The choice of weapons in the confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan: disguise as a "way of deception"

60

During the current conflict aviation Azerbaijan, represented by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), has a huge impact on the ground forces of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). From the air, military equipment, weapons depots, and military units are methodically destroyed.

The NKR air defense forces cannot cope with the task of countering UAVs, and Armenia, for one reason or another, does not use the most modern air defense systems available to it, for example, the Tor-M2KM anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM). Accordingly, first of all, the question arises of increasing the survivability of ground forces in conditions of air supremacy of enemy aviation.



One of the ways to solve this problem is the "way of deception" - the active use of camouflage and false targets.

In conditions when its own air force and air defense cannot cope with gaining air superiority or at least preventing the enemy from gaining such superiority, ground forces can only rely on camouflage, which ensures the maximum reduction in the effectiveness of enemy strikes.

One of the main ways is to create a large number of decoys. UAVs are designed to use guided weapons. Despite all efforts to reduce its cost, for example, by developing kits for upgrading unguided munitions to give them the properties of high-precision weapons, the cost of weapons for UAVs still remains quite high, which limits their use.

The use of false targets forces the enemy to devote more time to identifying targets, which reduces the intensity of strikes. In addition, camouflage of real targets in combination with the use of decoys leads to an increased consumption of guided munitions while reducing losses of the attacked side.

Inflatable decoys


One of the most effective ways to create decoys is to deploy inflatable dummies that simulate military equipment.


Inflatable models of military equipment

It is difficult to distinguish an inflatable model from a real target in a combat situation. Inflatable models can be equipped with heating systems to simulate engine operation, rotating elements that simulate radar.

Inflatable models can be placed separately from real positions, but then the enemy can calculate them by the lack of movement of personnel next to them (or it is necessary to imitate it). Also, inflatable models can be placed next to the positions of real weapons. For example, one position can contain real Tanks and their inflatable mock-ups, both of which should be equally covered with camouflage nets and relief elements. Accordingly, there is a fairly high probability that the enemy will not recognize the real target from the UAV and will release an expensive guided munition at the "rubber" tank. Often, even modern detection systems are unable to distinguish between real tanks and their inflatable counterparts, either in the visible, thermal or radar wavelength ranges.

It can be assumed that under existing conditions, the optimal solution would be to purchase mock-ups of military equipment immediately after purchasing their real prototypes, for example, 5-10 mock-ups per one real unit of military equipment.

No less, and perhaps more difficult task for the enemy will be to distinguish real warehouses or power plants from their inflatable counterparts.


Inflatable power plant

Apparently, the armed forces of Armenia and the NKR actively use inflatable models, and this is what justifies the numerous confirmed cases of the destruction of UAV targets. Unfortunately, in the images from the UAV, it is difficult to understand that it was the inflatable target that was destroyed.

Highly realistic layouts


It cannot be ruled out that more realistic mock-ups may appear, made on the basis of a metal or polymer frame with imitation of smoke from cannon shots, etc. In principle, countries ordering a limited amount of military equipment and wishing to increase its survivability can develop and manufacture such mock-ups on their own in parallel with the purchase of combat samples.

The choice of weapons in the confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan: disguise as a "way of deception"

Models of Soviet / Russian military equipment, made by order of the US Army for use in the exercise process

3D images


An even simpler solution could be to use 3D images. Of course, they will not be close to replacing the above false targets, but in any case, they will distract the enemy for a while. You shouldn't expect the enemy to spend high-precision ammunition on the "picture", but he will spend additional time on image recognition.


3D images can mislead the enemy, forcing him to spend extra time recognizing and finding real targets

The main advantages of 3D images are their minimal cost and ease of production. Basically, the image data can be applied to something like a banner stretched over a wire frame. Several dozen of these banners can fit in one truck. By moving them, you can pretty much load enemy reconnaissance with work, which will have to analyze photographs of satellite or aerial reconnaissance in an attempt to distinguish real aircraft and operational-tactical missile systems (OTRK) from their flat counterparts with a drawn shadow.

