Raid operations of the Black Sea Fleet. Part of 4

Last raid operation

October 5, 1943 Commander of the Black Sea fleet Vice Admiral L.A. Vladimirsky signed a combat order, according to which the 1st destroyer division in cooperation with torpedo boats and aviation the fleet on the night of October 6 is to raid the enemy’s maritime communications off the southern coast of Crimea and bombard the ports of Feodosia and Yalta. The purpose of the operation is the destruction of enemy vessels and landing ships leaving Kerch. The general leadership of the actions of the ships was entrusted to the chief of staff of the squadron, Captain 1st Rank M.F. Romanov, who was at the command post in Gelendzhik.

Here we immediately note that if for the preparation of a detachment of ships to solve the typical task of the day it could be enough, then to work out all the issues of organization with other kinds of forces, for example, aviation, most likely they are not enough. It is one thing if the commanders of the forces involved in the operation can be brought together for a briefing, and then clarify the details of each other. It is quite another thing if all participants take their Decisions separately from each other. It is even worse if these Decisions are heard and asserted by different warlords. In this case, it happened.

October 5 from 4: 30 to 17: 40 nine planes of the 30 reconnaissance aviation regiment conducted reconnaissance of enemy floating equipment on sea lanes in the north-western and western parts of the Black Sea, on the Kerch Strait-Theodosia communications. Aviation intelligence found: in 6: 10 in the Alushta area - 4 minesweeper, 12 high-speed amphibious barges and 7 barges, in 12: 05 - the same convoy in the Balaclava region; in Feodosia in 6: 30 – 23 speed amphibious barges, 16 self-propelled pontoons and 10 patrol boats; on 12: 00 on outer roadstead - 13 high-speed landing barges, 7 self-propelled pontoons and 4 patrol boats; in 13: 40 in the Gulf - 8 dispersed high-speed landing barges; in 16: 40 in port - 7 high-speed amphibious barges, 2 self-propelled pontoon and on the roads - 9 high-speed amphibious barges, 4 self-propelled pontoon and 3 patrol boats; from 7: 15 to 17: 15 in Kerch - 20 – 35 high-speed amphibious barges and self-propelled pontoons; in the Kerch Strait (in the Yenikale movement - cordon Ilyich) - 21 high-speed landing barge and 7 self-propelled pontoons; between Yenikale and Szuska Chushka - 5 high-speed amphibious barges and re-observation in 13: 00 - high-speed amphibious barge, 10 self-propelled pontoons and 7 patrol boats, and in 17: 05 – 18 high-speed amphibious barges and XNMX speedboats and 4 109: NNXX: 11 –32: 17; in 20: 35 in the Yalta region - high-speed landing barge; in 7: XNUMX between points Kerch, Kamysh-Burun and Tuzla Spit (in motion) - to XNUMX high-speed landing barges and XNUMX self-propelled pontoons.
Thus, on the communications along the Crimean coast between Kerch and Yalta there were a large number of enemy boats, most of which could not leave the area before nightfall.

To accomplish the mission, the leader "Kharkov", the destroyer "Merciless" and "Capable", eight torpedo boats, as well as naval air force aircraft were assigned.

A day before the release, the leader and the destroyers redeployed in Tuapse, and four hours before the start of the operation, the commanders of the ships received combat orders; the briefing was conducted personally by the fleet commander. It was quite different to bring the combat mission to the aircraft. For example, the commander of the 1-th mine-torpedo aviation division, Colonel N.A. Tokarev made his decision for the forthcoming hostilities on the basis of the oral decision of the Vrid Air Force Commander of the fleet. Moreover, this decision was brought to the commander of the division in 23: 00 (!) 5 in October by an officer in the operational department of the Air Force headquarters Major Bukreev. What coordination of interaction issues if the ships were already at sea!

The decision itself of the commander of the 1 th mtad regarding the division was as follows:
a) with one IL-4 aircraft in 5: 30 6.10.43, to carry out additional reconnaissance of watercrafts in the roadstead and in the port of Theodosius in the interests of artillery firing of destroyers, and then proceed with 5: 30 to 6: 00 to adjust;
b) four IL-4 aircraft in the period from 5: 30 to 6: 00 to suppress the fire of enemy coastal artillery batteries located on Cape Kiik-Atlama, Koktebel, Theodosia and Sarygol;
c) from 6: 00 from 44 ° 5 ′ 35 ° 20 ′ to P-39 “Air Cobra” and P-40 “Kittyhawk” fighters (from the composition of the 7 squadron of the 4 fighter combat squadron of 44 to the same part of the combat team of the 10's operational subordinate squadron of the 38 fighter regiment of the combat group and the same team and the combat team of 00’s XNUMX XNUMX XNUMX point; transition destroyers to the point XNUMX ° XNUMX ′ XNUMX ° XNUMX ′;
d) in 7: the 00 9th Pe-2 40 air regiment of dive-bombers under the cover of fighters to destroy ships in the port of Feodosia and photograph the results of the artillery firing of ships.
In addition, closer to the coast of the Caucasus, the fighter cover was supposed to be carried out by twelve LaGG-3 and Yak-1 airplanes of the 4 th air division.

