Military Review

October 6, 1943. Operation Verp and its lessons for our time

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Leader of the destroyers "Kharkov"


November 6 marks 77 years since the fatal day for the Black Sea fleet Operation Verp - a raid by the leader Kharkiv and two destroyers, Merciless and Able, on the communications of German-Romanian troops in the sea south of the Kerch Peninsula. The result of the operation was the death of all ships participating in it.

The operation was planned as a result of the previously unsuccessful work of the Black Sea Fleet on the enemy communications, along which he evacuated troops from the Caucasus. Previously, the Black Sea Fleet ships repeatedly tried to find and destroy enemy convoys, but the results were near-zero, not a single convoy was even found. Raids carried out for artillery strikes along the coast at night were also unsuccessful. Both the headquarters and the commander-in-chief Kuznetsov demanded results, and the fleet tried to give them, but instead of the results, it turned out to be a disaster.

To this day, this failure is controversial. It is used as an illustration of the inability of the fleet to fight, as the inability of admirals to establish interaction with a fighter aviation, with the front headquarters, on the other hand, it is used as an example of the inability of army commanders to use the fleet correctly, moreover, it is also used as an example of the fact that ships cannot operate in areas where the enemy has powerful aircraft.

In fact, the main value of studying Operation Verp today is to gain an understanding of what happened and, relying on it, to answer those questions that still remain important for the development of the fleet in our country.

Is there a need for a surface fleet in such a war, which was going on in the Black Sea in 1943, that is, in the absence of significant enemy surface and submarine forces? Can ships be used where enemy aircraft operate? Did the Black Sea Fleet command really neglect the air cover of the ships? Could our planes protect the ships? Was this raid necessary at all? Was it the stupidity of the admirals or the stupidity of the generals, or was it not stupidity at all? Were there any chances of success? Unfortunately, even the best researchers do not provide detailed answers to these questions. But the answer to the fundamental question directly depends on them: was the Headquarters correct in banning the use of surface ships in the Black Sea after this operation?

This is not an idle question. Unlike the long-outdated technology and tactics of the Second World War, it is still relevant today, as it refers to the correct or incorrect use of sea power in principle. We will hardly ever carry out raids with artillery shelling of barges and scows in ports, now is simply not the time. But is it necessary to remove large surface ships from the theater of operations when there is a threat from the air, but when there are many tasks for them? The question may well be relevant now. And the previous experience is quite useful in order to orient yourself correctly at the right time in today's environment.

Let us recall the course of events. The idea of ​​Operation Verp was that two destroyers, Project 7 Merciless and Capable of Project 7-U, as well as the destroyer leader (hereinafter - the leader) of Project 1 Kharkov, together with the Black Sea Fleet Air Force aircraft, were to to carry out a raid operation against German communications south of the Kerch Peninsula and in ports.

October 6, 1943. Operation Verp and its lessons for our time

Destroyer "Merciless"

It was supposed to combine artillery and bomb strikes on the port of Feodosia and destroy enemy ships and transports at sea. Separately, "Kharkov" was given the task of shelling Yalta. To ensure the effectiveness of the search for surface targets and artillery fire, the operation was carried out during daylight hours. The detachment of warships was commanded by the captain of the 2nd rank G.P. Negoda, commander of the destroyer battalion, which included the ships. At night, when the ships were moving to the coast, the ships were discovered and several times attacked by enemy aircraft and boats. Nevertheless, they continued to move towards their goal. "Kharkov", separated from the detachment, fired at Yalta, without achieving any results.

By that time, it became clear that due to the loss of surprise, it would not be possible to carry out the operation according to the original plan, and Negoda ordered to withdraw. Gathering together, the ships began to withdraw. During daylight hours, in the course of several powerful air strikes, the entire detachment of warships was destroyed. This was the largest one-time loss of the fleet in the entire war. After that, the Supreme Command Headquarters banned the exit of large ships to the sea, and they did not participate in the war anymore. The details of this tragedy are currently available on many Internet resources and in the literature, there is no point in repeating it, but it is worth giving an assessment of what happened.

And before assessing the tragedy that unfolded in the Black Sea 77 years ago, it is necessary to debunk a number of myths that surround this operation in the mass consciousness. They have nothing to do with reality, which is easy to verify, but for some reason they are popular among people who have not gone into the essence of the issue very deeply.

Verpa myths


The most important myth regarding Operation Verp is that the aviation was inactive and did not provide cover for the ships during the raid and withdrawal.

Fortunately for those who are really interested in the issue, the outstanding domestic military historian Miroslav Morozov carried out work to study a number of key points of the operation, the main of which can be considered the use of aviation in it. As usual, M. Morozov uses as sources of information documents compiled during the hostilities at the headquarters of formations, reports, dispatches, combat logs, etc., in this case "Report on the combat operations of the 1st MTAD of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force in operations of the Black Sea Fleet "Verp" 6.10.1943 ". 1st MTAD - 1st mine-torpedo aviation division of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force. Let's start with this. First link to the article by M. Morozov "Operation Verp".

And immediately the defeat of the first myth: aviation completely covered the ships, they had fighter cover most of the time. M. Morozov, starting from the "Report on Combat Actions", gives the following composition of the forces of the 1st MTAD on the day of the operation.

On 6.10.43, the air division had the following combat strength at the Gelendzhik-2 airfield *:

5 GAP ** - 18 IL-4, of which 8 are in service
11 GIAP - 15 Airacobra, - // - - 8
36 MTAP - 8 B-3 - // - - 5
36 MTAP - 4 A-20-Zh, of which 4 are in service
40 AP *** - 24 PE-2 - // - - 14

In addition, the operation involved fighters P-40 "Kittyhawk" from the 7 IAP 4 IAD, which appear in the decision on the operation in the amount of 8 units (with 16 available).

Also, a number of sorties were made by aircraft of the 11th ShAD, among which were Yak-1 fighters, but there is no data on its combat work yet.

The article by M. Morozov describes in detail both the decision, and the sequence and duration of the air missions, we will not repeat ourselves.

Thus, there was a fighter cover. Another thing is that it was not enough. M. Morozov concludes that it was necessary to attract more aviation. In theory, yes, in practice ... More on that below.

To illustrate the work of fighters, we present data on the losses of German aircraft in raids on ships (from an article by M. Morozov):

Flying boat BV-138 "Blom und Foss" - 1
ME-109 - 2
S-87 - 6
S-88 - 1

That is, there were fighters, they shot down the enemy (in the text of the article, the work of fighters is well described), they inflicted losses. On the possibility of the Black Sea Fleet fighter aviation, in principle, to solve the problem of protecting ships with the existing plan of operation - below.

The second myth about the "Verpa", somewhat less popular, but sometimes encountered: the operation itself did not make sense, the idea of ​​a raid was stupid.

In fact, the thesis is controversial. The purpose of the raid was to disrupt the enemy's communications, to destroy his watercraft and transport ships in ports and at sea. Can this task be considered absolutely useless? No, since the main task of the enemy's sea transport was the evacuation of troops from the Caucasus to the Crimea. That is, it was precisely about the destruction of enemy troops (if it was possible to "catch" the convoy), military property and weapons... In addition, some of the transported goods were used by the enemy for the needs of the troops. Also, the destruction of watercraft and transport vessels in itself also had value.

Could aviation accomplish this task without involving surface ships at all? In theory, yes, and systematically did it: Black Sea Fleet aircraft regularly flew to attack ports and transports at sea, albeit with low efficiency.

Arguments against the raid, of course, can also be found, but, apparently, it is worth mentioning one fundamental point.

The main aerial bomb during the Second World War was the FAB-100, which had 70 kg of explosives. In second place in terms of prevalence was the FAB-250, which had 97-100 kg of explosives. Usually, 6-10, often 8, such bombs were taken for a combat radius of a couple of hundred kilometers.

An example from an article by M. Morozov:

9 PE-2 leading - captain Yegorov, navigator - captain Mozzhukhin, under the cover of 6 "Airacobra" (leading - Guards Major Karasev) had the task of destroying floating craft in the port and in the roadstead of Feodosia. Takeoff 6.15, landing - 7.55.
At 7.15, they struck from a dive on the floating craft in the outer roadstead of the port of Feodosia. H = input - 4000 m. H = sbr. = 3000 m. H = altitude - 2000 m. BK = 180, 16 FAB-250, 20 FAB-100 were dropped. The result was photographed.

The specified list of bombs means dropping about 3 tons of explosives on the enemy, for which 9 Pe-2 bombers were needed, 333 kg of explosives per plane. At the same time, the flight time of the bombers was about 30 minutes, the same amount was required for the return flight, plus the group's draft, refueling, and inter-flight service. This particular flight required 1 hour 40 minutes in the air and at least several hours to prepare for a repeat flight.

Now, against this background, let us estimate the firing performance of a detachment of warships.

The main caliber of all the ships participating in the operation was 130-mm guns, capable of firing, among other things, high-explosive fragmentation shells with an amount of explosives in each 3,58 kg or 3,65 kg. Let's take 3,6 for simplicity.

Thus, in order to bombard the enemy with the same amount of explosives as nine Pe-2s in one sortie (which took several hours), the ships would have to fire 822 shells. Two destroyers each had four 130-mm guns, and the leader "Kharkov" had five guns, which gives a total of 13 barrels. 822 rounds equals approximately 63 rounds per barrel.

With a gun rate of fire of 7 rounds per minute, the ships would have fired such a number of shells in a little over 9 minutes.

In this case, the survivability of the barrel liner can be approximately estimated at 130 shots. That is, having fired 64 shells per barrel, the ships would have used up only half of the resource of the barrels if the liners were new (and before such operations they would have to be changed to new ones).

Thus, the total "shot" that the ships could afford was equivalent to the strike of at least 18 Pe-2 bombers. At the same time, artillery fire can be transferred after hitting a target, achieving shelling of a larger number of targets - these are FAB-100 and its 70 kg of explosives are indivisible, and the equivalent 19 shells can be fired at several targets.


Aft rangefinder station EM "Svobodny", photo 1943, one of the last photos of the ship

And this ability, on the one hand, to quickly concentrate fire, keep the target under fire, and, if necessary, carry fire, is the quality of artillery that is not compensated by aerial bombs. But the ship must be brought to the target at a short distance, which means that it must be protected from enemy aircraft covering the target. The second advantage of the ships, in principle (outside of the connection with the "Verp") was the presence of torpedoes, which could attack targets at sea.

In fact, the order for the operation indicated that during the shelling of Feodosia, two destroyers had to use up 250 shells, which was equivalent to 1,8 tons of explosives, or, "in terms of Pe-2" - a strike of 5-6 bombers. The expenditure of the "Kharkov" shells is not taken into account here, and all other ammunition could have been used by the ships on the discovered floating craft at sea.

The question arises in the accuracy of shooting, however, from the report of the 1st MTAD, it clearly follows the allocation of aircraft for adjusting the artillery fire.

Moreover, some targets that day were far more suitable for ships than for aircraft. Again, a quote from an article by M. Morozov:

Intelligence: ...
7.16 W = 45.00. D = 35.45, a caravan of up to 20 units under the cover of 2 ME-110 was heading for Feodosia.
Counteraction: heavy fire 3A and machine guns.

This is a pure target for ships. The ships had torpedo tubes and artillery sufficient to destroy such a convoy.

Thus, we have to admit that the idea to send not only airplanes, but also ships, was, in principle, correct. Or at least it cannot be considered completely wrong. This means that the insinuations about the meaninglessness of the operation, which sometimes arise, should be discarded.

On the whole, it should be noted that the operation was of the air-sea nature, very close interaction with aviation was envisaged, fighter cover was also envisaged, and it managed to inflict some losses on enemy aviation.

The ideas that the ships did not have any air cover and were not needed in that place and at that time are nothing more than myths, unfortunately, very tenacious.

Thus, we draw the first conclusion: the reason for the disaster that happened on October 6, 1943 was not the very idea of ​​the raid in principle, and not the absence of aviation at all.

The reasons were different.

Before we analyze them, it is worth answering a fundamental question.

Could fighters protect ships?


M. Morozov in his article indicates the following:

Now let's try to answer two main questions that appear in one form or another in all publications related to the October 6 disaster:
1. Did the Black Sea Fleet Air Force have the ability to reliably protect ships from air strikes with proper planning of the operation?
2. Was it possible to urgently organize a cover for the destroyers from 8.40, when after the damage to the leader "Kharkov" it became clear that the detachment was under threat of destruction by enemy aircraft?

The first question is relatively easy to answer. For reliable air defense of ships, assuming that the change of fighters would have to be done every hour for 6-6,5 hours (according to the planned table from 6.00 to 12.30), and the required composition of one shift was a fighter squadron, 40-50 serviceable fighters. That is how many of them were in the 11 GIAP, 9, 25 IAP and the Kittyhawk squadron of the 7 IAP, based at the Gelendzhik airfield. At the same time, two-thirds of the fighters were part of the 9th and 25th IAP, not subordinate in any respect to the commander of the 1st MTAD. Thus, it was necessary either to strengthen the division, or to leave the leadership of the aviation involved in the operation in the hands of the naval air force headquarters, which was already tracking the course of events, taking belated steps to save the ships. With the cash composition of the forces, 1 MTAD could indeed deploy no more than 3-4 fighters in one shift, and this number was enough only for a more or less successful fight against air reconnaissance aircraft.

Having dealt with the first question, we actually half answered the second. 1 MTAD could not reliably cover the ships on its own, therefore everything depended on the efficiency of the naval air force headquarters. It would have been possible to cover the ships if the decision to organize maximum fighter cover had been made no later than 10.00, i.e. within an hour from the moment of damage to the "Kharkov". This was not done, although the signal from the "Kharkiv" "I endure a distress" was recorded in the combat log of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force headquarters at 9.10. At 9.45 am, 3 Aerocobras and 4 LaGG-3s were raised on alarm, but only at 11.10 am the order was given to constantly cover the ships with no less than 8 aircraft. Before the order was executed, a second raid took place, which incapacitated the Merciless. Nevertheless, there was still an opportunity to save the ships. From 13.40, 11 ShAD aircraft appeared over the ships, but instead of a full-blooded squadron of "yaks" on the battlefield there were only 4 Yak-1 and 4 Il-2. Together with three Airacobras and two Bostons, three Yaks took part in repelling the third raid at 14.40. Following the results of the first two strikes, the Germans took into account that the ships were covered by fighters and therefore increased the composition of the attacking group to 18 bombers and 12 fighters. With such a balance of forces, it is not surprising that our fighters were unable to break through to enemy bombers and prevent a catastrophe. Half an hour after the Germans left, the number of "yaks" increased to eight. By this time, two ships had already sunk. From 16:11, the crews of 39 ShAD for some unknown reason no longer made sorties, as a result of which the number of loitering aircraft decreased again. By the time of the last raid, there were two P-2s and two PE-XNUMXs over the ships. Naturally, they did not become a hindrance for the 25 Junkers who had flown in to deal with the only destroyer!

Alas, but pointing out that, on the one hand ...

For reliable air defense of ships, based on the fact that the change of fighters would have to be done every hour for 6-6,5 hours (according to the planned table from 6.00 to 12.30), and the required composition of one shift was a fighter squadron, it would take 40-50 serviceable fighters. That is how many of them were in the 11 GIAP, 9, 25 IAP and the Kittyhawk squadron of the 7 IAP, based at the Gelendzhik airfield.

... and on the other ...

Following the results of the first two strikes, the Germans took into account that the ships were covered by fighters and therefore increased the composition of the attacking group to 18 bombers and 12 fighters. With such a balance of forces, it is not surprising that our fighters were unable to break through to enemy bombers and prevent a catastrophe.

... Miroslav Eduardovich contradicts himself.

Faced with increased fighter cover in the first half of the day, the Germans would simply orchestrate one or two more attacks, which would send even more aircraft. And they had planes. The Germans consistently built up a detachment of forces in order to finish off the ships. Nothing would have prevented them from starting this build-up one flight earlier. The enemy had an initiative, he himself decided how many planes to raise to strike, when and with what cover. At the same time, the ships were in the zone of action of the German aviation all daylight hours.

Of course, we can safely say that if the command of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force had used more aviation forces, perhaps some of the ships would have been saved. But, perhaps not. This in itself did not guarantee anything, and the Germans would have had the opportunity to break through to the ships through the aviation forces that the Black Sea Fleet could have there in any case, and not in one attempt. They had enough strength and time.

Now let's figure out how the operation was planned and carried out, regardless of the capabilities of fighter aircraft.

Raid plan and execution


There was nothing special about the raid itself, except for two nuances. Large air forces were involved in the operation, which was usually not the case. On the other hand, and this is a characteristic feature of the "Verpa", ship strikes and their withdrawal were to be carried out during daylight hours.

This was an atypical decision: mainly due to fears of enemy aircraft, the ships carried out raiding operations at night. Such operations did little, but mostly they did without losses.

The fact that the reason for the tragic ending of "Verpa" was precisely the timing of the operation is an obvious fact.

The time of sunrise on October 6 over Kerch is 6.39, an hour and a half before it is already light. Sunset - 18.05, and then for about 40 minutes more targets are more or less distinguishable on the water.

Then darkness comes. At night, the aviation of those years could attack ships in two ways: with bombs, having previously detected the target visually on the "lunar track" and illuminating it with SABs - light aerial bombs, and then, while the target is observed in the light circle from the SABs, cover it with ordinary dive bombs.

The second method is a torpedo attack on the "lunar track". This is how the Molotov cruiser was damaged in due time.

But the ships could successfully evade SABs by maneuvering, leaving the illuminated area. They did this even at night during Operation Verp, it was a mastered and simple maneuver.

It was also, in principle, possible to evade the attack of torpedo bombers.

The weather in those days was clear, visibility was good, but the ships had equipment for setting up smoke screens. That is, at night the enemy's chances of reaching the ship were minimal.

It would be logical that the retreat, when the enemy is alarmed and looking for an opportunity to get ships, should be carried out under cover of darkness.

In the case of Operation Verp, the attacks were to be carried out at the very beginning of the day, at dawn, and the entire daylight hours, and this is more than 13 hours, taking into account twilight, the three ships were to be within the reach of the German strike aircraft.

At the time of the operation, the intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet estimated the enemy's forces as 100 aircraft, of which 20 were dive bombers. This turned out to be an underestimated, incorrect estimate, but such forces were extremely dangerous.

The question arises: how did it become possible to use ships in such a dangerous zone during the day? There are a lot of interesting documents on this score.

From the transcript of the interrogation of a member of the Black Sea Fleet Military Council Rear Admiral Nikolai Mikhailovich Kulakov on January 1, 1944:

“Question: What was your leadership in developing the plan and preparing the operation?

Answer: Together with the fleet commander, I heard a detailed report from the deputy chief of the operational department of the fleet, Captain 2nd Rank Yeroshenko, with the participation of Captain 1st Rank Romanov, appointed to lead the operation. During the hearing, a number of amendments and changes were made to the scheme of the planned operation, and then a secondary report was heard and the plan was approved by the Military Council.

Question: Who owns the idea of ​​the operation?

Answer: I can't remember exactly, but the idea of ​​this operation, in my opinion, was proposed by the head of the Black Sea Fleet's operations department, Captain 1st Rank Melnikov. A few days before that, a similar operation was carried out, but the actions of the ships and the withdrawal from the enemy shores were carried out at night. When reporting on the results of the previous operation, People's Commissar Kuznetsov criticized it and pointed out the need for such operations at dawn. This instruction of the People's Commissar was supported especially by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Stepanov, who was also present at the same time. As a result of the report, it was concluded that night operations have no effect, and therefore the tasks of finding and destroying enemy watercraft must be postponed to daylight hours. Based on this conclusion, an operation was developed for the 1st destroyer battalion on October 5-6, 1943. "

Except for minor details, these statements were consistent with what the other officers had said. That is, the "Verp" was conceived for daytime because at night the effectiveness of the ships was low. It turns out that the Soviet commanders were not afraid of aviation?

From the protocol of interrogation of the commander on December 21, 1943, the commander of the destroyer "Merciless", Captain 2nd Rank V.A. Parkhomenko:

“Commanding a destroyer, I repeatedly took part in the operations of surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet, and these operations were carried out, as a rule, at night, and did not give any significant success. I was a supporter of the raiding operation during the day. As a supporter of daytime operations, I understood that the most serious enemy of surface ships was aviation, and therefore opposition from our aviation could always guarantee the success of the operation. Before the start of the operation on October 6, we received intelligence data that there was little enemy aircraft in the Crimea. This intelligence somewhat reassured me, but I understood that it was impossible to underestimate enemy aircraft.

In fact, there was no objection among the Soviet commanders about the day's raid, moreover, many people supported this idea. In the actions of the destroyer division commander, Captain 2nd Rank G.P. Negoda, there is also a lack of fear of enemy aircraft.

Moreover, when, even in the dark in the early hours of October 6, the ships were discovered by the enemy and even attacked with the help of SABs and conventional bombs (unsuccessfully), Negoda continued the operation, leading the ships to the target according to the plan.

According to his powers, he did not have the right to independently interrupt the operation, but he did not even immediately begin to report the loss of surprise, moreover, judging by the interrogation protocols of his subordinates, he was not particularly afraid of Resentment. Yes, he himself admits it.

Here's what he wrote in the report:

This kind of detection of ships by enemy reconnaissance was systematic in past operations, therefore, he believed, would not affect the performance of the operation.

From the transcript of interrogation of the commander of the BCH-1 destroyer "Merciless" N.Ya. Glazunov:

“Question: Did the meeting with Kharkiv take place at the appointed place and at the appointed time?

Answer: Yes.

Question: What was the speed of the ships while retreating from the coast?

Answer: After connecting at the withdrawal, the ships had a speed of 24 knots.

Question: Could it be more?

Answer: We could have retreated at least 30 knots.

Question: Why didn't they increase the speed?

Answer: I can only assume the presence of complacency, which was reinforced by the fact that the previous operations took place without any manifestation of any enemy activity.

There are, however, other indications that the move was 30-knot, but this was not the maximum speed for these ships. Having met in 8 miles from Alushta, the destroyers and the leader "Kharkov" departed at not the highest speed they were capable of, and even picked up the downed Germans from a flying boat from the water.

All this suggests that the sailors were not particularly afraid of aviation. Rather, they feared, but were sure that there would be no fatal consequences from the use of German aviation.

Moreover, and this is important, there was a consensus from the People's Commissar Kuznetsov and further to the commander of the Black Sea Fleet Vladimirsky, and right up to the commanders of the ships that the operation in daylight could well be successful. Note that this is 1943.

It was this mistake that actually caused the death of all ships during the operation. It is she who is considered the main mistake in planning the operation by many researchers, and spiteful critics allude to the inferiority of the Soviet and Russian people as military sailors.

Let us ask ourselves, however, the question: could it be that everyone who was involved in the operation to one degree or another simultaneously went crazy and forgot about the threat from the air? And they forgot, having combat experience: at that time it was already the third year of the war.

And if not? What could have forced the Soviet commanders to treat the threat from the air in this way, and all at once, including those who had to risk their lives not for the first time?

Enumeration of options will give us an unexpected, but for some paradoxical, but in fact the only reasonable answer, which cannot be reduced to something like “the Russians are not good at naval warfare”.

And the answer is this: previous combat experience did not give commanders of all levels a reason to fear German aviation as much as they began to fear it after the "Verp".

It's hard to accept, but we have an afterthought, and they didn't. They operated on the real achievements of German aviation.

Air threat in the Black Sea before Operation Verp


In a narrowly theoretical vein, the question was raised earlier in the article “Surface ships against aircraft. World War II "... But it's worth briefly highlighting it again.

