October 6, 1943. Operation Verp and its lessons for our time
Leader of the destroyers "Kharkov"
November 6 marks 77 years since the fatal day for the Black Sea fleet Operation Verp - a raid by the leader Kharkiv and two destroyers, Merciless and Able, on the communications of German-Romanian troops in the sea south of the Kerch Peninsula. The result of the operation was the death of all ships participating in it.
The operation was planned as a result of the previously unsuccessful work of the Black Sea Fleet on the enemy communications, along which he evacuated troops from the Caucasus. Previously, the Black Sea Fleet ships repeatedly tried to find and destroy enemy convoys, but the results were near-zero, not a single convoy was even found. Raids carried out for artillery strikes along the coast at night were also unsuccessful. Both the headquarters and the commander-in-chief Kuznetsov demanded results, and the fleet tried to give them, but instead of the results, it turned out to be a disaster.
To this day, this failure is controversial. It is used as an illustration of the inability of the fleet to fight, as the inability of admirals to establish interaction with a fighter aviation, with the front headquarters, on the other hand, it is used as an example of the inability of army commanders to use the fleet correctly, moreover, it is also used as an example of the fact that ships cannot operate in areas where the enemy has powerful aircraft.
In fact, the main value of studying Operation Verp today is to gain an understanding of what happened and, relying on it, to answer those questions that still remain important for the development of the fleet in our country.
Is there a need for a surface fleet in such a war, which was going on in the Black Sea in 1943, that is, in the absence of significant enemy surface and submarine forces? Can ships be used where enemy aircraft operate? Did the Black Sea Fleet command really neglect the air cover of the ships? Could our planes protect the ships? Was this raid necessary at all? Was it the stupidity of the admirals or the stupidity of the generals, or was it not stupidity at all? Were there any chances of success? Unfortunately, even the best researchers do not provide detailed answers to these questions. But the answer to the fundamental question directly depends on them: was the Headquarters correct in banning the use of surface ships in the Black Sea after this operation?
This is not an idle question. Unlike the long-outdated technology and tactics of the Second World War, it is still relevant today, as it refers to the correct or incorrect use of sea power in principle. We will hardly ever carry out raids with artillery shelling of barges and scows in ports, now is simply not the time. But is it necessary to remove large surface ships from the theater of operations when there is a threat from the air, but when there are many tasks for them? The question may well be relevant now. And the previous experience is quite useful in order to orient yourself correctly at the right time in today's environment.
Let us recall the course of events. The idea of Operation Verp was that two destroyers, Project 7 Merciless and Capable of Project 7-U, as well as the destroyer leader (hereinafter - the leader) of Project 1 Kharkov, together with the Black Sea Fleet Air Force aircraft, were to to carry out a raid operation against German communications south of the Kerch Peninsula and in ports.
Destroyer "Merciless"
It was supposed to combine artillery and bomb strikes on the port of Feodosia and destroy enemy ships and transports at sea. Separately, "Kharkov" was given the task of shelling Yalta. To ensure the effectiveness of the search for surface targets and artillery fire, the operation was carried out during daylight hours. The detachment of warships was commanded by the captain of the 2nd rank G.P. Negoda, commander of the destroyer battalion, which included the ships. At night, when the ships were moving to the coast, the ships were discovered and several times attacked by enemy aircraft and boats. Nevertheless, they continued to move towards their goal. "Kharkov", separated from the detachment, fired at Yalta, without achieving any results.
By that time, it became clear that due to the loss of surprise, it would not be possible to carry out the operation according to the original plan, and Negoda ordered to withdraw. Gathering together, the ships began to withdraw. During daylight hours, in the course of several powerful air strikes, the entire detachment of warships was destroyed. This was the largest one-time loss of the fleet in the entire war. After that, the Supreme Command Headquarters banned the exit of large ships to the sea, and they did not participate in the war anymore. The details of this tragedy are currently available on many Internet resources and in the literature, there is no point in repeating it, but it is worth giving an assessment of what happened.
And before assessing the tragedy that unfolded in the Black Sea 77 years ago, it is necessary to debunk a number of myths that surround this operation in the mass consciousness. They have nothing to do with reality, which is easy to verify, but for some reason they are popular among people who have not gone into the essence of the issue very deeply.
Verpa myths
The most important myth regarding Operation Verp is that the aviation was inactive and did not provide cover for the ships during the raid and withdrawal.
Fortunately for those who are really interested in the issue, the outstanding domestic military historian Miroslav Morozov carried out work to study a number of key points of the operation, the main of which can be considered the use of aviation in it. As usual, M. Morozov uses as sources of information documents compiled during the hostilities at the headquarters of formations, reports, dispatches, combat logs, etc., in this case "Report on the combat operations of the 1st MTAD of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force in operations of the Black Sea Fleet "Verp" 6.10.1943 ". 1st MTAD - 1st mine-torpedo aviation division of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. Let's start with this. First link to the article by M. Morozov "Operation Verp".
And immediately the defeat of the first myth: aviation completely covered the ships, they had fighter cover most of the time. M. Morozov, starting from the "Report on Combat Actions", gives the following composition of the forces of the 1st MTAD on the day of the operation.
On 6.10.43, the air division had the following combat strength at the Gelendzhik-2 airfield *:
5 GAP ** - 18 IL-4, of which 8 are in service
11 GIAP - 15 Airacobra, - // - - 8
36 MTAP - 8 B-3 - // - - 5
36 MTAP - 4 A-20-Zh, of which 4 are in service
40 AP *** - 24 PE-2 - // - - 14
11 GIAP - 15 Airacobra, - // - - 8
36 MTAP - 8 B-3 - // - - 5
36 MTAP - 4 A-20-Zh, of which 4 are in service
40 AP *** - 24 PE-2 - // - - 14
In addition, the operation involved fighters P-40 "Kittyhawk" from the 7 IAP 4 IAD, which appear in the decision on the operation in the amount of 8 units (with 16 available).
Also, a number of sorties were made by aircraft of the 11th ShAD, among which were Yak-1 fighters, but there is no data on its combat work yet.
The article by M. Morozov describes in detail both the decision, and the sequence and duration of the air missions, we will not repeat ourselves.