You can also draw images "stationary", periodically covering them with banners with the underlying surface texture.


High-quality 3D images may well mislead the enemy when shooting from a great height or from space.

The enemy will be extremely disappointed when, after striking an OTRK attack on an airfield with combat aircraft, found from space images provided by the "partners", it turns out that these were just drawings.

Camouflage nets


It is necessary not only to deploy decoys, but also to ensure effective camouflage of both real and decoys. The use of camouflage nets is one of the simplest ways to solve this problem. Modern camouflage nets not only reduce the visual, thermal and radar signature of protected objects, but also make it difficult to detect activity near these objects, complicating the identification of objects (real targets or inflatable mock-ups).


Using camouflage nets is one of the easiest ways to disguise

Smoke screens


To mislead the enemy about the activity of real and false objects, in addition to camouflage nets, smoke installations should be actively used. Modern metallized smoke and aerosols are capable of hiding objects not only in the visible, but also in the thermal, as well as in the radar wavelength ranges.


Installation of smoke screens

For the production of smoke, you can use not only specialized solutions, but also ordinary car tires - their reserves in settlements sometimes reach catastrophic proportions. The quality of such a smoke screen, of course, will be lower, but this is the most affordable solution, for which, in addition, you practically do not have to pay.


Smoke from burning car tires can significantly hinder the work of enemy reconnaissance.

Distortion of the signature of objects


The next stage is the camouflage of military equipment. This means not only camouflage nets, bushes and branches, but also a radical change in the appearance of military equipment. For example, a tank can be disguised as a truck, an OTRK as a refrigerator.


Disguise of a tank as a truck during World War II

Conversely, an old bus or a truck with difficulty moving can be given the appearance of an OTRK or multiple launch rocket system (MLRS).

In addition to the optical range, measures can be implemented to create false radar (RL) signatures. For example, with corner reflectors or Luneberg lenses.


Luneberg lens arrangement and placement on an F-22 fighter to distort the radar signature

The creation of a radar image of a target is hardly possible only with the help of corner reflectors or will be quite difficult to implement, but even simply randomly appearing contrasting radar marks will force the enemy to spend additional time on their identification.

Engineering solutions


One of the main tools of the infantryman was and remains the sapper shovel. With proper use, this is both disguise and protection from bullets and shrapnel.


Sapper shovel in some situations may be more important than a machine gun


During the First World War, thousands of kilometers of trenches were dug

In NKR, preparation of engineering barriers can be complicated by stony ground, but, on the other hand, ready-made engineering barriers will be more durable, and industrial explosives can be used for their manufacture.

The experience of Vietnam, Afghanistan and Palestine suggests that whole underground cities can be built, in which supply depots, hospitals and shelters, camouflaged firing points can be located. In stony ground, they can only be destroyed with powerful anti-bunker ammunition.


Underground cities of Vietnam and Palestine

Conclusions


Means of camouflage, decoys and engineering barriers are not of the same interest as weapons and military equipment. Often this applies not only to ordinary people, but also to the leadership of the armed forces of different countries of the world, at least until real clashes begin. Purchases of camouflage equipment pale in comparison to purchases of tanks, planes and ships.

Meanwhile, this is one of the most effective asymmetric methods of confronting an obviously stronger adversary, which is applicable not only to the situation with Armenia / NKR and Azerbaijan / Turkey, but also, for example, to the military conflict in Syria or Libya.

The measures presented in the article, implemented in a complex, can significantly weaken the impact of enemy aircraft, primarily UAVs, in the conditions of enemy air domination and lead to depletion of the enemy's reserves of high-precision ammunition.

It should be noted that the key element that determines the effectiveness of the use of camouflage means, false targets and engineering barriers is the training and discipline of the personnel of the armed forces.
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  1. sen
    +5
    9 October 2020 05: 50
    An even easier solution could be to use 3D images

    I saw 3D images on the asphalt, and next to it was a mark with the words "look from here". Indeed, when viewed from another point, the effect disappears.
    1. +1
      9 October 2020 08: 12
      Quote: sen
      An even easier solution could be to use 3D images

      I saw 3D images on the asphalt, and next to it was a mark with the words "look from here". Indeed, when viewed from another point, the effect disappears.


