Raid operations of the Black Sea Fleet. Part of 3

Communication raids in the western Black Sea

As already noted, on November 19, the People's Commissar of the Navy confirmed the need to organize combat operations of surface ships off the western shores of the Black Sea. At the same time, he pointed out that the first raid should be planned so that the enemy’s communications would be disorganized for a period sufficient to prepare and start a second operation. Based on this instruction, the command fleet November 27 set a task for the squadron to systematically carry out active operations in the western part of the sea with the aim of destroying enemy transports and ships floating along the Romanian coast, to conduct the first raid operation from November 29 to December 1. The composition of forces: the cruiser Voroshilov, the leader of Kharkov, the destroyers Sobrazivitelny, Boyky and Ruthless.

The situation at the end of November favored the operation. Thanks to distraction aviation enemy in the area of ​​Stalingrad created the possibility of secretive and relatively safe exit of our ships on the enemy rear communications. Complex hydrometeorological conditions also contributed to this.

In the evening of November 29, the 2 group of ships in the “Merciless” destroyer squadron (the pennant of the commander of the 1 battalion of destroyers of the captain of the 1 rank, PA Melnikov) and “Boikiy” arrived from Batumi in Tuapse. Having taken the fuel in 0: 50 30 November, she went to sea. The 1 group was composed of the Voroshilov cruiser (the flag of the squadron commander, Vice Admiral L. Vladimirsky), the leader Kharkov and the destroyer Sozyruchnyy left Batumi on 17: 15 29 in November. The exit of both groups was provided by preliminary control trawling of fairways, search for submarines, patrols of fighters and direct guarding of ships by patrol boats.

On the morning of November 30, both groups joined at sea and for several hours followed together westward. In 12: 50, at the signal of the flagship, the 2-I group separated and went to the south-west. Reaching the 42 ° 20 ′ parallel and having decided on the Turkish lighthouse Kerempe, she headed to Cape Kaliakria with the intention of being there by dawn on December 1. 1-group in 19: 00 30 November, after passing the meridian of Cape Kerempe, lay on the course 325 °, hoping to dawn to approach Snake Island from the east.

The transition to the combat mission area was held secretly. On the morning of December 1, the ships of the 1 group followed with set paravanes. The head was “Savvy” (commander captain of the 2 rank S.C. Vorkov), in the wake of him was Voroshilov (commander captain of 1 rank F.S. Markov), trailer - Kharkiv (commander captain 3- go rank PI Shevchenko). In 7: 35 in the fog, visibility up to 5 miles, on the right the course opened on. Snake, and in 7: 47 all the ships opened fire on him - more precisely, at the lighthouse, which from the 45 distance of kb began to differ well in optics. And this is not about the concentrated shooting of several calibers for the same purpose, when everyone, as a conductor, is led by the flagship artilleryman, and according to his commands, these or those batteries and ships, but about simultaneous shooting. It was just that everyone started shooting at once at the same target, although according to the plan only the destroyer was allocated for this, and only with the detection of boats or airplanes at the airfield is the leader. The distance was 40 – 30,5 KB, that is, they were beating at close range, direct fire.

As a result, the fire managers got entangled in the shells, the target was periodically covered with smoke and dust from the 180-mm shells, and then “Soobrazitelny” completely stopped firing “Kharkov”, giving five volleys, also for a while ceased fire, and only in 7: 58 started sighting again. Having made two attempts and received incomprehensible takeaways, he transferred fire on the supposed aerodrome, that is, just around the island. Then the leader began to move according to his plan. The cruiser ceased fire on 7: 57, the destroyer on 8: 00. As a result, according to the lighthouse, which was not even mentioned in the combat mission, 46 180-mm, 57 100-mm and about a hundred 130-mm projectiles were fired, and nowhere was said about its destruction.

Again, the shooting was carried out from a distance of about 40 KB on the go in 12 nodes. Approximately at the same distance to the south of the island stood the minefield S-44, to which the detachment, lying on the course 257 °, gradually approached at an angle of 13 ° - conditions under which a meeting with a mine was inevitable, even if the ships sailed without paravannykh guard . In 7: 57, at the same time as the cease-fire on the Voroshilov cruiser, an incident occurred that caused the order of alignment in the formation to be violated. From the left side of the course angle 45 ° in the distance 10 KB found a periscope. The cruiser had already begun to grumble at the submarine, but it soon turned out that the signalmen had taken the landmark for the periscope, and the cruiser, describing the smooth coordinate, lay down on the previous course; at the same time, instead of building the wake column, a ledge was formed to the left.

From the time the paravan guards were set up on the ships, the main task of the “Smart” was to produce mine reconnaissance ahead of the cruiser. In this case, after the cruiser is unknown for SS. Vorkova described the coordinate, “Savvy”, by increasing the speed from 12 to 16 nodes, twisted several degrees to the left to gradually reach the cruiser’s head, and soon the speed was reduced again to 12 nodes. In 8: 04, when the destroyer, which had not yet reached the cruiser’s head, was on the 10 – 15 heading angle of the starboard, at a distance of about 2 kb from the cruiser, the right Paravan of the Intelligent took the mine and after a few seconds hit the mine, in 10 – 15 m from the board.