According to the Decision made by the commander of the 1 Air Division, it was planned to ensure the shelling of the ports of Yalta and Theodosius at dawn on October 6 using the IL-4 corrector aircraft. Provided for the suppression of enemy coastal batteries by the air group of two Il-4 bomber and two Boston DB-7B. In addition, nine Pe-2 of the 40 th air regiment under cover of six Aerocob of the 11 th Fighter Aviation Regiment were to dive with the diving equipment of the enemy in the roads and in the port of Feodosia.

To cover the ships, they stood out: from Theodosia to the point 44 ° 26 ′ 35 ° 24 ′ from 6: 00 to 8: 00 four P-40 7 th aviation regiment; between points 44 ° 26 ′ 35 ° 24 ′ and 44 ° 13 ′ 36 ° 32 ′ with 8: 00 to 10: 00 two P-40 of the same regiment; between points 44 ° 13 ′ 36 ° 32 ′ and 44 ° 12 ′ 37 ° 08 ′ with 10: 00 to 11: 00 two P-39 11 of the 2nd regiment; between points 44 ° 12 ′ 37 ° 08 ′ and 44 ° 11 ′ 38 ° 02 ′ with 11: 00 to 12: 30 two P-40 7 of the 2nd regiment.
According to the fleet report on the operation, six P-40 are all that the Black Sea Fleet possessed. But on 15 of October, the 7 regiment had 17 operational "Kittyhawks", five more had the 30 th reconnaissance regiment. It is doubtful that all these machines will appear after October 5. During October, the Black Sea Fleet Air Force received eight P-40, one was written off by an act, and on November 1, the Black Sea Fleet Air Force had a Kittyhawk 31.

With the onset of darkness in 20: October 30 5, the ships under the command of the commander of the 1 division of captain 2 rank GP. The raids (the braid pennant on the “Merciless”) came out of Tuapse. About one o'clock in the morning, the leader "Kharkiv" (captain of the 2 rank, PI Shevchenko), with the permission of the detachment commander, began to move towards Yalta, and the destroyers continued on to Feodosia. But not in the shortest way, but in order to approach the port from the dark part of the horizon.

After two o'clock in the morning, the ships found German reconnaissance aircraft. Thus, the concealment of actions could not be ensured, although the squad commander maintained radio silence and reported on his detection only in 5: 30. However, the squadron chief of staff had already guessed about the loss of secrecy, since he had reported to the 2 about the reconnaissance aircraft: the commander of the leader had reported 30.

But mf Romanov did not know another ... It turns out that enemy aviation reconnaissance found destroyers still in Tuapse, immediately after their arrival, which gave grounds for the German Admiral of the Black Sea, Vice Admiral Kizeritsky, to suggest a possible raid of Soviet ships to the shores of Crimea. However, he did not cancel the previously planned departure of the convoy from Kerch to Feodosia in the afternoon of October 5, which was recorded by our air reconnaissance. Around 22 at 5 in October, the German radio direction finder station in Evpatoria reported that at least one destroyer had left Tuapse. In 02: 37, Chief of the Marine Commandant's Office “Crimea”, Rear Admiral Schultz, declared a battle alert to the areas of the naval commandant's offices of the ports of Yalta and Feodosia. Since that time, the Soviet ships have been waiting.

Exactly at midnight on October 6, German S-28, S-42 and S-45 torpedo boats left their base in Dvuyakornaya Bay, taking a position south of the convoy under the coast. In 02: 10, the group commander, Lieutenant Commander Sims, received an alert from a reconnaissance aircraft about his discovery of two destroyers heading west at high speed (note: connection reconnaissance aircraft - torpedo boat!). Realizing that the Soviet ships could not be intercepted before dawn, Sims ordered the commanders of torpedo boats to take a waiting position, gradually shifting to the west, towards Theodosia. The aircraft constantly watched the destroyers and denounced their place, course and speed to the commander of the German group.

