Is the old well forgotten to become the new? Part-2. By call of honor and duty

Armed with basic knowledge, we now turn to the most frequently asked questions and controversial issues arising in the discussions of domestic and foreign armored personnel carriers with regard to the models of armored vehicles themselves, design solutions, combat operations, and so on. Of course, the pros and cons of specific design decisions of certain types of weapons require separate articles, so the author cites "resolutive" conclusions on them.


1. The armor protection of domestic armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and BMD poorly protects even from small arms fire. weapons (also valid for some foreign samples).

We recall that when we became acquainted with the terms "BTR", "BMP", "BMD", then we heard something about the protection from fire of conventional means of destruction and anti-bullet armor. So here.

Under the term military small arms fall into products in caliber from 5,45 to 14,5 mm, inclusive, from pistols to heavy machine guns. However, from this range it is worthwhile to consider only regular weapons of motorized rifle subunits, limited to 7,62 mm caliber (9 mm), since the 12,7 mm caliber weapons already belong to large-caliber and their use is limited. In other words, a large-caliber machine gun is no longer a common weapon, as it is used either in the easel version or on the chassis. Therefore, armored vehicles, the sides of which provide protection against 12,7-mm bullets from a distance of less than 500 m no longer fit into the definition of BMP, BTR, BMD. It turns out that blaming BMP, BTR and BMD that fell under the fire of large-caliber weapons for non-compliance with the “official duties” is simply ignorant.

Nowadays, even pistols have armor-piercing cartridges in their ammunition (for example, the domestic 7,62-mm pistol cartridge 7H31 pierces an armor liner with 15 and 8 mm). What can we say about machine guns, rifles and machine guns. For example, to protect against a shot with 50 m normal to the surface of an armor-piercing 7,62-mm bullet (domestic B-32, for rifles and machine guns), the thickness of steel armor should be at least 20 mm. However, the distribution of such cartridges is also relatively small and they are used for special tasks. Thus, even small-caliber armor-piercing cartridges with conventional weapons are not entirely correct.

Of course, going into battle on an armored personnel carrier, infantry fighting vehicle, BMD against DShK or NSV is not a very tempting idea, but how is the infantry going into this battle without armored vehicles? But this will be the same infantry, which the armored vehicle will deliver to the place of the combat mission. Infantry in combat, fighting and performing tasks, and not riding in front of enemy firing points "wrapped up" in armor. Is not it?

An intermediate conclusion follows from this: large-caliber and ordinary small arms with armor-piercing cartridges are dangerous not only for armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry combat vehicles, but also for infantry. And it is dangerous for infantry as in the armored personnel carrier, infantry fighting vehicle, BMD, and to a greater extent for infantry moving on foot.

Generally, bulletproof armor meant armor protection that could withstand the hitting of regular infantry weapon bullets (5,45 / 5,56 mm; 7,62 mm) from a short distance. The smaller thickness of armor plates of domestic light armored vehicles is explained by their large tilt angles. Thus, the domestic BTR, BMP, BMD provide adequate protection against conventional weapons.

But one thing is when a frontal armor plate, located at an angle of 60 degrees from the normal, when conducting combat operations on the plain, makes the thickness of the armor for the projectile fired from the enemy’s weapon equal to the length of the leg and guarantees the likelihood of a ricochet far above 50 percent. And quite another thing is in a mountainous area or settlement. From the slope of the hill, the enemy will always shoot at an angle to the horizon, which will negate the advantages and feasibility of the angle of armor. When firing from the window of a house adjacent to the road, the angle of the bullet-armor meeting can generally become straight. In this case, it is possible to break through the relatively thin armor of an armored personnel carrier by fire from conventional small arms.

Moreover, it is known that no matter how protected armored vehicles are, it will always have external equipment and protruding parts of the devices. It is no secret that all this “good” is booked at least an order of magnitude weaker. Even any tank is not immune from small-arms fire from 1000 meters, it will lose antennas, additional fuel tanks, spare parts, mounted screens installed outside the machine gun turret, ejector or heat shield cannon and so on. From a short distance, any tracked vehicle can lose mobility as a result of the destruction of tracks from large-caliber small arms.

Even from long distances, even from small caliber small arms, armored vehicles can almost completely lose their combat capability! What was repeatedly used by militants of the illegal armed formations in the first Chechen campaign, when, after effective fire from snipers from the adjacent buildings, the crews had to simply drop equipment.

Is the old well forgotten to become the new? Part-2. By call of honor and duty
Figure 27 - Broken Sight Head BMP-3


We are talking about optical surveillance and reconnaissance devices. What are the "eyes" of any modern armored vehicles? Exactly - prismatic observation devices and sights heads. But prisms in this case can be ignored, since it is practically impossible to conduct effective fire (and indeed battle) with their help. It should be noted that domestic Tanks surpass foreign survivability in terms of survivability, since the combined day-night panoramic sights for the gunner with a channel for the commander are not used with us (currently in service). The frontal projection area of ​​their heads is smaller, the number is 1 piece larger, they practically do not protrude above the body and do not stand out sharply. Of course, visibility is lame, but it's better to see poorly than to see your last moments well.

Figure 28 a) - Tank sight heads (on the left Leclerk, on the right Abrams)


It turns out that at one time even research was carried out on the issue of tank stability to fire 30 mm guns. Unbelievable, but true - a tank is easy to incapacitate with just a few hits. The main thing is that they are relatively accurate.

Figure 28 b) - Tank sight heads (on the left T-84, on the right T-80)


Returning to the usual small arms, it is worth noting that it can seriously harm the protection of the tank, even without incapacitating optical devices. Under such protection refers to the hinged dynamic protection (LDD). The relatively thin walls of the boxes of NDZ blocks cannot withstand even the usual bullets of assault rifles at close range. Blocks are deformed, dismantled (broken). Not even detonated explosive plates lose their effectiveness. But the NDT must survive to the use of the enemy RPG.

Conclusions were made by the designers - the built-in dynamic protection (VDZ) appeared, the outer layer of armor of which withstands small arms fire and keeps the dynamic protection blocks in good condition. Unfortunately, not all tanks in service with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, have undergone a modernization. Even more regrettable, the Airborne Troops are not applicable to domestic light armored vehicles currently in service. What to say about VDZ, if there are still problems with installing NDZ on it.

Figure 29 - A soldier of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation with CPV in the hands


If you go to the problem from the other side, then in principle it can be assumed that most of the terrorists and militants of the illegal armed groups, with the exception of suicide bombers, want to live. Therefore, they are fighting for money, not for “thank you” and for the sake of the bright future of all mankind. Even with a large-caliber machine-gun or a rifle with armor-piercing cartridges that easily pierce armor BTR, BMP, BMD, no one in ambush in the next bushes from the column will not sit. The appearance of a fighter with CPV in his hands makes the unique “terminator” in the person of Arnold Schwarzenegger nervously smoking on the sidelines. But it’s scary to go into battle somehow, and dragging yourself over the far beyond 25 kg by weight is iron fun (not counting 11 kg 50-ti cartridges in a box), when you are attacked by fired and evil opponents, the pleasure is below average. In addition, unlike the BTR shooter, such a machine gunner is not protected at all. The only thing that he can cover up in case of failure is the range, which slowly but surely levels the parity of firepower over the armor.

Conclusion: domestic armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD provide adequate protection against conventional weapons when used as intended, that is, the armor protection of light armored vehicles protects against small-arms (light) weapons (conventional weapons).

2. The armor protection of domestic tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and BMD does not protect against RPG fire (sometimes referred to as "simple", "obsolete").

This question is most often mentioned when talking about the experience of hostilities in Afghanistan (both the Soviet troops during the 1979-1989 period, and the NATO contingent from the 2001 year), two Chechen campaigns.

In the context of the Afghan war among the personnel of the infantry infantry units of the BTR undeservedly received the nickname of "tin". This fact was due to the weak protection of the BTR from RPG fire. Here we immediately recall the anti-bullet armor of the armored personnel carrier, infantry fighting vehicle, BMD, that these simplest and outdated RPG shots were developed at about the same time as the armored vehicles mentioned above, as well as that the armored personnel carrier, infantry fighting vehicle, and BMD are not tanks.
Technique determines the tactics of combat. During the war in Afghanistan, Soviet troops encountered the specific nature of the fighting in the mountain-desert terrain. Armored vehicles are not to blame. Similarly, the tactics of combat operations in the city, when infantry covers moving armored vehicles from the flanks (adjacent to the road), the infantry had to operate in the mountains. Certainly, it is impossible to “digest” on foot. For any forced savings you had to pay.

Each reporting period in that war made adjustments to the tactics of warfare, developed methods of movement of columns, ways to identify and overcome ambushes. And all these measures had the desired effect. The phrase "Afghan experience" is valid not only in relation to the aul cleanups. Unfortunately, experience was not taken into account in the first Chechen campaign ...

Again, after years of 12, the same Afghanistan entered the allied contingent led by the United States on new armored vehicles, including special vehicles protected from undermining MRAP mines, including with hinged screen screens. Have they got less loss? These measures did not lead to a drastic reduction in losses, especially in terms of protection against RPGs. Fortunately or again, unfortunately, the Soviet experience was not properly taken into account by the US military. A dismounted carriage from an exploded and immobilized MRAP was bombarded with small arms with impunity.

According to official data, everything looks beautiful, in comparison with the losses of the Soviet troops. Here is just one experience of the Desert Storm knows how minimally records of combat losses in the US Armed Forces (for example, soldiers who received radiation sickness were not entered in the lists of the wounded in combat actions, the loss of armored vehicles from “friendly” fire was taken into account only by journalists).

In addition to multiplying the magnitude of casualties by a figure no less than two, we will also take into account the nature of current hostilities. If the United States itself equipped the entire capitalist world for a battle with the Soviet troops, now the spirits are by themselves, while the weapons they have not changed in principle and have not been updated, and the number of allied forces is approximately equal to the number of personnel of the Soviet limited contingent.

Intermediate conclusion: in the conditions of the partisan war, all those who fall into ambushes are on an equal footing. For example, the Merkava in Lebanon burned equally well in both 1982 and 2006. Another interim conclusion: in the near future, not a single armed conflict, not to mention the war, will not do without the widespread use of armored vehicles: tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers. Even in local conflicts, armored vehicles remain in demand as well-protected mobile firing points.

As already mentioned, RPGs and ATGMs are used covertly, from ambushes. Units in ambush position themselves in a manner convenient for themselves in order to inflict on the enemy the maximum possible harm profitably using the potential of the weaponry. But the partisan ambush is not full-scale hostilities with their battles. This is a “protest action” against the invaders, who use the seized territory, but do not attach it to themselves.

OBD using domestic armored vehicles is not only great at home. How did domestic armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles manifest themselves in battles?
In the war between Syria and Israel 1982, the Syrian army officers were pleased with the BMP-1. For example, a certain Syrian military officer M. Fauri was very pleased with the effectiveness of the BMP-1, on which he had to fight in person. During that war, he was the commander of an intelligence platoon. Fire 73-mm guns 2А28 "Thunder" his car were destroyed by two Israeli American-made armored personnel carriers M113A1, and by launching the Malyutka ATGM of the same BMP - tank М60А1. The very same BMP-1 remained intact until the end of the war. There is a complete implementation of the BMP assigned to it tasks: the fight against manpower, lightly armored vehicles and, if necessary, with enemy tanks, and even when acting on the front line.

The Iraqi forces in the 1980-1988 war against Iran also effectively used the BMP-1. Machines with troops at maximum speed jumped to the front edge of the enemy, immediately overcome the first trench and landed the infantry. She attacked the enemy in the first trench from the rear, destroying primarily anti-tank weapons. The tanks, which by then had crossed the first trench, approached without risk of getting a grenade from an RPG into the board or into the stern.

It has three major military conflicts at the same time, but in different theaters of war. Hilly desert terrain on the border of Syria and Israel, the mountain-desert terrain of Afghanistan, the flat desert terrain of Iraq and Iran. In the first and last, domestic light armored vehicles were massively and effectively used against their counterparts in combat. Here is the insidious trail of the nature of the fighting.

Armored vehicles were also massively used in Operation Desert Storm, where tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers of the US armed forces came together against domestic export samples (cut-down versions) of Iraq. The conflict is notable for the fact that despite the informational and logistical superiority of the US forces grouping over the Iraqi armed forces, the Yankees avoided open battles. At the same time, the Americans tried to bypass Iraqi tanks from the flanks and rear (according to Western sources - 75% of all hits had to their sides and stern).

In the course of Operation Freedom to Iraq, there were practically no open battles of armored vehicles of the two sides. Similar to the actions of dushmans against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the Iraqis preferred guerrilla actions. According to official figures, from 2003 to 2006 year. 20 Abrams tanks, 50 BMP M2A2 / M2AZ Bradley, 20 wheeled BMP Stryker, 250 multipurpose Hummer vehicles and more 500 different army trucks and cars were irretrievably lost in Iraq. Here it is worth adding the irretrievable loss of 85 helicopters, of which the majority are the Ap-X AN-64 type machines. But this is again “official data”. Needless to say about the Hummers 'crews' chances of surviving an RPG hit, making it impossible to recover?

By the way, looking a little ahead, I’ll add that on the roofs of the Hummers, who not long ago officially left the post of the main vehicle of the advancing infantry, it is forbidden for US troops to ride. The armored version of the Hummer was designed to protect against conventional weapons. Attention! A question for connoisseurs: “There are those who wish to change the BTR-80, BMD-1, BMP-1 to HMMWV M1097 (even the second or third generation)?” I think it’s full, but English-speaking.

Figure 30 - Destroyed HMMWV US Forces, Iraq


Of course, not only the nature of hostilities causes differences in combat losses between conflicts. For example, during the first Chechen campaign that had become fundamental and relevant to the present, it was possible to avoid incidents of armored vehicles being destroyed in a more or less trained crew of vehicles (the most powerful land mines do not count). So, for example, in January 1995 of the tank T-72B No. 529 fired simultaneously several calculations of the militants armed with RPG-7 and LNG-9 grenade launchers. Skillfully maneuvering and firing from all types of weapons, the crew of the tank was able, ultimately, to destroy the grenade throwers and safely get out of battle. After this battle, on the hull and turret of the battle, seven hits of LNG and RPG grenades were counted, but the armor was not pierced. The crew managed not to substitute the onboard projections of the enemy and became the winner.
In the spring of 1996, the tank company of one of the rifle regiments took part in the liberation of the village of Gonskoye, which was defended by more than 400 well-armed militants. She was armed with T-72B tanks equipped with dynamic defenses. The tanks attacked motorized riflemen in combat formations from the line of transition to the attack, remote from the militants' positions on the 1200 m. During the attack, the enemy tried to repel it with anti-tank systems with 9М111 “Fagot” missiles. A total of 14 ATGM launches were made. Two missiles did not reach the target thanks to a maneuver skillfully conducted by the crew of the vehicle (both missiles were intended for the same tank). 12 missiles hit the tanks, and four missiles landed in one of the cars. However, on vehicles hit by an ATGM, there were relatively minor damage that did not lead to the loss of their combat capability, and dynamic protection elements also worked. The penetration of armor was achieved only in one machine as a result of the launch of the rocket “slide” and its penetration into the tower from above at an angle of 15-20 degrees around the gunner's hatch. As a result of the cumulative jet, the electrical wiring was damaged and one crew member was slightly injured. The tank retained its combat capability and, despite the fact that as a result of the damage to the wiring, the automatic loader failed, he continued to perform the task. After the battle, he was sent in for repair. On the remaining T-72B, only the triggered elements of dynamic protection were replaced.

Fire from tank guns ATGM launchers and their calculations were destroyed.

The familiar zampotekh tank regiment talked about the methods of "survival" of the obsolete T-62 (in modifications deprived of dynamic protection), and he did not teach the authoritative and "bad" anyone. Such "relict" tanks under the control of a well-coordinated crew, masters of their craft, managed rare scratches on the hull. Namely: while the gunner and loader performed the assigned fire mission, the driver-mechanic (to a lesser extent) and the tank commander watched the situation. Duplication of fire control on the T-62 was not implemented, but the commander’s control system allowed him to deploy the tower at the heading angle of the commander's periscope at the touch of a button. As soon as the commander intercepted the movement of the grenade launchers of an illegal armed formation or a shot from an RPG, an anti-missile launch, he pressed this button. The gunner could only quickly defuse the gun in the direction of rotation of the tower. From the power of the muzzle wave, rocket-propelled grenades simply blown away, or they changed the trajectory. Then the line of grenade launchers came under fire.

And here is an illustrated example of a very common breakup that exposed the sides of tanks (see picture 31). Of course, the flimsy mounts of bulwarks often lead to their loss by themselves. But how arrogant is enough to rely on the poor protection of tanks, when the crews, clinging to the walls of houses, themselves cut off the side screens and NDZ units? Technique in the hands of a savage is a pile of metal.

Figure 31 - Torn rezinotkanevy screen with NDZ starboard tank T-72B


The final conclusion:
- in the case of illiterate (unqualified) actions of the crews, even the most advanced equipment is not capable of endlessly withstanding hits of anti-tank weapons, the evolutionary cycle of which is significantly ahead of the incubation cycle of protective equipment. Breaking is not building;
- BTR, BMP, BMD are not intended for independent action in conditions of mass use of anti-tank weapons by the enemy. In the course of many years of operation, this property of the BTR, BMP, BMD, embedded in them in the design, has been repeatedly confirmed;
- armor protection of domestic, as well as foreign armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and BMD does not protect against RPG fire; At the same time, against tanks, protection against RPGs can be assessed as satisfactory.

3. Weak anti-mine resistance of domestic tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and BMD forces the infantry to go on armor. This fear of fear overpowers the fear of death from a bullet. A significant increase in vehicle mass from additional anti-mine armor is acceptable.

I believe, first we need to resolve the issue of racial hostility of mines and armored vehicles, and then smoothly move on to the ailing frightening infantry on the roof.
Recently, it is considered that the obligatory requirement for modern tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles is high mine resistance. And is it really necessary or is it just a PR move imposed by Western armored vehicle manufacturers, always seeking to increase profits? Or are we really just “scored” and hopelessly behind?

So it happened at the behest of information warfare specialists that the losses from mines and IEDs were most likely to be agitated by immigrants from Europe in Africa, the experience of combat actions which resulted in the creation of armored vehicles resistant to mines - MRAP. The pioneer in the field of creating machines like MRAP (hereinafter referred to as MRAP) was Rhodesia, the successful idea was adopted by South Africa, the USA and others. Again, the MRAP was regarded only as an addition to the usual types of armored vehicles.

MRAPs are used for: infantry transportation in areas where illegal armed formations are active; transportation of high-ranking officials in conditions of increased terrorist danger; supplies of remote strong points and garrisons. At present, when most conflicts do not proceed as a clash of two regular armies, but as a coercion of partisans to peace, the role of the MRAP is becoming ever more relevant.

The transition from active hostilities of the Iraqi Armed Forces during the Desert Storm to partisan during the Freedom of Iraq forced the Pentagon to think first of all not about the durability of the frontal armor of its tanks against the old Soviet BPS, but about the protection of infantry vehicles from min. As a result, on an emergency basis, several MRAP samples from various manufacturers were launched into service. A total of about 20000 machines were purchased.

The main constructive measures to improve protection from the action of mines, implemented in MRAP:
1) maximum removal of the hull of the object to be protected (volume) from the road surface / mine blasting site (to reduce the impact and removal of blast energy from the hull);
2) giving the V-shaped part of the hull of the protected projection (in this case also airborne mines are considered);

Figure 32 - VAP Shaped MRAP Lazar Bottom


It is clear that the thickness of the armor plates of the V-shaped hull should be necessary and sufficient to withstand the detonation of a standard anti-tank mine under the vehicle (for example, the domestic TM-57 / TM-62 is 7-8 kg BB, M19 USA - 9,5 kg BB, by the way pure TNT Samples of the first years of release were being filled), while the rest of the armor was anti-bullet However, most MRAPs provide protection from VN with a power of 5-7 kg of TNT. Modern MRAP of the US Armed Forces are wheeled vehicles with a mass of 12 tons, a height above 2,6 m and a length of at least 5,9 m.

As soon as positive reviews of the operation of the MRAP appeared, a second wave of harsh criticism rolled into domestic armored vehicles, even more brutal. At the same time, it turned out that these results (exaggerated, to say the least) are expensive. Thus, the operation of only one US-based MRAP costs at least 10000 USD per year, and that is if repair was not required after the mine exploded. Currently, the United States does not really know what to do with its MRAP. Not believing the author for the word: (http://www.army-guide.com/rus/article/article.php?forumID=2119).

