Is the "old" well forgotten to become the "new"? (Part-3) Original questions or a little analytics
1. “Who is to blame for this?”, That is, what is the reason for the inconsistency of the domestic armored personnel carrier with modern requirements. “What is to be done?”, That is, if there is a way to catch up and overtake the naïve adversaries?
“The enterprises of the military-industrial complex are to blame!” - there will be an overwhelming response, which is only partially valid. In fact, the work of most defense enterprises is structured as follows.
Despite the reforms carried out in the environment of state defense enterprises, their essence was mostly reflected only in a change of names (for example, a company instead of a federal state unitary enterprise) and a change in the type of leadership (subordination). Enterprises still do not have a single drop of independence - it is up to the state to decide whether to develop or produce it, giving out tasks for conducting R & D. Trade domestically with private firms or individuals in armaments (with the exception of hunting weapons and products of national economic consumption) in the Russian Federation is generally prohibited, and exporting products to a foreign customer by enterprises is possible only through a single intermediary - ROSOBORONEXPORT, the only enterprise in the Russian Federation that has the right to international arms trade (not counting aviation) The intermediary is rather mediocre, despite the fact that he takes for his "services" not just a percentage, but the real part of the contract value. Often, ROSOBORONEXPORT sells to customers what is no longer being produced, and enterprises are required to climb out of their skin, but fulfill the requirements of an intermediary. His word is the law, although he is only a sales representative.
Having a state license for the right to develop and manufacture a certain type of military products, an enterprise whose bright heads of the collective receive brilliant thoughts on promising samples of another type of product simply cannot realize them because it does not have the right (legal grounds) to do so.
It is possible to implement such ideas by transferring intellectual property to the licensed enterprise. But this way is disadvantageous to neither one nor the other: the former may lose authorship, will not be able to control the quality, make changes or prevent changes to the design documentation, lose the appropriate part of the payments and profits; the latter receive a slap in the face, for “lovers” are invading their patrimony, who intend to overlap their own ideas. And that if you do not remember about the financial side of the project.
There are a great many regulatory documents governing the process of developing and putting products into production (GOST, OST, MI, and so on). In accordance with these documents, designers will have to perform the hardest and most voluminous junk work, from which foreign manufacturers are exempt. A cloud of paper rolls across the country in pursuit of a ton of signatures, and this time, this is money, this is not a fact that everyone will (everyone) sign. A simple example is that a foreign model of armored vehicles has an operation manual like a cell phone: it is about the same in volume and similar in content; Domestic: has several volumes of detailed descriptions with scientific text. Thus, the state only complicates the work of the domestic defense industry.
But now, let's imagine that somehow a brilliant idea was approved “at the top” or “top” simply foresaw it itself, and “our” enterprise received an R & D (R & D) task. Certain funds are allocated to OCD. Hardly all the funds will be spent on targeted spending, because the company still has many other projects for which the money was either not allocated at all, or was allocated in insufficient quantities, or was simply overspending (the funds were spent, they did not meet the limits of the allocated funds need to submit). God forbid, if the management of the enterprise goes to meet the "geniuses", and does not try to reanimate the "bending" project.
But all the money went to implement the idea. Innovators immediately focus on all the most advanced and modern and ... They fall into a dead end! For there is for designers innovators and such a blocking abomination, as the "List of spare parts and products, consisting on the supply in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation." In such a list (the exact name does not matter in principle) all consumables, spare parts and the like are recorded that were produced serially and used in military products already in service. Accordingly, everything that does not fall into this list should either be excluded by designers in favor of recorded analogs, or go through a debilitating rudimentary procedure of approval and listing on this list. Well, the innovative designer will not be able to change the old poor unreliable interior lights with incandescent bulbs for ultra-modern LED lights with motion sensors without losing months of time and millions of nerve cells to add these fixtures to the list and organize their military acceptance (which is a little lower). Again, foreigners have a full indulgence in this matter.
If in the West the manufacturer presents the finished product for military tests, which at the end of the tests decide on the suitability and compliance with the requirements of the products presented, the domestic system is far from such simplicity, "transparency" and perfection. We have military acceptance, which cynically "makes the brain" to designers at all stages of development ...