How dangerous was German aviation for surface ships on the Black Sea before that ill-fated day? The losses of the Black Sea Fleet from air strikes were considerable, but if we take large ships, then before Operation Verp we will see the following picture:

- EM "Frunze" (type "Novik"). Sunk at sea on September 21, 1941 by 9 bombers. He lay in a drift, rescuing the crew of the sunk gunboat "Red Armenia";
- KRL "Chervona Ukraine" (type "Svetlana"). Sunk on November 21, 1941 in the port of Sevastopol. While at the base, he fought off multiple attacks of large air forces, received extensive damage, lost speed and buoyancy. The crew waged a long battle for survivability, and was later removed from the ship;
- minelay "Ostrovsky" (former merchant ship). Sunk on 23 March 1942 in Tuapse, stood at the pier;
- EM "Svobodny (pr. 7th). June 10, 1942, sunk in the parking lot in Sevastopol;
- EM "Perfect" (pr. 7). June 26, 1942 attacked at sea on the move by 20 bombers, received several direct hits from bombs, sank;
- the leader of "Tashkent". Sunk 28 June 1942 He was damaged during the transition under massive air strikes (about 90 German aircraft dropped about 300 bombs on him, the strikes continued all daylight hours), with the help of other ships in tow he came to Novorossiysk, died during a massive (64 bombers on the entire naval base) strike by the German aviation at the Naval Base Novorossiysk, at the time of the sinking was at anchor in the base;
- EM "Vigilant" (pr. 7). On July 2, 1942, sunk by an air strike while anchored in Novorossiysk Bay;
- minelay "Comintern" (before re-equipment - cruiser "Kagul" type "Bogatyr"). On July 16, 1942, during a German air raid, he received serious damage in the parking lot in Poti, later disbanded and flooded. It was due to be repaired, but due to the loss of bases on the Black Sea, the repair was impossible. Prior to that, it was repeatedly attacked from the air at sea on the move, fought off up to 10 raids per day, and retained its combat effectiveness in the event of damage caused by aerial bombs.

Then there was Operation Verp. So let's take another look at the list. What conclusions can be drawn from it?

And the conclusions are simple: for the entire war from June 22, 1941 to the unfortunate day of October 6, 1941, the Germans, attacking a ship sailing in the open sea at full speed, were able to destroy only one destroyer - "Perfect". And that's all.

The leader "Tashkent" was pulled out in tow, the cruiser "Molotov" too. Prior to that, in the course of various operations of the Black Sea Fleet, starting with the landing near Grigoryevka, the Germans managed to seriously damage the ships, which then returned to service and fought on.

They managed to destroy ships in bases or at the stop ("Frunze"), and they did it very well, but the sailors know: the base for a ship is the most dangerous place, and the open sea is much less dangerous.

And in the sea - nothing. The same "Cahul-Comintern" in its last campaign was too tough for the German aviation, while it was at sea. We got it in the database. In the teeth, without discounts, they turned out to be only "Perfect", which was thrown by 20 planes. But, as already mentioned above, the intelligence of the Black Sea Fleet estimated all the forces of the enemy bomber aviation at 20 aircraft, and, as the command believed, they would have to deal with three ships and their own fighters. If we take the destruction of the Impeccable as a standard, it turns out that from the point of view of combat experience, the destroyer division, covered by fighters, should have been too tough for them.


"Merciless" on the move at sea.

All of the above is the only rational explanation of why all, really all officers who participated in the operation in one form or another, reacted to the German threat from the air as they did. And it is confirmed by what was shown later by the participants in the operation, including G.P. Negoda.

And this is the real reason for the death of ships during Operation Verp. It consists in the fact that the command of the Black Sea Fleet and the officers of the destroyer division, yes, judging by the report of the 1st MTAD, and the command of the Black Sea Fleet Air Force, treated the enemy as he deserved based on the results of the previous two years of the war.

And the enemy has performed much better than ever before or ever since.


That's what it was. And this also caused a shock at Headquarters. They are accustomed to a very definite level of losses of the fleet from the actions of German aviation. And he turned out to be prohibitively taller.

One cannot but say that in the fatal attack for ours - the one in which "Kharkov" received three hits in the engine room, the Germans were in many ways lucky. Eight bombers against three ships with anti-aircraft guns with a pair of fighters in cover do not look like a fatal force, but they turned out to be it. If the Germans had missed once, the ships would have left, even despite daylight.

Alas, the captain of the 2nd rank Negoda could not abandon the "Kharkov" and retreat on two destroyers. Firstly, he would not have wanted to, simply because there and then the situation did not look hopeless at all - the successful towing of the half-bombed Tashkent in the past again meant that everything is possible.

In addition, in the conditions of the political system of the USSR in the 40s, it was problematic to simply take and leave the ship, which generally had a small speed. It was, let's say, fraught, although Commander-in-Chief N. G. Kuznetsov later wrote that "Kharkov" had to be abandoned and two other ships and people were rescued, but upon his return, the fate of Negoda might well be determined by a completely different person than the Commander-in-Chief. This factor could not be ignored in those years.

Accordingly, those actions on the withdrawal, which we today consider fatal mistakes (and they were), there and then could not be perceived as such - there was simply no reason for this. Nothing particularly new for the Black Sea Fleet sailors in the morning of October 6, 1943, they more than once came out of such situations with honor, and then there were their fighters overhead ...

When the prospects became clear, it was already too late to do something.

Ironically, our sailors were let down by their extensive combat experience, the conclusions from which suddenly turned out to be inconsistent with the changed reality.

Some notes


Analyzing this raid, it is worth separating the questions "why it ended with such losses" and "why it ended unsuccessfully in terms of the combat mission." These are two different questions.

First, the Germans were waiting for a raid. The exit of ships from Tuapse by German intelligence was discovered in advance. One can safely blame the Black Sea Fleet command for insufficient measures to ensure surprise and misinformation of the enemy.

The second incomprehensible moment is the shelling of Yalta. This action of "Kharkov" did not lead to any results at all, it simply could not be carried out. And it was possible to guess about such a "result" in advance.

It is also unclear why an aviation force was not assigned to "Kharkov" that could correct the artillery shelling: previous experience said that such blind shelling was ineffective, and this time it turned out to be the same.

Independent actions of "Kharkov" would be much more useful if he were sent to search for convoys and enemy transports.

Thus, there were flaws in the initial decision for the operation, but they have no direct connection with losses, they simply characterize the level of command, the very formulation of tasks.

Another issue is the use of smoke by ships. It is not possible to find documents that would say something about the installation of smoke screens by the ships.

Actually, the fact that during the planning of the operation there were a lot of mistakes is obvious. It was poorly planned. But this poor planning of hers was more about how the fleet was going to achieve the objectives of the operation, rather than how it ended with losses.

Perhaps, the Scoundrel should have tried to separate the ships: if the destroyers and the Leader had withdrawn separately, then, most likely, the leader would have made it. True, without an afterthought, it is difficult to justify the separation in this way.

From the actions of G. P. Indignation, one can single out only one real and unforgivable mistake, which he HAS BEEN OBLIGED TO NOT MAKE. When "Kharkov" lost speed, and Negoda could not abandon him, it was necessary to take the leader to the tug "Merciless", on which the commander of the detachment was, and "Able" to give the order to take off on its own at full speed and not wait for anyone.


Rare photo - destroyer "Capable"

Such a decision directly stems from the very essence of naval warfare, it should have been made by any competent commander. Ships in one detachment must be able to move at the same speed, to keep the destroyer, which is a priori weak as an air defense means to protect the crippled "Kharkov" and its towing vehicle in the presence of fighter cover, it was fundamentally wrong.

From the standpoint of afterthought


Let's think: how could the operation be performed? The main contradiction, an attempt to resolve which turned out to be so expensive, was that the ships could operate relatively safely at night, but were ineffective, and during the day, with aviation adjustments, they could inflict damage on the enemy by shooting aimed, but were vulnerable to aviation.

How could this problem be solved? The answer is this: it was necessary to carry out the withdrawal of destroyers to the area of ​​combat use in such a way that they would complete their combat missions at the very end of daylight hours, and the exit from the air strike was already in the dark.

This also did not give 100% guarantees, but the chances of returning without losses increased significantly.

In addition, the need for an artillery attack on the port in conditions when the 1st MTAD had bombers, including heavy ones, raises doubts.

It would be much more useful if the ships were aimed at convoys, and, possibly, at the destruction of anti-aircraft batteries located not far from the coast, while aircraft in ports would be attacked by aircraft.

However, an artillery strike on the port could also have been inflicted, but taking into account the time factor, that is, before evening twilight.

How long did the Germans take to strike the ships? During the actual Operation Verp, the first attack took place at XNUMX:XNUMX am, which suggests that the Germans began to take off about an hour after dawn. At the same time, in reality they could take off at least an hour before it, visibility already made it possible to attack ships at sea, and they were discovered by the enemy even at night.

Thus, we can safely estimate the reaction time of the German aviation to the appearance of ships in 1-2 hours.

That is, if the ships were discovered at about 17.00, then by the time the German Ju-88s, carrying out additional reconnaissance of targets, left the area where the destroyers were located, it would be already dark.

At the same time, the ships would have about an hour and a half to conduct shelling with the help of a spotter plane, that is, many times more than is needed to shoot a given number of shells.

The solution to the contradiction between day and night operations, thus, was reduced to the sudden withdrawal of ships for the enemy into the area of ​​combat use during daylight hours.

How could this be achieved? By assigning them a corridor, from which they would not have to leave when moving to the designated area, and destroying all enemy forces and assets with aviation forces - the same 1st MTAD.

Such a procedure would make it possible, by the time the ships approach the shore, to assess whether their fire on boats in the port is needed or not, and to redirect them directly to the convoys if necessary, so that by nightfall they would have already completed or almost completed their combat mission.


On the "Capable"

Naturally, it was impossible to understand all this before everything happened. Therefore, it is impossible to make a claim to those who planned the "Verp" that they did not choose for themselves some similar course of action.

But on the other hand, such a claim can be addressed to the Headquarters.

Reaction Bet and its consequences


And now we come to the most important point - to that lesson from the operation, which is still relevant, even in our nuclear missile era.

After Operation Verp, the Headquarters banned the use of large surface ships and they never took part in the war.

The question arises: why, actually? Due to the loss of two destroyers and a leader? But we have just sorted out the reasons, moreover, we figured out how it was approximately possible to use ships in such a situation so as not to lose several units at once.

Remember the British: the battle at Kuantan, where they lost a battleship and battle cruiser, did not lead to the fact that they put their ships on hold. The loss of the aircraft carrier "Glories" did not lead to the same, nor did the loss of destroyers in the Mediterranean Sea.

The rate not only had to, it was also able to undertake an analysis of what happened and develop rules for conducting air-sea operations that would exclude such things in the future or simply reduce the risks.

Ship guns would be needed near Eltigen. Destroyers and cruisers would not have interfered with the communications at night, along which the Germans evacuated their 17th Army from the Crimea.

The fleet was still needed after the "Verp". but instead he was in fact put on a joke.

Let us ask ourselves a question: and if the fleet would later lose, for example, the "Red Crimea", forcing the enemy to lose five or six thousand soldiers who went to the bottom on different scows, would this loss be justified?

The answer is yes, it would be, simply because the Red Army would then spend its pace, ammunition, equipment, and, most importantly, people on the destruction of these five or six thousand soldiers. And at least not less than could have died on an old cruiser or destroyer.

And from the point of view of banal justice: why is it normal to put an infantry regiment on the offensive, but the old ship and the people as in a reinforced battalion are not?

But the Headquarters decided otherwise. No conclusions were made, no recommendations were made, the fleet was put on hold, and he did not say his own word, which he could have said at the end of the war on the Black Sea. In order to understand how disastrous the decision of the Headquarters turned out to be, here are some quotes from a German work "Evacuation from Crimea in 1944":

During May 10, Soviet troops continued to attack the Chersonesus position. We managed to beat them off. The fire of the Soviet artillery and air raids intensified. Most of the loading sites were located in the Kazach and Kamyshovaya bays. Since these points were in the center of the position, they were very well suited to the main loading points. As planned by the naval commandant of the Crimea, Rear Admiral Schultz, large transports, which themselves could not approach the piers, had to stop at the entrance to the bays, and loading on them was to be carried out from the ferries of the 770th engineer-landing regiment. Light and heavy anti-aircraft batteries of the 9th anti-aircraft artillery division were stationed on all capes. The greatest danger during loading would be the Soviet surface forces, but the large ships of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, as before, did not interfere with the evacuation.

At the same time, an important point: the Germans could not count on aviation.

On May 1 at 00:33 a radio message from the 10th security division provided information to the naval commandant about the location of the convoys. After that, at 03:00 it was possible to count on the approach of the convoy "Ovidiu", which included the auxiliary ship "Romania" (3150 brt). The arrival of the convoys "Ryer" and "Prophet" could be expected only at about 10:00, "Astra" - at noon, "Pionir" and seven KFK - in the afternoon, "Flige", "Crowter" and "Volga" - in the evening. The convoys "Bukhe", "Aikhe" and "Rose" were to arrive on the night of May 11-12. Covering these convoys was carried out from the territory of Romania by long-range fighters, which made 80 sorties for this purpose. At the same time, it was possible to ensure the constant presence of only 4 Bf-110 aircraft over Chersonesos, but this was better than nothing.

And then the weather worsened altogether, and theoretically the fleet could even use a battleship.

The naval commandant had high hopes for this night, since the thickening darkness did not allow the enemy to conduct targeted artillery fire and limited the capabilities of Soviet aviation. However, the fog descending from the land greatly impeded orientation. The quays were barely visible, and the artificial lighting was out of order. Therefore, it was all the more necessary to bring the convoy as close to the shore as possible. Soon "Dacia" was found, met by the BDB and Siebel ferries, after which it was brought closer to the shore with great difficulty. Then the connection between the naval commandant and the Dacia was lost again. He could not establish contact with the other convoys. Therefore, many ships, especially small ones, with poor navigation equipment, after a long voyage from Constanta could not report their exact location, got lost in the fog near the coast and did not come to the loading sites. In total, on the last night there were 60 ships near Chersonesos, of which only a few were able to load. The loading was carried out under the direction of the officers of the 1st Airborne Flotilla without interference wherever the ships approached for loading.

Perhaps more ships would have been found in the fog if the naval commandant had sent the other torpedo boats at his disposal to find them and bring them to Chersonesos. But he could not make such a decision, since the torpedo boat flotilla was the only combat unit that he had at his disposal in case the Soviet surface forces were repelled. An attack by Soviet destroyers on a convoy under loading or during its return that night or in the morning would mean another disaster.

But the Germans did not experience any catastrophe; by the decision of Headquarters, the ships continued to stand in the bases. And this despite the fact that the "Verp", in fact, was JUST A FAILURE, nothing more.

By the decision of the Headquarters, the fleet did not help in the destruction of the German forces evacuated from the Crimea.

Although I could and should have.

The result was the evacuation of a huge number of troops from the Crimea: according to German data, for the entire evacuation period since April 1944 - 130 people. But even if the numbers are overestimated, then in any case we are talking about tens of thousands of soldiers. And this was largely due to the decision of the Headquarters.

What is the reason for this strange decision? Indeed, due to the pogrom of Soviet aviation in 1941, it was not forbidden to fly, but due to the destruction of more than 20 Soviet tanks in the first five months of the war, the Headquarters did not prohibit their use.

The reason is as simple as day: misunderstanding of the importance of the fleet as a tool of war.

According to both the classical theories of naval power and the developments of Soviet military theorists of the 20s and early 30s, domination at sea is domination in communications, firstly, and secondly, achieving this is the main task of the surface forces of the fleet.

In post-war manuals on naval operations, we can also find similar provisions.

But from 1933 to 1939, for a naval officer, pronouncing the words "dominance at sea" could mean execution. For many, it meant. The problem was raised very briefly in the article “We are building a fleet. Theory and Purpose "... The issue was examined in detail and professionally in the essay "The Fates of Doctrines and Theories" by Captain 1st Rank M. Monakov and a number of other authors in the "Marine Collection" in the early 90s. On the one hand, this would never have allowed to prepare for war - and the fleet was not prepared for it.

On the other hand, the lack of understanding of the significance of naval power and its nature among the highest military-political leadership of the USSR led to a misunderstanding of the importance of the fleet at the right time in the right place.

The latter, in turn, made it difficult to assess the risks and benefits of continuing the war at sea. The ship is expensive and big, it is a symbol, it is a pity to lose it, but how many lives "on the ground" are saved by the work of such a ship on communications, a person with "land thinking" is simply not able to understand.

And if I did, I would also understand that it is better to risk the ship than to miss at least a division. As a result, they did not risk it and let the army go.

For the destruction of the Germans evacuated from the Crimea, the Red Army had to pay a considerable price.

But this was not the price of victory - it was the price of the reluctance of the top military leadership to understand the purpose of the navy and its significance.

If not for this, then the Headquarters would have given Verp a correct assessment: just a poorly planned and at the same time unsuccessful operation with large losses, nothing more. Better reason to plan operations.

Conclusions for our time


Today, 77 years later, we can state that the lesson has not gone into the future. Neither the General Staff, nor the people have the slightest desire to understand all these nuances.

Moreover, there are very frightening analogies with the past.

In the thirties, the fleet, for political reasons, could not prepare for war properly: the basis of the correct theory of its use was declared a bourgeois relic, and its carriers were subjected to physical destruction. For those who do not quite understand, let’s give an analogy: it’s as if in modern Russia for calls to learn to shoot from tank guns, not only from the spot, but also on the move, would be sent to life. Could the army prepare for war in such circumstances? No.

Today the navy cannot prepare for war. He is periodically "thrown" new ships, but it is often impossible to start practicing preparation for combat missions. There is no opportunity to learn how to search for and destroy modern mines, because there is not a single modern anti-mine complex, there is no way to work out the interaction of at least existing ships and naval aviation, because for this you first have to admit that this interaction is absent now - and we cannot admit that something is missing, there is no way to work out an anti-submarine, because there is nothing, there is no way to work out torpedo firing in conditions close to real ones, because the existing torpedoes simply will not work in such conditions.

And yet we cannot say about all this: we can only talk about how good everything is with us, great and wonderful, and in general, if tomorrow is a war, if tomorrow is on a campaign, if the enemy's power comes as one person, the entire Russian people for a free The homeland will rise. As in 1941, one to one.

Yes, today for proposals not to clean guns with bricks and learn to fight as Lenin bequeathed, "in a real way", they do not shoot, they simply fire. But the result is the same, at least in the navy - for sure.

In parallel, as in the 30s, when instead of the fleet we had the Red Army Navy, today we de facto not have a fleet, but naval units of the ground forces subordinate to generals from the ground forces. There is no sane theory of the military use of the Navy in the country, the political leadership does not understand the capabilities of the fleet as a type of the Armed Forces, and the army generals responsible for the country's defense (including from the sea, oddly enough) have a fundamental unwillingness to delve into all these things, strange way combined with the desire to control these things. And this also makes the current situation related to the years preceding the Great Patriotic War, and with itself.

And from this a simple conclusion follows. Since we have everything "as then", then we will fight "as then." But our enemy will be completely different.

In such conditions, new tragedies, such as Operation Verp, are simply inevitable. But this is not important, but the fact that their consequences are inevitable, which will then have to be solved with the hands and lives of 19-year-old conscripts. Like the release of Germans from the Crimea. Moreover, in a "continental power" it will again be impossible to draw any conclusions from this. We will run in this blood-soaked vicious circle forever.

The main lesson of Operation Verp today, oddly enough, is that we are doomed to repeat it and, most importantly, its consequences. And it's good if once, and if this one time in our nuclear age is not the last.
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  1. Dangerous
    Dangerous 7 October 2020 18: 19 New
    27
    Yeah ... After the victories of the era of the sailing fleet, our fleet has nothing to boast about. That in the Russian-Japanese war, that in the First World War, and even more so in the Second World War ...
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2020 18: 35 New
      18
      This is not entirely true. Even in Russian-Japanese there were glorious episodes.
      The problem is that in our history there were exactly two statesmen who had an absolutely holistic understanding of what naval power was - Peter I and Admiral S.G. Gorshkov.
      The first created a fleet and with its help made Russia a factor in European politics, while strengthening its economy.
      The second, together with nuclear scientists and rocket scientists, made the USSR a superpower. If we had an understanding of what sea power is and how to use it, everything would be different, the whole story would have gone differently.
      But we mainly use the nonsense "the fleet is not needed".
      They were also the reason why the fleet showed itself in the war, because initially Tukhachevsky was behind the pogrom of the fleet in the 30s, and they were driven by the desire to transfer as many resources as possible to the army.
      T.N. The "young school", which became a battering ram against the Russian Navy, relied heavily on Tukhachevsky.
      1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
        Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 7 October 2020 19: 32 New
        +3
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        They were also the reason why the fleet showed itself in the war, because initially Tukhachevsky was behind the pogrom of the fleet in the 30s, and they were driven by the desire to transfer as many resources as possible to the army.

        well, for all his doctrinaire (as an argument at a meeting of the Revolutionary Military Council on fleet issues, to quote "Anti-Duhring" is something), Tukh-sky was not so wrong about the decline of the line fleet in a future world war - so, in fact, and it happened. And the locked Baltic Fleet (though not by the British, but by the Germans) is also a fact. As well as the role of naval aviation. True, his vision of aviation actions against ships was, to put it mildly, original.
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2020 19: 45 New
          +9
          Let's just say that Tukhachevsky did not talk about the sunset of battleships, this sunset finally rolled in the 50s.

          And the locked Baltic Fleet (though not by the British, but by the Germans) is also a fact.


          The reasons are the same as described in the article - intrigues of the 30s. This is not the result of some objective reality, it is the result of the fact that the fleet was FORBIDDEN to prepare for war during the 30s.
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 7 October 2020 20: 38 New
            +2
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Let's just say that Tukhachevsky did not talk about the sunset of battleships, this sunset finally rolled in the 50s.

            Tukhachevsky really has nothing to do with it, and the decline of the battleships was due to the fact that they could not attack the US coast, because they would have been destroyed on the way to it. So the bet was placed on one-way bombers and the emerging missile armament, which is why the fate of the battleships was sealed.
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            The reasons are the same as described in the article - intrigues of the 30s.

            This was distorted, because there were no intrigues, but there was the creation of the naval people's commissariat independently, its withdrawal from the subordination of the people's commissar of defense, which in itself suggests that the sailors were generally given carte blanche. But during the war, they could not prove that it was a reasonable decision - this is a fact, and no one will refute it. Moreover, after the war and the return of the fleet to the Ministry of Defense, their isolation from reality served as the basis for the fact that the fleet began to be reduced.

            1. timokhin-aa
              7 October 2020 20: 51 New
              -4
              Your opinion is incredibly valuable, Comrade Warrant Officer.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 7 October 2020 21: 08 New
                +6
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Your opinion is incredibly valuable, Comrade Warrant Officer.

                Your enchanting conclusion
                In fact, the main the value of studying Operation Verp today - get an understanding of what happened and, relying on it, to answer those questions that still remain important for the development of the fleet in our country.
                typical demagoguery of a naval journalist, because the historical value of the study is certainly present, but this episode of the war no longer plays any role in answering today's questions.
                You just overslept that after the fifties at least two revolutions in military affairs took place (now there is a third one), and rush with episodes of the past like a written sack, although it is clear that this episode has no meaning for modern armed forces. This is a subject of historical study, but in no way a basis for developing a new concept of using the fleet in a future war, no matter how you pull an owl on a globe.
                1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
                  Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 7 October 2020 22: 09 New
                  +4
                  I agree - a thorough analysis of the episode is certainly good, but - a historical essay and nothing more. All these 'lessons learned for modernity' are the essence of the notorious 'spherical horse'.
                  1. timokhin-aa
                    7 October 2020 22: 37 New
                    +4
                    No, this is precisely the most valuable thing in the text.
                    And ignore the ensign, madness is contagious.
                    1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
                      Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 7 October 2020 22: 40 New
                      -2
                      ... And ignore the ensign, madness is contagious.

                      Never mind ... I'm already mad ... laughing
                  2. ccsr
                    ccsr 8 October 2020 11: 01 New
                    -4
                    Quote: Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
                    All these 'lessons learned for modernity' are the essence of the notorious 'spherical horse'.

