Black Sea Fleet Raid Operations
When I published here the story about the destroyer “Crushing”, one of the commentators threw a thought about the events on the Black Sea, which were not inferior in their tragedy.
And indeed, the so-called "raiding operations" of the Black Sea fleet during the Great Patriotic War - this is that part stories, about which, if they write, they write such that it is necessary to pass through the filter of the mind three times. And if you try to objectively look at the question ... To be honest, the tragedy of the “Shattering” - flowers.
The beginning of the Great Patriotic War on the Black Sea is described in many editions and quite fully. Let me remind you that on the first day of the war the People's Commissar of the Navy set the fleet with the task of conducting a raid operation by surface forces to the main base of the Romanian Navy and the largest port of Romania - Constanza. The essence of such an operation was set forth in HNO-40, there were also direct instructions on how to conduct such actions. Immediately, I note that the operation was prepared in conditions close to peacetime, all the forces and means, the authorities had full training, the material part was also prepared in full.
1 Act. The raid on the shelling of Constanta
The plan for the raid operation was developed by the fleet headquarters on the basis, it must be assumed, of the decision of the fleet commander. Here we will explain that the Operation Plan is not a single document, but a complex of documents, sometimes there are several dozen, but they all follow from the operational part made on the map (at that time it was often called the operation scheme). In the most simplified form, the Operation Plan was interpreted as the main document on the management of forces in an operation, which is a graphic representation of the Commander’s decisions on a map with a legend. Subsequently, the "legend" was called the "explanatory note."
In any case, the basis of the Plan is the Decision. However, in those days, the military leaders, judging by the documents stored in the Central Naval Archive, did not bother themselves with the adoption of this very Decision. In any case, no such document signed by, for example, the fleet commander has yet been discovered. And very sorry. The fact is that the Decision contains a personal plan for the operation. Such documents, executed on the map, often with the military commander’s own hand, as no other characterize him as a naval commander, provide an opportunity to assess the level of knowledge of naval art, possession of the situation, flexibility and, if you like, insidiousness of his operational-tactical thinking. This is the rare case when the commander does not approve the document, but puts his signature under it, thereby fully confirming his personal authorship - and, therefore, assumes all responsibility for the result. Here you can’t say later that the subordinate is stupid and that you don’t attach your own head to each ...
So, the decisions of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet to fulfill the task set by him, the People's Commissar was not found. True, there is a tracing paper, taken from the “Solution Scheme” and signed by the fleet headquarters officer, Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev and the head of the operations department of the headquarters, captain of the 2 rank O.S. Zhukovsky. But there is no commander’s signature on it, and most importantly, only the “maritime part” of the operation is displayed there, that is, the plan of action of the surface ships.
In the prescribed manner, the plan of the forthcoming operation was sent to the assertion of the one who set the combat mission, in this case, the Narkom. This document in the Archive is also absent, but it can be assumed that in oral textual form on the HF communication line they reported the plan of the commander for the upcoming operation. For efficiency, this kind of report is quite allowed, and was used several times during the war, including by the army team. In this regard, as well as for a number of indirect signs, there is reason to believe that there was no plan for the operation as such.
Apparently, on the basis of the plan of the commander and the Solution Scheme for the naval unit in 15: June 00 25, the commander of the Light Force Detachment (OLS) rear admiral TA Novikov was given combat orders:
“A detachment of light forces comprising: KR Voroshilov, two leaders, EM EM C type, under the command of Rear Admiral Comrade. Novikov in 05: 00 26.06.41 to attack the base of the enemy Constance with artillery fire.
The main object is oil tanks.
As a part of the strike group, have ld „Kharkov“, two destroyers of the type S. KR “Voroshilov” and LD “Moscow” to have in support. In the event of a strike group meeting the enemy’s destroyers, send Voroshilov to the CD and, with the support of his decisive attack, destroy it.
Along with the attack of the base by ships on Constanta, our strike aviation (4:00,4:30, 5:00).
Bear in mind the possibility of the presence of the enemy's DOC and minefields. ”
Together with the order, the commander of the OLS received tracing paper from the “solution scheme” (in the documents it is called the “transition scheme”), a table of conventional signals, and an artillery firing plan. As we see, the fleet commander entrusted the command of the OLS to carry out the naval part of the operation. But at the same time the commander was removed from her planning. Having received a combat order, the commander of the OLS must make his decision on its implementation, and then, having prepared an Action Plan, implement it. This is an axiom of combat control. In this situation, the commander becomes a hostage of others 'intentions, which may be completely unknown to him, and most importantly - possible others' mistakes.
For the sake of fairness, it must be said that in fact the squadron commander and the OLS commander knew about the planned operation and even, at least the first, tried to put their proposals into the plan. In particular, the squadron commander, Rear Admiral LA Vladimirsky proposed to use the Voroshilov cruiser with his 180-mm artillery as a strike ship, especially since he was well prepared for firing at the shore.
The fact is that in the Romanian press 7 in July 1940 and 20 in February 1941 were published official reports on the setting of minefields with indication of the dangerous area. This caution in the fleet headquarters was skeptical - and they were wrong: 15 – 19 June 1941 The Romanians put five minefields on the approaches to Constance, spending about 1000 mines and more 1800 mine defenders on them.
However, on the “solution scheme” instead of the officially declared borders of a dangerous mine area, a contour of some conditional minefield was drawn, outlined, as it turned out after the war, accidentally (!!!) almost coincided with the location of the actual minefields exposed a week before. It was from the configuration of this barrier that the squadron commander proceeded, offering the cruiser as a strike ship. In this case, his firing position could be located seaward, that is, outside the dangerous mine area of the proposed minefield.
Perhaps Vladimirsky did not know that the configuration of the dangerous area from mines was taken "from the ceiling" - but the comflot knew about it. Apparently, the Commissar knew about this, because in his telegram from 22 June about the operation, two tasks were set: the destruction of oil tank farms, and reconnaissance during the day of defense of the naval base - that is, including clarifying the minefield boundaries. N.G. Kuznetsov generally considered the June 26 raid operation as the first in a series of others where Voroshilov were to participate, as well as aircraft and torpedo boats. As for the leader and destroyers of the strike group, they considered that their guard guards were quite enough to neutralize the danger of mines.