Yes, there are quite a few conscientious military representatives, and without them it is sometimes impossible to test an experimental product at all, but the question is that, purely as a structure, domestic military acceptance is organized, so to say, wrong.
Namely - all decisions, protocols, CD should be consistent with the acceptance. Included in the product item that is not in the "list", we have completely stopped the development process. Military representatives do not take over the acceptance of purchased parts - they should already come to them with a military acceptance, organized at the manufacturer of the part. In general, the positive conclusion of the military representative on the product means that this product meets all the requirements, including in terms of design and completeness of the design and operational documentation presented by the military department to products of this class. What does this lead to? Instead of high-class (even domestic) instruments for acquiring onboard equipment, only those who have passed military acceptance go, even if they are inferior in all respects. In addition, the main effect of such actions deserves a separate paragraph. Namely - the impact of military acceptance on the final cost of the product.
Let “our” enterprise test and have already prepared for production a “brilliant” object of armored vehicles. The instrument composition of the product includes 20 devices for various purposes (communications equipment, observation of the terrain, computers, and so on). Each device passed military acceptance. After the product has been assembled, the process of “acceptance” takes place to the customer (Defense Ministry in the person of military representatives). Any acceptance does not cost for free, and as a result, the product rises in price by the amount of the military representative’s fee. That is, the state itself pays for what it buys (already bought). In other words, it buys from itself already purchased product. With a cost of 10 mln. Rub. for 1 units of this sample of armored personnel carriers, the military representatives are able to “wind up” at least 1 million rubles. to the final cost.
But this is only the tip of the iceberg. After all, the purchased devices also passed acceptance, and, therefore, also rose in price at their manufacturing plant. But the acceptance of the armored vehicle BTVT raises the cost of not just the new body of the armored personnel carrier manufactured by “our” enterprise, but with all the devices. That is, the state buys from itself twice. And this is not the limit.
Imported products do not undergo the procedure of military acceptance, they pass only input control and tests, the ones that have already been “our” sample before its production. Who does not believe - an example from my own experience. The cost of the APU (auxiliary power plant, power plant) is 400 thousand rubles. After acceptance - 700 thousand rubles. After its installation on BTVT, the complete assembly of BTVT, BTVT passes acceptance and its cost increases, that is, the cost of the APU becomes already about 750 thousand rubles. What the state gets for these extra 350 thousand rubles, I hope everyone understands. But you could take for 750 thousand rubles. such an APU ... If you simplify with an example, when you buy a cell phone and check its operation, compliance with the delivery set (approved by the manufacturer) of the package contents, then neither you from the store nor the store takes money from you for this work (acceptance). In the defense situation is the opposite.
How is this "event" called in the language of the Criminal Code? That's right - money laundering. If the military mission would be engaged only in escorting and testing, there would be no disputes and questions - there would be only gratitude and admiration, and so - a mess!
Fully private firms in the Russian Federation can be counted on the fingers of one hand. The situation is even more complicated for them - the state does not like competitors and it is incredibly difficult to obtain licenses for the right to develop and manufacture "popular" types of products. Therefore, they have to mask their products for consumer goods (for example: not “machete knife for survival”, but “economic knife”) or find a partner enterprise abroad and transfer production there.
Conclusion: so that the idea was born into the world in the Russian metal in its native fatherland, its designers will have to carry a hard cross, and this path will be thorny and cunning.
Domestic samples of armored vehicles intended for full-scale hostilities. When the need arose to act against partisan ambushes, the military did not issue a task to the designers to develop special equipment. The command considered it acceptable to use standard armored personnel carrier models. Well, constructors (especially in Soviet times) cannot initiatively develop new models (absolutely new ones, not modifications). Who will give them money? Production area? Enterprises are state-owned. The fact that they are OAO (and the like) are the same balls, only in profile. After all, private capital involves investment in profitable production. Production for the needs of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is associated with insane risks and costs, which most likely will not pay off. Now I think it is clear why the model range of our defense plants is not updated with the same frequency as, say, a Mitsubishi Lancer car.