This continued until four o'clock in the morning, when the Soviet ships turned north, to Theodosia. Having received the report, the torpedo boats went to intercept the destroyers. In 05: 04, Sims on the radio requested a reconnaissance aircraft to show the enemy’s position with lighting bombs - which the latter skillfully did, dropping several bombs south of the destroyers. Thus, they became perfectly visible from boats on the light path. Perhaps only then GP. Negoda finally became convinced that his actions were not a secret to the enemy, and reported this to the squadron command post.

Having not found the German torpedo boats and knowing that a similar situation had taken place in the past exits of the ships to the Crimean shores, the division commander decided that nothing special had happened. No disturbing information was received from the squadron command center, and G.P. Negoda continued the task according to plan. In 5: 30, Soviet destroyers discovered German torpedo boats going into the attack, and from a distance of about 1200, they opened fire, evading four torpedoes (the S-42 stuck a sight, and he did not complete the attack). During the battle, one 45-mm projectile hit the engine room of the S-45 torpedo boat, but it managed to keep full speed for 30 minutes. The last for the Germans turned out to be very important, since the German destroyers, after repelling the attack, began to pursue German boats!

At the order of Sims, S-28 turned south, trying to divert the attention of destroyers, and S-45, accompanied by S-42, covered with a smoke screen, began to retreat to its base in the Koktebel region. The Soviet ships were also divided, but after an unsuccessful torpedo attack, S-28 quickly broke away from its pursuer, and a pair of boats, leaving to the south, was under effective shooting until about six o'clock in the morning. By that time, having received organized repulse (after the attack of the boats, the coastal artillery was also fired upon by the ships), GP Negoda decided to abandon the shelling of Theodosia, in 6: 10 destroyers lay on the course of departure to the meeting point with the leader "Kharkov".

This morning, another meeting with German torpedo boats was destined to happen, and quite unexpected for both sides. At about seven o'clock "Merciless" and "Capable" in 5 – 7 miles south of Cape Meganom suddenly met with two torpedo boats that had jumped out from the dark part of the horizon, which clearly appeared in a torpedo attack. Having developed the maximum speed, both destroyers opened artillery fire and sharply turned away from the boats. A few minutes later, they also refused to attack and began to go north.

The circumstances were such that two German boats, S-51 and S-52, were returning to their base in the Koktebel area after repairs in Constance and their commanders did not know anything about the raid of Soviet ships on the ports of Crimea. Therefore, a meeting with them for the Germans happened completely unexpectedly and at such a distance when it was necessary to either attack or immediately leave. Attacking such well-armed warships in good visibility is a rather unpromising business, but the retreat attempt could have ended miserably — despite the repair, S-52 couldn’t develop more than 30 nodes. If the destroyers organized the pursuit, the S-52 would inevitably die. In this situation, the commander of the group of boats, Captain-Lieutenant Zevers decided to go into a false attack in the hope that the Soviet ships would begin to evade and withdraw, not thinking of a counterattack. So it happened, and the German boats came to the base.

As already mentioned, “Kharkov” was still in 2: 30 reported on its detection by a reconnaissance aircraft. According to German data, he was spotted by a radio direction finding station in Yevpatoria. Starting with 2: 31, Rear Admiral Schulz, head of the “Crimea” Marine Commandant's Office, began reporting on the hourly output of “Kharkov” to communicate with the radio center in Gelendzhik. The same station on the taken bearings determined the direction of movement of the ship in the direction of Yalta. In 5: 50, a radar station located on Cape Ai-Todor, discovered the leader in 110 ° bearing at a distance of 15 km.

After making sure that the target detected was not its own ship, in 6: 03 the German command allowed the coastal batteries to open fire on it. Almost at the same time, "Kharkov" began shelling Yalta. In 16 minutes, he fired at least one hundred and four 130-high-explosive fragmentation projectiles without adjustment. The leader’s fire was answered by three 75-mm guns of the 1-th battery of the 601-division, and then six 150-mm guns of the 1-th battery of the 772-division. According to German data, as a result of the shelling of the leader, several houses were damaged, there were victims among the civilian population. Following along the coast, the leader made a 32 shot at Alushta, but, according to the enemy, all the shells fell short. In 07: 15 "Kharkiv" joined the destroyers, following the course 110 ° with the speed of 24 node.

In 8: 05, three Soviet P-40 fighters appeared over the compound. At 08: 15, they discovered a German reconnaissance aircraft - the flying boat BV-138, which belonged to the 1 squadron of the 125 th naval reconnaissance group (I./SAGr 125) - and shot it down. After that, in 08: 20 fighters flew to the airfield. Of the five crew members of the scout, two squatted down on parachutes as ships, and the division commander ordered the “Capable” commander, captain 3, rank AN. Gorshenin lift them on board. The remaining two ships began to carry out anti-submarine escort of the destroyer. The whole operation took about 20 minutes.