                    There is nothing surprising in this - the journalist Timokhin wrinkles his forehead and pretends to be a "military thinker", although it is clear that his level does not rise above journalistic clichés. And therefore the value of his "essay" for the modern fleet is at the level of the plinth - he is the same "specialist" in naval problems, like the journalist Rogozin, a "specialist" in rocketry. In general, they say about such people - "Shoel Emelya, your week" ...
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      11 October 2020 09: 58 New
                      -2
                      Ensign Zadov clearly tried to jump over the words of his head in this comment, but not Schmog laughing
            2. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 7 October 2020 21: 16 New
              10
              This is some kind of book, otherwise I have been looking for this fragment about teachings for a long time. It shows well the visual level of admiralty.
              However, it did not get better later. Under Gorshkov, ships were set up, but this gathering did not become a fleet, and after the death of Gorshkov everything was blown away ...
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 7 October 2020 21: 29 New
                +7
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                This is some kind of book, otherwise I have been looking for this fragment about teachings for a long time.

                Vitaly Nikolsky
                GRU IN THE YEARS OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR. HEROES OF THE INVISIBLE FRONT
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                It shows well the visual level of admiralty.

                I would not like to stir up the past, but in the eighties a general staff commission worked at the main headquarters of the Navy, according to the results of which the chief of the Russian headquarters of the Navy Khurs was planned to be removed and sent to the reserve - as they say, there is nowhere else to sail ...
              2. timokhin-aa
                7 October 2020 22: 39 New
                +4
                In the 70s it was quite a navy, with "shortcomings on the ground", but with a sane doctrine of application and it was of considerable benefit to the political leadership.
                But then yes ...
                1. Serg65
                  Serg65 8 October 2020 12: 32 New
                  +3
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  70s it was quite a fleet

                  In what way?
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  he did a lot to the political leadership.

                  The modern navy is politically useful too!
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  with a sane doctrine of application

                  The doctrine changed almost every five years!
                  1. timokhin-aa
                    8 October 2020 15: 26 New
                    0
                    In the 70s, such tricks were obtained as in 1973 in Mediterranean, and not with such large forces.
                    I do not deny the mass of mistakes made, by the way.

                    In the 80s, there was a stupid competition with the United States in the military economy, and against the backdrop of the war in Afghanistan and the fall in oil prices.
            3. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 8 October 2020 11: 53 New
              +3
              Quote: ccsr
              This was distorted, because there were no intrigues, but there was the creation of the naval people's commissariat independently, its withdrawal from the subordination of the people's commissar of defense, which in itself suggests that the sailors were generally given carte blanche. But during the war, they could not prove that it was a reasonable decision - this is a fact, and no one will refute it.

              So during the war, the fleets were subordinated to the ground.
              On June 27.06.1941, the KBF was subordinated in operational terms to the Military Council of the Northern Fleet.
              14.07.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX The Red Banner Baltic Fleet from operational subordination to the Military Council of the Northern Front was transferred to the direct subordination of the commander-in-chief of the North-Western direction (SZN).

              The Black Sea Fleet was thrown over like a hot potato: in the fall - winter of 1941/1942. the fleet was operatively subordinate to the 51st OA, the Transcaucasian Front (while the Azov flotilla of the Black Sea Fleet was subordinated to the 51st A), the Caucasian Front, the Crimean Front.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 8 October 2020 13: 32 New
                0
                Quote: Alexey RA
                So during the war, the fleets were subordinated to the ground.

                No, it’s not. The fleets remained independent operational formations, and only the Headquarters decided when to use them and who would be the senior in conducting joint operations.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                On June 27.06.1941, the KBF was subordinated in operational terms to the Military Council of the Northern Fleet.

                Operational subordination just implies that only at a certain stage of interaction, land commanders are senior in planning operations, and they are not responsible for all the support of the fleet and its actions. This was the case throughout the war, and only after it, realizing the perniciousness of the separation decision made on the eve of the war, the fleet was returned to the subordination of the Ministry of Defense, making them a branch of the armed forces.
                Quote: Alexey RA
                The Black Sea Fleet was thrown over like a hot potato:

                This led to confusion, for which the naval forces themselves paid in the first place.
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 8 October 2020 13: 40 New
                  +4
                  Quote: ccsr
                  Operational subordination just implies that only at a certain stage of interaction, land commanders are senior in planning operations, and they are not responsible for all the support of the fleet and its actions.

                  See further:
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  14.07.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX The Red Banner Baltic Fleet from operational subordination to the Military Council of the Northern Front was transferred to the direct subordination of the commander-in-chief of the North-Western direction (SZN).

                  The army team commanded the KBF directly. The southern route of the Talinsky passage was closed to the fleet by order of Voroshilov.
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 8 October 2020 13: 48 New
                    0
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    The army team commanded the KBF directly.

                    This does not mean anything, because all the leading naval documents come from the NK of the Navy, and not from the NCO, as well as the supply of the fleet with everything necessary.
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    The southern route of the Talinsky passage was closed to the fleet by order of Voroshilov.

                    Well, it was not Voroshilov himself who decided this, but by agreement with Kuznetsov or his chief of staff at least.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      9 October 2020 10: 30 New
                      -1
                      and in agreement with Kuznetsov or his chief of staff at least.


                      Your speculations and nothing more than usual.
              2. andrew42
                andrew42 13 October 2020 18: 16 New
                +2
                And what is wrong in the OPERATIONAL subordination of the naval UNION (the fleet - it is loudly said) to the so-called "ground" in such theaters as the Black Sea and Baltic "puddles"? The features of the theater of operations and the possibilities must be soberly assessed, and not dealt with manilovism. Right now they have deprived the fleet of independent "strategic operations" in the "open spaces" of the northeastern Black Sea corner and the Gulf of Finland!
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 13 October 2020 19: 04 New
                  0
                  Quote: andrew42
                  And what is wrong in the OPERATIONAL subordination of the naval UNION (the fleet - it is loudly said) to the so-called "ground" in such theaters as the Black Sea and Baltic "puddles"?

                  Yes everything is correct. It's just that the author of the original post reproached the Navy for the fact that, having received independence in the form of a separate People's Commissariat, the Navy was never able to use it reasonably. I clarified that the independence of the fleet as received - so it was taken away, subordinating the army. So it's impossible to blame only the fleet for all the troubles.
                  Quote: ccsr
                  This was distorted, because there were no intrigues, but there was the creation of the naval people's commissariat independently, its withdrawal from the subordination of the people's commissar of defense, which in itself suggests that the sailors were generally given carte blanche. But during the war, they could not prove that it was a reasonable decision - this is a fact, and no one will refute it.

                  And I still do not remember this about the Navy Air Force, which, with the beginning of the war, turned into another army air force... For example, the KBF "barns" were reoriented to detect German advancing forces in the Baltic States. In the afternoon.
                  I'm not talking about a "rainy day over Dvinsk" ... what kind of independent solution of any problems can we talk about if the main strike air force of the fleet, instead of working in the Hanko area (as ordered by the commander of the fleet Tributs), was suddenly sent to bomb German tanks during the day?
                  1. andrew42
                    andrew42 13 October 2020 20: 17 New
                    0
                    I have a paternal grandfather, - there was an Il-2 shooter, - the 7th GShAP KBF :) was transferred to Ily from DB-shniki after being wounded.
      2. antivirus
        antivirus 7 October 2020 20: 33 New
        +1
        The reason is as simple as day: misunderstanding of the importance of the fleet as a tool of war.

        THE RIDERS GAME ME OUT.
        HOW MANY TANKS = HARKIV?
        a different psychology of everyone in the country, not just hands-va
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2020 20: 52 New
          +4
          HOW MANY TANKS = HARKIV?


          I would venture to suggest that not at all.

          a different psychology of everyone in the country, not just hands-va


          Well, as I write - to run through the blood-soaked vicious circle forever.
          1. antivirus
            antivirus 7 October 2020 21: 06 New
            +1
            and now many are able to mow with a scythe, and the skills of piracy-raiding - at sea - is a different psychology of both man, and the construction of the maritime state (including the law of the sea), and the education of people - "acceptable - not acceptable losses"
            1. timokhin-aa
              7 October 2020 22: 40 New
              +4
              and the skills of piracy-raiding - at sea - is a different psychology of both man, and the construction of the maritime state (including the law of the sea), and the education of people - "acceptable - not acceptable losses"


              Well, the moment is coming when it will be necessary to either learn or go into history.
              Do you really want to go down in history?
              1. antivirus
                antivirus 8 October 2020 20: 08 New
                0
                Do you really want to go down in history?

                - you can stay in it. ..... but it is necessary to serve from the Crimea in Kamchatka and Taimyr. forget about grapes for 3 years and love the cut
      3. Catfish
        Catfish 7 October 2020 21: 07 New
        15
        Alexander, hi Thank you for the detailed article and a detailed analysis of not only the operation, but also the concomitant situation at that time at the Black Sea Fleet in general, and at the headquarters in particular. I read the article in one spirit and could not tear myself away.

        And for some reason I immediately remembered the strikingly stupid attempt at shelling oil tanks in Constanta on June 25, 1941 by the leaders "Moscow" and "Kharkov". The oil tanks remained intact, the Moskva was sunk by a torpedo from the Soviet submarine Shch-206, which, in turn, was sunk by depth charges from the Soobrazitelny destroyer. So, out of the blue and without any effort on the part of the enemy, they lost two warships, but did not complete the task. And two years later "Verp". Naturally?

        By the way, Admiral Friedrich Ruge complained about the "continental thinking" of the Reich leadership in his memoirs, he very much scolded the army elite and other partaigenosse.
        1. Macsen_wledig
          Macsen_wledig 7 October 2020 21: 30 New
          +3
          Quote: Sea Cat
          "Moskva" was sunk by a torpedo of the Soviet submarine "Shch-206", which in turn was sunk by depth charges from the destroyer "Soobrazitelny".

          What a living legend ...

          Quote: Sea Cat
          By the way, on the "continental thinking" of the Reich leadership

          The very leadership that had appointed Great Britain as the enemy came up with Plan Z and rushed to put it into practice. :)
          1. Catfish
            Catfish 7 October 2020 21: 40 New
            +8
            What a living legend ...

            Even if this is a legend and the leader was blown up in a minefield, this still does not change the essence of the matter - the operation was not only failed, but failed with losses.
            1. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 7 October 2020 22: 42 New
              +5
              Moscow was surveyed at the bottom. There is an explosion on a mine. The main problem of that operation was that the Germans calculated the time and place of the raid, planted mines and even drove Romanian destroyers into the sea, who fired a little together with the coastal artillerymen. We have already aggravated everything many times over with disgusting planning, mixing ships during the operation, etc. etc.
            2. Serg65
              Serg65 8 October 2020 12: 39 New
              +4
              Quote: Sea Cat
              the operation was not only failed, but failed with losses.

              It was already ruined as soon as it was born in the form of a thought in Oktyabrsky's head !!!
          2. Victor Leningradets
            Victor Leningradets 8 October 2020 09: 55 New
            -1
            Plan Z is a waste of money and materials. Germany would not have been able to defeat Great Britain (as part of the Metropolis) in the proposed squadron battle even by the planned 1944.
            Raider operations were also not able to bring the Metropolis to its knees, as well as a large-scale submarine war on communications. But the combination of a dense air and sea underwater blockade led to the achievement of this goal. The decisive stage was to be the landing of the German expeditionary corps on the island. Great Britain with the maximum support of the forces of the surface fleet, but subject to complete air supremacy over the theater of operations. Further, it was necessary to ensure the supply of this corps by sea transport.
            And even the final establishment of dominance over the Metropolis would not bring Germany a final victory. With the inevitable support of Great Britain, the United States would have carried out a mass evacuation of a useful contingent to Canada, Australia, India, etc., which would have allowed the Anglo-Saxons to maintain domination in the Atlantic and ensure a continental blockade. Further, the war would enter a protracted phase of a competition between the potentials of creating new weapons capable of radically changing the course of the war.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 8 October 2020 11: 59 New
              +2
              Quote: Victor Leningradets
              The decisive stage was to be the landing of the German expeditionary corps on the island. Great Britain with maximum support from the forces of the surface fleet, but subject to complete air supremacy over the theater of operations. Further, it was necessary to ensure the supply of this corps by sea transport.

              To do this, Germany needed a fleet comparable to the forces based in the Metropolis (that is, if the Yankees did not intervene). And this again brings the Kriegsmarine to Plan Z. smile
              1. Victor Leningradets
                Victor Leningradets 9 October 2020 12: 31 New
                +1
                Absolutely not needed in conditions of air supremacy and CLOSE underwater blockade. On the contrary, if the Royal Nevi battleships thrust into the landing area, they would repeat the fate of Phillips' squadron.
                1. Macsen_wledig
                  Macsen_wledig 9 October 2020 13: 24 New
                  0
                  As I understand it, YOU are talking about some kind of alternative reality?
                  1. Victor Leningradets
                    Victor Leningradets 9 October 2020 14: 46 New
                    0
                    Yes, not really.
                    The fact is that Goering, in a large way, was right, but one-sided. Aviation alone cannot resolve the issue with Great Britain (I mean the island). In addition, a close naval blockade is needed, which only submarine forces could provide.
                    If the Luftwaffe won the Battle of Britain, the Metropolitan Fleet would have to relocate to the north as much as possible, which, along with a shortage of fuel, would dramatically increase the approach time to the landing area. So a mine-thrown, scrambling wolf-pack of a limited fleet would become, if not easy, but a victim of a combined strike.
                    It's just that Plan Z is not required to conquer Great Britain.
                    Well, I repeat, even the capture of Great Britain and Ireland does not lead to a victory for Germany in the war.
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 9 October 2020 17: 34 New
                      0
                      Quote: Victor Leningradets
                      If the Luftwaffe won the Battle of Britain, the Metropolitan Fleet would have to relocate to the north as much as possible, which, along with a shortage of fuel, would dramatically increase the approach time to the landing area. So a mine-thrown, scrambling wolf-pack of a limited fleet would become, if not easy, but a victim of a combined strike.

                      This is possible only in one case - if the French campaign fails. smile
                      For a powerful submarine fleet and powerful naval aviation require money. The Reich is unable to increase the military budget. This means that the money will be taken away from the army. With a predictable result.
                      And yes, since the Reich is building a submarine, then Britain does not need new large pots in the Atlantic. So the "wolf packs" of German submarines will stumble upon the British PLO from the destroyers, corvettes and sloops built in their place.
                2. timokhin-aa
                  11 October 2020 09: 56 New
                  -1
                  And what if TKA and destroyers stick in there at night? But what if the bomber command is so well visited at the loading points? But what if British submarines planted mines on transport routes? I will not predict the outcome of the "Sea Lion" if the Germans took it, but in general it would not have been an easy walk, to put it mildly, you just look at what the allies needed for such an operation.
                  1. Victor Leningradets
                    Victor Leningradets 12 October 2020 09: 58 New
                    0
                    Sorry, did not thank for the great article.
                    Now on to the case.
                    Who makes you land in Southern England across the Channel?
                    Think stereotypically.
                    And read carefully about the components of success: "CLOSE naval blockade and the conquest of LORD in the air." Overlord is the other way around. You will have to go what you can save under bombs, from Scapa Flow and Loch Yu (analogous to the Italian fleet in 1943).
                    The point of my post was as follows:
                    Instead of Plna Z - "seven" a day and thousands of strategic bombers. This excludes British battleships and aircraft carriers from action. Remaining light forces (which will be forced to drag from the North). Application experience - Operation Cerberus 11-13.02.1942
                    And the main point of the post: the seizure of the island by Great Britain never leads to the victory of the Second World War by Germany, but only radicalizes the actions of the United States, which, leaving Japan alone, fall upon Germany with the entire Anglo-Saxon world. They have freedom of choice and action.
            2. Andrew Matseevsky
              Andrew Matseevsky 8 October 2020 13: 59 New
              0
              It would be interesting to see how the crossing through the Channel would begin if the English fleet entered there, firing point-blank from everything that could shoot. And, for example, the Germans attacked him from the air, and half of the bombs would fall on their ships.
              1. Victor Leningradets
                Victor Leningradets 9 October 2020 12: 35 New
                +1
                In the conditions of the Luftwaffe air supremacy and the close underwater blockade, it would not have reached the landing area, and the battleship caliber is useless in the area of ​​operation of light forces, which was proved by the Yamato at Leyte.
                1. Macsen_wledig
                  Macsen_wledig 9 October 2020 13: 26 New
                  0
                  Quote: Victor Leningradets
                  and the battleship caliber is useless in the area of ​​action of light forces, as the Yamato proved under Leyte.

                  In the absence of normal high-explosive shells, it's useless ...
                  1. Victor Leningradets
                    Victor Leningradets 9 October 2020 14: 54 New
                    0
                    It's not about the shells, but about the number and rate of fire of the guns, as well as their dispersal in the landing area. Destroyers and aircraft are the best against transports and landing ships. And "Yamato" is a narrow specialist, an opener for battleships.
                    1. Macsen_wledig
                      Macsen_wledig 9 October 2020 15: 21 New
                      0
                      Quote: Victor Leningradets
                      It's not about the shells, but about the number and rate of fire of the guns, as well as their dispersal in the landing area. Destroyers and aircraft are best against transports and landing ships.

                      Did Yamato reach American footholds?
                      What a news... :)
        2. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
          Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 7 October 2020 22: 38 New
          +4
          ... in his memoirs, Admiral Friedrich Ruge lamented

          Yes, they all love to complain after a fight. Ludendorff, it seems, also lamented that, they say, if 2 billion marks had not been lost on the Kaiserlich Marina, they would have been in Paris right in 1914)
        3. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2020 22: 41 New
          +5
          And for some reason I immediately remembered the strikingly stupid attempt at shelling oil tanks in Constanta on June 25, 1941 by the leaders "Moscow" and "Kharkov". The oil tanks remained intact, the Moskva was sunk by a torpedo from the Soviet submarine Shch-206, which, in turn, was sunk by depth charges from the Soobrazitelny destroyer. So, out of the blue and without any effort on the part of the enemy, they lost two warships, but did not complete the task. And two years later "Verp". Naturally?


          Naturally. "Raid thinking" is the result of the work of the "young school". This is a direct consequence of the pogrom of the 30s.

          By the way, Admiral Friedrich Ruge complained about the "continental thinking" of the Reich leadership in his memoirs, he very much scolded the army elite and other partaigenosse.


          I strongly recommend reading Wolfgang Wegener, who opened this very "thinking". So, do not argue.
          Here in this brochure
          https://eknigi.org/voennaja_istorija/67181-operativno-takticheskie-vzglyady-germanskogo.html
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 8 October 2020 12: 57 New
            +2
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Naturally. "Raid thinking" is the result of the work of the "young school". This is a direct consequence of the pogrom of the 30s.

            And the nastiest thing is that taking as a basis raid strategy on cows, no one bothered with the tactics of these raids and the training of these commanders. Remember the conclusions from the battle at Cape Macquur?
            A few days after the battle, the chief of the intelligence department of the SF headquarters told the command that, according to intelligence, on the night of January 21, the enemy had lost a transport with a displacement of 8000 tons at Cape Makkaur. (...) prepared by the Chief of Staff of the Northern Fleet Rear Admiral M.I. Fedorov and the head of the operational department of the headquarters, Captain 1st Rank A.M. Rumyantsev and approved by the Commander of the Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral A.G. Golovko April 12, 1943
            It is quite characteristic that the assessment of the operation carried out as a whole was not voiced anywhere, it was only said that "the preparation for the operation was carried out by the brigade commander unsatisfactorily." The reason for this conclusion was that "the BEM commander neither for himself nor for the commanders subordinate to him did not set clear tasks what he wants to achieve in battle. Therefore, a torpedo salvo in battle was reduced to the release of torpedoes without any calculation, and the conduct of artillery fire - essentially to a defensive rather than an offensive tactical reception on the withdrawal. " Kolchin's lack of a plan for the battle and leadership of the detachment during the clash was harshly criticized. The decision to withdraw to sea without repeating the attack was recognized as clearly erroneous, and the confidence in the shelling of coastal batteries was unfounded.
            © Miroslav Morozov, Igor Borisenko. How the Skagerrak was missed.
            1. timokhin-aa
              8 October 2020 15: 32 New
              -2
              Therefore, a torpedo salvo in battle was reduced to the release of torpedoes without any calculation, and the conduct of artillery fire was essentially a defensive rather than an offensive tactical reception on withdrawal. "


              Fight to victory is from Mahan, no way.

              The young school rules.
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 8 October 2020 16: 24 New
                0
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Fight to victory is from Mahan, no way.

                The young school rules.

                Nope, not driving. Raid is the maximum damage in the minimum time, followed by a quick retreat. He mastered the second SF perfectly. But where is the practical implementation of the first part of the theory? wink
                Alas, our commanders were not ready for the implementation of the ideas of Mahen or Jeune École.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  8 October 2020 21: 18 New
                  -1
                  Anonymous from this Internet of yours writes:
                  The main problem of the Soviet theory of a "small war at sea", in contrast to its French counterpart - in the absence of such a theory, I apologize for the tautology.

                  Actually, the "theory", or rather the doctrine of the "small war at sea" in the RKKF grew out of a combination of the fiercest struggle for resources with the army and the prejudiced views of a part of the top party leadership (headed by V.I. Lenin, which is typical). When substantiating it, the thesis was put forward that a future war with the leading world powers at sea will have the character of the same intervention as that took place in 1918-20, and the overwhelming superiority of the united largest fleets of the aggressor does not leave the Soviet fleet, whatever it may be, nor a single chance in battle. Hence the main "flopophobic" conclusion of the 20s - the fleet must be reduced to coastal defense means, as small and cheap as possible. This extreme radicalism was rejected, but it was on this version of the use of the fleet that the domestic version of the "young school" in the person of Aleksandrov, Ludri, Dushenov and Co. was based.

                  As a result, sea battle, as a complex phenomenon, was reduced by them to a strike (first concentrated, then, when its inconsistency became clear - to a series of successive ones), which for obvious reasons does not provide for a long "combat competition" of the parties, while being carried out "on a short shoulder "coastal defense, ideally - at a prearranged line against enemy landing forces and their cover. These conditions, as it seemed, due to the massing of forces did not require high individual training of commanders, but required a high and fundamentally unattainable at that time for the RKKF organization of interaction between formations and even combat arms, reconnaissance and combat control during a whole defensive operation (hence the introduction to RKKF hitherto unprecedented level of "operational art", which, incidentally, did not help him much). At the same time, only residual attention was paid to the remaining two tasks of the "small fleet" - the struggle on communications and raiding operations.

                  So Soviet naval views at the turn of the 30s, which held out in one form or another until 1935, proceeded from: 1. the limited mission of the fleet; 2. patterns of defensive operations; 3.strike, not combat, as the main form of naval combat operations; 4. the principle of massaging light forces, leveling individual skill in these conditions. an operation, in combat terms, which is not a set of battles, but strikes, initially combined in place, time and target (hereinafter - in place and target, but spaced out in time). As a result, the combat training of commanders here faded into the background in comparison, say, with the knowledge of materiel and the ability to make the most of its capabilities. The task of managing an operation of this class was impracticable both due to technical capabilities and due to the insufficient level of training of command personnel, which time after time manifested itself as a result of naval maneuvers.

                  And then the concept changed towards the development of a "traditional" fleet, and all the problems with the training of command personnel immediately doubled, if not tenfold ....
                  1. Alexey RA
                    Alexey RA 9 October 2020 10: 32 New
                    0
                    Fun. Combat training and control skills are not needed in theory. And knowledge of the hardware and the ability to make the most of its capabilities are needed theoretically, but practically this is a big problem. sad
                  2. evgeniy.plotnikov.2019mail.ru
                    evgeniy.plotnikov.2019mail.ru 9 October 2020 17: 36 New
                    0
                    Good article. And as a reason for discussion it is good ... The episode itself is key for understanding the state of the USSR fleet during the Second World War.
                    To understand the History of the Russian Navy, such articles are needed, and to understand its current state, they are definitely useful.
                    I will share my thoughts.
                    Stalin was given a lot of talents. But, after all, it is not ,, he will break. During the war years, he showed special concern for artillery and aviation. Was thoroughly interested in tanks and self-propelled guns. And ,, that's just ,, the fleet ,, he did not have enough ,,! Indeed, in addition to physical fatigue, an adult also has a fatigue of the soul ...
                    Stalin assessed the state and capacity of the Army and Navy of the Union. As well as the state of industry in the USSR.
                    We were doomed, often, to take the quantity during the Second World War (compare the release of the BTT of the Reich and Soviet Russia during the WWII). What is the reason for this? Including the destruction of Tradition. With all the advantages of October, there were also disadvantages. A giant minus is a blow to Tradition. The fleet is about, about, about, about, long about. The fleet has not been built in decades!
                    The ban on the use of surface ships is Stalin's tremendous assessment of the capabilities of his fleet at that time. Later there will be grandiose plans for an ocean-going fleet ... For now, it's better this way. “It will be more precious to yourself” - so they say in such cases
        4. Serg65
          Serg65 8 October 2020 12: 38 New
          +2
          Quote: Sea Cat
          "Moskva" was sunk by a torpedo of the Soviet submarine "Shch-206", which in turn was sunk by depth charges from the destroyer "Soobrazitelny".