The battle chariots and tours were very good for their time, but it’s shameless to demand resistance to RPG shots from them. In other words, to complain about the BMP and BTR, created by the demands made in 60-70-s of the last century, that they do not withstand RPGs and bullets of large caliber, it is the same as to make claims to the elephant, that it does not fly, to ask the astronomer vertebral hernia removal sequence. Designers coped with their task. They made a technologically advanced model of armored vehicles for specific (submitted by the military) goals.
What can be done here? As in all times - to teach everyone, to give way and pass on experience to the young and talented, and not to blame for their “leakage” abroad of their homeland. A person with ideas and a desire to create a new tank is very difficult to live with the prospect of translating them after several years of “successful” participation in the project to create an “iron kaput”. Many simply put up with the inevitable self-realization, many “flow away”, and still others go to other areas of activity.
2. Time passes, nothing stays the same.. So why are we scolding the technique of the end of the last century's 60? The new generation of warriors need new weapons. Why not criticize for weak armor penetration arrows, reeds, broadswords? True - this is a weapon of another era. The Cold War is also a whole epoch. Modern realities impose modern requirements.
And what is the modern requirements for armored personnel carriers? Correct, if I am mistaken:
1) High security (within class and type).
2) High mobility, maneuverability.
3) Sufficient firepower to complete the assigned tasks.
4) Transportability and mobility (modern rapid deployment team structure).
5) Computerization and application of modern optoelectronic, computational, and television and radio equipment.
And how do these requirements differ from “non-modern”? Nothing. In BTVT always tried to use advanced instruments and equipment. Just the adding machine at one time was the limit of perfection, just like the atmospheric engines ... The aircraft fleet did not change at all and in the next 20 years minimum will remain as such. That is, nothing new is presented to armored vehicles, but only the duty to keep up with the progress in the element base and in the corresponding information technology equipment.
But the trouble is, some specific requirements, not described in the five points listed above, are striving to prevail over each other as modern requirements. These are incoming: in paragraph 1 - increased security, in paragraph 4 - requirements for limiting weight and dimensions tankdesigned for a typical rail freight platform.
Of course, many will argue, but what about mine protection? How is resistance to RPG from all sides and the roof? The answer is simple - these are the special requirements of local conflicts for specialized equipment.
What is so allocated a local conflict? First, the limited space, as a rule, covering one or two theaters of war. Again, one of them is urban fighting. The second most common mountain or desert terrain. Second, the limited military contingent in the conflict zone. Thirdly, the informational and material superiority of one side over the other, as a result of which direct clashes of the same type of technology do not occur. It is destroyed by a more developed side with inaccessible means for the enemy (aircraft, missile strikes). The lagging side is lagged behind only one tactic - guerrilla warfare, which is characterized by sabotage activities and the organization of various prepared ambushes.
The first example is two different in nature the US war against Iraq. In the Desert Bure, American mechanized units suffered losses from engineering obstacles (minefields), enemy aircraft and armored vehicles. In the second campaign, losses were inflicted only as a result of ambushes. Again, it is not correct to consider a controlled landmine as a minefield. This is a pure ambush when a visually observable object of interest is affected.
An example of the second. During the five-day war, not a single unit of armored vehicles was lost from the detonation of a mine. With the rapid oncoming fight minefield just did not have time to put.
And now the technical points. The average explosive mass in an anti-mine mine is 7 kg. Until the middle of the last century, they were stuffed with TNT. Now it is a minimum of TG-50, PVV or A-IX-I. There is a requirement to increase the mine defense to the level of keeping the blast on a mine with a power of 7 kg in TNT equivalent (TE) outdated before it was born.
Yes, the rebels more often make IEDs out of trotyl drafts, and the average explosive mass of such IEDs was 6-8 kg in TE (according to US statistics in Iraq). And what to do in case of war with an industrialized enemy, producing modern mines with special armor-piercing warheads, equipped with high-powered explosives? And what will prevent the rebels from adding an extra pair of trotyl checkers to the IED? And what will limit the partisans in the production of improvised explosives and the equipment of their IEDs also in greater numbers? Lovers rely on the size - the dimensions of the standard TNT 200 gram checkers are approximately equal to a pack of cigarettes. Let self-made explosives be less powerful, let its volume in the equivalent of the power of the previously described checkers be larger. This larger volume will result in perhaps two or three extra movements of the shovel? Alter already converted samples of armored vehicles? Thus, it is wrong to say about the demand of the defense ministry as a modern requirement for armored vehicles, to put it mildly.
