Military Review

We are building a fleet. Theory and Purpose

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... better not build at all fleetthan to build it knowingly unfit for solving its direct task; this, at least, will be frank and will not entail useless expenses on a toy unnecessary for the state.
B.I. Dolivo-Dobrovolsky, “On the Rationality of the Naval Idea in the State” (Maritime Digest, No.7, 1906)



Why do some nations have successfully evolving navies, while others are just a series of attempts to create them, with varying degrees of success? Attempts interspersed with periods of prolonged decline and defeat for ridiculous and stupid reasons? Why do some societies know how to maintain combat effectiveness at sea for decades and centuries, let it periodically fall to dangerously low levels, while others, having spent a ton of money and resources, building ships and training personnel, then miss all this, lose, leaving only footage of the chronicle and the once formidable aircraft-carrying cruisers, transformed on foreign land into amusement parks? What is the difference and where does it go?



To this difference, many not-so-smart people summed up a lot of theories, right down to giving birth to the concepts of “continental” and “sea powers,” justifying the ability of some and the inability of others to use naval forces with some cultural features ... All this is not entirely right. Almost not true. In fact, the line lies in the understanding of both society and the military-political leadership of literally a few simple principles, multiplied by the geographical restrictions characteristic of the state. If this were not so, then completely deprived of a normal fleet, maritime trade and the sea-working population of the United States would not have become between the 1890 and 1945 a year the dominant force on the seas.

The United States was what not very perspicacious people call the words “continental power” - a huge subcontinent, the main wealth of which, as well as the vector of the efforts of the population are on their land. Their navy was nothing against, for example, the Russian Imperial Navy. But soon they brilliantly won their naval war against Spain, and Russia lost its own with a bang. Lost Japan, in which seventy years before that there were bags of rice instead of money. Which, nine years before the attack on Port Arthur, was forced to take into account Russian political interests by a demonstration of power, not by the largest Russian squadron. What “cultural features” made this possible?

There is an answer.

There are centuries-old principles of building naval power. They are known and well described in the theoretical literature. They can be challenged, but not challenged. It is impossible, because there is no country so powerful in the naval sense that would ignore them. And there is no country that, even if instinctively or even unconsciously, following them, would not have received the “rise” of its sea power. Examples have numbers. And the United States, and Britain, and imperial Japan - there, in this list of countries that followed these rules. For a very short time, part of these principles was not quite consciously adopted by the USSR Navy - and the result was a rise in its power to unprecedented levels, a firm second place in power after the United States. Military thought in different countries came to their understanding when they were already formed, and structuring them took quite a long time. But in general, the "theoretical part" was completed before the First World War.

In Russia, with its hard history, a theory adapted to Russian characteristics was finally formulated a little later - after the Civil War. Until the very beginning of World War II, it was left without practical application, which had terrible consequences for our Motherland. But its individual echoes, partially embodied in practice, created the USSR's nuclear missile fleet, capable of operating anywhere in the world’s oceans, albeit with a number of restrictions.

Today, this knowledge is forgotten. They are forgotten, however, only by us. Our opponents in the world have not forgotten anything and are building their fleets on the basis of this simple understanding of simple questions.

Apparently, it is worth recalling them and voicing them.

Mahan and his postulates


In the 1889 year, the US Navy captain (later Rear Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan published his epoch-making work, without exaggeration, a book that we translated as “The Influence of Sea Force on the History of 1660-1783”.


Alfred Thayer Mahan, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy


And - a conceptual failure in translation from the very beginning. Mahan did not write anything about force, or force. He wrote about power - in a sociological context, power. In the physical - power. The work to establish power over the sea, completed in some time, if to be absolutely accurate. This is an important point - according to Mahan, marine power is a process of gaining power over the seas that lasts over time - it does not give such a decoding anywhere, but it is a direct translation into Russian of the name of his main work, made without distortion. "Influence of Sea Power upon history."

And this is the first lesson - where we are thoughtlessly thinking of gaining “sea power”, our competitors are looking for opportunities to gain sea power, even if it takes time. Gaining, through the application of systematic efforts for a long period of time. And yes, this acquisition requires effort and time, and there is nothing "wrong" in that - in order to gain that very power over the seas, you need to work, it will take time, it cannot be done quickly - you need to be able to rest and long, monotonously build its power, "brick by brick", year after year, century after century, forever, never departing from its goal ever. Generation after generation. In the fight. These efforts, their focus and relevance to the stated goal are the subject of discussion. This cover lesson passes by the Russian reader right away, like countless other mis-translated concepts. Nevertheless, even with some mental distortions, the book made a splash in Russia too. We will not paint its influence on the minds of those days, we will restrict ourselves to what postulates Mahen voiced.

The welfare of the people and the state that this people inhabits is directly dependent on how much this people controls world trade. World trade is sea trade - the delivery of large goods in significant quantities over long distances is unprofitable other than by water, but from other continents is simply impossible. It is carried out thanks to the presence of a merchant fleet that delivers goods, and access (from the sea, of course) to the source of these goods. This access can be “issued” in the form of a colony, or as exclusive trade rights in the exchange of goods with independent states. At the same time, it doesn’t matter how they are established - either by agreement or by an “explicit order” (we look at how the Netherlands controlled the supply of goods from the Baltic to central and Western Europe). In order to take control of maritime trade, the state must possess a powerful navy, so large and strong that it would not allow any other country to encroach on the state-owned “piece” of world trade. If the “opponent” is still trying to intercept commodity flows, both by seizing the colonies and destroying exclusive trade privileges, then it is necessary to fight with him - and this, for example, England and Holland did for several centuries in a row. In this case, a powerful naval fleet must defeat the enemy naval fleet, or by demonstrating the strength to expel it from the sea, thus ensuring the preservation of the “status quo”. Well, or not saving - it depends on who won. The next step, of course, is the expulsion of the merchant fleet from the sea, in those wild times by the banal capture or sinking of ships.
The condition for maintaining power over the sea (and sea trade) is the navy, and the correct course of action for it is force pressure on the enemy, reduced to two possible outcomes - the enemy is defeated in battle, or the enemy escaped without a fight.
This is how power over the seas is born - sea power. In the future, it may be a military-political factor and is not related to maritime trade, but it is born according to the above scheme.


