in the entire series of articles. This trouble was not born now, not in the 90s, this is the basis of the Soviet military-industrial complex. But again, the fact that the Defense Ministry cannot determine the appearance of the necessary military-industrial complex equipment is not to blame. The situation when one does not understand what he wants, and the second does not do what is necessary is tragic and when it ends it is not clear ...
    "А что ограничит партизан в производстве самодельных ВВ и снаряжением ими СВУ также в большем количестве?" - необходимость производить закладку фугаса скрытно и в кратчайшие сроки. Выкопать яму, заложить фугас, замаскировать его, всё это за короткое время дабы не вызвать подозрений. По дороге регулярно передвигается враг, его вертолёты/БПЛА производят облёт дорог, закладку фугаса могут заметить кто-то из местных лояльных к врагу или состоящих на связи с ним. Поэтому масса фугаса ограничена этими условиями, пара артиллерийских снарядов и несколько тротиловых шашек с детонатором.
    "Также никакая защита не сможет спасти бронемашину от бутылки с зажигательной смесью, составы которой могут иметь свойство прожигать броню." - это уже что-то... Вообще то "зажигательная смесь" применяется не для ПРОЖИГАНИЯ БРОНИ. Горящая смесь затекает через вентиляционные щели в моторное отделение вызывая там пожар, выводя двигатель из строя, поэтому бутылки с горючей смесью кидают именно с кормы на моторное отделение, но для этого нужно подойти к бронемашине на близкое расстояние, что не возможно при присутствии рядом пехоты.
    "Избежать потерь, попав в профессионально и грамотно подготовленную засаду, невозможно. Никакое навешивание брони не даст такого эффекта, как один толковый командир" - абсолютно неверно. Пример. Стандартная колонна, два БТР-80, три Газ-66, пара Уазиков. Организована засада с фугасами. Передний БТР - три выстрела РПГ, автомобили - фугасы, второй БТР - также РПГ, далее огонь пары ПК и десяток АК, снайпер - поиск организатора сопротивления. Результат, БТР выведены из строя и не могут оказать поддержку, бойцы в машинах понесли потери, много раненых, толковый командир пытается из оставшихся организовать оборону. Теперь та же ситуация и другой состав техники. Колонна, пара тяжёлых БТР Страйкер, Боксер или др. тяжелые БТР с навешенными решетчатыми экранами, три MRAP. Выстрелы РПГ не выводят из строя БТР и те открывают ответный огонь, от взрывов фугасов MRAP потеряли подвижность, но десант цел и готов выполнять приказы "толкового командира", стрелковое оружие боевиков не способно пробить броню MRAP, чем пользуется спешившееся пехота. ВОПРОС. какую технику выберет "толковый командир"?
    1. Parabelum
      Parabelum April 12 2013 15: 46 New
      Quote: Nayhas
      Теперь та же ситуация и другой состав техники. Колонна, пара тяжёлых БТР Страйкер, Боксер или др. тяжелые БТР с навешенными решетчатыми экранами, три MRAP. Выстрелы РПГ не выводят из строя БТР и те открывают ответный огонь, от взрывов фугасов MRAP потеряли подвижность, но десант цел и готов выполнять приказы "толкового командира", стрелковое оружие боевиков не способно пробить броню MRAP, чем пользуется спешившееся пехота. ВОПРОС. какую технику выберет "толковый командир"?

      And what prevents them from blowing up the Strykers on HEs, then using MRG shots to disable the MRAP and finish off the spilled infantry from small arms?
      1. iliq
        iliq April 12 2013 16: 51 New
        probably the fact that explosives for landmines do not grow on trees, to fill and lay a landmine kilo like this on 6 TNT (for guaranteed Stryker failure) is problematic - unlike installing a pair of MON-50 (or a homemade version with 1 kg of explosives and nails) that eliminate drugs in trucks ...

        the gratings remove an average of 50% of RPGs - and the hit of a single grenade that pierced the grate is not a fact that will disable the APC. the same applies to MRIs - hit by an RPG does not guarantee the defeat of either the car or the crew.
        (but a BMP / BTR armor break from RPG hit is an unpleasant thing for outsiders)

        и получим в сухом остатке - выведенные из строя пару машин, сохранённые жизни и "победу" над террористами.