The equipment, which must withstand the detonation of a mine, is primarily intended for occupation, and not for hostilities. Most of the armor of the machine goes to protection from the explosion of the mines of the bottom, rather than booking the rest of the body from at least small-caliber shells.
In the case of tracked vehicles, it is practically not attainable to achieve the minimum level of removal of the bottom from the surface (increased clearance) for tracked vehicles (openness of tracked tracks, tensioning and driving stars to enemy fire from small arms and artillery weapons, significant lengthening of tracks, causing an increase in their mass and, accordingly, the load on the chassis).
Protection of the bottom from the action of mines tracked vehicles will be associated with the necessary strengthening of the bottom armor, which, accordingly, will lead to a significant increase in the mass of the car, in comparison with wheeled vehicles of the same class and type.
Undermining a tracked vehicle on a mine is overwhelmingly associated with a loss of mobility. Consequently, it is necessary to pay special attention to protecting the crew from the subsequent after blasting of a car on a roundabout with small arms, including large-caliber ones. This will lead to additional weighting.
In urban conditions, it is easier to deprive a tracked armored vehicle of mobility by damaging the tracks due to the small distance of the fire collision. Also, no protection can save an armored vehicle from an incendiary bottle, the compositions of which may have the ability to burn through the armor. And the use of incendiary mixtures is most relevant in urban environments.
Put the following. A typical RPG plant produces 60000 RPGs per year. The armored plant produces the 200 BTR in the year. The question is: will the BTR withstand at least a tenth of the 300 RPGs falling on it, or is it easier to destroy the RPG production plant, cut off the supply channels to the militants, than build up its armor?
Conclusion: local war requirements are requirements for a special type of armored vehicle. Supplementing the requirements for all models of armored vehicles with the requirements developed on the basis of experiments of local hostilities is possible, but not expedient in full. The problem of defense is solved by elementary with the help of KMT.
3. In general, the best way to protect an armored personnel carrier from RPG hits and landmine explosions is not to fall under the attack of an RPG and not to run into uncleared land mines. This does not mean that the equipment should be buried deep under the ground beneath the concrete floor of the bomb shelter. On the contrary, the APC should be able to find threats in advance, at a safe distance, and destroy them or avoid their actions. That is, equipping models of BTVT SAZ (which are “Soft-kill”) is a modern requirement that is relevant for newly developed models of BTVT and for upgrading those in service.
The roadblock in the city of the BTR, lined with concrete blocks and sandbags, of course, easy to destroy from the RPG from the roof or window of the nearest house. The same APC, without any fortification, standing in the middle of a large field (or in a desert with a flat relief) will become an insurmountable obstacle for infantry, even if all the fighters are hung with various RPGs. The effective range of his KPVT over an RPG is hundreds of meters, and he can change position relatively quickly if necessary, unlike infantry. Suddenly appearing armored vehicles can be hit with their own anti-tank weapons or artillery support.
Avoid ambush impossible. To avoid losses, hitting a professionally and competently prepared ambush is impossible. To reduce the percentage of casualties to a minimum at the moment is achievable in practice (and has already been confirmed) with regular armament on armored vehicles currently in service through the rational management of the unit by commanders on the basis of the experience of combat operations.
No hanging of the armor will give such an effect as one intelligent commander, who will save the unit from “pofigism” and “relaxed”, which begins even at the desk during training sessions. Example. One of my colleagues thought about the situation for a very long time: “How can you accidentally shoot your own boys at the same machine gun. How is it necessary to be a down? ”The answer was found, when right in the sanitary“ loaf ”he himself became the same down. Thank God, these were teachings, and the machine gun shot from half a meter into my foot as a blank cartridge, although in the classroom it was said that the finger should be removed from the trigger, especially if I removed it from the safety catch.
In addition, when a tank rushes at you or near you, from which you cannot hide behind walls and not get lost on two floors of the house, whatever you have in your hands: RPG, AARC, ATGM, heroism quickly evolves into outstanding earth-moving qualities. The tank does not scare - the tank presses. And if he has a thermal imager or radar RNDC ... Then you have to live 2200 meters, related to the flight time of the projectile (5000 if the tank has a CCV).
