Raid operations on the ports of Crimea, 1942 g
The first to fire at Theodosia on July 31 were two minesweepers T-407 and T-411. The fact that for such purposes the extremely-deficient minesweepers of a special construction were generally used, we leave without comment. But note that these ships are not adapted for firing at invisible coastal targets; they could only fire at a visible target or over an area. Theodosia port, of course, has a certain area, but any ship can be hit with 100-mm shells in it only by chance. The radius of their sphere of destruction by the explosion is 5–7 m, the fragmentation damage is 20–30 m. And the port’s water area is about 500 × 600 m. This does not take into account the adjacent territory. If you wish, you can calculate how many shells need to be released to get into the 47 × 6,5 m landing barge. But it seems that such a task was not set. In general, little is known about this raid - there are no reports, it does not even appear in the pivot table of the Black Sea report fleet for the Great Patriotic War. The Chronicle ... says that two minesweepers and two patrol boats from a distance of 52–56 kb fired 100 mm shells at the port of Feodosia - 150, 45 mm - 291 and 37 mm - 80 shells. As a result, a fire broke out in the port. But the fact is that the maximum firing range of the 45-mm 21-K gun is only 51 kb, and the 37-mm machine gun is even less. Although the fire could have arisen from one successful hit of a 100 mm shell. Apparently, the purpose of the minesweeper raid on Feodosia should be considered reconnaissance in battle, that is, their task was to provoke a coastal defense system. It is hard to say how accurately they were able to identify the fire weapons in the region of Feodosia, but the ships came under fire.
The following night, the only relatively large torpedo boats SM-3 and D-3 in the fleet made a raid on Dvuyakornaya Bay. They found landing barges in the bay, fired three torpedoes and ten missiles at them. Another five NURS fired a volley at the coastal battery at Cape Kiik-Atlama. As a result of a torpedo hit at the landing barge F-334 tore off the stern, which sank.
The lack of patrol and weak artillery fire from the shore led the fleet commander to conclude that the enemy was not capable of seriously opposing the attack by large ships. Despite the objections of the squadron commander, the Military Council ordered Rear Admiral N.E., the commander of the cruiser brigade. On the night of August 3, the bass player should fire at the port of Feodosia and the quays of the Two-anchor Bay in order to destroy the floating assets concentrated in them. To ensure reliable observation of ships in the Feodosia region, a submarine M-62 was sent there. A preliminary attack on the port was to be done by a bomber aviation fleet.
In 17: 38 2 in August the cruiser “Molotov” (the flag of the brigade commander Rear Admiral N.Ye. Bassisty) and the leader “Kharkov” left Tuapse for Feodosia. Shortly after the ships sailed westward, aerial reconnaissance of the enemy was discovered. 28 minutes after the discovery by an air reconnaissance detachment in 18: 05 lay down on a false course towards Novorossiysk. But already in 18: 22, when the reconnaissance plane disappeared, the ships again turned to Feodosia.
In 18: 50, a reconnaissance aircraft reappeared, and up to 21 hours from a distance of 15 – 20 km, the detachment was continuously monitored. The ships again went to a false course, showing movement to Novorossiysk, but only in 19: 20, that is, half an hour after the second detection. From 19: 30 ships proceeded on the 320 ° course, leaving Novorossiysk on the right side of the beam. Naturally, such a “crude” false maneuvering of the Germans did not mislead. Based on the data of the reconnaissance aircraft Ju-88D, they began to prepare for departure the last torpedo-bearing compound remaining on the Black Sea - the squadron 6./KG 26, which had 10 serviceable Non-111 by that time. Before the detachment’s approach to Feodosia, the city was twice hit by our bombers. A total of five IL-4, seven SB and sixteen MBR-2 worked on it.
In 00: 20 3 August, the ships, approaching the border of the visibility sector of the submarine’s fire, did not have confidence in their position, and with its detection this uncertainty increased even more, because the fire was not at all on the expected bearing. Continuing to clarify the location, the brigade commander gave orders to the leader to fire at Dvuyakornaya Bay. In 00: 59 "Kharkiv" opened fire on the berths and drove it for 5 minutes, using 59 130-mm shells. Meanwhile, the coastal batteries of the enemy opened fire on the cruiser, which, until one in the morning, continued to specify its place to open fire on Theodosia. At the same time, ships lit by missiles from an airplane attacked the Italian torpedo boats MAS-568 and MAS-573.