        ps I will not mention UAVs and thermal imagers with cameras on technology, and remote weapon modules, and I will not say anything about the BIUS ...
        1. Parabelum
          Parabelum April 12 2013 17: 40 New
          Typically, terrorists know that they will destroy. Landmines are collected and prepared well in advance. Another thing is if they are waiting for two UAZ, and then bam and strikers. And who told you that MRAP will easily withstand RPG hits? Booking WRAPa is the same as that of an armored personnel carrier. Circumstances dictate tactics, the author of the article explains this popularly. If terrorists fight with strikers, then the charges are appropriate.
          1. iliq
            iliq April 12 2013 18: 15 New
            Typically, terrorists know that they will destroy. Landmines are collected and prepared well in advance.

            someone, somewhere, already suggested: for the experiment, take a bucket (a large and curious land mine), and bury it on the road. tell us about the results.
            насобирать 6+ кг взрывчатки (пусть даже и удобрений), найти специалиста который фугас сдеалает, доставить фугас на место и заложить его - сильно проблематично, и как показывает практика - таких случаев единицы. так же как и "страшных 152 мм" - мозжно пересчитать по пальцам руки за все годы чеченской компании. (статистика у twower)

            Another thing is if they are waiting for two UAZ, and then bam and strikers.

            а почему "бац"? разница в то, что будут ездить на штаной технике - одни на УАЗах и шишигах, а другие на МРАП - существенна, не находите?

            And who told you that MRAP will easily withstand RPG hits?

            if there is no break in the side (as in domestic armored personnel carriers / infantry fighting vehicles), then the effect of the cumulative jet is only on what will fall on its flight line. Yes, it is highly likely that she will fall into someone from the crew - but the rest will be combat-ready. hit in the engine - the crew again do not care.

            Booking WRAPa is the same as that of an armored personnel carrier.

            domestic equipment is often worse.

            If terrorists fight with strikers, then the charges are appropriate.

            так и пусть воюют - т.к. ВВ на редевьях не растёт - будет вместо подорванных десятка грузовиков с ЛС один "страйкер", и ещё не известно с каким результатом. плюс что большие закладки будут обнаруживаться и уничтожаться - т.е. уже 0,5 "страйкера" и попавшиеся при установке боевики.
            1. Parabelum
              Parabelum April 12 2013 18: 41 New
              Maybe you misunderstood me, they’ll try to explain, if the army uses strikers and similar equipment, then the enemy will be ready for its appearance, i.e. if strikers and then mining is appropriate. VV is not a problem, no one has canceled anti-tank mines. Interestingly, you argue, armored personnel carriers and WRAPs have the same bulletproof armor, and for some reason, if you hit an RPG, an armored personnel carrier will definitely break, WRAPn’t. Given that the armored personnel carrier has slanted armor, against perpendicular WRAPa. It smacks of sophistry ...
              1. iliq
                iliq April 12 2013 19: 02 New
                VV is not a problem, no one has canceled anti-tank mines.

                да ну? ВВ не проблема? смотрите статистики чеченской компании - если бы ВВ было "не проблема" - то закладывали бы её сотнями кило... а в рельности - мощные фугасы в чечне за все годы можно по пальцам пересчитать.
                так же как и такие-же фугасы в Ираке и Афганистане - их единицы! и в основном ВВ делают из удобрений - спрашивается почему, если ВВ "не проблема"?
                and once again I remind you about the complexity of bookmarking and disguising powerful landmines.

                Interestingly, you argue, BTR and WRAP have the same bulletproof armor,

                this is not true. see the classes of common MCSs for protection against small arms.

                for some reason, when hit by an RPG, an armored personnel carrier will definitely break,

                it is a fact. in Afghanistan and Chechnya, RPGs often broke sides, with corresponding consequences. Based on the results of Afghanistan, hinged armor (BMP-2D) was developed which removed this problem.

                Given that the armored personnel carrier has slanted armor, against perpendicular WRAPa.

                the thickness and design of the armor however.
                even the old man M113, with BMP-RPG protection characteristics, holds, there were no breaks ...

                It smacks of sophistry ...