          Ну drinks for Sidor Karakai !!! laughing
          1. Operator
            Operator 8 October 2020 13: 01 New
            +2
            Shch-206 was found at the bottom, 8 miles from the Romanian city of Mangalia, exactly in the place where it was drowned on July 9, 1941 by the Romanians in the person of the gunboat "Verses" and torpedo boats that used depth charges.

            And so yes - on June 26, the leader of "Moscow" could theoretically be sunk by a torpedo with Shch-206, but with a greater degree of probability was blown up by a Romanian mine during a raid on the port of Constanta, since he was moving on a minefield without a paravan, torn off during a panic escape at a speed of 30 knots and anti-artillery maneuver after shelling by a coastal battery with 280-mm guns.

            Such a syakaya Headquarters of the Supreme Command did not inform the brave military men about the enemy's 280-mm coastal guns laughing
            1. Serg65
              Serg65 8 October 2020 13: 09 New
              +1
              Quote: Operator
              it was drowned on July 9, 1941 by the Romanians in the person of the gunboat "Poems" and torpedo boats that used depth charges.

              Tell this to the cat Marine! hi
              1. Catfish
                Catfish 8 October 2020 15: 00 New
                +3
                Tell this to the cat Marine

                I myself am interested to know how you can drown a submarine "in the face of a gunboat."
                This is the face! Although, what can you take from them ... "One word - Romanian" (c) laughing drinks
      4. Kot_Kuzya
        Kot_Kuzya 7 October 2020 22: 44 New
        +5
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The second, together with nuclear scientists and rocket scientists, made the USSR a superpower

        I haven't read any more nonsense. "Gorshkov made the USSR a superpower" ... Yeah! A man who was not even the Minister of Defense. Of course, I understand that the Moremans dream of creating a fleet that would be stronger than the American and British fleets combined, and they do not differ much in intelligence. But such a pearl !!!! It's just the bottom!
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        They were also the reason why the fleet showed itself in the war, because initially Tukhachevsky was behind the pogrom of the fleet in the 30s, and they were driven by the desire to transfer as many resources as possible to the army.

        And this is absolutely the right decision. Well, that would become the people's commissar of defense, a Moreman like you, and instead of increasing the army, producing new weapons, the country would intensively rivet battleships and aircraft carriers. And the Red Army would have remained without tanks and artillery. In this case, the Germans would have captured Moscow in the fall of 1941 and would have reached the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line. And all these vaunted aircraft carriers and battleships how would help the front? Answer: absolutely nothing! I just don't understand the logic of the Moreman. They are just people with alternative logic, far from reality.
        1. Victor Leningradets
          Victor Leningradets 8 October 2020 10: 20 New
          0
          The wild losses on both sides of the Eastern Front are the result of precisely the overland thinking, corresponding to the time of Frederick the Great and the Union of "three petticoats". Someone will push someone on a thousand-kilometer space!
          And this despite the fact that maritime operations completely deprive continental Europe of the necessary raw materials and a significant part of food. And strategic aviation, at the cost of the loss of several dozen cars and hundreds of lives, is able to arrange Fort Duamon for cities such as Cologne and Dresden.
          Of course, ideally, the ultimate goal of the war is the occupation of the enemy's territory, but it can be carried out not only by exterminating half of the capable male population and the accompanying losses of civilians, but also by blocking communications and destroying infrastructure and occupying strategically important points. The second way is much more economical in terms of losses.
          Achieving this goal (as well as disrupting the achievement of similar goals by the enemy) is served by the trinity of ground (with significant airmobility) forces, naval forces and aviation.
          Our overland thinking leads to the fact that the enemy plans our actions in advance and, in the current realities, is able to involve our command in large-scale land operations, involving heavy losses, and, using our constraint in them, to inflict a suppression strike from the sea direction. Something similar was taught to us during the Korean War in the 1950 Incheon Landing Operation.
        2. English tarantas
          English tarantas 8 October 2020 11: 00 New
          -4
          how would you help the front?

          The evacuation of the army and the population further to the rear, landing in important and key places for the enemy, with the presence of initiative and the ability to choose where to land, breakage of Reich communications, naval bloody of supplies and suppliers, coastal artillery attacks (I remind you that ashore, as a rule, due to access to the sea has large transport hubs, big cities and industrial centers), air strikes inland, with, again, full initiative, the supply of weapons and food "from over" the hillock. Nobody cancels the land component, but there was and even is such a world master as Britain, after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, it was bending over the whole world in essence with a fleet.
          1. Kot_Kuzya
            Kot_Kuzya 8 October 2020 11: 37 New
            +1
            Are you quite cuckoo? Hey! At least sometimes you need to turn on the pumpkin!
            Evacuation of the army and population further to the rear,
            This is where battleships and aircraft carriers could evacuate people? Especially considering that the Baltic and the Black Sea are not for them, and there is no one to evacuate from the Kola Peninsula. And how could the battleships and aircraft carriers of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea be able to evacuate the inhabitants and factories of Leningrad, Kharkov, Moscow and Stalingrad?
            landing in important and key places for the enemy, with the presence of initiative and the ability to choose where to land
            Yeah, landing, landing ... Especially when the Baltic and the Black Sea are completely under German control, Leningrad was surrendered, since the Red Army was not developed for the sake of riveting battleships and aircraft carriers, Sevastopol was also surrendered, since no one could interfere with the tank divisions from Perekop, since all the forces went to the fleet. Consequently, the Baltic and Black Sea fleets were destroyed by the enemy, only the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet remained. And how will these fleets help the defense of Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad? Landing in Normandy? Isn't it funny yourself?
            breakage of communications of the Reich, sea supply and suppliers, coastal artillery attacks (I remind you that on the coast, as a rule, due to the access to the sea there are large transport hubs, big cities and industrial centers)
            Even the combined efforts of the British and American fleets failed to break off the communications of the Reich and its blockade, and you are crazy here that this is possible for the Soviet fleet.
            inland airstrikes
            In RI, the USSR did not have the resources for strategic aviation. So don't fantasize here.
            supply of weapons and food "from behind" the hillock

            The Allies were fully engaged in this. The USSR spent resources on the army, and not on the fleet, which was successfully replaced by the allies.
            Nobody cancels the land component, but there was and even is such a world master as Britain, after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, it was bending over the whole world in essence with a fleet.
            That's when Russia becomes an island, that's when yes, it will bend the whole world with a fleet... And so, GEOGRAPHY IS A JUDGMENT.
            1. English tarantas
              English tarantas 8 October 2020 17: 53 New
              -2
              Are you? I wrote that the fleet in general can. The FLEET is also cargo ships, these are good warships of all ranks, this is support and aviation. Each of your sayings is stupidity, I'm too lazy to answer it, I hope you will understand someday yourself
              1. Kot_Kuzya
                Kot_Kuzya 8 October 2020 22: 08 New
                0
                Quote: English tarantass
                I wrote that the fleet in general can. The FLEET is also cargo ships, these are good warships of all ranks

                And what benefit would cargo ships bring in the Baltic and Black Sea? Where would the cargo fleet carry cargo from in the Baltic? From Finland? From Germany? From Denmark? From Sweden? And from where would you take it on the Black Sea? From Romania? From Bulgaria? From Turkey? Aren't you funny yourself? Or is the mania of Moremanism turning off cognition and pumpkin? And what would battleships and aircraft carriers do in puddles like the Baltic and the Black Sea? Battleships and aircraft carriers can only deploy in the Northern and Pacific fleets, so explain to me how battleships and aircraft carriers near Murmansk and Vladivostok can stop the Wehrmacht tank divisions near the walls of Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Sevastopol and Stalingrad? You *** Moremans, understand that the USSR is not islands like Britain, Japan and the United States, which do not have land borders and a land front, this is for Japan, Britain and the United States, first of all, the fleet is important, since as long as they have a fleet , then no enemy will land on their land. And for Russia, which has a land border with a dozen countries, the most important thing is the army, not the navy!
                1. timokhin-aa
                  9 October 2020 22: 20 New
                  -2
                  And what benefit would cargo ships bring in the Baltic and Black Sea? Where would the cargo fleet carry cargo from in the Baltic? From Finland? From Germany? From Denmark? From Sweden? And from where would you take it on the Black Sea? From Romania? From Bulgaria? From Turkey?


                  If I tell you where they actually drove and how much during the war on the Black Sea, will you stop talking nonsense here?

                  Or is the mania of Moremanism turning off cognition and pumpkin?


                  And it will immediately become clear who is really bad with the pumpkin. Even without hints and finger points.

                  Well, do you agree?
                  1. Kot_Kuzya
                    Kot_Kuzya 10 October 2020 07: 49 New
                    -1
                    You are really timokhin. With the pumpkin off.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      10 October 2020 10: 09 New
                      -2
                      The drain is counted.
          2. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 8 October 2020 13: 24 New
            +3
            Quote: English tarantass
            Evacuation of the army and population further to the rear

            Only if there is an army holding the coast (with airfields). The Tallinn crossing will be different.
            And we don't have many places. from where you can evacuate something by the fleet.
            Quote: English tarantass
            landing in important and key places for the enemy, with the presence of initiative and the ability to choose where to land,

            Do you have any idea what size the landing on ETVD should be in order for the enemy not to unleash the landing in the first few days? To hell with them, with our unsuccessful landings in the Baltic and the Black Sea - but there was also Dieppe.
            In short, it makes no sense to land a smaller case on an uninsulated section of the coast - they will crush. Or you need to wait for the army to bring down the front on its own - and all the reserves will be shackled by the ground forces. That is, the fleet again depends on the army.
            Quote: English tarantass
            breakage of Reich communications

            What exactly? If in the Baltic, then the fleet depends on the army. The army handed over the Baltic states - everything, the KBF is sitting in the Marquis puddle.
            Quote: English tarantass
            coastal artillery attacks (remember, on the coast, as a rule, due to the access to the sea there are large transport hubs, large cities and industrial centers)

            In this case, the range of the fleet is limited by the need to move within the reach of enemy aircraft only in the dark. Il will need to carry the TF.38 with him in all its 1945 glory. smile
            1. timokhin-aa
              8 October 2020 15: 34 New
              -2
              In short, it makes no sense to land a smaller case on an uninsulated section of the coast - I doubt it


              A strange simplification.

              The landing at the port of Novorossiysk. This is one simple example.
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 8 October 2020 16: 29 New
                +2
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                The landing at the port of Novorossiysk. This is one simple example.

                Quote: Alexey RA
                Or you need to wait for the army to bring down the front on its own - and all the reserves will be shackled by ground troops. That is, the fleet again depends on the army.

                The corps is during independent actions of the fleet outside the frontal zone:
                Quote: English Tarantas
                landing in important and key places for the enemy, with the presence of initiative and the ability to choose where to land

                If you work with the army, then a couple of brigades of marines will be enough - but only on condition of a crumbling front. The army did not break through the front - there will be Strelna or Mereküla.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  8 October 2020 21: 00 New
                  -2
                  In Novorossiysk, the landing pulled back the forces and THEN the army went on the offensive.

                  I mean, there can be anything, there is no need to simplify. The specificity of the landing is the possibility of striking a weak point, the Army cannot do that, the enemy usually does not give it to it.
                  1. Alexey RA
                    Alexey RA 9 October 2020 11: 41 New
                    +2
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    In Novorossiysk, the landing pulled back the forces and THEN the army went on the offensive.

                    In Novorossiysk, the landing force landed 10 km from the front line on the mainland and from Malaya Zemlya.
                    And if not for the army team, then at best there would be one more Small Earth. And at worst - another South Ozereyka.
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    I mean, there can be anything, there is no need to simplify. The specificity of the landing is the possibility of striking a weak point, the Army cannot do that, the enemy usually does not give it to it.

                    The specificity of the landing on ETVD is the ability to collide with the enemy's mechanical reserves in the shortest possible time. So they need a large amphibious fleet and a strong air force capable of delaying the transfer of reserves by the enemy by strikes on communications.
            2. English tarantas
              English tarantas 8 October 2020 18: 10 New
              -2
              Only if there is an army holding the coast (with airfields). The Tallinn crossing will be different.
              And we don't have many places. from where you can evacuate something by the fleet.

              Well, nobody cancels the protection of loading. Come on, you can't moor to the shores on a boat, do you have to do it from the pier? If you mean that all the large clusters of large berths we have just in the Black and Baltic Seas, well, the main line to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk has never come in handy for us, what can we do.
              Do you have any idea what size the troops on ETVD should be in order for the enemy not to unleash the troops in the first few days?

              The bottom line is that ships go faster than trucks, and it is impossible to keep a constant and powerful defense along the coast continuously. I imagine we have excellent examples - allied landings.
              To hell with them, with our unsuccessful landings in the Baltic and the Black Sea

              They failed for the most part because our fleet could not land aircraft and put the German fleet to the bottom, and therefore the ship covering the landing could not continuously work out the coast, and after the landing, it perished under attack aircraft.
              What exactly? If in the Baltic, then the fleet depends on the army. The army handed over the Baltic states - everything, the KBF is sitting in the Marquis puddle.

              Raw materials and food from Turkey, Greece, South America, Sweden, Norway, Spain. If in the Baltic, then, as elsewhere, the task of a ship leaving at least one full-fledged and sufficient port is not to drown from: air raids from land, artillery from the coast, enemy ships, mines - actually everyday tasks.
              you will need to carry around the TF.38 in all its 1945 glory

              Well, yes, as you wanted. The Americans had to land torpedo bombers and they did it.
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 8 October 2020 18: 36 New
                +2
                Quote: English tarantass
                Well, nobody cancels the protection of loading. Come on, you can't moor to the shores by boat, do you have to do it from the pier?

                If you want to complete loading on time, you need a pier. With boats, loading will be long and sad.
                Quote: English tarantass
                The bottom line is that ships go faster than trucks, and it is impossible to keep a constant and powerful defense along the coast continuously. I imagine we have excellent examples - allied landings.

                Uh-huh ... I just had them in mind - as an example of what kind of fleet you need to have and what forces to land. to make something out of it.
                Now let's think about where to get all the money for this. In a country that until the second half of the 30s held on to the territorial army, since the territory was several times cheaper than the Red Army. And I still do not remind about the need for a complete modernization of industry for such a fleet. Vasiliev had a good description of what the construction of only four LK and two LKR dragged behind him, and what gaping heights out of stock и impossibility of production opened at the same time.
                Quote: English tarantass
                Raw materials and food from Turkey, Greece, South America, Sweden, Norway, Spain.

                The nuclear reactor is conventionally not shown in the diagram. ©
                This I mean that already for operations in the North Sea you need to have bases somewhere nearby.
                You can not count on the army that will capture them - after the construction of the Big Fleet, the USSR will have 100-120 divisions money.
                Quote: English tarantass
                Well, yes, as you wanted. The Americans had to land torpedo bombers and they did it.

                But we don't have the USA, but the USSR. And the only way for him to build a large fleet, while having the main threat on land - is to annex the United States. smile
                1. English tarantas
                  English tarantas 8 October 2020 20: 07 New
                  0
                  Well, the public put forward the term: "the fleet is not needed, let's leave the army." I declare: "there is a sea - there must be an appropriate fleet." But what the real story turned out to be is another matter, facts are separate, demagoguery is separate.
                  THE USSR. And the only way for him to build a large fleet, while having the main threat on land

                  * Cold war, the main threat to the USSR is overseas / strait, the task is to prevent them from sailing to Europe, opportunities are the second fleet in the world *
        3. ccsr
          ccsr 8 October 2020 11: 20 New
          +2
          Quote: Kot_Kuzya
          I haven't read any more nonsense. "Gorshkov made the USSR a superpower" ...

          This is really nonsense, testifying to the fact that journalist Timokhin does not adequately assess the history of our country, which is not surprising, because in Ukrainian schools it was perverted to please Svidomo. If we objectively assess Gorshkov from the point of view of the consequences for the USSR, then we can directly say that he is one of those military leaders who, for the sake of their ambitions, drove the country's economy into unnecessary spending.
          Quote: Kot_Kuzya
          I just don't understand the logic of the Moreman. They are just people with alternative logic, far from reality.

          Unfortunately, this is really so - apparently the wind of romance in tattered sails often blew out the remnants of sanity from their brains, and this is understood by those who can assess the armed forces not as an object for satisfying their ambitions, but as an essential element of the country's self-preservation, which should not be yoked on the shoulders of our people. And some of the current "naval theorists" have not gone far from their Soviet colleagues, which is why they would ruin the Russian economy by building unnecessary ships, just the same as "two fingers on the asphalt ...." It's strange that they are also offended when you talk about inadequacy of perception of modern realities, where their dreams are not destined to come true.
          1. Cyril G ...
            Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 14: 05 New
            +2
            then we can directly say that he is one of those military leaders who, for the sake of their ambitions, drove the country's economy into unnecessary spending.


            Right...
      5. Boris ⁣ Shaver
        Boris ⁣ Shaver 8 October 2020 05: 18 New
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Peter I and Admiral S.G. Gorshkov

        And, of course, Timokhin. After all, only equals judge reliably.
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 October 2020 12: 22 New
          0
          This is a debatable question.
          But the level of consciousness of Boris Razor is not controversial.
          1. Boris ⁣ Shaver
            Boris ⁣ Shaver 8 October 2020 13: 24 New
            0
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            This is a debatable question.

            Do you think there are some crazy people who are ready to speak in this discussion on the side of the statement I voiced above?
            1. timokhin-aa
              8 October 2020 15: 36 New
              -3
              I don’t know, but if some really crazy person wanders in here, he will be able to side with your point of view.
              Why not?
              1. Boris ⁣ Shaver
                Boris ⁣ Shaver 8 October 2020 15: 38 New
                0
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Do not know

                Lying is not good.

                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Your point of view

                There are problems on the site with sarcasm. Therefore, I will clarify - the user's statement sometimes reflects an exaggerated point of view, the opposite of the real point of view of the author. This is called sarcasm. So, the statement about the greatness of Timokhin, which as a real statement, in our common opinion, can only be supported by madmen, this is sarcasm, and not my point of view.
      6. English tarantas
        English tarantas 8 October 2020 10: 52 New
        +1
        In general, people who think "the fleet is not needed" and in WWII it would be better not to build it at all, since it was uselessly spent, it is worth voicing the idea that if there was a powerful group on the Black Sea with which the Germans could not do anything, then the Germans either they would not have taken Sevastopol at all, or Sevastopol would have been evacuated with a minimum of losses. It didn't work out, well, you can't change anything.
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 October 2020 11: 59 New
          0
          This is useless, these people carry what they carry, because they cannot think with their heads.
          I have caught them on this more than once.

          You can ask the same cat Kuza a simple question:

          "In real history, the fleet landed troops in Kerch and Eltigen in 1943, and it pulled back 4 enemy divisions out of 9 in the Crimea. If the fleet was not there, would the liberation of Crimea have been easier or more difficult?"

          And you can watch the snake dance in a frying pan. I really lost interest in these exercises, since I can't even induce them to think like that.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 8 October 2020 13: 34 New
            +2
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            You can ask the same cat Kuza a simple question:

            "In real history, the fleet landed troops in Kerch and Eltigen in 1943, and it pulled back 4 enemy divisions out of 9 in the Crimea. If the fleet was not there, would the liberation of Crimea have been easier or more difficult?"

            I even know the answer to this question:
            We carefully look at the composition of the landing forces in these operations and ask ourselves the question - why was it necessary to build the KR and EM for the Black Sea Fleet, if there were enough ships for the landing forces up to and including the TSC? Wouldn't it have been better to spend the money, materials and man-hours invested in real life in the construction of pr. 7, 7U, 26 and 26 bis on more needed things?
            wink
            1. timokhin-aa
              8 October 2020 13: 37 New
              0
              Aha. This is almost a standard answer for everyone - from kote to "experts" of the AST Center.
          2. English tarantas
            English tarantas 8 October 2020 18: 14 New
            0
            And you can watch the snake dance in a frying pan. I really lost interest in these exercises, since I can't even induce them to think like that.

            When I started to understand, on VO it was fun to argue with those who are not in the subject, and now I'm tired of saying a dictum, the answer to which is in the commentary to which this dictum was issued. Already twitches (
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 8 October 2020 13: 30 New
          +5
          Quote: English tarantass
          In general, people who think "the fleet is not needed" and in WWII it would be better not to build it at all, since it was uselessly spent, it is worth voicing the idea that if there was a powerful group on the Black Sea with which the Germans could not do anything, then the Germans either they would not have taken Sevastopol at all, or Sevastopol would have been evacuated with a minimum of losses.

          * looks thoughtfully towards Crete.
          Without air cover in the area of ​​action, 8 air corps will survive only the LK. CD is already problematic. That is, Sevastopol will live as long as the army holds the Kerch Peninsula with its airfields.
          And second, where are we going to base this grouping after the enemy reaches Sevastopol? And where are we going to repair damaged ships? In Nikolaev? wink
          1. English tarantas
            English tarantas 8 October 2020 18: 18 New
            0
            No air cover

            And what, the fleet is when without air defense?
            And second, where are we going to base this grouping after the enemy reaches Sevastopol? And where are we going to repair damaged ships? In Nikolaev?

            By the words "powerful grouping" I also mean thoughtful logistics and supply, since these things are a priori in military affairs.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 8 October 2020 18: 50 New
              +1
              Quote: English tarantass
              And what, the fleet is when without air defense?

              Are we going to bother with a full-fledged aircraft carrier "Taffy" on the Black Sea?
              Wow, wow, take it easy, enough to edit the "Hearts of Iron" save game, adding USSR resources, industry and KB and commanders perks. smile
              For without AB, air defense cannot be built on one barrel artillery until 1945.
              Quote: English tarantass
              By the words "powerful grouping" I also mean thoughtful logistics and supply, since these things are a priori in military affairs.

              Get out. And all this in a country that in real life could not supply the army even with barrels for fuel.
      7. Serg65
        Serg65 8 October 2020 12: 25 New
        +1
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The second, together with nuclear scientists and rocket scientists, made the USSR a superpower.