Conclusion: There are no effective means and methods for protecting columns from ambush attacks, which guarantee a probability close to 100 of percent to avoid losses among personnel of military personnel moving in a convoy. The appearance of a new technical means or method of advancement of columns will cause a similar response from the partisans and terrorists. Non-contact ways of dealing with typical threats to armored personnel carriers are promising ways to increase their security.
4. Options for improving protection and increasing the survivability of armored vehicles (based on materials from various publications and authors).
1) Additional hinged armor
The use of additional mounted tank armor can have a significant undesirable effect on the overall characteristics of the tank. Reduced maximum speed and mobility, reduced power density and increases the load on the suspension.
Special mounted kits appear to enhance survivability in urban environments, although initially the tank was not designed for fighting in populated areas (especially with dense buildings of large floors), since its armament cannot perform typical combat missions, being in close contact with infantry. To compensate for the shortcoming in the form of improper use of additional armor plates is irrational.
2) Modular design
It is worth noting that this property of armored vehicles is offered by designers as advanced, profitable, indispensable for modern technology. But, no country, even adopting and purchasing equipment with a modular design, uses or even thinks about using this advantage. No module was purchased separately! For example, the Bundeswehr of Germany (and the Armed Forces of the Netherlands) purchasing the Boxer acquired the KSHM, BTR and ambulance variants, although, logically, they would have to buy all the Boxers in the BTR version and buy the required number of required modules (KSM and medical).
Thus, this property allows only to change the modules of the fighting compartments (cargo, sanitary, command), removing them from the machines with damaged compartments of management and installing them on machines with damaged modules of the fighting compartments. What actually makes this property useless. Acquisition of technology, the development of a modular design of which funds were spent, is unprofitable. It is the same as buying a car for operation in the conditions of the Far North with a powerful two-zone conditioner, and in a hot climate with a preheater, heated windows and mirrors, and heated seats.
There were no special problems in the conversion of the BTR-80 to the KSHM. A design involving the installation of modules naturally leads to a weighting of the structure (universal base chassis frame; additional fixing points to impart rigidity, since the body is no longer carrying, but the common frame is missing; module body reinforcements; module floor and attachment points). Do not forget also that part of the equipment of the machine (spare parts and other accessories) are mounted on the sides and stern of the armored vehicle, additionally serving as protection elements. All this “good” is now to be placed on the base chassis, if there is no desire to constantly outweigh it from module to module or purchase in quantities equal to the number of modules.
There is a variant of modular protection, that is, weights of thicker plates to replace thin ones, selected in accordance with the assignment. As well as screens, mine trawls, modules of dynamic protection blocks and so on. As manufacturers say so “gizmos” - to install the entire kit on the tank requires less than half a day. Very handy! And how will it look in the same mountain-desert terrain? - Yes, the same as with the modules of combat compartments.
Any life-loving tank commander with a sufficiently developed self-preservation instinct will, by default, hang up armor all the way until “there is no way to cling to the bottom of the road.” Or, for example, so. An order to fire support the advance of the motorized infantry and the suppression of the firing points they identified in the village in the valley from the dominant height from a decent distance. Powerful protection blocks for this task are unnecessary, but armor is not needed here at all - you can at least use the usual “bare” mortar, and all modules will remain in storage. After 10 minutes, an order is received to develop successful offensive actions of the infantry and dislodge the enemy from the locality. When will motorized infantry get help? When will the armor modules be brought up, or will motorized riflemen be exchanged for several burned tanks with tankers? The author supports the position of a cheerful commander - armor protection should initially ensure the fulfillment of any assigned combat tasks related to the type of armored vehicles.
3) Increasing the thickness of body armor Rational tilt angles
Starting from the 1970-s to the present, in the TTZ, combat armored vehicles of the types BMP, BTR, BRDM and light tank being created in NATO countries introduce fire protection requirements for the 14,5-mm machine gun. And for the BMP - to protect the onboard projection of the machine from a distance of 100-200 m (STANAG 4569 Level 4). Accordingly, the thickness of the sides of combat vehicles in a monolithic version of steel armor is 35-45 mm (the last figure is the bottom board of the Marder 1 infantry fighting vehicle). This was one of the reasons for the almost double combat margins of the main NATO BMP Marder A3 (forehead - 30 mm steel) and М2А3 "Bradley" (forehead - 6,5 mm steel + 6,5 mm steel + 25 mm aluminum alloy) relative to the Soviet BMP.