                неплохо бы ещё и предмет обсуждения знать, кроме "нет проблем с ВВ" ;)
                MRI did not notice this yet.
            2. Massik
              Massik April 12 2013 20: 43 New
              and let them fight - because Explosives on the trees does not grow
              You’re mistaken about this, whoever supports them, I won’t believe that a shepherd girl will think of an acetone fuse or learn how to shoot lying on his back at 100 meters, they are given instructors, explosives are a much simpler question.
              1. iliq
                iliq April 12 2013 21: 13 New
                statistics on bombings in Chechnya is a stubborn thing. where to look - I’ve already brought more than once.
                if you have other statistics - for a tab of more than 6 kg - please go to the studio!
      2. Nayhas
        Nayhas April 12 2013 18: 08 New
        You can, of course, who argues, only between the two options that I brought, that the unit commander will choose? Where are the fighters more likely to survive?
    2. Avenger711
      Avenger711 April 12 2013 17: 54 New
      1) For the scoop in the ear.
      2) the USSR had a superpowerful army with moderate expenditures on it, although we are hung up with noodles to the contrary, the question is how he succeeded if his military-industrial complex was not a well-functioning system.

      Колонна, пара тяжёлых БТР Страйкер, Боксер или др. тяжелые БТР с навешенными решетчатыми экранами, три MRAP. Выстрелы РПГ не выводят из строя БТР и те открывают ответный огонь, от взрывов фугасов MRAP потеряли подвижность, но десант цел и готов выполнять приказы "толкового командира", стрелковое оружие боевиков не способно пробить броню MRAP, чем пользуется спешившееся пехота.

      A striker is a BTR-80 level box, only worse, instead of a brainless fap for everything American, they would get familiar with the characteristics, and a trellised screen is welded onto any canned food and then the efficiency is not more than 50%.
    3. Massik
      Massik April 12 2013 20: 37 New
      Выстрелы РПГ не выводят из строя БТР и те открывают ответный огонь, от взрывов фугасов MRAP потеряли подвижность, но десант цел и готов выполнять приказы "толкового командира", стрелковое оружие боевиков не способно пробить броню MRAP, чем пользуется спешившееся пехота.

      1- if the fighters know that the MRAP column is coming they will lay the landmines justifiably (they are also not fools to attack the tank with a gun) 200 kilograms that way, and using heavy RPGs or ATGMs against heavy armored vehicles it is not a problem to knock out a tank.
      the need to make a landmine secretly and promptly. Dig a hole, lay a land mine, disguise it, all this in a short time so as not to arouse suspicion. The enemy regularly moves along the road, his helicopters / UAVs fly over the roads, a landmine can be noticed by someone from the local loyal to the enemy or who are in touch with him. Therefore, the mass of landmine is limited by these conditions, a pair of artillery shells and several TNT bombs with a detonator.
      You have little idea in practice, you can make at least a nuclear bomb, it all depends on your skills. Elementary is 1 round - 25 kg of explosives, i.e. 10 rounds of -250 kg.
  17. Andreas
    Andreas April 12 2013 14: 57 New
    The author of the article is poorly versed in modern solutions for the protection of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. They already cease to be armored vehicles and are equipped with active protection systems against all types of shells - active, reactive, with a shock core, tandem, etc. Active defense - all-angle, works very effectively in urban combat.
    The same thing happens with the armament - shells, including armor-piercing armor-piercing shells, are equipped with thermal and inertial seekers capable of hitting targets, including air targets, at a distance of up to 20-30 km.
    For a long time, ground penetrating radars have been used to protect against mines and IEDs, and UAVs with thermal imagers are used for protection from guerrilla ambushes.

    Поэтому мнение автора о том, что "старое" (танк с четырьмя членами экипажа и плавающая БМП) лучше "нового" (танк "Армата" и семейство тяжелой боевой техники на его основе), является всего лишь ностальгией по 80-м годам прошлого века, когда Т-72 и БМП-2 были верхом совершенства.
    1. GHG
      GHG April 12 2013 19: 30 New
      They already cease to be armored vehicles and are equipped with active protection systems against all types of shells - active, reactive, with a shock core, tandem, etc. Active defense - all-angle, works very effectively in urban combat.

      The same thing happens with the armament - shells, including armor-piercing armor-piercing shells, are equipped with thermal and inertial seekers capable of hitting targets, including air targets, at a distance of up to 20-30 km.

