We are building a fleet. Theory and Purpose
B.I. Dolivo-Dobrovolsky, “On the Rationality of the Naval Idea in the State” (Maritime Digest, No.7, 1906)
Why do some nations have successfully evolving navies, while others are just a series of attempts to create them, with varying degrees of success? Attempts interspersed with periods of prolonged decline and defeat for ridiculous and stupid reasons? Why do some societies know how to maintain combat effectiveness at sea for decades and centuries, let it periodically fall to dangerously low levels, while others, having spent a ton of money and resources, building ships and training personnel, then miss all this, lose, leaving only footage of the chronicle and the once formidable aircraft-carrying cruisers, transformed on foreign land into amusement parks? What is the difference and where does it go?
To this difference, many not-so-smart people summed up a lot of theories, right down to giving birth to the concepts of “continental” and “sea powers,” justifying the ability of some and the inability of others to use naval forces with some cultural features ... All this is not entirely right. Almost not true. In fact, the line lies in the understanding of both society and the military-political leadership of literally a few simple principles, multiplied by the geographical restrictions characteristic of the state. If this were not so, then completely deprived of a normal fleet, maritime trade and the sea-working population of the United States would not have become between the 1890 and 1945 a year the dominant force on the seas.
The United States was what not very perspicacious people call the words “continental power” - a huge subcontinent, the main wealth of which, as well as the vector of the efforts of the population are on their land. Their navy was nothing against, for example, the Russian Imperial Navy. But soon they brilliantly won their naval war against Spain, and Russia lost its own with a bang. Lost Japan, in which seventy years before that there were bags of rice instead of money. Which, nine years before the attack on Port Arthur, was forced to take into account Russian political interests by a demonstration of power, not by the largest Russian squadron. What “cultural features” made this possible?
There is an answer.
There are centuries-old principles of building naval power. They are known and well described in the theoretical literature. They can be challenged, but not challenged. It is impossible, because there is no country so powerful in the naval sense that would ignore them. And there is no country that, even if instinctively or even unconsciously, following them, would not have received the “rise” of its sea power. Examples have numbers. And the United States, and Britain, and imperial Japan - there, in this list of countries that followed these rules. For a very short time, part of these principles was not quite consciously adopted by the USSR Navy - and the result was a rise in its power to unprecedented levels, a firm second place in power after the United States. Military thought in different countries came to their understanding when they were already formed, and structuring them took quite a long time. But in general, the "theoretical part" was completed before the First World War.
In Russia, with its hard history, a theory adapted to Russian characteristics was finally formulated a little later - after the Civil War. Until the very beginning of World War II, it was left without practical application, which had terrible consequences for our Motherland. But its individual echoes, partially embodied in practice, created the USSR's nuclear missile fleet, capable of operating anywhere in the world’s oceans, albeit with a number of restrictions.
Today, this knowledge is forgotten. They are forgotten, however, only by us. Our opponents in the world have not forgotten anything and are building their fleets on the basis of this simple understanding of simple questions.
Apparently, it is worth recalling them and voicing them.
Mahan and his postulates
In the 1889 year, the US Navy captain (later Rear Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan published his epoch-making work, without exaggeration, a book that we translated as “The Influence of Sea Force on the History of 1660-1783”.
And - a conceptual failure in translation from the very beginning. Mahan did not write anything about force, or force. He wrote about power - in a sociological context, power. In the physical - power. The work to establish power over the sea, completed in some time, if to be absolutely accurate. This is an important point - according to Mahan, marine power is a process of gaining power over the seas that lasts over time - it does not give such a decoding anywhere, but it is a direct translation into Russian of the name of his main work, made without distortion. "Influence of Sea Power upon history."
And this is the first lesson - where we are thoughtlessly thinking of gaining “sea power”, our competitors are looking for opportunities to gain sea power, even if it takes time. Gaining, through the application of systematic efforts for a long period of time. And yes, this acquisition requires effort and time, and there is nothing "wrong" in that - in order to gain that very power over the seas, you need to work, it will take time, it cannot be done quickly - you need to be able to rest and long, monotonously build its power, "brick by brick", year after year, century after century, forever, never departing from its goal ever. Generation after generation. In the fight. These efforts, their focus and relevance to the stated goal are the subject of discussion. This cover lesson passes by the Russian reader right away, like countless other mis-translated concepts. Nevertheless, even with some mental distortions, the book made a splash in Russia too. We will not paint its influence on the minds of those days, we will restrict ourselves to what postulates Mahen voiced.
The condition for maintaining power over the sea (and sea trade) is the navy, and the correct course of action for it is force pressure on the enemy, reduced to two possible outcomes - the enemy is defeated in battle, or the enemy escaped without a fight.
This is how power over the seas is born - sea power. In the future, it may be a military-political factor and is not related to maritime trade, but it is born according to the above scheme.
Thus, England and Holland became the “sea powers” (we use this meaningless domestic term).
Mahan in his book drew attention to a possible strategy "for the weak" - the so-called "Cruising war." The historical experience with which he operated said that, of course, such a thing may well prove to be useful - but only when the combat fleet of the belligerent subjected to “cruising” is associated with the fighting fleet of the attacker. Otherwise, "in the style of Mahan," cruising war will fail.