In 8: 15 flew a new pair of P-40, the third car returned to the airfield due to engine failure. They were the first to find two Ju-08 at a high altitude first in 30: 88 (apparently scouts), and then in 08: 37 a strike group - eight Ju-87 dive bombers from 7./StG3 under the cover of four fighters Me-109.

Naturally, two Soviet fighters failed to break the attack, and the enemy dive bombers who had come from the sun reached three 250-kg bombs hit the leader Kharkov. One of them hit the upper deck in the 135 area of ​​the frame and, breaking through all the decks, the second bottom and bottom, exploded under the keel. Another bomb hit the first and second boiler rooms. Both boiler rooms and the first engine room were flooded, water slowly flowed through the damaged bulkhead on the 141 frame into the boiler room No. 3.

Thus, from the main power plant in the ranks there was a turbo-tooth unit in the engine room No. 2 and the third boiler, the pressure in which dropped to 5 kg / cm². The shock pump in the second car failed, diesel generator No. 2, turbofan No. 6. The explosion blew off and threw overboard one 37-mm anti-aircraft machine gun, two anti-aircraft machine guns failed. The leader lost his turn, received a roll of 9 ° on the starboard side and trim on the nose near 3 m. In this situation, the division commander ordered the Able Commander to tow the Kharkiv astern.

Now the connection, located in 90 miles from the Caucasus coast, was moving at a speed of only 6 nodes. In 10: 10, the P-40 troika covering the fleet flew away, but a pair of P-9 arrived in 50: 39. In 11: 01, they finished breaching, according to their report, knocking down one Ju-88 during this time - apparently, a scout. In 11: 31, two A-20G bomber arrived to cover the ships from the air, and in 11: 50 14 Ju-87 from 8 and 9./StG3 appeared on destroyers. Naturally, they did not get a decent response and successfully bombed. Two Ju-87 attacked "Kharkov" and stopped its towing "Able", and the rest began to dive on the "Merciless". The latter, in spite of the maneuvering and intensive fire of anti-aircraft artillery, was hit by one aerial bomb in the first engine room, and the second one was torn off directly at the side in the area of ​​the second vehicle. As a result of the bombings, the outer plating and deck on the starboard in the area of ​​110 – 115 frames were destroyed, the side plating from the cheekbones in the area of ​​the second machine was torn, the first engine room and the third boiler room were flooded, and the steering wheel was wedged. Water filtration began in the second engine and boiler rooms.

The destroyer lost speed, but remained afloat with a roll of 5 ° -6 ° on the port side. By order of the commander of the captain 2 rank V.A. Parkhomenko began a struggle for survivability and to facilitate the ship they fired all torpedoes overboard, dropped depth charges. "Kharkiv" did not receive any damage, but still did not have a turn. The "Capable", according to some sources, from close tears, the seams in the aft section on the starboard side diverged, and he took about 9 tons of water, but did not lose the course.

Assessing the situation and sending a report to the command, the division commander ordered the Captain's commander to start towing the leader and the Merciless one by one. This continued until the moment when, after 14 hours, a third boiler was put into operation on the “Kharkov” and the ship was able to start up to 10 nodes under one machine. "Capable" took in tow "Merciless."

A natural question: where were the fighters? Events developed as follows. In 5: 40, the commander of the 1 Air Division received information from the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force about the detection of our ships by enemy aircraft. In this regard, they ordered to bring in immediate readiness all the fighters allocated for cover. When the situation was created, the division commander suggested not to strike the Pe-2 at Theodosia, and six P-39, allocated to provide bombers, to retarget to cover the ships.

But this decision was not approved, ordering to continue the operation according to the plan. In 6: 15, the planes flew off to Theodosia’s bombardment and returned from a futile raid only on 7: 55. In 10: 30, a pair of P-39 was supposed to come to the ships, but she didn’t find the ships and came back. In 10: 40, the second pair of P-39 takes off - the result is the same. Finally, only in 12: 21, the four P-40 appears over the ships - but, as we know, the German aircraft struck the second blow in 11: 50.

By the way, how far from our airfields did German aviation deal a second blow? So, those who flew in to cover the A-20G ships found them at the point W = 44 ° 25 ′ D = 35 ° 54 ′, that is, in 170 km from the airfield in Gelendzhik. Judging by the report of the 1 th air division, the flight time of the fighters was 35 minutes. Enemy aviation operated with the removal of the order of 100 km.