Against 30-mm guns such armor can no longer cope. I recall right away: “If there is no difference, why pay more?”. That BMP-1, that МХNUMXА2 "Bradley" after the shelling of the thirty will turn into a colander. Ahzarit looks like a winner. But due to the lack of his own weapons, he will be a target with the infantry locked inside him. And against the fire of tank guns, even the defense of Akhzarit will be powerless.
Conclusion: It is advisable to increase the armor of the BMP or BTR up to a certain limit - to the level of protection against typical means of dealing with light armored vehicles and armament of enemy light armored vehicles, that is, from large-and-medium-range SS 30-mm automatic cannons.
Variants of the design of armored personnel carrier, when MTO is located in the front of the case, the machines are now considered as the most advanced and promising. But how does such a solution contribute to increased security? The answer is only in frontal projection from artillery ammunition and missiles. From mines, this decision does not save. As already noted, you can press the button for an explosion of a radio-fuse at any time, for example, right under the combat or control compartment. The situation is similar with magnetic and pin fuses of anti-bottom mines in which there is a moderator.
There are opponents of such a composition, claiming that a machine made according to this scheme loses mobility when it is hit in the forehead. Visible bias such judgments. With the defeat in the forehead of the machine with the front compartment control mobility is also lost - either the nasal fuel tanks light up or the driver is struck. Since the problem is in the protection of the crew and landing force, the answer to the question of which layout is better is obvious - with the frontal position of the logistic support.
5) Remote Assisted Auxiliary Weapon Module
The fact that a machine gun paired with a cannon is a big zone of low booking is no longer a secret. Therefore, the desire to remove him away worthy only of encouragement. He can only fight with the living force of the enemy. Of course, there is only one rational place to install such a module - on the roof of the tower (hull), but you have to choose between the caliber of the paired machine gun or the caliber of the above-mentioned (anti-aircraft) machine gun of the tank commander, since even one module for one machine gun will take place for two.
However, the module reduces the capabilities of the tank in the fight against manpower, as the twin and anti-aircraft machine guns could operate in different directions. But we already spoke about the tasks of the tanks. "To moisten" manpower behind the tank and on the flanks of the work of the BMP and BTR, in the village - the infantry. Also, nothing prevents to install a "full-size" combat remotely controlled module with a variety of rocket-cannon armament, which is already installed on light armored vehicles.
6) “One of the options for further improving a simple BTR is to leave this base machine virtually unchanged, but to supplement and support it with a second support vehicle on the same chassis on which powerful turret armament is installed”
The advantage of such an order would be that each type of machine would perform only one task, on which it would specialize, so that combat control of this pair would be easier than control of a powerful multi-purpose strike complex. These machines could be used together if required, or be separated and perform their different tasks in different parts of the battlefield. ”
Another time we remember what the BMP, BTR, tank. It is not necessary to produce armored personnel carriers with tank weapons and tanks without weapons for the landing. Everything is already invented. The main thing is to correctly dispose of them.
5. Some experts believe that tanks have lost their meaning. Being only an offensive weapon of close (contact) combat, moreover, it is not always sufficiently effective (sensitive losses in certain local conflicts), tanks have no prospects for the future battlefield.
The arsenal of anti-tank weapons, which have become very effective and turned into mass weapons, is constantly expanding and improving. Overcoming the defense of the enemy, saturated with such weapons, will turn into an intractable problem for tanks. Tanks will incur unacceptably high losses, and their use will become inappropriate. True, it does not indicate how to replace the tanks, if necessary, to conduct active hostilities. As the existing parity in the range of tank weapons over anti-tank is not specified. Moreover, it is unclear how to do without tanks, if the enemy did not refuse them. One thing is mine explosives and the shelling of RPG columns from ambushes, and quite another reflection of a frontal attack.