Thus, England and Holland became the “sea powers” ​​(we use this meaningless domestic term).

Mahan in his book drew attention to a possible strategy "for the weak" - the so-called "Cruising war." The historical experience with which he operated said that, of course, such a thing may well prove to be useful - but only when the combat fleet of the belligerent subjected to “cruising” is associated with the fighting fleet of the attacker. Otherwise, "in the style of Mahan," cruising war will fail.

At the time of writing, there were already many examples of such a failure. Today, at the peak of the industrial era, we can recall much more significant failures - unlimited submarine warfare, which was twice defeated by Germany - and both times because the German "cruisers" - submarines - did not have the proper support from their combat fleet.

On the other hand, the unrestricted submarine war that the Americans waged in the Pacific in 1941-1945 years was completely successful - all the resources that Japan theoretically had for the naval war were constrained by a hopeless confrontation with the US Navy. With the American Navy. There was absolutely nothing left to protect shipping.

Everything that Mahan described was extremely true, but true mainly for the period described. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the world was already different. Some of Mahan's postulates remained true in the twentieth century - the same "cruising" war was quite "Mahean" in both world wars. Others demanded adjustments.

So, world trade has been greatly transformed, a court under a neutral flag has become a mass phenomenon, international agreements have appeared that regulate their status in the course of hostilities. Radio communication appeared, which dramatically accelerated control and increased the speed of all processes related to military operations.

Mahan tried to keep up with the times. In 1911, work came out of his pen "Naval strategy in comparison and contrast with the principles and practice of military operations on the ground." The most powerful text with more than five hundred pages, devoted almost exclusively to military examples, comparing operations on land and at sea, and their application to the current military-political situation, both in the world and around the United States (mainly) substantially detailed and clarified the postulates Mahan. Twenty-two years have passed since he wrote his first and most important book, during which time the Japanese-Chinese, Spanish-American, and Russian-Japanese wars took place, where the fleets played a crucial role.

Mahan subjected his principles to reanalysis through the prism of modernity, through combat experience, which was absent when he began his theoretical research. Cutting off all that was superfluous and obsolete showed that one of its main principles is if there is a fleet, then it should be actively used against the enemy fleet - true. Mahen analyzed the Russo-Japanese War, paying particular attention to the actions of the 1 Pacific Squadron. It is noteworthy that he considered the correct course of action for the forces in Port Arthur to attack the Japanese fiercely and desperately in order to change the balance of forces as much as possible by the time the 2 Pacific Squadron of Rozhestvensky entered the war.

Was this said correctly? Let's imagine that the 1-I TOE died completely in the battle, having managed to destroy another Japanese battleship, over a couple of actually sunk. What would it give? The fact that Rozhestvensky would have met one armadillo less in the Tsushima Strait. Someone might say that given the balance of power, this would not work. May be. And if they were two less? On three? Or would there be just as many battleships, but the number of destroyers and cruisers would have drastically subsided?

Mahan was absolutely right in this case. Fight is important, and it is they who decide everything, ultimately. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, a lot has changed. But the principle that a combat fleet is designed to fight has never lost its relevance. It should be created and built precisely for this, this is its purpose. A little later we will see that the force can not only be used, but also be demonstrated, instead of a battle, the threat of that can be used, but the fact that the fleet must be able to fight is undeniable. To fight, including with another fleet. So, it should be built on the basis of this. Or it is necessary to build nothing at all and "to distribute to pensioners". Or for the infantry to finally massively buy good and strong boots. And this is not a hyperbole, it’s actually better.

Let us remember this as the "Mahan principle" in our modern "creative processing", of course.

Ships, and formations of the navy should be able to fight with ships and formations of other fleets. The construction of "quasi-battle" ships formally having weapon, but in fact unable to fight the enemy Navy, is unacceptable. The training of personnel, the condition of the rear and the material base should allow the fleet to immediately engage in hostilities against another fleet, if necessary.

Sounds like a banality? Yes, this is commonplace, but most of the ships that the Russian Navy will receive from this year to the middle of the 2020’s or just “quasi-combat,” that is, there are formally weapons on board, and they can’t fight against an adequate enemy (22160 project, which is directly called by the officers of the Navy as "not a warship"); or they can perform one or two tasks and only in the absence of serious opposition (RTO projects 21631 and 22800). Or a combat ship, but it does not have critical systems for intended use or ensuring combat stability (submarines without anti-torpedoes and sonar countermeasures, minesweepers without anti-mine systems). For the domestic fleet today, not combat or quasi-combat target ships are the norm, but full-fledged combat "units" are rather the exception. Why? Because those who order them, coordinate, accept and design do not mean BATTLE as the main purpose of the created ship. Alas, this is so, and there is a lot of evidence to this.

Apparently, even the lessons of more than a hundred years ago, some have not learned. It will be terribly painful if history repeats them - after all, we are conducting such a steep propaganda of the fact that everything is more than good, but then all of a sudden ...

But all that was needed was to follow a simple principle. Actually, this distinguishes successful countries in naval construction from unsuccessful ones - understanding of the principles and following them. This is the reason for the success of some and the failure of others.

But let's continue, because Mahan's principle is not the only one.

“Some Principles of Marine Strategy” by Sir Julian Stafford Corbett


Mahan, having accomplished a great deed, did not create a harmonious theory, however. Those postulates that he voiced were generally true, if only because he built them on the basis of analysis of events that actually took place. But this cannot be considered a theory, it cannot be considered a method. In Mahan's books there are not even definitions - what theory is there. This is a set of principles. You can adhere to Mahan's principles - and it is necessary in some cases. It’s just that already at the beginning of the 20th century the “Mehanian” approach was incomplete. He did not explain everything.

For example, the fate of the 1-th Pacific squadron of the Russian fleet at first glance was predetermined by the fleet under the command of Togo. But she did not die in a naval battle, right? And not under attack from the sea fell Port Arthur. On the other hand, without the Japanese fleet, all this would have been impossible. But Togo conducted blockade actions, and did not get into a fight at any cost - although he did not neglect the attacks of the base, but in general this was not the main content of his actions. Although he eventually achieved success.

It was clear to many thinkers of those years that a certain theory was needed, one that would "cover" all questions about how to wage a naval war and by what methods to achieve victory in it.