A-20G flew to the airfield in 13: 14, the four P-40 - in 13: 41. In 13: 40, they were replaced by two P-39. By this time, the four Yak-1 and the four Il-2 were also above the ships. In 14: 40, the “yaks” and “sludge” were gone, but three P-39 and two A-20Gs remained, and in 14: 41, nine Ju-87 from 7./StG3, 12 Me-109 and two Ju-88. However, already in the course of the air combat, three Yak-1 from the 9 air regiment joined our aircraft.

Upon detection of enemy aircraft "Capable" moved away from the "Merciless". It was on him and came the main blow. The ship is covered with a continuous stream of water; Shaking from direct hits, having fallen to the port side with increasing trim on the stern, he soon quickly sank. The personnel who tried to leave the sinking destroyer, for the most part, were dragged into the crater and died.

"Able" avoided direct hits, but received damage from ruptures of aerial bombs in 5 – 6 m from the starboard in the area of ​​the nose superstructure, in 9-10 m on the left side at the second torpedo tube and in the rear part. A series of breakdowns of mechanisms in boiler rooms and engine rooms, resulting in a loss of travel for 20 – 25 minutes, occurred from the shock of the hull. By that time, Kharkiv was hit. He received two direct hits on the forecastle, several bombs exploded near the ship. All the nasal rooms before the 75 frame were flooded, the auxiliary mechanisms of the only boiler remaining under the steam from the strong shaking of the hull failed, the leader began to sink with his nose to the starboard. We didn’t manage to carry out any significant measures to fight for survivability, and in 15: 37, firing from a stern 130-mm gun and one anti-aircraft machine gun, “Kharkov” disappeared under water.

Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy’s airplanes had flown away, “Capable” approached the place of the leader's death and began to save the personnel. It took him more than two hours. Then the destroyer returned to the place of the “Merciless” death, but managed to pick up only two people, when another raid followed in 17: 38. Before the 24, the Ju-87 bombers began to dive into the ship from several directions. With a small time interval, three bombs weighing up to 200 kg each fell into the "Capable": in the area of ​​the 18-th and 41-th frames and in the first engine room. In addition, several small-caliber bombs exploded in the rooms 3 and 4.

The ship almost immediately sank its nose to the forecastle deck, while almost all of those saved from Kharkov were killed. In the inactive first boiler room, fuel oil from the damaged main line caught fire, and a flame escaped from the first chimney. This flash was observed from the German U-9 submarine. On Capable, the commanders attempted to organize a struggle for survivability, but after 10 – 15 minutes the destroyer lost the buoyancy residues and in 18: 35 sank. During the last raid on the destroyer, there were P-39, P-40 and Pe-2 pairs, but P-40 did not take part in the rest of the fuel in repelling the impact.

Torpedo and patrol boats, as well as seaplanes picked up a person from 123 water. Killed 780 sailors, including the commander of the leader "Kharkiv" captain 2-rank P.I. Shevchenko. The death of people contributed to the onset of the night, the deterioration of the weather, the completely inadequate number and the imperfection of the life-saving equipment that the ships had.

Let's summarize some results. October 6 1943 killed three modern destroyers, which at that time were in a state of high combat and technical readiness, were fully equipped with everything necessary, the number of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns on them brought to 5 – 7, their commanders and personnel more than than two years of experience in the war, including the struggle for survivability with the most severe injuries (both destroyers lost their nose pieces). Against these three ships, the German Ju-87 dive bombers acted in the first raids by groups of 8-14 vehicles, all of which took place in the area of ​​operation of the Soviet fighters. It was the fourth similar raid operation, the previous three ended in vain.

Planned operation fleet headquarters. The set of developed documents is unknown, but in all reports only the combat orders of the fleet commander No. op-001392 from October 5 appear. Surely there was some kind of graphic part. Since the ships left Batumi to the forward base of Tuapse as early as 7: 00 4 of October, it is obvious that the commander made his decision no later than October 3. The operation was planned by the fleet headquarters, and it was to be approved by the commander of the North Caucasus Front, to whom the Black Sea Fleet promptly submitted. If you believe the subsequent "debriefing", it turns out that the front did not even suspect about conducting a raid operation. We note this fact.

How the Operations Commanders of the Air Force took Decisions on the operation is well illustrated by the example of the 1 Air Division. However, from the point of view of the organization of interaction, this did not affect anything. Firstly, the ships refused to fire on Theodosia, and therefore did not work with the spotter. According to previous experience, it can be said that this is one of the most difficult tasks in terms of the mutual understanding of the forces involved. Secondly, virtually no interaction between ships and fighter planes was envisaged, that is, each acted according to his plans, which were theoretically agreed upon at the place and time, but did not provide for joint actions.