      It is, but first of all, there is high detail and realism. With regard to the creation of false images of military equipment, this is not required, since the observation is carried out from a very long distance - look at the images from a satellite or from a high-altitude reconnaissance.

      In addition, to some extent, the images can be oriented in the right direction - for example, in the case of the conflict in question, it is clear that the reconnaissance UAV will fly mainly from Azerbaijan.

      And it is clear that a trained operator will detect a fake, but he will spend time on this, and during this time he can be detected and shot down.

      Or, for example, Azerbaijan will receive images from commercial satellites for a fee, does it have operators capable of recognizing a fake? What if 12 Su-30SM will have 48 inflatable models and 120 more banners with images? Only 1 guided munition, mistakenly fired according to the "picture", will be much more expensive than all 120 "pictures".
      1. -1
        9 October 2020 08: 47
        even a novice artist may well draw a snag - some kind of entrenched wasp complex.
        and it won't be easy to tell the difference from a drone.
        1. +2
          9 October 2020 14: 09
          Quote: yehat2
          and it won't be easy to tell the difference from a drone.

          Into the thermal imager?
          And multispectral systems are on the way.
          1. 0
            9 October 2020 14: 12
            what the fuck is a thermal imager from 8 km altitude
            This is not a trillion dollar Pentagon satellite, the equipment there is much simpler.
            This is, firstly, and secondly - is it so difficult to heat the snag?
            1. +3
              9 October 2020 14: 14
              Quote: yehat2
              what the fuck is a thermal imager from 8 km altitude

              ?
              Only 8 km.

              Quote: yehat2
              and secondly - is it so difficult to heat the snag?

              Drawing? very hard.
              1. -2
                9 October 2020 14: 15
                you already decide - a thermal imager or a camera. two will not work right away.
                1. +3
                  9 October 2020 14: 18
                  Quote: yehat2
                  you already decide - a thermal imager or a camera. two will not work right away.

                  Actually, it's not just "working out", it's a trend.
                  Filming in several ranges, adding images from the radar
                  1. -1
                    9 October 2020 14: 27
                    what nonsense? the camera works during the day. Not bad, but the camera.
                    At night, when the IR range is contrasting, drones with infrared guidance systems can be used. But not all at once. They are not Americans or even Chinese. These are just the Turks who are only capable of collecting lego.
                    and in Lego another 50 years, multispectral systems will not exist.
                    And just as this apparatus is primitive, the means of its deception are just as primitive.
                    The only thing that is difficult is to detect it in time and shoot it down without wasting expensive equipment.
                    1. +2
                      9 October 2020 14: 49
                      Quote: yehat2
                      what nonsense? the camera works during the day. Not bad, but the camera.
                      At night, when the IR range is contrasting, drones with infrared guidance systems can be used. But not all at once.

                      ???????
                      And at the same time, religion interferes? laughing
                      Even the ancient Soviet thermal imagers were easily used during the day.
                      Moreover, the HD low-light camera works well at night.
                      1. -4
                        9 October 2020 14: 50
                        are you underdeveloped Try to turn on the thermal imager during the day and look around.
                        I see no point in explaining further.
                      2. +3
                        9 October 2020 14: 59
                        Quote: yehat2
                        Try to turn on the thermal imager during the day and look around.

                        For the gifted: I did it for the first time back in 1995. As a cadet. Thermal imager 1PN59 installed on PRPshke

                        It looks like you confused a thermal imager and a "night light" with an electro-optical converter laughing laughing laughing

                        Quote: yehat2
                        I see no point in explaining further.