After the discovery of mines first thought SS. Vorkova was the assumption that mines were delivered recently (this was evidenced by the appearance of the mined mine) and close to the island, but meeting with mines is less likely to be more seaward (this assumption was true). Therefore, the commander of the "Smart", turning around with machines, abruptly turned the ship to the left and under the nose of the cruiser, which continued to follow the same course, for the second time and exceptionally successfully crossed the line of mines standing at 100 intervals, and left the dangerous area to the south. Apparently, on the steep circulation in combination with the low speed, the paravanes went wrong, the guard's capture width sharply decreased, as a result of which the ship “slipped” in the mine interval.

The destroyer commander violated all existing rules, according to which ships, if a minefield was detected, should either continue to move along the same course and with the highest speed allowed when using a paraguard guard, or go backwards along the path covered, ensuring that the stern did not go to the side. The choice of one or another method of maneuvering, which reduces the likelihood of encountering a mine, depends on the nature of the task being performed and on the degree of reliability of the available means of self-defense against mines.

In this case, acting by intuition and contrary to any rules, SS Vorkov really avoided serious danger. The next sub-cutting of a mine on the same southern row (left paravan) or on the northern row that still had to cross (if the destroyer had not dodged to the south) would most likely be accompanied by a mine explosion - and according to the Baltic experience such explosions of the EMC mark mines on a short distance from the board is very dangerous for destroyers.

Since immediately after undermining the mines about this, they gave signals with whistles, raising the “Y” flag and the semaphore, S.S. Vorkov believed that the Voroshilov cruiser would fall into his wake and also deviate to the south of the detected barrier. But the cruiser judged otherwise. L.A. Vladimirsky believed that the detachment fell on the newly delivered mine can, and since he did not know its boundaries, he did not try to bypass it. He also did not want to back up, as this would lead to the confusion of the paravan and caused a loss of time in sight of the enemy, and therefore ordered the cruiser commander to continue moving without changing course. At least that's how he explained his decision on joining the database. From what the squadron commander actually proceeded at that moment, remained a mystery. Most likely, he was guided just by the instructions mentioned above.

Near 8: 06, the Voroshilov crossed the wake of the destroyer and, after that, in the right paravan of the cruiser at a distance of 12 – 15 m from the side, there was a strong explosion of a mine. The light went out on the whole ship, steam in the boilers sat down, engine telegraphs and a telephone went out of action. After the explosion after the explosion on the right wing of the bridge and not finding on the deck and on board traces of destruction, the squadron commander immediately returned to the machine telegraph, where the cruiser commander was, who had just through the messenger ordered to back up. Considering this decision of the commander wrong, L.A. Vladimirsky ordered to give full speed, which was done. All this was happening while the ship was crossing the southern row of the S-44 minefield. In less than a minute, in 8: 07, a second mine exploded in the left paravan. Since the cruiser’s cars still worked in reverse during 10 – 20 seconds, forward speed fell to 6 – 8 nodes. For this reason, the paravanas were closer to the board than at the time of the first explosion, and therefore the second one also occurred closer to the ship. As a result, many instruments and mechanisms failed, radio communication was disrupted and a leak appeared in the case. Both paravan were lost, but the trawling parts remained. A minute later, in 8: 08, lighting was restored on the ship, and it became possible to use the emergency machine telegraph.

The damage sustained by the cruiser forced the squadron commander to abandon the shelling of the port of Sulin. The cruiser, being between both rows of mines, described the circulation, successfully crossed the southern row of mines and avoided a minefield, the western end of which was still two miles to the west of the blast site. That is, the cruiser still left a permanent course. It can be said that it saved the ship: on the same course, when crossing the northern row of mines "Voroshilov", who lost paravanov, probably would have blown up on one or two mines. But no one guaranteed that there is not another line of mines to the south. Therefore, most likely it was necessary to try to get out of the minefield in reverse - especially as the cruiser had already expanded the passage from 100 to 300 m. But they did it the way they did, and everything worked out.

In this situation, the squadron commander made the natural decision to stop the operation and return to the base. The question was only to leave everyone or not. After all, the leader, like the second squad, was already acting according to his plans. At first, when the cruiser revealed a leak, the squadron commander considered the position of the ship to be serious and therefore decided to return to his “Kharkov”.

Around 9 hours, while still away from the coast, about 16 miles southeast of the Bournas mark, the leader Kharkiv, in accordance with the order received on the radio, stopped the search and turned to the southeast to join the flagship. In the afternoon of December 2, the ships of the 1 group returned from the sea to their bases.