      Are you waiting! laughing
      1. Andreas
        Andreas April 12 2013 23: 02 New
        How many kilometers will the BPS fly from a tank gun at a speed of 1800 m / s at an angle of 45 degrees to the horizon?
        And GOS are now even built into bullets, and there are already two manufacturers:
    2. Massik
      Massik April 12 2013 20: 52 New
      The author of the article is poorly versed in modern solutions for the protection of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. They already cease to be armored vehicles and are equipped with active protection systems against all types of shells - active, reactive, with a shock core, tandem, etc. Active defense - all-angle, works very effectively in urban combat.
      Yeah, you’re traveling like that on a tank all in the screens -RPG doesn’t take it, here you have an incendiary bomb with a burning temperature under 2000 degrees above. and now your active defense begins to tear right at you, then the usual PG-7 VR and hello.
      1. Andreas
        Andreas April 12 2013 22: 50 New
        The active protection system of a tank is not screens filled with explosives, but rocket-propelled grenades fired from a mortar (protected by their hull from checkers) towards active and reactive shells, missiles and shock nuclei directed into the tank, including from the upper hemisphere.
        1. Massik
          Massik April 13 2013 10: 42 New
          At this combustion temperature, the armor melts like oil, the fillers of the component armor are not particularly heat-resistant, so the armor will help little
          1. Andreas
            Andreas April 14 2013 18: 21 New
            A checker with a burning temperature of 2000 degrees will be repulsed by the SAZ of the tank on approach, as well as any projectile, rocket, rocket-propelled grenade or strike nucleus.
        2. GHG
          GHG April 14 2013 11: 59 New
          And how is interaction with infantry ensured? Shall we all? The topic you mentioned is already closed, because It has no prospects. Even by the criterion of value. There are generally a lot of nuances, but along the way you saw military equipment only in pictures.
          1. Andreas
            Andreas April 14 2013 16: 36 New
            The bullet is given as an example of an object, the size of which now allows you to set the GOS. The cost of electronic components is determined by their circulation, with hundreds of thousands of pieces (a series of armor-piercing and high-explosive fragmentation shells), the cost of the seeker will be lower than the cost of mechanical fuses.
            Наличие в боекомплекте танка (125-мм орудие) и БМП (100-мм орудие) снарядов с ГСН упрощает до предела их взаимодействие с пехотным прикрытием, бойцам которого остается только подсветить инфракрасной лазерной "указкой" цель и полюбоваться на её останки.
    3. Alekseev
      Alekseev April 13 2013 14: 36 New
      Quote: Andreas
      shells, including sub-caliber armor-piercing shells, are equipped with thermal and inertial GOS,

      Das ist fantastisch!
      Особенно когда представишь БПС с "инерциальной головкой". wassat Или хоть с "тепловой"...
      Dear, do you even bother what you say?
      Verily, he looks at the book (s), but sees ... lol
      1. Andreas
        Andreas April 14 2013 16: 58 New
        Dear, for you personally:

        information about the hardware base for inertial GOS

        information on a homing projectile
        1. Alekseev
          Alekseev April 14 2013 19: 18 New
          Советую Вам,для истинного понимания, что такое БПС, а также почему он не требует различных "головок" (what is its value) do not climb on fantastic websites giving work to various talkers, but enter a contract under the RA and personally touch this same BPS with pens.
          And if you're lucky, then shoot them. They shoot armor-piercing-sub-caliber, although very rarely.
          But, even once having seen how it flies, you will understand everything.
          1. Alekseev
            Alekseev April 14 2013 19: 53 New
            Better yet, get an education on the topic under discussion.
            In this case, it immediately becomes clear why the inertial guidance system was used on the FAU-2 missile, but ATGMs have different systems ...: reques
            А уж у БПСов, там "головка" так "головка"! wassat
            1. Andreas
              Andreas April 14 2013 20: 17 New
              Понятие "инерциальная система" с недавних пор изменило свое содержание - теперь это не только нечто, основанное на гироскопах, но в том числе и лазерные акселерометры с инерционным измерительным микротелом (в просторечии именуемые "лазерные гироскопы").
              If interested, take a look on the Internet, where they are now installed.
              Last year’s development at the California Institute of Technology is only more miniaturized, allowing you to place a laser accelerometer on a smartphone board.