Having created armored vehicles with enhanced protection from the effect of mines for a certain theater and the nature of the hostilities, they cannot decide on their place and the need for the presence of army armored vehicles in the hierarchy. Well, the Pentagon cannot define their tasks in conditions of general combat. And these miracles of technology were spanked more than the BTR-80 for the whole USSR. Well, a little was transferred to Afghanistan, a little mothballed just in case, they sold a bit. But bad luck - it's time to change the main vehicle of the US Armed Forces HMMWV, and the project JLTV in the number of 50000 units is intended to change it. JLTV has a requirement to ensure the crew’s safety from the effects of mines and IEDs at a level not lower than MRAP, but at a much lower weight and operating costs. So far, there has not been much superiority over MRAP in JLTV prototypes. Oshkosh Truck's M-ATV is generally one in two. The initiative has fallen in love with the initiator in full. But those who do not know about these problems have achieved the cessation of deliveries of domestic armored vehicles to the troops and continue to wipe their pants with a sense of accomplishment, instead of tactilely trying out this very technique.

Now about the obvious advantages and disadvantages of the MRAP. The majority of manufacturers of MRAP claimed protection against explosion, with a capacity of 5-7 kg of TNT equivalent, which is clearly not enough, for example, to protect against the TM-62 mine. Moreover, most of these machines have a wheel formula 4х4. Undermining even the most powerful IEDs or mines (while cases of anti-tracked mines and similar IEDs are being considered), leading to the failure of one wheel, do not allow movement to continue. That is, after the explosion, the car will remain in the zone of fire. And the surviving crew will have to risk their lives again. We recall about the features of ambushes, bulletproof armor and we understand that a radical reduction in losses is not to be expected. And if the partisans will have a “shaitan-pipe” (RPG-7) ...

At the same time, the wheel formula 8х8, used in Soviet BTR (equal in mass to the MRAP of the first, lightest level), allowed the car to continue driving even after losing four wheels (two wheels on one side). The crew and landing force remained intact, since the main shock wave from the explosion passed under the bottom and was led away from the hull. Therefore, the Afghan Mujahideen used up to 35 kg of TNT for guaranteed undermining of the Soviet BTR. For example, the machine shown in the 33 image left the scene of the blast on its own (the picture was taken in 10 km from the blast site). People inside the car received light and medium contusion injuries. Outside on the armor, two soldiers were killed (spinal fracture and head injury). Restoration of the car in the repair company regiment took 24 hours.

Figure 33 - BTR-80 after blasting on a TM-62P mine


But the BMD and BMP, on the contrary, showed weak mine resistance. When an anti-mine mine was detonated or a mine was used, everyone inside the vehicle received serious injuries or died, not to mention the loss of mobility. Unfortunately, this is the specificity of light tracked vehicles.

Figure 34 - Design Features of MRAP


The overestimated ground clearance theoretically helps to dissipate the blast wave during a blast, but its magnitude in 355-450 mm for MRAP machines does not exceed the performance of domestic armored vehicles (In BTR-80, the clearance is 475 mm). The maximum removal of the hull from the road surface, as well as giving a V-shaped bottom, increases the height of the armored vehicle. For fighting in the city, this will not lead to a significant reduction in its visibility. But when attacking actions outside settlements, a high silhouette with a clear clearance under the bottom will seriously facilitate the enemy's task of detecting a target. And despite the fact that special attention has recently been paid to means of reducing visibility (stealth technology, due to which all developed armored vehicles are “squares”). What is the use of them, except for the utilization of funds, if the dimensions of such machines visually unmask them at long distances and make them targets that are convenient for destruction with hand-held anti-tank weapons and large-caliber small arms?

Figure 35 - MRAP Force Protection Cougar versus HMMWV


Not everything is unambiguously with the superiority of the V-shaped bottom in the fight against antidot and anti-tracked mines. If, in the fight with the first, the V-shaped bottom is the optimal solution, then with the second, the V-shaped form is rather a “disservice” for the mine.

Figure 36 - Experimental MRAP Marine Personnel Carrier


Figure 37 illustrates the advantage in dissipating the energy of an explosion of a V-shaped bottom over a flat one when it explodes on an anti-tracked mine. The author of the picture miraculously bent the arrow imitating a shock wave, which was stuck into it at a right angle in the center of the right side. If the flat bottom doesn’t withstand the impact (just by the angle), can the V-shaped energy dissipate the explosion energy?

Figure 37 - Benefits of a V-shaped MRAP


Let's skip high-explosive anti-bottom mines and recall right away their cumulative counterparts, from which an increase in ground clearance of 100 mm and a relative increase in bottom armor thickness from its V-shaped slope will not play a significant role in enhancing protection. When the focal length is reached - "godfather" will work on the armor in full. From the bottom, there will be no interference with the normal formation of a cumulative jet. For example, PG-7B jet shots have a mass of explosives from a 716 warhead. Everyone already knows the penetration ability. The mines have a caliber, that the mass of explosives have great potential for rapid development, and the benchmark PG-7В for them is not an exorbitant limit.

In the "network" there is such a curious material (http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=ada_1189106198), where the method and the result of using the order of the anti-tank grenades RKG-3, which are forgotten and not described in the first part of the article, are given. What can we say about anti-skid and anti-slip mines? Neither sides nor roof developed V-shaped. Yes, the proliferation of this type of mines is not great, especially among the partisans, but what prevents in the light of newly discovered circumstances to recall them?

It was the turn of radio-controlled land mines. They are usually undermined when the least protected part of the hull is located above the mine (or the location of the landing force, crew, ammunition, which can be detonated). Here is the overwhelming advantage of MRAP protection. It would have seemed a victory, but ... We compare the release of IEDs and radio-controlled mines with the number of conventional anti-tank mines released and produced, and we understand that it is more worth being afraid of the latter, especially if you don’t have to fight with partisans.

Figure 38 - MRAP BAE "Caiman" immobilized (damper fluid flows out of the wheel to extinguish the energy of an explosion)


Figure 39 - MRAP International MaxxPro MPV


Most MRAPs are based on front-wheel commercially available trucks for cost reduction. Engine compartments, as a rule, are not booked at all (see figures 31, 32). Well, withstand twelve-ton MRAP blasting on a mine in TNT equivalent 6-8 kg. The armor protection of the sides, roof, stern and MTO from this did not become opposable. What is there RPG and NSVT - even less powerful small arms will easily deal with them. Benefit on top of that, this defense has almost no tilt angles that contribute to the ricocheting of grenades, shells and bullets. It is not difficult to deprive the MRAP of mobility even from light weapons, which, however, does not serve as a reason for their criticism.

Many manufacturers of armored vehicles, developing their MRAP "from scratch" or upgrading the equipment already produced, are still limited to the phrase "V-shaped bottom." For example, the “Stryker” Double V-Hull, which already has two V-shaped bottoms, but gives due protection to the sides. By the way, despite complaints about the lack of protection against partisan actions, the "hawkers of democracy" were satisfied with the fighting qualities of the Stryker, and once again convinced themselves of the correctness of the Stryker brigade strategy, which is a direct analogue to our good old SME on the BTR. The developers of “DINGO ATF” did use the traditional flat bottom.

Figure 40 - M1127 "wrapped" in hinged protection against RPG


Figure 41 - Mine Bottom of the Lynx Armored Car (IVECO LMV)


Figure 42 - Mine Bottom of the GTK "Boxer" armored car


The power of the MRAP is not enough even for adequate defense. Modules are poorly protected from the action of even light weapons. All for the sake of weight loss, because the cost of delivering one MRAP from the USA to Iraq is a pleasure with at least four digits in the bill. Iraq is certainly not space, but those extra pounds are also costly, especially when they are among thousands of pieces of equipment.

In Russia, designers, driven by a wave of criticism, under the pressure of military leaders with imposed opinion, also rushed to create armored vehicles of a new generation, with the mandatory requirement of protection from mines, like in MRAP. And this is true for light and heavy developed armored vehicles. But it is worth thinking about the following question: “Who are we going to seize?” Russia has no territorial claims to any country. If anyone threatens to be undermined by mines, it is to damned enemies who are overcoming the immense fields of our great homeland, well-sown with engineering ammunition, the production of which can be mastered by almost everyone in the home kitchen. Why do we need thousands of MRAP? Why waste so much extra “iron” on the bottom when they can cover the board (see picture 43)?

Figure 43 - M1127, turned into a "road cruiser"


Probably, it is worth developing a technique with enhanced mine protection, but only within the framework of creating special machines - the BIS. The analysts of the US Armed Forces themselves fully agreed with this, as it became known from recent Western publications. In addition to the MNR M1 Grizzly (adopted, there is no information about entering the troops) for the army we developed an analogue of our BIS and UR-77 - BIS ABV (Assault Breacher Vehicle), note - it is “assault”. This unification, and standardization, and savings, and increased protection from all sides.

Figure 44 BIS ABV based on M1 Abrams MBT


Once again we ask the question: "Is it necessary to ensure the defense of the mines by strengthening the bottom and creating new vehicles of armored vehicles?"
In the first part of the article, it was already mentioned about mines, which are divided according to the fuse target sensor according to the following types: pressure, discharge, tension, break, inertial, wind, magnetic, acoustic, electromagnetic, optical, temperature and barometric action. Virtually all such mines are efficiently handled by engineering equipment specially developed for these purposes, which was also mentioned.

Currently, there are four main ways of making passages in minefields: mechanical, explosive, non-contact and manual. The latter is clearly of little interest.

In the mechanical method of making passages in minefields, mounted (built-in) devices are used that are mounted in front of the armored vehicle (roller and roller-and-knife trawls KMT-6, KMT-7, KMT-8, KMT-10) or armored clearance machines BMR .

The explosive method of making passages in minefields involves the use of demining charges, undermining which the mines operate, collapse and are thrown out of the passage being made (demining installations UR-77, UR-83П).

The non-contact method is used to trigger mines that have non-contact target sensors or disable electronic components of fuses (EMT electromagnetic trawl, Infauna, Centaur station, RP-377BM, Lesochek, and others).

This non-contact method is the most promising (in the opinion of the author). The cost of equipment is incomparably higher than the cost of armor, but the equipment will eliminate the effect of an explosion on the carrier, while the armor will take a hit on itself, and in the best case will be replaced with a new one. At worst, even if the crew is alive and well, the car is not recoverable. In the column it will be enough to have one machine with the equipment, while the MRAP will be able to detect a mine only after the explosion. The cost of one MRAP on average 350-400 thousand USD. Is it really more expensive special means?

When conducting an attacking battle, making passes in enemy minefields is carried out, as a rule, in an explosive manner using extended charges (US) and demining installations of the type UR-77. Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles (BMP), equipped with trawls, overcome barriers on their own. Doesn't it seem that equipping light armored vehicles with a sufficient number of trawls for overcoming sections of a mined area is much more efficient, cheaper in production and operation? Installation of electronic equipment for just one car from the column is even more efficient, cheaper in production and operation? The USSR had trawls even before the events in Afghanistan. Rhodesia and the United States did not have them, so they went their own way, which is now being dragged along by everyone, including Russia. But the US has enough time to remember it enough - now even trawls are fitted to MRAP-adapted minefield fields.

Figure 45 - HMMWV with mine sweep


46 picture - MRAP "Cougar" with mine sweep


Figure 47 - MRAP RG33L with manipulator


Under the conditions of an interested industry, mines have enormous potential for modernization. The author is inclined to believe that it is possible to create anti-tank mines with tandem combat units with armor penetration characteristics not inferior to rocket-propelled grenades. And then what? Give 200 mm armor on the bottom!? Another obvious huge evolutionary parity of the means of destruction over the armor.

Conclusion:
- guerrilla actions from ambush inevitably lead to damage. Even having a special MRAP machine in its fleet, an allied NATO contingent suffers losses from the action of mines;
- in fact, the whole range of measures to improve protection, implemented in the MRAP, protects only against anti-explosive high explosive devices and it’s not a fact that it is against anti-tank mines, industrial production, especially modern ones;
- MRAP is just an additional type of armored vehicles. Moreover, it is not intended to drive through minefields, but is intended only to increase the survivability of the crew in the event of a mine explosion or an IED. Consequently, it is expedient to implement the concept of MRAP not within the framework of a new class of armored vehicles, but as part of the modernization of the part in service and mass-produced BTR, BMP and BMD (just in case);
- according to the method of protection from the action of mines, the MRAPs are merely a perverted analog of the roller trawl;
- in conditions of general combat, increased protection from the action of mines is necessary only for a special type of vehicle, and therefore, domestic light armor meets its purpose and the modern requirements of combat;
- the availability of modern radio-electronic means allows for equipping domestic tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and BMD with them to achieve the required level of protection against the action of mines, moreover, at a radically top level of protection against mines (remote), unlike foreign analogues. Unfortunately, it seems that, as always, Russia will have to go from the pioneers to the overtakers.

The queue of recognition of symptoms and the search for pathogens of Fear.

I would like to note in advance that it seems doubtful that the soldiers of the United States or any other country are not afraid of mines, moving in the cabins of their MRAP or Hummery. Mines in the passport do not look, the purpose of the visit or a military ID is not asked. So does the transportation of the landing on the roof, and not inside the troop compartment, increase security from the action of mines?

Indeed, every person who observed Soviet / Russian soldiers and officers sitting on the roofs of an armored troop-carrier, BMD, and infantry fighting vehicles had the question: “Why not inside?”. “When a mine is blown up, only the crew will die, and not the entire squad,” the response of enlightened neighbors or screen heroes sounded pathetic. Who and when first voiced this explanation, came up with this style of movement is not known.

But it is known that the militants of the illegal armed groups used this very well - why waste an RPG shot or put a mine when you can just give a line from the window of the machine gun and put a branch on without looking, and the car will go on without noticing the loss. Laid a mine two meters from the road, and yes even poured nails on top. Ba-bang - and the board was cleared of infantry. Remember history Figure 33 and understand that guaranteed to get rid of losses, this measure does not help. Yes, it is generally nothing in such situations will not help. But a logical explanation for riding on the roof is simply bound to exist!

Figure 48 - Nexter VBCI BMP


The height of the Russian BTR-80 is 2460 mm (on the roof of the tower), 475 mm clearance, the French VBCI is 2260 mm (the value is clearly underestimated, the height of the tower is not taken into account), the clearance is 500 mm. But if the BTR-80 has inclined side plates, then the VBCI is straight. Naturally, no one will jump from such a height of desire. The one who did not jump from the body of an army KAMAZ in a standard fifteen-kilogram outfit with a gun in his hands, would hardly believe that from such a height it is possible to break into a cake. The answer is short - you can, because it is not for nothing that the paratroopers are taught to “stack” when landing. The situation is very similar. So, in the event of a mine exploding, the landing troops that had fallen off from the roof would hardly be combat-ready. There can be no reduction in speech overloads - vertebrae sitting on the roof will receive exactly the same amount as they would receive sitting inside.

Maybe the fact is that when armor is broken through with an RPG shot, the crew in the car will receive barotrauma will be broken off? But the grenade explodes outside. First, the action of the fragments of the hull and the products of the explosion will be tested just sitting on top.

Figure 49 - Dropping from the roof of the BTR-80


A reasonable explanation is only one thing - the lack of ergonomics. At the disposal of the landing force in BMD-1 (2) there is no more than 1300 mm of free space (vehicle height minus clearance and height of the tower, without taking into account the thickness of the roof, bottom, etc.), at the disposal of the infantry in BPM-1 (2) - 1330 mm. That is, the landing sits in them in the positions of the embryo, which is not entirely comfortable (see picture 50). All domestic armored vehicles do not have air conditioners, and being inside a "pan", in which the air temperature easily reaches 60 оС, to put it mildly, does not contribute to an increase in combat readiness. Doorways are small, it is impossible to dismount quickly and not to stuff the cones, and even that is “fast” far to “satisfactory” (13-15 seconds).

Figure 50 a) - Dismounting from the BMP-1 troop compartment (2)


Figure 50 b) - Dismounting from the BMP-1 troop compartment (2)


Figure 51 a) - View of the troop compartment of the BMD "Bradley" (for comparison)


Figure 51 b) - Departure from BTR VBCI, France (for comparison)


Figure 51 c) - Amphibious assault BTR "Namer", Israel (for comparison)


At the beginning of the shelling or undermining of a mine, as well as the beginning of a fire in a car, it will be incomparably more difficult for wounded soldiers to get out (dismount) from it than from it. The local conflict is still not Stalingrad. Round-the-clock fighting by partisans is rarely conducted, and sensible military, as we know from the first part of the article, do not climb on the APC to attack, just as they don’t take a taxi to the bakery.

Fear of dying from mines is more comparable with the same fear of movement in the forest: it seems to the incoming one that the enemy sits behind each tree or shrub and aims at it, and the defender, on the contrary, that because of each tree, enemies are about to trample on him. And, of course, the peculiarities of the mentality - Russian "maybe", Ponte and recklessness. Here, in order not to be torn apart by the God-fearing Russian people, the author subtly hints that it was not by chance that he wrote a little earlier how the crew of the armored car might not notice the loss, but proceeded from the experiments of military operations in Chechnya.

Generally, based on the wide range of special engineering equipment and equipment in service with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (KMT, BIS, IMR, BREM, UR and others), created and intended to overcome engineering barriers, the need for mine protection from domestic light armored vehicles becomes, to put it, using normative vocabulary, inappropriate. Only the question of the presence of its necessary quantity in the troops remains open.

"Out of sight, out of mind". MRAP media star, where there is the BIS, WRI, BREM and SD, especially domestic. This is the only way to explain the unfair disregard for even the very existence of the best-in-class Russian engineering armored vehicles in favor of foreign convulsive attempts to create something similar.

Conclusion:
- go on the roof of the armored personnel carrier, infantry fighting vehicle, BMD is no safer than making a campaign for the crew inside the car, than moving around in the back of a truck with a canvas awning, and it is more expedient only from the point of view of the speed of leaving the vehicle (dismounting) in the event of an ambush attack on the convoy ;
- those properties of domestic armored vehicles that are described as shortcomings in comparison with modern models of armored vehicles of potential opponents are not such. A complete non-compliance with the requirements of protection, especially from the action of mines, is just bloated PR;
- in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation there are no sufficient number of special vehicles BIS, WRI, protected from the action of mines similarly (honestly, an order of magnitude higher) MRAP, the functions of which were assigned to light armored vehicles that are not equipped with special engineering equipment in the form of mine trawls, which led to loss of personnel and equipment;
- the weak resistance of the domestic tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and BMD, is not the factor that makes the infantry go on armor;
- for effective protection from the action of mines of domestic armored personnel carriers in combat, a special engineering technique was created, which should operate in a uniform manner with the same type chassis (MBT, BMP, BTR, BMD).

4. The armor protection of domestic armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD does not allow them to operate in conjunction with tanks.

Using or, as the lawyers say, on the basis of the first part of the article, we boldly cut off BMD and BTR from tanks. It remains to consider one person involved in the case - the BMP. If she doesn’t write “because of what and why” for a long time, she (they) has reached such a life, then we can note one very simple and objective argument. The following argument - from the fire of modern tank 120 / 125-mm cannons, even from long distances, does not always save the armor of modern main tanks. If, as usual, to turn around to foreign experience, it is clear that for some reason in the west they did not weld 150-mm sheets onto the front armor of the BMP, say, Bradley, which in the “Bure in the Desert” moved in the rear of the M1, surely hitting them in Stern "friendly" fire. It still does not help. By the way, the same VBCI must act in the same order as the Leclerc and is also deprived of a heavy armor.

In the light of the tendencies of transition to the caliber 140 mm, it seems more appropriate for the author to completely remove the task of operating with tanks in a general manner in an explicit manner, as it was provided for by TO and IE 1972 of the year.

The conclusion is obvious:
- it is possible to operate effectively with tanks even on a bicycle, but on what to act against tanks against tanks is another matter;
- Any tanker who chooses a target between a tank and a BMP to destroy, will first of all choose a tank, since it is the tank that carries enough firepower to defeat his counterpart. After that, you can safely deal with the BMP and its troops, you can even move off to a safe distance from its fire;
- the crew and the landing on the BMP to act against the tanks is no more dangerous than to act against them on foot;
- armor protection of domestic armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, BMD allows them to act with tanks, but their use in actions against tanks is obviously associated with large losses.

Figure 52 - BMP-2 support T-72 tanks


5. The system of active protection "Arena" could significantly increase the security of armored personnel carriers, why is it still not installed?

Firstly: active protection systems (all domestic similar systems are called SAZ, foreign ones - “Hard kill APS”) are able to effectively deal only with cumulative ammunition, and for the most part with anti-tank guided missiles and rocket grenades. It will be more difficult to cope with thick tanker “kuma” hulls. And with the assertiveness of OFS, especially in variant G (concrete-piercing projectile), and the impetuous arrogance of BPS, it is possible to understand only in words, that is, theoretically.

But if you imagine the conditions of guerrilla warfare in urban environments and discard the empty arguments of interested representatives of RPG manufacturers (due to the nature of the duty ratio, which is a little further, it is proposed to hit the armored vehicles with SAZ with two simultaneous shots from different directions or from one, but with a slight delay) , then SAZ become extremely curious.

Secondly: except for Israel (there is information about the interest of India) in the issue of arming such systems, the armed forces of all developed countries are plagued by vague doubts. On the one hand, everything is great, but on the other, something stops. It is interesting, what makes constantly modernize the SAZ developed and ready for mass production? Need to understand ...