Since we will encounter at least two minefields, S-9 and S-10, in the following narrative, we will give a brief description of them. Both barriers had a length of 5,5 miles, mines were exposed by two lines at a distance from each other 200 m, distance between mines (mine interval) 100 m, deepening 2,5 m, depth of positioning location from 40 to 46 m. Barrage S-9, exposed 17 June 1941, included 200 mines, as well as 400 defenders. The X-NUMX S-10 barrage of June included 18 mines as well as 197 defenders. By the way, on the map in 395 – 75 miles east of Constanta, another dangerous area from mines was indicated, the origin of which is not at all clear.
Let's go back to 15: 00 25 June. According to the report on the raid operation on Constanta (although 1942 was written already in August), immediately after receiving the combat order, the commanders of the ships participating in the operation, as well as the directors of the firing squad of the strike group, were instructed. They dismantled the plan of forthcoming actions, paying particular attention to the organization of shooting at the shore, depending on the visibility conditions in the target area. The ships immediately began preparations for sailing, as the shooting from the armature of the strike group was assigned to 16: 00. This was completely unrealistic, and the shooting was transferred to 18: 00 - that is, just three hours after receiving a battle order! If everything is exactly as it is written in the report, then it was possible to immediately say: the plan most likely will not work.
Based on the decision of the komflot to accomplish the task, they formed a strike group consisting of the leader “Kharkov” and the “Intelligent” and “Intelligent” squadron destroyers headed by the commander of the destroyers of the 3 division of the destroyers captain 2-rank M.F. Romanov, as well as a support group in the composition of the Voroshilov cruiser and the leader of Moscow under the command of the commander of the Light Force Detachment Rear Admiral TA Novikov, appointed commander of all surface forces involved in the operation. For the delivery of a joint strike, three groups of bombers were allocated (two DB-3 and nine SB).
In 18: 00 25 June, the strike team began to withdraw from the mooring lines and exit Sevastopol Bay. However, when approaching the boom at the monitoring and communication post, the “Exit is not allowed” signal was raised, the ships anchored. It turns out that in 17: 33 the fleet headquarters received the results of the action plan review by the people's commissar of the Navy.
There, the strike group was established as part of two leaders, and the support group was composed of a cruiser and two destroyers. So, unexpectedly for themselves, the leader “Moscow” got into the strike group. Not only did he not prepare for joint shooting, they didn’t even begin preparations for the battle and the march, as the shooting from the anchor of the covering detachment was originally planned in 21: 30, and then, due to the delay in the release of the strike group, the shooting was transferred to 22: 30.
What happened next can easily be imagined by anyone. The leader "Moscow" began to urgently prepare its main power plant, the boat urgently delivered a set of combat documents from one of the destroyers, and the division commander arrived on board the leader to instruct the ship commander. The situation was somewhat facilitated by the fact that both leaders were in one division, that is, as they say, “fused”, and during Operation “Moscow” the main thing was to stay in the wake of Kharkov and closely monitor the signals from the flagship.
Finally, in 20: 10, the reformed strike group consisting of the leaders Kharkiv (the pennant of the division commander) and Moskva left Sevastopol and, passing through our minefields, started moving towards Odessa to mislead the enemy’s air reconnaissance . At nightfall, the ships set course for Constanza and developed the course of 28 knots.
A support group consisting of the Voroshilov cruiser (the flag of the commander of the Light Forces Detachment), the Savvyatny and the Intelligent Squadron destroyers departed Sevastopol on 22: 40. With the passage of bon destroyers got into the wake of the cruiser, trailing "Smart", a detachment of 20 nodes with paravanami went to the exit of the defensive minefield on the FVK number 4. The destroyer "Smart" still on the Inkerman gang caught on something with his paravan guardian and lagged behind the detachment. Soon the paravan got into place, and the destroyer rushed to catch up with the ships that had gone ahead. However, walking through the FVC number 4, he suddenly realized that ... lost at the entrance to his own base! It turns out that the destroyer slipped through the narrow red sector of the Chersonesus lighthouse, indicating the first knee of the passage between minefields, and also lost its place. Only in 03: June 00 26 "Intelligent" was finally able to get out of their minefields. Looking ahead, we say that only in 07: 25 he managed to enter into the security of the returning cruiser.
As for Voroshilov and the Savvy, they, after successfully passing our minefield, set off 28 knots. Soon the destroyer began to fall behind, and in 02: the 30 ships lost each other. Yet at dawn, "Smart" was able to join the flagship.
In 01: 47 26 June, when the leaders approached the dangerous area from the mines marked on the map farther from Constanta, they put the paravan guardians and continued to move with the 24 node. Here we note that, according to the instructions for combat use of the K-1 paravanes that existed at that time, the speed of the ship after their installation should not exceed the 22 node.
At dawn, in 04: 42, when the number leaders were 23 miles from Constanza, and in fact, about 2 – 3 miles closer, the outlines of the coast opened right along the course. The ships continued to follow the same course at the same speed to the starting point of the opening of fire. In 04: 58, when the head leader Kharkiv was about 13 miles east of the Constance lighthouse, he lost the right paravan and reduced the course to a small one, the division commander ordered Moscow to become the leader, commander leader Lieutenant AB. Tukhov and performed - although he lost his right-wing paravan still miles after 7 before! Apparently, the division commander was not aware of the loss of the paravan by “Moscow”; otherwise, this rebuilding is difficult to explain: when maneuvering in battle in the wake of the wake, the flagship always seeks to be the head, as in the extreme case, if he loses all controls, the last remains - “do as I do!”. Considering that “Moscow” was not originally planned as part of the shock group, the latter is particularly significant.
In 05: 00 ships turned on the 221 ° combat course and began to develop the course of 26 nodes. Around this moment, "Kharkiv" loses the left paravan. Perhaps this was due to speeding - but as it turned out after the war, mine defenders could have been the cause of the loss of both paravan. The fact is that, presumably, from 04: 58 to 05: 00, the leaders crossed the S-9 minefield. The probability of meeting each ship with a mine was about 20%, and taking into account the trawling left part of the “Moscow” paravan, it was about 35%, but neither the mine exploding nor the mine dropping the paravan occurred. In this setting, they decided not to waste time setting up a second set of paravanas. (And how can you call it?)