              To your regret, the knowledge gained in educational institutions and at military training grounds is becoming obsolete at a speed of one to two years.
              1. Alekseev
                Alekseev April 16 2013 13: 28 New
                Not all knowledge becomes obsolete so quickly.
                Quote: Andreas
                California Institute of Technology
                to a real embodiment, corresponding to an acceptable price-quality condition, a huge distance.
  18. Nayhas
    Nayhas April 12 2013 15: 12 New
    "Появляются специальные навесные комплекты для повышения живучести в городских условиях, хотя изначально танк для ведения боёв в населённых пунктах не предназначен," - если город не жалко, то лучше танка ничего нет, по крайней мере пока не придумано.
    "поскольку его вооружение не может выполнять типовые боевые задачи, находясь в тесном соприкосновении с пехотой." - наоборот, только танковое орудие способно надежно подавить вражеские опорные пункты обеспечив пехоте возможность дальше зачищать местность.
  19. xmike
    xmike April 12 2013 15: 45 New
    What infantry will threaten a tank breakthrough during the full-scale war? Chemical weapons and only armored vehicles and rides .....
  20. Shtyn dwarf
    Shtyn dwarf April 12 2013 16: 05 New
    The US experience in Afghanistan is interesting. They have infantry transporting specially protected vehicles from IEDs. But after some time they ceased to be effective, because the Taliban began to lay more powerful IEDs. Since then, the main method of opposing IEDs is not to build up armor and defense, but UAVs that hang in the sky for 24 hours over the tracks along which equipment moves in order to detect rebels during the installation of IEDs.
  21. Chicot 1
    Chicot 1 April 12 2013 16: 54 New
    Bravo! It is intelligible, understandable and exhaustive ... For as the unforgettable Fiales Fog said (the same one that, according to J. Verne, circumnavigated in 80 days):
    -"Use what is at hand!"
    The main thing is that you need to use it all wisely. And use it for its intended purpose, and not assign tasks uncharacteristic of it to the technique ... Otherwise, of course, you can slurp it with cabbage soup, but it’s much more convenient to do it with a spoon ... wink

    И обоина с артой в тему... Советский ОБТ Т-80УД "Береза" (работа кисти Андрея Жирнова...
  22. lilit.193
    lilit.193 April 12 2013 17: 10 New
    I read all three parts. Honestly, I didn’t understand everything to the end, but I understood one thing - nefig from a tank or a Betaer to sculpt devils that bow from the side. Like in this photo. laughing
  23. Slevinst
    Slevinst April 12 2013 18: 02 New
    How many people have so many opinions at first I completely believed the author, but after reading the comments I realized that not everything is so simple. As a conclusion, I can only say one thing. Only warring technology can show what it needs to be, provided that responsible people make conclusions from the characters and ways of defeating this technology. As well as enemy technology.
  24. bublic82009
    bublic82009 April 12 2013 20: 03 New
    all of these ideas are good. but there BUT ... cars get heavier, which means they become less mobile in our mud.
  25. Svyatoslav72
    Svyatoslav72 April 12 2013 20: 30 New
    1. Who is to blame and what to do? Do not give control and control to idiots and morons who are manically attracted to Power and enrichment.
    2. Who is responsible for what? The state is not a beast or a separate organization; start with LikBeza on Ideology: Priorities; Goals; Tasks; Methods; Motivation; Results. Ideology forms Politics, Politics is responsible for methods, economics as one of the methods of Politics provides an opportunity for domination and influence inside and outside the State.