Having met with opposition and making sure that, firstly, the cruiser knows its place with an accuracy of 3 – 5 kb, and secondly, he still will not be allowed to lie on a constant course for ten minutes, the brigade commander refused to fire on Theodosia and in 01 : 12 gave the signal to go south with the speed of 28 nodes. Apparently, the decision was absolutely correct. The accuracy with which the cruiser knew its place is indirectly indicated by the fact that the report never indicated the distance to the coast, and only once it was noted in the combat log: “0: 58. The enemy opened artillery fire on the cruiser. Orient P = 280 gr., D = 120 cab. " Under these conditions, the ship could carry out shooting at the shore only “according to navigational data”. And for this, apart from knowing your place with an accuracy of several tens of meters, you need to lie on a constant course during the shooting, otherwise you can not get into the port, but you can not get into the city either. In other words, shooting under such conditions was nothing more than unloading artillery cellars through barrels. The only person who would have suffered from such an attack was the civilian population.
The night was lunar, visibility along the lunar path was 30 – 40 kb. Literally a few minutes after the departure began, in 1: 20, the first attack of the torpedo bombers began. At the same time, Italian torpedo boats launched an attack. In 1: 27 “Molotov”, unexpectedly for those in the conning tower, lost control, a strong vibration began, the ship’s speed began to fall, with a deafening roar a cloud of steam escaped from the nose tube - the nose echelon safety valve of the main power plant worked. First of all, they tried to switch to emergency steering from the steering compartment, but it did not respond to all requests. Sent messenger stunned by the fact that ... the stern on the 262 frame together with the tilting compartment is not. Due to the firing of their own anti-aircraft artillery in the conning tower, no one heard or felt the air torpedo hit the stern from the starboard.
Driving the machines, the Molotov 14-node junction continued to go to the Caucasian coast. In 02: 30,03: 30 and 07: 20, the torpedo bombers repeated the blows, but to no avail, while they lost two cars. Our fighters appeared over the ships in 05: 10. In 05: 40, there were already ten fighters in the area of the ships, however, when the Ju-88 passes over the cruiser nine minutes later, they all end up somewhere on the horizon. During the last torpedo attack, Molotov again had to rely only on its own strength. Finally, the wounded cruiser in 21: 42 3 August was anchored in Poti.
In general, all the fears of the squadron commander were justified: the secrecy of the operation could not be maintained, there were no decent cruiser targets in Theodosia, the lack of reliable hydrographic support made even shelling of the port area impossible to destroy the mooring front, fighter cover, as it happened before, turned out to be formal: when it was needed, the fighters were absent or they were completely inadequate. Instead of a short artillery strike, the cruiser "pushed" at Theodosia for 50 minutes. "Molotov" three times evaded the detected boats and three times tried to lie down on the combat course for the shelling of the shore. Apparently, this is the case when such persistence could hardly be justified.
As a result, the "Molotov" received the hardest damage, even by the standards of ship repair facilities in peacetime. In the conditions of the Black Sea of the summer of 1942, the cruiser could remain incapacitated until the end of hostilities - it was just lucky for the Black Sea people that they had such high-quality personnel of ship repairmen. But still, "Molotov" re-entered into service only 31 July 1943, and no longer participated in the hostilities.
After an unsuccessful march to Feodosia, the fleet commanders, engaged in defending bases and providing sea transportation, until the second half of September, 1942 stopped using surface ships, including torpedo boats, on enemy sea communications.
Only in the midst of battles on the Novorossiysk and Tuapse directions, active operations of surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet on enemy communications resumed. True, not without a corresponding push from above. September 24 issued a directive of the Military Council of the Transcaucasian Front, and September 26 - Commissar of the Navy. In these documents, the task of actions on the enemy’s maritime communications was determined by the fleet as one of the main tasks, for which it was prescribed to target the activities of not only submarines, but also aviation, as well as surface ships. The directive of the People's Commissar of the Navy demanded increased activity of the surface fleet through the deployment of hostilities on enemy communications off the western coast of the Black Sea, and especially on the routes of communication with the Crimea and the North Caucasus.