                        I agree, it doesn't make sense. Due to your complete lack of knowledge.
                      3. -3
                        9 October 2020 15: 19
                        Quote: Spade
                        It looks like you confused a thermal imager and a "night light" with an electro-optical converter

                        I don't want to continue stupid
                        here is a rough guide to Sophie's device
                        about the same is on the bayraktar
                        at an altitude of 8 km (they do not fall below 7.5 so that the wasp does not run over)
                        he sees only at 2-4 times magnification, and, I emphasize at night, not during the day.
                        The quality of the picture is so to itself, while in a narrow beam, the review is physically impossible.
                        if you looked, you know, if you hang noodles, your problems.
                        if you reduce at least the radiation of the tank by half, then the drone will most likely not see the target. How to reduce - I wrote.
                        And you will fill in about magic devices for those who have not studied physics.
                      4. +4
                        9 October 2020 15: 42
                        Quote: yehat2
                        I don't want to continue stupid

                        That is, you will no longer write about the impossibility of using a thermal imager during the day?

                        Quote: yehat2
                        here is a rough guide to Sophie's device

                        There is no need for "rough guidelines" if there are precise characteristics.
                        There is WESCAM CMX 15D from L3Harris Technologies
                        Here are the characteristics on the developer's site
                        https://www.wescam.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/WESCAM-MX-15D-0501AB-Spec.pdf

                        Here's a video including blend mode
                      5. -1
                        9 October 2020 15: 49
                        this one is even worse, although the viewing sector is slightly better.
                        in any case, it is enough only to slightly lower the thermal contrast to
                        these UAVs had big problems with night operation. The sun will do it during the day.
                        Because Armenians may well protect themselves from bayraktars by completely simple means.
                      6. +1
                        9 October 2020 16: 10
                        Quote: yehat2
                        in any case, it is enough just to slightly lower the thermal contrast,

                        laughing laughing laughing
                        Little?

                        Quote: yehat2
                        these UAVs had big problems with night operation.

                        There is a system that illuminates the area with a laser. To ensure the operation of the "night light"
                        Approximately as on our 1PN61, only without the ability to measure the range
                      7. -2
                        9 October 2020 16: 12
                        there is no such system - I looked at the performance characteristics at the link
                        no illumination systems, no laser, no flashlight, generally a beggar.
                        besides, the active backlight system eats electricity well.
                        And with a powerful source thereof, I strained the UAV.
                        but even if there is, the problem is not to look at the target, but to find it
                        and in the review, no backlight will be enough to work
                      8. +2
                        9 October 2020 16: 17
                        Quote: yehat2
                        there is no such system - I looked at the performance characteristics at the link
                        no illumination systems, no laser, no flashlight, generally a beggar.

                        Sensor # 6 - Laser Illuminator

                        Not to be confused with a laser rangefinder-designator (Sensor # 7 & # 8 - Laser Designator / Rangefinder), which illuminates the target, not the terrain
                      9. +2
                        9 October 2020 16: 51
                        It is strange to read this dispute, you are talking about technologies that have been used for a long time in civilian life. In the military sphere in the 70s and 80s in the army were already, if not earlier. On modern military equipment, this equipment is a matter of course.
                      10. -1
                        9 October 2020 16: 57
                        Quote: OgnennyiKotik
                        On modern military equipment, this equipment is self-evident

                        This is probably why they buy for reinforcement abroad, but they cannot do it themselves.
                      11. +1
                        9 October 2020 17: 49
                        About that, in fact, and speech.
                        Disguise is a tricky thing these days.
                      12. -1
                        9 October 2020 17: 53
                        Very dear. Initially, the technique must be planned with means of reducing the visibility, but this is before the first shot. After the start of a combat mission, all tricks to increase stealth are useless.
                        I am directly surprised by the local commentators, in their opinion, the technique should be hidden, camouflaged, motionless and not shoot, so that the enemy does not notice. It is not clear who will perform the combat mission from this logic.
                      13. +1
                        9 October 2020 18: 00
                        Quote: OgnennyiKotik
                        After the start of a combat mission, all tricks to increase stealth are useless.

                        Not a fact.
                        The visibility reduction system still helps. Reducing the likelihood of defeat.

                        Here's a concrete fact - if the targets on the shooting range are made more contrasting against the background, for example, by encircling the edges with a white stripe, the shooting results will increase.