    3. Реальность показывает, что оружейники не сильно тяготят к поиску нового или глобальному модернизированию, для соответствия времени. Поэтому аферизм и надувательство это часть ихней деятельности. Вспомните Т-90, как убили конкурента Т-80. Не говоря о глобальном надувательстве в строительстве Флота Авиации и новых Сухопутных формирований. За одно это можно к стенке ставить без всяких "честных" судов.
    4. Глобальные и Локальные конфликты. Как показывает практика, современные Армии не готовы ни к тому ни к другому, будь они в нападении или защите. Основная ошибка кроется в формировании и обучении, солдат и офицеров. На войне совсем другая психология, и правильное вооружение/оснащение способствует эффективности БД. Тактика и Стратегия на месте, несоизмеримо отличается от "замыслов" кабинетно-штабного междусобойчика. Поэтому активная банда на ишаках с карамультуками более эффективна чем механизированная Армия. Кстати! мины модно ставить дистанционно.
    5. Columns and Ambush, who whom ?! All statements have one answer. Tactics and Strategy. What makes War so good is that it does not tolerate illusions and dullness. There is one good tip for a scout: -Before you get in somewhere, think about how to get out of there. I will not crucify what needs to be done or how, since it is simply useless in the conditions of Global Service Idiocy.
    6. Живучесть техники. Пока основной показатель складывается из Цена-Качество, НИЧЕГО НЕБУДЕТ. Самый главный показатель: Живучесть-Эффективность, но это дорого и непрактично с точки зрения продаж и незаконного обогащения. Научно-технический прогресс не стоит на месте, что не сделали одни сделали другие. Надо правильно мотивировать людей, на поиск и внедрения, осуществления "невозможного", а в связи с построением Глобально Капитало-Фашизма эта задача просто неосуществима.
  26. Kazbek
    Kazbek April 12 2013 21: 37 New
    We must do robots like drones.
  27. dmb
    dmb April 12 2013 21: 51 New
    Many thanks to the author. For a long time I did not get such pleasure from technical articles.
  28. Vas_OK
    Vas_OK April 12 2013 23: 38 New
    The author has a personal biased attitude towards military representatives, unsubstantiated, baseless. The military representative, in some way, absolutely by no means, has any direct relation to the pricing of the finished product, except for one thing - reducing the cost by finding the opportunity to optimize this cost in an economic way by subtracting costs that are not directly related to the product. All margins on purchased products occur only after their physical (technological) processing at the factory. For your information, before military envoys together with enterprises participated in the process of creating military equipment and weapons, many had academic degrees, few were members of republican academies. Often, it was a conscientious military representative who in the early stages identified design errors, helped to eliminate them (previously the military representative could even conclude an agreement with the enterprise). I can’t keep silent about the rationalization and inventive movement, because the norm was not less than one rationalization proposal per month for the site.
    О том что говорит автор, объективно существует, но только из-за слабого "понимания" вопроса виновные названы не те. Тормозят, да, но военные научные организации и само предприятие, обычно они организуют мафии, в которых яйцелобые на прикорме у заводских, и под сделанную хрень подделывают, якобы научное обоснование. А МО при проведении закупок всегда использует "ресурс"...
  29. Vas_OK
    Vas_OK April 12 2013 23: 48 New
    Quote: Begemot
    Everything is very familiar, especially from a paper loony bin. It seems that nothing has changed in 25 years, I suspect that it has even gotten worse. All that officials begin to lead is turning into insanity.