In the same 1911 year, when Mahan released his Naval Strategy, another book came out in another part of the world. The book, which really "closed" almost all issues. Explained almost everything. Even for the present.

It was a book by British historian Julian Stafford Corbett (then still without the prefix "sir") “Some principles of maritime strategy”.

Corbett, who was a civilian man, a historian without military experience, released precisely the theory from his pen. Although there are questions to the way he defined the “theory of war” and the “nature of war”, in general, his book is just a theory, and this is a working theory — it will be shown below how much.

We are building a fleet. Theory and Purpose

Julian Stafford Corbett. Then still, apparently not "sir." But he had it ahead


Corbett defines the purpose of naval warfare very simply - and this is actually the “alpha and omega” warfare at sea:
"The purpose of hostilities at sea is both to achieve supremacy at sea, and at the same time to prevent the admission of such by the adversary."


It was, at first glance, the same thing that Mahan was preaching, but Corbett, unlike Mahan, did not put such emphasis on battle as a means to an end. According to Corbett, supremacy at sea was achieved in the following ways:

1. By decisively defeating the enemy navy.

2. By blocking the enemy.

The second point is fundamentally important - a little later it was Corbett’s strategy that would be chosen by the British as the main one in the war with Germany. And this is what Mahan did not consider as an independent operational concept.

Corbett here, apparently, was not the first - in the book of Admiral S.G. Gorshkov's “Sea Power of the State” mentions the Russian textbook of naval tactics of 1873 by the authorship of Captain-Lieutenant Berzin, where the same thing is said with almost the same words.

Corbett, however, went even further, and considered the rest (that is how it was at that time) of the options for a war at sea.

For the situation of contested domination, Corbett formalized the long-known principle of fleet-in-beeing - “fleet as a factor of presence”, when the naval group is close enough to the enemy to attack (or counterattack), but in order to reduce risks or save forces in battle comes in. As a result, the enemy now bears risks - any maneuver by his fleet can cause both a counterattack against the maneuvering forces and an attack on the target, which these forces can no longer defend after the maneuver begins. Thus, any opponent’s actions are shackled - the most reasonable or least risky option on his part is “do nothing”. This does not mean that a party that puts pressure on the enemy with its fleet should evade the battle, but it is not obliged to strive for it in this case. You need to understand that to arrange the enemy with such a “zugzwang” (adjusted for the fact that he can give up the initiative and not “walk” at all) you still have to try - this is not always as simple as it seems. But it is possible, and the same British are perfectly able to do this.

Corbett considered the option “for the weak side” as the second option for action under the conditions of the disputed domination - however, it is applicable for the strong side. “Auxiliary counterattacks” - “minor counter attacks”. The weak side, according to Corbett, can try, with the help of one-time attacks of small enemy forces, attacks of his single ships, fleet in the base or under other conditions when the numerical superiority of the attacked side cannot be realized, "change the balance" in their favor. And this is logical, history knows many examples of how the weak side managed to create local superiority in power.

An example, Corbett, however, found an unsuccessful one - the first Japanese strike on the Russian ships of Port Arthur. Unsuccessful because it was not a counterattack. But it’s very successful as an illustration of the concept of “balancing the balance” with the enemy by delivering the first blow - even if war is inevitable, then you need to hit first, and so that according to the results of the attack you get a more favorable (or less disadvantageous) balance of forces than it was in peacetime.

The third type of Corbett action is the use of supremacy at sea.

The main types of such should be an obstacle to enemy invasion, an attack by the enemy’s shipping and defense of their own, and “expeditionary” actions, in simple terms - an invasion from the sea to the territory of the enemy.

Corbett incredibly shrewdly writes that the supremacy of “our” fleet at sea does not mean at all that the enemy will not try to conduct a large-scale landing operation - he just needs to wait until the main forces of the fleet are far away, or, alternatively, operate far from that place where the dominant fleet can arrive quickly. In the 1940 year in Narvik, the Germans substantively showed the British that the books of their prophets should be carefully studied. With a disproportionately weaker fleet than Britain, Germany was able to land troops in Norway and conduct combat operations until the British retreated. Corbett warned of such a possibility and pointed out that protection from enemy invasion should be among the tasks, even with secured supremacy at sea.

Corbett proposed to conduct the cruising war “according to Mahen” - having first gained dominance at sea with his fighting fleet, and then protecting his communications from the “cruisers” of the enemy and wielding superior forces in his communications.

The last way to use the already achieved supremacy at sea, Corbett considered landing operations on enemy land. As an apologist for limited intervention in the military conflict (and island Britain had such an opportunity), he saw the finale in the form of an expeditionary force landing, which was to force the enemy to accept British conditions - as was the case during the Crimean War, which Corbett mentions at the end of his a masterpiece of military thought.

Corbett, however, made the most important conclusion compared to past theorists, however, at the beginning of the second part of his book, where, in principle, he analyzes the concept of “dominance at sea,” determining what it is and, accordingly, making it possible to understand how it to achieve.

The sea, Corbett wrote, cannot be conquered like land. And, therefore, dominance at sea has nothing to do with the deployment of troops or navy in one or another of its areas, as would be the case on earth. You can’t just “pick it up”. In fact, the only thing that can be “taken away” from the enemy according to Corbett (and in reality this is so) is the ability to move around the sea.

Corbett points out:
"Dominance at sea, therefore, is nothing more than control over maritime communications, used for both commercial and military purposes."


Is Corbett right? Yes, completely. Britain acted on this basis. Grand Fleet blocked Germany’s communications throughout the First World War - both for commercial shipping, which at some point caused an economic collapse in Germany, and for the maneuver of warships. During the Second World War, the Royal Navy blocked for German surface ships the ability to go to sea (use communications for military purposes) and fought against the German "cruisers" (submarines) in their communications. It was control over communications that was the subject of a naval war. "Bismarck" was destroyed while trying to pass through the sea routes to the open ocean and Brest. The British did not wait for him at the base. They were waiting for him on the communications they controlled.