Thus, there was a fighter cover. Another thing is that it was not enough. M. Morozov concludes that it was necessary to attract more aviation. In theory, yes, in practice ... More on that below.
To illustrate the work of fighters, we present data on the losses of German aircraft in raids on ships (from an article by M. Morozov):
Flying boat BV-138 "Blom und Foss" - 1
ME-109 - 2
S-87 - 6
S-88 - 1
ME-109 - 2
S-87 - 6
S-88 - 1
That is, there were fighters, they shot down the enemy (in the text of the article, the work of fighters is well described), they inflicted losses. On the possibility of the Black Sea Fleet fighter aviation, in principle, to solve the problem of protecting ships with the existing plan of operation - below.
The second myth about the "Verpa", somewhat less popular, but sometimes encountered: the operation itself did not make sense, the idea of a raid was stupid.
In fact, the thesis is controversial. The purpose of the raid was to disrupt the enemy's communications, to destroy his watercraft and transport ships in ports and at sea. Can this task be considered absolutely useless? No, since the main task of the enemy's sea transport was the evacuation of troops from the Caucasus to the Crimea. That is, it was precisely about the destruction of enemy troops (if it was possible to "catch" the convoy), military property and weapons... In addition, some of the transported goods were used by the enemy for the needs of the troops. Also, the destruction of watercraft and transport vessels in itself also had value.
Could aviation accomplish this task without involving surface ships at all? In theory, yes, and systematically did it: Black Sea Fleet aircraft regularly flew to attack ports and transports at sea, albeit with low efficiency.
Arguments against the raid, of course, can also be found, but, apparently, it is worth mentioning one fundamental point.
The main aerial bomb during the Second World War was the FAB-100, which had 70 kg of explosives. In second place in terms of prevalence was the FAB-250, which had 97-100 kg of explosives. Usually, 6-10, often 8, such bombs were taken for a combat radius of a couple of hundred kilometers.
An example from an article by M. Morozov:
9 PE-2 leading - captain Yegorov, navigator - captain Mozzhukhin, under the cover of 6 "Airacobra" (leading - Guards Major Karasev) had the task of destroying floating craft in the port and in the roadstead of Feodosia. Takeoff 6.15, landing - 7.55.
At 7.15, they struck from a dive on the floating craft in the outer roadstead of the port of Feodosia. H = input - 4000 m. H = sbr. = 3000 m. H = altitude - 2000 m. BK = 180, 16 FAB-250, 20 FAB-100 were dropped. The result was photographed.
At 7.15, they struck from a dive on the floating craft in the outer roadstead of the port of Feodosia. H = input - 4000 m. H = sbr. = 3000 m. H = altitude - 2000 m. BK = 180, 16 FAB-250, 20 FAB-100 were dropped. The result was photographed.
The specified list of bombs means dropping about 3 tons of explosives on the enemy, for which 9 Pe-2 bombers were needed, 333 kg of explosives per plane. At the same time, the flight time of the bombers was about 30 minutes, the same amount was required for the return flight, plus the group's draft, refueling, and inter-flight service. This particular flight required 1 hour 40 minutes in the air and at least several hours to prepare for a repeat flight.
Now, against this background, let us estimate the firing performance of a detachment of warships.
The main caliber of all the ships participating in the operation was 130-mm guns, capable of firing, among other things, high-explosive fragmentation shells with an amount of explosives in each 3,58 kg or 3,65 kg. Let's take 3,6 for simplicity.
Thus, in order to bombard the enemy with the same amount of explosives as nine Pe-2s in one sortie (which took several hours), the ships would have to fire 822 shells. Two destroyers each had four 130-mm guns, and the leader "Kharkov" had five guns, which gives a total of 13 barrels. 822 rounds equals approximately 63 rounds per barrel.
With a gun rate of fire of 7 rounds per minute, the ships would have fired such a number of shells in a little over 9 minutes.
In this case, the survivability of the barrel liner can be approximately estimated at 130 shots. That is, having fired 64 shells per barrel, the ships would have used up only half of the resource of the barrels if the liners were new (and before such operations they would have to be changed to new ones).
Thus, the total "shot" that the ships could afford was equivalent to the strike of at least 18 Pe-2 bombers. At the same time, artillery fire can be transferred after hitting a target, achieving shelling of a larger number of targets - these are FAB-100 and its 70 kg of explosives are indivisible, and the equivalent 19 shells can be fired at several targets.
Aft rangefinder station EM "Svobodny", photo 1943, one of the last photos of the ship
And this ability, on the one hand, to quickly concentrate fire, keep the target under fire, and, if necessary, carry fire, is the quality of artillery that is not compensated by aerial bombs. But the ship must be brought to the target at a short distance, which means that it must be protected from enemy aircraft covering the target. The second advantage of the ships, in principle (outside of the connection with the "Verp") was the presence of torpedoes, which could attack targets at sea.
In fact, the order for the operation indicated that during the shelling of Feodosia, two destroyers had to use up 250 shells, which was equivalent to 1,8 tons of explosives, or, "in terms of Pe-2" - a strike of 5-6 bombers. The expenditure of the "Kharkov" shells is not taken into account here, and all other ammunition could have been used by the ships on the discovered floating craft at sea.
The question arises in the accuracy of shooting, however, from the report of the 1st MTAD, it clearly follows the allocation of aircraft for adjusting the artillery fire.
Moreover, some targets that day were far more suitable for ships than for aircraft. Again, a quote from an article by M. Morozov:
Intelligence: ...
7.16 W = 45.00. D = 35.45, a caravan of up to 20 units under the cover of 2 ME-110 was heading for Feodosia.
Counteraction: heavy fire 3A and machine guns.
7.16 W = 45.00. D = 35.45, a caravan of up to 20 units under the cover of 2 ME-110 was heading for Feodosia.
Counteraction: heavy fire 3A and machine guns.
This is a pure target for ships. The ships had torpedo tubes and artillery sufficient to destroy such a convoy.
Thus, we have to admit that the idea to send not only airplanes, but also ships, was, in principle, correct. Or at least it cannot be considered completely wrong. This means that the insinuations about the meaninglessness of the operation, which sometimes arise, should be discarded.