At the time of writing, there were already many examples of such a failure. Today, at the peak of the industrial era, we can recall much more significant failures - unlimited submarine warfare, which was twice defeated by Germany - and both times because the German "cruisers" - submarines - did not have the proper support from their combat fleet.
On the other hand, the unrestricted submarine war that the Americans waged in the Pacific in 1941-1945 years was completely successful - all the resources that Japan theoretically had for the naval war were constrained by a hopeless confrontation with the US Navy. With the American Navy. There was absolutely nothing left to protect shipping.
Everything that Mahan described was extremely true, but true mainly for the period described. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the world was already different. Some of Mahan's postulates remained true in the twentieth century - the same "cruising" war was quite "Mahean" in both world wars. Others demanded adjustments.
So, world trade has been greatly transformed, a court under a neutral flag has become a mass phenomenon, international agreements have appeared that regulate their status in the course of hostilities. Radio communication appeared, which dramatically accelerated control and increased the speed of all processes related to military operations.
Mahan tried to keep up with the times. In 1911, work came out of his pen "Naval strategy in comparison and contrast with the principles and practice of military operations on the ground." The most powerful text with more than five hundred pages, devoted almost exclusively to military examples, comparing operations on land and at sea, and their application to the current military-political situation, both in the world and around the United States (mainly) substantially detailed and clarified the postulates Mahan. Twenty-two years have passed since he wrote his first and most important book, during which time the Japanese-Chinese, Spanish-American, and Russian-Japanese wars took place, where the fleets played a crucial role.
Mahan subjected his principles to reanalysis through the prism of modernity, through combat experience, which was absent when he began his theoretical research. Cutting off all that was superfluous and obsolete showed that one of its main principles is if there is a fleet, then it should be actively used against the enemy fleet - true. Mahen analyzed the Russo-Japanese War, paying particular attention to the actions of the 1 Pacific Squadron. It is noteworthy that he considered the correct course of action for the forces in Port Arthur to attack the Japanese fiercely and desperately in order to change the balance of forces as much as possible by the time the 2 Pacific Squadron of Rozhestvensky entered the war.
Was this said correctly? Let's imagine that the 1-I TOE died completely in the battle, having managed to destroy another Japanese battleship, over a couple of actually sunk. What would it give? The fact that Rozhestvensky would have met one armadillo less in the Tsushima Strait. Someone might say that given the balance of power, this would not work. May be. And if they were two less? On three? Or would there be just as many battleships, but the number of destroyers and cruisers would have drastically subsided?
Mahan was absolutely right in this case. Fight is important, and it is they who decide everything, ultimately. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, a lot has changed. But the principle that a combat fleet is designed to fight has never lost its relevance. It should be created and built precisely for this, this is its purpose. A little later we will see that the force can not only be used, but also be demonstrated, instead of a battle, the threat of that can be used, but the fact that the fleet must be able to fight is undeniable. To fight, including with another fleet. So, it should be built on the basis of this. Or it is necessary to build nothing at all and "to distribute to pensioners". Or for the infantry to finally massively buy good and strong boots. And this is not a hyperbole, it’s actually better.
Let us remember this as the "Mahan principle" in our modern "creative processing", of course.
Ships, and formations of the navy should be able to fight with ships and formations of other fleets. The construction of "quasi-battle" ships formally having weapon, but in fact unable to fight the enemy Navy, is unacceptable. The training of personnel, the condition of the rear and the material base should allow the fleet to immediately engage in hostilities against another fleet, if necessary.
Sounds like a banality? Yes, this is commonplace, but most of the ships that the Russian Navy will receive from this year to the middle of the 2020’s or just “quasi-combat,” that is, there are formally weapons on board, and they can’t fight against an adequate enemy (22160 project, which is directly called by the officers of the Navy as "not a warship"); or they can perform one or two tasks and only in the absence of serious opposition (RTO projects 21631 and 22800). Or a combat ship, but it does not have critical systems for intended use or ensuring combat stability (submarines without anti-torpedoes and sonar countermeasures, minesweepers without anti-mine systems). For the domestic fleet today, not combat or quasi-combat target ships are the norm, but full-fledged combat "units" are rather the exception. Why? Because those who order them, coordinate, accept and design do not mean BATTLE as the main purpose of the created ship. Alas, this is so, and there is a lot of evidence to this.
Apparently, even the lessons of more than a hundred years ago, some have not learned. It will be terribly painful if history repeats them - after all, we are conducting such a steep propaganda of the fact that everything is more than good, but then all of a sudden ...
But all that was needed was to follow a simple principle. Actually, this distinguishes successful countries in naval construction from unsuccessful ones - understanding of the principles and following them. This is the reason for the success of some and the failure of others.
But let's continue, because Mahan's principle is not the only one.