The ships of the second group "Merciless" and "Boyky", on the morning of December 1 in conditions of poor visibility, approached the Romanian coast, began to specify their place by the depths measured by the echo sounder and mechanical lot. It turned out that the ships were seaward of the number of places; as it turned out later, the discrepancy, apparently, was about four miles to the east. Around the 8 clock, heading west, the destroyers entered the fog band; visibility dropped to 3 – 5 kb. It was necessary to give at first a small, and then the smallest move. At the same time, the paravan guards, put in 5: 30, when the detachment was still in 40 miles from the coast, were almost inactive, since the paravanes were not diverted from the ship.

Being unsure of his place, the division commander did not want to go north to Mangalia until the coast opened. However, in 8: 04, when the echo sounder showed depth in 19 m (which, judging by the map, corresponded to the distance to the coast no more than 4 – 5 kb), there was nothing left but to turn to the right. A minute after the turn, the shore appeared, and in 8: 07 a silhouette of transport was found. Soon, they noticed three more silhouettes of transports, one of which was later identified as a warship, similar to a gunboat of the type “Dumitrescu”. The enemy’s coastal batteries almost immediately opened fire, shells falling into the 15 meters from the side and covering salvos were observed.

In 8: 10, the destroyers opened fire using the 1-N night viewfinder, however, they installed 2 kb on the “Merciless” by mistake instead of the 24 command distance, and the first line also gave a hop. Having introduced the amendment, the fire manager achieved a cover with a second salvo, but the third turn was not observed because of fog. In 12: 8 ceased firing as the targets disappeared. The destroyers turned back and, after 13 minutes, again attacked the vehicle with artillery and torpedoes, but after a few minutes they stopped fire, as all targets were hit and disappeared in the fog. A total of 20-mm projectiles were spent — 130, 88-mm — 76,2, 19-mm — 37, and 101 torpedoes. Sunk considered three enemy transport. Unfortunately, as it turned out, coastal shoals and rocks were attacked.

Poor visibility did not allow to establish with accuracy exactly where the events described above occurred. On the “Merciless” they believed that everything happened in the area of ​​the village of Kolnikaya, two miles south of Cape Shabler. The commander of "Boikiy" believed that the ships were located in the port area of ​​Mangalia, in 18 miles north of the number of places. Based on the analysis of the reports at the squadron headquarters, they came to the conclusion that, judging by the measured depths and the nature of the observed coast, which was rather low, rather than steep, it can be assumed that the area of ​​events was near the village of Cartolha, south of the cape of the same name, in five miles north of Cape Shabler.

Since visibility has not improved, and the place of the detachment remained undefined, P.A. Melnikov refused to perform the second part of the task, believing that the artillery bombardment of the port of Mangalia would turn into just the unloading of cellars, and the destroyers would in vain be exposed to the risk of detonation of mines. Therefore, the detachment turned into a base. After departing miles on the 20 from the coast, around the 10 hours, the ships began to harvest the paravan. There were neither paravanes nor trawling parts of the guard on the “Boykom” - they didn’t even notice when they were lost. On the "Merciless" still noticed earlier that the left paravan on the circulation went to starboard. When trying to remove the guard, it turned out that both trawling parts were messed up and could not be lifted without a great loss of time. A little earlier, as it turned out later, there was a false detection of the periscope, which was shot at. Soon they took radiograms about the undermining of the Voroshilov cruiser on a mine and ordering the leader of the Kharkiv to return. The last radiogram, transmitted from the "Smart" on behalf of the squadron commander, gave reason to assume that the cruiser was dead, a L.A. Vladimirsky moved to the destroyer. Considering the situation that had been created on the “Merciless”, they chopped off both trawling units together with paravanis, and the destroyers went to connect with the flagship. December 2 "Merciless" and "Boyky" otdvartovali in Tuapse.

We specifically examined in such detail the operation of the ships of the squadron off the Romanian coast. First of all, because it has become the second since the beginning of the war. The first, as we remember, was held on June 26 1941, that is, almost a year and a half ago. What has changed since then?

The 26 raid operation on June 1941 was aimed at firing on the port of Constanta. The purpose of the last operation was enemy communications along the Romanian coast, convoys into the sea, the ports of Sulin, Bugaz and Mangalia. Additionally, we set the task of firing Snake Island. In general, this small island for a long time was an attracting force for Soviet ships and aircraft. At the beginning of the war was supposed to land the amphibious assault to capture the serpentine. The principal agreement of the General Staff was obtained, and from July 3 1941, the Black Sea Fleet aviation began systematic bombardments of objects on the island. However, even before this, Serpentine was regularly appointed as a substitute target when striking down cities of Romania. Nothing but a lighthouse and a radio station was not on the island, and the plan to capture 6 July was abandoned. However, the aircraft methodically continued to bomb Snake until July 10, thus unloading several tombs of bombs on it. Data on the destruction of the lighthouse is not.

At about the same time, Soviet submarines began to appear regularly on the island, since it was easy to ascertain its position on it before taking designated positions. Naturally, the Romanians eventually discovered this - just the X-NUMX of 29 exhibited on 1942 in October, and the S-44 minefield was a reaction to the frequent Soviet boats visiting the area. By the way, on the same minefield, the 2 X-XXUMX submarine U-1942 that was released at sea on December 212 died. And she died after December 11 - apparently, when, when changing positions, she decided to clarify her position on Snake.