“The main tanks are quite universal weapons, but in difficult conditions on the modern battlefield, their capabilities are not limitless. Having a small crew, functionally tied to the machine, the tanks are of little use for the tasks to complete the battle: the destruction of the remnants of the enemy forces and the mastery of his territory. Possessing powerful, but essentially single-channel armament, tanks do not effectively solve the tasks of fighting “tank-dangerous” manpower. ” But, after all, it is for these purposes that the light armored vehicles supporting the tanks are intended: BTR, BMP.
“The ammunition of tanks is relatively small, so they are of little use for the performance of tasks typical of artillery - defeat area targets, including areas saturated with poorly observed“ tank-dangerous ”manpower.” Again, for these tasks have already created a special technique. Why should a tank generally perform tasks of towed or self-propelled artillery? Does shooting for closed positions at a distance over 5 kilometers require multi-layer combined armor, low silhouette and high mobility?
"In promising concepts (on the subject of" Armata "), it is proposed to abandon mechanical overlapping systems by targeting and firing at all and bring the tank’s armament into a separate reserved module." Even if this module is booked at the same high level as the manned crew compartment, it will be most vulnerable to enemy fire.
“The weapons module will also contain means of reconnaissance of targets and observation of the battlefield.” Then what is the use of maximum crew protection if a gun module is suddenly struck? The crew is blind, disarmed, the tank becomes disabled and loses its orientation in space. Each of these properties of armored vehicles (firepower and the ability to detect a target) strongly affects the further survivability of the tank on the battlefield. The crew remains to either wait for the execution in the armored capsule, or leave the car. If on the battlefield, the enemy created the conditions for defeating the relatively poorly protected, but still highly armored gun module of the tank using their fire weapons, then the crew’s prospect of leaving the car and getting to the shelter or another tank in a combat-ready state or simply alive seems unlikely. In other words, the crew of such a wrecked tank will still be amazed. Depriving the enemy tank crews is much more profitable than a tank that can be repaired or rebuilt. The production cycle of the “new” tanker is much longer. Who is right in assumptions as practice will always show in the near future.
Moreover, one should not forget that armored vehicles, and first of all tanks, are the most protected component of the ground forces when using nuclear weapons, which no nuclear power has yet refused. On the contrary, the number of members of the “nuclear club” has increased and is likely to continue to grow. The positions of tanks for protection against chemical weapons (chemical, biological) are even more solid.
Arsenal of anti-tank weapons is growing. But it can be used not only exclusively against tanks, but against fortifications, buildings and structures, vehicles, manpower, and so on. Created to fight tanks, these funds will cause guaranteed losses to everything that is protected at least a little weaker. The evolution of the means of protection, although slower than the means of destruction, is evolving. While the development of some areas of weapons has almost stopped (the increase in the power of the blasting and the effectiveness of throwing explosives).
Naturally, it is impossible to create an absolutely invulnerable tank, as well as an absolute destructive tool. Tanks will suffer losses that may be higher than in past wars. However, this is a consequence of the changed nature of the struggle on the modern battlefield. Tanks will remain the most protected weapons, the losses of other means of struggle will be much higher.
It is also believed that the threat of hostilities with the use of nuclear weapons is unlikely and the design of armored vehicles with the expectation of hostilities in the conditions of mass use of nuclear weapons is not advisable. However, the tense geopolitical situation in the world calls into question this thesis. North Korea and Iran have been on the verge of a long time. Pakistan and India have not settled their conflicts. In addition, Pakistan is also not popular in the west, thanks to the assistance of terrorists. China is no longer afraid to threaten Japan and the United States. In other words, we have five nuclear powers that are actively trying to impose their opinions on Europe and the United States (even if two are not confirmed, but they do not have to detonate bombs - it is enough to infect the area with uranium). Really, in the effort to protect themselves from the NATO coalition forces that are superior at times, will these countries not take advantage of the “cores”?
As long as the United States, their henchmen and the like do not voluntarily join the Russian Federation with the best wishes, handing us all their nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as a sign of goodwill and pure intentions, the Armed Forces of Russia must possess weapons capable of performing any combat missions and fighting in any conditions, including when an enemy uses weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons.