    Nothing but one - the paper has outlived its own, it is gone, now - electronic document management, digital signature, microfilm is done without photocopying.
  30. speron
    speron April 13 2013 00: 56 New
    The series of articles is cool with a good selection of comparisons and a variety of requirements that all parties involved in creating new military equipment have to consider. But no matter how customers with developers of all possible conditions for its application take into account, it all turns out to be somehow incomplete or unfinished.
    Maybe because as long as a man, a military man grows up to positions and titles when he can demand and sign technical tasks on say weapons models, he often is already in some senile senility or captive of his own fantasies.
    In 60-70 marshals thought so, because in their youth, when they fought, they stomped more and more on foot, and the attack could also be with a tank landing on a tank. And here you understand the technology with armor is given to young generations, and so that life doesn’t seem like honey, it’s better to push them there. Strange as it may seem, the BTR-60, the most backward in its performance characteristics, is also the most comfortable, but it’s not easy to get out of it. 70 ka, with your 185cm height, you only think about how to protect your head from iron, all kinds of locks, manholes, stowage places, and all kinds of things that have been screwed in so much and welded to the armor from the inside. And he also doesn’t threaten to evacuate quickly, I thought 80 ka was better, it’s almost the same crap. For our armored personnel carriers BRDM BMP BMD, the best landing party is the Chinese in tights, they will be less comfortable in them, and to us, plus a helmet, armor, unloading or weapon pouches, as it should be, and this does not include equipment for weapons of the compartment, spare tapes, cartridges , shots for RPGs and so on. And in this piece of iron, you may have to live.
    In 1994, in Yugoslavia, our KAMAZs and armored personnel carriers were the fastest on the roads and the only equipment that was often repaired and regulated by the drivers themselves.
    It’s about unfinished, but there’s at least a separate article about it.
    1. Massik
      Massik April 13 2013 10: 46 New
      насчет БТР вы правы ,ну что делать слышали про такой вид спорта "Гимнастика в индивидуальной бронезащите " позанимаешься вроде и двигатся свободней ,приспособлялись как то.
      1. ramsi
        ramsi April 14 2013 22: 04 New
        Well, you can do it, it's not so difficult. Why not?!.
  31. Zomanus
    Zomanus April 13 2013 16: 12 New
    The article is good. Especially about the idiocy of state acceptance. You can forget about all sorts of finishing touches during the production process. That is, if during the clash a jamb is found or a ratsuha is born, it will be easier to fix or introduce it at the forefront than at the enterprise. Maybe that's why we have so few new technology, because it’s less hemorrhoid to share the old one.
  32. super-vitek
    super-vitek April 13 2013 22: 08 New
    Прочитал внимательно все статьи данного цикла.Писал комент к второй части,теперь к этой.Военная приёмка не панацея.Я работал на ТАНТК им.Г.М.Бериева,так вот военпреды на этом предприятии в большинстве своём далёкие от основной деятельности предприятия люди,ну и как многие в нашей стране "не без греха" drinks !!! As for the bureaucrats, they not only inhibit promising developments and research from us. In all mega-civilian states, just like ours, you’ll share the money. And at the expense of our reservation, I’m sure that it’s still our MBT is still strong and fast !!! In general, the author succeeded in a very high quality, although it is debatable in my opinion !!!
  33. super-vitek
    super-vitek April 13 2013 22: 18 New
  34. mojohed
    mojohed April 15 2013 07: 34 New
    Article is super! The author is well done. Materials in the GABTU and the military-industrial complex for analysis! It was discussed that if the tank commander is confident in the effectiveness of the armament of his vehicle and in its security, then it fights normally. The main thing is that the Ngas in the country should go on patriotic education without regard to the opinion that the enemy, the armor visible in the sight, is stronger, and the tanks are better, and the crews are more trained, and the generals are more experienced and, in general, the enemy - she knows how to fight, but we have armored plywood, the guns on the tanks do not provide 100% penetration according to the technical characteristics of Abrams or Challenger.
    Вермахт в конце 30-х начале 40-х, благодаря пропаганде "знал", что их Т-3, Т-2 и Т-4 самые лучшие танки на континенте (не знал массовый боец Вермахта о Т-34 и КВ). а наши в первые дни ВОВ судя по воспоминаниям участниклв, то тут, то там кричали "окружили" или на вопрос - почему бросили мат. чать? - отвечали: "у него танков тыщи, а у нас по воробьям из них стрелять!". пропаганда и знание массовым бойцом и танкистом, что его техника хоть и хуже, но значительно и приницпиально не уступает вражеской - главная истина любого боя и войны. Второе - это умения и навыки командования. В общем, как говорили армейские наставления в советской редакции - боец должен быть уверен в силе своего оружия, защите от средств поражения врага и в правильности решений командования, тогда такая армия свершит чудеса на поле боя.
  35. carbofo
    carbofo April 16 2013 03: 03 New
    I can’t say what's in the subject, but.
    Maybe it’s time to reconsider the approach to technology by military representatives.
    For example: the developer within the assignment decides what technologies and materials to use, and the military representative only tests and verifies the performance characteristics of the assignment.
    Further, the developer, of course, has gotten into a sore point, finalizes the prototype to the requirements for unification, if any.