        Gorshkov was an ambiguous person, using his proximity to Brezhnev could create a truly powerful and balanced fleet, but he lacked character.
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Tukhachevsky was behind the destruction of the fleet in the 30s

        Tukhachevsky ... in 1920, the RKKF had 6,5 former officers of the imperial fleet in the service of the Soviet regime, by 1941 only four come to my mind! Four, Alexander! What kind of fleet can we talk about if SEVEN Commanders-in-Chief of the USSR Navy changed from 1920 to 1939? Who do you think should have thought about the fleet? Who could, before Stalin, sort out the tasks of the fleet? Tukhachevsky? Haller with Stepanov? The latter generally sat below the grass, quieter than water !!! Tukhachevsky ... Lenin after the Kronstadt mutiny generally wanted to destroy the fleet, Tukhachevsky .. The military specialists began to be destroyed back in 1925 immediately after Trotsky's disgrace, then the Shakhty affair, the Industrial Party affair ... the only thing that can be remotely attached to Tukhachevsky is the Vesna case ... The Kremlin elite, which dreamed of starting a war with Romania in 31, did not need a declassed element in the army and navy.
        Almost the same thing happened after the collapse of the USSR. The officers from the fleet fled in crews. How many officers are left now possessing the usual naval certificate of last years?
        Today the navy cannot prepare for war

        Who will cook it, Sasha? Putin? Shoigu? Nabiullina? You have often criticized Chirkov, Korolev, Evmenov, why criticize them? They are a product of their time! Who was they to learn from? At Chernavin, Gromov, Kuroedov, Vysotsky ??? In 2014, a few commanders could moor their ship without the help of tugs, even fewer commanders had navigational experience !!! Evmenov has practically no experience of ship service !!!
        Yes, I agree, not a fountain! And where to get others, Sash ???
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 October 2020 13: 38 New
          0
          I don’t argue Sergey, I’m writing about that.
          1. Serg65
            Serg65 8 October 2020 13: 50 New
            +1
            And I liked the historical analysis of the raiding operation, with the exception of some moments! yes
        2. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 13: 47 New
          +1
          http://tsushima.su/forums/viewtopic.php?id=10366&p=1

          Here is a list of generals and admirals of the RKKF of the 40s, including those who participated in the Second World War from among the former midshipmen, officers and military officials of the RIF. And there are not 4 people to take them away.
          Moreover, this is not at all about all the officers of the RIF who continued to serve in the RKKF in the 40s.
          1. Serg65
            Serg65 8 October 2020 14: 08 New
            +3
            Quote: Cyril G ...
            there are not 4 people to take them away

            Remove wartime graduates from there and get ... well, a little more than four ... I agree. I counted 32 officers who entered the RKKF with the rank of lieutenant or higher.
            Quote: Cyril G ...
            Moreover, this is not at all about all the officers of the RIF who continued to serve in the RKKF in the 40s.

            And who, in your opinion, was supposed to teach the Krasvoenmore sea tricks? Isn't it Dybenko?
            1. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 14: 15 New
              0
              Quote: Serg65
              And who, in your opinion, was supposed to teach the Krasvoenmore sea tricks? Isn't it Dybenko?


              What did you say this to?
              The fact that a bunch of people (ex-officers of the RIF) served and taught at the academy and high school is a fact. However, I'm talking about those who served during the Second World War in the rank of cap. 3/2/1 rank. Like the same cap. 2 of the Lakes rank in the Ladoga flotilla.

              Quote: Serg65
              Take wartime graduates out of there and get ... well, a little Take away wartime graduates from there and get ... well, a little

              As it is.
              1. Serg65
                Serg65 8 October 2020 14: 31 New
                +2
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                What did you say this to?

                This is how graduates of the Soviet Navy and commanding courses at these schools fought during the Second World War!
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                I'm talking about those who served during the Second World War in the rank of cap. 3/2/1 rank.

                And I'm talking about those who were supposed to lay the foundations of the Soviet fleet, but did not have time ... the new generation had to invent these foundations ... on their knees! From here and all the problems of the Soviet Navy, not only the pre-war, war periods, but also the post-war years! These problems have smoothly spilled over into the modern fleet.
                1. Cyril G ...
                  Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 17: 10 New
                  0
                  Quote: Serg65
                  And I'm talking about those who were supposed to lay the foundations of the Soviet fleet, but did not have time ... the new generation had to invent these foundations ... on their knees! From here and all the problems of the Soviet Navy, not only the pre-war, war periods, but also the post-war years! These problems have smoothly spilled over into the modern fleet.


                  For the most part, you can and agree. On the other hand, some of the hereditary chronic diseases of the RIF spilled over into the Soviet fleet. And RIF really had its own problems
                  1. timokhin-aa
                    8 October 2020 21: 14 New
                    0
                    "... The main problem of the Soviet theory of a" small war at sea ", in contrast to its French counterpart - in the absence of such a theory, I apologize for the tautology.

                    Actually, the "theory", or rather the doctrine of the "small war at sea" in the RKKF grew out of a combination of the fiercest struggle for resources with the army and the prejudiced views of a part of the top party leadership (headed by V.I. Lenin, which is typical). When substantiating it, the thesis was put forward that a future war with the leading world powers at sea will have the character of the same intervention as that took place in 1918-20, and the overwhelming superiority of the united largest fleets of the aggressor does not leave the Soviet fleet, whatever it may be, nor a single chance in battle. Hence the main "flopophobic" conclusion of the 20s - the fleet must be reduced to coastal defense means, as small and cheap as possible. This extreme radicalism was rejected, but it was on this version of the use of the fleet that the domestic version of the "young school" in the person of Aleksandrov, Ludri, Dushenov and Co. was based.

                    As a result, sea battle, as a complex phenomenon, was reduced by them to a strike (first concentrated, then, when its inconsistency became clear - to a series of successive ones), which for obvious reasons does not provide for a long "combat competition" of the parties, while being carried out "on a short shoulder "coastal defense, ideally - at a prearranged line against enemy landing forces and their cover. These conditions, as it seemed, due to the massing of forces did not require high individual training of commanders, but required a high and fundamentally unattainable at that time for the RKKF organization of interaction between formations and even combat arms, reconnaissance and combat control during a whole defensive operation (hence the introduction to RKKF hitherto unprecedented level of "operational art", which, incidentally, did not help him much). At the same time, only residual attention was paid to the remaining two tasks of the "small fleet" - the struggle on communications and raiding operations.

                    So Soviet naval views at the turn of the 30s, which held out in one form or another until 1935, proceeded from: 1. the limited mission of the fleet; 2. patterns of defensive operations; 3.strike, not combat, as the main form of naval combat operations; 4. the principle of massaging light forces, leveling individual skill in these conditions. an operation, in combat terms, which is not a set of battles, but strikes, initially combined in place, time and target (hereinafter - in place and target, but spaced out in time). As a result, the combat training of commanders here faded into the background in comparison, say, with the knowledge of materiel and the ability to make the most of its capabilities. The task of managing an operation of this class was impracticable both due to technical capabilities and due to the insufficient level of training of command personnel, which time after time manifested itself as a result of naval maneuvers.

                    And then the concept changed towards the development of the "traditional" fleet, and all the problems with the training of command personnel immediately doubled, if not tenfold .... "

                    The young school made everything very much worse.
        3. Local from the Volga
          Local from the Volga 8 October 2020 20: 19 New
          0
          When Stalin asked Tukhachevsky about the artillery cadets from Mongolia who fired into the sky exclusively, he answered: "Where can I get you other Mongols ?!"!))
      8. Niel-le-Calais
        Niel-le-Calais 9 October 2020 23: 27 New
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Even in Russian-Japanese there were glorious episodes.


        he sank 3 warships. The most successful episode of RJAV. True, Ivanov's feat is not studied in schools. More Rudnev.
        battleships "Hatsuse" and "Yashima", cruiser "Takasago" .- on the account of Ivanov / Amur
      9. Vadim_888
        Vadim_888 14 October 2020 00: 48 New
        0
        It was a shame not to see Ushakov, Lazarev, and the controversial Kolchak on the list
    2. Skai
      Skai 8 October 2020 21: 44 New
      0
      Why was the missile boat of the Georgian Navy sunk in 2008 with an anti-aircraft missile? what the hell is not a victory ?! ... soldier
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 9 October 2020 11: 58 New
        +2
        Quote: SkАй
        Why was the missile boat of the Georgian Navy sunk in 2008 with an anti-aircraft missile?

        Uh-huh ... though later both missile boats of the Georgian Navy - "Tbilisi" and "Dioscuria" - were discovered in Poti. Completely intact. belay
        And they were sunk, as a result, by the group of Lieutenant Colonel Lebed from the 45th regiment.

        Here is the result of her visit to Tbilisi:

        And here are the consequences of visiting "Dioscuria":
    3. Selevc
      Selevc 9 October 2020 12: 19 New
      0
      Quote: Dangerous
      Yeah ... After the victories of the era of the sailing fleet, our fleet has nothing to boast about. That in the Russian-Japanese war, that in the First World War, and even more so in the Second World War ...

      And if you turn on the brains ??? One of the main - if not the most important task of any of the Soviet fleets - "Covering and providing ground operations and landing operations." In 1945, South Sakhalin was liberated, the Kuril Islands were liberated from the Japanese, troops landed in the ports of Korea !!!

      And all this was done by one Pacific Navy - a very modest fleet, for example by Japanese standards, with limited resources and at very remote theaters of the database !!! Here are the real major victories of the USSR at sea !!! At the same time, no matter what kind of ships it was carried out - the main thing is that it was done quickly and the goals of the war were achieved !!! It's the most important !!!
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 9 October 2020 18: 18 New
        0
        Quote: Selevc
        In 1945, South Sakhalin was liberated, the Kuril Islands were liberated from the Japanese, troops landed in the ports of Korea !!!
        And all this was done by one Pacific Navy - a very modest fleet, for example by Japanese standards, with limited resources and at very remote theaters of the database !!! Here's a real big victory for the USSR at sea !!!

        But they don't like to remember these victories. Because the Pacific Fleet almost managed to fail both operations - the Kuril landing, and the landing in Seisin. In the course of these operations, the fleet managed to step on all the "rake" of the previous landings, starting from 1941 - and only the weakness of the enemy, who was in the transition to surrender, saved our forces.
        Landing on Shumshu:
        The beginning of the artillery preparation - two hours before the landing. The Japanese could only be grateful for such a timely notification.
        The landing zone was full of pitfalls. As a result, the troops were landed in the water, often at a depth of 2,5-3 meters. In full combat. Result - 22 of 1 radios reached the shore. The control of the battle was ... intermittent.
        The first echelon was landed practically without artillery - only 4 "magpies". And with these forces, he had to storm the Japanese long-term defenses and repulse tank attacks. If in 1945 it comes to closing the embrasures with bodies, something obviously went wrong.
        During the landing of the first and second echelons, Japanese antiamphibious batteries fired at our ships. There was nothing to crush - from the large ships, the fleet allocated a mine layer, 2 PSKR and 4 TSC. And the landing force ignored these batteries, developing an offensive inland.
        The landing force managed to unload its artillery only on the night from the first to the second day of battles.
        The air defense of the landing zone was organized so well that Japanese aircraft managed to storm our ships several times. In August 1945 (!)
        Seishin landing:
        The only one who had experience in conducting them, General Kabanov, was removed from the planning of landings.
        The landing operation for the first two days was controlled as much from Vladivostok - personally by the commander of the Pacific Fleet. And only when the danger of failure arose, the command was urgently transferred to Kabanov.
        The landing and reinforcement forces in the first two days were too small - two companies and a battalion. Against the division.
        The fleet did not allocate large ships to support the landing - only one old EM "Voikov".
        Reinforcements went by a teaspoon per hour, and at the same time in Vladivostok the rifle division was either loaded onto transports or unloaded - the fleet headquarters constantly changed plans.
        The landing party did not have spotters and generally no interaction with the Pacific Fleet aviation. I emphasize: not with the Air Force, but with my own naval aviation. The flyers flew nearby, bombed something - but the landing was neither hot nor cold.
      2. Vadim_888
        Vadim_888 14 October 2020 00: 53 New
        0
        Forgot to mention the ice campaign and the heroic battle of Moonsund
        battleship of glory against the superior forces of the German fleet in the first world war, and a breakthrough from surrounded Tallinn in the second,
  2. polpot
    polpot 7 October 2020 18: 20 New
    +4
    Thank you, very interesting, Eternal memory to the fallen soldiers.
  3. Ryaruav
    Ryaruav 7 October 2020 18: 33 New
    +6
    just as admirals did not know how to fight in 1941 and in 1943 they did not know how, in 1943 it was clear to everyone that aviation had become the main striking force at sea
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2020 18: 45 New
      +5
      Do you read what you comment?
      1. Narak-zempo
        Narak-zempo 7 October 2020 22: 37 New
        +2
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Do you read what you comment?

        Chukchi is not a reader, a Chukchi writer.
    2. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 13: 49 New
      -1
      Quote: Ryaruav
      in 1943 it was clear to everyone that aviation had become the main strike force at sea


      This lesson was not fully understood by Gorshkov and his ideological heirs, the new admirals.
      1. Serg65
        Serg65 8 October 2020 14: 39 New
        +2
        Quote: Cyril G ...
        This lesson was not fully understood by Gorshkov and his ideological heirs, the new admirals.

        Why did you decide that?
        1. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 17: 16 New
          +2
          With all the reductions in the fleet, aviation was cut first. Under Khrushchev, the fleet lost its attack and fighter aircraft. Moreover, not even 10 years had passed, all this had to be revived painfully and with anguish .... As a result, according to late Soviet standards, the ShAP for the fleet, without its own IA, was fundamentally unacceptable. But by the way, they built herds of missile, torpedo boats and RTOs. What is happening now can only be called a disaster.
          1. timokhin-aa
            8 October 2020 21: 23 New
            0
            You can recall the MRA, which was developed by Gorshkov to its level. By the way.
            1. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 9 October 2020 00: 02 New
              0
              And what does Gorshkov have to do with creating an MPA? And then, in fact, the MPA was tilipated in the YES channel, for which the war at sea was secondary (MA was traveling in a carriage unfastened from the fleet. (P.)), And did not make the necessary changes in the anti-ship missile system before the collapse of the USSR, not to mention about the traditional menagerie ..... The missed opportunities there in this regard are above the roof.
              The mere fact that the electronic warfare aircraft on the Tu-22M platform was never made speaks volumes.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 9 October 2020 11: 00 New
                +1
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                The mere fact that the electronic warfare aircraft on the Tu-22M platform was never made speaks volumes.

                I think this is too expensive a combat aircraft for use in the auxiliary structures of the armed forces. And the time spent in the air hardly satisfies the tasks of the electronic warfare service. I think they need a simpler and cheaper plane, because it is unlikely that it will enter the enemy's air defense zone, which means that speed characteristics are not the main ones for it.
                1. Cyril G ...
                  Cyril G ... 9 October 2020 11: 15 New
                  0
                  Here another jammer was supposed to operate in the combat formations of the MRAPs, moreover, it seems to me advisable to have 3 squadrons as part of the MRAP - 2 are shockmen, the 3rd special purpose, which has electronic warfare and RTR aircraft in its composition, and possibly a link of long-range fighters based on the same Platform ...
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 9 October 2020 11: 43 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Cyril G ...
                    Here another jammer was supposed to operate in the battle formations of the MRAPs,

                    Can it be cheaper to use containers, especially if you make them like UAVs and deliver them to the operation site, than to allocate a combat aircraft for the EW service? However, this is not my topic, but I know well how the prices for the entire product increase, if only the base is chosen incorrectly, but the efficiency as a whole does not change.
                    1. Cyril G ...
                      Cyril G ... 9 October 2020 12: 59 New
                      0
                      It depends at what point in time. I'm actually talking about the end of the 70s and 80s, then it was advisable to have jammers in the battle formations of the MRA to cover them from the Phoenixes and Sparrow. Now it's a completely different matter ...
                  2. Alexey RA
                    Alexey RA 9 October 2020 18: 35 New
                    0
                    Quote: Cyril G ...
                    Here another jammer was supposed to operate in the battle formations of the MRAPs,

                    I'm wondering how the interaction of jammers based on Tu-16 with missile carriers based on Tu-22M2 was planned?
                    Because, for example, at 568 mrap in 1981, the 1st and 2nd squadrons were rearmed on the Tu-22M2, and the 3rd was left on the old Tu-16sps. on which she flew until 1992.
                    https://eagle-rost.livejournal.com/24597.html
                    Quote: Cyril G ...
                    Moreover, it seems to me advisable to have 3 squadrons as part of the MRAP - 2 are shockmen, the 3rd special purpose, which has electronic warfare and RTR aircraft and possibly a link of long-range fighters based on the same Platform

                    Soviet practice: 1,2 squadrons - missile-carrying, 3 - special, 4 - training? wink
                    1. Cyril G ...
                      Cyril G ... 9 October 2020 21: 39 New
                      0
                      Quote: Alexey RA
                      How was the interaction of jammers based on Tu-16 planned with missile carriers based on Tu-22M2?


                      If, honestly, this idiocy is not clear to me in principle, for this is a lot of problem both at the level of organizing a joint flight in uniform combat formations, and at the level of maintenance and operation.
                      IMHO - the maximum possible return from YES and MRA in the USSR did not receive. MRA / DA could become a truly irresistible sword of the Soviet Navy.
                    2. Cyril G ...
                      Cyril G ... 11 October 2020 11: 18 New
                      0
                      Quote: Alexey RA
                      I'm wondering how the interaction of jammers based on Tu-16 with missile carriers based on Tu-22M2 was planned?


                      So I think it's just stupidity or is it treason ?!
                2. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 9 October 2020 18: 27 New
                  +1
                  Quote: ccsr
                  I think this is too expensive a combat aircraft for use in the auxiliary structures of the armed forces.

                  Well, yes, well, yes ... Tu-22M for REP is too expensive, but Tu-22 is not. smile
                  The REP aircraft for the MRA is not an auxiliary, but a combat aircraft that goes on the attack along with the missile carriers it covers. For at that time, it was only possible to reliably cover the aircraft with a specially equipped vehicle, and not with the onboard missile carrier stations.
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 9 October 2020 19: 05 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    The REP aircraft for the MRA is not an auxiliary, but a combat aircraft that goes on the attack along with the missile carriers it covers.

                    You can see it from your pole, but ask any commander of an Air Force division, he will always speak out in favor of an extra combat aircraft. We went through this in Soviet times - I know what I'm talking about.
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    For at that time, it was only possible to reliably cover the aircraft with a specially equipped vehicle, and not with the onboard missile carrier stations.

                    But the Americans do not think so, and prefer to have container jamming stations on strategic bombers, rather than allocate a combat aircraft for this:
                    Colonel A. MAXIMENKOV

                    The US Air Force is working to build up the capabilities of technical means of electronic warfare (EW), which should ensure control over the operation of radio electronic means (RES) of the enemy and the simultaneous prevention or reduction of such control on his part both in war and in peacetime.
                    The American concept of conducting electronic warfare assumes the presence of two main aviation subsystems: on the basis of specialized electronic warfare aircraft of group protection; based on UAVs and autonomous false air targets (ALVTs).
                    ......
                    In 2009, the US Air Force, in order to improve the effectiveness of the fight against modern reconnaissance and control of enemy air defense systems, resumed the program of creating a new electronic warfare system - CCJ (Core Component Jammer), placed on board the strategic bombers B-52N "Stratofortress", for jamming ground Radar early warning of air targets of enemy air defense systems. These aircraft will receive the designation EB-52 or B-52 CCJ. They will retain their capabilities for the use of nuclear and high-precision conventional weapons, and will also be able to solve a wide range of electronic warfare tasks using multifunctional electronic reconnaissance and jamming equipment during long patrols (up to 12 hours) at remote theaters.

                    The electronic warfare complex is supposed to be placed in two containers (length 9,1-12,2 m, weight about 2 kg), installed on the suspension nodes of the aircraft's external fuel tanks.

                    The equipment of the complex will provide detection, recognition, positioning and suppression of modern and advanced radars in the frequency range 70-40 MHz and disruption of radio communication networks of enemy air defense systems in the range of 000-20 MHz. The complex will be able to carry out effective jamming at the same time to several dozen radio electronic means (RES) of the enemy at ranges up to 2 km in the 000 ° sector. Provides for the setting of broadband (barrage), frequency and spectrum conjugate, as well as response and misleading (elevation, range, speed) interference.

                    When creating the complex, it is planned to take as a basis the equipment developed within the framework of the modernization program for the electronic warfare EA-6B "Prowler" South Africa III. A distinctive feature of the new jamming stations is the use of AFAR (the length of each antenna array is more than 2,5 m, operates in the X- and Y-frequency bands), which forms a fan (multi-beam) radiation pattern. This AFAR is created on the basis of the lattice installed in the SPEAR container of the EC-1 ZON "Compass Call" aircraft. The use of such an antenna will make it possible to generate powerful narrow-beam radiation in a given direction perpendicular to the aircraft flight route. The power consumed by the complex of electricity will be up to 60 kW with the capabilities of the power plant of the aircraft 100 kW.

                    In addition to the electronic warfare system, it is planned to equip part of the main armament (air-launched cruise missiles, guided air-to-ground missiles) of the B-52N aircraft with warheads that create an electromagnetic pulse, including the microwave range, to disable the enemy's electronic equipment ( primarily electronic computers), as well as use the ADM 160V MALD ALVTs with radar jamming equipment.

                    http://militaryarticle.ru/zarubezhnoe-voennoe-obozrenie/2010-zvo/7943-osnovnye-programmy-vvs-ssha-po-sozdaniju-sredstv
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 9 October 2020 19: 14 New
                      0
                      Quote: ccsr
                      You can see it from your pole, but ask any commander of an Air Force division, he will always speak out in favor of an extra combat aircraft.

                      So this is the Air Force, not the naval MPA. In the Navy, the third squadrons pulled out to the last.
                      Quote: ccsr
                      But the Americans do not think so, and prefer to have container jamming stations on strategic bombers, rather than allocate a combat aircraft for this:

                      I think we were talking about the MRA of the USSR? What does the current state of affairs with REP have to do with it?
                      A specialized aircraft REP based on the Tu-22M * was needed in the late 70s.
                      1. ccsr
                        ccsr 9 October 2020 19: 43 New
                        +1
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        So this is the Air Force, not the naval MPA. In the Navy, the third squadrons pulled out to the last.

                        The psychology of the commanders is always the same, regardless of the type of armed forces.
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        A specialized aircraft REP based on the Tu-22M * was needed in the late 70s.

                        To be honest, I don’t know what the concept of the General Staff's electronic warfare service looked like then, but the species chiefs had their own ideas about this, and therefore I do not know what all this resulted in. Maybe someone from the EW specialists will educate the local public, it would be interesting to know.
                      2. timokhin-aa
                        11 October 2020 09: 37 New
                        0
                        You don’t spend a lot of time on this figure, he is having fun here, forcing people to waste time on his blizzard, no matter what issue is discussed, this miracle takes a deliberately wrong position, and begins to annoy others.

                        The Air Force also had electronic warfare squadrons to the end, in those regiments where they flew the Tu-22, and the attack tactics of the aircraft carrier group did not differ between the Air Force and the MRA, the share of time in combat training that was allocated to aircraft carrier issues differed, after all, it was Air Force, not naval aviation.

                        And your opponent has an abnormal unhealthy desire to pester people - at least type his nickname on the Russian keyboard, it's clear all at once.
                      3. Cyril G ...
                        Cyril G ... 11 October 2020 11: 19 New
                        0
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        A specialized aircraft REP based on the Tu-22M * was needed in the late 70s.

                        Exactly
              2. timokhin-aa
                9 October 2020 22: 24 New
                0
                And what does Gorshkov have to do with creating an MPA?


                She grew up herself or what?

                The mere fact that the electronic warfare aircraft on the Tu-22M platform was never made speaks volumes.


                We were on the Tu-16 and Tu-22.
                1. Cyril G ...
                  Cyril G ... 9 October 2020 23: 45 New
                  -1
                  The fleet, in principle, has nothing to do with the creation of the MPA. They deigned to play with boats ...
                  1. timokhin-aa
                    10 October 2020 10: 09 New
                    0
                    How to understand nothing to do with it? Who created it then?
                    1. Cyril G ...
                      Cyril G ... 10 October 2020 11: 13 New
                      0
                      The Navy was generally not in the know about the creation of the first aviation anti-ship missile system for the Tu-4. They found out only at the time of the beginning of the combat use of the KS-1.
                      1. timokhin-aa
                        10 October 2020 17: 32 New
                        0
                        August 30 marks 65 years since the formation of the 124th heavy bomber long-range naval aviation regiment, at the Black Sea Fleet, in the Guards. The regiment was created by Directive of the General Staff of the Navy No. 53280 of August 30, 1955. Prior to that, since 1953, the regiment existed as the 27th special unit and was engaged in testing the first Soviet serial air-based anti-ship missile system KS-1. The 27th special unit was actually the first naval missile-carrying aviation unit in the USSR, and after the formation of the 124th tbap dd, it became possible to talk about the emergence of a new type of forces in the MA of the Navy.