Main characteristics of SAZ:
- cost. Makes up 200 – 600 thousand USD (“Arena” - about 300 thousand USD);
- the mass of the set of equipment. It is 140 – 780 kg (“Arena” - 1100 kg);
- reaction time (from target detection to its defeat). Range: 0,005 – 0,560 sec (“Arena” - 0,070 sec);
- reaction time to the next target (that is the duty ratio). Range: 0,0 – 15,0 sec (“Arena” - 0,2 – 0,4 sec);
- the zone of the beginning of the detection of a dangerous target. Makes up 2 – 150 m (“Arena” - 50 m);
- zone of continuous defeat (“Arena” - 30 m);
- The number of warheads. Ammunition: 6 – 12 units ("Arena" - 22 units.);
- speed of targets being destroyed (“Arena” - 70 – 700 m / s);
- energy consumption (“Arena” - 1 kW);
- occupied reserved volume of the carrier (“Arena” - 30 l);
- protection sector in azimuth. Range: 150 – 360о (“Arena” - 270о);
- overlapping sectors of neighboring warheads. In one direction can operate from 1 to 16 blocks (that is, all).

It can be seen that the cost of one SAZ is comparable to the cost of one MRAP. At the same time, an important requirement for placing a SAZ on a carrier is its partial or complete location on top of all other protection systems. That is, SAZ is not only protected from small arms fire, but also interferes with the optimal location of other protection systems. Also, in most cases SAZ increase the visibility of the carrier. The enemy’s location of the blocks is known and visually visible, and he has the time and opportunity to take advantage of this or to inflict elementary damage by shooting SAZ.

Thirdly: alas, but despite the active advertising of the Arena and the primacy in the development and creation of SAZ, the most advanced, albeit later developed, are foreign samples. The Russian model Arena-E (Design Bureau of KBM, Kolomna) lost, as did Iron Fist (Israel Military Industries), Trophy (RAFAEL ADS), Quick Kill (Raytheon), AMAP-ADS (Deisenroth Engineering) by test results in India by the Swedish LEDS-150 (Saab). Yes, it can be said that this is an export option, but even purely according to the “Arena” performance characteristics in this list, the leaders are “from the end”, despite the fact that Saab is constantly rebuilding LEDS.

Fourthly: SAZ are effective against partisans, but they are in no way adapted to “normal” combat operations, that is, to frontal attacks. Not for nothing are SAZ warheads located closer to the sides and aft.

Fifth: a direct competitor in the face of the latest generation of mounted dynamic protection (NDZ) is much cheaper than a SAS in terms of cost with relatively equal efficiency (SAS can hit several targets released at the same point, but the protection area in azimuth and elevation and overall the number of NDZ blocks is much greater). In addition, to improve the protection of the carrier from RPG grenades, against which SAZ and NDZ are mainly targeted, and SAZ hopelessly lose to the simplest, most advanced, cheap and effective means - lattice screens. If SAZ does not expand the range of effectively struck ammunition, their prospects are unenviable.

Sixthly: on all demonstrative firing at the object protected by the Arena, it uses inert shots PG-2. That is, even manufacturers themselves do not believe in stopudovy efficiency and reliability of SAZ.

Conclusion:
- the idea of ​​SAZ is quite attractive, but even today it is still “raw” for the needs of the consumer;
- the characteristics of the domestic SAZ “Arena” are inferior in many respects to their foreign counterparts (the analogue of the LEDS-300 being developed is not expected at all) and does not allow the commercially available passive protection systems of similar designation to surpass;
- The Arena SAZ is rightly ignored by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but this does not remove the blame from the RF Ministry of Defense in particular for not equipping the domestic light armor with similar passive means of protection, unlike foreign armies.

6. Ammunition of domestic tanks is located in the hull, prone to detonation when a tank is detonated by a mine, unlike, for example, the M1 tank and its modifications.

With this question too it is not necessary to deal long. We go to learn materiel. We learn that tanks МХNUMX, starting with modification М1А1, have shells of three readiness queues. 1 shells are located in the housing niche under the tower, the rest in two niches in the tower in equal parts. 6-mm armored bulkheads are separated from the crew compartment. That is, when undermining a mine, the M20 also has something to detonate. One shot will explode or twenty-one significant role in the fate of the crew will not play.

But the mechanic-driver of the M1 tank is immured from the entire crew in his personal "office", and this is not sarcasm or irony. On the one hand, this increases the survivability of the crew. On the other hand, if, after an explosion in the fighting compartment, or simply after getting into the tower, the power system is stuck or the power system fails, then the mechanics will have to hope that the support will be close and will have time. After all, even if he can open the hatch, then squeeze between the hatch and the tower (cannon) - for nothing in the world. Then there is a choice either to burn, either to the mercy or to be torn apart by the enemy.

If you compare the M1 with domestic tanks, then immediately comes to mind the story of the battleship "Invincible" of the British Navy, in which the propelling charges were not protected by shells. Indeed, the shells and charges to them in burning cartridges placed in non-mechanized laying, domestic tanks are less protected than those placed in the trays of conveyors AZ / MH or sleeves laying МХNUMX. But, as it turned out in the practice of fighting, the protective shutters of the niches M1 tankers rarely close because of the inconvenience of the latter. Accordingly, in the case of detonation of ammunition, the crew members in the fighting compartment of the tank are not protected by anything. The crews of the T-1 and T-72 in similar conditions replenished ammunition only the number of mechanized shots. Shots placed in non-mechanized laying, remained in the boxes on the base, too, because of the inconvenience with their loading into the tank and subsequent use. Thus, in combat, T-80, T-72 were disposed of in part of their shortcomings, while the M80 got rid of its merits.

But still, a lower location to the tank floor, and therefore to the action of a mine explosion, in domestic tanks increases the likelihood of a detonation of ammunition, which has been repeatedly proved by OBD. At the same time, even the most defended OBD ammunition also detonated.

In the continuation of the comparison, another fact comes to mind - the confident infliction of contusion injuries and the disabling of the crew of the tank with the penetration of the CFC without penetration. It is still doubtful that the increase in survivability and security of the crew during the detonation of ammunition in an isolated compartment (tower niche) seems to be. Not only does the tank lose its ammunition and firepower and turns into a target, so the energy of the explosion in comparison with the outboard explosion of the CFS will be more. 20-mm wall as a damper, and the role of irresistible protection is weak. Again, getting into a shot placed in the turret is much simpler than a shot being in the conveyor inside the fighting compartment - the most protected place in the tank. Therefore, the design decision on the non-insulated placement of ammunition in the presence of a carousel AZ / MH was justified.
Disappointing for the crew, but a positive fact from the point of view of the possibility of restoring a domestic car is that if a charge placed in the hull is defeated, its burnout is more likely than detonation. The rest of the ammunition can remain completely unharmed, which is excluded when unitary loading.

Conclusion: in the event of a mine explosion, the ammunition sets of foreign tanks are prone to detonation to a lesser extent, compared to domestic ones. At the same time, in any real combat conditions, without the use of anti-tank mines or when tanks are equipped with mounted or attached mine defenses, the advantage in defending ammunition is unequivocally from domestic tanks.

7. Domestic armored vehicles have advanced to date optical-electronic means of dealing with the WTO. WTO will be the main means of destruction of tanks in the near future.

It is believed that to combat the WTO (precision weapons) armored vehicles need the following: means of reducing visibility for optical and electronic means of reconnaissance of targets, SAZ (EW equipment and so on).

If foreign armies already use on their combat vehicles means of reducing visibility (screens with a special coating and camouflage), the Russian Armed Forces in the old manner are masked manually by soldiers with brushes in their hands and a can of available paint and a pair of tied branches. Further exhibition samples dressed in shaggy rubber mats matter still can not move.

SAZ data are not intended for destroying enemy ammunition, but for counteracting their normal functioning - withdrawal from the optimal trajectory, redirecting to false targets and setting these false targets, blocking radio commands and radio interference. In the west, such SAZs are called “Soft kill APS”, domestic ones are optical-electronic countermeasure complexes (CEP).

In order to understand what and how armored vehicles will have to encounter with the CoE in the present and near future, we will get to know the specifics of using the WTO (guided artillery shells [UAS] and ATGM) in tanks.

1) An advanced observer with a set of equipment "honorary suicide bomber" consisting of a laser pointer-rangefinder, communications, orientation tools (GPS navigators, digital compasses, and so on), shot timing equipment scans the target.

More details about this kit: domestic LCD-4 costs more than 4 million rubles, weight - from 20,5 kg (the manufacturer has very tactfully kept silent that this is complete with a night vision unit and a thermal imager on 4 hours of operation, I want more - add a few thousand rubles and kg for the battery and for the thermal imager cooling unit); communications costs about 150 thousand rubles. with a mass of about 4,5 kg. Other "rubbish" also adds kilograms and rubles to the "piggy bank" of intelligence officers, and this is without taking into account personal weapons and standard equipment. And this is only one post, so each shot of the WTO literally goes gold and is simply obliged to do its “work” to “excellent”;
- after completing the topographic location, determining the coordinates and parameters of the target, he transfers the data to the battery commander (the senior officer of the battery if CMR are used);
- after calculating the initial shooting settings, the battery commander "gives the nod" to the shot. The matter is taken equipment synchronization shot, which will tell the scouts when to highlight the target;
- shot. UAS is coming to the trajectory section where the head of guidance starts searching for a target (descending branch of the trajectory). The Scout highlights the target;
- UAS, accepting the signal reflected from the target, corrects the flight path and hits the target.

It seems simple. What really? If we reject such “rare” weather troubles as fog, rain, snow, dust and sandstorms, low clouds and so on, come to terms with the fact that a goal can simply disappear from view, for example, by standing in bushes or behind a tree, drove into pit then stay with the following. The average time of flight of the projectile at a distance of over 20 km about 40 seconds. Of these, the required target illumination time for capturing it with a pointing head is no more than 15 seconds. Thus, the tank after its detection by the enemy's scout has about 60 seconds in order to avoid defeat, not counting the time spent on calculating installations, preparing and loading the shot, and exchanging radio data.

A little earlier, advanced observers called death row. This is because even at the present time, when the means of detecting laser irradiation and radio suppression stations on armored vehicles have not yet become widespread, experts agree that the WTO in its modern view will be effective only against the “backward” adversary. Possessing modern weapons, the enemy will easily find the scouts, and will bring their weapons on them - from a powerful laser emitter, a blinding observer (by the way, the Chinese are following this way) to a tank anti-tank system. Paradoxically, but the fact is that Lebanese militants who are actively using outdated Malyutka anti-tank guided missiles, are controlled by wire, in terms of security of WTO use, the most advanced.

Many “experts” will say that the return laser beam is nonsense, but the illegal armed formation snipers with the retarded glued eye from a distance of about 5000 m will not agree with the range finders of our artillery spotters. As well as the burned-out tubes of tank sights reconciliation when the distance measurement button is erroneously pressed when carrying out the maintenance of the TMS of tanks. Well, dozens of antisniper devices developed to date allow determining the source of exposure.

The cost of the WTO (guided artillery ammunition [UAB] and corrected artillery ammunition and aerial bombs [CAB]) exceeds the cost of ATGM, and the cost of their combat use ... If the tank hits the advanced observers, the WTO turns into an empty hefty suitcase, which is heavy to carry, and it's a pity to quit.

At present, the ideas of domestic designers have poured into the creation of the EPR “Shtora-1”, consisting of sensors for detecting laser radiation, a sensor for detecting radiation from an ATGM control channel, smoke grenade launchers, infrared projectors and a weather station sensor.
Technology "stealth" our tanks in the foreseeable future just does not threaten. The “blind” in 15 seconds emits a lot of watts of energy. After the tank is repulsed from the AAC, its coordinates are easily calculated (radar or thermal imager at the reconnaissance observation station). In any case, the "Blind" allows you to deal with the "symptoms" and the consequences of the outbreak of the attack, and not with the cause of its beginning, while it has a fairly high cost, the load on the power system of the tank, is not protected from light rifle fire.

Conclusion
:
- the topic of the WTO, which began a rapid development, also quickly faded into the background, from which it also soon retired. The cost of developing a WTO counteraction complex is significantly lower than the cost of developing a WTO countermeasure complex (counteracting WTO countering complexes). Currently, the current status of the WTO is an idea without continuing in the future;
- if you are guided by the principle: “something is better than nothing,” then domestic EEC is the ultimate dream. For a truly effective struggle with an adversary possessing and using a WTO, the capabilities of domestic CoEP are not enough;
- even if domestic KOEP are not perfect, only domestic tanks are currently protected from the use of the enemy by the WTO.

8. Israeli heavy armored personnel carriers Akhzarit, Puma and Namer are the most protected BTR / BMP in the world. They should focus on the development of new domestic counterparts.

“Merkava” tank is certainly excellent, but its invulnerability, admittedly, is too high. The “Military Review” already had a link to this material (http://alternathistory.org.ua/luchshii-v-mire-tank-merkava-perspektivy). What can I say? If the Merkava Mk.4 was powerless against the RPG and ATGM, then the heavy armored personnel carriers built on its base clearly did not outperform the original. But let's not get ahead and start looking for roots.

Take the example of "Ahzarit", so to speak progenitor. Many “analysts” associate an increase in the hull mass of the T-54 / 55 tank on the basis of which the Ahzarit is built from 27 to 44 tons with an unprecedented increase in body armor. 17 tons of extra armor - class! But this is just a fallacy or a myth. Even if you analyze purely visually, without having secret drawings.

The point is this. The known proportion is “1: 3: 7”, the meaning of which is as follows: for differentiated armor protection of modern BTVT, the regularity is valid - if a given increment of the length of the BTVT sample corresponds to a unit increment of its mass, a three-fold increase in mass and height will be sevenfold.

Akhzarit is longer than the T-54 / 55 (tank hull) by 250 mm (and the heaviest millimeters of the nose, the thickness of which was increased from 100 to 200 mm), wider by 370 mm, lower than just 220 mm (if you count height T-55 on the roof of the tower). Only one additional frontal armor sheet with a thickness of 100 mm is at least 3 tons of weight. Of course, armor protection of the forehead and hull as a whole is greatly enhanced, but otherwise it’s more for increasing the size than for dramatically increasing the protection of an outdated tank.

Figure 53 - Silhouette T-54 on the background of TBTR Ahzarit


Yes, powerful side screens appeared (each weighing about a ton) and dynamic protection on them, but the height of the sides themselves increased by no less than 25% and now they have no tilt angles. Where there used to be a shoulder strap tower, now weighty slab, and so on.

Intermediate conclusion: talk about the miracle of the protection of "Akhzarit", to put it mildly, exaggerate. 17 tons of armor is for the most part a fee for an increase in the amount booked. We recall about a couple of well-aimed shots on optics and understand how it is with pleasure that you can enjoy the view of the Akhzarith monster burning from the Molotov cocktail.

Figure 54 - Evacuation of the wounded through the roof of a heavy heavy armored personnel carrier, Lebanon


The issue of exploitation is a special subject - this is both the engine and the tank transmission and the resource of components and assemblies is also a tank one. Money is not small. Even the United States cannot afford to use Akhzarit as a “fly” or “workhorse”. That is, it is impossible to replace BTR-80 with similar vehicles in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation today and in the near future.

Of course, the idea of ​​refitting outdated tanks in an armored personnel carrier deserves attention. In our country, the slogan seems to go: “All unnecessary things will be scrapped, we will collect scrap metal!” As a result, T-64, T-72 and T-80, which have not yet worked out with a full set of DZ blocks and on-board screens, are simply disposed of with tears in their eyes (BTRZ workers).

Figure 55 - Typical platform of the domestic BTRZ


Yes, they could be converted into heavy armored personnel carriers or, for example, the BIS. But not only the domestic industry makes a difference - no one else has made such machines except Israel. The Germans, for example, conscientiously saw their “Marder” and outdated “Leopards”, both the first and the second.

Figure 56 - Disposal of BMP Marder in Germany


Why, there the Germans, the Israelis themselves are no longer engaged in alterations, and this despite the fact that they have something to convert, for example, American tanks M60.

Figure 57 - 700 Israeli tanks M60, offered for sale at 0,25 USD for 1 kg.


And after the appearance of this material, you can leave all disputes at all (http://topwar.ru/22142-izrail-sozdast-novoe-semeystvo-bronetehniki.html). Even the authors and owners of Akhzarit and Namera want to have something simpler and easier in addition to them: “The Israeli Defense Ministry intends in the near future to launch the program for developing a new family of light armored combat vehicles adapted for combat in urban areas . The prospective family has already received the name "Rakiya"; It will be created on the basis of the main battle tank “Merkava” Mk.4 using part of its technology, but they will not be tanks. Most likely, the new cars will receive a wheeled chassis, the Merkava Mk.4 will be twice as light (its weight is about 65 tons) and will be much faster and more maneuverable. ” This material is also available on the "Military Review".

Why is the successful experience of Israel not adopted by other countries? Maybe because it is not difficult for Israel to keep 500 "Ahzarits" in the service of the army, given the financial compensation paid annually by Germany, but the needs of the armies of the USA, China, Germany and Russia in armored personnel carriers are much higher. And everything as always rests on money.

Again, and who ever said that they are the best? Has anyone compared them with the Russian BIS? Moreover, the BIS has a huge potential for modernization and improvement, in contrast to the overweight “Akhzarit”, “Pumas” and “Namera”. It should be a shame, comrades!

Conclusion:
- Israeli heavy armored personnel carriers “Akhzarit”, “Puma” and “Namer” are indeed the most protected foreign landing armored vehicles, but they are not armored personnel carriers and not BMPs. The scope of work that is assigned (assigned, for example, in Afghanistan) to domestic armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, they will never perform;
- It is necessary to focus on heavy BTR "Ahzarit", "Puma" and "Namer" when developing new domestic counterparts, but you need to develop a different type of car (for more details on this, see paragraph 11);
- author's opinion: domestic BIS - the most protected heavy BTR / BMP in the world.

9. Unsuccessful arrangement of fuel tanks BMP-1 (2) in the aft hatches of the troop compartment.

Immediately ask the question "experts" (that is, to themselves): "Where is this location successful or will it be?" We use the method "by contradiction" (the method of "exceptions"), based on the fact that we are creating a floating car with a low silhouette, strongly limited in mass and size and intended for attacking actions.

A) Outside the hull. Easily accessible for refueling, easily accessible for enemy fire. Hit and penetration of such tanks is not terrible for the crew, but deadly, since the car will lose its course and will become a well-highlighted target. In addition, such a machine can swim only vertically before meeting with the bottom. Hang on the stern can not be - there are hatches of the troop compartment. Option disappears.
B) Inside the case. The consequences of the hits are absolutely the same - fatal, but it will be more difficult for the enemy to do this, because the tanks will not be visually visible. Other things being equal, we choose this option and then determine where to put the tank.
1) Into the bow in the MTO compartment. The crew is protected as much as possible. Well, even if after the penetration of tanks, the MTO will burn out completely - the crew will have time to leave the car. That's just the weight distribution will not allow the car to float, especially without landing, well, except that vertically with his nose down. Not that!
2) In the fighting compartment. There is simply no place in it. Exclude option.
3) In a shelf under the roof. Possible only in the troop compartment. In this case, it is necessary to record in the landing of schoolchildren or dwarfs, so that they can crawl into such a department. Do not go!
4) In the floor of the bottom. The variant is similar to item 3).

Figure 58 - Fuel tanks in the stern hatchways of the BMP-1 troop compartment (2)


5) Somewhere else. It is clear that it is impossible to enter the MTO department - we will not be able to swim, there is nowhere in battle - there is a turret, ammunition and two crew members. It remains the troop compartment. Nobody can be crammed in here, everything is already crowded without it. An ideal place for swingers.
Conclusion: in view of the technical requirements, the designers made a rational reasonable and logical decision to place the fuel tanks in the stern hatches, which are protected by the maximum possible measures.

10. The BMP-3 with the Bakhcha combat module has the highest firepower.

It is very likely, but ... We recall the purpose of the BPM and the tasks performed by it and ask ourselves the question: "Why does the BMP have so much extra iron (about 4 tons) when there is an ACS and other specially created and armed vehicles based on them?" In general, the BMP-3 itself is a special subject, which is only one consideration of the chassis from the point of view of the theory of the layout of combat vehicles. But we confine ourselves to “Bakhchoy”.

Battle module "Bakhcha-U". His birth is associated with the demands of the military to significantly increase the firepower of the BMP-3 developed at that time. Thanks to these requirements, the low ballistics gun 2А70 was born. What was the result?

Saying about the Bakhcha-U module, that it is an absurd addition to the crazy BMP-3, is like praising. Extremely hard, but as it is; here the opinion of the author coincides with the views of many industry experts and the military, directly operating the machine. So, who cannot adequately perceive objective criticism, let him stigmatize us, or better still, beats his head against the wall).

Dear FCS, “sharpened” under guided ammunition, 30-mm gun and PKT, 100-mm gun 2-70. And also in the fences on the chassis of the AGS-17 or PKT. In short, blinded from all that was.

The place of the PCT is explicable, obligatory and unshakable. Until such an equally cheap and effective means of fighting the nearby infantry infantry troops of the PKT will be in the "main force".