It can be assumed that this island also got into the operation plan of the ships of the squadron because of the desire to decide once again before the raids on the ports. This was even despite the fact that the appearance of the Serpentine in appearance most likely should have led to the loss of secrecy. At the same time, the ships made astronomical observations at the crossing and thus knew their place. Under these conditions, it was already possible at sea to abandon the solution of a secondary task in order to achieve the main goal of the operation. However, the squadron commander did not.

It is noticeable that the planning of the December 1942 operation was carried out much more qualitatively than the June 1941. Certainly, the experience of one and a half years of war affected. Actually, with the exception of underreporting of the available data on the mine situation in the designation of the combat course of the first detachment south of Snake, there were no more specific flaws. This is even taking into account the real situation that became known to us after the war. That is, the operation was planned reasonably enough. But spent ...

Thus, the squadron’s second-in-operation operation against Romanian communications was unsuccessful. And this is despite a number of favorable factors. For example, the preservation of secrecy of action of forces, the absence of the enemy in the area of ​​attack aircraft, the presence of relatively reliable and complete information about the mine situation. The reason for the breakdown is a fairly benignly planned operation — weak operational-tactical and special training for officers.

However, the People's Commissar of the Navy assessed this campaign as a whole as a positive manifestation of activity and ordered to organize and carry out such actions every time with his personal permission and upon the submission of the developed plan. We should not forget that the result of the operation at the time was considered three allegedly sunken vehicles. By the way, using the example of this operation, we can demonstrate how misleading we were simply.

Here is a quote from the book of N.G. Kuznetsova "Course to victory":
“We took into account the lesson of the raid on Constanza. In November, the cruiser Voroshilov was sent to 1942 to bombard the base of enemy ships in Sulin. He completed the task successfully and without loss, although the enemy resisted more strongly than during the raid on Constanza. ”

How many people read Kuznetsov’s memoirs? Probably several tens of thousands. Approximately the same amount of people believe that Voroshilov defeated, despite the enemy’s desperate resistance, Sulin's naval base, unharmed, returned home with a victory. This again shows that to study history Memoirs are as dangerous as artistic novels.

The assessment of the People's Commissar, the qualitative analysis of the operation performed, the dissection of all major mistakes made the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet confident of the need to repeat the operation. However, the situation has changed somewhat. First, the enemy strengthened aerial reconnaissance approaches to the western coast of the Black Sea. Secondly, one of the conclusions of the operation was that paravannye guards did not guarantee the safety of cruisers and destroyers in the case of forcing minefields. In subsequent operations, it was proposed to carry out the strike of ships in trawls in dangerous from mines areas.

Despite the difficulty of carrying out raiding operations in providing minesweepers, this might have been the case, especially since there were suitable trawling ships. But the combat ships in the squadron was almost gone, since both modern cruisers, as well as most of the destroyers, were under repair. Therefore, they decided to conduct the raid operation not by providing minesweepers, but by themselves. To do this, they formed two strike groups consisting of: the first T-407 (the pennant of the commander of the 1 division of the captain of the 3 rank AM Ratner) and T-412; the second T-406 (Breyd-pennant of the commander of the 2 division of the captain of the 3 rank of VA Yanchurin) and T-408. However, the squadron nevertheless took part - the flagship of the operation “Savvyrochnyi” destroyer was isolated from it, and the rear admiral V.G. Fadeev, who led all the forces at sea.

The task of the detachment was to search for and destroy convoys in the area of ​​Constanta - Sulin - Bugaz. In addition, "with the aim of moral influence on the enemy and to disorganize his communications," they decided to make an artillery bombardment of the Olink lighthouse and the village of Shagany, which had no military significance.

According to the available intelligence data, the passage of enemy convoys off the western shores of the Black Sea was provided by destroyers of the Naluca type, patrol boats and aircraft. The Romanian destroyers were clearly inferior to the minesweepers of the 53 and 58 artillery armament projects. Therefore, the ships were divided into two groups of two units. This made it possible to start the search for convoys simultaneously on two sections of communications that were distant from each other: on the approaches to the Portitsky Arm and in the area of ​​the Burnas sign. That is, where the submarines repeatedly found and attacked the enemy convoys, and where, at the same time, the freedom of maneuvering of the minesweepers was ensured, since in both these areas the mine situation was considered favorable.

In case of a sudden meeting of minesweepers with a stronger enemy ship (for example, a destroyer), it was supposed to use the “Intelligent” as a support ship. However, the possibility of the timely provision of such support was initially considered dubious - the battle areas of the strike groups were too far from each other. But they also didn’t want to abandon the division of forces, as the fuel available on the minesweepers allowed only the shortest search (no more than four hours), and the separation of areas made it possible to increase the probability of finding an enemy. The plan of operation provided for the use of aviation, primarily for reconnaissance purposes. However, her participation was expected to be purely symbolic.