In 05: 02 "Kharkiv" opened fire on oil sheds. The adjustment was carried out according to the measured deviations, the defeat was five-guns with a tempo of 10 seconds. With the third salvo of “Kharkov”, the second leader opened fire. In 05: 04 in 3 – 5 miles south of Constanta, two flashes of gunfire were noticed. A little later, in the area of "Moscow", two shells fell with an 10 flight of kb, a second salvo went with a flight of 5 kb, and the third fell short of an 1 – 1,5 kb.
“Kharkov” had the impression that a large-caliber coastal battery was shot at the lead leader, therefore, by order of the division commander at 5: 12, “Moscow” stopped firing, set a smoke screen and lay down on the 123 ° withdrawal course. Kharkiv itself lagged behind somewhat and, turning to a departure course, in 5: 14 increased the speed to 30 nodes so that the smoke curtain would not jump out of the head ship's wake. At the same time, he ceased firing, using a high-explosive projectile 154. Simultaneously with the flagship, three enemy destroyers were observed at the stern, who, going north, seemed to have opened indiscriminate fire - in any case, their volleys lay down with a big undershoot from Kharkov.
The fire on the "Moscow" stopped, but she continued to go anti-artillery zigzag. Seeing this, the division commander in 05: 20 gave the command to the head ship: “Go ahead, go straight ahead”. However, this order was not executed: in 5: 21 in the area of the third gun of the leader “Moscow” there was a powerful explosion, a column of water and smoke went up to 30 meters, and the ship broke in half. The bow section turned out to be a deployed stem towards the stern and lay down on the port side. At the stern, the screws in the air rotated and the smoke apparatus worked, and on the aft superstructure, the anti-aircraft gun launched firing at the approaching enemy aircraft. After 3 – 4 minutes, both parts of the leader sank.
After the bombing of “Moscow”, the leader “Kharkiv” rounded it from the north (while it successfully crossed the S-10 minefield) and, by order of the division commander, stopped the passage in 1 – 2 KB from the sinking ship to rescue people. However, after hearing the arguments of the commander of "Kharkov" captain 2-rank P.A. Melnikova, M.F. Romanov changed his mind, and after a minute the leader made a move. In 5: 25, two 280-mm projectiles dropped from a Tirpicz coastal battery near Kharkov. The explosions caused a strong shaking of the hull, as a result of which the vapor pressure in the boilers fell, the speed of the ship dropped to 6 nodes.
At this time, the commander of the OLS on the Voroshilov cruiser, who was at the rendezvous point with the shock detachment, received from the commander of the radio division using a table of conditional signals: “I fired at the oil tanks, I need help, my place is 55672 square”. Immediately, the commander of the "savvy" was given the order to go at full speed to the "Kharkov" indicating his place and course to the point. The cruiser remained at the rendezvous point, maneuvering the moves of the 28 – 30 nodes on the anti-submarine zigzag. The next radio was received at 05: 50 from “Kharkov”: “The leader of Moscow is bombing airplanes, I need help if possible”. In fact, the divisional commander wanted to convey: ““ Moscow ”exploded, I need help” - but the encryption somewhere in the transmission turned out to be distorted.
In 06: 17, the squad leader requested aviation support for the commanders for the leaders, for which he received an order: “To withdraw at full speed to the main naval base.” Fulfilling this order, Voroshilov laid down on the course 77 ° and began to withdraw. In 07: 10 on the horizon, the destroyer "Clever" appeared, who was ordered to enter the guard of the cruiser. At the same time, they transmitted to "Kharkiv": "To move east, there will be no rendezvous."
In 05: 28, “Kharkov” developed the course to 28 nodes, but almost immediately, two large-caliber projectiles exploded near the leader and the steam in the boilers again sat down. In 05: 36, from the close breaks of the bombs, the main boiler number 1 failed. Then, in 05: 55 and in 6: 30, “Kharkov” repelled attacks by small groups of enemy aircraft, while in 05: 58, boiler No. 2 failed. With the end of the second raid, the Tirpitz coastal battery also ceased fire. Due to the failure of the turbofan of the only operating boiler, the ship’s stroke fell to 5 nodes. In 06: 43, a leader noticed an air bubble and a trail of a torpedo, which Kharkiv dodged, firing at the alleged location of the submarine with diving shells.
Finally, in 07: 00 approached the Savvyruchny destroyer and began to occupy a place ahead of the leader. At this moment, the torpedo trail was seen from the destroyer on the 50 ° starboard course angle. Turning to the right, the "savvy" left the torpedo on the left and simultaneously discovered the second one running along the starboard to the leader. The latter also carried out a maneuver of avoidance by turning to a torpedo, and the destroyer, having reached the point of the intended salvo, dropped four large and six small depth charges. After that, a large oil spot was observed and for a moment the submerged stern appeared and quickly submerged in water. Over time, in the literature, these two torpedo attacks were transformed into one that occurred in 06: 53, and as a result of which there were signs of submarine drowning. Whose these were torpedoes, whose stern part was seen from the ships, remains a mystery to this day.
In 11: 40, the destroyer "Smart", sent by him to the aid, joined "Kharkov" and "Smart". Reflecting three more attacks by enemy aircraft, ships in 21: 09 26 June entered Sevastopol. The cruiser "Voroshilov" arrived there even earlier. According to intelligence data, as a result of artillery shelling and the bombing of Constance in 6: 40, a fire in the oil storage facility occurred, the train with ammunition was set on fire, the railway tracks and the station building were destroyed.
By the way, about aviation. She had to strike three blows at Constanza: in 4: 00 with two DB-3, in 4: 30 with two SB and, finally, simultaneously with ships in 5: 00 - seven SB. The logic of the first two blows is unclear - apparently, all they could really do was wake the enemy in advance. But actually these blows were not. The first group of two DB-3 returned from halfway, due to a malfunction of the material part. Of the second group, consisting of two SBs, one also returned due to a malfunction, and the second continued flying, but did not return to its airfield, and its fate remained unknown. Only the third group of seven SBs bombed Constance, but only 1,5 hours after the shelling of the base with ships.