                        The WTO is similar. The less contrast the target, the higher the probability of failure of guidance
                      14. 0
                        9 October 2020 18: 02
                        Quote: Spade
                        The visibility reduction system still helps. Reducing the likelihood of defeat.

                        I agree. A game of probability.
                      15. +1
                        9 October 2020 18: 03
                        Quote: OgnennyiKotik
                        I agree. A game of probability.

                        War has always been a game of probability
      2. 0
        9 October 2020 09: 21
        Any data / information is checked for confirmation / misinformation, for example your example about “sudden” aircraft silhouettes - past the cash desk.
        1. +1
          9 October 2020 09: 48
          Quote: WFP
          Any data / information is checked for confirmation / misinformation, for example your example about “sudden” aircraft silhouettes - past the cash desk.


          So this is exactly what is required of them - to overload analysts with work. Inflatable models are also not the most complicated and expensive product, but in any case they are more expensive, and it is more difficult and longer to deploy them than flat "pictures".

          One will complement the other. It seems that they found the target, spent time, processed the images - these are kratinki - the shadows do not match, etc., the second time, the third ...
          On the fourth, everything seemed to be fine, they were delighted, struck, and then there were inflatable models ...
          1. +2
            9 October 2020 10: 53
            Well, you do not hold intelligence agencies for fools. Even in relation to your "introductory" - the Su-30 (Su-27ub) - a piece machine on the fields of the FSU (not counting the other Chinese and Indians) and if somewhere there were more boards, it is natural that somewhere diminished. And taking into account the open infospace and citizens, whose water in a ... se does not hold on - to open the "puppet theater" like two fingers on the asphalt.
            The wunderkindness of the UAV in relation to the conditions of a highly intersected area is minimized by the complex engineering preparation of the OP, spare / false, the use of shelters for group weapons (warheads of any kamikaze UAV will not bite through the puff cake of the shelter, like other URKs, SPBE well and MZA in marketable quantity (from 7,62 up to 23 mm).
            Not for the sake of dispute.
  2. +6
    9 October 2020 05: 57
    The shovel is not a sapper, however. Everything that the author suggests is correct, but it is necessary to prepare for a comprehensive application in advance, and not to add tails in the process.
    In addition, the topic of field fortification for TV and TV dropped out.
  3. +4
    9 October 2020 06: 03
    The US division of the Patriot air defense missile system includes a decoys service section. Each battery should prepare several positions with dummies up to 3 km away. Frequent changes in positions should prevent the enemy from discovering the location of air defense weapons.
    The second most important use after nets is camouflage foam. The main masking property of chemical foam is that it distorts the typical infrared signature of military vehicles. Foam applied to the hidden object acquires its temperature, as a result of which infrared detectors cannot "recognize" it. According to foreign experts, chemical foam almost completely eliminates the identification of military equipment samples by optical and electronic-optical devices, which ultimately complicates their detection.
    Use of a laser for functional damage to matrix photodetectors of UAV optical-electronic equipment.
  4. +7
    9 October 2020 06: 16
    It is very difficult to write when you have a poor command of the topic ... The level of the article for students of the CWP of the Soviet school of the 6th grade. There are many interesting materials on this topic, but the author simply did not find them (or did not look for them). The armies have special camouflage units that have special means and camouflage techniques and there are many of them in the public domain. You just had to look well. And more about 3-D drawings and a sapper shovel - smiled !!!
    1. +1
      9 October 2020 06: 58
      And, what is most important in my opinion, the article is ABSOLUTELY not tied to the topic of the battles in Nagorno-Karabakh. Where
      real application examples?
      1. +2
        9 October 2020 07: 30
        And the first paragraph? What kind of engineering support in NK if there is a group at stationary positions (which are not “exploited” for the first five years and were opened by the attacking side) at a glance.
    2. +1
      9 October 2020 08: 15
      Quote: Vitaliy Tsymbal
      It is very difficult to write when you have a poor command of the topic ... The level of the article for students of the CWP of the Soviet school of the 6th grade. There are many interesting materials on this topic, but the author simply did not find them (or did not look for them). The armies have special camouflage units that have special means and camouflage techniques and there are many of them in the public domain. You just had to look well.