The departure to the sea was initially set for December 8, but the unfavorable weather forecast made it necessary to postpone the start of the operation on the evening of December 11. The strike groups left Poti at one-hour intervals — to 17: 00 and 18: 00. The destroyer "savvy" left Poti at midnight on December 12. At the crossing, both groups and the destroyer determined their place in the Turkish lighthouses Inebolu and Kerempa, which allowed the minesweepers to approach the Snake Island area in the morning of Snake Island with discrepancies in the number of 13 miles [4,5]. In this case, the first group did not approach the island at a distance less than 70 miles, and the second group approached it at a distance of 14 miles. Both morning and day visibility was excellent, reaching 9,5 – 12 miles, and sometimes 15 – 20 miles.

Now let's see the alignment of the enemy forces. December 13, on the day of the raid of our minesweepers, in Odessa were the destroyers Marasti and R. Ferdinand ", in Sulin - destroyer" Smeul ", in Constanta - minelayers" Dacla "and" Murgescu ", and in the river port Vilkovo - monitors of the river division. Other Romanian ships were in Constanta, under repair, and could not be used on that day for combat operations at sea.

The first group of ships after determining the location of Snake Island in 9: 10 lay on the course 341 ° - with the expectation to approach the coastal strip east of the Burnas sign. On this way, the minesweepers passed through the middle of a wide 25-mile passage between the S-42 and S-32 minefields. In 10: 49, on the left, behind the traverse, the smoke of the ship was noticed, and after 5 minutes the masts of a large transport appeared. Then the second transport was discovered, but the escort ships had not yet been observed. In 11: 09, the minesweepers turned left on the 230 ° course and began to noticeably approach the enemy convoy. In 11: 34 they found a destroyer of the type “Naluca”, from which an identification signal was made, and after it two vehicles with a displacement of 7 – 9 thousand tons and six large boats well distinguished.
The meeting took place with the Romanian transport Oituz (2686 brt) and the Bulgarian Tzar Ferdinand (1994 brt). They in 8: 15 left Sulin to Odessa, having the Sborul destroyer and four Germanic minesweepers in escort. In 11: 37, when the convoy was about 14 miles south of the Burnas mark on the left side of the nose, at a distance of about 65 KB, they found “two squadron destroyers”.

The escort ships were clearly inferior to the Soviet minesweepers in combat capabilities, but the group commander did not think so and acted hesitantly, losing his advantage provided by the suddenness of the attack. First of all, AM Ratner sent a radiogram to the “Savvy” with a request to provide support for the destruction of the detected convoy - which is probably correct, because with their two 100-mm guns, trawlers would drown transport for a very long time.

In 11: 45 T-407 opened fire on the head vehicle, and in a minute T-412 fired at the destroyer. The commander of the convoy immediately ordered the transports to retreat to the Ochakov girlu, and the destroyer and minesweepers set up a smoke screen. Subsequently, the boats, keeping close to the transports, covered them with smoke screens, and the Sborul first continued to move closer to the “destroyer destroyers”, but soon lay down on the opposite course and at the same time in 11: 45 hit the fork. The destroyer fire from 66-mm guns was invalid as the shells fell with undershoots. Soviet ships fired no better, starting a battle from a distance of 65 KB. At the same time, it must be remembered that there are no fire control devices on the minesweepers; all that artillerymen possessed was gun sights and a range finder. The result of the shooting was zero. In addition, the German minesweepers minted the torpedo attack several times and tried to get the Soviet ships turned away.

Under the guise of a smoke curtain of transport began to return to the opposite course. Gradually, the distance of the battle was reduced. All this time, the Romanian destroyer courageously diverted fire to himself, and the boats put smoke screens. The relatively high-speed transport “Tzar Ferdinand” began to move forward and withdrew in the direction of Zhebryan, so that in the future there was only “Oituz” under attack. In 12.42, minesweepers became noticeably closer to him, so the destroyer Sborul soon turned to the right, closer to the “destroyers of the destroyers”, which distracted their fire. He also opened fire, but shooting accuracy on both sides remained ineffective, and no hits were achieved, despite the fact that the battle distance was reduced to 38 kb. Yet in 13: 26, the shells falling around the destroyer became dangerous, which caused him to retreat in anti-artillery zigzags. Wind direction, first south-southeast, after 13 hours changed to south-west. Therefore, the Romanian destroyer hid behind a smoke screen, and our minesweepers with 13: 35 lost contact with him.

From our ships in 11: 53 and 12: 45, we observed up to 28 100-mm projectiles hit one of the transports. At the end of the battle a fire arose on him, but the destroyer again allegedly did not allow him to come closer and finish him off. By that time, that is, to 13: 36, the minesweepers had already consumed 70% of ammunition, so the division commander decided to stop the fight and ordered to break away from the enemy.