This is how the whole event looked. Now let's clarify the details, using some captured materials. First about the coastal battery. According to Romanian data, of all the coastal batteries located in the region of Constanta, only the German Tirpitz 280-mm battery participated in the battle. Moreover, despite the fact that there was a constant observation of the sea and the silhouettes of Soviet ships coming from the east, stood out clearly against the bright background of the horizon, the battery opened fire very late, approximately at 05: 19, that is, just a few minutes before the explosion "Moscow". The first volley fell with the flight and to the left of our ships. But even after the death of one leader, Tirpitz did not cease fire and led him roughly to 05: 55, having made an order of 35 volleys around Kharkov. Therefore, the question arises: who has shot at the leaders and made them lie on the course of withdrawal?
The fact is that it was on this night that almost the entire Romanian fleet was concentrated in the region of Constanta, and not at the base, but at sea! Thus, in the distant patrol, behind the outer edge of the minefields, the gunboat Giculescu was to the north of Constanta, and the Sborul torpedo boat was to the south. The middle patrol at Constanta was carried by two minelayers and a gunboat. From the north, the passage between the minefields and the coast was covered by the destroyers Marabesti and R. Ferdinand ", and from the south - the destroyers" Marasti "and" R. Maria. It seems that our ships were waiting here. In any case, in such a composition and regime, the ships could not bear the watch every night. Note for yourself this fact!
So, just two southern destroyers were discovered by our leaders around 5 for hours, laid out on the course 10 ° and at 05: 09 opened fire on the lead ship, covering it with a second or third salvo. However, during the transition to defeat, the Romanians incorrectly took into account the speed of the target, and all the volleys began to lay down on the stern of "Moscow". Since the Romanian destroyers were on the background of the coast, they were found only when the "Kharkov" began to withdraw, that is, around 05: 13. With the turn of the Soviet ships to the left on the course of withdrawal, they disappeared into a smoke screen, the Romanian ships stopped firing. Four minutes later, the leaders began to look through the smoke, the destroyers on 05: 17 resumed fire and continued it until the explosion of "Moscow".
The picture has more or less become clearer - but now it’s not clear what they saw from “Kharkov” in 05: 04 south of the port for flashes, if neither Romanian ships, nor the Tirpitz battery even opened fire at that moment. Here we recall the air strike. As we have already noted, one of the second group, consisting of two SBs, returned because of a malfunction, while the second continued to fly, but did not return to its airfield, and its fate remained unknown. So, according to Romanian data, around 5 hours in Constance, an alarm was announced, and soon a single Soviet bomber flew over the city. It is quite possible that this was the missing SS from the second group, and the flashes on the shore were the fire of an anti-aircraft battery.
We now return to the explosion of "Moscow". As you can see, at this moment two Romanian destroyers and a coastal battery fired at it. Already this is enough for one of the shells to hit the ship and cause an explosion - for example, artillery ammunition or torpedoes. By the way, initially in the fleet it was believed that the death of the ship was caused by the hit of a projectile of a large-caliber coastal battery in one of the spare torpedoes stored, as is known, on the upper deck. + I can not rule out the version of the explosion on a mine.
After the death of the leader "Moscow" Romanian boats picked up from the water 69 from 243 people of his crew, headed by the commander. Subsequently, Tukhov managed to escape from the Romanian captivity and fought as part of one of the partisan detachments in the area of Odessa. He died a few days before the detachment merged with our advancing troops.
Let's summarize a certain tactical result of the operation. The Black Sea Fleet planned to deliver a joint strike by ships and aircraft on the main base of the Romanian fleet - Constanta. At the same time, the main target of the strike was not ships, but tank packs, that is, the task was not solved in the interests of the fleet and not even in the interests of the ground forces. Why was it needed at all in this form? It would be very interesting to find out whose initiative is this?
Judging by the information that we now have about the situation in the first hours and days of the war in the highest echelons of the leadership of the country, the Red Army and Navy, it is difficult to imagine that with such a request Kuznetsov could have been addressed by the People's Commissar of Defense - not before that, yes, again, not his headache. It is even less likely that the task of striking the storage tanks in Constanta was set by the General Command Headquarters, and it appeared only on June 23. Apparently, the author of the idea of a raid on Constanza is the headquarters of the Navy, and, judging by some documents, most likely the original idea was to “disable the naval base, inflict losses on the enemy in ships and vessels, and destroy the port facilities the work of the port of Constanta ".
The very emergence of the idea of such an operation is not surprising - the 131 HMO-40 article clearly indicates that "Operations against enemy coastal facilities are one of the methods of transferring war to enemy territory." And that is exactly what future war saw us. The 133 article of the same HNO-40, listing the features of operations against coastal objects, indicated that "each operation has a fixed object that has permanent properties, which facilitates and specifies calculations and actions." That is, in the base itself a certain stationary aiming point was required. With regard to Constanta, it was ideally that oil tankers could fulfill its role. In the end, the second task of the operation was reconnaissance in force, and there the main thing was to make the enemy put into operation his entire defense system. The trouble is that this task remains unresolved: the absence of reconnaissance planes during the strike devalued the results achieved at such a price. After all, all that we have accurately identified is the distant border of the minefield. Even the location of the coastal battery "Tirpitz" remained unknown.
Due to the fault of the Fleet Air Force, no joint strike failed. Particularly surprising is the return of three aircraft for technical reasons. Recall that they were only the fourth day of the war, the entire materiel passed all the necessary regulations, all the necessary reserves were available, all the technical personnel were prepared, there were no enemy strikes on the airfields - all by regular, all, as in a peaceful life. The same can be said about the "Smart", who could not hold out in the calm sea behind the cruiser on the 28-node turn. What was it worth its 40-nodal speed on the measuring mile during the sea trials just a few months ago? Probably, these facts in the most objective way characterize the real combat capability of the forces of the fleet before the war.
A curtain.