                        They did not know and did not guess. I admit that they began to make the comet initially with the suggestion of someone else, not from the Navy. But here it was tested at the naval aviation airbase, and the naval aviation received it first.
          2. Serg65
            Serg65 9 October 2020 08: 11 New
            0
            Quote: Cyril G ...
            Under Khrushchev

            smile Somehow Nikita Sergeevich decided to visit his bosom friend Gamal Abdel. On the trip comrade Khrushchev set off on the motor ship "Armenia" ..... when leaving the Dardanelles, "Armenia" was greeted by NATO ships and planes. The constant presence of NATO ships and aircraft in a couple of days brought Nikita Sergeevich to white heat .... The first secretary pounced on Gorshkov with obscenities ... admiral, where are your ships ????? So Nikita Sergeevich, you yourself ordered them to be cut into metal !!!!
            Postscript ... it was this journey of Khrushchev that gave rise to the creation of the 5th OpEsk and the revision of Khrushchev's views on the development of the surface fleet!
            Quote: Cyril G ...
            built herds of missile, torpedo boats and MRK

            Ok ... how many rank 1 rocket ships have the industry been able to build?
            1. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 9 October 2020 10: 42 New
              0
              Quote: Serg65
              Ok ... how many rank 1 rocket ships have the industry been able to build?


              I'm not even close to that.
              Firstly, there were a lot of missile boats and it was not necessary. Look how many of the same project 205 were built. Rather, the speech is about the fact that in the composition of each fleet it would be much more useful to be a SHAD on IS in the first place. Secondly, the WWII experience in coastal waters spoke of the need to have, among other things, artillery and patrol boats. And here again, instead of efforts to form permanent tactical groups, which would include RCA and patrol boats and artillery boats. And we even had separate brigades of missile boats. Remember the results of the battles in the Mediterranean where the Arabs were killed by the Bofors

              The first secretary with obscenities attacked Gorshkov ... admiral, where are your


              The gorshkov were cunning, the ships were, but the thrust was not enough, and so yes, he was a magnificent courtier. I used the moment ts
              1. Serg65
                Serg65 9 October 2020 12: 27 New
                -1
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                Gorshkov cunning the ships were

                Well, yes ... 1 crr + 6 crl 68-bis + 1 crl 28 ave and 1 crl 28-bis for 4 fleets! Sorry, 1964! This is about ...
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                was not enough

                On May 9, 1964, Khrushchev arrived in Alexandria, and already in June of the same year, a detachment of ships consisting of the Mikhail Kutuzov KRL, the Conscious BPK and the Komsomolets Ukrainy BPK first entered the Mediterranean Sea for combat service!
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                Look how many of the same project 205 were built.

                Project 205 is the end of the 50s and the beginning of the 60s .... who in those days was still armed with anti-ship missiles? Until 1962, nobody!
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                Remember the results of the battles in the Mediterranean where the Arabs were killed by the Bofors

                It was on these results that projects 1241 and 1234 appeared in the Soviet Navy!
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                which would include both RCA and Patrol boats and artillery

                1990-th year, PMTO Sakotra, AK pr. 205P and MPK 1125M quite coped with the tasks voiced by you!
                1. Cyril G ...
                  Cyril G ... 9 October 2020 13: 15 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Serg65
                  Sorry, 1964! This is about ...


                  And before that, it was 1937, when the RKKF could not provide cover for cargo transportation on the Spanish route, there were ships, there was no desire. And then there was the Cuban missile crisis, when absolutely the same thing happened.

                  Now about the cruisers - in 1964 there were 13 ships of Project 68bis, 2 ships of Project 68K and 2 ships of Project 26. In total, only artillery cruisers - 17 and another missile cruiser pr.58. I don’t consider 2 more RRC because they raised the flag at the end of 1964. A total of 18 ships of 1 rank for 4 fleets and about 100 destroyers.

                  who in these times was still armed with anti-ship missiles? Until 1962, nobody!


                  Who can argue that it is only known that the use of the P-15 by the Jewish RCA turned out to be ineffective due to the low noise immunity of the ARGSN. Therefore, I write for the fight in the coastal area it was more expedient to use multi-purpose, read artillery boats and fighter-bombers ...

                  AK pr. 205P and MPK 1125M quite coped with the tasks voiced by you!


                  So when was that ?!
                  1. Serg65
                    Serg65 9 October 2020 14: 31 New
                    -2
                    Quote: Cyril G ...
                    in service in 1964 there were 13 ships of Project 68bis

                    Yeah .. 6 in the first line, 7 in conservation.
                    Quote: Cyril G ...
                    2 ships of Project 68K

                    1 educational and 1 OS
                    and that ..
                    Quote: Serg65
                    1 rkr + 6 crl 68-bis + 1 crl 28 pr. And 1 crl 28-bis for 4 fleets!

                    wink
                    Quote: Cyril G ...
                    And before that it was 1937

                    The same picture, only in the place of Khrushchev Stalin.
                    Quote: Cyril G ...
                    ships were

                    belay There were ships ... 40 battleships, 6 aircraft carriers and 50 cruisers ????
                    Quote: Cyril G ...
                    missile cruiser pr.58. 2 more RRC I don’t think because they raised the flag at the end of 1964

                    what And two RRCs of which project ????
                    1. Cyril G ...
                      Cyril G ... 9 October 2020 14: 37 New
                      0
                      58 project two ships entered service in 1964. November-December. This is if we are about 1964.
          3. ccsr
            ccsr 11 October 2020 10: 38 New
            +1
            Quote: Cyril G ...
            With all the reductions in the fleet, aviation was cut first. Under Khrushchev, the fleet lost its attack and fighter aircraft

            If you want to learn more about what was happening with the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet at that time, I recommend finding this book on the network:

            I. P. SHEVCHENKO , KOVAL Yu.L.
            CHRONICLE OF THE FIRST CONNECTION
            FIRING AVIATION
            BLACK SEA FLEET
            Kerch-Odessa
            2019
            CHRONICLE OF THE FIRST COMMUNICATION OF FIRING AVIATION
            BLACK SEA FLEET
            In memory of the aviators of the 127th Fighter Aviation Division
            Air Force of the Black Sea Fleet
            dedicated to ...
            1 section
            Formation of the naval fighter aviation formation
            In April 1940, the 62nd Fighter Aviation was created.
            brigade (IAB) of the Black Sea Fleet (Black Sea Fleet), which includes the 8th, 9th and 32nd
            fighter aviation regiments (IAP), 18th, 87th, 93rd and 96th separate
            fighter aviation squadrons (FIAE). Commander of the 62nd IAB
            Colonel Dziuba Georgy Georgievich was appointed. At the beginning of the Great
            World War II units of the 62nd Aviation Brigade were deployed
            at the airfields of the Black Sea cities: in Evpatoria - 8, 32nd IAP and 18th
            OIAE, in Ochakov - 9th IAP and in Kerch - 93rd OIAE.
            In September 1941, at the Simonovka airfield, Krasnodar Territory
            the 62nd mixed fighter aviation regiment of special
            destination (SIAPON) for air cover of the cities of Gelendzhik, Anapa
            and Novorossiysk. By order of the commander of the 62nd SIAPON with
            September 1941 Colonel Ivan Vasilyevich Sharapov was appointed.
            The regiment was later renamed the 62nd Mixed Fighter
            Aviation Regiment (SIAP).
            In the fall of 1941, two aviation squadrons of the 62nd IAB participate
            in the defense of the main naval base of the Black Sea Fleet - the city of Sevastopol.
            In the period from December 1941 to May 1942, fighter aircraft
            The Air Force (VVS) of the Black Sea Fleet participates in support of the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, repels air raids by fascist aircraft on ground forces and covers military and transport ships. The main place of air battles of the 62nd IAB
            there was a sky over the coast and the southeastern part of the Black Sea:
            Feodosia, the Kerch Peninsula and the coastal part of the Caucasus
            (Tamanyu, Anapa, Novorossiysk, Lazarevskaya, etc.)
            1. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 11 October 2020 11: 21 New
              0
              Do you have it in the e-mail?
  4. Pavel57
    Pavel57 7 October 2020 18: 38 New
    +4
    Each ship was named and its loss was noticeable. And the divisions were largely impersonal.
  5. The comment was deleted.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2020 18: 45 New
      +9
      This does not justify the decision of the Headquarters to terminate the application of the Tax Code.
      1. Kote Pan Kokhanka
        Kote Pan Kokhanka 7 October 2020 19: 40 New
        +3
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        This does not justify the decision of the Headquarters to terminate the application of the Tax Code.

        Here I agree with the Author. Although traditionally, after such a quote, the argument is given "Stalin planned to save the fleet, For the post-war redistribution of spheres of influence, as an argument!"
        1. antivirus
          antivirus 7 October 2020 20: 35 New
          -4
          and the threat to the Romanians-Turks-Blgars was needed later, for their withdrawal from the war-transition under the "high hand of the Kremlin" In addition to the victory in the Crimea and Odessa.
          in case of any losses - THE QUESTION OF STRAITS AND ACTIONS BY THE MEDITERRANEAN MARINE SCADER OF ENGLAND AGAINST US IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE STRAITS RISED UP.
          THERE WAS NO HANDS IN THE COUNTRY AND IVS PODLIZAMS IN FRONT OF THE CHURCHILS.
          How to cover the Danube Delta (when entering the river) without the ships of the KChF?
          1. Kote Pan Kokhanka
            Kote Pan Kokhanka 7 October 2020 20: 52 New
            +4
            Good evening!
            Then let's go from the other side, but could our Red Banner Black Sea Fleet (model 1943) provide effective resistance to the British squadron during the escalation of the conflict?
            Although, it is clear that it is better to have at least something than nothing.
            1. antivirus
              antivirus 7 October 2020 21: 08 New
              +1
              to show the effective resistance of the British squadron during the escalation of the conflict?
              1.block the Straits
              2 flood at the entrances to the bases as in 1854 and 2014
              1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
                Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 7 October 2020 22: 22 New
                0
                ... 1.block the Straits
                2 flood at the entrances to the bases as in 1854 and 2014

                Brilliant! Well - after all, maybe

                Own Nels
                Russian land to give birth!
                laughing
              2. Serg65
                Serg65 8 October 2020 13: 01 New
                +2
                Quote: antivirus
                block the Straits

                Stalin planned a battle with the British squadron in the Dardanelles in the late 40s!
            2. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 13: 25 New
              0
              Quote: Kote pane Kohanka
              Could our Red Banner Black Sea Fleet (model 1943) provide effective resistance to the British squadron during the escalation of the conflict?


              No word at all. And blocking the straits was not a solvable task in general. In the best case, delay by a couple of hundred square meters with a mine setting.
          2. timokhin-aa
            7 October 2020 21: 08 New
            +8
            All this did not justify the game of giveaway with the enemy in the course of the ongoing war for survival on its territory.
            Moreover, the ships were obviously not the latest in technology and equipment.
            I had to fight.
            1. antivirus
              antivirus 7 October 2020 21: 12 New
              -1
              how much non-ferrous metal is in Kharkiv and the tank? proportions - which is more valuable? it must be preserved even at death.
              going to die, but this rye (winter)
            2. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
              Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 7 October 2020 22: 29 New
              +1
              ... in the course of an ongoing war for survival on its territory

              Namely - on the territory. The water area is secondary. As, in fact, Tukh-sky said - the Navy played an auxiliary role.
              1. timokhin-aa
                7 October 2020 22: 49 New
                +5
                Thanks to Tukhachevsky, he did not work out even half of his potential.
                Nemchekov 200-300 thousand could "work out" a plus to what really was.
                And the army would be easier.

                An attempt to crush the fleet under the boots of the infantry does not make life easier for the ground forces, but complicates it. They lose their "ally".
        2. Vadim_888
          Vadim_888 14 October 2020 01: 03 New
          +2
          [
          ... “Stalin planned to save the fleet, D
          rather, Stalin stopped trusting the admirals, lost faith in their ability to plan something
          1. Kote Pan Kokhanka
            Kote Pan Kokhanka 14 October 2020 04: 24 New
            +1
            Maybe you are right.
      2. Cyril G ...
        Cyril G ... 7 October 2020 22: 47 New
        +3
        And what would the use of large NKs at the Black Sea Fleet give after such an enchanting pogrom?
        - to use destroyers in the Kerch Strait, to counter the surface forces of the Kriegsmarine (3-4 Schnelbots, several Raumbots and a dozen artillery ferries) would be essentially unrealistic due to the local soup with dumplings
        - Apply them when evacuating the Fritzes from Crimea. The only possible option. Only I do not believe in its successful implementation, even without the disaster on October 6 ...
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 October 2020 12: 01 New
          +2
          - Apply them when evacuating the Fritzes from Crimea. The only possible option. Only I do not believe in its successful implementation, even without the disaster on October 6 ...


          Even not trying is unforgivable. There could be a victory of fantastic proportions. And the threat was minimal.
          1. Cyril G ...
            Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 13: 27 New
            +1
            Even in the north, we did not dare to use the SF destroyers against the regular Fritz coastal convoys. Moreover, both the condition of the EM-Severomors and the flotation were significantly higher.
            1. timokhin-aa
              8 October 2020 13: 41 New
              0
              I repeat - the war for domination of communications in the USSR was a firing theme from 1933 to 1939.

              How would they learn?
              1. Cyril G ...
                Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 13: 53 New
                +1
                They learned to fight with surface ships. The problem is what? Well yes ...
                1. timokhin-aa
                  8 October 2020 14: 11 New
                  +2
                  We learned how to fight, but at the same Black Sea Fleet they could not find a single convoy in the sea in front of the "Verp", although there were convoys and they were looking for them.

                  Because it must be ABLE to do. But as?
                  1. Cyril G ...
                    Cyril G ... 11 October 2020 13: 06 New
                    0
                    But in the North and the Baltic Fleet, surface ships entered into battle with the enemy's OBK, and on the Black Sea Fleet they quite intercepted the convoy - remember the results?
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      15 October 2020 10: 52 New
                      0
                      Young school - reducing the fight to concentrated strikes, then to a series of successive ones.

                      I have already given an explanation on this topic, incl. and here in the comments. When it is forbidden to learn to fight for 6 years, and for words about how to fight correctly, they are put up against the wall, then the effect will be just that.
              2. Vadim_888
                Vadim_888 14 October 2020 01: 05 New
                0
                ... I repeat - the war for domination of communications in the USSR was a firing topic from 1933 to 1939.

                How would they learn
                , and most importantly on what? On mostly obsolete ships of the Russian Empire?
            2. Serg65
              Serg65 8 October 2020 14: 12 New
              +3
              Quote: Cyril G ...
              Even in the north, we did not dare to use the destroyers of the Northern Fleet against the regular coastal convoys of the Fritzes.

              The destroyers of the Northern Fleet could barely cope with the escort of their convoys, and you also want to put the fight against the enemy on them!
              1. timokhin-aa
                8 October 2020 14: 53 New
                +1
                Westerners write that the Federation Council created serious communication problems for Dietl. Whatever destroyers.
                1. Serg65
                  Serg65 8 October 2020 14: 56 New
                  +2
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  Westerners write that the Federation Council created serious communication problems for Dietl. Whatever destroyers.

                  That's right, the destroyers had their own work, the rest was shifted to submarines, TKs and aviation.
                2. Vadim_888
                  Vadim_888 14 October 2020 01: 06 New
                  0
                  Submarines probably had in mind
  6. Alien From
    Alien From 7 October 2020 18: 38 New
    +6
    Thanks to the author, an interesting and detailed article!)
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2020 18: 46 New
      +3
      Please glad you liked it.
      1. Kote Pan Kokhanka
        Kote Pan Kokhanka 7 October 2020 20: 53 New
        +5
        For a long time there was no such work at VO. Thanks!
  7. The comment was deleted.
  8. Operator
    Operator 7 October 2020 18: 45 New
    -9
    "When you speak, it feels like you are delusional" (C)

    Yes, yes, yes: it was the Supreme Command Headquarters that forced the admirals to intercept enemy convoys on the sea lanes of Yalta, and ... what were the communications of Yalta in 1943 - with Gurzuf? laughing

    Yes, yes, yes: it was the Supreme Command Headquarters that forced the admirals-brave men to complete the raid operation in the daytime and still allocated their representatives to push the brave gunners of the leader of "Tashkent" under the elbow, which is why they even missed all targets in Yalta during the day - I wonder how? laughing

    Yes, yes, yes: it was the Supreme Command Headquarters that forbade the valiant admirals who were good fellows to put up a smoke screen during raids by enemy aircraft, because "this did not correspond to combat experience" - which one? laughing

    Etc. etc.

    PS It is especially important that this opus claims to be instructed (from a journalist from the outskirts, by the way) for the Black Sea Fleet.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 7 October 2020 19: 18 New
      +8
      Quote: Operator
      Yes, yes, yes: it was the Supreme Command Headquarters that forced the admirals to intercept enemy convoys on the sea lanes of Yalta, and ... what were the communications of Yalta in 1943 - with Gurzuf?

      Have you read the exact same article? Because the article under discussion directly states which convoy should have been intercepted:
      Intelligence: ...
      7.16 W = 45.00. D = 35.45, a caravan of up to 20 units under the cover of 2 ME-110 was heading for Feodosia.
      Counteraction: heavy fire 3A and machine guns.

      Quote: Operator
      Yes, yes, yes: it was the Supreme Command Headquarters that forced the admirals-brave men to complete the raid operation in the daytime and still allocated their representatives to push the brave gunners of the leader of "Tashkent" under the elbow, which is why they even missed all targets in Yalta during the day - I wonder how?

      Well, now also "Tashkent" has risen from the bottom of the sea.
      Where does the article say about the Headquarters order for shelling in the daytime? There, two names of the initiators of this are directly named - and both of them are naval:
      Question: Who owns the idea of ​​the operation?

      Answer: I cannot remember exactly, but the idea of ​​this operation, in my opinion, was proposed by the head of the Black Sea Fleet's operations department, Captain 1st Rank Melnikov. A few days before that, a similar operation was carried out, but the actions of the ships and the withdrawal from the enemy shores were carried out at night. When reporting on the results of the previous operation, People's Commissar Kuznetsov criticized it and pointed out the need for such operations at dawn. This instruction of the People's Commissar was supported especially by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Stepanov, who was also present at the same time. As a result of the report, it was concluded that night operations have no effect, and therefore the tasks of finding and destroying enemy watercraft must be postponed to daylight hours. Based on this conclusion, an operation was developed for the 1st destroyer battalion on October 5-6, 1943

      The article blames the Headquarters only for the fact that, without thoroughly understanding the reasons for what happened, she drove all the ships larger than the TSC into the bases.
      On the other hand, it is possible that the Stavka simply soberly assessed the level of training of the naval commanders who managed to lose the last ship already within the radius of the coastal Yaks. And even if you remove these, the others will not be better. Suffice it to recall the raid operation on the KON on the Northern Fleet, when the LD could not determine the distance to the TR, when firing at the LD, only one TA went off, and all the torpedoes went by. EM, who was following the leader, did not fire a torpedo at all, waiting for the command of the flagship, and when the flagship began to turn away from the KOH, EM, instead of launching torpedoes, blocked his firing director. The reasons for the failure are still the same - the lack of sane planning of the operation (well, bad preparation of teams too).
      1. timokhin-aa
        7 October 2020 19: 50 New
        +2
        The article blames the Headquarters only for the fact that, without thoroughly understanding the reasons for what happened, she drove all the ships larger than the TSC into the bases.
        On the other hand, it is possible that the Stavka simply soberly assessed the level of training of the naval commanders who managed to lose the last ship already within the radius of the coastal Yaks.


        To repulse that blow, it was necessary to have about 30 fighters in the air. Unrealistic.
        The trick is that nothing would help.
        1. Cyril G ...
          Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 13: 31 New
          +2
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          It was necessary to have about 30 fighters in the air to fight that blow.


          Well, why on earth is 30 then? If the same staffel with a cover from the BF-109 unit participated in a series of consecutive strikes at best
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 8 October 2020 19: 10 New
            0
            Quote: Cyril G ...
            Well, why on earth is 30 then? If the same staffel with a cover from the BF-109 unit participated in a series of consecutive strikes at best

            The Germans used small forces only in the first strikes, when only Axes could cover the ships. As soon as our ships crawled into the radius of Jacob and Cobras, the Germans immediately sent a reinforced group: 18 "bast shoes" under the cover of 12 "Messers".

            The main ambush was that there were forces to intercept this group. But it was necessary to know exactly the time of the enemy group's exit to the cover object - because the flight time for their fighters was 30-35 minutes, and the watch time was no more than an hour. And for this, long-range detection was necessary, at least 40-45 minutes before the enemy aircraft entered the ships. In short, a radar was needed.
            1. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 19: 13 New
              0
              And again, there was still an opportunity to provide radar for at least some of the Black Sea Fleet destroyers ...

              No matter how it turns out, if we start to dig that the radar kits delivered in bulk are stuck in Murmansk or central warehouses in MOSCOW
            2. timokhin-aa
              8 October 2020 21: 25 New
              0
              In short, a radar was needed.


              And not on ships.

              By the way, let's flood. And what would the SDRLO look like on the technologies of those years laughing
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 9 October 2020 12: 54 New
                +1
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                By the way, let's flood. And what would the SDRLO look like on the technologies of those years

                Everything is already stolen before us. © smile
                Deck - like this:

                Coastal - like this:
              2. Cyril G ...
                Cyril G ... 9 October 2020 13: 47 New
                0
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                And not on ships.


                It is that on ships + deployed on the KPUNIA detachment. They were already on the shore, albeit a little.
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 9 October 2020 18: 46 New
                  +2
                  Quote: Cyril G ...
                  Exactly what's on the ships

                  Well, yes, the coastal from our territory may not "finish off" to the desired distance.
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  long-range detection was needed, at least 40-45 minutes before the enemy aircraft entered the ships

                  On the other hand, the radar station on EM in 1943, and even after firing the main battery, is a device operating in the "it goes out, then goes out".
                  Noise and groan in the parking lot - "Argon" does not work. smile
                  Quote: Cyril G ...
                  deployed on the KPUNIA detachment

                  But this must be included with the radar station.
      2. Kote Pan Kokhanka
        Kote Pan Kokhanka 7 October 2020 20: 06 New
        +5
        Quote: Alexey RA
        On the other hand, it is possible that the Headquarters just soberly assessed the level of training of the commanders of the Navy,


        In this situation, it is necessary to change the commander of the fleet, but that Oktyabrsky, like his colleague Tributs in such situations, constantly got out of the water. Not unimportant was the technical factor. So, studying the weapons schemes of domestic ships of all ranks, you note the dense layout of anti-aircraft weapons. Often on the same line, in front of the main caliber guns, or on them. In addition, there is a shortage of small-caliber artillery. The Sevens and the Leader were simply not ready for independent operations without a dense air cover. The means of detection were also lame.

        Without diminishing the feat of our sailors, having organizational, personnel and technical vulnerabilities, the operation was doomed to failure.
        By the way, I was surprised by the presence of Il-2 attack aircraft and Pe-2 bombing raids in guarding the battalion.
        Regards, Vladislav!
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2020 21: 13 New
          +3
          In this situation, it is necessary to change the commander of the fleet,


          There he was changed - Vladimirsky was removed. Although, figuratively speaking, it was the jamb of the system.

          By the way, I was surprised by the presence of Il-2 attack aircraft and Pe-2 bombing raids in guarding the battalion.


          From torpedo boats and submarines on the surface + aerial reconnaissance
        2. Sergey Sfiedu
          Sergey Sfiedu 7 October 2020 21: 56 New
          +4
          "By the way, the presence of Il-2 attack aircraft and Pe-2 bombing raids in guarding the division surprised" - well, in theory, they could well drive off the Junkers and Heinkels. But for this, their crews had to be taught the basics of fighter combat. I remember reading somewhere that the Il-2 tried to attack the German transport vehicles, but unsuccessfully, as they simply could not shoot at planes.
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 8 October 2020 00: 06 New
            +4
            Bombing Pe-2 in guarding the division "- well, in theory, they could well drive off the Junkers and Heinkels.