“Some Principles of Marine Strategy” by Sir Julian Stafford Corbett
Mahan, having accomplished a great deed, did not create a harmonious theory, however. Those postulates that he voiced were generally true, if only because he built them on the basis of analysis of events that actually took place. But this cannot be considered a theory, it cannot be considered a method. In Mahan's books there are not even definitions - what theory is there. This is a set of principles. You can adhere to Mahan's principles - and it is necessary in some cases. It’s just that already at the beginning of the 20th century the “Mehanian” approach was incomplete. He did not explain everything.
For example, the fate of the 1-th Pacific squadron of the Russian fleet at first glance was predetermined by the fleet under the command of Togo. But she did not die in a naval battle, right? And not under attack from the sea fell Port Arthur. On the other hand, without the Japanese fleet, all this would have been impossible. But Togo conducted blockade actions, and did not get into a fight at any cost - although he did not neglect the attacks of the base, but in general this was not the main content of his actions. Although he eventually achieved success.
It was clear to many thinkers of those years that a certain theory was needed, one that would "cover" all questions about how to wage a naval war and by what methods to achieve victory in it.
In the same 1911 year, when Mahan released his Naval Strategy, another book came out in another part of the world. The book, which really "closed" almost all issues. Explained almost everything. Even for the present.
It was a book by British historian Julian Stafford Corbett (then still without the prefix "sir") “Some principles of maritime strategy”.
Corbett, who was a civilian man, a historian without military experience, released precisely the theory from his pen. Although there are questions to the way he defined the “theory of war” and the “nature of war”, in general, his book is just a theory, and this is a working theory — it will be shown below how much.
Corbett defines the purpose of naval warfare very simply - and this is actually the “alpha and omega” warfare at sea:
It was, at first glance, the same thing that Mahan was preaching, but Corbett, unlike Mahan, did not put such emphasis on battle as a means to an end. According to Corbett, supremacy at sea was achieved in the following ways:
1. By decisively defeating the enemy navy.
2. By blocking the enemy.
The second point is fundamentally important - a little later it was Corbett’s strategy that would be chosen by the British as the main one in the war with Germany. And this is what Mahan did not consider as an independent operational concept.
Corbett here, apparently, was not the first - in the book of Admiral S.G. Gorshkov's “Sea Power of the State” mentions the Russian textbook of naval tactics of 1873 by the authorship of Captain-Lieutenant Berzin, where the same thing is said with almost the same words.
Corbett, however, went even further, and considered the rest (that is how it was at that time) of the options for a war at sea.
For the situation of contested domination, Corbett formalized the long-known principle of fleet-in-beeing - “fleet as a factor of presence”, when the naval group is close enough to the enemy to attack (or counterattack), but in order to reduce risks or save forces in battle comes in. As a result, the enemy now bears risks - any maneuver by his fleet can cause both a counterattack against the maneuvering forces and an attack on the target, which these forces can no longer defend after the maneuver begins. Thus, any opponent’s actions are shackled - the most reasonable or least risky option on his part is “do nothing”. This does not mean that a party that puts pressure on the enemy with its fleet should evade the battle, but it is not obliged to strive for it in this case. You need to understand that to arrange the enemy with such a “zugzwang” (adjusted for the fact that he can give up the initiative and not “walk” at all) you still have to try - this is not always as simple as it seems. But it is possible, and the same British are perfectly able to do this.
Corbett considered the option “for the weak side” as the second option for action under the conditions of the disputed domination - however, it is applicable for the strong side. “Auxiliary counterattacks” - “minor counter attacks”. The weak side, according to Corbett, can try, with the help of one-time attacks of small enemy forces, attacks of his single ships, fleet in the base or under other conditions when the numerical superiority of the attacked side cannot be realized, "change the balance" in their favor. And this is logical, history knows many examples of how the weak side managed to create local superiority in power.
An example, Corbett, however, found an unsuccessful one - the first Japanese strike on the Russian ships of Port Arthur. Unsuccessful because it was not a counterattack. But it’s very successful as an illustration of the concept of “balancing the balance” with the enemy by delivering the first blow - even if war is inevitable, then you need to hit first, and so that according to the results of the attack you get a more favorable (or less disadvantageous) balance of forces than it was in peacetime.
The third type of Corbett action is the use of supremacy at sea.
The main types of such should be an obstacle to enemy invasion, an attack by the enemy’s shipping and defense of their own, and “expeditionary” actions, in simple terms - an invasion from the sea to the territory of the enemy.
Corbett incredibly shrewdly writes that the supremacy of “our” fleet at sea does not mean at all that the enemy will not try to conduct a large-scale landing operation - he just needs to wait until the main forces of the fleet are far away, or, alternatively, operate far from that place where the dominant fleet can arrive quickly. In the 1940 year in Narvik, the Germans substantively showed the British that the books of their prophets should be carefully studied. With a disproportionately weaker fleet than Britain, Germany was able to land troops in Norway and conduct combat operations until the British retreated. Corbett warned of such a possibility and pointed out that protection from enemy invasion should be among the tasks, even with secured supremacy at sea.
Corbett proposed to conduct the cruising war “according to Mahen” - having first gained dominance at sea with his fighting fleet, and then protecting his communications from the “cruisers” of the enemy and wielding superior forces in his communications.