On the whole, it should be noted that the operation was of the air-sea nature, very close interaction with aviation was envisaged, fighter cover was also envisaged, and it managed to inflict some losses on enemy aviation.
The ideas that the ships did not have any air cover and were not needed in that place and at that time are nothing more than myths, unfortunately, very tenacious.
Thus, we draw the first conclusion: the reason for the disaster that happened on October 6, 1943 was not the very idea of the raid in principle, and not the absence of aviation at all.
The reasons were different.
Before we analyze them, it is worth answering a fundamental question.
Could fighters protect ships?
M. Morozov in his article indicates the following:
Now let's try to answer two main questions that appear in one form or another in all publications related to the October 6 disaster:
1. Did the Black Sea Fleet Air Force have the ability to reliably protect ships from air strikes with proper planning of the operation?
2. Was it possible to urgently organize a cover for the destroyers from 8.40, when after the damage to the leader "Kharkov" it became clear that the detachment was under threat of destruction by enemy aircraft?
The first question is relatively easy to answer. For reliable air defense of ships, assuming that the change of fighters would have to be done every hour for 6-6,5 hours (according to the planned table from 6.00 to 12.30), and the required composition of one shift was a fighter squadron, 40-50 serviceable fighters. That is how many of them were in the 11 GIAP, 9, 25 IAP and the Kittyhawk squadron of the 7 IAP, based at the Gelendzhik airfield. At the same time, two-thirds of the fighters were part of the 9th and 25th IAP, not subordinate in any respect to the commander of the 1st MTAD. Thus, it was necessary either to strengthen the division, or to leave the leadership of the aviation involved in the operation in the hands of the naval air force headquarters, which was already tracking the course of events, taking belated steps to save the ships. With the cash composition of the forces, 1 MTAD could indeed deploy no more than 3-4 fighters in one shift, and this number was enough only for a more or less successful fight against air reconnaissance aircraft.
Having dealt with the first question, we actually half answered the second. 1 MTAD could not reliably cover the ships on its own, therefore everything depended on the efficiency of the naval air force headquarters. It would have been possible to cover the ships if the decision to organize maximum fighter cover had been made no later than 10.00, i.e. within an hour from the moment of damage to the "Kharkov". This was not done, although the signal from the "Kharkiv" "I endure a distress" was recorded in the combat log of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force headquarters at 9.10. At 9.45 am, 3 Aerocobras and 4 LaGG-3s were raised on alarm, but only at 11.10 am the order was given to constantly cover the ships with no less than 8 aircraft. Before the order was executed, a second raid took place, which incapacitated the Merciless. Nevertheless, there was still an opportunity to save the ships. From 13.40, 11 ShAD aircraft appeared over the ships, but instead of a full-blooded squadron of "yaks" on the battlefield there were only 4 Yak-1 and 4 Il-2. Together with three Airacobras and two Bostons, three Yaks took part in repelling the third raid at 14.40. Following the results of the first two strikes, the Germans took into account that the ships were covered by fighters and therefore increased the composition of the attacking group to 18 bombers and 12 fighters. With such a balance of forces, it is not surprising that our fighters were unable to break through to enemy bombers and prevent a catastrophe. Half an hour after the Germans left, the number of "yaks" increased to eight. By this time, two ships had already sunk. From 16:11, the crews of 39 ShAD for some unknown reason no longer made sorties, as a result of which the number of loitering aircraft decreased again. By the time of the last raid, there were two P-2s and two PE-XNUMXs over the ships. Naturally, they did not become a hindrance for the 25 Junkers who had flown in to deal with the only destroyer!
1. Did the Black Sea Fleet Air Force have the ability to reliably protect ships from air strikes with proper planning of the operation?
2. Was it possible to urgently organize a cover for the destroyers from 8.40, when after the damage to the leader "Kharkov" it became clear that the detachment was under threat of destruction by enemy aircraft?
The first question is relatively easy to answer. For reliable air defense of ships, assuming that the change of fighters would have to be done every hour for 6-6,5 hours (according to the planned table from 6.00 to 12.30), and the required composition of one shift was a fighter squadron, 40-50 serviceable fighters. That is how many of them were in the 11 GIAP, 9, 25 IAP and the Kittyhawk squadron of the 7 IAP, based at the Gelendzhik airfield. At the same time, two-thirds of the fighters were part of the 9th and 25th IAP, not subordinate in any respect to the commander of the 1st MTAD. Thus, it was necessary either to strengthen the division, or to leave the leadership of the aviation involved in the operation in the hands of the naval air force headquarters, which was already tracking the course of events, taking belated steps to save the ships. With the cash composition of the forces, 1 MTAD could indeed deploy no more than 3-4 fighters in one shift, and this number was enough only for a more or less successful fight against air reconnaissance aircraft.
Having dealt with the first question, we actually half answered the second. 1 MTAD could not reliably cover the ships on its own, therefore everything depended on the efficiency of the naval air force headquarters. It would have been possible to cover the ships if the decision to organize maximum fighter cover had been made no later than 10.00, i.e. within an hour from the moment of damage to the "Kharkov". This was not done, although the signal from the "Kharkiv" "I endure a distress" was recorded in the combat log of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force headquarters at 9.10. At 9.45 am, 3 Aerocobras and 4 LaGG-3s were raised on alarm, but only at 11.10 am the order was given to constantly cover the ships with no less than 8 aircraft. Before the order was executed, a second raid took place, which incapacitated the Merciless. Nevertheless, there was still an opportunity to save the ships. From 13.40, 11 ShAD aircraft appeared over the ships, but instead of a full-blooded squadron of "yaks" on the battlefield there were only 4 Yak-1 and 4 Il-2. Together with three Airacobras and two Bostons, three Yaks took part in repelling the third raid at 14.40. Following the results of the first two strikes, the Germans took into account that the ships were covered by fighters and therefore increased the composition of the attacking group to 18 bombers and 12 fighters. With such a balance of forces, it is not surprising that our fighters were unable to break through to enemy bombers and prevent a catastrophe. Half an hour after the Germans left, the number of "yaks" increased to eight. By this time, two ships had already sunk. From 16:11, the crews of 39 ShAD for some unknown reason no longer made sorties, as a result of which the number of loitering aircraft decreased again. By the time of the last raid, there were two P-2s and two PE-XNUMXs over the ships. Naturally, they did not become a hindrance for the 25 Junkers who had flown in to deal with the only destroyer!