AGS-17, especially mounted on the chassis, is a very profitable and desirable means of fire. He would be in a pair with the 30-mm cannon, and enemy infantry within the 1,5 radius of a kilometer. But how stupidly on the BMP-3 they were installed in the fenders! All the power of the AGS-17 talent to fire on a hinged trajectory was torn off, thrown away and forgotten in favor of the course barrage fire weapon. But the BMP does not need it, it is not a three-turreted tank. Unlike "Berezhka", "Bakhche" AGS in its original form and magnificence did not get.

As mentioned earlier, it is easy to disable a tank with just a few hits of 30-mm projectiles. The main thing is that they are accurate. That is, it is not necessary to arm the BMP with a tank gun to fight armored vehicles. This means that the module and the whole machine cannot be abused for arming the 30-mm cannon.

To fight with openly located manpower, manpower in the trenches and fortifications that 30-mm, that 100-mm gun is not enough. For action on similar targets, it is preferable to have a mortar capable of delivering ammunition to the target without fortifications. By the power of the action that high-explosive, that fragmentation 82-mm mine will give odds similar to 100-mm shells. Actually machines with similar weapons have already been created and are beginning to enter the troops (SAU 2K32, 2C34). What is the merit of 2А70?

According to testimonials, the stated sighting range in the 4000 m was not confirmed by accurate hits. You can shoot at 4000 m, but it's impossible to get somewhere, or more precisely. That is, if the OFS is fired, the BCS generally has an effective range of less than 1500 m. And why then a gun that does not cover the 30-mm gun that is already on board with an effective range? In any case, let's say, a little expensive.
The love of guided missiles has no limits. Expensive, but refined and tasteful. Already 8 pieces on board! From OBD we can say one thing - they do not like military guided weapons. Especially to serve his OMS. In any case, the number of such shots is already a moot point.

To say bad things about what he personally worked with, of course, is not entirely pleasant, but still ... Let us omit general questions, and now consider the side that is affected extremely rarely - maintenance of equipment. Here, BMP-3 with “Bakhchoy” is out of competition for costs. God forbid you to conduct THAT 2А70 and remove the trigger mechanism !!! Advice to conscripts - to mess around, contract soldiers ... You knew what you were going for. My advice and request to Satan - make it a torture for bad designers! After all, this simple operation takes several hours.

The manual for the BMP-3, created by the minds of the PCU, describes the maintenance of the 2-70 gun. It is here that the true essence of the designers of the machine manifests itself. None of them, it seems, didn’t bother to climb into their own child. It’s one thing a cannon, and it’s quite another thing a weapon mounted in an BMP tower with an 2A42 (2A72) gun coupled to it and a PKT machine gun. In any case, the operational documentation should not be done. Shame!

So, to begin with, the trigger mechanism of the 2А42 (2А72) cannon is removed and removed so that it doesn’t stop them from crawling. Then the links of its tape diverter are removed in the same way (a metal multisection box-shaped gutter leading from a rotating polik to a gun), because the mechanism buffer lies on them. This is done in a half-ride on outstretched hands, observing with one eye the gap between the elements of the "design" of the interior, with its head resting on some regular iron figovin, which in the fighting compartment simply does not count. Finally, with the help of a sledgehammer, the desired mechanism is taken out, weighing over 30 kg, and with all the same outstretched arms is removed to the roof of the tower for maintenance. And now, in order to put it in place, you will have to not just repeat everything in the reverse order, but spend twice as much time and effort on it. I don’t know why, but neither the mechanism, nor the studs of the belt diverter links (resting on the buffer) stand in place, they do not want to persuade all the same sledgehammer, which has nowhere to swing. Moreover, all this was done by us on an already half-disassembled (!) Car.

As a result, one MOT 2А70 takes time, if measured in hours ... In short, in a combat situation it is easier to either remove the module from the car on the crane, so that its nodes have normal access, or it can be changed at all to a working one, it will be faster. In general, no words - one mat. Only crawl to the heels of the links of the box worthy of a medal for courage. Those who are familiar with the situation, will not lie. And this is just one example. To torment the crew with this is simply inhumane, even for the Russian army (I would like to say especially, but my own experience did not allow). Let it be better at this time the crew TSP will pass.

What we have in the end: FCT, which simply has nothing to replace, obstructed AGS-17, 30-mm gun, aimless 100-mm gun 2-X70.

Conclusion:
- The numbers of firepower of the BMP-3 with the Bakhcha combat module are too high, but even the available firepower for the BMP-3 is redundant and not needed, armament is irrational. The module (thanks to the 2А70 product) is a ballast, the weight of which with great success would be taken by additional armor;
- to hide behind the demands of the military for increasing firepower with the installation of the Bakhcha-U combat module is an alarming sign both for the domestic defense industry and for the customer.

11. The buoyancy property of BTR, BMP, BMD is not necessary, it is better to send all the reserves in favor of security. And bridges and so will be, where the tanks - there are bridge laying.

To the issue of buoyancy. In the attack on any theater of operations (with the exception of deserts), troops will be forced to force various water barriers - rivers, lakes, canals, estuaries, reservoirs, flooding sites, and so on. On average, on planet Earth, for example, rivers up to 100 m wide are found every 35 – 60 km, 100 – 300 m wide - through 100 – 150 km, and 300 m wide - through km. In other words, during the offensive, units will have to overcome, on average, one medium water barrier and several small width obstacles on average.

According to the experience of the offensive actions of the Second World War, the forcing was carried out effectively, as a rule, only in a short time, suddenly for the enemy and on a broad front. Crucial to the success of forcing had (and will have in the future) a gain in time. Yes, the events are long-standing ...
However, tactical exercises conducted during the Cold War in the armies of the NATO countries, along rivers, canals, lakes, were usually equipped with powerful defensive lines, fire barriers, flooded areas, and nuclear mines. Thus, potential adversaries do not deny that they will actively use water barriers, and both natural and man-made ones. Moreover, these obstacles are becoming insurmountable also for the likely opponents themselves, shackling their own maneuvers.

In general, depending on the situation, the crossing of a water obstacle can be carried out in various ways: on the move, with preparation of forcing before units approach the water obstacle, or with the deployment of the main forces near the water barrier, after additional preparation for forcing in a short time. In all cases, the success of the forcing is determined by careful preparation, well-organized enemy reconnaissance and water obstacles, ensuring surprise, reliable air cover of units, powerful enemy fire engagement, timely deployment of cross-over facilities and ferry equipment, and measures to prevent the accumulation of personnel and equipment. at crossings, as well as strict observance of security measures.

If all of the above are foreseen before each crossing of a water barrier, there can be no question of the development of an offensive and success. Consequently, units need mobile transportable vehicles to overcome water obstacles, and preferably armored ones, the very ones that they propose to refuse.

It is clear that the most expedient and attractive way to overcome water obstacles - on the go. The essence of forcing off the move lies in the rapid exit to the water obstacle in the order of battle in which the battalion attacked, quickly overcoming it on a broad front after a short fire preparation, a decisive attack of the enemy and the non-stop development of the offensive on the opposite shore. The advantage of this method of forcing is that it provides the necessary gain of time, the suddenness of striking the enemy, the high rate of advance. What is important is the capture of the crossings and the timely delivery of the crossing means, until the retreating enemy regrouped his forces and turned to a counterattack or a powerful echeloned defense.

In accordance with the plan of actions for forcing and the combat mission assigned to the units, their combat order is created. It must ensure the decisive destruction of the enemy on its shore, the rapid forcing of a water obstacle and the continuous buildup of combat efforts during a battle on the opposite shore.

The advancement of subunits to the water barrier is carried out at maximum speed. If a unit operates as part of a forward detachment, its task is to reach the water barrier as soon as possible, bypassing the enemy’s individual strongholds, to capture the remaining ferries and sections suitable for forcing. Crossing units carry on existing bridges, as well as on floating combat vehicles and amphibious vehicles, on the opposite shore, they seize profitable lines and keep them until the main forces approach.

Figure 59 - Overcoming a water obstacle with a T-80BB tank using OPVT (snorkel)


Tank units operating as part of the main forces are shipped simultaneously with the first echelon on captured bridges and fords or by means of amphibious assault vehicles. After mastering the opposite shore, part of the tanks can be shipped under water. Having overcome a water barrier, tank divisions, without stopping, go to their own directions and carry out the assigned tasks.

The transfer of artillery attached to the subunit, as well as anti-aircraft units, is usually carried out on floating machines and paratroopers in such a way as to ensure continuous fire support and cover for the advancing units on the opposite shore.

That is, in any case, floating machines are needed, the more they will be, the better. What if an insidious enemy, like the Red Army once, undermines all the bridges during a retreat? It remains only to understand him, forgive and release, instead of catching up, grabbing, finishing him in his own lair.
Of course, the landing should be defended as it should, but you shouldn’t go as far as fanaticism, because by and large, as we have established earlier, modern 120-125-mm ammunition of tank guns is the same as to destroy a tank, BMP, BTR or BMD. In the duel of tanks, the one who gets before will win. Therefore, the thickness of the armor of the forehead of the hull or tower is not strictly important. That 200-mm, that 20-mm armor will lead to losses in personnel and equipment, but 20-mm armor will allow technology to swim.

It is not possible to fully replace the buoyancy property with the use of OPVT (equipment for underwater driving of a tank) not only because of the limitations imposed by the technical and operational characteristics of the OPVT itself (extreme excitement, depth of obstacles to be overcome, time for preparation, protection from small arms fires and explosions of projectiles and mines near carrier). Often, overcoming a water obstacle ford is hampered by the characteristics of the bottom, which may be a layer of silt several meters deep (true for obstacles encountered on the vast expanses of the fatherland). In general, OPVT is not applicable for landing armored vehicles from amphibious ships, and especially its return.

Figure 60 - The landing of troops on the BTR-80 with BDK


Figure 61 - Return of the BTR-80 to the BDK


Figure 62


Figure 63


Some "experts" oppose buoyancy with an affordable opportunity to carry a bridge with them. The bridge ... To carry ... With you? In the first echelon ?? We are not lazy and look at the performance characteristics of the domestic pontoon park. Finds the following:
1) PPS-84:
- 120-ton floating bridge: bridge width - 15,5 m; roadway width - 13,77 m; full bridge length - 702,2 m; pickup time from the complete set - 3 h;
- 90-ton floating bridge: bridge width - 11,89 m; roadway width - 10,11 m; full bridge length - 932,6 m; pickup time from the complete set - 3,5 h;
- 60-ton floating bridge: bridge width - 8,28 m; roadway width - 6,55 m; full bridge length - 1393,4 m; pickup time from the complete set - 2,5 h;
2) PP-91:
- 60-t bridge: the length of the bridge from the park kit - 224,4 m; bridge pickup time - 25 min; maximum flow rate - 3 m / s; extreme excitement - 1 score;
- 90-t bridge: the length of the bridge from the park kit - 165,2 m; bridge pickup time - 20 min; maximum flow rate - 3 m / s; extreme excitement - 2 points;
- 120-t bridge: the length of the bridge from the park kit - 129,2 m; bridge pickup time - 15 min; maximum flow rate - 3 m / s; extreme excitement - 3 points.

It is clear that the parks are not made of inflatable balls, but of links, which also need to be delivered, and, as a rule, they are located on the wheeled chassis. For example, the PPS-84 fleet includes: 192 river links with pontoon vehicles, 24 coastal links with pontoon vehicles, 12 lining sets with liner vehicles, 72 towing and motorboat BMK-460 towing boats, XNXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXHXXXXXHXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX-12 KrAZ-24 vehicle; PP-260: 91 motor links MZ-8; 235 towing motor boats BMK-4; 225 River Link; 32 coastal links.

So, the troops awaiting the crossing will have to wait a bit under the enemy's hurricane fire, bravely taking fire on themselves without being able to maneuver. Even in the “truncated” version of the 100 units on a wheel, the 10,3 length is a meter with a minimum distance between links when moving as part of a column in 5 m (whereas, according to the 25-50 m standard), this is an uncluttered uncolored 1525 m column. Yes, and the promptness of building a bridge (even at 1 hour) for offensive actions is clearly not satisfactory. The battery of the enemy's self-propelled gun will destroy engineers with the entire fleet fifteen kilometers from twenty.

Again, no one is trying to build a bridge without an occupied bridgehead. A springboard is definitely not a coastal strip in 100 m to the nearest raspberry bushes. And who and what will capture it? An armored MTU will master the 24 meter of a water barrier, you need more - build a bridge under the whistle of bullets, a hail of fragments, shell explosions as you wish.

For example, the BMP-3 with all its “hurricane” firepower occupied a springboard on the other side. The enemy will naturally try to destroy it with all his might, and, consequently, the battle will be hot. While consuming 6-7 shells per minute, the main caliber will be silent after eight minutes, the 2А72 will go out, say, in another five. So what is next?

If there are few of these arguments in favor of buoyancy, then I recommend contacting here: (http://topwar.ru/22152-poligon-most-za-chas.html). Well, how does the idea of ​​carrying a bridge with you look now?

Nor should we forget that all Soviet weapons were intended not to capture the whole world, but to repel possible aggression by capitalist countries. Considering the level of development of our infrastructure (the number and length of paved roads, the number of bridges able to withstand heavy equipment, ferries and river freight transport, the abundance of lakes, rivers and wetlands throughout the country), the ability of equipment to overcome water obstacles by swimming is very justified . Especially when all these crossings will be blown up, so that the damned capitalists will suffer and build new crossings that can withstand their equipment and autobahns for the MRAP.

Conclusion:

- the bridge builders will tirelessly and faithfully follow the tanks, but their forces are limited, it is not advisable to use a pontoon park in offensive operations, especially in the first echelon;
- no reserve by weight for the sake of buoyancy, used for the sake of security instead of buoyancy, will not allow the enemy to sustain the shelling of equipment waiting for their turn to cross;
- considering that even frontal armor of modern MBT is difficult to resist with anti-tank ammunition of MBT cannons, anti-tank mines, then defending BMP like tanks does not make sense. The level of 30-mm projectile and 40-mm grenades is a sufficient level;
- it is hard to book an BMP forehead capable of swimming, justified, the board and the stern is not advisable. In general, let us recall why BPM is needed and we will understand that attacking a BMP from the stern is possible only when using the machine for an inappropriate purpose;
- buoyancy expands the capabilities of the machine, contributes to the speed of application and increase mobility, transportability; buoyancy property for BTR, BMP, BMD is mandatory, especially for domestic ones.

12. BTVT is poorly protected from aviation.

Unambiguously answer this question on the move will not work. It is necessary to stipulate in advance the conditions for their meeting on the battlefield: will it be obsolete tanks of the Iraqi guard in the desert against the air forces of the army and the air force fleet The USA, on the contrary, the US tanks against Iraqi aviation or the combined arms battle of two superpowers (well, or at least roughly equal in military "strength" countries).

In the first case, everything is clear - the tanks are left to their own devices, air defense systems and friendly aircraft do not hide behind. Aviation of the enemy allocates significant forces directly to defeat enemy armored vehicles. Each tank of Iraq has one aircraft and a helicopter, not counting more modern direct analogues (exaggerated). Conclusion: Iraqi tanks are doomed to accept the death of the brave, performing combat missions and engaging in battle with superior enemy forces.

In the second case, tank duels are expected, because the Iraqi aviation will have something to do - the struggle for existence instead of performing fire tasks on enemy armored vehicles. The US Air Force is unlikely to allow a neighborhood in the sky and will use all available resources to gain air supremacy.

Well, now the third case that interests us the most. Immediately, we note that 100% anti-tank aviation does not exist, unlike artillery. All airplanes and helicopters are universal (multipurpose) combat vehicles capable of destroying armored vehicles on the battlefield, if necessary, using a wide range of special ammunition. All this to the fact that in the course of full-scale hostilities, aviation again will have more strategic priorities than defeat tanks.

The main such goal - the conquest of superiority in the air. Helicopters, although they have the ability to fight airborne targets, but they cannot fight with this aircraft. Therefore, it is logical to assume that it is on their shoulders will be assigned the responsibility for the destruction of armored vehicles. But, as long as the enemy aircraft have superiority in the air near and on the line of combat contact, the use of helicopters will be associated with large losses. Also, given the successes of modern air defense systems, "sharpened" under the fight with unobtrusive low-flying, high-flying, highly maneuverable high-speed targets (airplanes), the prospects of helicopters that fell into their area of ​​operation are unenviable, taking into account the remoteness of their characteristics of visibility, speed, maneuverability from " heights "characteristics of aircraft.

At the same time, it is not a secret that air force facilities (airfields) are much more priority targets than tank forces. In the case of the start of full-scale hostilities, the surviving aircraft will remain a low percentage, and to do it, as we have already noted, will be what. To compensate for the loss of aviation with the help of industry is currently not possible, since the production cycle (not to be confused with the creation cycle) of a modern helicopter or aircraft is weeks and months, and this is subject to the integrity of the production capacity of dozens of suppliers of components and parts for their production. At the same time, when the airfields and hangars will be objects of special attention, tank forces will begin ground operations.

By the time the aircraft can come to, the tank troops will be able to approach them at a distance of throw. It is worth noting that at full combat load, the cruising range of tanks (despite the fact that they can be relatively painless to hang additional barrels of fuel) is equal to the radius of action of attack helicopters and airplanes, which can increase the range only by replacing missiles or bombs with an additional tank. But the time and cost of maintenance and repair of armored personnel carriers and operation are significantly lower than those of aircraft.

Thus, one cannot rely on the omnipotence of aviation in the fight against armored vehicles, especially in full-scale military operations. Tank units, as a rule, are supplemented by air defense systems (ZSU, ZRAK), operating with them in the same order and covering helicopters and attack planes with the maximum range of the anti-tank missile system. Little would prevent armored vehicles from interfering, maneuvering and firing back in order to escape from under the fire of aviation.

What is dangerous helicopter or attack aircraft for the tank? Of course, with their weapons and the fact that they can carry out quick maneuvers to attack armored vehicles in the least protected areas - the roof. And for this, he is arming with artillery weapons (20-30 mm automatic cannons), ATGM, conventional and special cluster bombs (of course, must be dropped from a great height over armored vehicles), unguided rockets. Let us consider in more detail each type of weapons.

Bombs

There is a wide range of bomb weapons from free-fall OBs to adjustable and guided cluster bombs with anti-tank submunitions. This whole nomenclature is quite applicable for action on armored vehicles. But there are limitations in their use, fair for both the entire range of bomb weapons, and for its private representatives.

Let's start with the fact that in order to use their weapons, a helicopter or attack aircraft must secretly approach the armored vehicles, that is, at low altitude, for air defense and enemy aircraft. Also, unnoticed, he must detect the target and prepare for its attack. These conditions are quite difficult to fulfill if the fighting does not take place in an open field or desert. It is necessary to drop bombs to the carrier in such a way so as not to fall into the zone of scattering of fragments after they break.

To hit a free-fall bomb exactly even in a fixed target is not an easy task. To compensate for inaccuracy designed powerful bombs of large caliber and cluster bombs. The first, if they miss, can turn over the nearby tanks, the second cover the area with submunitions, in which the target is located, so that one of them is guaranteed to fall into it. A simple measure of protection for armored vehicles in this case is to increase the distance and intervals between adjacent vehicles.


Another thing is doroguschih managed and adjustable bombs. With obvious advantages in the achievable accuracy of hits, these types of bombs have disadvantages in the form of high costs and the availability of opto-electronic suppression tools on armored vehicles, which we talked about a little earlier.

ATGM

The use of ATGM is similar to the use of UAS, which were mentioned earlier, and has the same drawbacks, except that the “let-forget” principle is implemented in modern aviation variants. In one go the helicopter can make two or more launches of an ATGM.

Automatic small-caliber gun

As a rule, aircraft automatic cannons are similar to guns mounted on armored vehicles, but it can only be applied to the target in more advantageous projections (above). However, the power may still not be enough to destroy highly armored targets.

NUR

The optimal type of weapons as the criterion of "cost-effectiveness", and all-weather, almost unlimited conditions of use in comparison with others.

Conclusion:
- aviation is really dangerous for armored vehicles, which, in turn, is not sufficiently protected from it (by itself, without air defense vehicles);
- in the presence of air defense weapons in the first echelon, actions of aircraft on armored vehicles are no less dangerous for it than for armored vehicles. Given the difference in the cost of the attack helicopter and the main tank, the use of aircraft for the destruction of armored vehicles in such conditions becomes more dangerous for aviation. The loss of aviation is more painful than the loss of armored personnel carriers.

13. BMPT "Terminator", whose machine is so lacking in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

First of all, we are determined for what is this hybrid? For actions in a uniform manner with tanks and the suppression of enemy tank-dangerous weapons (live force, pillboxes, and other means and weapons). Therefore, the armament of the car must be appropriate.

Figure 64 - Terminator BMPT


In order not to delve into the analysis of design flaws, we’ll just sort out the question: “Do enough weapons carry BMPTs to support tanks and what is their superiority over vehicles designed to support tanks in combat at present (BMP, engineering vehicles and air defense machines)?”
In the arsenal of BMPT there are two guns 2А42, PKTM, two AGS-17, four ATGM “Attack”. Radically from the weapons of BMP it is no different. At the same time, there are no interference stations, means of fighting enemy aviation, or means of dealing with an enemy located above the position of combat vehicles (in the mountains or in high-rise buildings) either.