      Share links?
      1. +3
        9 October 2020 08: 38
        See sites about the engineering troops of the USSR and the Russian Federation ... Well, first, find the Textbook of the sergeant of the engineering troops of the USSR)))
  5. The comment was deleted.
  6. +3
    9 October 2020 07: 29
    War is a way of deception .. Said 2500 years ago.
  7. +5
    9 October 2020 08: 10
    Masks and branches are actively used - only from a thermal imager it does not help. Here is a video of arrivals in tanks under nets or disguised as a bush / mound.



    There are relatively cheap capes, but they will not help much, but better than nets and branches:


    There is a panacea for this - a special Adaptive system from BAE, but it costs more than a tank (and not a T-72), so even Sweden cannot pull it.
    1. 0
      9 October 2020 14: 34
      thermal radiation significantly masks banal construction foam or any mattress-like cape, it helps just to pour water over it.
      it’s just that Armenia’s army has Losers in physics, otherwise they would have found a way to hide the equipment long ago.
      1. 0
        9 October 2020 17: 19
        Quote: yehat2
        it helps just to pour it over with water. it’s just that Armenia’s army has Losers in physics, otherwise they would have found a way to hide the equipment long ago.

        it's just that there are no educated military men from the USSR left ...
  8. +5
    9 October 2020 09: 28
    the drawings showed inefficiency even during World War II. The Germans tried to paint their airfields under the bombed ones: they painted craters, crashed planes, etc. Reconnaissance revealed this in two counts, not to mention aerial photography in several ranges.
    In general, the question of disguise is complex and multifaceted. In this particular case, Armenians need to use masseti several times larger so that it is not clear where exactly the target is. From the air, you can see that there is a target, it is clear where to shoot, the number of misses will increase by 2-3 times. But it will only work with armored vehicles.
    Smoke screens can help, but only temporarily and in a limited area. Besides, you yourself will become blind.
    There are underground shelters, but fire weapons are placed outside, so it is problematic to camouflage them. If only to make reinforced concrete pillboxes so that they can withstand a direct hit of low-power ammunition.
    1. +3
      9 October 2020 14: 13
      Quote: glory1974
      the drawings showed inefficiency even during World War II. The Germans tried to paint their airfields under the bombed ones: they painted craters, crashed planes, etc. Reconnaissance revealed this in two counts, not to mention aerial photography in several ranges.

      Is not a fact...
      But the fact that scattering fertilizers can mislead the enemy, making an even field visually bumpy is a fact. Proven by practice
  9. 0
    9 October 2020 09: 44
    What is the author's claim that Turkish UAVs have a "huge" impact on the NKAO soldiers based on? There is hardly any serious evidence, except for the dubious quality of the video. The only result is a damaged bridge. And now it is in general - fogs, rains have begun - the use of UAVs is difficult or even impossible. And then the earth will turn sour and the blitzkrieg will end.
  10. +2
    9 October 2020 12: 05
    Quote: glory1974
    the drawings showed inefficiency even during World War II. The Germans tried to paint their airfields under the bombed ones: they painted craters, crashed planes, etc. Reconnaissance revealed this in two counts, not to mention aerial photography in several ranges.
    In general, the question of disguise is complex and multifaceted. In this particular case, Armenians need to use masseti several times larger so that it is not clear where exactly the target is. From the air, you can see that there is a target, it is clear where to shoot, the number of misses will increase by 2-3 times. But it will only work with armored vehicles.
    Smoke screens can help, but only temporarily and in a limited area. Besides, you yourself will become blind.
    There are underground shelters, but fire weapons are placed outside, so it is problematic to camouflage them. If only to make reinforced concrete pillboxes so that they can withstand a direct hit of low-power ammunition.