Alas, but pointing out that, on the one hand ...
For reliable air defense of ships, based on the fact that the change of fighters would have to be done every hour for 6-6,5 hours (according to the planned table from 6.00 to 12.30), and the required composition of one shift was a fighter squadron, it would take 40-50 serviceable fighters. That is how many of them were in the 11 GIAP, 9, 25 IAP and the Kittyhawk squadron of the 7 IAP, based at the Gelendzhik airfield.
... and on the other ...
Following the results of the first two strikes, the Germans took into account that the ships were covered by fighters and therefore increased the composition of the attacking group to 18 bombers and 12 fighters. With such a balance of forces, it is not surprising that our fighters were unable to break through to enemy bombers and prevent a catastrophe.
... Miroslav Eduardovich contradicts himself.
Faced with increased fighter cover in the first half of the day, the Germans would simply orchestrate one or two more attacks, which would send even more aircraft. And they had planes. The Germans consistently built up a detachment of forces in order to finish off the ships. Nothing would have prevented them from starting this build-up one flight earlier. The enemy had an initiative, he himself decided how many planes to raise to strike, when and with what cover. At the same time, the ships were in the zone of action of the German aviation all daylight hours.
Of course, we can safely say that if the command of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force had used more aviation forces, perhaps some of the ships would have been saved. But, perhaps not. This in itself did not guarantee anything, and the Germans would have had the opportunity to break through to the ships through the aviation forces that the Black Sea Fleet could have there in any case, and not in one attempt. They had enough strength and time.
Now let's figure out how the operation was planned and carried out, regardless of the capabilities of fighter aircraft.
Raid plan and execution
There was nothing special about the raid itself, except for two nuances. Large air forces were involved in the operation, which was usually not the case. On the other hand, and this is a characteristic feature of the "Verpa", ship strikes and their withdrawal were to be carried out during daylight hours.
This was an atypical decision: mainly due to fears of enemy aircraft, the ships carried out raiding operations at night. Such operations did little, but mostly they did without losses.
The fact that the reason for the tragic ending of "Verpa" was precisely the timing of the operation is an obvious fact.
The time of sunrise on October 6 over Kerch is 6.39, an hour and a half before it is already light. Sunset - 18.05, and then for about 40 minutes more targets are more or less distinguishable on the water.
Then darkness comes. At night, the aviation of those years could attack ships in two ways: with bombs, having previously detected the target visually on the "lunar track" and illuminating it with SABs - light aerial bombs, and then, while the target is observed in the light circle from the SABs, cover it with ordinary dive bombs.
The second method is a torpedo attack on the "lunar track". This is how the Molotov cruiser was damaged in due time.
But the ships could successfully evade SABs by maneuvering, leaving the illuminated area. They did this even at night during Operation Verp, it was a mastered and simple maneuver.
It was also, in principle, possible to evade the attack of torpedo bombers.
The weather in those days was clear, visibility was good, but the ships had equipment for setting up smoke screens. That is, at night the enemy's chances of reaching the ship were minimal.
It would be logical that the retreat, when the enemy is alarmed and looking for an opportunity to get ships, should be carried out under cover of darkness.
In the case of Operation Verp, the attacks were to be carried out at the very beginning of the day, at dawn, and the entire daylight hours, and this is more than 13 hours, taking into account twilight, the three ships were to be within the reach of the German strike aircraft.
At the time of the operation, the intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet estimated the enemy's forces as 100 aircraft, of which 20 were dive bombers. This turned out to be an underestimated, incorrect estimate, but such forces were extremely dangerous.
The question arises: how did it become possible to use ships in such a dangerous zone during the day? There are a lot of interesting documents on this score.
From the transcript of the interrogation of a member of the Black Sea Fleet Military Council Rear Admiral Nikolai Mikhailovich Kulakov on January 1, 1944:
“Question: What was your leadership in developing the plan and preparing the operation?
Answer: Together with the fleet commander, I heard a detailed report from the deputy chief of the operational department of the fleet, Captain 2nd Rank Yeroshenko, with the participation of Captain 1st Rank Romanov, appointed to lead the operation. During the hearing, a number of amendments and changes were made to the scheme of the planned operation, and then a secondary report was heard and the plan was approved by the Military Council.
Question: Who owns the idea of the operation?
Answer: I can't remember exactly, but the idea of this operation, in my opinion, was proposed by the head of the Black Sea Fleet's operations department, Captain 1st Rank Melnikov. A few days before that, a similar operation was carried out, but the actions of the ships and the withdrawal from the enemy shores were carried out at night. When reporting on the results of the previous operation, People's Commissar Kuznetsov criticized it and pointed out the need for such operations at dawn. This instruction of the People's Commissar was supported especially by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Stepanov, who was also present at the same time. As a result of the report, it was concluded that night operations have no effect, and therefore the tasks of finding and destroying enemy watercraft must be postponed to daylight hours. Based on this conclusion, an operation was developed for the 1st destroyer battalion on October 5-6, 1943. "
Answer: Together with the fleet commander, I heard a detailed report from the deputy chief of the operational department of the fleet, Captain 2nd Rank Yeroshenko, with the participation of Captain 1st Rank Romanov, appointed to lead the operation. During the hearing, a number of amendments and changes were made to the scheme of the planned operation, and then a secondary report was heard and the plan was approved by the Military Council.
Question: Who owns the idea of the operation?
Answer: I can't remember exactly, but the idea of this operation, in my opinion, was proposed by the head of the Black Sea Fleet's operations department, Captain 1st Rank Melnikov. A few days before that, a similar operation was carried out, but the actions of the ships and the withdrawal from the enemy shores were carried out at night. When reporting on the results of the previous operation, People's Commissar Kuznetsov criticized it and pointed out the need for such operations at dawn. This instruction of the People's Commissar was supported especially by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Stepanov, who was also present at the same time. As a result of the report, it was concluded that night operations have no effect, and therefore the tasks of finding and destroying enemy watercraft must be postponed to daylight hours. Based on this conclusion, an operation was developed for the 1st destroyer battalion on October 5-6, 1943. "
Except for minor details, these statements were consistent with what the other officers had said. That is, the "Verp" was conceived for daytime because at night the effectiveness of the ships was low. It turns out that the Soviet commanders were not afraid of aviation?