Let's start with the thirty. "A queue of eight armor-piercing shells fired from the 2А72 cannon (and therefore 2А42, 2А38, AO-18) is capable of breaking through 120-mm tank armor." It sounds very cool like propaganda - from HBS in Chechnya and Afghanistan, the weak firepower of domestic 30-mm guns was revealed. Quickly cope with a half-meter (on the upper floors of high-rise) brick wall, as well as a concrete panel, they were not able to. And the militants moved to a new position with impunity. OFS with remote undermining in ammunition no. That is, there is no opportunity to fight with hidden human strength (which is expected in the case of enemy defensive actions).

The 2А42 is not a version of the 2А38 anti-aircraft thirty, it was primarily intended for actions against ground targets. The probability of hitting an air target at a distance above 2500 m no more than 10%. Helicopter ATGMs are guaranteed to “work” with the 4000 m. Thus, the 30-mm BMPT guns can only effectively strike openly deployed manpower and light enemy armored vehicles at a distance inferior to the effective range of the CFS tank gun (which has a shell with ammunition in its ammunition).

Both PKTM and AGS-17 weapons are primarily against short range manpower. Installing AGS-17 in fencing niches is not rational, as it does not allow them to fire on a hinged trajectory. In fact, the effectiveness of AGS is reduced to the effectiveness of PCTM, and they duplicate each other.

ATGM “Attack” is designed to destroy armored vehicles and protected firing points. If the tank itself is intended for the first one, then for the second target, the anti-tank missile system is an unjustifiably expensive means of destruction.

Total: support tanks BMPT by and large there is nothing, all the weapons are poorly protected from small arms fire, and the crew is as many as five people. What is the point in BMPT, if the same less protected ZSU will move side by side to protect against enemy aircraft, do they protect the BMP from infantry and light armored vehicles? Then the BMPT turns into a “anti-personnel” vehicle, moreover, it operates only in openly located manpower and duplicates the already existing vehicles.

In fact, BMPT should be highly armored for operations with ZSU tanks (2С6 “Tunguska”, ZSU-23-4 “Shilka”). Their cannon armament will effectively deal with enemy manpower, including on the upper floors of buildings due to the large elevation angles of the guns, light armored vehicles, rocket covers from aviation, and the avionics will allow target detection at long distances and target designation to tanks. In general, it is with such a machine that the enemy’s tank-dangerous weapons can now be carried out with the help of artillery, which will also receive target designation.

Conclusion: BMPT "Terminator" is an unsuccessful model of armored personnel carrier, its purpose does not match. The most successful is a model with a ZSU combat module on a tank chassis, such as the one who did not go to the Donets series ZRPK.

Figure 65 - Donets ZRPK
Ctrl Enter

Noticed a mistake Highlight text and press. Ctrl + Enter

74 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. agent April 11 2013 09: 19 New
    • 4
    • 0
    +4
    I didn’t read everything, but apparently the work has been done a lot, with explanations and good photos.
    1. cth; fyn April 11 2013 11: 39 New
      • 10
      • 0
      +10
      Yes, the article is gorgeous.
      1. carbofo April 12 2013 20: 17 New
        • 2
        • 0
        +2
        I’ve been reading for an hour and a half, I'm tired, but I’m sure to read at home.
        In detail, in detail, who knows how much, why it is possible and impossible, it is very pleasant to read a technical-analytical article without a technical dictionary :).
        The only thing that I want to notice so far is the desire of the Israelis to strengthen the protection of everything and everything, they unfortunately have very few people, and even ours rushed back like a fried smell, so they try their best to protect their soldiers, a controversial method, but this is their way .
  2. avt
    avt April 11 2013 09: 22 New
    • 27
    • 0
    +27
    good It is a well-reasoned opinion, the article is successful. + And the syllable is good, the author conveyed all the thoughts quite easily. Good job ! good
  3. ramsi
    ramsi April 11 2013 09: 28 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    I, as I understand it, the general conclusion is this: everything was planned quite well with us ...
    Since the article is very large, to the point, I can bring only one significant minus of the BTR-BMP so far: disgustingly, mediocrely organized both landing and landing, and the effect of the landing from the car
  4. vorobey April 11 2013 09: 36 New
    • 15
    • 0
    +15
    thanks to the author for both articles.

    Especially for the nuances of melon and vulnerability to aviation.

    I will repeat one conclusion. - To fight is harmful to health.
    Whoever read my comments on armored vehicles for a long time understood me.

    As for the Donets, you can argue as well, although the shilka at one time showed efficiency in both the city and the mountains.
  5. rennim April 11 2013 10: 05 New
    • 4
    • 0
    +4
    I liked the article .. although I disagree with some points. I think that in any military equipment there should be protection from the fool. We want to get a professional army ... That's good. But it is not always necessary to fight only for professionals. Let us recall the Second World War when the personnel army was knocked out almost in 3-4 months. Therefore, one cannot count on the competent use of technology .. especially lightly armored in various military theater conditions. I believe that the future lies with well-armored vehicles capable of withstanding a shot from hand-held anti-tank weapons. (If not from all angles).
  6. Fox
    Fox April 11 2013 10: 13 New
    • 14
    • 0
    +14
    yes ... the author was taken out by "specialists" who do not understand the essence of the issue, and he wrote kaaak ... everything is clear, clear and understandable.fat plus!
  7. Owl
    Owl April 11 2013 11: 04 New
    • 9
    • 0
    +9
    Decent, affordable. From personal memories: when using armored vehicles (BMPs, armored personnel carriers) in the period 2000-2001 to transport personnel in the areas of active operations of gangs, I distributed the personnel approximately equally: those who were inside the corps and those who were "on armor" . Those sitting on the roof of the hull were observing and should, when a threat arose, quickly suppress (destroy) the enemy with fire from machine guns (for a machine gunner with a right-handed machine gun, because of the mass of a machine gun with an equipped gearbox the “reaction” speed is greater), if it is blown up buried in the ground (under asphalt) high-explosive - to take up the defense around the car, to ensure the evacuation of the wounded from the car, to take up a circular defense. Inside the armored corps were crew members, a signalman, a medic, a machine gunner, a sniper, and a sapper. When a bomb is buried in a buried land mine, personnel "on the armor" survive, when fired by small arms or when a fragmentation bomb located on a tree is detonated, without loss those inside the armored corps.
    1. ramsi
      ramsi April 11 2013 11: 23 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      but if those who were sitting on the armor sat behind the raised manhole covers, as if behind shields, this would not hinder the review, but the chances of survival would increase. Besides
      BTR-BMP is obliged to hold a large-caliber machine gun, and BMP - and a small-caliber gun in the forehead
  8. super-vitek April 11 2013 11: 16 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    I read your first article. I liked it more. In this article I did not understand the course of your thoughts. In your opinion, all armored vehicles should have 20 mm armor and be armed with 30 mm guns !!! All armored vehicles in the world are wrong and wrong !! ! BMPT is not effective in supporting tanks, and ZSU is what you need. Why should the tank protect against aviation in the city!? Give an example of the defeat of MBT in the city in conflicts over the past 20 years !!! In general, I did not understand your baseless negativity. Analysis held at a level with only some pessimistic bias !!!
    1. Parabelum April 11 2013 11: 47 New
      • 10
      • 0
      +10
      The author conveys his idea that technology should fulfill its tasks. Conveyors transport, not fight with tanks. Tanks destroy such, and not shoot single soldiers in the field, etc. Regarding the ZSU, according to your logic, the ZSU in Afghanistan had nothing to do at all, there were no planes and helicopters in the dushmans, however, Shilki was used very effectively. Just because of the large elevation angle of the guns. Mountains, you know such mountains. Due to the specifics of urban combat, when shelling is conducted from the upper floors of buildings, it’s just ZSU with their high rate of fire and high-altitude firing points that can be effectively suppressed by a large elevation angle.
      The author of the article is a big plus, very interesting and informative.
      1. aksakal April 11 2013 21: 37 New
        • 0
        • 0
        0
        Quote: Parabelum
        Due to the specifics of urban combat, when shelling is conducted from the upper floors of buildings, it’s just ZSU with their high rate of fire and high-altitude firing points that can be effectively suppressed by a large elevation angle.

        - it would be good at the same time to increase the penetration power of 30 mm cannons, so that the walls of the buildings would be stitched for a good live. I once watched how the Amer 30 mm cannon with which the Amer Thunderbolt is armed - that’s the gun impressed. Why can’t we get the same power on our 30 mm cannons? With such guns in urban combat conditions, that ZSU, that Terminators would be so effective! Pointed to the house and crumbled into dust laughing at the same time, he hid in it. True, ammunition will often need to be brought up.
    2. Eric
      Eric April 11 2013 23: 55 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      Are you under fire from a 23-mm gun, and not just one but four, even if they were shooting alternately? It doesn’t matter what walls you are behind, you will want to become a floor, a ceiling, and even this wall, but just not to protrude through the window or from behind the wall. This also applies to trenches. I have not been, but represent a psychological effect. It is enough to recall the storming of the Taj Beck, and the actions of the dowry of the tunguska in Grozny, 94-95. ATGM is redundant, there is a tank to combat the tank, and regular infantry equipment. My opinion, I do not pretend to the last resort.
      1. Mohomax April 18 2013 11: 46 New
        • 0
        • 0
        0
        if the crew is experienced and knows their car like five fingers, then the terminator will be very unpleasant news for the enemy, which also inspires panic. Just need to improve the technique however
  9. Alexey M April 11 2013 11: 25 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    The author is a good guy. Accessible told a lot of interesting things. A lot of analytics and comparisons. Even the pictures in the subject are. YOUNG !!!
  10. biglow
    biglow April 11 2013 11: 42 New
    • 4
    • 0
    +4
    Thanks to the author for an excellent article and illustrations. We are waiting for an answer from Israel about the best Merkava tanks in the world.
  11. Canep April 11 2013 11: 42 New
    • 3
    • 0
    +3
    Good article. Clever journalists let them honor, but how much dirt they poured on our armored vehicles cannot be collected with any ficus. At the same time, the Germans themselves say that the T-90 (and even the T-72B) is better than their Leopards (there was talk about buying leopards) About mine protection, that's right, it is better to have normal engineering reconnaissance than to carry a few tons of excess armor on each machine.
  12. Avenger711
    Avenger711 April 11 2013 11: 46 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    The author is fundamentally mistaken in the following:

    1) BMP-3, as well as its module “Bahcha-U” are actively purchased by many countries, the Chinese even bought a license for “melon”, probably not fools after all. That is, the structured system has proven its practicality. More difficult with missiles, although they are now sculpted on all BMPs.

    2) The author himself indicated why the floating equipment is the destiny of special forces, but not of the mass army, but did not understand this. Any BMP on the other side will simply be left without ammunition if it is not destroyed earlier, which is easy to do in the absence of tanks. One floating armored car has a bunch of non-floating vehicles, about tanks and heavy artillery, and nothing to say. That is, the floating amphibious unit should also include floating cargo transport and self-propelled guns. Otherwise, the floating armored personnel carrier will resemble an atomic cruiser as part of a squadron of diesel destroyers, and at the same time it will be no more autonomous than a similar ship with a traditional engine in terms of provisions and ammunition.

    Building bridges under fire is a fantasy, the artillery will clear the other side, the enemy will not be able to attack the bridge except from the air, or with artillery, and their capabilities are limited.

    Further, if we pursue the enemy, and he abuts against the river, and the bridge on the river, then our task is to destroy the bridge, after that even if light armored vehicles float away, everything else will be simply thrown.

    3) BMPT and ZSU. The use of ZSU in cities and mountains took place in the Second World War. However, a modern anti-aircraft gun carries a bunch of ultra-expensive equipment, which is useless in urban combat, at the same time it is not obliged to stand next to it to cover the tank, that is, the anti-aircraft gun in the city is absurd, where it is limited in firing at air goals, the technology itself is also less vulnerable to aviation. In Afghanistan, the radar was generally removed from the "shilok".
    That is, instead of an anti-aircraft gun, you need a simpler machine and preferably a bit more complicated, that is, the BMPD concept is correct, but there is no weapon for it, ideally 57 mm with large vert angles. guidance, grenade launchers, and thermobaric warhead missiles, optionally guided.
  13. Rusich
    Rusich April 11 2013 11: 52 New
    • 5
    • 0
    +5
    good Article good !!!
    And the thing comes to mind that "Over time, we forgot how to Think" (for 20 years!)
  14. Prapor Afonya April 11 2013 11: 53 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    Quote: rennim
    I liked the article .. although I disagree with some points. I think that in any military equipment there should be protection from the fool. We want to get a professional army ... That's good. But it is not always necessary to fight only for professionals. Let us recall the Second World War when the personnel army was knocked out almost in 3-4 months. Therefore, one cannot count on the competent use of technology .. especially lightly armored in various military theater conditions. I believe that the future lies with well-armored vehicles capable of withstanding a shot from hand-held anti-tank weapons. (If not from all angles).

    It is practically impossible to provide complete protection of equipment from all means of destruction, as well as to a fool, since it is impossible to increase armor indefinitely, an enemy can always put an extra few kg of explosives into a means of destruction, and it will always be a fool, progress does not stand still (in production of equipment), and in battle even a professional can panic, not to mention the conscript.
    1. PSih2097 April 11 2013 17: 14 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      since it is impossible to increase armor indefinitely, the enemy can always put in the means of destruction an extra few kg of explosives

      In the competition Shell - Armor, the shell will always win, this is known from the Great Patriotic War ...
  15. cth; fyn April 11 2013 11: 59 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    The article is gorgeous, but the author forgot to mention that in addition to the V shaped bottom there are several more ways to protect against mines, for example, when we discussed the Polish armored personnel carrier "hippo" or how it is there, several methods including the "cellular bottom" flashed where two the sheets are spaced and connected by perpendicular ribs, by the way, the security of the existing BTR-60/70/80 can thus be increased, and foam can be crammed into the resulting voids like on panties. It’s just that it’s protecting the bottom, and the photo shows that it’s not the most vulnerable part. Now I’ll look for that article and see what’s there, and I would like to know the opinion of the author on those ways of protecting against mines.
    As for the torn rubber-fabric screens, sometimes they fly off under their own weight (acceleration and all that), and the tank did not burn visibility from it as from ... uh, tank. This problem can be solved by using rigid bulwarks with the use of integrated contact dynamic protection, which will be a wall or a brick fence along the drum.
    According to the terminator, I completely agree - something else guano.
    1. cth; fyn April 11 2013 12: 18 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      No, not about the Polish armored personnel carrier, that article was.
  16. Takashi April 11 2013 12: 03 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    if, honestly, too big and heavy an article - I think it should have been divided into several parts.
    1. BTR \ BMP
    2. tanks
    3. .....

    First reading experience:
    1. Why do we need all this iron? everything explodes, everything breaks through
    2. BTR \ BMP - absolutely not needed, it’s easier to take KAMAZ and weld 40 mm steel onto it
    3. mine protection is simple - you need to already make flying tanks (as in Star Wars)
    1. cth; fyn April 11 2013 12: 31 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      Taty is excellent, and the main idea is that there is a technique, but it is used either for other purposes or not skillfully, plus the nuances of some wunderwafels or Russian edrenbatons are indicated.
  17. Tartary April 11 2013 12: 14 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    Here is the answer to our non-professional, but urapatriotic "approvals" ........ "more in the series" ...... "they know how to do the same" .... "we rest", etc. etc.
    A great article, but in some places the information makes the atmosphere uncomfortable ... In general, as always after truthful criticism ...
    Well, at least moderate criticism. So there is reason to say here that -
    --- "Not everything is not so bad, men!"
    1. aksakal April 11 2013 22: 06 New
      • 2
      • 0
      +2
      Quote: Tartary
      Here is the answer to our non-professional, but urapatriotic "approvals" ........ "more in the series" ...... "they know how to do the same" .... "we rest", etc. etc.
      - recently argued with the VAF, and not at all about his professionalism, but precisely because he, using generally well-deserved authority, is the instigator of many not very positive things on this resource. This:not professional, but urapatriotic "approvals" - (thank you for not saying the word “urapatriotic” specially for Russian patriots by the term “n ... tserot” coined by the representatives of the God-chosen, and thank you for that) it’s his intonations, the feeling is that he writes under different nicknames. What’s wrong with patriotism? What is wrong with a Russian guy who loves Russian military equipment, even if it is not the best model? And given that not professional, but urapatriotic "approvals" it is usually given as a sentence, simply as a fact that does not require evidence ... If you pronounce this phrase with such an accusatory-label bias, please be so kind as to prove it with your own considerations, and it would also be nice to offer your design vision. And then Rastopshin knows how to criticize, a lot of intelligence is not necessary for this.
      The article is good, informative. I learned a lot. The nuances are different. Why Arena is not widely used, for example. But there are few constructive proposals, and what can be done to improve? For the same armor, what other measures should I apply? Maybe metamaterials, in the sense of creating armor with the properties of metamaterials? If the damaging elements of the Arena are weak and effective only against the WTO and ATGMs, in general, soft shells with thin-walled protection and delicate equipment inside, then what can you think of against a steel sub-caliber (or uranium and tungsten) sub-caliber blanks? So far I have not abandoned the idea of ​​a “caterpillar” armor, when the armor is made with flexible joints and stretched between two drums in such a way as to withstand a large number of revolutions. In contact with such an armor, while it knocks out a "mushroom" body in it during the process of breaking through, it already deviates up or down along the trajectory (depending on where it goes) and is thus sidetracked. Well, something like this - you can criticize all this, I'm waiting for criticism, but only justified.
      1. ramsi
        ramsi April 12 2013 20: 59 New
        • 0
        • 0
        0
        Quote: aksakal
        So far I have not abandoned the idea of ​​a caterpillar armor, when the armor is made with flexible joints and stretched between two reels


        the thick one will not work, but otherwise it’s difficult, and what is the better of the lattice screen?
  18. Leisure April 11 2013 12: 17 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    In vain, the author “caught up” with tankers because of a “paper” bulwark with stripped DZ. It’s as if they were tearing it specially. Well, what will you do if you have to drive outside the parquet to complete the task.
  19. Castor oil April 11 2013 12: 33 New
    • 3
    • 0
    +3
    Phew! I mastered the article, the flow of beeches! Respect to the author - not always agree, but intelligently decomposed. good
  20. abc_alex April 11 2013 12: 48 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    About the BMP-3 author did not mess up anything? Where did the course grenade launchers come from?

    Well, in vain he’s talking about a 100 mm gun. It seems to me from all the other ways to launch ATGMs one of the most acceptable.
    1. Bad_gr April 13 2013 22: 40 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      Quote: abc_alex
      About the BMP-3 author did not mess up anything? Where did the course grenade launchers come from?

      On the fenders
      1. Bad_gr April 14 2013 11: 32 New
        • 0
        • 0
        0
        Quote: Bad_gr
        About the BMP-3 author did not mess up anything? Where did the course grenade launchers come from?

        By the way, yes, term papers there are not grenade launchers, but FCT. These are BMPT grenade launchers in this place.
  21. urganov April 11 2013 12: 56 New
    • 3
    • 0
    +3
    The first part did not like, about which I made fun of the comments to her, but with what pleasure I watched the syllable and thought in the second part ... Just bravo, and "encore." Or as they say on the Internet, "the author, write ische." The main logic is good, evidence-based, although in detail and not indisputable. Bravo again, and thanks for the work (for the time spent, perseverance and desire).
  22. iliq
    iliq April 11 2013 13: 17 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    In general, depending on the situation, the crossing of a water obstacle can be carried out in various ways: on the move, with preparation of forcing before units approach the water obstacle, or with the deployment of the main forces near the water barrier, after additional preparation for forcing in a short time. In all cases, the success of the forcing is determined by careful preparation, well-organized enemy reconnaissance and water obstacles, ensuring surprise, reliable air cover of units, powerful enemy fire engagement, timely deployment of cross-over facilities and ferry equipment, and measures to prevent the accumulation of personnel and equipment. at crossings, as well as strict observance of security measures.