The last way to use the already achieved supremacy at sea, Corbett considered landing operations on enemy land. As an apologist for limited intervention in the military conflict (and island Britain had such an opportunity), he saw the finale in the form of an expeditionary force landing, which was to force the enemy to accept British conditions - as was the case during the Crimean War, which Corbett mentions at the end of his a masterpiece of military thought.
Corbett, however, made the most important conclusion compared to past theorists, however, at the beginning of the second part of his book, where, in principle, he analyzes the concept of “dominance at sea,” determining what it is and, accordingly, making it possible to understand how it to achieve.
The sea, Corbett wrote, cannot be conquered like land. And, therefore, dominance at sea has nothing to do with the deployment of troops or navy in one or another of its areas, as would be the case on earth. You can’t just “pick it up”. In fact, the only thing that can be “taken away” from the enemy according to Corbett (and in reality this is so) is the ability to move around the sea.
Corbett points out:
Is Corbett right? Yes, completely. Britain acted on this basis. Grand Fleet blocked Germany’s communications throughout the First World War - both for commercial shipping, which at some point caused an economic collapse in Germany, and for the maneuver of warships. During the Second World War, the Royal Navy blocked for German surface ships the ability to go to sea (use communications for military purposes) and fought against the German "cruisers" (submarines) in their communications. It was control over communications that was the subject of a naval war. "Bismarck" was destroyed while trying to pass through the sea routes to the open ocean and Brest. The British did not wait for him at the base. They were waiting for him on the communications they controlled.
Or take the example of Admiral Togo. Tsushima is sitting in us all with a sharp splinter, but in truth, Togo simply defended the communications of the Japanese army. That is why his fleet was blocked by Port Arthur, and did not make a giant bloody bulk on the fortress from the sea with all his might. When, in order to preserve communications, it was necessary to destroy the potential force that threatened them - the 2 squadron, Togo did it in "Mehanian" style in battle. But the battle and destruction of the Russian fleet was not an end in itself of the Japanese high command - their goal was to defeat the earth, expelling Russia from the lands of interest to the Japanese, expel the forces of the army, which required supplying the army with everything necessary, and it could only be supplied by sea. To do this, it was necessary to eliminate the threat to communications - the Russian fleet, which was done.
Or ask ourselves a question from the present - what are American nuclear submarines doing in Avacha Bay, near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky? Yes, the same thing - they provide for the Russians the potential impossibility of maneuvering submarines by sea (using naval communications for military purposes) in case of war. How are we deploying the Strategic Rocket Forces in that region geographically? The boat goes into the sea from the Avacha Bay, turns south, goes to the Kuril ridge, then either above the surface through the first Kuril passage or in underwater through the fourth, passes to the Sea of Okhotsk and then to the designated air defense missile defense - a protected area of combat duty, where- then there and located. It is on these lines "under the sea" that the Americans are going to dominate.
From the point of view of our Navy and the General Staff, the deployment of the full strategic nuclear forces in the threatened period will untie the hands of the top political leadership, making a disarming strike against Russia impossible. The Americans, on the contrary, have been struggling for many years to get the chance of such an attack, and for this they are preparing in the event of a crisis to stop the possibility for the NSNF to turn around - by preventing them from navigating through sea lanes. This is their command of the sea - domination of the sea. This is what the Anglo-Saxons have built around their entire naval policy for many centuries - of which consciously, "according to the book" - for more than a hundred years. This is both a goal and a criterion. This is what the fleet exists for and what it should do. The theory turned out to be true, and the principle is almost eternal.
It is important to understand that this is not only and not so much about maritime trade routes. The path along which the nuclear submarine goes to the designated combat patrol area is also maritime communications. This is not about trading lines. We are talking about obstructing maneuver by sea in principle. On the prohibition of deployment as such. This is what "domination of the sea." It can be local, for example, in the coastal zone along Kamchatka and in the Sea of Okhotsk, or wider, for example, throughout the Black Sea and the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Americans claim global dominance. But the nature of dominance at sea does not change with a change in scale, and the purpose of the fleet as its acquisition does not change either.
And this is the watershed. There are no "sea powers" and "continental powers" either. There is no cultural divide that makes one nation capable of marine power and another incapable or limited in ability. It does not give the Japanese origin of “bonuses” to the striking power of the fleet in itself. They are given by understanding the mission of the fleet in war. There are simply principles to follow. Whoever follows them gets the fleet. It may be small, or may be large. It can grow and become stronger, or it can stagnate, but it is always fully and without special reservations fighting, it has a purpose, its personnel have no questions about why he goes to the service, military leadership and politicians Those responsible for naval construction can always understand whether it is necessary to build a ship or to start one or another expensive project. Just corny because there is a criterion to evaluate its correctness. Two simple principles. The fleet is ultimately intended to fight with another fleet (Mehan), and its goal is to establish dominance at sea, that is, on sea lanes (Corbett) - in any way, including by destroying enemy forces in battle.
There is an understanding of these things at all levels of command and power in the camp - there is the so-called “sea power”. No - and at least how many ships you build and any number of planes take into combat duty, but “this” will not become a full-fledged fleet.