Or take the example of Admiral Togo. Tsushima is sitting in us all with a sharp splinter, but in truth, Togo simply defended the communications of the Japanese army. That is why his fleet was blocked by Port Arthur, and did not make a giant bloody bulk on the fortress from the sea with all his might. When, in order to preserve communications, it was necessary to destroy the potential force that threatened them - the 2 squadron, Togo did it in "Mehanian" style in battle. But the battle and destruction of the Russian fleet was not an end in itself of the Japanese high command - their goal was to defeat the earth, expelling Russia from the lands of interest to the Japanese, expel the forces of the army, which required supplying the army with everything necessary, and it could only be supplied by sea. To do this, it was necessary to eliminate the threat to communications - the Russian fleet, which was done.

Or ask ourselves a question from the present - what are American nuclear submarines doing in Avacha Bay, near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky? Yes, the same thing - they provide for the Russians the potential impossibility of maneuvering submarines by sea (using naval communications for military purposes) in case of war. How are we deploying the Strategic Rocket Forces in that region geographically? The boat goes into the sea from the Avacha Bay, turns south, goes to the Kuril ridge, then either above the surface through the first Kuril passage or in underwater through the fourth, passes to the Sea of ​​Okhotsk and then to the designated air defense missile defense - a protected area of ​​combat duty, where- then there and located. It is on these lines "under the sea" that the Americans are going to dominate.

From the point of view of our Navy and the General Staff, the deployment of the full strategic nuclear forces in the threatened period will untie the hands of the top political leadership, making a disarming strike against Russia impossible. The Americans, on the contrary, have been struggling for many years to get the chance of such an attack, and for this they are preparing in the event of a crisis to stop the possibility for the NSNF to turn around - by preventing them from navigating through sea lanes. This is their command of the sea - domination of the sea. This is what the Anglo-Saxons have built around their entire naval policy for many centuries - of which consciously, "according to the book" - for more than a hundred years. This is both a goal and a criterion. This is what the fleet exists for and what it should do. The theory turned out to be true, and the principle is almost eternal.


The cover of one of the reprints of Some Principles of Marine Strategy. Very symbolic


It is important to understand that this is not only and not so much about maritime trade routes. The path along which the nuclear submarine goes to the designated combat patrol area is also maritime communications. This is not about trading lines. We are talking about obstructing maneuver by sea in principle. On the prohibition of deployment as such. This is what "domination of the sea." It can be local, for example, in the coastal zone along Kamchatka and in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, or wider, for example, throughout the Black Sea and the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Americans claim global dominance. But the nature of dominance at sea does not change with a change in scale, and the purpose of the fleet as its acquisition does not change either.

And this is the watershed. There are no "sea powers" and "continental powers" either. There is no cultural divide that makes one nation capable of marine power and another incapable or limited in ability. It does not give the Japanese origin of “bonuses” to the striking power of the fleet in itself. They are given by understanding the mission of the fleet in war. There are simply principles to follow. Whoever follows them gets the fleet. It may be small, or may be large. It can grow and become stronger, or it can stagnate, but it is always fully and without special reservations fighting, it has a purpose, its personnel have no questions about why he goes to the service, military leadership and politicians Those responsible for naval construction can always understand whether it is necessary to build a ship or to start one or another expensive project. Just corny because there is a criterion to evaluate its correctness. Two simple principles. The fleet is ultimately intended to fight with another fleet (Mehan), and its goal is to establish dominance at sea, that is, on sea lanes (Corbett) - in any way, including by destroying enemy forces in battle.

There is an understanding of these things at all levels of command and power in the camp - there is the so-called “sea power”. No - and at least how many ships you build and any number of planes take into combat duty, but “this” will not become a full-fledged fleet.


The consequences of misunderstanding the war at sea - the lost Russian fleet, in this photo the battleship battleship "Victory" and the cruiser "Pallas" in Port Arthur


Our people and their ideas.


All of the above at a theoretical level was consciously in Russia in the first years after the Russo-Japanese war. The painful analysis of the defeat made by Russian naval officers, army officers and a number of public figures, in principle, made it possible to answer the most important questions. For example, the Russian naval theorist and officer Nikolai Lavrentievich Klado was one year ahead of Corbett, with the understanding that the main tasks of the fleet are to ensure their communications at sea and to suppress enemy actions. He did not formulate the same set of rules and definitions as Corbett, but he devoted great influence to the issue of interaction between the fleet and the army.

Klado developed his mind-sets in relation to the military-political situation specifically developed to the west of Russia, and mainly in relation to a potential war with Germany. Thus, he did not create a universal theory, but with regard to the great war in Europe with the participation of Russia, his calculations are largely true even now (see Klado N.L. The value of the fleet in the series of state military equipment - Oranienbaum: Edition of the officer rifle school , 1910.)

But it’s not enough to understand the problem, it also needs to be fixed. This was not done in full, and during the First World War the Russian fleet was not able to realize all its potential, although on the other hand, its role in today's society is usually underestimated, especially for the Black Sea Fleet. And then there was a revolution and a civil war, which the fleet, in its former form, simply did not survive.

But, strangely enough, it was the early Soviet years, the years of heady freedom and revolutionary romance, when it still seemed that there would be only victories and achievements, when you could still say everything you think loudly, gave us your own, domestic theory of building military naval forces. It would seem that in a situation where the remains of decrepit warships go to scrap for the sake of buying steam locomotives, it’s not up to marine strategic theories, but in the end everything turned out differently.

In 1922, the printing house of the Maritime Commissariat in Petrograd issued a small book in volume “The value of sea power for the state”, authored by Boris Borisovich Gervais, head of the Maritime Academy (now VUNC Navy "Naval Academy named after N. G. Kuznetsov"). Boris Gervais, at that time, was, without exaggeration, one of the most talented naval thinkers in our country. Unlike other prominent theorists, Gervais was also an outstanding practitioner - he participated in the Russo-Japanese War as an officer-miner of the cruiser "Stormbreaker", participated in the military campaigns of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment, in a battle in the Korean Channel, was awarded for courage. During World War I, he commanded two destroyers, after which he was responsible for the coastal defense of the entire Gulf of Finland. He rose to the rank of captain in the Imperial Navy. He participated in the Civil War on the side of the Soviet government. In general, the experience of BB Gervais had excellent, incomparable with the theoretical officer Mahan. And his work by its content still remains important for the domestic fleet. Alas, it is forgotten, but this is the best adaptation of the principles of naval construction to domestic realities at this historical moment.