At the same time, it was intended to increase the impact of surface forces on the enemy's bases in the Crimea (Yalta, Theodosius), without refusing to act during the daytime, consistent with the situation, however. It was necessary to approach all ship exits thoughtfully, providing their actions with complete intelligence data and reliable air cover. The directive also required the strengthening of submarine activities, the wider use of mine weapons from surface ships and aircraft, more decisive use of torpedo aircraft.
The first in the raid operation was the guard ship “Storm”, accompanied by the SKA-031 and SKA-035 patrol boats. The purpose of the raid - Anapa. According to the plan of operation, the port was supposed to be illuminated by lighting bombs (SAB) aircraft, but it did not arrive due to meteorological conditions. It was delivered to the ships as well: the wind had 6 points, the sea - 4 points, the guard's roll reached 8 ° and it buried its nose in the wave. The range target was carried out along barely distinguishable coastline, in the direction towards the port. In 00: 14 “Storm” opened fire and in seven minutes shot the 41 projectile somewhere, while having 17 passes due to three cases of liner bulge. The enemy woke up and began to illuminate the water area with searchlights, and then the coastal battery opened fire. However, the Germans did not see the Soviet ships, and therefore also shot at random. The fact is that the patrol used shots with a flameless charge, and therefore did not unmask his whereabouts. It seems that a weak fire was observed from the ship on the shore, but the shooting was immediately assessed as completely ineffectual. In order not to spoil the statistics, this raid, like the actions of two minesweepers on Theodosia 31 in July, did not get into the reports of the Black Sea Fleet.
October 3 to attack Yalta came destroyers "Boyky" and "Smart". The task of the exit is the destruction of watercrafts and port facilities. According to intelligence data, Italian ultra-small submarines and torpedo boats were based on Yalta. No target highlighting was assumed. Shooting was performed as a joint area, without adjustment. In fact, it was about simultaneous firing at the approved single source data. The fire was opened in 23: 22 at a speed of 12 nodes on the 280 ° bearing at 116,5 distance in kb. For 13 minutes, "Smart" spent 203 projectile, and "Brisk" - 97.
The latter, after the first volley from a shake in one of the devices of the stern group, removed the locknut, as a result of which a short circuit occurred, and then firing was carried out only by the bow group. According to the report, the wind is in the area of 2 points, the sea - 1 points, the visibility of 3 miles. Comparing the visibility range (3 miles) and firing (11,5 miles) involuntarily raises the question of how to perform shooting. Despite the fact that the report states “using CAS on an automatic machine using an auxiliary sight”, it can be assumed that the shooting was carried out in the classical way “according to navigational data”, which was fully provided by the Mina STS. Accuracy of shooting in this way is determined by the accuracy of the knowledge of his place by the ship.
Yalta port is a small water area of 250 – 300 meters wide, fenced off by a pier. At a distance of 110 KB, the average deviation in range for the 130 / 50 caliber is about 80 m. Without going into mathematical delights, we can say that to get into the waters of Yalta port, the ships had to know the distance to it with an error of no more than one cable (185 m ). It is doubtful that such accuracy in those conditions took place. On the shore, traditionally, a fire was observed.
Since we will encounter attacks on ports in the future, we note that after the liberation of the temporarily occupied ports, not only counterintelligence officers worked there, but also representatives of various fleet directorates. Their task was to ascertain the effectiveness of various, including raid, operations. As follows from the few reporting documents, no serious damage to shelling of ships did not cause. There were some damage to the ports - but they were usually disputed by pilots; there were casualties among the local population, but no one wanted to take responsibility for them. As for fires as a result of shelling, they could well have been — the only question was what was burning? Moreover, there are cases of the creation by the Germans of false fires aside from important objects.