    If all of the above are foreseen before each crossing of a water barrier, there can be no question of the development of an offensive and success. Consequently, units need mobile transportable vehicles to overcome water obstacles, and preferably armored ones, the very ones that they propose to refuse.

    let's start with the definition of "what should be in order to cross the river on an armored personnel carrier":
    1. there should be the possibility of approaching the land
    2. there should be the possibility of the descent of equipment
    3. there should be the possibility of equipment leaving the water
    4. There should be the possibility of equipment moving away from the shore.

    in reality, all four conditions exist only on a very small number of places on water barriers (and these were indicated on Soviet military carts) - i.e. places to successfully overcome a few units. the enemy also does not know about these places and is waiting for guests there.

    what we see in the exercises is an engineering-prepared crossing. 100 m to the right / left - and the priest, nobody goes anywhere (swampy shores, lack of roads, forest, steep shores - all this must be multiplied by 2 - for the second coast)

    so it’s not so easy and simple with “lots, lots of floating equipment” - it was verified the same way at numerous exercises in the USSR and the countries of the Vashava treaty.
  23. Nayhas April 11 2013 13: 27 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    "1. The armored protection of domestic armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles weakly protects even from small arms fire - Conclusion: domestic armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles provide adequate protection against conventional means of destruction ... that is, armored protection of light armored vehicles protects against small arms fire ) weapons "- nonsense, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles make their way from PC, RMB, especially on board.
    "2. Armor protection of domestic tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles does not protect against RPG fire - armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles are not intended for independent operations in the conditions of the enemy’s massive use of anti-tank weapons." - and where to find such conditions? At the training ground?
    "- the armor protection of domestic, as well as foreign armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles does not protect against RPG fire; at the same time, against tanks, protection against RPGs can be assessed as satisfactory." - nonsense. BMP Puma, BTR Namer.
    “the Allied contingent led by the United States entered the same Afghanistan on new armored vehicles, including special vehicles protected against the detonation of mines of the MRAP class, including with mounted grating screens. Have they lost less? Radically, these measures did not lead to a decrease in losses , especially regarding RPG protection. " - if this is stated then statistics should be provided. The MRAP task is not to maintain mobility after a mine detonation, but to preserve the crew and the landing, which is achieved; data on losses in Afghanistan are published monthly on the website of the United States Department of Defense. "As of March 31, 2013, 2185 were killed in total, 454 of them were non-combatants, 3 of them (general) civilians, 18360 were wounded (of 2185 - 2063 were killed directly in Afghanistan, of which 344 were not combat)"
    “If the USA themselves equipped the whole capitalist world to engage in battle with the Soviet troops of the Dushmans, now the spirits are doing it themselves” - is nonsense. The United States funded training and the purchase of weapons; weapons and ammunition were procured in China (only MANPADS were received from the United States). Now the spirits are fighting with the same weapons as against the SA.
    “A question for connoisseurs:“ Are there anyone who wants to change the BTR-80, BMD-1, BMP-1 to HMMWV M1097 (even the second or third generation)? ” - An idiotic question. The same as asking about the exchange for Gas-66.
    “But how arrogant is it to rely on the poor protection of tanks when the crews, clinging to the walls of the houses, themselves cut off the side screens and NDZ blocks? Equipment in the hands of a savage is a pile of metal.” - Oh how! It turns out the "savages" are to blame, not the designers who invented the crappy mount of the side screens and their design! By the way, the Syrian tankers also complained about the on-board screens in the latest reports, so they are also seen as “savages”.
    “The blasting of even the most powerful IEDs or mines, leading to the failure of one wheel, does not allow you to continue driving. That is, after the blasting, the car will remain in the firing zone." - From what fright did the author decide that the MRAP should continue to move on after the detonation of a mine or a VU? Mine Protection Requirements for MRAP to ensure the life of everyone inside the machine!
    The author does not understand that MRAP is not a replacement for armored personnel carriers, it is an evolution of an ordinary truck, on which units move. Modern armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles are heavy vehicles equal in protection to the main tank and the same mass. All this is done TO PROTECT THE MOST EXPENSIVE IN THE LIGHT, SOLDIER LIFE! And it doesn’t matter how much it costs. If the state got involved in the war, it should provide its soldiers with maximum protection! Further inventions of the author contain a bunch of erroneous conclusions, but damn there is no time to list them ...
    1. Avenger711
      Avenger711 April 11 2013 19: 56 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      If the state got involved in the war, then the goal is to achieve victory in the war, and not to minimize its losses, moreover, such thoughts that if only to survive should be stopped in the bud. Otherwise, such an army will run away, even before the battle. You have to hell of resources to build armored personnel carriers weighing 50 tons, build, but most likely you will not have such resources and the division of technology in terms of security will have to be overcome by tactics. Because the price of defeat will be much higher than the price of soldier's life.

      Modern armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles are heavy vehicles equal in protection to the main tank and the same mass.


      Do not write nonsense, but you will not be ridiculed, even heavy infantry fighting vehicles weigh only 30+ tons.

      Oh how! It turns out the "savages" are to blame, not the designers who invented the crappy mount of the side screens and their design!


      Khlopotov, in his blog on this subject, quite reasonably remarked that the 700-800-horsepower engine that pushes a car weighing 40+ tons does not really care how high-quality your screens are there, if there is no screen break point, then it will simply twist along with tracked shelves.

      Now the spirits are fighting with the same weapons as against the SA.


      Only no one gives them money. But the Americans had a lot of things that, in the 80s, both ours and the American military only dreamed about. However, the task of protection is not radically solved.
      1. Nayhas April 11 2013 22: 15 New
        • -2
        • 0
        -2
        Well, there are countries in which the government and the command do not care about human lives, there are countries in which human life comes first. It all depends on society. In the first case, public opinion is not taken into account, any protests are suppressed, the deceased are declared heroes, posthumous awards are awarded, monuments are built, people make fiery speeches, a flock of cheer patriots is sent to people asking the wrong questions, they say they died like heroes and there is nothing to argue ... In the second In this case, human life is valuable in that society asks people for sending a soldier to the war for every death, and for the fact that the command did not provide the soldier with the necessary protection, they are threatened with legal proceedings, resignations, millions of payments, and the loss of political points.
        "Do not write nonsense, but do not be ridiculed, even heavy infantry fighting vehicles weigh only 30+ tons." - so let's get started. Provide data on the mass of BMP Puma and BTR Namer and begin to roll.
        "Khlopotov in his blog on this subject quite reasonably remarked that the 700-800-horsepower engine that pushes a car weighing 40+ tons doesn’t care how high-quality the screens are installed there" - only domestic ones have problems with on-board screens tanks.
        “No one gives them money. But the Americans had a lot of things that both our and the US military only dreamed of in the 80s.” “There are so many weapons in Afghanistan that there’s more than one war.” China, Pakistan and Russia, up to a certain time, supplied weapons there. The principle of perfume has not changed much, a pair of 152mm. shells on the sidelines, then a quick shelling and retreat.
        1. aksakal April 12 2013 01: 49 New
          • 0
          • 0
          0
          Quote: Nayhas
          . In the second case, human life is valuable in that society asks people for sending a soldier to the war for every death, and for the fact that the command did not provide the soldier with the necessary protection, they are threatened with legal proceedings, resignations, millions of payments, and the loss of political points.
          - idealization in your inflamed brain. If the state sends its sons to war, it knows for sure that there will be losses. Then, “save your life when undermined” - ok, your vaunted vehicle stopped, inside, all remained alive. It was lucky if it was just a mine buried by someone, the diggers buried and left. But more often than not, most often with machine guns and machine guns lie behind the nearest gullies. How long do you manage to extend the life of the passengers of your vaunted MPI? This is the first. The second, and this is the main thing - the MCI, which has lost its course, will no longer fulfill the assigned combat mission, the remaining 8-wheeled armored personnel carrier will continue to move and will try to carry out the combat mission, even if there are several dead on board. You have liberal nurses and sentiments, boy, I explain simply - war is when it is not at all up to sentiment. What is "not up to sentiment"? - this is when in the first place the fulfillment of the assigned combat mission, rather than saving lives.
          Quote: Nayhas
          that a 700-800-horsepower engine that pushes a car weighing 40+ tons doesn’t care how high-quality your screens are there "- that's just the problem with on-board screens in only domestic tanks.
          - Give examples of the most active military operations of other tanks in the conditions of the densest military development. I am sure that not only these canvas screens will get damaged in contact with the 40-60 ton colossus with the building, and they will receive metal ones in the same volume, it just cannot be otherwise. A relatively thin steel screen (and it can’t be made very thick by definition) just cannot help but laugh if the multi-ton colossus touches the concrete surface of the building. You need to distract from computer tank toys, it’s where the tanks come into contact with the buildings, the building collapses, and the tank is intact, like from a factory. Believe me, in real life everything is different!
          1. Nayhas April 12 2013 07: 55 New
            • 0
            • 0
            0
            You are sarcastic to impossibility, but oh well.
            "Then," save life under a bomb "- ok, your vaunted vehicle stopped, everyone remained alive inside. It was lucky if it was just a mine buried by someone, the diggers buried and left. But most often it’s not so, most often with machine guns and "machine guns lie behind the nearest gullies. How long do you manage to extend the life of the passengers of your vaunted MPI?" - I repeat again, MRAP is not a replacement for armored personnel carriers, but the evolution of an ordinary truck adapted for transportation in the war zone. I honestly don’t understand what is your complaint about surviving after a landmine bombing? What is wrong with the landing and crew surviving and being able to continue the battle? Are you satisfied with the option when a unit in the Urals completely dies after a landmine explosion? The main cargo transportation in the same Chechnya was carried out according to the one / two BTR-80 and two / three Gaz-66 / Kamaz / Ural / ZiL-131 schemes. Departure for stripping, change to a block post, etc. And the small ones without any cover at all in UAZs and Loafs. Now compare one / two Boxer APCs and two / three MRAPs, who are more likely to survive in an organized ambush using guided land mines?
            "A relatively thin steel screen (and it can’t be made very thick by definition) just cannot help but laugh if the multi-ton colossus touches the concrete surface of the building." - on the T-72 it is not steel, but rubber-fabric with a flimsy mount, and therefore easily comes off. On foreign tanks, side screens are made of armored steel from 20mm. thick.
            1. aksakal April 12 2013 09: 54 New
              • 0
              • 0
              0
              Quote: Nayhas
              The main cargo transportation in the same Chechnya was carried out according to the one / two BTR-80 and two / three Gaz-66 / Kamaz / Ural / ZiL-131 schemes

              - If I ask the question this way, then I blame the Russian generals for an unjust collision with armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, because trucks for transporting military vehicles are completely different. The Russians never had this, because Russia did not fight much in the conditions of a mine war. And the generals just had to give the technical specifications to the manufacturers - namely, the Urals and Kamaz to create the appropriate equipment, and not to run into and destroy the manufacturers of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles. Although everything is clear there - the producers of the BTR and BMP belong to Deripaska, and people from another oligarch are sitting in the Moscow Region. And the best way to approach it is from this point of view, and not argue until hoarseness - MPAP or armored personnel carrier? In fact, it is in 10th place in Russian realities.
              Quote: Nayhas
              rubber fabric with flimsy fastening, and therefore easily comes off. On foreign tanks, side screens are made of armored steel from 20mm. thick.
              - What does it change? In a collision with a building and 20 mm, the screen will collapse, albeit not as much as the rubber fabric, and even more so the mounts will fly off in the same way - because there are no mounts that can withstand a collision of 60 tons and a much more massive building. So, the rubber fabric has its own advantages - the mounts have flown off - change the mounts and hang the screen in place. Active protection boxes are not damaged in this case, but fly off again due to the fastenings. Change the mounts and hang everything in place, the main thing is that the parts would be available. Change the entire damaged 20 mm plate (you cannot straighten it already) and together with the fasteners. Much more expensive. When punching the screen with a cumulative jet, the main role is played by active armor, the one that in boxes, a 20 mm sheet does not play a special role here, there is more psychology. And what does psychology have to do with it? Has someone already canceled the bad sense?
              1. Nayhas April 12 2013 15: 45 New
                • 0
                • 0
                0
                You are absolutely right, the military-industrial complex cannot be blamed for what turned out tanks and armored vehicles. As they say what they ordered, they got it. The military back in 1980. faced with the safety of convoys, but did not draw any conclusions, and then in Chechnya everything repeated more than once. In 2000 I saw in Khankala a kind of MRI based on the Urals, a frank craft, judging by the fact that riot police drove it on it in their city. The cabin is sheathed in sheets, instead of a body armored box with loopholes and hatches in the roof and doors in the stern. The military itself has repeatedly stated that BMPs and armored personnel carriers have poor reservations, that the sides are flashed from a PC, but to no avail ...
                1. cth; fyn April 14 2013 12: 53 New
                  • 0
                  • 0
                  0
                  Why doesn’t any one, BTR-4 in Ukraine, already has under 20 tons the car weighs and, by bourgeois standards, has a second protection class, and the ramp is wide, but I don’t like something request no
  24. jar.zoom
    jar.zoom April 11 2013 13: 29 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    Finally, it’s a competent reasoned article. Thank you. I almost agree in everything. It’s worthy of surprise that they still write about it! I want to spit while reading woe-tactics and platoon vanes, who saw nothing but a shot from an RPG or a land mine.
  25. Tourist Breakfast April 11 2013 13: 48 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    From the text of the article:
    ... evolutionary parity of weapons over armor.

    ... firepower parity over armor protection.


    Note to the author - "Parity (from lat. Paritas - equality) - equality of two or more parties to the relationship in any way. It can mean a state of relative balance of power, equality of goals, equivalence of means of payment, equality of rights and obligations, etc."
    Accordingly, parity cannot be “something over something”.
  26. ups
    ups April 11 2013 13: 51 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    Interesting. who is a specialty author, I put a plus. But there are controversial moments, it pleases him to have a clean look and a little more analysis.
  27. Kars April 11 2013 14: 25 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    It would be possible to comment. Especially crossing over a water obstacle. But there are too many things.
    It would be necessary to divide the article into more parts.

    in terms of KAZ, disagrees with many things, in principle, the author may be unfamiliar with KAZ Zaslon.

    And just like that
  28. Vovka levka
    Vovka levka April 11 2013 14: 56 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    The author is our respect.
  29. sniper April 11 2013 15: 18 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    I read the article with great pleasure! Thanks to the author, everything is balanced, logical and accessible. The point of vulnerability of the columns from guerrilla ambushes is very interesting, it’s strange that there were no recommendations to overcome this danger ... Based on the author’s logic (though I am an amateur, but the conclusion suggests itself, the author brought him to it close) MBT with a mine trawl at the head of a column and a pair of UAVs with thermal imagers to detect an ambush, followed by a mortar fire, could solve this problem ... Maybe I'm wrong, I would like to hear the opinion of experts ...
    1. gallville April 11 2013 17: 01 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      Quote: sniper
      MBT with anti-mine trawler at the head of the column

      A mine trawl that would be more or less clear as a “plow with pressure” is more simply a simulator of a target, if it rescues from an ordinary mine from a remote and deeper mine - no.
      Quote: sniper
      a pair of UAVs with thermal imagers to detect an ambush

      The thermal imager is not a panacea, like the UAV itself. Masking methods and even somewhere in the mountains with the use of engineering fortifications have not been canceled. Although in general they would have provided assistance.
      Quote: sniper
      mortar fire

      Mortar fire will not work for two reasons:
      a) the mortar range leaves much to be desired.
      b) the spread of fragments from mines will hit its own landing (and in cars it makes no sense to remain).
      1. sniper April 11 2013 17: 50 New
        • 2
        • 0
        +2
        thanks for the comment
        Quote: gallville
        the spread of fragments from mines will hit its own landing (and in cars it makes no sense to remain).

        So for that and the UAV, that would be to find an ambush at a sufficient distance and destroy before the column is detected ... For this, a mortar is preferable, in my opinion ...
  30. Colonel April 11 2013 16: 16 New
    • 3
    • 0
    +3
    I read both articles in one breath. Many thanks to the author. I allow myself a little clarification in the question
    The non-contact method is used to trigger mines
    RP-377UVM (1,2) does not destroy the radio-electronic component of the fuse, but only "muffles" the radio fuse channel over all available ranges (together with the radio communication of the column). One of the RP-377 series interference transmitters was used in the trawl mode, but it turned out to be ineffective against a more or less protected channel.
  31. Crang
    Crang April 11 2013 16: 40 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    I read the article. Very interesting. However, a number of points, apparently due to the patriotic nature of the author, do not quite correspond to reality. First, let's start with the vulnerability of domestic armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles from small arms fire. The author in his article concludes that the armor of our armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles in the field protects against pistols and automatic weapons of a caliber of 5,45mm and 7,62mm, but larger-caliber systems are supposedly not a regular means and not small arms, and therefore they can be like as well as not to consider. First, as the author of the article rightly noted, small arms fire can be fired from roofs of houses, windows, etc. as a result, the bullets will hit the armor at angles close to the normal and pierce it. In the second, such a division is not appropriate here - it is a means of infantry / is not. 12,7mm DShK / NSV machine guns as well as 14,5mm KPV very widespread in the world. All of them without any problems penetrate the armor of our armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and BMD. At the same time, the armor of the western BMDs "Bradley", "Marder" at the cost of refusing buoyancy, but it reliably protects the most powerful machine guns from fire, and "in a circle." And buoyancy ... Do you need a BMP? An armored personnel carrier may and may need, and infantry fighting vehicles must act in conjunction with tanks. Tanks can’t swim, so then why is it BMP? So the armor of the western BMP and BRM is really much better than ours.
    Now for the tanks ... This thesis was very touched: Of course, visibility is lame, but it's better to see poorly than to see well your last moments.. The head of a sight broken by a bullet, this does not mean destruction of the tank. Modern western tanks see much better than our old T-72B and T-80BV. And this gives them very great advantages over ours, which may turn out to be decisive in battle. Our T-72B and T-80BV run the risk of not seeing their "last moments" at all. And as for the damage to the optics by bullets .. Well, they broke the scope or observation device. You just need to repair or replace it and that's it. In addition, optics are now being booked and have protective curtains. The tracks of a modern tank cannot be brought down from any machine gun. And spare parts boxes, fuel tanks and auxiliary power units (APUs) are like a ryaz vulnerable part of our tanks again. In the West, all this economy is located inside the armored corps, and in ours it is open - on the fenders. For all the time there is only one fact of the destruction of the M1A2 Abrams tank by fire from a 12,7mm DShK machine gun (according to the Armed Forces and the GTD grills).
    1. iliq
      iliq April 11 2013 16: 48 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      for some reason, the author also believes that in a major war the enemy will not have armor-piercing rounds for riflemen. and forgets that they were quite widespread among Chechen fighters.
      regarding tank optics - this is not only the best orientation and data on the battlefield, but also the range of detection and destruction of targets.
    2. Avenger711
      Avenger711 April 11 2013 19: 58 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      The Bradley armor protects only from 7.62 in the forehead. For its weight, "Bradley" is still one cardboard.

      Well, they smashed a sight or an observation device. You just need to repair or replace it and that's it.


      Yeah, like in WoT. "Triplex restored, normal view."
      1. talentedvillain
        talentedvillain April 11 2013 20: 25 New
        • 1
        • 0
        +1
        Sight repair process:
        1. Arrival at the place of repair of representatives of the manufacturer of the sight (only they have the right to tear factory seals).
        2. Sight repair:
        2.1 Repair of minor faults at the facility (tank).
        2.2 Complex repair or replacement of the sight.
        2.2.1 Dismantling the sight from the tank turret.
        2.2.2 Repair or installation of a new sight.
        2.2.3 Alignment and alignment of the sight.
        3. Bringing the tank to normal combat (the cost of the operation for domestic tanks is about 1 million rubles).
        Conclusion: the expense of time and money makes "just repair" a complex organizational and technical operation.
        1. Crang
          Crang April 11 2013 22: 20 New
          • 1
          • 0
          +1
          However, this is far from the same as a smoking, twisted ruin with a torn tower. Optics on any tank / helicopter / plane / ship can hardly be reliably protected. This does not mean that you need to completely abandon the protection of armored vehicles.
      2. Crang
        Crang April 11 2013 22: 18 New
        • 1
        • 0
        +1
        Are you out of your mind? The BMP M3A2 "Bradley" forehead protects 30mm guns 2A42 of the Soviet BMP-2 from XNUMXmm fire. It was still in the ToR for the development of this American BMP. The Bradley holds machine-gun fire in a circle. To destroy it, it is necessary to apply even the old, but RPGs.
    3. Akellastambul
      Akellastambul April 12 2013 09: 06 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      About visibility, you can also add that the author, to some extent, contradicts himself, says: “Of course, visibility is lame, but it's better to see poorly than to see your last moments well ..”, and then that “In a duel of tanks, who gets in before. " But after all, the one who sees earlier on the basis of logic will get earlier.
  32. KoRSaR1
    KoRSaR1 April 11 2013 16: 48 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    Terminator - they thought they worked a miracle, it turned out to be useless nonsense, I talked about this from the first days, and they minus me on YouTube soldier the same errors in design and armament as in BMP2.
    1. Rider April 11 2013 17: 24 New
      • 1
      • 0
      +1
      SW is an opponent.
      just think about why they put the memory 32 on the Ramean Urals and lawns, and why the AGS is added to all promising modules.
      But Pinocchio combines both of them, plus the security of MBT
      1. Rider April 11 2013 17: 24 New
        • 0
        • 0
        0
        quarrel memory of 23 of course.
    2. Akellastambul
      Akellastambul April 12 2013 09: 22 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      When I saw the photo, I immediately thought that some kind of “Terminator” is absurd and the name is also lame, where is our “daisy”, “tulip”, etc. About BMP-3, the author also approved me in the opinion. When I saw this miracle in the army, it immediately occurred to me, “what an absurdity,” some machine guns in the fenders of which stand. But I sincerely want to believe that I'm wrong.
  33. gallville April 11 2013 16: 54 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    The article did not like gives away ur-patriotism. In addition, tanks with infantry fighting vehicles are too stretched and mixed into a heap - basically vehicles of different branches of the armed forces. To paint the number of misconceptions will take the same article in size. It is necessary to give credit and correctly written as much.
  34. alex shnajder April 11 2013 17: 06 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    the article is gorgeous! write the author yet.
  35. Rider April 11 2013 17: 12 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    Well, skzat, I will express my stupidity
    (And what type of mona is everything to me, but for me ?!)
    sad

    the article aroused mixed feelings.
    if at first, it was perceived extremely positively, then towards the middle, and especially at the end, it began to cause bewilderment.
    the general outline of the article is as follows - even with the existing shortcomings, everything is less or less in order, and changing the rank is optional (although desirable)

    I will express some of my thoughts
    I noticed a clear contradiction of the author in the topic of the combat use of lightly armored vehicles (BMP BTR, etc.). At the beginning, the author says that such a BT is fully operational when used correctly (that is, it doesn’t scare you, but extinguishes reptiles from afar)
    and I agree, because trust the fool glass x ..
    but such a hitch, if to defeat the enemy infantry in the green, or behind light shelters, the firepower of beters and bekh is still enough (distance matters) then for the same thing, but in urban conditions, alas, no.
    not in vain in Grozny (in the 1st company from Bech the 1st model was valued) which, despite the slight elevation of the gun, could destroy the enemy behind the brick and concrete walls, which the 30mm gun of the 2nd model was practically not capable of.

    that is, the author acknowledged that he laid down those should not replace MBT
    but in the crossing section (which positively struck me), the author already assigns the APC and BMP to the attacking role.
    that is, the oena should sweep away the enemy units defending the crossings, or trying to crush our troops that captured the bridgehead.
    it turns out that it is precisely this role that it should fulfill.
    paradox.
    waabche section on the forcing of water barriers, I was very surprised 9 in a positive sense 0 I never looked at the crossings from this point of view.
    small clarification.
    TANK will almost never overcome water barriers on the bottom.
    for one simple reason - BOTTOM BINDING.
    even during exercises in the SA, sections of the river with a pebble or sandy bottom were chosen
    in the worst case, with a minimal layer of bottom sludge.
    about lakes and speech not - there is complete horror.
    and this means that biting over bridges and floating crossings will be cruel to disgrace.
    and in this case it is supposed to use a floating BT? - to the madness of the brave ...
    and by the way (if someone does not agree) what are the examples of using floating BT in combat conditions?
    alas - alas.