Continued, all parts:
Part of 1. The raid on the shelling of Constanta
Part of 2. Raid operations on the ports of Crimea, 1942 g
Part of 3. Communication raids in the western Black Sea
Part of 4. Last raid operation
And indeed, the so-called "raiding operations" of the Black Sea fleet during the Great Patriotic War - this is that part stories, about which, if they write, they write such that it is necessary to pass through the filter of the mind three times. And if you try to objectively look at the question ... To be honest, the tragedy of the “Shattering” - flowers.
The beginning of the Great Patriotic War on the Black Sea is described in many editions and quite fully. Let me remind you that on the first day of the war the People's Commissar of the Navy set the fleet with the task of conducting a raid operation by surface forces to the main base of the Romanian Navy and the largest port of Romania - Constanza. The essence of such an operation was set forth in HNO-40, there were also direct instructions on how to conduct such actions. Immediately, I note that the operation was prepared in conditions close to peacetime, all the forces and means, the authorities had full training, the material part was also prepared in full.
1 Act. The raid on the shelling of Constanta
The plan for the raid operation was developed by the fleet headquarters on the basis, it must be assumed, of the decision of the fleet commander. Here we will explain that the Operation Plan is not a single document, but a complex of documents, sometimes there are several dozen, but they all follow from the operational part made on the map (at that time it was often called the operation scheme). In the most simplified form, the Operation Plan was interpreted as the main document on the management of forces in an operation, which is a graphic representation of the Commander’s decisions on a map with a legend. Subsequently, the "legend" was called the "explanatory note."
In any case, the basis of the Plan is the Decision. However, in those days, the military leaders, judging by the documents stored in the Central Naval Archive, did not bother themselves with the adoption of this very Decision. In any case, no such document signed by, for example, the fleet commander has yet been discovered. And very sorry. The fact is that the Decision contains a personal plan for the operation. Such documents, executed on the map, often with the military commander’s own hand, as no other characterize him as a naval commander, provide an opportunity to assess the level of knowledge of naval art, possession of the situation, flexibility and, if you like, insidiousness of his operational-tactical thinking. This is the rare case when the commander does not approve the document, but puts his signature under it, thereby fully confirming his personal authorship - and, therefore, assumes all responsibility for the result. Here you can’t say later that the subordinate is stupid and that you don’t attach your own head to each ...
So, the decisions of the commander of the Black Sea Fleet to fulfill the task set by him, the People's Commissar was not found. True, there is a tracing paper, taken from the “Solution Scheme” and signed by the fleet headquarters officer, Rear Admiral I. D. Eliseev and the head of the operations department of the headquarters, captain of the 2 rank O.S. Zhukovsky. But there is no commander’s signature on it, and most importantly, only the “maritime part” of the operation is displayed there, that is, the plan of action of the surface ships.
In the prescribed manner, the plan of the forthcoming operation was sent to the assertion of the one who set the combat mission, in this case, the Narkom. This document in the Archive is also absent, but it can be assumed that in oral textual form on the HF communication line they reported the plan of the commander for the upcoming operation. For efficiency, this kind of report is quite allowed, and was used several times during the war, including by the army team. In this regard, as well as for a number of indirect signs, there is reason to believe that there was no plan for the operation as such.
Apparently, on the basis of the plan of the commander and the Solution Scheme for the naval unit in 15: June 00 25, the commander of the Light Force Detachment (OLS) rear admiral TA Novikov was given combat orders:
“A detachment of light forces comprising: KR Voroshilov, two leaders, EM EM C type, under the command of Rear Admiral Comrade. Novikov in 05: 00 26.06.41 to attack the base of the enemy Constance with artillery fire.
The main object is oil tanks.
As a part of the strike group, have ld „Kharkov“, two destroyers of the type S. KR “Voroshilov” and LD “Moscow” to have in support. In the event of a strike group meeting the enemy’s destroyers, send Voroshilov to the CD and, with the support of his decisive attack, destroy it.
Along with the attack of the base by ships on Constanta, our strike aviation (4:00,4:30, 5:00).
Bear in mind the possibility of the presence of the enemy's DOC and minefields. ”
Together with the order, the commander of the OLS received tracing paper from the “solution scheme” (in the documents it is called the “transition scheme”), a table of conventional signals, and an artillery firing plan. As we see, the fleet commander entrusted the command of the OLS to carry out the naval part of the operation. But at the same time the commander was removed from her planning. Having received a combat order, the commander of the OLS must make his decision on its implementation, and then, having prepared an Action Plan, implement it. This is an axiom of combat control. In this situation, the commander becomes a hostage of others 'intentions, which may be completely unknown to him, and most importantly - possible others' mistakes.
For the sake of fairness, it must be said that in fact the squadron commander and the OLS commander knew about the planned operation and even, at least the first, tried to put their proposals into the plan. In particular, the squadron commander, Rear Admiral LA Vladimirsky proposed to use the Voroshilov cruiser with his 180-mm artillery as a strike ship, especially since he was well prepared for firing at the shore.
The fact is that in the Romanian press 7 in July 1940 and 20 in February 1941 were published official reports on the setting of minefields with indication of the dangerous area. This caution in the fleet headquarters was skeptical - and they were wrong: 15 – 19 June 1941 The Romanians put five minefields on the approaches to Constance, spending about 1000 mines and more 1800 mine defenders on them.
However, on the “solution scheme” instead of the officially declared borders of a dangerous mine area, a contour of some conditional minefield was drawn, outlined, as it turned out after the war, accidentally (!!!) almost coincided with the location of the actual minefields exposed a week before. It was from the configuration of this barrier that the squadron commander proceeded, offering the cruiser as a strike ship. In this case, his firing position could be located seaward, that is, outside the dangerous mine area of the proposed minefield.
Perhaps Vladimirsky did not know that the configuration of the dangerous area from mines was taken "from the ceiling" - but the comflot knew about it. Apparently, the Commissar knew about this, because in his telegram from 22 June about the operation, two tasks were set: the destruction of oil tank farms, and reconnaissance during the day of defense of the naval base - that is, including clarifying the minefield boundaries. N.G. Kuznetsov generally considered the June 26 raid operation as the first in a series of others where Voroshilov were to participate, as well as aircraft and torpedo boats. As for the leader and destroyers of the strike group, they considered that their guard guards were quite enough to neutralize the danger of mines.