October 13 in 7: 00 from Poti left the destroyer "Cleaver" and the squall ship Squall. The purpose of the exit was the shelling of the Feodosia port. At about zero o'clock of October 14, the ships were determined by Cape Chauda, then in 0: 27 - by Cape Illya. In 01: 38, the plane dropped over the cape of Ilya SAB, which made it possible to once again clarify its place. Before 01: 54 dropped two more lighting bombs - and all over the cape, and not over the port. There was no connection with the aircraft, and therefore it was impossible to use it to adjust the fire.
In 01: 45 ships lay on the combat course and opened fire. Both ships had a primitive PUS Geusler, and therefore the shooting was carried out as at an observable target. The "undeclared" in the range of guided on the water's edge, and in the direction - on the right slope of Cape Ilya. Distance 53,5 KB, four-guns. On the third volley they noticed undershoots as well as takeaways to the left. From the fifth salvo made adjustments, outbreaks of gaps began to be observed in the port area. On the ninth salvo, the lock was jammed on the gun number 3, then it did not take part in the shooting. In 01: 54 ceased shooting, using the 42 projectile.
"Flurry" was led to the left 1,5 – 2 KB. The fire opened simultaneously with the destroyer at a distance of 59 kb, but without a homing point, at first he just shot at the course angle. Naturally, the first shells flew to no one knows where. With the occurrence of a fire on the shore, I moved the fire to the fire. The shooting stopped at 01: 56, using 59 shells. Despite the fact that the shooting was carried out with flameless shots, there were failures of flame arresters. As we thought, because of this, the enemy found the ships and in 01: 56 opened fire on them with two coastal batteries. The shells lay down in 100 – 150 meters astern of the sentry. At the same time, the ships formed a departure course and in 19: 00 entered Tuapse. The illuminator reported on three fires in the port. According to the plan, the ships should have spent 240 shots, but due to the cessation of illumination of the aiming point, they finished shooting earlier.
In fact, the Soviet ships were discovered by the coastal PLC eight minutes before they opened fire (on 00: 37, German time). The coastal battery (captured 76-mm guns) fired at the 20 11-100 15 meters. Our ships achieved one hit on the territory of the military part of the port, as a result of which there was one lightly wounded.
Then there was a pause in the raid operations - everyday routine was seized. However, on November 19, the People's Commissar of the Navy confirmed the need to fulfill the previous directive regarding the organization of hostilities of surface ships off the western shores of the Black Sea. We will dwell on this in more detail, but, looking ahead, we note that following the results of the first 1942 operation off the coast of Romania, the squadron ships decided not to send there, but to use them against the Crimean ports. The task remained the same - the destruction of boats.
Despite the fact that 17 – 18’s December 1942 intelligence could not give out anything specific to Yalta or Theodosia, it was known that the first Italian submarine base operated, and Theodosia remained an important communications hub and port for the convoys supplying German troops on the Taman Peninsula. For shelling, Yalta was allocated the most modern and high-speed leader "Kharkiv" and the destroyer "Boky", and for Feodosiya - the old destroyer "Nezamozhnik" and the sentry ship "Shkval". The operation, which was planned for the night from 19 to December 20, envisaged providing ships with illumination of targets using lighting bombs and adjusting the fire with airplanes.
A prepared order can be considered typical for such hostilities, and therefore we will consider it completely.
Battle Order No. 06 / OP
Raid Poti, LC "Paris Commune"
Maps № 1523,2229,2232
The Directive of the Military Council of the Black Sea Fleet No. 00465 / OG is tasked with the goal of destroying the ships and disrupting enemy communications with the destroyers and patrol ships from 01: 30 to 02: 00 20: 12.42 to make artillery shelling Yalta and Feodosia during the coverage at the light of a non-RAF light on a non-XNUMX: XNUMX: XNUMX: XNUMX: XNUMX: XNUMX .
1 dmm as part of the LD "Kharkiv", M "Boky" coming out of Poti in 09: 00 19: 12.42 with 01: 30 to 02: 00 20: 12.42 fire on the port of Yalta, and then return to Batumi. 120 projectile consumption per ship. The commander of the squad captain 2-rank Melnikov.