Our people and their ideas.
All of the above at a theoretical level was consciously in Russia in the first years after the Russo-Japanese war. The painful analysis of the defeat made by Russian naval officers, army officers and a number of public figures, in principle, made it possible to answer the most important questions. For example, the Russian naval theorist and officer Nikolai Lavrentievich Klado was one year ahead of Corbett, with the understanding that the main tasks of the fleet are to ensure their communications at sea and to suppress enemy actions. He did not formulate the same set of rules and definitions as Corbett, but he devoted great influence to the issue of interaction between the fleet and the army.
Klado developed his mind-sets in relation to the military-political situation specifically developed to the west of Russia, and mainly in relation to a potential war with Germany. Thus, he did not create a universal theory, but with regard to the great war in Europe with the participation of Russia, his calculations are largely true even now (see Klado N.L. The value of the fleet in the series of state military equipment - Oranienbaum: Edition of the officer rifle school , 1910.)
But it’s not enough to understand the problem, it also needs to be fixed. This was not done in full, and during the First World War the Russian fleet was not able to realize all its potential, although on the other hand, its role in today's society is usually underestimated, especially for the Black Sea Fleet. And then there was a revolution and a civil war, which the fleet, in its former form, simply did not survive.
But, strangely enough, it was the early Soviet years, the years of heady freedom and revolutionary romance, when it still seemed that there would be only victories and achievements, when you could still say everything you think loudly, gave us your own, domestic theory of building military naval forces. It would seem that in a situation where the remains of decrepit warships go to scrap for the sake of buying steam locomotives, it’s not up to marine strategic theories, but in the end everything turned out differently.
In 1922, the printing house of the Maritime Commissariat in Petrograd issued a small book in volume “The value of sea power for the state”, authored by Boris Borisovich Gervais, head of the Maritime Academy (now VUNC Navy "Naval Academy named after N. G. Kuznetsov"). Boris Gervais, at that time, was, without exaggeration, one of the most talented naval thinkers in our country. Unlike other prominent theorists, Gervais was also an outstanding practitioner - he participated in the Russo-Japanese War as an officer-miner of the cruiser "Stormbreaker", participated in the military campaigns of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, in a battle in the Korean Channel, was awarded for courage. During World War I, he commanded two destroyers, after which he was responsible for the coastal defense of the entire Gulf of Finland. He rose to the rank of captain in the Imperial Navy. He participated in the Civil War on the side of the Soviet government. In general, the experience of BB Gervais had excellent, incomparable with the theoretical officer Mahan. And his work by its content still remains important for the domestic fleet. Alas, it is forgotten, but this is the best adaptation of the principles of naval construction to domestic realities at this historical moment.
The theoretical views of B. Gervais can be described very briefly and concisely:
1. Modern states and their ability to wage war are critically dependent on maritime communications.
2. To ensure victory in the war, the fleet must break the enemy’s communications and prevent him from using the sea for military or commercial purposes. This is especially important to prevent any enemy landing against Russian territory.
3. Similarly, the fleet must maintain its communications. This will provide the opportunity to use the sea to maneuver troops, transport and carry out landing operations against the enemy.
4. Since Russia has an extensive land border and opponents on land, a critical mission of the fleet is to help the army in the war. The best way to help the army is to ensure its flank from the sea, both during defense and during the offensive. In the event of an enemy attack, its advancing group is “cut off” by a strike (landing) from the sea to the flank, in the same way an army advancing on the enemy can count on the support of naval landing. Moreover, in all cases, enemy landings are not allowed.
5. To ensure such freedom of action, the domestic fleet must destroy, destroy or block the enemy fleet, and impede its actions. In some cases, together with the army.
6. To do this, a fleet is required that is appropriate in strength to such a mission.
Like Corbett, Gervais used a simple and concise wording to describe the mission of the Navy:
Both that, and another, provides the fleet with the required freedom of action, and does not give such an adversary.
Gervais saw naval operations not as independent operations, but rather as combined operations of the army and navy. He considered the option of destroying enemy fleets in the base by attack from land, for which it was necessary to conduct an extensive landing operation, which, again, required support from the combat fleet. He paid a lot of attention to submarine warfare, and extremely sagaciously defined its intermediate finale, which allies in the Atlantic convincingly demonstrated in the 1943-1945 years. He illustrated each of his postulates with extensive military examples from the past and theoretical possibilities of the near future.
From the point of view of technology, Gervais focused on global trends. In those years, battleships dominated the sea. It was a kind of superweapon, as is now strategic aviation. Gervais believed that it was a linear fleet of heavily armored and high-speed ships with powerful artillery that should be the main instrument of war at sea. Light forces - destroyers capable of conducting high-speed attacks, raids and the like from under the cover of linear forces should have contributed to him. It was required to have a cruiser for reconnaissance and a submarine to wage war on communications and the hidden destruction of enemy warships. Due to the fact that aviation progress does not stand still, it was to be expected that soon, shore-based bombers would become a huge danger to surface ships. In order to prevent base aviation from melt the surface ships with air strikes with impunity, it is required to provide air defense of ship formations with the help of carrier-based aviation and a certain number of air defense carriers. Due to the extraordinary effectiveness of mines and their danger, the fleet must have a sufficient number of mine loaders to carry out mine operations, and minesweepers, to protect its forces from mines established by the enemy. Not bad for the early 20s, right?