Since we will encounter at least two minefields, S-9 and S-10, in the following narrative, we will give a brief description of them. Both barriers had a length of 5,5 miles, mines were exposed by two lines at a distance from each other 200 m, distance between mines (mine interval) 100 m, deepening 2,5 m, depth of positioning location from 40 to 46 m. Barrage S-9, exposed 17 June 1941, included 200 mines, as well as 400 defenders. The X-NUMX S-10 barrage of June included 18 mines as well as 197 defenders. By the way, on the map in 395 – 75 miles east of Constanta, another dangerous area from mines was indicated, the origin of which is not at all clear.
Let's go back to 15: 00 25 June. According to the report on the raid operation on Constanta (although 1942 was written already in August), immediately after receiving the combat order, the commanders of the ships participating in the operation, as well as the directors of the firing squad of the strike group, were instructed. They dismantled the plan of forthcoming actions, paying particular attention to the organization of shooting at the shore, depending on the visibility conditions in the target area. The ships immediately began preparations for sailing, as the shooting from the armature of the strike group was assigned to 16: 00. This was completely unrealistic, and the shooting was transferred to 18: 00 - that is, just three hours after receiving a battle order! If everything is exactly as it is written in the report, then it was possible to immediately say: the plan most likely will not work.
Based on the decision of the komflot to accomplish the task, they formed a strike group consisting of the leader “Kharkov” and the “Intelligent” and “Intelligent” squadron destroyers headed by the commander of the destroyers of the 3 division of the destroyers captain 2-rank M.F. Romanov, as well as a support group in the composition of the Voroshilov cruiser and the leader of Moscow under the command of the commander of the Light Force Detachment Rear Admiral TA Novikov, appointed commander of all surface forces involved in the operation. For the delivery of a joint strike, three groups of bombers were allocated (two DB-3 and nine SB).
In 18: 00 25 June, the strike team began to withdraw from the mooring lines and exit Sevastopol Bay. However, when approaching the boom at the monitoring and communication post, the “Exit is not allowed” signal was raised, the ships anchored. It turns out that in 17: 33 the fleet headquarters received the results of the action plan review by the people's commissar of the Navy.
There, the strike group was established as part of two leaders, and the support group was composed of a cruiser and two destroyers. So, unexpectedly for themselves, the leader “Moscow” got into the strike group. Not only did he not prepare for joint shooting, they didn’t even begin preparations for the battle and the march, as the shooting from the anchor of the covering detachment was originally planned in 21: 30, and then, due to the delay in the release of the strike group, the shooting was transferred to 22: 30.
What happened next can easily be imagined by anyone. The leader "Moscow" began to urgently prepare its main power plant, the boat urgently delivered a set of combat documents from one of the destroyers, and the division commander arrived on board the leader to instruct the ship commander. The situation was somewhat facilitated by the fact that both leaders were in one division, that is, as they say, “fused”, and during Operation “Moscow” the main thing was to stay in the wake of Kharkov and closely monitor the signals from the flagship.
Finally, in 20: 10, the reformed strike group consisting of the leaders Kharkiv (the pennant of the division commander) and Moskva left Sevastopol and, passing through our minefields, started moving towards Odessa to mislead the enemy’s air reconnaissance . At nightfall, the ships set course for Constanza and developed the course of 28 knots.
A support group consisting of the Voroshilov cruiser (the flag of the commander of the Light Forces Detachment), the Savvyatny and the Intelligent Squadron destroyers departed Sevastopol on 22: 40. With the passage of bon destroyers got into the wake of the cruiser, trailing "Smart", a detachment of 20 nodes with paravanami went to the exit of the defensive minefield on the FVK number 4. The destroyer "Smart" still on the Inkerman gang caught on something with his paravan guardian and lagged behind the detachment. Soon the paravan got into place, and the destroyer rushed to catch up with the ships that had gone ahead. However, walking through the FVC number 4, he suddenly realized that ... lost at the entrance to his own base! It turns out that the destroyer slipped through the narrow red sector of the Chersonesus lighthouse, indicating the first knee of the passage between minefields, and also lost its place. Only in 03: June 00 26 "Intelligent" was finally able to get out of their minefields. Looking ahead, we say that only in 07: 25 he managed to enter into the security of the returning cruiser.
As for Voroshilov and the Savvy, they, after successfully passing our minefield, set off 28 knots. Soon the destroyer began to fall behind, and in 02: the 30 ships lost each other. Yet at dawn, "Smart" was able to join the flagship.
In 01: 47 26 June, when the leaders approached the dangerous area from the mines marked on the map farther from Constanta, they put the paravan guardians and continued to move with the 24 node. Here we note that, according to the instructions for combat use of the K-1 paravanes that existed at that time, the speed of the ship after their installation should not exceed the 22 node.
At dawn, in 04: 42, when the number leaders were 23 miles from Constanza, and in fact, about 2 – 3 miles closer, the outlines of the coast opened right along the course. The ships continued to follow the same course at the same speed to the starting point of the opening of fire. In 04: 58, when the head leader Kharkiv was about 13 miles east of the Constance lighthouse, he lost the right paravan and reduced the course to a small one, the division commander ordered Moscow to become the leader, commander leader Lieutenant AB. Tukhov and performed - although he lost his right-wing paravan still miles after 7 before! Apparently, the division commander was not aware of the loss of the paravan by “Moscow”; otherwise, this rebuilding is difficult to explain: when maneuvering in battle in the wake of the wake, the flagship always seeks to be the head, as in the extreme case, if he loses all controls, the last remains - “do as I do!”. Considering that “Moscow” was not originally planned as part of the shock group, the latter is particularly significant.
In 05: 00 ships turned on the 221 ° combat course and began to develop the course of 26 nodes. Around this moment, "Kharkiv" loses the left paravan. Perhaps this was due to speeding - but as it turned out after the war, mine defenders could have been the cause of the loss of both paravan. The fact is that, presumably, from 04: 58 to 05: 00, the leaders crossed the S-9 minefield. The probability of meeting each ship with a mine was about 20%, and taking into account the trawling left part of the “Moscow” paravan, it was about 35%, but neither the mine exploding nor the mine dropping the paravan occurred. In this setting, they decided not to waste time setting up a second set of paravanas. (And how can you call it?)