From the protocol of interrogation of the commander on December 21, 1943, the commander of the destroyer "Merciless", Captain 2nd Rank V.A. Parkhomenko:
“Commanding a destroyer, I repeatedly took part in the operations of surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet, and these operations were carried out, as a rule, at night, and did not give any significant success. I was a supporter of the raiding operation during the day. As a supporter of daytime operations, I understood that the most serious enemy of surface ships was aviation, and therefore opposition from our aviation could always guarantee the success of the operation. Before the start of the operation on October 6, we received intelligence data that there was little enemy aircraft in the Crimea. This intelligence somewhat reassured me, but I understood that it was impossible to underestimate enemy aircraft.
In fact, there was no objection among the Soviet commanders about the day's raid, moreover, many people supported this idea. In the actions of the destroyer division commander, Captain 2nd Rank G.P. Negoda, there is also a lack of fear of enemy aircraft.
Moreover, when, even in the dark in the early hours of October 6, the ships were discovered by the enemy and even attacked with the help of SABs and conventional bombs (unsuccessfully), Negoda continued the operation, leading the ships to the target according to the plan.
According to his powers, he did not have the right to independently interrupt the operation, but he did not even immediately begin to report the loss of surprise, moreover, judging by the interrogation protocols of his subordinates, he was not particularly afraid of Resentment. Yes, he himself admits it.
Here's what he wrote in the report:
This kind of detection of ships by enemy reconnaissance was systematic in past operations, therefore, he believed, would not affect the performance of the operation.
From the transcript of interrogation of the commander of the BCH-1 destroyer "Merciless" N.Ya. Glazunov:
“Question: Did the meeting with Kharkiv take place at the appointed place and at the appointed time?
Answer: Yes.
Question: What was the speed of the ships while retreating from the coast?
Answer: After connecting at the withdrawal, the ships had a speed of 24 knots.
Question: Could it be more?
Answer: We could have retreated at least 30 knots.
Question: Why didn't they increase the speed?
Answer: I can only assume the presence of complacency, which was reinforced by the fact that the previous operations took place without any manifestation of any enemy activity.
Answer: Yes.
Question: What was the speed of the ships while retreating from the coast?
Answer: After connecting at the withdrawal, the ships had a speed of 24 knots.
Question: Could it be more?
Answer: We could have retreated at least 30 knots.
Question: Why didn't they increase the speed?
Answer: I can only assume the presence of complacency, which was reinforced by the fact that the previous operations took place without any manifestation of any enemy activity.
There are, however, other indications that the move was 30-knot, but this was not the maximum speed for these ships. Having met in 8 miles from Alushta, the destroyers and the leader "Kharkov" departed at not the highest speed they were capable of, and even picked up the downed Germans from a flying boat from the water.
All this suggests that the sailors were not particularly afraid of aviation. Rather, they feared, but were sure that there would be no fatal consequences from the use of German aviation.
Moreover, and this is important, there was a consensus from the People's Commissar Kuznetsov and further to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet Vladimirsky, and right up to the commanders of the ships that the operation in daylight could well be successful. Note that this is 1943.
It was this mistake that actually caused the death of all ships during the operation. It is she who is considered the main mistake in planning the operation by many researchers, and spiteful critics allude to the inferiority of the Soviet and Russian people as military sailors.
Let us ask ourselves, however, the question: could it be that everyone who was involved in the operation to one degree or another simultaneously went crazy and forgot about the threat from the air? And they forgot, having combat experience: at that time it was already the third year of the war.
And if not? What could have forced the Soviet commanders to treat the threat from the air in this way, and all at once, including those who had to risk their lives not for the first time?
Enumeration of options will give us an unexpected, but for some paradoxical, but in fact the only reasonable answer, which cannot be reduced to something like “the Russians are not good at naval warfare”.
And the answer is this: previous combat experience did not give commanders of all levels a reason to fear German aviation as much as they began to fear it after the "Verp".
It's hard to accept, but we have an afterthought, and they didn't. They operated on the real achievements of German aviation.
Air threat in the Black Sea before Operation Verp
In a narrowly theoretical vein, the question was raised earlier in the article “Surface ships against aircraft. World War II "... But it's worth briefly highlighting it again.
How dangerous was German aviation for surface ships on the Black Sea before that ill-fated day? The losses of the Black Sea Fleet from air strikes were considerable, but if we take large ships, then before Operation Verp we will see the following picture:
- EM "Frunze" (type "Novik"). Sunk at sea on September 21, 1941 by 9 bombers. He lay in a drift, rescuing the crew of the sunk gunboat "Red Armenia";
- KRL "Chervona Ukraine" (type "Svetlana"). Sunk on November 21, 1941 in the port of Sevastopol. While at the base, he fought off multiple attacks of large air forces, received extensive damage, lost speed and buoyancy. The crew waged a long battle for survivability, and was later removed from the ship;
- minelay "Ostrovsky" (former merchant ship). Sunk on 23 March 1942 in Tuapse, stood at the pier;
- EM "Svobodny (pr. 7th). June 10, 1942, sunk in the parking lot in Sevastopol;
- EM "Perfect" (pr. 7). June 26, 1942 attacked at sea on the move by 20 bombers, received several direct hits from bombs, sank;
- the leader of "Tashkent". Sunk 28 June 1942 He was damaged during the transition under massive air strikes (about 90 German aircraft dropped about 300 bombs on him, the strikes continued all daylight hours), with the help of other ships in tow he came to Novorossiysk, died during a massive (64 bombers on the entire naval base) strike by the German aviation at the Naval Base Novorossiysk, at the time of the sinking was at anchor in the base;
- EM "Vigilant" (pr. 7). On July 2, 1942, sunk by an air strike while anchored in Novorossiysk Bay;
- minelay "Comintern" (before re-equipment - cruiser "Kagul" type "Bogatyr"). On July 16, 1942, during a German air raid, he received serious damage in the parking lot in Poti, later disbanded and flooded. It was due to be repaired, but due to the loss of bases on the Black Sea, the repair was impossible. Prior to that, it was repeatedly attacked from the air at sea on the move, fought off up to 10 raids per day, and retained its combat effectiveness in the event of damage caused by aerial bombs.