In the events of October 6, these flaws in the planning of the operation are weakly visible - and primarily because of the scantiness of the dedicated fighter aircraft. Indeed, what kind of joint actions could be organized during the first strike of the enemy, when there were four German fighters for two Soviet fighters? In the second strike of fourteen Ju-87, two A-20Gs stood up. Six fighters took part in the third strike from our side, but twelve of them also flew Germans! There were no German fighters during the fourth strike, but two P-39 and two Pe-2 had to confront twenty-four Ju-87.

It can be said that whatever the Soviet pilots asses, they could not physically break any of the blows. The tragedy could have been prevented if, after the first raid in 8: 37, the destructive cover was repeatedly enhanced. Was there such an opportunity?

Yes, it was. The exact number of fighters of the Black Sea Fleet on October 6 is unknown to us, but on October 15 the fleet air forces had serviceable vehicles with a sufficient range: P-40 - 17 (7-iap), P-39 - 16 (11-iap), Yak 1 - 14 + 6 (9-iap + 25-iap). There were at least five P-40s in the 30 reconnaissance regiment, but without reconnaissance the fleet had about fifty fighters capable of covering ships at a distance of up to 170 km, which could have made several sorties. By the way, the fighters made 50 sorties just to cover the ships.

A natural question: how many fighters were needed? Based on the existing standards and experience of hostilities, to reliably cover three ships with the expected enemy grouping in 10 – 12 bomber without escort fighters required an fighter squadron, that is, an average fighter per bomber. At a distance from the airfield in 150 km, with a time reserve for X-NUMX-minute air combat, the P-15 with outboard tanks could barrage at an altitude of 39-500 m for three hours, and without tanks - two times less. Under the same conditions, the P-1000 could patrol 40 and 6,5 hours respectively, and the Yak-3,5 - hour and 1 minutes. These figures are taken from standards developed from the experience of the Great Patriotic War, in real conditions they could be less.

But even if all the planes flew without outboard tanks (and some fighters had them exactly), if we reduce the percentage rates on 20, it is still clear that the air force of the fleet could well cover the ships with squadrons for about eight hours. Well, let it be six o'clock! During this time, the destroyers in any case would have reached the base.

However, this did not happen. First of all, because the commander of the Air Force did not receive a specific and unequivocal order to organize this most complete destructive cover for the ships. This was not done, although the signal from “Kharkiv” “I am suffering a disaster” is recorded in the combat log of the headquarters of the Russian Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet back in 9: 10. Only in 11: 10 was ordered to permanently cover ships with at least eight aircraft - but this was not actually done.

Now we need to see how correctly acted the commander of the detachment of ships. But first, about the ships themselves in terms of their combat stability from air strikes. In this regard, the Soviet destroyers as of the middle of 1943 were among the weakest in their class among all the warring states. We will not even consider our allies: a universal main caliber, anti-aircraft fire control devices, radar ... German destroyers did not have a universal main caliber, but carried radar to detect air targets and more than a dozen anti-aircraft guns. Of the Soviet ships, only the "Capable" had anti-aircraft 76-mm gun fire control devices. Unfortunately, these guns themselves were ineffective for firing at air targets, and at dive bombers they were simply useless. In addition, the "Capable" had seven 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. The "Merciless" had five of them, and the "Kharkov" - six. True, all the ships still had 12,7-mm machine guns, but by that time no one really counted on them.

In general, we didn’t do any revelations: already with 1942 in the General Staff, various reports, notes, reports circulated in the relevant departments of the Navy and fleets, which the aircraft’s anti-aircraft weapons didn’t correspond to the air threat. Everyone knew everything, but could not undertake anything cardinal: the only available means of self-defense — anti-aircraft guns — was not enough. In addition, many ships, the same destroyers, were so cluttered and overloaded that there was nowhere to place the submachine guns.

Similar problems occurred in the fleets and other belligerent states. There, for the sake of enhancing anti-aircraft weapons, destroyers often dismantled torpedo tubes and non-zenith main caliber guns. We, for various reasons, did not take such drastic measures on any of the fleets. The few radar stations that we began to receive from the allies, mounted primarily on ships of the Northern Fleet, did not receive any Black Sea before the end of hostilities. As a result, the Soviet destroyers in the face of the threat of air strikes could not act without fighter cover. And even then it was obvious to everyone.
On the tragedy of 6 in October 1943, a lot has been written in both closed and open editions. At the same time, documents related to the analysis of the operation were not printed anywhere. Only the conclusions set out in the Supreme Command Rate Directive of 11 of October 1943 are known. However, already from the first reports, the divisional commander 2-rank GP was named as the main immediate culprit. Negoda. First of all, they immediately recall the delay connected with catching the crew of the German intelligence officer. There was probably no deep sense in raising the pilots. But, firstly, not every day there is an opportunity to take such prisoners. Secondly, they went to the Crimean shores a dozen times already - and never the ships were subjected to effective massive air strikes. By the way, most likely this fact influenced the heads of GP Disgust, after each raid hoping that he will be the last. Even if we recall "Tashkent", then the Germans could not even sink it in the sea ...