    Well, a little about the combat use of the Lightly Armored Equipment (LBT) (thank God that it’s not LGBT!)
    You can discuss a lot about - why the native infantry prefers to go on armor, and not inside.
    I will add one more to those factors that the author cited - an insufficient review from the belly that beh, that betrov, (who was he knows)
    here the effect of blindfolds affects when a soldier is waiting for an attack every minute, but cannot answer.
    so the soldier prefers to beat off and defrost the fifth point on the iron than using the dubious comfort of the airborne squad.
    there is also a lack of anti-personnel weapons of OF action, and I am very glad that developments are being carried out in this direction, in particular the “take care” module (article below)
    with automatic AGS 17 (abalny piece)

    (to be continued)
    1. Rider April 11 2013 17: 13 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      more...

      Well, in the end, I strongly disagree with the author, in the topic BMPT Terminator,
      such vehicles are indispensable for our infantry units EXACTLY INFANTRY, since they combine fire on enemy infantry in a clean field, sheltered in a trench and bunkers, and in concrete / brick buildings.
      as well as in the event of a fight with the enemy’s BBT.
      I also do not revive that this machine will cover the tanks.
      as for giving the tank (and infantry) escort vehicle the function of an anti-aircraft gun (fighting an airborne enemy), in my opinion, here the author is trying to cross a hedgehog and a hedgehog.
      Why come up with something new when there is a completely successful tunguska.
      Unfortunately, universality is not always buzzing.


      I apologize for the bunch of rumors and graphomaniac mistakes, as well as for the clumsy style.
      1. iliq
        iliq April 11 2013 20: 45 New
        • -1
        • 0
        -1
        I strongly disagree with the author, in the topic BMPT Terminator,

        the author only conveys the opinion of people in uniform from the Moscow Region. Well, all sorts of experts (both domestic and foreign)

        such vehicles are indispensable for our infantry units EXACTLY INFANTRY, since they combine fire on enemy infantry in a clean field, sheltered in a trench and bunkers, and in concrete / brick buildings.
        as well as in the event of a fight with the enemy’s BBT.

        you just need to train your military personnel not only to paint grass and lay snowdrifts with a cantick;)
        and no BMPTs will be needed - which NATO members actually constantly show - both in the open field (desert) and in city battles.
        you can still turn to the completely forgotten experience of the Red Army - for example, the storming of Berlin.

        everything has long been studied, disassembled and planned - in the Charter. true disregard for it can not be corrected by any prodigies ...
        1. Rider April 11 2013 21: 45 New
          • 1
          • 0
          +1
          I do not quite agree with you about: you just need to train your military personnel not only to paint grass and lay snowdrifts with a cantick;)

          you see, even if we train the motorized riflemen and tankers superbly, we will still suffer losses at the level of the 2nd Chechnya. (well, maybe a little less)
          the fact is that in modern combat the SYSTEM OF INTERACTIONS of all the involved combat arms is at war.
          for this reason, the Yankees with small losses equal one country after another.
          as right, a colleague of avdkrd noticed a little lower (well, and you’ll break the language) The Americans ... win ... thanks to the competent use of their technology, the full use of its capabilities and the prevention of the enemy from using their weaknesses.

          with us, each kind of wax fights on its own, we can dream of competent tactical interaction.

          and specifically for BMPT

          we just NEED such cars.
          the vitality of our cars is just tears (often bloody)
          here is discussed above why fighters prefer to go on and not on
          but simply to the patam that BMP stands for Mass Grave of the Foot Soldier
          too many of our soldiers saw gnarled burnt remains in the torn belts of beh and betrov
          because they sigat from the armor with a skucher
          and to do it in a tight hold, and even if those sitting at the door are out of order ...
          don't blame them, they just want to live.

          by TERMINATOR.

          This machine implements the principle of a "long arm" that is, without entering the affected area with small arms and grenade launchers, mowing greenback, processing trench with the ACS and demolishing buildings and bunkers with ATGMs.
          such a wonderful colossus.
          1. iliq
            iliq April 11 2013 22: 49 New
            • 0
            • 0
            0
            you see, even if we train the motorized riflemen and tankers superbly, we will still suffer losses at the level of the 2nd Chechnya. (well, maybe a little less)
            the fact is that in modern combat the SYSTEM OF INTERACTIONS of all the involved combat arms is at war.

            just in Chechnya we see unprepared soldiers.

            as a colleague of avdkrd noted right below (well, you’ll break the tongue) Americans ... win ... thanks to the competent use of their technology, the full use of its capabilities and the prevention of the enemy from using their weaknesses.

            this is exactly what is - a good preparation, not the invention of wunderwafes.

            we just NEED such cars.
            the vitality of our cars is just tears (often bloody)
            here is discussed above why fighters prefer to go on and not on
            but simply to the patam that BMP stands for Mass Grave of the Foot Soldier
            too many of our soldiers saw gnarled burnt remains in the torn belts of beh and betrov

            BMPT has no place for the landing ...

            because they sigat from the armor with a skucher
            and to do it in a tight hold, and even if those sitting at the door are out of order ...
            don't blame them, they just want to live.

            misuse of technology has never led to anything good. Americans understood this and use MRAP for guerrilla / mine warfare - mine losses were reduced by 90%. draw your own conclusions.

            This machine implements the principle of a "long arm" that is, without entering the affected area with small arms and grenade launchers, mowing greenback, processing trench with the ACS and demolishing buildings and bunkers with ATGMs.
            such a wonderful colossus.

            study the Charter, you will discover many new and useful things for yourself. how, who and what performs these tasks there is described in detail. and without the invention of the prodigy!
            1. Rider April 11 2013 23: 17 New
              • 0
              • 0
              0
              just in Chechnya we see unprepared soldiers.

              Duc is what we are talking about, but the difference between 1st and 2nd is very significant.

              this is exactly what is - a good preparation, not the invention of wunderwafes.

              and how do you like it http://gosu-wot.com/pt10/
              then do not say prodigy.

              BMPT has no place for the landing ...

              as you can see there http://weaponscollection.com/18/1917-tyazhelyy-bmp-bmpt-ukrainskogo-proizvodstva
              .html

              but maybe you and I had a confusion in terms of what you meant Tank Support Fighting Vehicle. and I am the Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle (or tank - on the tank chassis)

              misuse of technology has never led to anything good.

              I don’t understand why such maxims, I kind of advocate for too.

              use MRAP - losses from mines decreased by 90%
              decreased compared to what?
              statistics do not please?
              again, if you still don’t understand, I’m using three hands for a more secure equipment, that's why I stand for BMPT
              and by the way, the increase in mine protection is offset by an increase in explosives wink

              and last (I especially liked)

              study the Charter, you will discover many new and useful things for yourself. how, who and what performs these tasks there is described in detail. and without the invention of the prodigy!

              I understand that you completely neglect the progress in the production of BBT?
              In fact, why, if the charter of the mustache says.
              But what is your favorite Mrap?
              1. iliq
                iliq April 12 2013 00: 16 New
                • 0
                • 0
                0
                Duc is what we are talking about, but the difference between 1st and 2nd is very significant.

                Of course, it’s significant - after the brainwashing they received, they already knew that they should not be engaged in cap-making. but nevertheless, with Chechnya-2, fighters of the Red Army of the 1945 model would have cope with much smaller losses in a shorter time. operating only with the means available for 1945.
                About the US Army, I generally said nothing.

                and how do you like it http://gosu-wot.com/pt10/
                then do not say prodigy.

                This is a projection, a picture. what will happen in the end (highly protected BMP, not BMPT) is still unknown.

                but maybe you and I had a confusion in terms of what you meant Tank Support Fighting Vehicle. and I am the Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle (or tank - on the tank chassis)

                you are talking about TBMP - heavy BMP. but it has neither AGS nor ATGM. she’s not at all yet.

                use MRAP - losses from mines decreased by 90%
                decreased compared to what?
                statistics do not please?

                I have already discussed and analyzed this topic for a long time, there are statistics in the public domain, now I can’t find it.
                statistics on Iraq, after the mass introduction of MCIs, with almost the same number of mines and landmines, losses from them decreased by 90% - and these are convoys, patrols and other, which were carried out on armored and unarmored vehicles.

                and by the way, the increase in mine protection is offset by an increase in explosives

                also already understood - see statistics in Learn twower - getting 6 kg of explosives to blow up Iveco Lynx is very difficult. BB on trees does not grow. and having thrown off one blast of 6 kg, 12 blasts of 500 g automatically disappear ...
                something like that.

                I understand that you completely neglect the progress in the production of BBT?
                In fact, why, if the charter of the mustache says.

                I suggest not inventing wunderwaffles instead of training soldiers.
                and progress ... just change the firing range in the textbook - that's all that he allows so far. no qualitative and quantitative changes occurred, especially in the fight against partisans / militants.
                See the Americans in Afghanistan. What has changed there since the Soviet soldiers were there?

                But what is your favorite Mrap?

                it is only a small addition to the Charter; it has not made any significant changes to the Charter.
                1. Rider April 12 2013 01: 18 New
                  • 0
                  • 0
                  0
                  Chechnya-2 fighters of the Red Army of the 1945 model would cope with much smaller losses

                  you have moved away from the essence of the discussion
                  Initially, I talked about the concept of using LBT, and that even with an excellent degree of troop training. their coherence leaves much to be desired, hence the reference to am.

                  This is a projection, a picture.

                  this is the concept of a heavy infantry fighting vehicle
                  but you won’t be a child prodigy.

                  use MRAP - losses from mines decreased by 90%
                  I’ve already discussed and discussed this topic for a long time


                  then you acknowledge that the introduction of a new class of technology can fundamentally change the situation on the battlefield?
                  fine, and write it down.

                  and by the way, the increase in mine protection is offset by an increase in explosives

                  also already understood - see statistics in Learn twower


                  that is, you don’t know that a landmine can be made up of unexploded bombs and shells with explosive capacity up to 500 kg?
                  ah ah ah, and someone else sends me to ZhZhshkami and YouTube.

                  I suggest not inventing wunderwaffles instead of training soldiers.
                  and progress ...


                  that is, you deny MRI (they were introduced during the 2nd Iraq?
                  ah, she did not change the charter?
                  Ah ah ah
                  But about the pedestrian groups of sappers you have not heard?
                  about MBT trawls and mine clearance vehicles?
                  what for the child prodigy MRAP. if all of the above and so coped.

                  the development of heavy armored vehicles, both for infantry and fire support at a tank base, is the next step in the evolution of both BMPT and tactics of their use.

                  but about the charter it’s good to tremble on tyrnet.

                  with best regards.
                  1. iliq
                    iliq April 12 2013 12: 39 New
                    • 0
                    • 0
                    0
                    when you’re ready to talk without FWM and snot - come in, we’ll talk on the topic;)
                    1. Rider April 12 2013 13: 10 New
                      • 0
                      • 0
                      0
                      yes I
                      can expose.
                      1. iliq
                        iliq April 12 2013 14: 48 New
                        • 0
                        • 0
                        0
                        from your previous post did not understand anything. what, why and how?
                      2. Rider April 12 2013 14: 59 New
                        • 0
                        • 0
                        0
                        Yes, all that you understand.

                        just get off with common phrases.
                        they say that wunderwafles (modernization and adoption of new weapons) are not needed.
                        and your charter is a panacea.

                        you more and more agree with the author of the article, which is full of words. still advocates for the existing status quo.

                        I am taking my leave for this, because I consider the further discussion unpromising.
                      3. iliq
                        iliq April 12 2013 15: 10 New
                        • 0
                        • 0
                        0
                        pier and wunderwaffles (modernization and adoption of new weapons) Not needed.

                        and I’ll continue to argue (and I’m not alone) - wunderwaffles are not needed instead of training soldiers.

                        modernization and adoption of new weapons

                        are needed, but only those that are really needed, and not the child prodigies from hopelessness.

                        and your charter is a panacea.

                        Of course, a panacea - it is with the charter that the US Army has been waging successful wars for the past 22 years - both against regular armies and against partisans.
                        and our charter was written with the blood of more than one generation - and those who laid on it always washed with the blood of our boys.

                        you more and more agree with the author of the article, which is full of words. still advocates for the existing status quo.

                        well, god be with you. just do not ascribe to me my fabrications.

                        I am for the modernization of the existing and the adoption of new types of weapons - but against the invention of the prodigy (BMPT, BMP-3).
                        but unfortunately the real economic and political situation of the Russian Federation does not allow even the simplest modernizations to be done ...

                        ps you try to adhere to generally accepted terminology:
                        BMPT - Tank Support Fighting Vehicle
                        TBMP - Heavy BMP.
                        so that people who are a little in the subject understand you;)
                      4. Rider April 12 2013 16: 06 New
                        • 0
                        • 0
                        0
                        you already forgive you for a complete mess in your head and in what you write.
                        you contradict yourself.

                        wunderwaffles instead ... what for are not needed.

                        and right there

                        modernization and adoption of new weapons

                        are needed, but only those that are really needed


                        don't you like prodigies
                        excuse me how do you distinguish them?
                        is T 62 compared with T34 is it progress or a child prodigy?
                        Why do you think that BMPT (I will take into account the wish with the name) is unnecessary for the army?
                        Do you prefer Zushki on KamAZ
                        or the same zushka in a tower based on MT LB?
                        you think that these distortions came from a good life.
                        how the implementation of the rules of the charter prevented the appearance of these deformities 7

                        well, god be with you. just do not ascribe to me my fabrications.

                        and right there - I suggest not inventing wunderwaffles instead of training soldiers.
                        and progress ...


                        did you read the third part of the author?
                        there (besides many words about bureaucracy, and crocheting) in plain text it says - BMPT is not necessary, mine protection is not necessary.
                        reinforcement of reservation and din protection - optional.
                        and it is necessary to fight with what is.
                        here's another word to add about the charter, well, one to one you.

                        Well, the last (I really liked it)

                        I am for the modernization of the existing and the adoption of new types of weapons - but against the invention of the prodigy (BMPT, BMP-3).

                        how to bask - started for health, finished for peace.
                        you contradict yourself.
                        they say it is necessary to modernize, but it is not necessary to modernize.

                        so how do you see modernization?
                        I've commented on the 3rd part posted a photo of the upgraded BMP 3
                        it is in the counterguerrilla version.
                        Do you think that improved night sights are not needed?
                        thermal sights?
                        duplicate fire control system?

                        it is this (except for enhanced protection) and is provided in the 3rd beh

                        you already understand your desires.

                        but the charter
                        sorry, the charter is certainly a necessary thing, and you are absolutely right that it is written not in ink.
                        but you know, I’m looking for examples of the latest cases of the use of military utava in the actions of troops. and they are negligible
                        even a victorious war 8 8 8 and that is not a model of its implementation.

                        in terminology - thanks, I will know.
                      5. iliq
                        iliq April 12 2013 16: 31 New
                        • 1
                        • 0
                        +1
                        you already forgive you for a complete mess in your head and in what you write.
                        you contradict yourself.

                        yes, yes, I don’t understand the difference between the modernization of the BMP-2 and the adoption of the BMPT laughing fool

                        don't you like prodigies
                        excuse me how do you distinguish them?
                        is T 62 compared with T34 is it progress or a child prodigy?

                        Well, if this is a question for you, then I can’t help with anything ...

                        did you read the third part of the author?
                        there (besides many words about bureaucracy, and crocheting) in plain text it says - BMPT is not necessary, mine protection is not necessary.
                        reinforcement of reservation and din protection - optional.
                        and it is necessary to fight with what is.
                        here's another word to add about the charter, well, one to one you.

                        Let's start with the fact that this is not only the opinion of the author, but also of many military and experts - for combined arms combat (big war) - all this is really not necessary. and for a country with a weak economy, it’s also disastrous.
                        for counter-guerrilla wars, this technique is not suitable, you need a specialized one - MRI and Co.
                        I didn’t learn anything new here.

                        so how do you see modernization?

                        in that, enough money;)
                        There are more than a dozen options for modernization - but Moscow Region does not have money for modernization. and that which is being modernized is a taunt to the chickens!

                        I've commented on the 3rd part posted a photo of the modernized BMP 3
                        it is in the counterguerrilla version.

                        you would figure out what kind of car in the photo, so, for starters;)

                        but the charter
                        sorry, the charter is certainly a necessary thing, and you are absolutely right that it is written not in ink.
                        but you know, I’m looking for examples of the latest cases of the use of military utava in the actions of troops. and they are negligible

                        as soon as the majority will do what they are supposed to do according to the charter, no wunderwaffles will be needed.
                        This was repeatedly proved by individual military units both in Chechnya and practically all NATO wars ...

                        even a victorious war 8 8 8 and that is not a model of its implementation.

                        you better not know my assessment of this ...
                      6. Rider April 12 2013 17: 02 New
                        • 0
                        • 0
                        0
                        yes, yes, I don’t understand the difference between the modernization of the BMP-2 and the adoption of the BMPT

                        Apparently not, for you there are a couple of birds on BMP 2 and they are equivalent.

                        is T 62 compared with T34 is it progress or a child prodigy?

                        Well, if this is a question for you, then I can’t help with anything ...


                        and you evaded the answer.
                        it means that in one case you have modernization, in the other, you will manage the charter.
                        very clear.

                        Let's start with the fact that this is not only the opinion of the author, but also of many military and experts - for combined arms combat (big war) - all this is really not necessary. and for a country with a weak economy, it’s also disastrous.
                        for counter-guerrilla wars, this technique is not suitable, you need a specialized one - MRI and Co.
                        I didn’t learn anything new here.


                        you’ll excuse me, but in this example I see a break in causal relationships,
                        BMPT - nafig, such as expensive.
                        And Mrap, is he free?
                        because under it purely new machines need to be developed.

                        on what basis is the Terminator not suitable for combined arms combat?
                        armor - available
                        weapons for fighting tanks and infantry - available.
                        Absolutely suitable for both protecting tanks and supporting infantry.

                        Ah yes, experts do not order.
                        here to put these experts for a homemade mixture of memory with KAMAZ.
                        or in bare behe to drive into the canyons of the streets.


                        as soon as the majority will do what they are supposed to do according to the charter, no wunderwaffles will be needed.

                        precisely and we will fight at T 34.

                        it means so (in your opinion) there will be no modernization (experts have not yet decided which side to approach, and there is no money)
                        then we’ll fight, then what we have (CHARTER A SCARY FORCE, WE DISSOLVE ALL ENEMIES) Well, we’ll forget Mrap.
                        ahh, damn it, no money.
                        then we can do without MRIs

                        The charter rules.
                      7. iliq
                        iliq April 12 2013 18: 01 New
                        • 1
                        • 0
                        +1
                        Apparently not, for you there are a couple of birds on BMP 2 and they are equivalent.