Ha "Sborul" did not see that our ships left transport alone and proceeded to bombard the village of Shagany; therefore, the convoy commander who was on the destroyer, taking advantage of the respite on 13: 45, requested radio assistance from a detachment of river monitors. At 14 hours, when our minesweepers had already laid down on the course of departure, Sborul again turned to approach them, in order to divert their fire towards themselves and, thereby, enabling the escort to slip southward to the port of Sulin. However, by that time, the Soviet ships were no longer paying attention to the enemy, and in 18: 05 the convoy returned in full strength, with all the security and without any loss, returned to Sulin.

Perhaps the situation could fundamentally change with the arrival in the area "savvy". When 11: 59 received a radiogram on it asking for support, the destroyer was located 25 miles south of Snake Island. Judging by the received radiogram, the enemy convoy, found near Ochakov arm, was apparently heading for Odessa. Only in 12: 20 the brigade commander figured out the situation, after which the “savvy” increased the turn to 20 nodes and lay down on the course 30 °. But even this excess of the set speed with the guard set by the paravanny could not help the cause, since there were still about 70 miles to the place of the intended meeting with the first group of minesweepers. Especially since the destroyer was not going there: A.M. Ratner did not inform the brigade commander that at the beginning of the battle the convoy lay down on the return course, and therefore the “Intelligent” was heading to the pre-meeting point with the escort on his way to Odessa.

After the end of the battle, allegedly due to the almost complete use of ammunition, the first strike group did not leave the area, but went to attack the village of Shagany, having spent more 26 100-mm shells. The real reason for the termination of the battle is that the detachment simply could not cope with the convoy. Indeed, who stopped to finish off the transport, in which 28 (!) Shells had allegedly fallen? But the destroyer, who was armed with 66-mm cannon of the beginning of the 20th century and also allegedly received several hits of 100-mm projectiles, did not let him get close to him. Any transport (perhaps, except for a timber truck), having received more than two dozen 100-mm shells, would be a ruin, and from the hit of two or three 100-mm shells, the destroyer would most likely have sank.

The second group of minesweepers, after determining the location of Snake Island in 9: 16, lay down on the 217 ° course, and on this course an hour later the reconnaissance aircraft of the enemy first discovered it. At 11 hours, minesweepers set out on a course of 244 °, and then, with good visibility, they made a five-hour unsuccessful search on the approaches to the Portico Station. During this time, planes approached the minesweepers several times, in which in three cases anti-aircraft fire was opened. Radiograms in plain language in Romanian (and part in Russian) were transmitted from two planes, with the names “Maria” and “Merashti” (names of Romanian squadron destroyers) being mentioned.

During the maneuvering, which was carried out at a speed of 16 nodes, the minesweepers, judging by the tracing paper, crossed the S-21 barricade twice and once the S-22 mine barrage, but there the mines were recessed in 10 meters, and therefore were completely safe for surface ships. However, it is possible that minesweepers were generally apart from these obstacles: the fact is that with 9: 16 this group maneuvered in reckoning. Occasionally the shore appeared on the horizon, but perhaps what was considered to be the shore of the Portitsky girl was in fact a haze that was taken from a distance as a coastline. For a number of signs, taking into account the Romanian data, it can be assumed that the second group of minesweepers did not maneuver so close to the shore, as V.A. Yanchurin.

Having made an artillery bombardment of the Olin lighthouse district, the minesweepers at 16: 16 laid down on the retreat course. Three times from 16: 40 to 17: 40 13 December, and also on the morning of December 14 reconnaissance aircraft appeared over the ships. In 4: 40 15 December, the second group of minesweepers returned to Poti.

As we can see, the operation was unsuccessful - although at that time it was believed that the minesweepers at least seriously damaged the transport and the destroyer. If we take planning, then it can be stated that the allocation of one destroyer as a ship of support for two groups of minesweepers turned out to be insufficient: in reality, he could not help not only two groups at the same time, but even the first one. It was so obvious that in 14: 24, not having received from the commander of the first group reports on the task performance by radio, the brigade commander ordered the “Smart” commander to move south-east, that is, to the Caucasian coast. Reports on the completion of the task were received from the first group of minesweepers in 14: 40, and from the second group - in 16: 34. At that time, the destroyer with speeds of 28 nodes went to Poti, where he arrived safely on the afternoon of December 14.

The choice of minesweepers as strike ships cannot be called successful. The available forces made it possible to send several destroyers to the Romanian shores, but they were afraid of a repetition of the incident with the detonation of mines in the cruiser's para-guards. If this happened to a destroyer, the consequences would likely be much worse. It was possible to send a destroyer with a minesweeper - but not to go all over the raid operation after the trawl first. Today we know that minesweepers during 11 – 14 December 1942 operation safely avoided meetings with minefields, but at that time no one could guarantee this.

But even with such a composition of strike groups from minesweepers, the operation could be effective: the convoy was discovered. And then there was a variation on the theme of the previous operation: the group commander was not able to conduct a naval battle, and the gunners demonstrated low skills. Fleet aviation covered ships at the junction in the eastern part of the Black Sea.