Then there was Operation Verp. So let's take another look at the list. What conclusions can be drawn from it?
And the conclusions are simple: for the entire war from June 22, 1941 to the unfortunate day of October 6, 1943, the Germans, attacking a ship sailing in the open sea at full speed, were able to destroy only one destroyer - "Perfect". And that's all.
The leader "Tashkent" was pulled out in tow, the cruiser "Molotov" too. Prior to that, in the course of various operations of the Black Sea Fleet, starting with the landing near Grigoryevka, the Germans managed to seriously damage the ships, which then returned to service and fought on.
They managed to destroy ships in bases or at the stop ("Frunze"), and they did it very well, but the sailors know: the base for a ship is the most dangerous place, and the open sea is much less dangerous.
And in the sea - nothing. The same "Cahul-Comintern" in its last campaign was too tough for the German aviation, while it was at sea. We got it in the database. In the teeth, without discounts, they turned out to be only "Perfect", which was thrown by 20 planes. But, as already mentioned above, the intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet estimated all the forces of the enemy bomber aviation at 20 aircraft, and, as the command believed, they would have to deal with three ships and their own fighters. If we take the destruction of the Impeccable as a standard, it turns out that from the point of view of combat experience, the destroyer division, covered by fighters, should have been too tough for them.
"Merciless" on the move at sea.
All of the above is the only rational explanation of why all, really all officers who participated in the operation in one form or another, reacted to the German threat from the air as they did. And it is confirmed by what was shown later by the participants in the operation, including G.P. Negoda.
And this is the real reason for the death of ships during Operation Verp. It consists in the fact that the command of the Black Sea Fleet and the officers of the destroyer division, yes, judging by the report of the 1st MTAD, and the command of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force, treated the enemy as he deserved based on the results of the previous two years of the war.
And the enemy has performed much better than ever before or ever since.
That's what it was. And this also caused a shock at Headquarters. They are accustomed to a very definite level of losses of the fleet from the actions of German aviation. And he turned out to be prohibitively taller.
One cannot but say that in the fatal attack for ours - the one in which "Kharkov" received three hits in the engine room, the Germans were in many ways lucky. Eight bombers against three ships with anti-aircraft guns with a pair of fighters in cover do not look like a fatal force, but they turned out to be it. If the Germans had missed once, the ships would have left, even despite daylight.
Alas, the captain of the 2nd rank Negoda could not abandon the "Kharkov" and retreat on two destroyers. Firstly, he would not have wanted to, simply because there and then the situation did not look hopeless at all - the successful towing of the half-bombed Tashkent in the past again meant that everything is possible.
In addition, in the conditions of the political system of the USSR in the 40s, it was problematic to simply take and leave the ship, which generally had a small speed. It was, let's say, fraught, although Commander-in-Chief N. G. Kuznetsov later wrote that "Kharkov" had to be abandoned and two other ships and people were rescued, but upon his return, the fate of Negoda might well be determined by a completely different person than the Commander-in-Chief. This factor could not be ignored in those years.
Accordingly, those actions on the withdrawal, which we today consider fatal mistakes (and they were), there and then could not be perceived as such - there was simply no reason for this. Nothing particularly new for the Black Sea Fleet sailors in the morning of October 6, 1943, they more than once came out of such situations with honor, and then there were their fighters overhead ...
When the prospects became clear, it was already too late to do something.
Ironically, our sailors were let down by their extensive combat experience, the conclusions from which suddenly turned out to be inconsistent with the changed reality.
Some notes
Analyzing this raid, it is worth separating the questions "why it ended with such losses" and "why it ended unsuccessfully in terms of the combat mission." These are two different questions.
First, the Germans were waiting for a raid. The exit of ships from Tuapse by German intelligence was discovered in advance. One can safely blame the Black Sea Fleet command for insufficient measures to ensure surprise and misinformation of the enemy.
The second incomprehensible moment is the shelling of Yalta. This action of "Kharkov" did not lead to any results at all, it simply could not be carried out. And it was possible to guess about such a "result" in advance.
It is also unclear why an aviation force was not assigned to "Kharkov" that could correct the artillery shelling: previous experience said that such blind shelling was ineffective, and this time it turned out to be the same.
Independent actions of "Kharkov" would be much more useful if he were sent to search for convoys and enemy transports.
Thus, there were flaws in the initial decision for the operation, but they have no direct connection with losses, they simply characterize the level of command, the very formulation of tasks.
Another issue is the use of smoke by ships. It is not possible to find documents that would say something about the installation of smoke screens by the ships.
Actually, the fact that during the planning of the operation there were a lot of mistakes is obvious. It was poorly planned. But this poor planning of hers was more about how the fleet was going to achieve the objectives of the operation, rather than how it ended with losses.
Perhaps, the Scoundrel should have tried to separate the ships: if the destroyers and the Leader had withdrawn separately, then, most likely, the leader would have made it. True, without an afterthought, it is difficult to justify the separation in this way.
From the actions of G. P. Indignation, one can single out only one real and unforgivable mistake, which he HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO NOT MAKE. When "Kharkov" lost speed, and Negoda could not abandon him, it was necessary to take the leader to the tug "Merciless", on which the commander of the detachment was, and "Able" to give the order to take off on its own at full speed and not wait for anyone.
Rare photo - destroyer "Capable"
Such a decision directly stems from the very essence of naval warfare, it should have been made by any competent commander. Ships in one detachment must be able to move at the same speed, to keep the destroyer, which is a priori weak as an air defense means to protect the crippled "Kharkov" and its towing vehicle in the presence of fighter cover, it was fundamentally wrong.
From the standpoint of afterthought
Let's think: how could the operation be performed? The main contradiction, an attempt to resolve which turned out to be so expensive, was that the ships could operate relatively safely at night, but were ineffective, and during the day, with aviation adjustments, they could inflict damage on the enemy by shooting aimed, but were vulnerable to aviation.
How could this problem be solved? The answer is this: it was necessary to carry out the withdrawal of destroyers to the area of combat use in such a way that they would complete their combat missions at the very end of daylight hours, and the exit from the air strike was already in the dark.