In 05: 02 "Kharkiv" opened fire on oil sheds. The adjustment was carried out according to the measured deviations, the defeat was five-guns with a tempo of 10 seconds. With the third salvo of “Kharkov”, the second leader opened fire. In 05: 04 in 3 – 5 miles south of Constanta, two flashes of gunfire were noticed. A little later, in the area of "Moscow", two shells fell with an 10 flight of kb, a second salvo went with a flight of 5 kb, and the third fell short of an 1 – 1,5 kb.
“Kharkov” had the impression that a large-caliber coastal battery was shot at the lead leader, therefore, by order of the division commander at 5: 12, “Moscow” stopped firing, set a smoke screen and lay down on the 123 ° withdrawal course. Kharkiv itself lagged behind somewhat and, turning to a departure course, in 5: 14 increased the speed to 30 nodes so that the smoke curtain would not jump out of the head ship's wake. At the same time, he ceased firing, using a high-explosive projectile 154. Simultaneously with the flagship, three enemy destroyers were observed at the stern, who, going north, seemed to have opened indiscriminate fire - in any case, their volleys lay down with a big undershoot from Kharkov.
The fire on the "Moscow" stopped, but she continued to go anti-artillery zigzag. Seeing this, the division commander in 05: 20 gave the command to the head ship: “Go ahead, go straight ahead”. However, this order was not executed: in 5: 21 in the area of the third gun of the leader “Moscow” there was a powerful explosion, a column of water and smoke went up to 30 meters, and the ship broke in half. The bow section turned out to be a deployed stem towards the stern and lay down on the port side. At the stern, the screws in the air rotated and the smoke apparatus worked, and on the aft superstructure, the anti-aircraft gun launched firing at the approaching enemy aircraft. After 3 – 4 minutes, both parts of the leader sank.
After the bombing of “Moscow”, the leader “Kharkiv” rounded it from the north (while it successfully crossed the S-10 minefield) and, by order of the division commander, stopped the passage in 1 – 2 KB from the sinking ship to rescue people. However, after hearing the arguments of the commander of "Kharkov" captain 2-rank P.A. Melnikova, M.F. Romanov changed his mind, and after a minute the leader made a move. In 5: 25, two 280-mm projectiles dropped from a Tirpicz coastal battery near Kharkov. The explosions caused a strong shaking of the hull, as a result of which the vapor pressure in the boilers fell, the speed of the ship dropped to 6 nodes.
At this time, the commander of the OLS on the Voroshilov cruiser, who was at the rendezvous point with the shock detachment, received from the commander of the radio division using a table of conditional signals: “I fired at the oil tanks, I need help, my place is 55672 square”. Immediately, the commander of the "savvy" was given the order to go at full speed to the "Kharkov" indicating his place and course to the point. The cruiser remained at the rendezvous point, maneuvering the moves of the 28 – 30 nodes on the anti-submarine zigzag. The next radio was received at 05: 50 from “Kharkov”: “The leader of Moscow is bombing airplanes, I need help if possible”. In fact, the divisional commander wanted to convey: ““ Moscow ”exploded, I need help” - but the encryption somewhere in the transmission turned out to be distorted.
In 06: 17, the squad leader requested aviation support for the commanders for the leaders, for which he received an order: “To withdraw at full speed to the main naval base.” Fulfilling this order, Voroshilov laid down on the course 77 ° and began to withdraw. In 07: 10 on the horizon, the destroyer "Clever" appeared, who was ordered to enter the guard of the cruiser. At the same time, they transmitted to "Kharkiv": "To move east, there will be no rendezvous."
In 05: 28, “Kharkov” developed the course to 28 nodes, but almost immediately, two large-caliber projectiles exploded near the leader and the steam in the boilers again sat down. In 05: 36, from the close breaks of the bombs, the main boiler number 1 failed. Then, in 05: 55 and in 6: 30, “Kharkov” repelled attacks by small groups of enemy aircraft, while in 05: 58, boiler No. 2 failed. With the end of the second raid, the Tirpitz coastal battery also ceased fire. Due to the failure of the turbofan of the only operating boiler, the ship’s stroke fell to 5 nodes. In 06: 43, a leader noticed an air bubble and a trail of a torpedo, which Kharkiv dodged, firing at the alleged location of the submarine with diving shells.
Finally, in 07: 00 approached the Savvyruchny destroyer and began to occupy a place ahead of the leader. At this moment, the torpedo trail was seen from the destroyer on the 50 ° starboard course angle. Turning to the right, the "savvy" left the torpedo on the left and simultaneously discovered the second one running along the starboard to the leader. The latter also carried out a maneuver of avoidance by turning to a torpedo, and the destroyer, having reached the point of the intended salvo, dropped four large and six small depth charges. After that, a large oil spot was observed and for a moment the submerged stern appeared and quickly submerged in water. Over time, in the literature, these two torpedo attacks were transformed into one that occurred in 06: 53, and as a result of which there were signs of submarine drowning. Whose these were torpedoes, whose stern part was seen from the ships, remains a mystery to this day.
In 11: 40, the destroyer "Smart", sent by him to the aid, joined "Kharkov" and "Smart". Reflecting three more attacks by enemy aircraft, ships in 21: 09 26 June entered Sevastopol. The cruiser "Voroshilov" arrived there even earlier. According to intelligence data, as a result of artillery shelling and the bombing of Constance in 6: 40, a fire in the oil storage facility occurred, the train with ammunition was set on fire, the railway tracks and the station building were destroyed.
By the way, about aviation. She had to strike three blows at Constanza: in 4: 00 with two DB-3, in 4: 30 with two SB and, finally, simultaneously with ships in 5: 00 - seven SB. The logic of the first two blows is unclear - apparently, all they could really do was wake the enemy in advance. But actually these blows were not. The first group of two DB-3 returned from halfway, due to a malfunction of the material part. Of the second group, consisting of two SBs, one also returned due to a malfunction, and the second continued flying, but did not return to its airfield, and its fate remained unknown. Only the third group of seven SBs bombed Constance, but only 1,5 hours after the shelling of the base with ships.