Bb Gervais in his young years


The theoretical views of B. Gervais can be described very briefly and concisely:

1. Modern states and their ability to wage war are critically dependent on maritime communications.
2. To ensure victory in the war, the fleet must break the enemy’s communications and prevent him from using the sea for military or commercial purposes. This is especially important to prevent any enemy landing against Russian territory.
3. Similarly, the fleet must maintain its communications. This will provide the opportunity to use the sea to maneuver troops, transport and carry out landing operations against the enemy.
4. Since Russia has an extensive land border and opponents on land, a critical mission of the fleet is to help the army in the war. The best way to help the army is to ensure its flank from the sea, both during defense and during the offensive. In the event of an enemy attack, its advancing group is “cut off” by a strike (landing) from the sea to the flank, in the same way an army advancing on the enemy can count on the support of naval landing. Moreover, in all cases, enemy landings are not allowed.
5. To ensure such freedom of action, the domestic fleet must destroy, destroy or block the enemy fleet, and impede its actions. In some cases, together with the army.
6. To do this, a fleet is required that is appropriate in strength to such a mission.


Like Corbett, Gervais used a simple and concise wording to describe the mission of the Navy:
“In the case of offensive tasks, naval force must certainly strive for supremacy at sea, that is, to destroy the enemy fleet or to close his exit from the harbors. In the case of defensive tasks, the naval force should mainly strive to maintain its combat effectiveness and freedom of access to the sea, i.e. to prevent the enemy from dominating the sea. ”


Both that, and another, provides the fleet with the required freedom of action, and does not give such an adversary.

Gervais saw naval operations not as independent operations, but rather as combined operations of the army and navy. He considered the option of destroying enemy fleets in the base by attack from land, for which it was necessary to conduct an extensive landing operation, which, again, required support from the combat fleet. He paid a lot of attention to submarine warfare, and extremely sagaciously defined its intermediate finale, which allies in the Atlantic convincingly demonstrated in the 1943-1945 years. He illustrated each of his postulates with extensive military examples from the past and theoretical possibilities of the near future.

From the point of view of technology, Gervais focused on global trends. In those years, battleships dominated the sea. It was a kind of superweapon, as is now strategic aviation. Gervais believed that it was a linear fleet of heavily armored and high-speed ships with powerful artillery that should be the main instrument of war at sea. Light forces - destroyers capable of conducting high-speed attacks, raids and the like from under the cover of linear forces should have contributed to him. It was required to have a cruiser for reconnaissance and a submarine to wage war on communications and the hidden destruction of enemy warships. Due to the fact that aviation progress does not stand still, it was to be expected that soon, shore-based bombers would become a huge danger to surface ships. In order to prevent base aviation from melt the surface ships with air strikes with impunity, it is required to provide air defense of ship formations with the help of carrier-based aviation and a certain number of air defense carriers. Due to the extraordinary effectiveness of mines and their danger, the fleet must have a sufficient number of mine loaders to carry out mine operations, and minesweepers, to protect its forces from mines established by the enemy. Not bad for the early 20s, right?

In the early twenties, an ideological trend took shape among Soviet military sailors, aimed precisely at building a normal, full-fledged balanced fleet capable of performing a wide range of tasks - from minesweeping to repelling air strikes against ships. Their ideas are extremely relevant today. Just replace the battleships with URO ships, the cruisers with multipurpose nuclear submarines, add an air defense carrier (we already have one, we don’t have to imagine anything), normal minesweepers and diesel submarines ready for mine operations instead of mine loaders (or BDKs with trained mines productions by crews) - and you don’t have to think up anything special, everything has already been invented, clearly and clearly. Naval aviation only add. And, most importantly - everything is perfectly consistent with the principles.

Do we need to keep our communications? Northern Sea Route, connection with Sakhalin, Kuril Islands, Kamchatka, Chukotka, Kaliningrad? The Syrian Express? What are the routes for the deployment of nuclear strategic nuclear forces in the Pacific Ocean and in the north? It is necessary. Will there be a fight for them? Yes, that's for sure. And what if we hold them back? And let the SSBN turn around, and the merchant fleet continue to sail from Sabetta and further everywhere? And do not let the enemy wield them? This means that our enemy lost - neither escalate the war (interfere with the Strategic Nuclear Forces), nor starve these Russians, nor even land troops. Dead end.

But, according to the evil fate, building a normal balanced fleet in those years stumbled on an extremely harmful mental virus.

We are talking about the so-called "young school", the protagonist of which was Alexander Petrovich Alexandrov (Avel Pinhusovich Bar). Aleksandrov-Bar himself did not have any experience in participating in a real naval war, began to serve and grow in political positions, taking commissar positions, began to receive a naval education only in the 1922 year, he received it only in the 1927, but already in 1932 Lecturer at the Naval Academy. Since 1930, Aleksandrov has been creating a “name” for himself by criticizing the traditional approach to naval construction, the one that created Britain’s naval power and ensured victory over Russia in Japan. The criticism basically boiled down to the following - it is useless to try to destroy the enemy fleet, all the same the power of the productive forces is such that the enemy will quickly recover all losses, and no establishment of domination will be impossible, which means that we must abandon the desire to ensure supremacy at sea, and begin to create a new one, “Theory of maritime operations” relevant to practical tasks. These views were set forth in his brochure. "Critique of the theory of sea ownership".

Aleksandrov’s constructions contained the worst mistake of all possible - a logical one. He missed that not only one side, but the other, too, would struggle to compensate for the losses, relying on the "growth of productive forces", trying to maintain the previously existing superiority and even increase it. The Second World War perfectly showed how it looks. Productive forces worked for the United States and Japan, and not just Japan, and the United States completely established supremacy at sea at a certain point. In addition, the power of weapons also increased, and the reimbursement of lost ships in fact was already in question - Germany, which was under continuous bombing, was an example of this. The ideas of the young school did not contain any clear goal - if the "traditionalists" had this dominance at sea, then the "young" had something that they themselves could not precisely formulate. And they could not in the end.