This also did not give 100% guarantees, but the chances of returning without losses increased significantly.
In addition, the need for an artillery attack on the port in conditions when the 1st MTAD had bombers, including heavy ones, raises doubts.
It would be much more useful if the ships were aimed at convoys, and, possibly, at the destruction of anti-aircraft batteries located not far from the coast, while aircraft in ports would be attacked by aircraft.
However, an artillery strike on the port could also have been inflicted, but taking into account the time factor, that is, before evening twilight.
How long did the Germans take to strike the ships? During the actual Operation Verp, the first attack took place at XNUMX:XNUMX am, which suggests that the Germans began to take off about an hour after dawn. At the same time, in reality they could take off at least an hour before it, visibility already made it possible to attack ships at sea, and they were discovered by the enemy even at night.
Thus, we can safely estimate the reaction time of the German aviation to the appearance of ships in 1-2 hours.
That is, if the ships were discovered at about 17.00, then by the time the German Ju-88s, carrying out additional reconnaissance of targets, left the area where the destroyers were located, it would be already dark.
At the same time, the ships would have about an hour and a half to conduct shelling with the help of a spotter plane, that is, many times more than is needed to shoot a given number of shells.
The solution to the contradiction between day and night operations, thus, was reduced to the sudden withdrawal of ships for the enemy into the area of combat use during daylight hours.
How could this be achieved? By assigning them a corridor, from which they would not have to leave when moving to the designated area, and destroying all enemy forces and assets with aviation forces - the same 1st MTAD.
Such a procedure would make it possible, by the time the ships approach the shore, to assess whether their fire on boats in the port is needed or not, and to redirect them directly to the convoys if necessary, so that by nightfall they would have already completed or almost completed their combat mission.
On the "Capable"
Naturally, it was impossible to understand all this before everything happened. Therefore, it is impossible to make a claim to those who planned the "Verp" that they did not choose for themselves some similar course of action.
But on the other hand, such a claim can be addressed to the Headquarters.
Reaction Bet and its consequences
And now we come to the most important point - to that lesson from the operation, which is still relevant, even in our nuclear missile era.
After Operation Verp, the Headquarters banned the use of large surface ships and they never took part in the war.
The question arises: why, actually? Due to the loss of two destroyers and a leader? But we have just sorted out the reasons, moreover, we figured out how it was approximately possible to use ships in such a situation so as not to lose several units at once.
Remember the British: the battle at Kuantan, where they lost a battleship and battle cruiser, did not lead to the fact that they put their ships on hold. The loss of the aircraft carrier "Glories" did not lead to the same, nor did the loss of destroyers in the Mediterranean Sea.
The rate not only had to, it was also able to undertake an analysis of what happened and develop rules for conducting air-sea operations that would exclude such things in the future or simply reduce the risks.
Ship guns would be needed near Eltigen. Destroyers and cruisers would not have interfered with the communications at night, along which the Germans evacuated their 17th Army from the Crimea.
The fleet was still needed after the "Verp". but instead he was in fact put on a joke.
Let us ask ourselves a question: and if the fleet would later lose, for example, the "Red Crimea", forcing the enemy to lose five or six thousand soldiers who went to the bottom on different scows, would this loss be justified?
The answer is yes, it would be, simply because the Red Army would then spend its pace, ammunition, equipment, and, most importantly, people on the destruction of these five or six thousand soldiers. And at least not less than could have died on an old cruiser or destroyer.
And from the point of view of banal justice: why is it normal to put an infantry regiment on the offensive, but the old ship and the people as in a reinforced battalion are not?
But the Headquarters decided otherwise. No conclusions were made, no recommendations were made, the fleet was put on hold, and he did not say his own word, which he could have said at the end of the war on the Black Sea. In order to understand how disastrous the decision of the Headquarters turned out to be, here are some quotes from a German work "Evacuation from Crimea in 1944":
During May 10, Soviet troops continued to attack the Chersonesus position. We managed to beat them off. The fire of the Soviet artillery and air raids intensified. Most of the loading sites were located in the Kazach and Kamyshovaya bays. Since these points were in the center of the position, they were very well suited to the main loading points. As planned by the naval commandant of the Crimea, Rear Admiral Schultz, large transports, which themselves could not approach the piers, had to stop at the entrance to the bays, and loading on them was to be carried out from the ferries of the 770th engineer-landing regiment. Light and heavy anti-aircraft batteries of the 9th anti-aircraft artillery division were stationed on all capes. The greatest danger during loading would be the Soviet surface forces, but the large ships of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, as before, did not interfere with the evacuation.
At the same time, an important point: the Germans could not count on aviation.
On May 1 at 00:33 a radio message from the 10th security division provided information to the naval commandant about the location of the convoys. After that, at 03:00 it was possible to count on the approach of the convoy "Ovidiu", which included the auxiliary ship "Romania" (3150 brt). The arrival of the convoys "Ryer" and "Prophet" could be expected only at about 10:00, "Astra" - at noon, "Pionir" and seven KFK - in the afternoon, "Flige", "Crowter" and "Volga" - in the evening. The convoys "Bukhe", "Aikhe" and "Rose" were to arrive on the night of May 11-12. Covering these convoys was carried out from the territory of Romania by long-range fighters, which made 80 sorties for this purpose. At the same time, it was possible to ensure the constant presence of only 4 Bf-110 aircraft over Chersonesos, but this was better than nothing.
And then the weather worsened altogether, and theoretically the fleet could even use a battleship.
The naval commandant had high hopes for this night, since the thickening darkness did not allow the enemy to conduct targeted artillery fire and limited the capabilities of Soviet aviation. However, the fog descending from the land greatly impeded orientation. The quays were barely visible, and the artificial lighting was out of order. Therefore, it was all the more necessary to bring the convoy as close to the shore as possible. Soon "Dacia" was found, met by the BDB and Siebel ferries, after which it was brought closer to the shore with great difficulty. Then the connection between the naval commandant and the Dacia was lost again. He could not establish contact with the other convoys. Therefore, many ships, especially small ones, with poor navigation equipment, after a long voyage from Constanta could not report their exact location, got lost in the fog near the coast and did not come to the loading sites. In total, on the last night there were 60 ships near Chersonesos, of which only a few were able to load. The loading was carried out under the direction of the officers of the 1st Airborne Flotilla without interference wherever the ships approached for loading.