Encouraged by the fact that as a result of the two previous raids on the Romanian communications, as it was then believed, the enemy suffered significant damage, and wishing to be part of the success of the Red Army on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet decides to deliver another blow. For these purposes, all the same minesweepers T-406 stand out (the pennant of the commander of 2 division of captain 3-rank B, A. Yanchurin), T-407, T-412 and T-408, but supported them this time two destroyers - “Savvy” (flag of the commander of the trawling brigade and obstacles of Rear Admiral VG Fadeev) and “Merciless”.

It seems to have been taken into account the experience of the previous operation, when the "Smart" physically could not have time to the battlefield of one of the two strike groups. But in this case it didn’t matter, because now the minesweepers had to act together, by one reconnaissance-strike group. The number of support ships increased due to the finding, according to intelligence data, of two Romanian destroyers in Constanta and two gunboats in Sulin.

Recall another drawback of the previous raid - the absence of aerial reconnaissance. True, the first group of minesweepers succeeded in detecting an enemy convoy without aviation assistance; more precisely, the convoy went straight to meet the minesweepers at the moment when they were just about to start the search. However, everyone understood that it was impossible to rely on luck, and this time the fleet's aviation ordered three days before the ships sailed to aerial reconnaissance at the Sulin-Bugaz communications section, as well as the ports of Constanta, Sulin, Bugaz and Odessa, and finally Crimean enemy airfields. In the future, fleet aviation was to conduct tactical reconnaissance to guide ships on convoys and deliver attacks with them, as well as to cover ships at the crossing.

Unfavorable weather conditions for a number of days did not allow fleet aviation to proceed with preliminary reconnaissance. According to the forecast, the weather could only get worse in the future. That is, it became obvious that there would be no aerial reconnaissance, no joint strikes on a convoy, no fighter cover. Apparently, in such a shortened form, the operation could only be successful by chance, and taking into account the well-known truth that, with equal damage, the probability of losing ships off the coast of the enemy is always higher than that of its own - even unreasonably risky. However, they decided to carry out the operation.

The easiest way would be to explain it to the Russians "maybe": there is no intelligence - well, maybe, you can even stumble upon something; there are no bombers - well, so if the convoy ships are found, then, probably, they themselves will cope; There are no fighters - well, so if our people are sitting on the ground, then why will the enemy fly. But this is not serious reasoning. There are no documents explaining why, in the event of a worsening weather forecast, they still decided to carry out the operation - no. But there are assumptions. Apparently, they initially didn’t really count on their aircraft: since the beginning of the war there was no example of even one really successful joint operation of surface ships and the Air Force. Those single instances when spotter planes contacted the firing ship and gave some information about the fall of their shells, the ship's gunners were judged pessimistically.

Indeed, after all, the entire adjustment process, like the observation of the results of shooting from an airplane, was purely subjective in nature and was not confirmed by any means of objective control. Moreover, the gunners sometimes neglected the corrections issued by the pilots and continued firing on the former sight and sight equipment - the pilots didn’t know about it, but reports began to come in from the aircraft that the shells lay on the target. And how many times did it happen that aviation, for whatever reason, at the last moment refused to perform tasks? Thus, it turns out that the notorious non-participation of the fleet air forces in the operation was not critical, since in practice they did not expect anything from it. Unfortunately, the subsequent events of 1943 – 1944. largely confirm this conclusion.

But back to the raid operation. Four designated minesweepers left Poti on December 4 on 26 December, with a slight delay against the target date, and the destroyers left this base on 19 hours. In 10: 52 26 December, when the reconnaissance-strike group was located in the 100 miles west of Poti, a reconnaissance plane appeared, which later monitored the movement of the group for 3 hours 20 minutes. During this time, minesweepers dropped depth charges in the area of ​​the discovery of one or two periscopes, but they did not do the main thing - they did not lay down on a false course, as was envisaged by the plan. In 14: 20, the enemy aircraft has disappeared. Believing that he would call the bombers to attack the minesweepers on the course already explored, the division commander at 14: 35 sent a radiogram to the fleet air force asking to send aircraft to cover the minesweepers - but, of course, no one flew. In 14: 45 V.A. Yanchurin radioed the brigade commander on the "savvy" on the attack of the submarine and the detection of the minesweepers by enemy aircraft.

Here it should be noted that during the entire combat campaign the discipline was not observed on the air. In total, V.A. Yanchurin sent twenty-seven radiograms, of which twenty-six were transmitted and received clearly and without delay, but one did not reach the addressee at all. What do you think what? The same, the first, about the reconnaissance aircraft. She was transferred to 14: 45 to the brigade commander, received at the communications center of the fleet, but did not rehearse for the flagship destroyer. And on the "Savvy", despite carrying a radio watch to communicate with a group of minesweepers, the said radiogram was not accepted. V.A. Yanchurin was informed that a receipt was not received on the radiogram transmitted to 14: 45, but he did not give the order to transmit it again. Thus, V.G. Fadeev remained in ignorance that secrecy was already lost and that most likely the continuation of the operation was meaningless: the enemy would cover all his convoys in the ports for at least a while.