In an interesting way, the beginning of the thirties was marked by the fact that the "traditionalists" were repressed, and the adherents of the "new school" received good posts - often instead of the very repressed traditionalists. True, the “young school” could not create a new theory of the struggle at sea. But she was able to break the old one. Having lost the sane purpose of its existence, the fleet lost the correct guidelines in organizing combat training, and then successively failed the Republican naval operations in Spain, the approach to planning and conducting which the “Soviet friends” turned out to be completely ugly, then it turned out that the fleet could not fulfill the requirement Stalin's deployment of forces in the Mediterranean. Then there were big maneuvers in the Baltic, in which it turned out that the sailors simply couldn’t do anything except take the ship from point A to point B. Stalin responded with a new round of repressions, the “young school” was now put under the knife itself, but corrected by such methods nothing succeeded - the fleet is too complex a system for something to be set up like this. As a result, it was painfully slow to restore everything.

Restore fell to the share of People's Commissar N.G. Kuznetsov, but he did not have enough time at all for anything - the fleet was untied with repressions and ridiculous political appointments about a year before the war with Germany. Something to return to normal in such a time was impossible. Nevertheless, even in its extremely disorganized state, the fleet was able to make a huge contribution to the victory over Germany, a contribution that today, unfortunately, has disappeared from the mass consciousness, and many military people are not correctly recognized. But we remember.

After the war, the ideology of naval construction again began a return to the right side. So, the requirement for ensuring supremacy at sea, which was understood as a prohibition of the enemy’s actions, and the need to maintain their communications, finally returned to the instruction on conducting marine operations of NMO-51. After Stalin's death, little has changed in “ideology” - the requirement to ensure the dominant position of the Soviet Navy in the areas of combat operations never left the guiding documents, and even with errors and stupid things (such as rejection of the aircraft carrier fleet), but the strength of the Navy was constantly growing. To understand the scale of growth, the forces that Britain sent to the Falkland War could, without any problems, and possibly without losses, destroy one regiment of naval missile-carrying aircraft in a few sorties. And this was one of the results of "thinking in the right direction."


A good photo of a good ship from the fleet No.2 in the world. The control cruiser "Zhdanov", from the 5-th operation, 1983


The Soviet forces were focused on the battle - even submarines had to hit warships and other submarines, and not try to wage a cruising war in the style of “unshaven boys” Dönitz, although of course, no one would miss enemy vehicles. And since the ships under construction, their weapons and type also corresponded to this approach, the power of the fleet became higher and higher. This does not look surprising from a theoretical point of view - the Commander-in-Chief Gorshkov perfectly understood the significance and importance of establishing dominance at sea, at least local.

We will not idealize the Navy of the USSR. There were a lot of “excesses” in its development, especially when the evil genius of the Soviet state and one of his involuntary grave diggers, Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov, paid close attention to the fleet. And yet, while the "guiding star" of the need to ensure supremacy at sea (with different sauces, up to the modern "maintaining a favorable operational regime" - however, this term has already surfaced in history, and meant the same thing as now), luminaries over the fleet itself and over shipbuilding, the Navy became stronger.

The collapse of the nineties affected not only the Navy, and the consequences for its combat power that it brought with itself did not belong to the concepts of naval construction - the whole country fell apart. We must understand that Russia went through such a turning point when literally everything was subjected to doubt and negation - few people in the world have such “baggage” behind them. This affected the fleet to the full extent, since everything was doubted and denied, the role of the fleet in the country's general defense system was also seriously questioned at all levels - from the ministry of defense to the minds of individual citizens. The result was strange.

Split principles


An officer serving in parts of the Navy, when asked a question like “what is the purpose of the fleet?” Will be able to blur out something like the need to maintain the very same favorable operational regime, which becomes favorable after the establishment of supremacy at sea, the need for which in the guidance documents and instructions of the fleet is fully spelled out. Is this right, should everything be so? Yes, it should and should.

But in state doctrinal documents, everything is not so! This is similar to the psyche of a schizophrenic who sincerely believes in conflicting things, but alas, we have come precisely to this. While the units and fleets are preparing for one thing, the highest state power in its doctrinal attitudes professes something completely different.

From the website of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, section "Tasks of the Navy":
The Navy is designed to ensure the protection of the national interests of the Russian Federation and its allies in the oceans by military methods, to maintain military and political stability at the global and regional levels, and to repel aggression from sea and ocean directions.
The Navy creates and maintains conditions for ensuring the safety of the naval activities of the Russian Federation, ensures the naval presence of the Russian Federation, demonstrates the flag and military power in the oceans, takes part in the fight against piracy, and in military, peacekeeping and humanitarian actions carried out by the world community which are in the interests of the Russian Federation, calls ships and vessels of the Navy at ports of foreign states.


Does anyone see here words like “military operations”, “destruction”, “protection of communications”, “domination at sea”? There is a certain “reflection of aggression from sea and ocean directions”. And if we ourselves need to hit? And repel ground aggression? How many landings did the fleet land during WWII? Strictly formally, starting from the wording of the Ministry of Defense, our Navy is NOT INTENDED FOR CONDUCTING AN ATTACK WAR IN GENERAL. It is, of course, intended to contain this very war. To this end, it includes a strategic nuclear force. Moreover, the mere provision of their deployment during the threatened period or in wartime is military operations. What if containment fails? Although, maybe in some other doctrinal document everything is somehow more specifically stated?

As previously stated in the article “The ideological impasse of the Russian fleet? No, Russian society! ”, in Russia there are the following doctrinal documents regarding the Russian Navy. The first is the Russian Maritime Policy. This document is mentioned in passing about the fleet, as it is “not about the Navy,” it lists the principal goals of Russia as a state on the seas and oceans, from scientific activities to fishing. The fleet is mentioned there only in the context of the fact that it must protect the interests of the country at sea, without highly specialized details.

The second document, which is almost completely related to the Navy, is the “Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for the period up to 2030 of the year”. The characterization of this document in the mentioned article was given more than exhaustive: profanity. Those interested can follow the link above and evaluate this gap with reality closer.

However, we are not too lazy to quote another fragment of this document, not mentioned earlier:

V. Strategic requirements for the Navy,
tasks and priorities in the field of its construction and
development
... b) in wartime:
the ability to cause unacceptable damage to the enemy in order to
his coercion to end hostilities on conditions
guaranteed ensuring the national interests of the Russian
Federation
ability to successfully confront an adversary,
possessing high-tech naval capabilities (including
including armed with precision weapons), with factions
its naval forces in the near, distant marine zones and ocean
areas;
high level defensive capabilities in the area
anti-ballistic, anti-aircraft, anti-submarine and anti-mine
defense;
ability to long-term autonomous activity, including
including self-replenishment of inventory
means and weapons in remote areas of the oceans from ships
rear support for new projects;
compliance of the structure and operational (combat) capabilities of the forces
(troops) to modern forms and methods of warfare, their
adaptation to new operational concepts for the use of the Armed Forces
Russian Federation, taking into account the full range of military threats
security of the Russian Federation.