2 dmm in the M "Independent", TFR "Flurry", coming out of Poti in 08: 00 19: 12.42, following to m. Idokopas near our shores from 01: 30 to 02: 00 20: 12.42 to fire at the Theme of Theme Shells consumption: M "NZ" - 100, SKR "ShK" - 50. After the shelling, return to Poti. The squad commander, captain of the 2 rank Bobrovnikov.
Attributed airplanes to start lighting Yalta and Theodosia in 01: 30 20: 12.42, the main task is to adjust the fire when opening fire with coastal batteries at Kiik-Atlami, m. Ilya and Atodor to drop several bombs on them to demoralize. In daylight, cover ships with fighter aircraft.
The squadron commander of the Black Sea Fleet Vice-Admiral Vladimirsky
Chief of Staff of the squadron of the Black Sea Fleet Captain 1 rank V. Andreev
Notice how the combat mission is formulated - “to fire the port”. Agree that for its execution it is enough to simply make the designated number of shots towards the port. Could the task be formulated more specifically? Of course, if reconnaissance indicated that, for example, there is a transport in the port or ships are moored in such and such part of its water area. Yalta and Theodosia at that time were transit ports for convoys heading to Taman and back.
This is not some of today's delights - these are the requirements of the main combat documents that existed at that time, such as, for example, the combat statute of the Navy BUMS-37. And what do we have in this case? The operation was carried out just on the appointed day, according to the readiness of the forces, without any reference to intelligence. If we go back again to the battle order itself, then in general it did not meet the requirements of article 42 BUMS-37.
The ships went out to sea at the onset of December 19 darkness. The leader and the destroyer began shelling the port of Yalta in 1: 31 in 250 ° bearing from the distance of 112 kb, having a course of 9 nodes. The MBR-2 spotting aircraft did not arrive, but the IBR-2 illuminating aircraft was located over Yalta, as well as the Il-4 backup spotting aircraft. However, with the latter, the communications ships did not have (!!!). The shooting ended in 1: 40, while "Kharkiv" fired 154 shots, and "Boyky" - 168. The destroyer fired using the main launcher of the launcher, according to the conditional area of size 4 × 4 kb. Despite the fact that flameless charges were used, 10 – 15% of them gave a flash, and the coastal battery fired at the ships; hits are not marked. As for the results of the shooting, the planes seemed to see explosive shells in the port area.
The Germans identified the group in 3 – 5 units with 76-105 mm guns that produced 40 volleys. The return fire led the 1-I battery of the 601-I division of coastal naval artillery. No hits were observed. About the damage is not reported. More concern was caused by the 3 – 4 raid of the aircraft, which dropped something behind the pier - the Germans were afraid that these were mines.
The destroyer “Deceased” opened fire on the port of Theodosia on 01: 31 from a distance of 69 KB on the 286 ° bearing. The illuminator did not arrive, but the spotter plane was in place. However, he did not observe the fall of the first volley, and had to repeat it. According to the second salvo, they received the proofs, entered it, transferred the initial data to the "Squall", and the ships together went over to defeat. During the execution of the shooting, the aircraft twice gave proofs. However, the manager of the shooting doubted their authenticity and did not enter. Apparently, he was right, since in the future the plane gave a "target". In 01: 48 shooting stopped. The destroyer used up a 124 shot, and the patrol ship 64. As in the case of the first group, part of the flameless charges gave a flash, which, as we believed, allowed the enemy to locate ships and open fire on them. The results are traditional: the plane saw a drop in shells in the port, fires on the Wide Mall.
The Germans discovered our ships in 23: 27 using coastal PLC at a distance of 10 350 meters and declared an alarm. They believed that they were fired from guns with a caliber of 45-105 mm, and everything was done about 50 volleys. The return fire led the 2-i battery of the 601-th division. A drop of shells was observed in the harbor water area, as a result of which tug D was burned (obviously, the port tug is among the trophy ones). The remaining damage is minor, there are no casualties. From German batteries at a distance of 15 200 meters, two or three enemy twin-tube destroyer-class ships were observed.
Continued, all parts:
Part of 1. The raid on the shelling of Constanta
Part of 2. Raid operations on the ports of Crimea, 1942 g
Part of 3. Communication raids in the western Black Sea
Part of 4. Last raid operation