Perhaps more ships would have been found in the fog if the naval commandant had sent the other torpedo boats at his disposal to find them and bring them to Chersonesos. But he could not make such a decision, since the torpedo boat flotilla was the only combat unit that he had at his disposal in case the Soviet surface forces were repelled. An attack by Soviet destroyers on a convoy under loading or during its return that night or in the morning would mean another disaster.
Perhaps more ships would have been found in the fog if the naval commandant had sent the other torpedo boats at his disposal to find them and bring them to Chersonesos. But he could not make such a decision, since the torpedo boat flotilla was the only combat unit that he had at his disposal in case the Soviet surface forces were repelled. An attack by Soviet destroyers on a convoy under loading or during its return that night or in the morning would mean another disaster.
But the Germans did not experience any catastrophe; by the decision of Headquarters, the ships continued to stand in the bases. And this despite the fact that the "Verp", in fact, was JUST A FAILURE, nothing more.
By the decision of the Headquarters, the fleet did not help in the destruction of the German forces evacuated from the Crimea.
Although I could and should have.
The result was the evacuation of a huge number of troops from the Crimea: according to German data, for the entire evacuation period since April 1944 - 130 people. But even if the numbers are overestimated, then in any case we are talking about tens of thousands of soldiers. And this was largely due to the decision of the Headquarters.
What is the reason for this strange decision? Indeed, due to the pogrom of Soviet aviation in 1941, it was not forbidden to fly, but due to the destruction of more than 20 Soviet tanks in the first five months of the war, the Headquarters did not prohibit their use.
The reason is as simple as day: misunderstanding of the importance of the fleet as a tool of war.
According to both the classical theories of naval power and the developments of Soviet military theorists of the 20s and early 30s, domination at sea is domination in communications, firstly, and secondly, achieving this is the main task of the surface forces of the fleet.
In post-war manuals on naval operations, we can also find similar provisions.
But from 1933 to 1939, for a naval officer, pronouncing the words "dominance at sea" could mean execution. For many, it meant. The problem was raised very briefly in the article “We are building a fleet. Theory and Purpose "... The issue was examined in detail and professionally in the essay "The Fates of Doctrines and Theories" by Captain 1st Rank M. Monakov and a number of other authors in the "Marine Collection" in the early 90s. On the one hand, this would never have allowed to prepare for war - and the fleet was not prepared for it.
On the other hand, the lack of understanding of the significance of naval power and its nature among the highest military-political leadership of the USSR led to a misunderstanding of the importance of the fleet at the right time in the right place.
The latter, in turn, made it difficult to assess the risks and benefits of continuing the war at sea. The ship is expensive and big, it is a symbol, it is a pity to lose it, but how many lives "on the ground" are saved by the work of such a ship on communications, a person with "land thinking" is simply not able to understand.
And if I did, I would also understand that it is better to risk the ship than to miss at least a division. As a result, they did not risk it and let the army go.
For the destruction of the Germans evacuated from the Crimea, the Red Army had to pay a considerable price.
But this was not the price of victory - it was the price of the reluctance of the top military leadership to understand the purpose of the navy and its significance.
If not for this, then the Headquarters would have given Verp a correct assessment: just a poorly planned and at the same time unsuccessful operation with large losses, nothing more. Better reason to plan operations.
Conclusions for our time
Today, 77 years later, we can state that the lesson has not gone into the future. Neither the General Staff, nor the people have the slightest desire to understand all these nuances.
Moreover, there are very frightening analogies with the past.
In the thirties, the fleet, for political reasons, could not prepare for war properly: the basis of the correct theory of its use was declared a bourgeois relic, and its carriers were subjected to physical destruction. For those who do not quite understand, let’s give an analogy: it’s as if in modern Russia for calls to learn to shoot from tank guns, not only from the spot, but also on the move, would be sent to life. Could the army prepare for war in such circumstances? No.
Today the navy cannot prepare for war. He is periodically "thrown" new ships, but it is often impossible to start practicing preparation for combat missions. There is no opportunity to learn how to search for and destroy modern mines, because there is not a single modern anti-mine complex, there is no way to work out the interaction of at least existing ships and naval aviation, because for this you first have to admit that this interaction is absent now - and we cannot admit that something is missing, there is no way to work out an anti-submarine, because there is nothing, there is no way to work out torpedo firing in conditions close to real ones, because the existing torpedoes simply will not work in such conditions.
And yet we cannot say about all this: we can only talk about how good everything is with us, great and wonderful, and in general, if tomorrow is a war, if tomorrow is on a campaign, if the enemy's power comes as one person, the entire Russian people for a free The homeland will rise. As in 1941, one to one.
Yes, today for proposals not to clean guns with bricks and learn to fight as Lenin bequeathed, "in a real way", they do not shoot, they simply fire. But the result is the same, at least in the navy - for sure.
In parallel, as in the 30s, when instead of the fleet we had the Red Army Navy, today we de facto not have a fleet, but naval units of the ground forces subordinate to generals from the ground forces. There is no sane theory of the military use of the Navy in the country, the political leadership does not understand the capabilities of the fleet as a type of the Armed Forces, and the army generals responsible for the country's defense (including from the sea, oddly enough) have a fundamental unwillingness to delve into all these things, strange way combined with the desire to control these things. And this also makes the current situation related to the years preceding the Great Patriotic War, and with itself.
And from this a simple conclusion follows. Since we have everything "as then", then we will fight "as then." But our enemy will be completely different.
In such conditions, new tragedies, such as Operation Verp, are simply inevitable. But this is not important, but the fact that their consequences are inevitable, which will then have to be solved with the hands and lives of 19-year-old conscripts. Like the release of Germans from the Crimea. Moreover, in a "continental power" it will again be impossible to draw any conclusions from this. We will run in this blood-soaked vicious circle forever.
The main lesson of Operation Verp today, oddly enough, is that we are doomed to repeat it and, most importantly, its consequences. And it's good if once, and if this one time in our nuclear age is not the last.
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