In the early twenties, an ideological trend took shape among Soviet military sailors, aimed precisely at building a normal, full-fledged balanced fleet capable of performing a wide range of tasks - from minesweeping to repelling air strikes against ships. Their ideas are extremely relevant today. Just replace the battleships with URO ships, the cruisers with multipurpose nuclear submarines, add an air defense carrier (we already have one, we don’t have to imagine anything), normal minesweepers and diesel submarines ready for mine operations instead of mine loaders (or BDKs with trained mines productions by crews) - and you don’t have to think up anything special, everything has already been invented, clearly and clearly. Naval aviation only add. And, most importantly - everything is perfectly consistent with the principles.
Do we need to keep our communications? Northern Sea Route, connection with Sakhalin, Kuril Islands, Kamchatka, Chukotka, Kaliningrad? The Syrian Express? What are the routes for the deployment of nuclear strategic nuclear forces in the Pacific Ocean and in the north? It is necessary. Will there be a fight for them? Yes, that's for sure. And what if we hold them back? And let the SSBN turn around, and the merchant fleet continue to sail from Sabetta and further everywhere? And do not let the enemy wield them? This means that our enemy lost - neither escalate the war (interfere with the Strategic Nuclear Forces), nor starve these Russians, nor even land troops. Dead end.
But, according to the evil fate, building a normal balanced fleet in those years stumbled on an extremely harmful mental virus.
We are talking about the so-called "young school", the protagonist of which was Alexander Petrovich Alexandrov (Avel Pinhusovich Bar). Aleksandrov-Bar himself did not have any experience in participating in a real naval war, began to serve and grow in political positions, taking commissar positions, began to receive a naval education only in the 1922 year, he received it only in the 1927, but already in 1932 Lecturer at the Naval Academy. Since 1930, Aleksandrov has been creating a “name” for himself by criticizing the traditional approach to naval construction, the one that created Britain’s naval power and ensured victory over Russia in Japan. The criticism basically boiled down to the following - it is useless to try to destroy the enemy fleet, all the same the power of the productive forces is such that the enemy will quickly recover all losses, and no establishment of domination will be impossible, which means that we must abandon the desire to ensure supremacy at sea, and begin to create a new one, “Theory of maritime operations” relevant to practical tasks. These views were set forth in his brochure. "Critique of the theory of sea ownership".
Aleksandrov’s constructions contained the worst mistake of all possible - a logical one. He missed that not only one side, but the other, too, would struggle to compensate for the losses, relying on the "growth of productive forces", trying to maintain the previously existing superiority and even increase it. The Second World War perfectly showed how it looks. Productive forces worked for the United States and Japan, and not just Japan, and the United States completely established supremacy at sea at a certain point. In addition, the power of weapons also increased, and the reimbursement of lost ships in fact was already in question - Germany, which was under continuous bombing, was an example of this. The ideas of the young school did not contain any clear goal - if the "traditionalists" had this dominance at sea, then the "young" had something that they themselves could not precisely formulate. And they could not in the end.
In an interesting way, the beginning of the thirties was marked by the fact that the "traditionalists" were repressed, and the adherents of the "new school" received good posts - often instead of the very repressed traditionalists. True, the “young school” could not create a new theory of the struggle at sea. But she was able to break the old one. Having lost the sane purpose of its existence, the fleet lost the correct guidelines in organizing combat training, and then successively failed the Republican naval operations in Spain, the approach to planning and conducting which the “Soviet friends” turned out to be completely ugly, then it turned out that the fleet could not fulfill the requirement Stalin's deployment of forces in the Mediterranean. Then there were big maneuvers in the Baltic, in which it turned out that the sailors simply couldn’t do anything except take the ship from point A to point B. Stalin responded with a new round of repressions, the “young school” was now put under the knife itself, but corrected by such methods nothing succeeded - the fleet is too complex a system for something to be set up like this. As a result, it was painfully slow to restore everything.
Restore fell to the share of People's Commissar N.G. Kuznetsov, but he did not have enough time at all for anything - the fleet was untied with repressions and ridiculous political appointments about a year before the war with Germany. Something to return to normal in such a time was impossible. Nevertheless, even in its extremely disorganized state, the fleet was able to make a huge contribution to the victory over Germany, a contribution that today, unfortunately, has disappeared from the mass consciousness, and many military people are not correctly recognized. But we remember.
After the war, the ideology of naval construction again began a return to the right side. So, the requirement for ensuring supremacy at sea, which was understood as a prohibition of the enemy’s actions, and the need to maintain their communications, finally returned to the instruction on conducting marine operations of NMO-51. After Stalin's death, little has changed in “ideology” - the requirement to ensure the dominant position of the Soviet Navy in the areas of combat operations never left the guiding documents, and even with errors and stupid things (such as rejection of the aircraft carrier fleet), but the strength of the Navy was constantly growing. To understand the scale of growth, the forces that Britain sent to the Falkland War could, without any problems, and possibly without losses, destroy one regiment of naval missile-carrying aircraft in a few sorties. And this was one of the results of "thinking in the right direction."