    so every now and then that the networks for the thermal imager are completely useless. Layouts are also useless in different ranges, even heated ones .. Masking is useless for now. You need concrete about 5 meters, and even then it will fly through the window, in short everything is useless. About 5 years ago, they discussed that the wasp and only the wasp are effective against drones, if not for the video still discussed. Only drones, even more drones, an automatic assembly shop of 1000 pieces per hour will save the day.
    1. +1
      9 October 2020 12: 58
      networks for a thermal imager are completely useless

      let the fishermen use nets, and glory1974 wrote about camouflage nets.
      What will you see from the air in a thermal imager? ten stretched camouflage nets, that's all. Their main task in these conditions is not to disguise the position, but to hide the true goal.
      .
      the Armenians had time to look around and dig in, a video tank in a trench is higher, there are still trenches nearby, but there is no camouflage of false (reserve) positions, and camouflage nets, taking into account the enemy's thermal imaging capabilities, need to be tightened up.
      and not every drone can pull a normal thermal imager on itself - here it is already necessary to be larger in size and an order or two more expensive to launch.
    2. +1
      11 October 2020 23: 04
      About 5 years ago, they discussed that the wasp and only the wasp are effective against drones, if not for the video still discussed.

      I have met here quite a few individuals who believe in the ability of Pantsir to shoot down dozens of CDs from .. guns. (What a savings, let them send more smile) True, these guns did not go well with air targets at the range ..
      (From the same opera)
      1. 0
        12 October 2020 09: 23
        Quote: 3danimal
        About 5 years ago, they discussed that the wasp and only the wasp are effective against drones, if not for the video still discussed.

        I have met here quite a few individuals who believe in the ability of Pantsir to shoot down dozens of CDs from .. guns. (What a savings, let them send more smile) True, these guns did not go well with air targets at the range ..
        (From the same opera)


        The situation can be corrected by HE shells with remote detonation on the trajectory - the probability of defeat can increase by an order of magnitude. It seems that we already have such shells, but there is still some silence in their introduction.
        1. 0
          12 October 2020 14: 17
          Heard only about experimental samples. But for them, and the guns need others, and the MSA.
          IMHO, 35mm is the best option (following the example of Rheinmetal) - more ready-made striking elements, with reasonable dimensions and ammunition.
          It is also better to use 2 separate complexes: the cannon (in which the guns are not spaced 2 meters apart) and the rocket. ZRPK - a wrong decision, again, IMHO smile
  11. +2
    9 October 2020 12: 44
    Quote: Artura
    The Armenian air defense is doing very well, enough bullshit is already tired to drive. To the fig of these drones were sent to the next world. Enough to believe in Azeri cartoons.

    They seem to send animate beings to the next world, and they seem to have the whole entity in the name of drones ...
    1. +1
      11 October 2020 23: 17
      An important point: the calculation of the air defense system, which is under fire, is experiencing considerable stress, which increases the percentage of erroneous decisions (which again leads to death). Its loss is no less serious than the "hardware" - go prepare a new one for a n-th amount of money and time (which may not be available).
      And the UAV operator, whatever the outcome, simply gains experience, and coffee is always at hand smile
      1. +1
        12 October 2020 09: 16
        Quote: 3danimal
        An important point: the calculation of the air defense system, which is under fire, is experiencing considerable stress, which increases the percentage of erroneous decisions (which again leads to death). Its loss is no less serious than the "hardware" - go prepare a new one for a n-th amount of money and time (which may not be available).
        And the UAV operator, whatever the outcome, simply gains experience, and coffee is always at hand smile