    If the requirements for unification or for the specifications of materials and equipment do not coincide with the opinion of military representatives, a decision is made on the novelty of the technical device and the expediency of its production.
    Then I recalled the Kamov Design Bureau helicopter project, for the Chinese, recently there was an article about it, a detailed TTZ with explanations, nomenclature and dimensions, I’m afraid our TTZ did not do this in life.
    As for Rosobronexport, I think that this organization is needed but in a different form, namely, as an intermediary for export sales, nothing more, it should only declare the state’s will for transactions and control them, having the right to veto transactions, act as a commercial intermediary I consider it unnecessary to conclude transactions, to set a single sales tax rate and period.
    Participation in negotiations and control only as a mandatory observer, plus the preparation of all documents for export, and control of execution and delivery.
    In other words, they don’t take part in the process of participation, unless it was agreed to involve its specialists by the parties for consultations in the process of concluding the contract, for example, help to agree on the price of the transaction, but I will make a reservation this is custom work from the seller, which of course is paid separately.
  36. Starik63
    Starik63 24 November 2013 23: 09 New
    Many thanks to the author (exactly so - with a capital letter) Konstantin Kolobov !! A very sensible article: a pleasant and understandable language, a fairly deep (but not abstruse !!) analysis, very necessary and sensible thoughts, simple and concrete examples! Thanks again! I allow myself the impudence (not to be named for another) of a small result.
    1. НЕВОЗМОЖНО создать бронированную машину УНИВЕРСАЛЬНУЮ, полностью удовлетворяющую всем возможным и невозможным требованиям (особенно бредовым и явно "ангажированным").
    2. Any and every employee knows that any operation is best performed by a specialized tool, rather than a universal one. The specialized tool doesn’t spoil the applicationists either, and it’s easier, and rarely breaks down. So it is with armored vehicles - for what it is intended, it should correspond to that. AND MEETS, but as well - more on that later.
    3. The creation of any weapon arises from the TASK for its design. Brilliant self-taught can not compete with the system (another question is how good it is, this system). And the STATE gives out the design assignment !! In theory, it should proceed from the state defense doctrine (simple and understandable), which clearly means where, at which theater of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with which enemy (country, group of countries) this state intends or is forced to fight and how (to attack, defend). Based on this doctrine, everything else is built, from the distribution of roles in the government to the staff structure of the smallest units. And in this regular structure, it is determined what equipment this unit relies on for weapons. AND WHAT QUALITIES it should possess, this technique is solved precisely in the very TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SAMPLE OF ARMS (TECHNIQUES) BY FORCES OF INDUSTRY. But according to the forces of industry at a given time, to create something that corresponds to the task or not is a question. And the Author, not verbatim of course, but by the very spirit and style of the article, confirms that in those years they did even more than they asked. Indeed, to date, the backlog for modernization has not been exhausted.
    4. Любое оружие (и техника) только инструмент в руках воина. И только от его умения обращаться с ним зависит результат. Дайте стрельцу допетровской России "Утёс" - или испугается, или бросит за ненадобностью - фитиль куда вставлять не найдёт, да и полки для пороха нету. И опять Автор "в корень зрит". Значит не техника плоха - не в тех руках она!
    5. Вот и подошли к ранее упомянутому "... дальше". Позволю себе ещё одну дерзость - напомню старое определение: "БОЕГОТОВНОСТЬ ТЕХНИКИ ОПРЕДЕЛЯЕТСЯ ЕЁ ИСПРАВНОСТЬЮ, УКОМПЛЕКТОВАННОСТЬЮ И НАЛИЧИЕМ ПОДГОТОВЛЕННОГО ЭКИПАЖА" (сократил конечно, но смысл остался без изменений). Промышленность создала весьма удачные (если не сказать больше) образцы бронетанковой техники, страна поставила их в войска, укомплектовала. заправила, создала систему обслуживания (пока ещё ТА страна), призвала и подготовила экипаж, выучила командира и вручила этому ... (не готов пока назвать - а то БАН) и людей и железо. Результат - большинство из них критикует Автора статьи, меньшинство - Автор упоминает в положительных примерах.
    6. В ТОЙ стране хватало глупых преград в создании "продвинутых" образцов БТТ, в ЭТОЙ - они не нужны. Пусть мелкие модернизации (мы их объявим как крупные достижения) пусть производство будет (аж 7 - 10
    new cars a year for the WHOLE ARMY), though absurdly outrageous hybrids appear (mutants, in a word), the main thing is not to be left without a cash flow in your pocket.
    7. Спасибо за терпение - итог. Техника отличная, Не простая, не лёгкая в эксплуатации но - отличная. И ПОЛНОСТЬЮ соответствует своему предназначению. Да - нужны квалифицированные люди для содержания машин, да - нужны толковые командиры. Но это тема другой статьи. Автор своё дело сделал на "отлично"
  37. merkava-2bet
    merkava-2bet 23 November 2017 18: 29 New
    I turn to the author with a big request, I am interested in the period of the Afghan war, more precisely when and where, and most importantly with what efficiency, the following were introduced: invoice, lattice and dynamic protection, as well as other measures to increase the survivability of the BTT, the so-called Afghan variants and kits, handicraft, and factory or repair type, this is my favorite topic for two reasons: I myself am a tanker and the second reason, I was born and raised in Mary and saw a lot from that war, a low bow to all internationalist soldiers, shuravi