            On June 27, 1942, it was a pair of Pe-2s that helped the leader of the "Tashkent" reach Novorossiysk.
        3. Ivanchester
          Ivanchester 7 October 2020 22: 06 New
          +2
          During the operation described in the article, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet was Admiral Vladimirsky, who at the beginning of 1944 was just removed from office.
        4. Victor Leningradets
          Victor Leningradets 8 October 2020 10: 37 New
          +3
          You are absolutely right!
          To strengthen the air defense of the ships, it was necessary to sacrifice one torpedo tube and two upper B-13s. Place Lend-Lease 4 "/ 45 QF Mark XVI 4" / 45 or QF Mark XVII 4 "/ 45A instead of them, as well as stick Erlikons instead of combat searchlights and DShK machine guns. But for this you had to have the courage to directly address the Supreme Commander, referring on the experience of the Allies.Neither Oktyabrsky, nor Tributs, nor Kuznetsov were capable of this.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 8 October 2020 13: 47 New
            0
            Quote: Victor Leningradets
            To strengthen the air defense of the ships, it was necessary to sacrifice one torpedo tube and two upper B-13s. Replace them with Lend-Lease 4 "/ 45 QF Mark XVI 4" / 45 or QF Mark XVII 4 "/ 45A

            SUAO under all this splendor where will we put it? You can't touch your native KDP - since a pair of B-13s remained. Or will the British system be taught to control the B-13 as well?
            Quote: Victor Leningradets
            as well as to poke erlikons instead of combat searchlights and DShK machine guns.

            There's no point. EM's main enemy is a dive bomber. And in the report of the commander of the AV Enterprise on the battles near the Solomon Islands, it is directly written that the Oerlikons are useless for repelling the strike of dive bombers - planes drop bombs before entering the effective fire zone of the 20-mm MZA. The maximum that "Oerlikon" is capable of is to fire on already "unloaded" dive bombers. Moreover, it was written about the Japanese, who, to improve accuracy, pulled with a reset to the last.
            1. Nehist
              Nehist 8 October 2020 15: 00 New
              +3
              What about the Brit and the Americans delolite? Especially shaved, they stopped one TA and the rest of the MZA strengthened
              1. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 8 October 2020 16: 15 New
                +2
                Quote: Nehist
                What about the Brit and the Americans delolite? Especially shaved, they stopped one TA and the rest of the MZA strengthened

                And the British eventually came to their senses - and on destroyers with mixed artillery weapons they began to remove additional 102-mm, replacing them with TA. So if we want to re-arm the "sevens", then it is better to immediately make them of the "Lively" or "type P" type with a single main caliber of 4 ".
                Regarding the MLA, a good example is the "R type", on which half of the "Erlikons" were exchanged for single-barreled "Bofors".
                1. Cyril G ...
                  Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 17: 20 New
                  0
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  then it is better to immediately make of them a type "Lively" or "type P" with a single main caliber of 4 ".

                  This is exactly what should have been done after the war, 3x2 SM-5s will quite become on the same pr. 30bis.
                2. Macsen_wledig
                  Macsen_wledig 8 October 2020 18: 53 New
                  0
                  Quote: Alexey RA
                  So if we want to re-arm the "sevens", then it is better to immediately make them of the "Lively" or "type P" type with a single main caliber of 4 ".

                  Both the first and the second were forced: there were not enough 120-mm main guns ...
                  And nowhere did I meet laudatory reviews about them, except for obscene ones about "Obidient" and "Obdureit" and "Oruel", which of their 4 "did not reach the German ships in the New Year's battle.
                  1. Alexey RA
                    Alexey RA 9 October 2020 13: 00 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Macsen_Wledig
                    Both the first and the second were forced: there were not enough 120-mm main guns ...

                    So we are considering a forced measure: how to strengthen the air defense of the EM, having initially the absence of its long-range fighters and the presence of the enemy only a small fleet (for the Romanians took care of their EM no worse than our Black Sea Fleet after the "Verpa" smile ).
                    Quote: Macsen_Wledig
                    And nowhere did I meet laudatory reviews about them, except for obscene ones about "Obidient" and "Obdureit" and "Oruel", which of their 4 "did not reach the German ships in the New Year's battle.

                    Well, EM Black Sea Fleet will definitely not have such an enemy. smile At the World Cup, they mostly have to work on TCA and BDB.
            2. Victor Leningradets
              Victor Leningradets 9 October 2020 12: 48 New
              0
              You are partly right, but the SUAO follows the anti-aircraft guns - Lend-Lease and instead of the KDP. It will quite cope with the control of the B-13 instead of 4.7 "/ 45 QF Mark IX, having adjusted the ballistics. I will not say a good word about the Bofors against the dive bombers, but you can put two twin instead of 34-K, but on the Tashkent their analogue 70-K is successful Oerlikons serve more to prevent panic on the attacked ship (wow, we fry!) and to irritate the attacking pilots (when there are continuous tracers around you, you will not be too late on the combat course).
              In general, a destroyer against the coast is a necessary measure. This is the lot of cruisers. Moreover, the 180 mm caliber looks extremely advantageous here.
              1. Macsen_wledig
                Macsen_wledig 9 October 2020 13: 21 New
                0
                Quote: Victor Leningradets
                I won't say a good word about the Bofors against the dive bombers,

                Because of?

                Quote: Victor Leningradets
                however, on "Tashkent" their analogue 70-K successfully failed.

                As the saying goes: "What is your evidence? .." (c)

                Quote: Victor Leningradets
                In general, a destroyer against the coast is a necessary measure.

                For lack of stamp ...
                1. Victor Leningradets
                  Victor Leningradets 9 October 2020 15: 03 New
                  0
                  Because of?

                  - can shoot down but cannot prevent approaching the target.
                  As the saying goes: "What is your evidence? .." (c)

                  - These are not mine, but V.N. Eroshenko
                  For lack of stamp ...

                  - maybe it was worthwhile to balance the forces and not waste the shells?
                  1. Macsen_wledig
                    Macsen_wledig 9 October 2020 15: 19 New
                    0
                    Quote: Victor Leningradets
                    - can shoot down but cannot prevent approaching the target.

                    And only American 3 "/ 50 Marks 22 ...
                    But they are still far and long.

                    Quote: Victor Leningradets
                    - These are not mine, but V.N. Eroshenko

                    And in what place to look?

                    Quote: Victor Leningradets
                    - maybe it was worthwhile to balance the forces and not waste the shells?

                    Where would the RKKF have recruited so many cruisers?
              2. Alexey RA
                Alexey RA 9 October 2020 19: 04 New
                0
                Quote: Victor Leningradets
                You are partly right, but the SUAO follows the anti-aircraft guns - Lend-Lease and instead of the KDP. It will quite cope with the control of the B-13 instead of the 4.7 "/ 45 QF Mark IX, having adjusted the ballistics.

                Why do we need two calibers and only two B-13s on the EV? On the other hand, there are also few anti-aircraft guns.
                No really taking off their head through their hair, they don't cry - since change, then change everything. Fortunately, it's somehow tense with a surface enemy of a comparable class at the World Cup. smile
                Quote: Victor Leningradets
                I won't say a good word about the Bofors against the dive bombers, but you can put two sparks instead of 34-K, but on the Tashkent their analogue 70-K successfully failed.

                70-K is the same analogue of "Bofors" as V-11 - analogue of ZAK. smile
                70-K is an army assault rifle with manual guidance, which, by the will of our industry, was registered as an MZA on naval ships.
                Speaking of the Bofors, I meant just a naval 40-mm twin with water cooling, power guidance drives and director control.
                Here is what the commander of AB "Enterprise" wrote about the first battle (26.10.1942/40/1,1) after installing on AB XNUMX-mm instead of XNUMX ':
                The performance of the 40mm in their first action was gratifying. Eventually these guns may prove to be our best defense against dive bombers.

                The work of the 40-mm in their first battle pleased. As a result, these tools may be our best defense against dive bombers.
            3. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 9 October 2020 13: 56 New
              0
              To combat dive bombers, it was precisely what 34K with MPUAZO Soyuz or Ring were needed. With which, uh, I was strained. However, on Kharkiv MPUAZO was definitely there, on the destroyers MPUAZO was not at all.
              1. Macsen_wledig
                Macsen_wledig 9 October 2020 14: 30 New
                0
                Quote: Cyril G ...
                and the destroyers of the MPUAZO were not completely removed.

                At the Black Sea Fleet - "Capable" and "Free";
                At KBF - "Strict", "Slender", "Strozhevoy" and, possibly, "Fast" and "Statny".
      3. Operator
        Operator 7 October 2020 21: 31 New
        +6
        And you definitely understood the meaning of the article: the brave military men wanted the best, and the Headquarters, by their folly, did not understand their good intentions, put them on a chain until the end of the war along with the entire Black Sea Fleet (which was tantamount to drowning the fleet by the enemy)? laughing
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 8 October 2020 10: 41 New
          +1
          Quote: Operator
          And you definitely understood the meaning of the article: the brave military men wanted the best, and the Headquarters, by their folly, did not understand their good intentions, put them on a chain until the end of the war along with the entire Black Sea Fleet (which was tantamount to drowning the fleet by the enemy)? laughing

          The meaning is a bit different: the gallant military men wanted the best, but they constantly screwed up. And Headquarters, without understanding the reasons for the stocks, instead of targeted organizational conclusions, slammed a wholesale organizational conclusion: all large ships were banned from leaving the base.
          It is the same as that following the results of the battle on July 12.07.1943, XNUMX, the use of all tank formations was prohibited.
          1. Operator
            Operator 8 October 2020 11: 06 New
            0
            The reason was as simple as a nail: the brave painters self-taught at the front in six months, and only the grave could fix the brave military men - the level of technical culture of the Soviet population in the middle of the 20th century did not correspond to the level of complexity of operation and use of the navy, unfortunately.
            1. timokhin-aa
              8 October 2020 12: 02 New
              -1
              No, the reason is completely different, and the article says what.
  9. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 7 October 2020 18: 57 New
    +2
    In addition, in the conditions of the political system of the USSR in the 40s, it was problematic to simply take and leave the ship, which generally had a small speed.

    Problematic, but possible. The fate of EM "Wrathful" is an example of this: the EM, which was blown up by a mine, remained afloat, the team was ready to enter boiler # 3 - but an order came to leave the ship, which was later finished off.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2020 19: 47 New
      +2
      The order came, this is one thing, he decided it another.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 7 October 2020 19: 50 New
        +3
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The order came, this is one thing, he decided it another.

        The order came - this is in the sense that he came to the destroyer. And the commander of the squadron cap-two Svyatov decided to leave the ship.
        The commander of the detachment, Captain 2nd Rank I.G. Svyatov, taking into account the situation (and in addition to "Wrathful", the "Maxim Gorky" was blown up by a mine), ordered the personnel to leave the ship. The crew of the "Wrathful" received the "Proud" that approached it, and then the abandoned ship was shot by 130-mm high-explosive shells. But, despite the fire and explosion of ammunition in one of the artillery cellars, the abandoned destroyer stubbornly did not want to sink. Only two days later, it was sunk by German aircraft.
        © S.L. Balakin. "Thundering" and others. Destroyers of project 7.
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2020 19: 53 New
          +2
          Nevertheless, it is quite possible to assume that Negoda did not dare.
    2. Kote Pan Kokhanka
      Kote Pan Kokhanka 7 October 2020 20: 08 New
      +5
      Theoretically, the Improved Seven should have come at the expense of a layered engine room, but - His Majesty is the case.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 8 October 2020 16: 35 New
        +1
        Quote: Kote Pan Kokhanka
        Theoretically, the Improved Seven should have come at the expense of a layered engine room, but - His Majesty is the case.

        Yes, "Wrathful" would have made it - he, already being left by the team, kept afloat for about two more days. Moreover, boiler No. 3 was already being prepared for commissioning. But Svyatov was carrying a "Maxim Gorky" without a nose, plus a cloud of messages from signalmen about periscopes (the "periscope epidemic" then covered not only the Black Sea Fleet). So, choosing between "bring to the base at least KR"And"chasing two birds with one stone, linger and possibly lose everything", he chose the first option.
  10. 27091965
    27091965 7 October 2020 19: 17 New
    +2
    On the other hand, the lack of understanding of the significance of naval power and its nature among the highest military-political leadership of the USSR led to a misunderstanding of the importance of the fleet at the right time in the right place.


    I think at that time the USSR understood the importance of the fleet and the tasks for it were determined in accordance with the available forces of the Navy.


    It is not clear what kind of dominance at sea and, most importantly, over what country the USSR Navy could claim at that time.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2020 19: 47 New
      +1
      Read the marine collection, there is.
      1. 27091965
        27091965 7 October 2020 20: 34 New
        +5
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Read the marine collection, there is.

        what
        I think it will be more interesting;

        And a large number of publications from that period of time, excerpts from which were used in your article.
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2020 20: 53 New
          +1
          It’s just a mockery to hint to me that I didn’t read Gervais.
          1. 27091965
            27091965 7 October 2020 21: 20 New
            +3
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            It’s just a mockery to hint to me that I didn’t read Gervais.


            Dear Alexander. I did not try to mock you, my comment refers to an article in the "Marine Collection", I do not agree with your statement;

            On the other hand, the lack of understanding of the significance of naval power and its nature among the highest military-political leadership of the USSR led to a misunderstanding of the importance of the fleet at the right time in the right place.
            hi
            1. timokhin-aa
              7 October 2020 22: 52 New
              +4
              Gervais was imprisoned for his convictions in 1931. Then they released him, forced him to write a penitential article in which he renounced his convictions, admitting that it was impossible to fight for supremacy in the sea lanes of the fleet, since it was not proletarian, not Bolshevik ...
              He died in 1934, at the age of 56, clearly not without the influence of the stress experienced.
              And - an important point, he was the only large-scale Soviet naval theorist who was not shot.

              It was not in vain that I wrote about Monakov and the "Sea Collection"; it shows well what it all led to.

              Well, you have to go through the links in the text, there is just one of Gervais's books. And in my article.
  11. Macsen_wledig
    Macsen_wledig 7 October 2020 19: 17 New
    +4

    There are, however, other indications that the move was 30-knot, but this was not the maximum speed for these ships.

    In the memoirs of P.V. Uvarov, who served as chief officer at "Kharkov", it is mentioned that by the end of 42 "Kharkov" could only issue approx. 30 knots full speed.
    And the retreat with a 28-node move fits well into these data.
    1. timokhin-aa
      7 October 2020 19: 48 New
      +3
      24 knots. According to the interrogation protocol. However, this alone does not change anything.
      1. antivirus
        antivirus 7 October 2020 20: 49 New
        -2
        not moreman - intelligence reported on transports? or a "free search" adventure? entry into Kerch and the strait? what else had to be done for the feat?
        overland people are tired of paying in blood and looking at "well-fed" sailors, they drove into a cavalry attack - you can analyze the result. and there is nothing to explore.
        Everything is clear in the subconscious, not the "art of war"
        1. timokhin-aa
          7 October 2020 22: 53 New
          +3
          Intelligence reported and there were many attempts to sink the German convoys, but they never succeeded.
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 7 October 2020 23: 58 New
            +3
            Intelligence reported and there were many attempts to sink the German convoys, but they never succeeded.

            What was in the way?
            Lack of assertiveness in the search for the enemy or the technical characteristics of the allocated funds?
            1. timokhin-aa
              8 October 2020 12: 05 New
              0
              Together. There, the Germans organized everything very competently - minefields, detachments of torpedo boats, coastal batteries, aviation and convoys with protection inside all this. Ours on boats and destroyers tried to slip there at night in order not to get hit by an airstrike, there were fire contacts with German small things, but it was not possible to cover the convoy.

              Several times the submarines turned out to be in the right place and fired, but our torpedoes almost always passed below the shell being fired, or did not fire when hit.

              As it is now, in general.
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 8 October 2020 16: 11 New
                -1
                Several times the submarines turned out to be in the right place and fired, but our torpedoes almost always passed below the shell being fired, or did not fire when hit.

                Is there any evidence from the German side about torpedoes hitting and not firing?
                A large mass of German watercraft on the Black and Azov Seas were landing barges, lighters and other shallow-draft trifles.
                On this torpedoes and passed under them.
                The Germans are literate. We are bast shoes ... And our boats are of the wrong system.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  8 October 2020 21: 17 New
                  0
                  We have enough.
                  And the boats and torpedoes we had were of the wrong system, it is common knowledge, and there is a statistics of the victories of the boatmen.

                  And the reasons for this depressing state of affairs are well known.
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 8 October 2020 23: 16 New
                    0
                    We have enough.

                    So the Germans did not even notice the torpedoes allegedly piercing the side, but not exploding?
                    The Japanese noticed American torpedoes in their bots and this greatly relaxed them.
                    Why didn't our torpedoes please you? Build quality or even its characteristics?
                    And what torpedoes actually do not suit you: 53-27, 53-36, 53-38, 53-38U?
                    Maybe it was necessary to buy torpedoes from the Germans or the British?
                2. Cyril G ...
                  Cyril G ... 11 October 2020 12: 28 New
                  0
                  Quote: hohol95
                  And our boats are of the wrong system.


                  Definitely not the one
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 11 October 2020 22: 46 New
                    0
                    Our boats fought only on such boats! There were no others!
                    It's always difficult to "go out with a sling against a giant" ...
                    Or do you have a different opinion?
                    1. Cyril G ...
                      Cyril G ... 11 October 2020 23: 25 New
                      +1
                      This is indisputable - it's a shame that on the eve of the war, such miracles were not performed on the part of mosquitoes ... It was lucky that the mighty RKKF, here I am a little ironic, propped up the Marine Guard with a bunch of boats, including this important thing - 80 percent of MO-2/4 were NKVD. And boats in our conditions are the basis of coastal operations.
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 11 October 2020 23: 39 New
                        0
                        And boats in our conditions are the basis of coastal operations.

                        In the conditions of those hostilities that the enemy waged! Maximum activities on land with a relative minimum of activities at sea.
                        Mines, torpedo boats, low-draft lighter barges, aircraft, submarines.
                        And even this was facilitated by the closed maritime areas of military operations! The Baltic and Black Seas are no match for the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans!
                        And the Mediterranean Sea became the site of fierce battles due to Caudillo Franco's refusal to enter the war on the side of the Third Reich.
              2. Cyril G ...
                Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 17: 26 New
                +3
                I will add, in view of the absolutely gloomy organization of combat control at the Black Sea Fleet, the German radio intelligence service, even without breaking the codes, very soon revealed the regularities of the increase in radio exchange of our naval subscribers preceding the launch of the raiding forces, that is, the destroyers and the KR, after which an alert was given.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  8 October 2020 21: 18 New
                  -1
                  It wasn’t about the navy, it was the people.
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 8 October 2020 23: 17 New
                    0
                    It wasn’t about the navy, it was the people.

                    Are the people wrong again?
                    Or was proper supervision abhorrent?
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      9 October 2020 10: 37 New
                      +3
                      The people were UNDEVELOPED,
                      The Great Patriotic War made us as cool as they remember in the USSR. Before that, people were completely different, they only matured after going through this meat grinder.

                      The Germans simply killed everyone who did not think quickly and correctly enough and were within reach, everyone in general.
                      The Soviet people in 41 and 45 are two different peoples. Not everyone understands this, but it is.
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 11 October 2020 22: 48 New
                        0
                        The people were UNDEVELOPED,

                        At least the ambassador was shy! ..
                        Is Al completely headless?
                        No matter what they say -
                        All will bring one to the women!

                        Again the people "let us down" ...
                      2. timokhin-aa
                        12 October 2020 01: 09 New
                        +1
                        The people did not disappoint. In theory, the people jumped over their heads in that war.
                        But there is a limit to everything.
                        Organizationally, we did not export until the end of the 44th. There was no intelligence, no knowledge, no experience.
                        By the end of the 44th, the Germans taught something, the allies pumped up technology and a completely different war began.
                        These are like facts, why are you arguing with them?
                        The Great Patriotic War made us who we are, like a blacksmith's hammer makes a sword from a blank.
                        So see?
                        The blank is not a weapon. The French were "forged" by their revolution and subsequent wars, the Americans were conquered by the conquest of the conquest, us - by the Second World War. And before this test, we really did not understand very much, we simply did not master it.
                        And about the fleet and then not really. Apart from the influence of Gorshkov, he alone could not change everything, although he did the almost impossible.
                      3. hohol95
                        hohol95 12 October 2020 10: 44 New
                        0
                        The French were "forged" by their revolution and subsequent wars,

                        The Second World War especially made the French nation more resistant to the hardships of war.
  • Bez 310
    Bez 310 7 October 2020 19: 24 New
    +5
    The article is interesting.
  • Crabong
    Crabong 7 October 2020 19: 28 New
    +1
    All this is relevant now. Such operations must be carried out in a complex manner. First of all, intelligence of all kinds must be ensured. Further, strike missions are performed by surface and air assets of the fleet and attached subunits. Naturally, air superiority in the area of ​​operations must be ensured!
    The fact that three ships were thrown to carry out a mission without organizing this operation would, of course, require correct consideration!
    1. Kote Pan Kokhanka
      Kote Pan Kokhanka 7 October 2020 20: 11 New
      +5
      We are all strong in hindsight after three-quarters of a century !!! And not in the sea, but on the couch.
      1. timokhin-aa
        7 October 2020 20: 55 New
        +9
        This is because we don't want to learn from our mistakes.
        Smart people learn from other people's mistakes, it is clear who - from their own, and we not just do not learn from any - we are also ready to fight to never learn.
      2. Macsen_wledig
        Macsen_wledig 7 October 2020 20: 55 New
        +5
        Quote: Kote Pan Kokhanka
        We are all strong in hindsight after three-quarters of a century !!! And not in the sea, but on the couch.

        This is a disease of many historians: to philosophize about "how best" knowing all the decisions of both sides and the consequences of these very decisions ...
        Like always trying to win Tsushima for TOE-2 or Midway for the Japanese. :)
        1. Victor Leningradets
          Victor Leningradets 9 October 2020 13: 06 New
          +1
          Fair enough! But critical analysis is necessary, and besides - it's interesting!
          Another thing is an alternative story, in which the author plays for one of the parties with a full-fledged afterthought and all kinds of "special stages", and the opponent is stupid and cannot do anything in response. It turns out dull nonsense.
        2. ccsr
          ccsr 11 October 2020 11: 03 New
          +2
          Quote: Macsen_Wledig
          This is a disease of many historians: to philosophize about "how best" knowing all the decisions of both sides and the consequences of these very decisions ...