Losses were, are and will be. The only way to protect the crews and assault forces of the armored vehicles from the fire of any anti-tank weapons, including tank guns, is to drive them under the armor of the asylum from a nuclear explosion. But you can't stop an enemy like this, you won't win. The best defense is attack. You cannot win cards or chess without exchanging cards or figures. Wins the one who will cause more losses, and not the one who will try to avoid them; who will create more casualties, not remedies. There is no impregnable fortress. All the fortresses that once stormed in the wars fell. At the same time, no one built his fortress around this fortress. Why was the T-72 born when T-64 and even T-80 were already? To have more means of struggle, cheaper and more massive, albeit inferior in performance.
Pilot passenger airliners understand that in the event of an accident, it will fall along with the plane "on the ground itself." But this does not interfere with the crews who are well prepared and not passive in emergency situations to deal with danger with honor. This is true not only for pilots and submariners. If you hope in advance that your tank is much worse than its counterparts, then you are not a tanker, but a substance with the letter “G” that does not sink.
The fact that the domestic armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD escorted the columns and stormed the city, carrying the infantry stuck to the roof, and poorly protecting the crews - not their fault. Just no other technology. Of course, you can even praise Hamer, but even the Israelis themselves, whose budget Germany feeds, are going to create something more budgetary. Compare the number of the Armed Forces and the Tsahal. We can also create heavy armored personnel carriers, but then the rest of the majority of the army will have to move behind the tanks on our own two feet. And how great it would be to convert the 50000 T-55 and 30000 T-72 into Akhzarit counterparts ... And pack all of Europe!
Well, to put it in a modern, accessible language, it’s certainly incredibly cool to have thousands of floating airborne tank-braemo-imro-btro-self-propelled guns in service, much like having a Ferrari with a cross-country UAZ in its garage, the boot of a minivan with no cost more “Lada” and so that it takes no more parking space than the “Oka”. Thus, while agreeing that this is absurd, it is worthwhile to face the truth and draw the appropriate conclusion.
Domestic BMP, BMD, BTR meet the requirements for them. Current requirements for them are no different from the requirements of previous years. “Modern requirements”, which are so actively imposed on them by the public, are the requirements for a new special anti-backlash vehicle capable of overcoming minefields by the method of detonation and independently fighting with armored vehicles, manpower and aviation of the enemy.
PS Once, I learned from a television announcement about the imminent broadcast of a television program, which included a video about my “work”. When I looked at the report, I simply didn’t know what to do - laugh or cry. Guys! Do not watch campaign materials such as "Military Secrets." In such programs of common sense at best ten percent, and then if you know what to listen to.
Many of the DSP books, but, thanks to the “independent” Ukraine, there is a chance to pamper yourself even with a living paper copy, which our neighbors kindly declassified.
1) Tactics. - M .: Voenizdat, 1987 g;
2) V. Belogrud. Tanks in the battles for the Terrible. Part of 1,2;
3) Yu. Spasibukhov. M1 "Abrams" (to know what these tons of iron death are and no longer make honest people laugh, hinting or speaking openly about their superiority);
4) The magazine "Technics and weapons", articles:
- Major General O. N. Brilev;
- V. Chobitok. Fundamentals of Theory and история development layout of the tank (MANDATORY).
5) Losik OA Article: “Do tanks have a future?”
6) Melee weapons of Russia.
7) Engineering ammunition. T. 1
8) B.V. Profits. Hand grenades. Directory.
9) Engineer's Sergeant textbook (the earlier, the better).
10) BMP-1. THAT and RE (various years of release).
11) BMP-3. THAT, RE, an album of drawings and drawings.
12) T-72B. Re.
13) T-90. THAT, RE, an album of drawings and drawings.
14) Soviet military encyclopedia. T. 1-8.
15) Experience of fighting in the mountain-desert terrain. Part 1 - M .: Voenizdat. 1981
16) "Features of the conduct of combat operations of the Soviet troops in the mountain-desert terrain" (from the experience of combat use of units of the airborne troops in the Republic of Afghanistan).
17) Report of the former Chief of Staff of the North Caucasian Military District Lieutenant-General V. Potapov. The actions of formations, units and subunits of the Special Forces during a special operation to disarm illegal armed formations in 1994-96 on the territory of the Chechen Republic.