        Yes, this is an important problem - in Arab-Israeli conflicts, Arabs often fled, barely detecting signs of an air raid, throwing air defense systems. But for the air defense system it is quite realistic to make remote consoles, and mask the calculation at 100-200 meters from the launcher - the so-called. remote control station (VPBU). I don't know if there is a VPBU for all air defense systems, but some of them definitely have one.
  12. 0
    9 October 2020 13: 31
    War is a way of deception.
  13. -2
    9 October 2020 15: 24
    https://news.day.az/politics/1278089.html
  14. +4
    9 October 2020 15: 25
    One officer told me how they shot down American planes in Vietnam. The Vietnamese masters of camouflage and just camouflaged the complex that it is not visible even to a foot soldier. But overnight they shot something similar to our SA-75 Dvina air defense system and even managed to paint it. the Americans flew to the bombing of this complex of wooden miracle, for which they received after
    1. +1
      11 October 2020 22: 59
      I guess they chose targets visually in those years?
      These wooden air defense systems are not a threat to modern sensors.
      1. 0
        12 October 2020 09: 12
        Quote: 3danimal
        I guess they chose targets visually in those years?
        These wooden air defense systems are not a threat to modern sensors.


        And what are these special sensors? The radar station will show the silhouette of a wooden air defense system, especially if you cover it with silver, and most likely will show it that way.

        The optical camera will show it visually, but if it is made with high quality, it will be difficult to distinguish it.

        Thermal imager? But the complex in the parking lot does not heat up - the engine is turned off, so the absence of a heat trace is not proof of the layout. Well, or you can put a simple stove or a hair dryer in the right place.

        No radar radiation? And if it works on a passive optical channel? After all, it was with the use of the optical channel that the F-117 was shot down in Yugoslavia. And it is quite possible to simulate radar radiation - if not by a microwave, then by some inexpensive specialized device.
        By the way, why not? Magnetron from a disassembled microwave + dish from satellite TV. You can also email. add a drive to rotate the structure.
    2. 0
      12 October 2020 09: 05
      Quote: APASUS
      One officer told me how they shot down American planes in Vietnam. The Vietnamese masters of camouflage and just camouflaged the complex that it is not visible even to a foot soldier. But overnight they shot something similar to our SA-75 Dvina air defense system and even managed to paint it. the Americans flew to the bombing of this complex of wooden miracle, for which they received after


      Therefore, they did the USA - initiative, endurance, perseverance, readiness for hardships and an abyss of work done.
  15. +1
    9 October 2020 18: 16
    Quote: Disant
    networks for a thermal imager are completely useless

    let the fishermen use nets, and glory1974 wrote about camouflage nets.
    What will you see from the air in a thermal imager? ten stretched camouflage nets, that's all. Their main task in these conditions is not to disguise the position, but to hide the true goal.
    .
    the Armenians had time to look around and dig in, a video tank in a trench is higher, there are still trenches nearby, but there is no camouflage of false (reserve) positions, and camouflage nets, taking into account the enemy's thermal imaging capabilities, need to be tightened up.
    and not every drone can pull a normal thermal imager on itself - here it is already necessary to be larger in size and an order or two more expensive to launch.

    The thermal imager sees through the nets, it sees the radiation of motors and metal. Metal has its own temperature and it differs from soil. And the network does not reflect. You can cover the field with foam, then yes, but where can I get so much foam, and the first rocket will arrive, the foam will all fly away. In the game of cat and mouse, only the cat has a chance to win
  16. +2
    9 October 2020 22: 21
    I'm wondering how an inflatable tank in an open field will deceive the operator when there are no tracks of a caterpillar. As far as I understand, operators are also taught how to recognize where the target is and where the snag.
    1. +1
      12 October 2020 09: 03
      Quote: Shiden
      I'm wondering how an inflatable tank in an open field will deceive the operator when there are no tracks of a caterpillar. As far as I understand, operators are also taught how to recognize where the target is and where the snag.


      And if at first the real tank drives up to the false position, then it backs up. And so at four points. In three there will be inflatable tanks, in one real. All this is covered with mask nets + from time to time, smoke screens are set.

      Of course, they can also recognize the real goal. But no one says that disguise is a panacea for all problems. Everything will depend on the skill, ingenuity and efficiency of the opposing sides.

      By the way, on rocky soils, the problem of footprints is less relevant.
  17. 0
    12 December 2020 17: 18
    Armenians are smart! Why buy paying millions when you can buy an inflatable ball for 100 rubles! And Pashinyan didn't have enough for balls. As a result, the children were put in, and those who were supposed to fight are still holding rallies in Yerevan!