Finally, thirdly, it must be borne in mind that in these 20 minutes, ships going at a speed of 24 node could approach eight miles to their shore, an 28 hub move - to 9,3 miles, and if they had developed 30 nodes, then would have crossed xnumx miles In all cases, the first blow was inevitable, and its result would most likely remain the same.

The second raid took place in 11: 50, that is, after more than three hours. All this time, "Capable" towed "Kharkov". No other valuable and priceless recommendations were given to the divisional commander ... after the war. Some even believed that GP Negoda had to throw "Kharkov" as a bait and retreat two destroyers to the base. I would like to see at least one Soviet commander who would be able to order to throw afloat destroyer 45 miles from the coast of the enemy. And if the enemy had not sunk him, and took and brought in tow to Feodosia? Incredible? As much as one expects from a Soviet military leader that he will abandon his ship in the middle of the sea.

There was a second option: to remove the crew and "Kharkov" flooded. This would take 20 – 30 minutes. But who knew when the next raid - and whether it will be at all. They would have drowned a valuable ship that could have been brought into the base, but take enemy aircraft and never appear again. Who would be responsible for this? G.P. Negoda to take on such responsibility was clearly not ready. True, having received a report on the damage to "Kharkiv", the fleet commander gave an encryption with this order. But, first, this telegram was not found in the Archive of the Navy, but here there is a very important point: did the commander order to flood "Kharkov" - or only recommended it? Agree this is not the same thing. Secondly, according to some data, this encryption before the second raid against GP. Negodu not hit.
And thirdly: knowing the time of the third raid, it is safe to say that with any actions of the detachment commander, the ships would not have avoided it. We have already dismantled the situation with the fighter cover, so the result of the strike most likely did not change either, but events would have happened two times closer to our shore.

Concluding the conversation about the place and role of the division commander in the events described, we note that the only solution that would really prevent the tragedy could be the termination of the operation after the loss of secrecy of the forces' actions became apparent. But, again, this is from the position of today - and how would you react to such a decision then?

On the example of this tragedy, it is vividly seen how the Soviet commander turned out to be a hostage to the situation that he did not create, but the system that existed. Regardless of the outcome of the operation (either the divisional commander interrupted it after the loss of stealth, or he abandoned the leader as a bait and returned with two destroyers, or he himself flooded another damaged destroyer and returned with one ship), GP Negoda, in any case, was doomed to be guilty of something. Moreover, in any case, no one could foresee the assessment of his guilt. He could be brought under the firing article for the loss of one ship - and forgive at the loss of all three. In this particular case, they didn’t chop off the shoulder, after all, it was October 1943. On the whole, they objectively understood: GP After recuperation, he was appointed the first mate of the battleship to the Baltic, and he completed the service in the rank of rear admiral.

Changes in the conditions of the operation during the October 6 operation did not provoke a response from the headquarters that led the forces - everyone tried to adhere to the previously approved plan. Although after the second strike it became obvious that the ships should be rescued in the full sense of the word, since they were taken seriously and they could not stand up for themselves. At the same time, the inability of the fleet commanders to direct the operation in a dynamically changing environment (although what the fuck dynamics are, ships have sunk more than 10 hours!), To respond adequately to maintain the continuity of force management.

Perhaps this is the main cause of the catastrophe, and the rest is the consequences and particulars. Here again, we stumble over the quality of operational and tactical training of staff officers, their inability to analyze the current situation, anticipate the development of events, and manage forces under the active influence of the enemy. If the acquired experience allowed the control bodies to basically cope with their functional responsibilities in planning combat operations, then with the implementation of these plans everything was worse. With a dramatic change in the situation, under the conditions of time trouble, decisions need to be made quickly, often without being able to discuss them with colleagues, approve with the bosses, and make comprehensive calculations. And all this is possible only if the manager, of whatever scale, has not only personal experience, but also absorbed the experience of previous generations, that is, possessed real knowledge.