The Soviet forces were focused on the battle - even submarines had to hit warships and other submarines, and not try to wage a cruising war in the style of “unshaven boys” Dönitz, although of course, no one would miss enemy vehicles. And since the ships under construction, their weapons and type also corresponded to this approach, the power of the fleet became higher and higher. This does not look surprising from a theoretical point of view - the Commander-in-Chief Gorshkov perfectly understood the significance and importance of establishing dominance at sea, at least local.
We will not idealize the Navy of the USSR. There were a lot of “excesses” in its development, especially when the evil genius of the Soviet state and one of his involuntary grave diggers, Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov, paid close attention to the fleet. And yet, while the "guiding star" of the need to ensure supremacy at sea (with different sauces, up to the modern "maintaining a favorable operational regime" - however, this term has already surfaced in history, and meant the same thing as now), luminaries over the fleet itself and over shipbuilding, the Navy became stronger.
The collapse of the nineties affected not only the Navy, and the consequences for its combat power that it brought with itself did not belong to the concepts of naval construction - the whole country fell apart. We must understand that Russia went through such a turning point when literally everything was subjected to doubt and negation - few people in the world have such “baggage” behind them. This affected the fleet to the full extent, since everything was doubted and denied, the role of the fleet in the country's general defense system was also seriously questioned at all levels - from the ministry of defense to the minds of individual citizens. The result was strange.
Split principles
An officer serving in parts of the Navy, when asked a question like “what is the purpose of the fleet?” Will be able to blur out something like the need to maintain the very same favorable operational regime, which becomes favorable after the establishment of supremacy at sea, the need for which in the guidance documents and instructions of the fleet is fully spelled out. Is this right, should everything be so? Yes, it should and should.
But in state doctrinal documents, everything is not so! This is similar to the psyche of a schizophrenic who sincerely believes in conflicting things, but alas, we have come precisely to this. While the units and fleets are preparing for one thing, the highest state power in its doctrinal attitudes professes something completely different.
From the website of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, section "Tasks of the Navy":
The Navy creates and maintains conditions for ensuring the safety of the naval activities of the Russian Federation, ensures the naval presence of the Russian Federation, demonstrates the flag and military power in the oceans, takes part in the fight against piracy, and in military, peacekeeping and humanitarian actions carried out by the world community which are in the interests of the Russian Federation, calls ships and vessels of the Navy at ports of foreign states.
Does anyone see here words like “military operations”, “destruction”, “protection of communications”, “domination at sea”? There is a certain “reflection of aggression from sea and ocean directions”. And if we ourselves need to hit? And repel ground aggression? How many landings did the fleet land during WWII? Strictly formally, starting from the wording of the Ministry of Defense, our Navy is NOT INTENDED FOR CONDUCTING AN ATTACK WAR IN GENERAL. It is, of course, intended to contain this very war. To this end, it includes a strategic nuclear force. Moreover, the mere provision of their deployment during the threatened period or in wartime is military operations. What if containment fails? Although, maybe in some other doctrinal document everything is somehow more specifically stated?
As previously stated in the article “The ideological impasse of the Russian fleet? No, Russian society! ”, in Russia there are the following doctrinal documents regarding the Russian Navy. The first is the Russian Maritime Policy. This document is mentioned in passing about the fleet, as it is “not about the Navy,” it lists the principal goals of Russia as a state on the seas and oceans, from scientific activities to fishing. The fleet is mentioned there only in the context of the fact that it must protect the interests of the country at sea, without highly specialized details.
The second document, which is almost completely related to the Navy, is the “Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030 of the year”. The characterization of this document in the mentioned article was given more than exhaustive: profanity. Those interested can follow the link above and evaluate this gap with reality closer.
However, we are not too lazy to quote another fragment of this document, not mentioned earlier:
tasks and priorities in the field of its construction and
development
... b) in wartime:
the ability to cause unacceptable damage to the enemy in order to
his coercion to end hostilities on conditions
guaranteed ensuring the national interests of the Russian
Federation
ability to successfully confront an adversary,
possessing high-tech naval capabilities (including
including armed with precision weapons), with factions
its naval forces in the near, distant marine zones and ocean
areas;
high level defensive capabilities in the area
anti-ballistic, anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and anti-mine
defense;
ability to long-term autonomous activity, including
including self-replenishment of inventory
means and weapons in remote areas of the oceans from ships
rear support for new projects;
compliance of the structure and operational (combat) capabilities of the forces
(troops) to modern forms and methods of warfare, their
adaptation to new operational concepts for the use of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation, taking into account the full range of military threats
security of the Russian Federation.
To do something, fleet, what will happen to these abilities? Will it be implemented as a BATTLE with an adversary? What is the success of the confrontation with enemy groupings? And if they do not appear for battle, just like the Grand Fleet in the First World War? Will all exports be blocked in the English Channel, Gibraltar and Tsushima, and all? What to do then? Where is the answer in the doctrine?