To do something, fleet, what will happen to these abilities? Will it be implemented as a BATTLE with an adversary? What is the success of the confrontation with enemy groupings? And if they do not appear for battle, just like the Grand Fleet in the First World War? Will all exports be blocked in the English Channel, Gibraltar and Tsushima, and all? What to do then? Where is the answer in the doctrine?

This list is not a destination, and it does not comply with the principles of building maritime power that guide other countries. It is impossible to deduce from it the correctness or non-correctness of a particular shipbuilding program. It cannot be used as a criterion to verify the necessity or unnecessity of a project of a ship or class of ships. It is impossible to push off from him in choosing a strategy for action in a war at sea. This is just a set of unrelated wishes, and no more. Yes, right and right wishes, but only wishes.

And it is precisely in this chaos that, in place of the fundamental principles of building the Navy, there is a guarantee of all our problems - not warships, not combat rear admirals in shipbuilding, a fleet that is being built without clear operational tasks, without a basic idea that would give it its existence meaning. Minesweepers, unable to fight mines, and ships of almost 2000 tons, armed with one three-inch gun, are also from here. You cannot build a battle fleet where it is doctrinal and should not be combat.

But we remember that from the sailors in the event of war they will require something completely different. Indeed, dominance at sea did not disappear from their guiding documents. The state, which is building a non-combat, albeit a military fleet, stuffs it with ships that do not even have a purpose, at a critical moment in time will begin to set the task to this fleet “as it is”. Real tasks in a real war, against a real enemy, but not by a real fleet. The logical ending in the form of a new Tsushima in this case will only be a matter of time. Losses will be quite real.

Obviously, we need a new (or well-forgotten old?) Paradigm.

We'll have to do everything ourselves


Karl Marx wrote:
"The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism with weapon, material force must be overturned by material force: but the theory becomes material force as soon as it takes possession of the masses."


We, patriotic citizens, do not have material strength in order to force the government to change their minds. But she does not respond to verbal criticism. But, in full accordance with the definition of Marx, we can create our own theory of how everything should be and make it the property of the masses. And then it can no longer be ignored, if only because the majority will be indoctrinated. And, frankly, the moment for this has come. Because when, if not now, and who, if not us?

Formulating, starting from the work of theorists and common sense, the very set of principles that must be followed in the creation and development of the navy, what any doctrinal document should begin with:

The Navy of the Russian Federation is the type of armed forces intended for warfare on the sea, including its water surface, airspace above the sea, water column and seabed adjacent to the water edge of the land area, as well as in other water bodies - lakes and rivers , on their bottom and shores. In some cases, the Navy conducts hostilities, hitting the enemy’s communications equipment and their network, using malicious software, and also hits targets in Earth orbit, if necessary. The Navy achieves victory in the war by gaining dominance at sea, namely by establishing a level of control over sea lanes in specified areas of the oceans, the far, near sea and coastal zones, which allows the Russian Federation to use them unlimitedly for any purpose, and also does not allow the enemy to either interfere with such use, or to use these communications himself, up to the complete impossibility of deploying his forces. Dominance at sea is conquered or established without a battle by the navy both independently and as part of interspecific groups of the armed forces of the Russian Federation. If possible, the Navy seeks supremacy at sea by blocking or demonstrating force, or threatening to use force. If these actions did not lead to the desired result, then the Navy will DESTROY the opposing enemy forces that impede the establishment of supremacy at sea. To do this, all ships, submarines, combat aircraft, and other weapons systems of the navy have the ABILITY to engage in combat, including prolonged combat, and to carry out tasks to destroy opposing ships, submarines, aircraft and other weapons systems of the enemy, his manpower and various objects on land, including in its depths. The personnel of the Navy has the level of training and morale necessary to complete such tasks.

THE MAIN OBJECT OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE NAVY IS THE NAVY FORCE OF THE OPPONENT AND THEIR COAST INFRASTRUCTURE. In case of military necessity, the Navy can destroy targets located on land using rocket and artillery weapons of ships, naval aviation and parts and formations of the marine corps.

THE TASK TO CONQUER LIVING AT SEA IS MAIN FOR THE Navy. With complete impossibility to conquer the lordship at sea, it is required not to allow the establishment of the lordship at sea to the opponent. All other tasks performed by the Navy are secondary, with the exception of ships in the composition of the strategic nuclear forces and amphibious ships, for which anti-land operations are the main task. All warships and combat aircraft accepted as part of the Navy must either be able to be used to perform the specified main mission, or be necessary for its implementation by other ships and aircraft. EXCEPTIONS ARE NOT ALLOWED.


Simply? Simply. These are the principles that make the navy a navy. It doesn’t matter whether corvettes or aircraft carriers are its basis, if only a few thousand people serve in it or hundreds of thousands - it doesn’t matter. The principles are important.

It is necessary to evaluate whether the design of the new warship is adequate (or how the project is implemented)? First, see if it, or its implementation, complies with the principles. Need to evaluate the direction of combat training? We look how much it keeps up with the principles. This is the criterion that separates a country that has a fleet from a country that has many ships.

It is these provisions that should one day appear in our doctrinal attitudes, at the same time become an indication for what needs to be done and a measure for what has already been done. And it is precisely starting from them that our country should build its fleet in the future.