As for the additional forces, if the commander of the fleet, as required, reported on his intention to conduct the raid operation to the commander of the North Caucasus Front and approved his plan, he could count on the support of the front air forces. In any case, understanding their part of responsibility for the result, the front command did not take the position of an outside observer.

In conclusion, I must say about the price that the enemy paid for the death of three destroyers. According to the Air Forces of the Black Sea Fleet, the Germans lost a reconnaissance aircraft, Ju-88, Ju-87 - 7, Me-109 - 2. According to German data, it is not possible to establish the exact amount of losses. Throughout October, 1943 participated in raids III / StG 3 lost four Ju-87D-3 and nine Ju-87D-5 from combat reasons - more than any other month in the autumn of 1943.

After the death of the last of the Black Sea leaders and two destroyers, only three modern ships of this class, Boiky, Vigorous and Smart, and also two old ones, Zheleznyakov and Nezamozhnik, remained in the ranks. Since that time, the ships of the squadron of the Black Sea Fleet no longer participated in the hostilities until their very end in the theater.

We have already done some intermediate conclusions, analyzed the unsuccessful or not entirely successful actions of the forces of the Black Sea Fleet. Summarizing, we can say that the main cause of failure was the human factor. This matter is thin, multifaceted. But with permissible simplifications, it can be said that the human factor could negatively affect the outcome of hostilities in three main cases.

The first is betrayal. On this occasion, it should be noted that the victory in the Great Patriotic War, first of all, was brought by the selfless love of the Soviet people to their homeland. He defended his Fatherland, his relatives and relatives from possible enslavement. This was the root cause of the mass heroism of the Soviet people at the front and in the rear. True, they say that the heroism of some is the idiocy of others, usually their superiors, who by their actions drove people to a stalemate. However, these hopeless situations, sorry for the pun, as a rule, there were at least two ways out. And the absolute majority chose a feat, not a betrayal. Naturally, here in no way mean the Soviet soldiers who were captured due to circumstances beyond their control.

If we accept this point of view, then we must immediately eliminate any malicious intent when planning and conducting operations. Analysis of all the unsuccessful actions of the Soviet Navy during the war years does not give a single, even the slightest, reason for such suspicions.

The second is cowardice. Here we start with the fact that all Soviet people with weapons in their hands, and sometimes without him, they defended our Homeland from the German invasion, who bestowed this life on us - heroes by definition. Moreover, it is completely irrespective of what feats personally each of them has accomplished, what rewards he has. Any person who faithfully carried out his duty, even far from the front, was also a participant in that war, he also contributed to the Victory.

Of course, the family has a black sheep, but it is easy to argue to the one over whose head the bullets are not whistled. In the course of hostilities, including at the Black Sea Theater, there were isolated instances of cowardice in the face of the enemy, and even more often - confusion, paralysis of the will. However, an analysis of the activities of the Black Sea region shows that such isolated cases have never affected the course, and even more so the outcome of the hostilities. As a rule, for each coward was his boss, and sometimes a subordinate, who by his actions parried the negative consequences of the coward’s activities. Another thing is that people often more than enemies were afraid of their own bosses and “competent authorities”. Here, the cowardice that was shown to them did affect several times, if not the outcome of operations, then at least the number of losses. Suffice it to recall amphibious operations conducted in the absence of the necessary conditions, including weather. They knew what the expected weather was, they knew what it threatened with, they even reported on the team - but when it came to the commanding roar from above, they all let out on the Russian perhaps. And how many times in a war, and even in peacetime, one could hear from the chief: “I will not go over the top!”

The third is banal human stupidity. True, we must immediately make a reservation that if, as a result of any research, you are led to the idea that certain decisions or actions turned out to be wrong due to the fact that the boss is a fool, immediately beware. Surely this did not happen because the boss or the performer is stupid, but because the researcher has reached the limit of his knowledge of this issue. After all, to declare what happened to be the result of someone's stupidity is the simplest and most universal way to explain the negative outcome of certain events. And the less competent a researcher is, the more often he resorts to precisely this explanation of what happened.

The reason for the failure of all the operations described is primarily in the low operational-tactical training of the fleet commanders. The negative developments on the land front, as well as the problems and shortcomings of the material and technical plan, only exacerbated the miscalculations and mistakes in decision making and their implementation. As a result, in pursuit of victorious reports, decisions were made to conduct operations that resulted in the loss of warships (cruiser, 2 destroyer leader, 2 destroyer) and hundreds of our sailors. This must never be forgotten.

Continued, all parts:
Part of 1. The raid on the shelling of Constanta
Part of 2. Raid operations on the ports of Crimea, 1942 g
Part of 3. Communication raids in the western Black Sea
Part of 4. Last raid operation