          Absolutely accurately noticed, and if the "land" historians somehow critically assess the consequences of certain operations on the course of the entire war, then the "naval" historians, due to the absence of real major naval battles of the ships of the NK Navy, have a hypertrophied idea of ​​the importance of the fleet in the Great Patriotic. And even their current quirks about the prospects of the fleet in a future war, given that rocket armament radically changed the balance of power in the world, causes not so much bewilderment as surprise from their inadequacy to assess the modern armed forces of our country.
          That is why everything that the "naval strategists" carry on such sites as the military, especially in the person of the journalist Timokhin, must be treated very critically - they still cannot agree with the idea that the fleet in the form it was in the Soviet time, not only will not be revived, but will also be fatal for the economy of our country. Therefore, their ideas should be treated as in the story of one well-known Soviet writer-marine painter, who described the situation in the main headquarters of the naval forces after the revolution, where naval officers seriously discussed operations to seize foreign straits and bases, despite the fact that the fleet as such did not exist at all ... In general, do not take away their virtual toys from the naval ones - let them play, but they will never see real aircraft carriers, no matter how they convince them of the importance of unblocking Venezuela or naval operations against Turkey or Japan, in which "strategist" Timokhin succeeded in this forum.
      3. Cyril G ...
        Cyril G ... 11 October 2020 12: 26 New
        +1
        There are some questions that are simply bewildered by neglect. Example? I have them. The fundamental rottenness of naval aviation by the command of the Navy is the same. This despite the fact that during the Second World War, aviation showed the highest efficiency in comparison with NK, mosquitoes, ber.arta and submarines. Moreover, at least twice overlapping by the number of sunk ships and submarines. As a result, further, aviation is essentially denied, reducing the strike and fighter air regiments of the fleet. And why was it necessary to build dozens of cruisers and hordes of destroyers, this is a great mystery. The aircraft carrier managed to get through the anus through the anus into the fleet already in the 70s, it looked really just disgusting ...
  • WapentakeLokki
    WapentakeLokki 7 October 2020 21: 10 New
    +2
    Quote: Ryaruav
    just as admirals did not know how to fight in 1941 and in 1943 they did not know how, in 1943 it was clear to everyone that aviation had become the main striking force at sea

    ... just did not have time to go through the rotation of personnel (as in the land theater where, instead of peacetime generals, 41 wars were already completed by generals who were promoted precisely as commanders from colonels and majors), alas, in the fleets, the whole war is still the same and all the same ...
    ... by the way, the ability to see perspectives .. to have the talent of Cassandra .. is not given to everyone who wears a dagger ... the role of aviation in future battles at sea after Mitchell's experiments was able to see only Yamamotto for the loss of the LC) .. and then in the whole world EVERYONE was betting on the LC .. as, however, now on CV ... but who knows how it will be (after all, in the 39th, no one could think of the imminent sunset of the LC) so and today the aspect of 10 CV squadrons under the flag with stars and stripes as a monopolist on the sea (and the land adjacent to it 1000 miles from the coast) will get blown in the breath and go off the stage ... but what kind of weapon it will be (or its complex) time will tell, but the one who knows how to foresee THIS will dictate to others .. as once in the 40s CV US NAVY fleet
    1. Kote Pan Kokhanka
      Kote Pan Kokhanka 8 October 2020 04: 21 New
      0
      Quote: WapentakeLokki
      after all, in the 39th, a speedy sunset could not have occurred to anyone

      I will add from myself that the superiority of the LK at the beginning of WWII was proved by practice and combat experience. For example, the destruction of Glories!
    2. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
      Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 8 October 2020 08: 41 New
      0
      Quote: WapentakeLokki
      just did not have time to go through the rotation of personnel (as in a land theater

      and what do you mean by "rotation"? Cleansing or natural decline (captivity, death)? And what would the "rotation" give to the fleet in terms of quality?
  • Alex013
    Alex013 7 October 2020 21: 35 New
    +2
    Interesting article. It is also necessary to note the weakness of our destroyers' own air defense (for example, Merciless has 4 DShK units and 3 37 mm assault rifle units, and Fletcher has 5 40 mm Boffors pairs and 7 Oerlikons). Plus Able was destroyed during the rescue operation, at first he picked up sailors from the leader, and then he returned to the place of death of the Merciless and again fell under a wave of bombers, which became fatal ...
    1. Macsen_wledig
      Macsen_wledig 7 October 2020 21: 49 New
      +4
      Quote: Alex013
      and Fletcher has 5 pairs of 40 mm Bofors and 7 Oerlikons).

      This is Fletcher's arr. 44-45 years.
      In 42-43, "Fletcher" had a twin "Bofors" (or even a "Chicago piano" in general) and 4-6 "Erlikons".
      1. Alex013
        Alex013 7 October 2020 23: 38 New
        +3
        Since the summer of 43. "Piano" until 43 was
        1. Kote Pan Kokhanka
          Kote Pan Kokhanka 8 October 2020 17: 17 New
          +4
          Sevens also had 76,2 mm anti-aircraft guns.
          1. Alex013
            Alex013 8 October 2020 17: 53 New
            +1
            I agree. Only the automated SUAZO was absent on the sevens, it was manual. 76,2 was used more as a universal weapon.
        2. Macsen_wledig
          Macsen_wledig 8 October 2020 18: 59 New
          +1
          Quote: Alex013
          Since the summer of 43. "Piano" until 43 was

          If the Americans are not lying, then the "piano" was on the first twelve ships, delivered up to October 1942, then the "Boofors" was installed.
  • hohol95
    hohol95 7 October 2020 23: 54 New
    +4
    Remember the British: the battle at Kuantan, where they lost a battleship and battle cruiser, did not lead to the fact that they put their ships on hold. The loss of the aircraft carrier "Glories" did not lead to the same, nor did the loss of destroyers in the Mediterranean Sea.

    Dear author! With such memories, one should not forget about how many of those British built during the war years of warships and boats! And don't forget about the Dominion fleets:
    By the start of World War II, the Royal Canadian Navy had 11 warships, 145 officers and 1674 sailors.
    During the Battle of the Atlantic, the Royal Canadian Navy sank 31 submarines and sank or captured 42 enemy surface ships. The fleet lost 24 ships and 1797 sailors in the war.

    And for the USSR, the loss of ships, even of the destroyer class, was very painful!
    Our fleets never dreamed of such compensation for losses. At the same time, in order to replenish the escort forces, the British asked the United States to "cede" 50 WWI-era destroyers to them!
    And do not forget what was built in the USSR itself. What did the naval commanders displease with the Hurricane-class patrol boats (destroyers). They built only 18 units, and the need for such ships was throughout the war! And for this reason, more expensive destroyers were thrown into battle!
    But torpedo boats of the G-5 type have been tuned ... a lot!
    At the same time, the tsarist fleet, the bits of which went to the USSR, was not so balanced.
    And further! The following conclusion suggests itself from the article - the use of German aviation in the Baltic Sea was not taken into account in the Black Sea! The Black Sea residents themselves had a mustache. Is it so?
    Or the naval general staff did not systematize the details of losses from enemy aircraft and did not develop appropriate countermeasures.
    1. timokhin-aa
      8 October 2020 12: 06 New
      +3
      And for the USSR, the loss of ships, even of the destroyer class, was very painful!


      No difference. There is a war - fight. Why else are these ships needed at all?
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 8 October 2020 16: 32 New
        +1
        Why did the Germans take care of Tirpitz?
        The mere fact that he existed made some British admirals sweat and look around!
        In this case, the rate may actually be reinsured!
        But the naval forces with big stars could not convince the Headquarters not to make such a decision!
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 October 2020 21: 16 New
          0
          So our war ended on the Black Sea, the question was the price

          The rate decided not to save.
  • kig
    kig 8 October 2020 03: 26 New
    +4
    the Germans, attacking a ship sailing in the open sea at full speed, were able to destroy only one destroyer - "Impeccable". And that's all.

    If we are already engaged in statistics, it would be good to indicate how many such attempts were made, and how many of our ships were generally under attack.
    1. timokhin-aa
      8 October 2020 12: 06 New
      +1
      The article is already big. There were a lot of attempts.
  • Boris ⁣ Shaver
    Boris ⁣ Shaver 8 October 2020 05: 14 New
    +1
    Only "Impeccable" was in the teeth without discounts.

    The presence of air cover for all of the listed ships and cover for bombers has not been disclosed, there is no information on weather conditions, anti-aircraft weapons of ships have not been disclosed, etc. How to compare?
  • Eug
    Eug 8 October 2020 06: 26 New
    0
    Land generals do not like the fleet and aviation because of their dependence on the weather - how is it that they cannot go to sea or take off? As for the ban on the use of large surface ships by the Stake - as for me, the reason is quite simple. Ships with a trained crew are an irreplaceable resource during the war, especially in the Black Sea, and all other types of the Armed Forces are a rechargeable resource, so they preferred to "spend" the replenished resources (blasphemous, but I can't find another word), saving ships for something famous only Bet. Directly on the operation - the lack of a long-range fighter of the Pe-3 type played its negative role. As for me, in this situation it would be worth crushing enemy convoys closer to the embarkation points in order to provide a tighter air cover. And the actions at the transition to leave the submarine and aviation. Well, try to carry out several massive air attacks on the ports of the Crimea, but then again there are no long-range fighters ... although there were already external fuel tanks, they would have to be dumped into the sea ...
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 8 October 2020 11: 46 New
      +4
      Quote: Eug
      Land generals do not like the navy and aviation because of their dependence on the weather - how is it that they cannot go to sea or take off?

      This is not entirely true, judging at least by the Kerch-Eltigen operation, where the ground generals prayed for the fleet, because they understood that the entire landing would be the end if the naval forces did not help them, even by losing their ships and boats. The problem was not born in the USSR, and its roots must be sought in tsarist times, when the naval freedom allowed sailors to ignore interaction with large masses of ground forces altogether, and their arrogance played an important role in this. A big tragedy for our country was the fatal mistake of separating the Navy into a separate People's Commissariat on the eve of the war and giving them the right not to obey the People's Commissar of Defense, but to live by their own interests. This predetermined the chaos and confusion in the conduct of joint operations of ground forces and naval forces both in the Black Sea and in the Baltic, which ultimately ended in failure for the fleet itself.
      As a paradox, due to the separation of the fleet into an independent People's Commissariat, even problems arose for the naval attachés conducting intelligence in Germany, and they did not even have their own communication system, as reported by Tupikov in encryption:
      1. Eug
        Eug 8 October 2020 14: 28 New
        0
        The airborne troops in the Kerch-Eltigen operation prayed not only for the fleet, but also for the female regiment of Po-2 night bombers under the command of Bershadskaya. But - if I am not mistaken, Lieutenant Colonel Gladkov was the senior in rank there. And organizational problems poured into a periodically escalating struggle between the army and the navy for influence, at least on Stalin. The army men insisted on the subordination of the fleet, the navy, often seeing the incompetence of the army in matters of the fleet and the likelihood of losing part of their career prospects, resisted and defended maximum independence. As a result, there are a lot of "sparks" in relationships and, to be honest, sometimes the desire to "substitute" allied partners ...
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 8 October 2020 18: 16 New
          0
          Quote: Eug
          But - if I am not mistaken, Lieutenant Colonel Gladkov was the senior in rank there.

          No, he was a colonel, the commander of the 318th division that landed in Eltigen. In the north of Kerch, another landing was landed, and there was a division commander for whom Gladkov was not a senior commander:
          "For the seizure of the bridgehead on the Kerch Peninsula and the courage and heroism shown at the same time" by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of November 17, 1943, Colonel Vasily Fedorovich Gladkov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the award of the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal.

          There is his memoir, very interesting for any reader interested in amphibious assault and you can understand how everything happened.
          Quote: Eug
          And organizational problems resulted in a periodically escalating struggle between the army and the navy for influence at least on Stalin.

          Apparently on the eve of the war, the naval forces managed to convince Stalin of the need to create a naval people's commissariat, and this had fatal consequences for our armed forces.
          1. timokhin-aa
            9 October 2020 17: 42 New
            +1
            Apparently on the eve of the war, the naval ones managed to convince Stalin of the need to create a naval people's commissariat


            Again, ridiculous guesses.
            Why don't you read something on the topic, and then speak out? What prevents you from accomplishing this intellectual feat?
            1. ccsr
              ccsr 9 October 2020 18: 47 New
              0
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              Again, ridiculous guesses.

              Refute my "guesses", dreamer and I admit that you understand the pre-war construction of the armed forces.
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              What prevents you from accomplishing this intellectual feat?

              What prevents you from giving facts, and not talking nonsense as usual? Well, at least give a link to the memo, on which the decision was made by the Government of the country?
  • Nazaroff
    Nazaroff 8 October 2020 09: 12 New
    +5
    What was allowed virtually unhindered to evacuate such a number of German troops from the Crimea to Romania, otherwise it cannot be called a CRIME ... All these Germans were supposed to be at the bottom of the Black Sea. But how many lives, our soldiers of the ground forces, could have been saved by sailors - it's hard to imagine!
  • Gvardeetz77
    Gvardeetz77 8 October 2020 10: 48 New
    0
    Quote: antivirus
    to show the effective resistance of the British squadron during the escalation of the conflict?
    1.block the Straits
    2 flood at the entrances to the bases as in 1854 and 2014

    To flood something heroically?
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Force multiplier
    Force multiplier 8 October 2020 12: 03 New
    -1
    About the German evacuation from Crimea
    The greatest danger during loading would be the Soviet surface forces, but the large ships of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, as before, did not interfere with the evacuation

    There is still some slyness here. The Germans were well insured against the appearance of Soviet surface ships. Air reconnaissance, and as a result, early detection of ships that have left the sea, suspension / dispersal of convoys, strike into the void. Coastal artillery + mentioned anti-aircraft batteries. Patrol by artillery self-propelled barges and passageways in the barriers near Sevastopol. System for setting smoke screens in bays. Almost until the very last days, a group of attack aircraft (II./SG 2) on Fw 190 remained in Sevastopol (the quote itself refers almost to the first day when these ISs were no longer in Crimea). Submarines deployed near Soviet bases on the east coast (11 May U 9 flooded Storm acoustic torpedo). As for the prospects for attacks at night on convoys on the high seas, there is enough information in the very text of the article. Plus again AT and Romanian EMs.
    In that situation, the decision of the Headquarters was correct, the ships could do little and, moreover, somehow seriously affect the course and outcome of the evacuation.
    1. timokhin-aa
      8 October 2020 12: 09 New
      +1
      In that situation, the decision of the Headquarters was correct, the ships could do little and, moreover, somehow seriously affect the course and outcome of the evacuation.


      It was necessary to analyze why the “Verpa” failed and, most importantly, how to avoid it and attack in any case.

      Otherwise, the very existence of the fleet loses its meaning, in principle. Why is he needed if he does not fight? The decision to end the armed struggle during the ongoing war of destruction cannot be justified.
      1. Force multiplier
        Force multiplier 8 October 2020 18: 32 New
        0
        It's hard to imagine that they haven't analyzed it. Collective bodies with a large number of planners, analysts, using intelligence and other data, the full completeness of which is difficult to cover even the most conscientious researcher. There are no documents published in this regard, but we see the decision in fact. And it is clear that the decision is ultimately correct. Even though the bets on boats and submarines "did not play", the aviation after the evacuation of the Luftwaffe from the Chersonesus airfield, in the last days of the evacuation, caused a pogrom of the convoys

        Fleet in being is quite an effective principle.
    2. Cyril G ...
      Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 13: 36 New
      0
      Quote: Force Multiplier
      In that situation, the decision of the Headquarters was correct, the ships could do little and, moreover, somehow seriously affect the course and outcome of the evacuation.


      And nevertheless, it was necessary to carefully plan the operation and strike with the forces of the cruiser and the existing destroyers, carefully considering concealment measures and excluding the radio exchange of large ships of the Black Sea Fleet with access to the sea, or rather imitating its basic level.
      1. Force multiplier
        Force multiplier 8 October 2020 18: 43 New
        0
        By indirect signs, radio intelligence can determine that ships are at sea. Plus aerial reconnaissance (including night reconnaissance, using radar to search, the Germans had it all). The submarines at the Soviet bases, even if they could not attack, would have reported the ships leaving. Long-range escort of convoys by torpedo boats, and as a consequence, their early warning, which would allow the convoys to disperse in advance
        1. timokhin-aa
          8 October 2020 21: 46 New
          0
          And nevertheless, the fact that the enemy does not allow himself to be slaughtered like cattle is not a reason to abandon attempts to destroy him.
          1. Force multiplier
            Force multiplier 9 October 2020 13: 56 New
            +1
            In this case, there was no refusal, but the choice of a more suitable tool for destruction
            1. Cyril G ...
              Cyril G ... 9 October 2020 14: 00 New
              +1
              Well, no matter how I disagree. If the Cruiser and the destroyers at least disorganized the KOH order, and then the planes would work out against single ships. there would already be a profit ..

              In fact, the effectiveness of air strikes was relatively low.
              1. Force multiplier
                Force multiplier 9 October 2020 14: 14 New
                0
                After finding the ships, the convoy would have dispersed itself long ago

                It was relatively low while the Luftwaffe was on Chersonesos. After they flew away, Soviet aviation staged a massacre
  • Cyril G ...
    Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 13: 33 New
    0
    Quote: Victor Leningradets
    Replace them with Lend-Lease 4 "/ 45 QF Mark XVI 4" / 45 or QF Mark XVII 4 "/ 45A,


    There's no point. But the 40 mm Bofors could have been screwed on
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 8 October 2020 13: 52 New
      +1
      Quote: Cyril G ...
      There's no point. But the 40 mm Bofors could have been screwed on

      Until the middle of 1943, the Allies will not give - not enough themselves. The maximum that we can get until this time is an analogue of our 70-K, but in a 40-mm caliber.
      1. Cyril G ...
        Cyril G ... 8 October 2020 17: 32 New
        0
        This is at least something
  • vblotov
    vblotov 8 October 2020 15: 01 New
    0
    I respect the publications of Alexander Timokhin. But in this case it is the result of Operation Verp. Three warships were killed and more than 800 commanders and Red Navy men were killed. You can say as much as you like that our pilots are great, but our pilots have no losses that day, just as the Germans have none, except for the plane shot down by ships. https://voenflot.ru/pomni/blytov-v-zhivye-pomnite-pogibshih-chyornyj-den-chernomorskogo-flota
    1. timokhin-aa
      8 October 2020 15: 39 New
      +1
      Here we are not talking about this, but, firstly, about the true reasons for the fleet's neglect of the threat from the air, and secondly, in what reaction the Headquarters all this caused and whether it was justified.
  • yehat2
    yehat2 8 October 2020 17: 38 New
    0
    I do not know how the command staff of the Black Sea Fleet was taught, but it was very strange to ignore the threat of aviation this way.
    The first thing I would plan is not where to shoot, but how to get your ass away.
    As the author correctly pointed out, the fleet was needed for a whole heap of goals and it was not worth losing it.
    Besides, I have big questions for aerial reconnaissance.
    1. timokhin-aa
      8 October 2020 21: 47 New
      0
      Why is it strange? The fact of the matter is that it was not strange - they started from their own combat experience in the previous two years and gave an assessment of the threat from German aviation based on it.
  • K298rtm
    K298rtm 8 October 2020 23: 16 New
    0
    Thanks to the author for an interesting, informative article.
    1. timokhin-aa
      9 October 2020 10: 40 New
      +1
      Please, I will try. And then we somehow ignore the naval history of the Second World War. Or they give splint or pour slop, but no one really wants to analyze and draw conclusions - and there is something to think about.
      1. SID
        SID 9 October 2020 14: 08 New
        0
        An analysis of the analytical work of the Headquarters and the command of the front and the Navy is a very popular (not by the command itself, of course) and always relevant topic for our Armed Forces!
  • The comment was deleted.
  • p164
    p164 9 October 2020 00: 26 New
    +6
    Why write so much?
    Three ships on the entire Black Sea in broad daylight were sent to destroy a major port. Cover - a bunch of planes.
    It is clear that a flock of enemies flew in and bombed, like on a training ground.
    What for? Yes, someone among the high command muttered about the fact that all the people are at war, and the ships smoke the sky ... Well, out of desperation, the Black Sea admirals drove everyone who was on the move to slaughter. I fully admit that there were simply no other efficient ships with serviceable vehicles.
    What kind of intelligence and powerful cover? Everything was on a leftover principle. All Soviet forces were deployed on gigantic fronts. And by that time the Black Sea Fleet no longer had any strategic significance.
    There is simply absolutely nothing to analyze here. One of the sad episodes of the big war, when the forest is being cut down and the chips are flying.
    The fleet is expensive, time consuming ... It was not then in the USSR. There were separate ships. But there was no fleet. The sailors were heroes. There were some successful operations. But nothing more. This did not decide the fate of the war. This means that the attitude of the high command was appropriate.
    So the admirals set out on an adventure.
    1. timokhin-aa
      9 October 2020 10: 39 New
      0
      Please do not invent, this is not even a simplification, but I do not know what
  • SID
    SID 9 October 2020 14: 06 New
    0
    Good oooh! :)
    High-quality analytics good
    Thanks to the author! soldier
  • SID
    SID 9 October 2020 16: 24 New
    +1
    By the way, on air cover, interaction with aviation ...

    Pokryshkin's memoirs describe a similar episode of the IA during the Crimean liberation operation, which was crowned with success.

    The excerpt is the desired passage from the book "Know yourself in battle"can be found here: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/pokryshkin-1/16.html Check out a small excerpt starting with the paragraph: "Preparations have begun for the liberation of the Crimea from the Nazi invaders... ". To quote him in the commentary, he is still too long.

    In difficult conditions of the offensive across the only bridgehead on the Sivash with a small number of bridge crossings, the commander of the 8th Air Army, General T. T. Khryukin, set the task of covering the crossings and preventing their destruction before Pokryshkin's regiment:

    "- Your regiment is responsible for covering the bridgehead on the Sivash and the crossings of the Kreiser army, which is being concentrated to liberate the Crimea. The conditions there are very difficult. There are few bridge crossings. Many rifle units are fording, and the water is now terribly cold. We must do everything to prevent the bombing of our troops. Think about how to successfully solve this problem, report to me. "

    So ... The time period of the strategic Crimean operation and the "Verp" operation is approximately one. At first glance, the conditions are completely different, but if we consider the key moment of the air cover, then the situation is largely identical. The forces allocated to starter aviation allocated to cover the crossings are comparable. The conditions for the concentration of Luftwaffe forces on the covered object are also similar. However, the organization of air cover on the Sivash was organized radically differently, which ensured the complete success and fulfillment of the task by the forces of one IAP.

    This episode confirms Timokhin's assertion about the main reasons for the tragic loss of three ships due to insufficient thoughtful planning, inconsistency, and lack of organization of the control links at the highest levels. On the Sivash, on the contrary: a thoughtful approach to planning the allocation of funds, provision and proper initiative decided the outcome of the battles with complete success for us.

    In the case of providing cover for the offensive from the Sivash bridgehead, the life-giving force in the proper organization was, unfortunately, the lone genius of the commander at the IAP level, and not the competent and energetic work of the Stavka, the front headquarters, the 8th VA. Although the quick support of an outstanding initiative on the part of Army Commander Khryukin is an undoubted valiant act.
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  • vblotov
    vblotov 10 October 2020 09: 16 New
    0
    https://voenflot.ru/pomni/blytov-v-zhivye-pomnite-pogibshih-chyornyj-den-chernomorskogo-flota
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Time traveller
    Time traveller 11 October 2020 00: 50 New
    0
    Why use large ships if you could solve the same problems with boats with RS?
    1. timokhin-aa
      11 October 2020 09: 40 New
      0
      No way, no way. It's hard to shoot from a cannon at sea, rolling. RS is just a salvo to nowhere - at a stationary target on the shore, from the coastal zone, where the waves are smaller, or from the river delta, where there are almost no waves you can work out, but you still can't.
      1. Time traveller
        Time traveller 11 October 2020 12: 52 New
        0
        Boats with RSs have been successfully used in the Black Sea since 1942 both for strikes against coastal and sea targets. And even to repel air attacks. Moreover, the installation of the RS on boats was a grassroots initiative, which made its way through precisely because it showed its effectiveness. A description of the combat use is available on the Internet. Very informative in terms of assessing the ban on the use of large ships.
        A significant drawback of boats is their low seaworthiness. But this is not in terms of their ability to strike, but in terms of restrictions on going out to sea due to weather conditions.
  • ban
    ban 11 October 2020 02: 40 New
    0
    Alexander, you can argue with some conclusions, but, in general, thanks for the article. Respect and respect !!!
    1. timokhin-aa
      11 October 2020 09: 45 New
      0
      Thank you, for a long time my hands were itching to disassemble this operation, and most importantly - its consequences.
  • Sergei Novozhilov
    Sergei Novozhilov 11 October 2020 08: 06 New
    0
    On 6.10.42, a landing took place on the Tuzla island in the Kerch Strait. Until 9 a battle took place to liberate the Taman peninsula, where Soviet fighters dominated the air. For our fighters, the Ju-10.42 dive bombers were an easy target. 87 German Ju-25, distracted by the Black Sea Fleet ships, could not inflict damage on our advancing troops on the ground.
    1. timokhin-aa
      11 October 2020 09: 41 New
      +1
      Weak consolation.
  • Dmitry V.
    Dmitry V. 14 October 2020 11: 14 New
    0
    At night, when the ships were moving to the coast, the ships were discovered

    Moreover, a reconnaissance aircraft was guided by radars and they were aimed at illuminating with luminous bombs and providing guidance for German torpedo boats (which, in theory, were supposed to detect destroyers and destroy).