On minesweepers took a full supply of fuel, which allowed for a fairly long search. According to the plan, they had to determine their place on the same Snake Island in 17: 15 27 December and then search 18: 00 27 December to 14: 00 28 December on enemy communications in the Sulin-Bugaz area. But because of the delay in going to sea, and then due to the nearly two-hour loss of time caused by the failure of the T-407 machines, the search-and-search group, receiving an observation of the Keremp lighthouse in the morning of December 27, approached the Snake Island area very late in the dark and in poor visibility.

To approach the coast, they chose the proven 13 of December, along which the first group of minesweepers departed into the sea after a battle in the Zhebriyanskaya bay. But in fact, minesweepers had a discrepancy more than 10 miles and were much closer to the shore. This is partly due to the naval armament of the ships, which was no different from that of the Russo-Japanese War. Visibility in the area did not exceed 1 KB, so in 0: 00 28 December, considering himself 20 miles south-southeast of the Burnas sign, the division commander decided to reduce the speed to 8 nodes and maneuver far enough from the minefields set in the coastal strip by our ships in 1941

V.A. Yanchurin hoped that visibility would improve with daybreak; this would allow one to approach the shore to clarify the location and then proceed to the search. But in fact, the search began earlier than expected. In 4 hours, when the minesweepers, following the course of 232 °, were in reckoning in 14 miles from the coast, to the right of the traverse, at a distance of 15 – 20, kb suddenly found a strip of high coast. It became clear that the minesweepers are located somewhere between the Burnas sign and the village of Budaki, that is, in the area of ​​their minefield No. 1 / 54, but it is unknown where exactly. Therefore, we decided to move 10 – 11 miles into the sea to wait for improved visibility.

If up to this point there was still hope for a chance meeting with an enemy escort, then it soon evaporated: in 5: V.N. 45 Fadeev on the radio ordered V.A. Yanchurinu show your place. There was no doubt that the enemy, having received a report from a reconnaissance plane about four of our ships to the west on the 26 day of December, not only stopped the movement of convoys, but also strengthened surveillance at communication service posts, in particular, at radio direction finding stations. Thus, the radio telegraph talks that were made on the morning of December 28 in the waters controlled by the enemy not only confirmed the presence of Soviet ships, but also indicated their place with sufficient accuracy. However, the brigade commander, having no connection with the minesweepers for two days, could not stand it and broke the radio silence.

At 7 hours, the battalion commander ordered the mine sweepers to stop the counting machines by measuring the depths of the place. Soon after, they entered a strip of thick fog. In 8: 45 V.A. Without any justification, Yanchurin, in turn, violated the secrecy rules by sending a “Radiatory” radiogram with the report that the voyage takes place in a fog of numbering, and therefore he intends to approach the coast by calculation, make artillery shelling and then begin to depart, and asks for instructions. This radiogram was answered: "Good."

The minesweepers, again risking falling on one of our defensive minefields, went to the coast, which later opened up, then disappeared in the fog, and around 10 hours, when visibility improved for a while, fired from a cannon and buildings in area of ​​the mark of Burnas, having a point of reference from the pipe of the plant. As a result of the shelling, fires were traditionally caused on the shore, and there were destructions of several buildings. Total spent 36 113-mm shots. Given the accuracy of the ships sailing, it is difficult to say exactly which pipe they fired at. And it’s generally useless to wonder which objects were destroyed on the shore. In the documents of the Control Commission in Romania, she was not bombarded by Burnas - either the Romanians were not noticed, or only civilians were injured.

Having stopped the shelling, the minesweepers in 10: 20 lay down on the retreat course. The subsequent backflush produced later showed that the path of the minesweepers at night and in the morning of December 28 was by chance well located in the aisles between its minefields. So, the search for enemy communications was stopped much earlier than the scheduled date. However, even earlier, the day of December 26, it became clear that this search is unlikely to bring success.

By the way, we had only one incident since the beginning of the war, which allowed trawlers to mine-mine reconnaissance directly in the combat zone of their submarines. They could well go in the path of withdrawal within the shallow water zone with the supplied kite trawls, as our submarines serving the positions No. 42 and 43 used about the same way. Naturally, this was not envisaged by the plan of the operation - but the whole leadership was in the hands of the trawling forces! But the initiative of most of the officers was already strangled by the existing realities of that life. The entire reverse passage passed without incident, and in the morning of December 30 the ships returned to Poti.

The last foray into communications in the western part of the Black Sea, if it was successful, was only in the sense that everyone had returned safely to base. The reasons for the ineffectiveness of the operation were considered not by the mistakes of the brigade and division commanders, but above all by the winter weather conditions, and therefore for some time they decided not to conduct operations at the Romanian shores. Moreover, for the shock surface ships, a lot of tasks arose in the area of ​​the Taman Peninsula.

Continued, all parts:
Part of 1. The raid on the shelling of Constanta
Part of 2. Raid operations on the ports of Crimea, 1942 g
Part of 3. Communication raids in the western Black Sea
Part of 4. Last raid operation