                        oh fantasy, fantasy ...

                        and you evaded the answer.
                        it means that in one case you have modernization, in the other, you will manage the charter.

                        well, if for you the discovery that the T-62 replaced the T-34 ... and this did not cause any changes in the Charter ...

                        BMPT - nafig, such as expensive.
                        And Mrap, is he free?

                        the fact of the matter is that MCI is much cheaper than BMPT, and replaces trucks for transporting drugs during a guerrilla war.

                        on what basis is the Terminator not suitable for combined arms combat?

                        the fact that you want to perform the tasks of artillery, tankers and motorized rifles on it. no one has yet been able to clearly prescribe his goals and objectives on the battlefield.

                        Ah yes, experts do not order.
                        here to put these experts for a homemade mixture of memory with KAMAZ.
                        or in bare behe to drive into the canyons of the streets.

                        many of these experts went through Afghanistan and Chechnya, and even went abroad “on a business trip”. not to mention military academies. What can you boast of all this?

                        precisely and we will fight at T 34.

                        Why are you so torn? out in the "victorious" 888 on the T-62 fought ...

                        it will begin (in your opinion) there will be no modernization (experts have not yet decided which side to approach, and there is no money)
                        then we’ll fight, then what we have (CHARTER A terrible FORCE, WE DISSOLVE ALL ENEMIES)

                        that's exactly how the comrade quoted by you said:
                        they win ... thanks to the competent use of their technology, the full use of its capabilities and the prevention of the enemy from using their weaknesses.

                        especially against militants.

                        "BMP-2" upgrades that you "discovered" (and not BMP-3 as you might think) - they’ve been wandering around the network for more than five years ... so think for yourself, decide for yourself what is where and how;)

                        Well, we’ll even forget Mrap.
                        ahh, damn it, no money.
                        then we can do without MRIs

                        they seem to have heard with MRIs - even though the armored Urals are entering the troops and are being used as intended.

                        The charter rules.

                        and he always steers, and even taxes!
                        and as soon as "at random" (reconnaissance, security, lost their way, communications) - so cargo 200 and "heroes stood to their deaths" ...
                      8. Rider April 12 2013 18: 46 New
                        • 0
                        • 0
                        0
                        Apparently not, for you there are a couple of birds on BMP 2 and they are equivalent.

                        oh fantasy, fantasy ...
                        .

                        that’s precisely your fantasy.

                        well, if for you the discovery that the T-62 replaced the T-34 ... and this did not cause any changes in the Charter ...

                        TBMP replaced conventional ones, and BMPT organically supplemented it.
                        but in one case you welcome progress, in the other not.
                        oh yeah, they didn’t register him in the charters.
                        Tady will fight on carts.
                        they seem to be in all charters (pre-war)
                        but no, T 62 is still there.

                        on what basis is the Terminator not suitable for combined arms combat?

                        the fact that you want to perform the tasks of artillery, tankers and motorized rifles on it.


                        and personally, I consider this an AGROMAD BEST plus.
                        but you obviously prefer to drag BMP tanks and a bunch of infantry reinforced with mortars.
                        with artillery support.

                        and by the way, why did you decide that the BMPT would fight alone. ?


                        "BMP-2" upgrades that you "discovered" (and not BMP-3 as you might think) - they’ve been wandering around the network for more than five years ... so think for yourself, decide for yourself where and how

                        Yes, I don’t think so, just the finger pressed the wrong number.
                        besides, you yourself see that there is a modernization model, but things are still there.
                        as I understand it, the Moscow Region decided to replace the reinforced armor with the enhanced study of the charter.

                        the fact of the matter is that MCI is much cheaper than BMPT, and replaces trucks for transporting drugs during a guerrilla war.

                        tell it to those who will continue to ride on armor and betrov
                        (I understand that they will continue to be armed)

                        many of these experts went through Afghanistan and Chechnya, and even went abroad “on a business trip”. not to mention military academies.

                        but poorly give an example?
                        but somehow unfounded.

                        Why are you so torn? out in the "victorious" 888 on the T-62 fought ...

                        as I understand it, you continue not to fight against them.
                        and what, the charter allows.

                        they seem to have heard with MRIs - even though the armored Urals are entering the troops and are being used as intended.

                        and with BMP BTR?
                        someone said that the modernization of 2ki is already in their fifth year.

                        The charter rules.

                        and he always steers, and even taxes!


                        but where is it written in the charter that it is not necessary to upgrade equipment, or to accept new models for arming?
                      9. iliq
                        iliq April 12 2013 19: 20 New
                        • 0
                        • 0
                        0
                        that’s precisely your fantasy.

                        and I write them with your hands good

                        TBMP replaced the usual ones,

                        it hasn’t come yet, and where it came (Israel, Sweden, Germany) - for some reason it replaced only a small part of the BMP ...

                        and BMPT organically supplemented it.

                        like BMP-3 tried to replace artillery, infantry and tankers, with the corresponding deplorable result.

                        and personally, I consider this an AGROMAD BEST plus.
                        but you obviously prefer to drag BMP tanks and a bunch of infantry reinforced with mortars.
                        with artillery support.

                        I’ll tell you a secret - to break through the defense you need at least three times the superiority of the attackers ...

                        and by the way, why did you decide that the BMPT would fight alone. ?

                        because only in fairy tales "suddenly out of nowhere" - and in reality - a severe shortage of drugs, equipment, fuels and lubricants ...
                        and you have to choose - BMPT or tank / howitzer / BMP ...

                        Yes, I don’t think so, just the finger pressed the wrong number.
                        besides, you yourself see that there is a modernization model, but things are still there.

                        so if there is no money to upgrade existing equipment - where will they come from with a new one?

                        as I understand it, the Moscow Region decided to replace the reinforced armor with the enhanced study of the charter.

                        Well, it seems like lately things have become better with combat training, we hope that there will be no more failures like Chechnya and 888.

                        tell it to those who will continue to ride on armor and betrov
                        (I understand that they will continue to be armed)

                        Yes, do not go already;) smart steel. and wearing bronics with helmets;)
                        Yes, and armored Urals en masse in the troops.

                        but poorly give an example?
                        but somehow unfounded.

                        go to http://otvaga2004.ru/, read, there is a forum there.
                        You can talk with Khlopotov and Chobitk.

                        and with BMP BTR?
                        someone said that the modernization of 2ki is already in their fifth year.

                        they upgrade so little - but they expect that in a couple of years Armata and Kurganets will be released.

                        but where is it written in the charter that it is not necessary to upgrade equipment, or to accept new models for arming?

                        something already specifically flats you wassat
                      10. Rider April 12 2013 19: 59 New
                        • 0
                        • 0
                        0
                        and I write them with your hands

                        Well, no, dear comrade. let your fantasies remain yours.

                        it hasn’t come yet, and where it came (Israel, Sweden, Germany) - for some reason it replaced only a small part of the BMP ...

                        You see for yourself, there is a tendency, and by the way, Israel prefers TBMP in combat units.
                        draw your own conclusions.

                        but in reality - a severe shortage of drugs, equipment, fuels and lubricants ...
                        and you have to choose - BMPT or tank / howitzer / BMP ...


                        So how did you get together then going to war?
                        one infantry?
                        here, either give blood from the nose to the diesel fuel, or even sit in the LDPE.
                        and BMPT just reduces the number of pieces of equipment.
                        although I agree, it is not a panacea, but not a bunch of armor to drag.

                        Yes, do not go already;) smart steel. and wearing bronics with helmets;)
                        Yes, and armored Urals en masse in the troops.


                        sorry. but here you are a little out of touch.
                        I’ll tell you a secret that armored personnel carriers in BMP landings and armored personnel carriers do not oddit.
                        closely there. and in some cases not a vykarakak.
                        and you said above that there are problems with fuel and lubricants, so what do you order to cover the armored Kamaz trucks with?
                        they themselves are not armed, which means either tanks or old unmodernized
                        bechi.
                        and whatever you like. you have to go on top.
                        for inside the review is a little more than no.
                        or even completely abandon MRAP. if there are no tanning salons.

                        go to http://otvaga2004.ru/, read

                        thanks, I’ll come and read.

                        they upgrade so little - but they expect that in a couple of years Armata and Kurganets will be released.

                        Well, you see, uv opponent. Kurgan, this is the platform for TBMP
                        and you accept them with hostility.
                        (So ​​the Israelis are right)
                        there will be a replacement for the BMP 1/2, and the 3rd model, although improved in terms of armoring, still leaves much to be desired.
                        in principle, if you equip it (Kurgan) with a decent combat module, then the need for BMPT disappears (since you don’t like it that way)

                        something already specifically flats you

                        but still,
                        The Charter may directly prohibit weapons upgrades.
                        so you say, otherwise I do not know.
  • MAG
    MAG April 11 2013 17: 33 New
    • -1
    • 0
    -1
    2 part is super !!! Everything is written correctly about mraps, but BASK requires re-equipping the whole army with mraps and then we will have HAPPINESS!
  • Kurkin April 11 2013 18: 54 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    The author is well done! Good work done, great article! Thank you so much!
  • avdkrd April 11 2013 20: 13 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    In many ways, I agree with the author in assessing domestic BT, but not in everything. The author contradicts a little by issuing data on the number of overcoming water obstacles in the offensive and the "non-aggressive" doctrine of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The concept of Russian armored vehicles, as well as the concept of its combat employment, is a legacy of the USSR. In principle, it is ideal for the third world (for which it was created). It has tremendous combat stability due to its relative simplicity and reliability and is able to perform combat missions for years without stationary maintenance. For example, tell me how many marches Abrams can withstand (Leclerc, Challenger, Leopard - to choose from) after the destruction of infrastructure (albeit partial) by nuclear strikes? Or with deficiency HIGHLY qualified personnel? T-90, and especially T-72 will be serviced by the crew until the fuel sources are completely exhausted. But this is all the lyrics, times have changed and the diversity of local conflicts requires a different approach. Apparently this is what we will see in the line of Boomerangs and Almaty. Modular reservations with the ability to say “lose extra pounds” to overcome water barriers are possible even with the modernization of the BMP-1,2. But in any case, it is necessary to make changes to the charter, effective methods of using BT should be developed, and most important, IMPLEMENT. Americans in their frank scrap metal win one war after another precisely due to the competent use of their technology, the full use of its capabilities and the prevention of the enemy from using their weaknesses.
    1. iliq
      iliq April 11 2013 20: 37 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      For example, tell me how many marches Abrams can withstand (Leclerc, Challenger, Leopard - to choose from) after the destruction of infrastructure (albeit partial) by nuclear strikes?

      about the same as the T-72 (in the hands of a qualified specialist) - about 10 km before overhaul. and you don’t need to invent bad NATO members;), otherwise I'll talk about the gas turbine MBT T-000 (hi Abrams) and the MTU 80 engine and its reliability (hi T-883 and T-64)

      But in any case, it is necessary to make changes to the charter, effective methods of using BT should be developed, and most important, IMPLEMENT.

      study the charters, and no need to reinvent the wheel!

      The Americans at his frank scrap metal they win one war after another precisely thanks to the competent use of their equipment, the full use of its capabilities and the prevention of the enemy from using their weaknesses.

      what prevents to restore order in the native Fatherland?
  • avdkrd April 11 2013 20: 14 New
    • -1
    • 0
    -1
    The approach of domestic designers to the buoyancy of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers by increasing displacement (by ship) is, to put it mildly, incomprehensible. There are implemented solutions in the world by means of external inflatable pontoons (implemented in Korean K-21), and security from penetration is easily achieved by filling the pontoons not just with air, but with an analog of construction foam.
    1. iliq
      iliq April 11 2013 20: 38 New
      • 0
      • 0
      0
      Readers Forum Courage2004 visible drinks
  • iliq
    iliq April 11 2013 21: 06 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    By the way, the author forgot about the BREAK of armor of the BMP and armored personnel carrier when hit by an RPG. To strengthen the armor was developed "Afghan" BMP-2D - with additional mounted armor. this reinforcement prevented the breakdown of the main armor upon hit by an RPG and its consequences for those inside.

    after the end of the Afghan war, these modernizations were not in demand ... and in Chechnya the available improvised weapons were hung up ...
  • 2я19 April 11 2013 23: 06 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    In the rest of the two articles we have a conclusion that the Soviet BT is not so bad, you need to use it correctly and for the intended purpose. And the combined team is the combined team. "Only a regimental orchestra can be combined" (General Gromov).
  • vedruss
    vedruss April 12 2013 00: 27 New
    • 2
    • 0
    +2
    Complicated article. I learned something new, thanks to the author.
    I will describe what I disagree with.
    Bahcha-u.
    There was a case in Georgia, ours are sitting on a pair of BMPs in an ambush - they see the Georgian 72s crawling, 3 pieces as expected, and our BMPs only have ATGMs against tanks, well, we’d be glad to rush aboard, but only as the storyteller said recalling the teachings and test firing by these ATGMs where only every second and third ATGM didn’t fire, they missed them ... The moral of the story is this - says that if there were BAHCHA on an infantry fighting vehicle, it would be safe to shoot them on board.
    also in a city battle, BAHCHA can precisely destroy with a 100 mm cannon those concrete walls which commentators complained about above, and shells with remote detonation exist for it.

    about BMPT "FRAME" (terminator), a thing radically necessary. The main advantage of this technique in the CIRCLE qualitative review. why there I didn’t understand 2 guns of 30 mm, and 1 probably would have been enough, and a system of changing the type of ammunition could be developed (since the Pinostans coped with this, then we can do it all the more.)
    instead of just 30 mm of fluff I would stick a 40 mm new grenade launcher there - we recently developed to replace the AGS17 there the weight of the warhead is 90 grams, it’s the most to smell green. The diameter of the lesion is 16 m.
    BMPT armor is better than tank.
    And asking infantry, tankers, and motorized rifles IN BATTLE: Do they need BMPT ?, I think we would all hear - give two !!!
    comparing our tanks with European, Jewish and American. do not forget that their tanks themselves do not travel far, do not travel through fields, swamps, snow, and virgin lands. with their weight and dimensions, it’s hard for them to move at all, and not just to drive ours.
    BMP Bradley is nonsense. This is an analogue of our armored personnel carrier. bring the soldiers to battle and finish off the savages after catching them in the desert. Enormous dimensions make it possible to ignore it, the armor is there, it really holds the 7.62 bullet, but since it doesn’t swim, it holds them on its shore with a bored look in a dreamy thoughtfulness about meeting with our infantry fighting vehicle in the rear, at the same time, after crossing , and striking it with a 30 mm cannon, breaking even the frontal armor of tanks of those years back in the 80s if you hit exactly at one point. Any tank in the world can carry this fluff on board until now. It is not in vain that it is even put on our attack helicopters.
    1. aksakal April 12 2013 11: 41 New
      • 2
      • 0
      +2
      Quote: vedruss
      Also, in a city battle, BAHCHA can just qualitatively destroy with a 100 mm cannon those concrete walls on which commentators complained above, and shells with remote detonation exist for it.
      - it would be cool to create a shell - an analogue of the Israeli AMAR that explodes after entering the building where the Papuans are sitting with guns. A good feature.
  • goody April 12 2013 08: 55 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    Many thanks to the author for the tremendous work. The article is very informative, I learned a lot of interesting moments! With such a technique, it is possible to reconnoiter yes
  • iliq
    iliq April 12 2013 21: 16 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    Quote: Rider
    sorry. but here you are a little out of touch.
    I’ll tell you a secret that armored personnel carriers in BMP landings and armored personnel carriers do not oddit.

    on this sim I finish.
    learn materiel, at least from photo 888.
  • Alexander Kirov
    Alexander Kirov April 14 2013 00: 56 New
    • 3
    • 0
    +3
    The article is correct, it’s not always competent, but not fatal. It takes people to think. Without touching mine protection, I’ll say that I know KAZ (active defense complex). I’ll tell about it, because developed, if not developed this system in 1983. Well, not even 30 years have passed since we have what we have and have our BMP. Technical problems KAZ-technological and scientific base-it already exists. There are no people in the design bureau who were sitting on armor and under armor. KB went in a proven way and ran into an ARENA price of 300 tons cu It’s easier to say that they took up the old one again, for the radar. Which of you, for orientation in the world, wears a radar to determine your friend or alien, edible-inedible. Why do I need to identify a flying wasp per kilometer with the help of a radar if I need to slam it at an elongated distance hands? As a result, the ARENA radar requires a large amount of energy up to a separate energy supply system. Most identification issues in the living world are solved in the optical range and supported by IR and UV, as well as Rg. The industry needs to set the task of developing KAZ immediately, competently, taking into account the entire military experience. These are not yet visible. The design bureaus do it themselves, offer, and the military makes a smile. From the solution to the problem of a high-quality universal KAZ, the solution to the new BMPT, a heavy BMP for combat, its design and effectiveness. Today I would pay attention to KAZ ZASLON "Mikrotekh, Ukraine. Interesting thing. No one appreciated it, and developers around the world go with it, then they will offer Poles to ANDERS, then they get to the landfill in the USA, they didn’t stand at the market with it. The problem is the lack of interest in state level. And with whom to fight Ukraine? I don’t see the enemy. Who is very interested in what modern KAZ should look like write me, I will answer. As for heavy infantry fighting vehicles. I agree to all 100, And Israel is ahead! And our Russia? AKHZARIT is already 25 years old. We don’t need to restore our scrap metal, but we need to catch the trend and do it better. We didn’t catch it. Our BPM-T should weigh 35 tons, it is protected by a DZ complex, KAZ of the latest generation and weapons worthy of the enemy. All systems are unified with the main battle tank Other machines are also needed. They can swim, fly, flutter like butterflies, as long as it matches their purpose and the achievement of Victory. And look here. Ukraine, Kharkov Tank Repair Plant does what. Let one copy, but correct. There are drawbacks. I I’d put a turbine from 80s and put YUMO-500 in a landfill, and the GPO installed, and closed the ramp, as I put it on NAME and KAZ, and the landing was ennobled. Armament is a separate issue. As the author of the article was close to the concept itself !!! Yes, 100 mm BAHCH, this is a song. Someone said to put a flamethrower, this is a real thinker. These are weapons for BMPTs, tank support vehicles. We must definitely put a 120 mm low-ballistic gun under mines, ATGMs, a flamethrower, HE shells. The gun should turn freely 360 in any crowded streets. For those who were there, imagine a blow with a thermobaric charge of 120 mm into the house and at a distance of 50 m? As Pugacheva sang, I would not want to meet that goat again. There are many problems, and the main thing is to put the protection of the soldier's life in the first place. Who is against it?
  • Torang
    Torang 14 May 2013 15: 16 New
    • 1
    • 0
    +1
    Everything is true on the topic. Everything has its time and place.
  • Soul of time 19 October 2017 22: 04 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    The article is interesting. But it’s painfully slippery. Along with interesting correct arguments and conclusions, there are some distortions and dust in the eyes.

    Booking armored vehicles.
    The author wants to convince us that since such a technique was developed for specific tasks, then the enemy will act accordingly. The enemy, apparently, will not use a grenade launcher, ATGM, or at least a large-caliber machine gun (which can be specially dragged to the ambush position) on an armored personnel carrier. Therefore, BTR does not need a strong reservation.

    Mine protection technology.
    The author twitches and tries to blur his eyes with the fact that, say, such special vehicles are used only in certain territories, conflicts, roads, are ineffective against all mines, etc.
    The enemy, of course, cannot sow territory with mines. Yeah.
    The fact that mine protection can save infantry and crew from death, which can then fight, is not bad. After all, you can still buy equipment or no longer use it on this site, but to train an infantryman or, especially, a special forces soldier, this is several times more expensive than that equipment.
    In addition, the author cites the cost of foreign mine action technology, forgetting that the prices there are too high. Everything is cheaper for us.
    Well, sometimes there may not be time to make a passage in a minefield. But at hand there is such a protected machine.
    “But the US has enough wisdom to catch up on time - now even trawls are mounted on MRAP adapted exclusively for minefields.”
    Probably they are mounted not because they do not rely on mine bottoms, but because after hitting a mine anyway the car will have large damages that could lead to impossibility of movement. Therefore, trawls are also used.
    "Therefore, it is advisable to implement the MRAP concept not within the framework of a new class of armored vehicles, but within the framework of modernizing parts of the armored and serially produced armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and BMDs (just in case)."
    But this is the right conclusion!

    The main conclusion that I would like to make from this article. Applying the technique must be correct. At the right time and in the right place. Then everything turns out as efficiently as possible.
    However, for this it is necessary to have the appropriate data about the enemy. And this is far from always possible. And therefore, I wrote all this above.
    Yes, and about the Abram combat packs. Do not rely on the fact that in battle their crews will not close the armored curtains.
  • Soul of time 19 October 2017 22: 24 New
    • 0
    • 0
    0
    Quote: avdkrd
    Americans in their frank scrap metal win one war after another precisely thanks to the competent use of their technology, the full use of its capabilities

    With this, you can argue well and omit those who wrote that nonsense below the baseboard.