This is how the whole event looked. Now let's clarify the details, using some captured materials. First about the coastal battery. According to Romanian data, of all the coastal batteries located in the region of Constanta, only the German Tirpitz 280-mm battery participated in the battle. Moreover, despite the fact that there was a constant observation of the sea and the silhouettes of Soviet ships coming from the east, stood out clearly against the bright background of the horizon, the battery opened fire very late, approximately at 05: 19, that is, just a few minutes before the explosion "Moscow". The first volley fell with the flight and to the left of our ships. But even after the death of one leader, Tirpitz did not cease fire and led him roughly to 05: 55, having made an order of 35 volleys around Kharkov. Therefore, the question arises: who has shot at the leaders and made them lie on the course of withdrawal?
The fact is that it was on this night that almost the entire Romanian fleet was concentrated in the region of Constanta, and not at the base, but at sea! Thus, in the distant patrol, behind the outer edge of the minefields, the gunboat Giculescu was to the north of Constanta, and the Sborul torpedo boat was to the south. The middle patrol at Constanta was carried by two minelayers and a gunboat. From the north, the passage between the minefields and the coast was covered by the destroyers Marabesti and R. Ferdinand ", and from the south - the destroyers" Marasti "and" R. Maria. It seems that our ships were waiting here. In any case, in such a composition and regime, the ships could not bear the watch every night. Note for yourself this fact!
So, just two southern destroyers were discovered by our leaders around 5 for hours, laid out on the course 10 ° and at 05: 09 opened fire on the lead ship, covering it with a second or third salvo. However, during the transition to defeat, the Romanians incorrectly took into account the speed of the target, and all the volleys began to lay down on the stern of "Moscow". Since the Romanian destroyers were on the background of the coast, they were found only when the "Kharkov" began to withdraw, that is, around 05: 13. With the turn of the Soviet ships to the left on the course of withdrawal, they disappeared into a smoke screen, the Romanian ships stopped firing. Four minutes later, the leaders began to look through the smoke, the destroyers on 05: 17 resumed fire and continued it until the explosion of "Moscow".
The picture has more or less become clearer - but now it’s not clear what they saw from “Kharkov” in 05: 04 south of the port for flashes, if neither Romanian ships, nor the Tirpitz battery even opened fire at that moment. Here we recall the air strike. As we have already noted, one of the second group, consisting of two SBs, returned because of a malfunction, while the second continued to fly, but did not return to its airfield, and its fate remained unknown. So, according to Romanian data, around 5 hours in Constance, an alarm was announced, and soon a single Soviet bomber flew over the city. It is quite possible that this was the missing SS from the second group, and the flashes on the shore were the fire of an anti-aircraft battery.
We now return to the explosion of "Moscow". As you can see, at this moment two Romanian destroyers and a coastal battery fired at it. Already this is enough for one of the shells to hit the ship and cause an explosion - for example, artillery ammunition or torpedoes. By the way, initially in the fleet it was believed that the death of the ship was caused by the hit of a projectile of a large-caliber coastal battery in one of the spare torpedoes stored, as is known, on the upper deck. + I can not rule out the version of the explosion on a mine.
After the death of the leader "Moscow" Romanian boats picked up from the water 69 from 243 people of his crew, headed by the commander. Subsequently, Tukhov managed to escape from the Romanian captivity and fought as part of one of the partisan detachments in the area of Odessa. He died a few days before the detachment merged with our advancing troops.
Let's summarize a certain tactical result of the operation. The Black Sea Fleet planned to deliver a joint strike by ships and aircraft on the main base of the Romanian fleet - Constanta. At the same time, the main target of the strike was not ships, but tank packs, that is, the task was not solved in the interests of the fleet and not even in the interests of the ground forces. Why was it needed at all in this form? It would be very interesting to find out whose initiative is this?
Judging by the information that we now have about the situation in the first hours and days of the war in the highest echelons of the leadership of the country, the Red Army and Navy, it is difficult to imagine that with such a request Kuznetsov could have been addressed by the People's Commissar of Defense - not before that, yes, again, not his headache. It is even less likely that the task of striking the storage tanks in Constanta was set by the General Command Headquarters, and it appeared only on June 23. Apparently, the author of the idea of a raid on Constanza is the headquarters of the Navy, and, judging by some documents, most likely the original idea was to “disable the naval base, inflict losses on the enemy in ships and vessels, and destroy the port facilities the work of the port of Constanta ".
The very emergence of the idea of such an operation is not surprising - the 131 HMO-40 article clearly indicates that "Operations against enemy coastal facilities are one of the methods of transferring war to enemy territory." And that is exactly what future war saw us. The 133 article of the same HNO-40, listing the features of operations against coastal objects, indicated that "each operation has a fixed object that has permanent properties, which facilitates and specifies calculations and actions." That is, in the base itself a certain stationary aiming point was required. With regard to Constanta, it was ideally that oil tankers could fulfill its role. In the end, the second task of the operation was reconnaissance in force, and there the main thing was to make the enemy put into operation his entire defense system. The trouble is that this task remains unresolved: the absence of reconnaissance planes during the strike devalued the results achieved at such a price. After all, all that we have accurately identified is the distant border of the minefield. Even the location of the coastal battery "Tirpitz" remained unknown.
Due to the fault of the Fleet Air Force, no joint strike failed. Particularly surprising is the return of three aircraft for technical reasons. Recall that they were only the fourth day of the war, the entire materiel passed all the necessary regulations, all the necessary reserves were available, all the technical personnel were prepared, there were no enemy strikes on the airfields - all by regular, all, as in a peaceful life. The same can be said about the "Smart", who could not hold out in the calm sea behind the cruiser on the 28-node turn. What was it worth its 40-nodal speed on the measuring mile during the sea trials just a few months ago? Probably, these facts in the most objective way characterize the real combat capability of the forces of the fleet before the war.
A curtain.
Continued, all parts:
Part of 1. The raid on the shelling of Constanta
Part of 2. Raid operations on the ports of Crimea, 1942 g
Part of 3. Communication raids in the western Black Sea
Part of 4. Last raid operation
Information