This list is not a destination, and it does not comply with the principles of building maritime power that guide other countries. It is impossible to deduce from it the correctness or non-correctness of a particular shipbuilding program. It cannot be used as a criterion to verify the necessity or unnecessity of a project of a ship or class of ships. It is impossible to push off from him in choosing a strategy for action in a war at sea. This is just a set of unrelated wishes, and no more. Yes, right and right wishes, but only wishes.
And it is precisely in this chaos that, in place of the fundamental principles of building the Navy, there is a guarantee of all our problems - not warships, not combat rear admirals in shipbuilding, a fleet that is being built without clear operational tasks, without a basic idea that would give it its existence meaning. Minesweepers, unable to fight mines, and ships of almost 2000 tons, armed with one three-inch gun, are also from here. You cannot build a battle fleet where it is doctrinal and should not be combat.
But we remember that from the sailors in the event of war they will require something completely different. Indeed, dominance at sea did not disappear from their guiding documents. The state, which is building a non-combat, albeit a military fleet, stuffs it with ships that do not even have a purpose, at a critical moment in time will begin to set the task to this fleet “as it is”. Real tasks in a real war, against a real enemy, but not by a real fleet. The logical ending in the form of a new Tsushima in this case will only be a matter of time. Losses will be quite real.
Obviously, we need a new (or well-forgotten old?) Paradigm.
We'll have to do everything ourselves
Karl Marx wrote:
We, patriotic citizens, do not have material strength in order to force the government to change their minds. But she does not respond to verbal criticism. But, in full accordance with the definition of Marx, we can create our own theory of how everything should be and make it the property of the masses. And then it can no longer be ignored, if only because the majority will be indoctrinated. And, frankly, the moment for this has come. Because when, if not now, and who, if not us?
Formulating, starting from the work of theorists and common sense, the very set of principles that must be followed in the creation and development of the navy, what any doctrinal document should begin with:
The Navy of the Russian Federation is the type of armed forces intended for warfare on the sea, including its water surface, airspace above the sea, water column and seabed adjacent to the water edge of the land area, as well as in other water bodies - lakes and rivers , on their bottom and shores. In some cases, the Navy conducts hostilities, hitting the enemy’s communications equipment and their network, using malicious software, and also hits targets in Earth orbit, if necessary. The Navy achieves victory in the war by gaining dominance at sea, namely by establishing a level of control over sea lanes in specified areas of the oceans, the far, near sea and coastal zones, which allows the Russian Federation to use them unlimitedly for any purpose, and also does not allow the enemy to either interfere with such use, or to use these communications himself, up to the complete impossibility of deploying his forces. Dominance at sea is conquered or established without a battle by the navy both independently and as part of interspecific groups of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. If possible, the Navy seeks supremacy at sea by blocking or demonstrating force, or threatening to use force. If these actions did not lead to the desired result, then the Navy will DESTROY the opposing enemy forces that impede the establishment of supremacy at sea. To do this, all ships, submarines, combat aircraft, and other weapons systems of the navy have the ABILITY to engage in combat, including prolonged combat, and to carry out tasks to destroy opposing ships, submarines, aircraft and other weapons systems of the enemy, his manpower and various objects on land, including in its depths. The personnel of the Navy has the level of training and morale necessary to complete such tasks.
THE MAIN OBJECT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE NAVY IS THE NAVY FORCE OF THE OPPONENT AND THEIR COAST INFRASTRUCTURE. In case of military necessity, the Navy can destroy targets located on land using rocket and artillery weapons of ships, naval aviation and parts and formations of the marine corps.
THE TASK TO CONQUER LIVING AT SEA IS MAIN FOR THE Navy. With complete impossibility to conquer the lordship at sea, it is required not to allow the establishment of the lordship at sea to the opponent. All other tasks performed by the Navy are secondary, with the exception of ships in the composition of the strategic nuclear forces and amphibious ships, for which anti-land operations are the main task. All warships and combat aircraft accepted as part of the Navy must either be able to be used to perform the specified main mission, or be necessary for its implementation by other ships and aircraft. EXCEPTIONS ARE NOT ALLOWED.
Simply? Simply. These are the principles that make the navy a navy. It doesn’t matter whether corvettes or aircraft carriers are its basis, if only a few thousand people serve in it or hundreds of thousands - it doesn’t matter. The principles are important.
It is necessary to evaluate whether the design of the new warship is adequate (or how the project is implemented)? First, see if it, or its implementation, complies with the principles. Need to evaluate the direction of combat training? We look how much it keeps up with the principles. This is the criterion that separates a country that has a fleet from a country that has many ships.
It is these provisions that should one day appear in our doctrinal attitudes, at the same time become an indication for what needs to be done and a measure for what has already been done. And it is precisely starting from them that our country should build its fleet in the future.
To be continued ...
- Alexander Timokhin
- Wikipedia commons, Gutenberg project, D. Getmanenko / TASS, archive of Igor and Larisa Shiryaeva
Information