To be continued ...
Author:
Photos used:
Wikipedia commons, Gutenberg project, D. Getmanenko / TASS, archive of Igor and Larisa Shiryaeva
277 comments
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  1. strannik1985
    strannik1985 9 September 2019 05: 53 New
    +5
    And what is the US opponent in North America from 1890 to 1945?
    1. Cartalon
      Cartalon 9 September 2019 10: 14 New
      +2
      Germany, Japan, Great Britain, again Germany.
      1. strannik1985
        strannik1985 9 September 2019 10: 24 New
        +1
        At sea, or overseas, not on its own continent. That is, the long line of defense is the fleet, then the BO and, lastly, the ground forces.
        1. Proxima
          Proxima 9 September 2019 22: 23 New
          +4
          Under this difference, many not very smart people summed up a lot of theories, right down to giving birth to concepts “Continental” and “sea powers”, substantiating the ability of some and the inability of others to profitably use the naval forces with some cultural features ... All this is not entirely true (from text)

          So "not very smart" was Alexander the First, who announced that The Russian Empire is a great continental power and it does not need a fleet. fool You see, he was offended by the fleet that he was ineffective in the fight against Napoleon. Reasonably “reasoning”, the tsar suggested that if the funds spent on the fleet were invested in ground forces, then there would be no capture of Moscow, with all the consequences ... As a result, the fleet began to be financed at a wild minimum, well, then, we received the shameful Crimean War. Just think what kind of crazy logistics the Anglo-French had - soldiers, horses, guns, provisions, ammunition, etc. were loaded onto ships in Plymouth or Brest, Gibraltar and the Turkish Straits passed and landed unhindered in Crimea! And all that the Russian fleet needed to block the Bosphorus. The number of the enemy fleet does not count, the width of the Bosphorus reaches 700 meters, and even less on the fairway, so they would not be able to realize this advantage. But we could not do this !!! (for the above reason). What is the most offensive that the Turkish fleet on the Black Sea could not oppose to us (it was destroyed during Sinope).
          In a word, neglect of the navy can lead to disastrous consequences for Russia. It was before and it is now!
          Alexander, thanks for the article, which is probably very difficult to write and submit material, but you succeeded! hi
          1. ecolog
            ecolog 9 September 2019 23: 37 New
            +4
            There isn’t enough money for everything. England-France - colonial powers. They have no ocean fleet. France, by the way, lost the colonial war, including because it did not pull both the army and the navy. The result is a revolution and a guillotine for the crown. And the British army - this is a shell fired from a naval gun. They can (could) afford. But, too, they exerted themselves in the WWI, trying to contain both a large army and a mega-fleet. The result - the loss of superpower status in favor of the United States. Although, it would seem, they won.
            1. AAK
              AAK 11 September 2019 11: 27 New
              0
              At different times, starting from the era of the Great geographical discoveries, there was 1 “great” sea power and several “regional” powers in the world. Of the world - until the 17th century - Spain, the 17th century - the first half of the 20th - Great Britain, from the 2nd half of the 20th to the present time - the USA. It was they who controlled the main world sea lanes and, as a result, world sea trade. Their military fleets were built on the percentage of trade, and controlling this trade contributed to the non-decreasing income of those same percent ..
              Some of the "regional" maritime powers tried to get closer to the "world" ones - to Spain - Portugal, to Great Britain - Holland, and then France, to the USA China is now trying to get closer. But first, the real share of “applicants” in maritime trade decreased (the transfer of colonies from one hand to another as a result of wars or gaining independence by the colonies), and then followed by a military defeat at sea. Separate are Japan and Germany, which in 1 MV and 2 MV tried to become serious competitors of the "world" only by military means, not being leaders in world maritime trade, the situation is similar in the attempt of the USSR to become a competitor in the 2nd half of the 20th century USA (but without the onset of the "hot" phase of naval struggle). China’s current attempts to seriously “wrestle” with the United States independently, in my opinion, are unpromising in the near future, the Amers have too many allies / satellites around the world ... China can get real competition only under the condition of the closest naval "cooperation" with Russia , then the initial conditions can be met:
              - a really high share in world maritime trade;
              - the need to establish control (or, at a minimum, ensure a stable presence) over the 2-3 most important trade routes (the "Great Oil Route", the Northern Sea Route, the trade route "Southeast Asia - USA and Latin America");
              - the presence of a sufficient number of warships of the main classes.
              But "cooperation" at sea is impossible without serious cooperation in politics and economics, to which it is still far away, if this is only possible in principle ...
          2. Ehanatone
            Ehanatone 15 September 2019 17: 43 New
            +1
            "So" not very smart "was Alexander the First, who announced that the Russian Empire is a great continental power and it does not need a fleet."
            This is only the third most important "intelligence" a1, and ....
            And the first and main "cleverness" of a1 is that he generally entered into conflict with Napoleon and climbed into the European ...
            And in general, this "advanced" emperor has even any outstanding "smarts" before the vegetable ...
            No wonder Pushkin wrote about him:
            The ruler is weak and crafty ....
  2. dirk182
    dirk182 9 September 2019 07: 29 New
    +5
    In fact, everything is correctly written. This morning, I accidentally stumbled upon a speech by the head of Stratfor from 2015. It’s hard to see the irony in his words. Namely: "America has become the country that controls all the oceans." And about the end of the creation of a sanitary cordon around Russia. It seems to me that you can write and reason a lot. But the time is gone. No matter how sad it may sound. We are not ready for war (God forbid it will be). More precisely, we (visitors and commentators of the site) are ready, but the country's leadership, economy and industry are not. It is absurd to hope that all these destroyed defense industry enterprises, production cycles and specialists will appear in the coming years. What year are we hoping and waiting here. And we rejoice at every unit of military equipment, every ship. But it's just about nothing. In the war, the military-industrial complex wins. An industry that is capable of producing not 5-10 units per year, but thousands.
  3. ares1988
    ares1988 9 September 2019 07: 53 New
    +1
    Monumental. Thanks for the work.
    1. timokhin-aa
      9 September 2019 10: 08 New
      +9
      I will try further.
      1. Mooh
        Mooh 9 September 2019 14: 43 New
        +1
        We already suspected the worst. First disappeared from the comments, then in general. Welcome back! So happy.
  4. Ruslan
    Ruslan 9 September 2019 08: 21 New
    0
    I like these principles. directly, clearly and on business!
    1. timokhin-aa
      9 September 2019 10: 08 New
      +2
      Please glad you liked it.
  5. BAI
    BAI 9 September 2019 09: 25 New
    +8
    Which fleet versus fleet? When was the last time the squadrons fought with each other? Over the past 100 years, everything has changed significantly. Even in the Flocland conflict, the English fleet fought against Argentine aviation, and not against the fleet. General Belgrano is a byproduct. And his main task was to deliver aviation and landing to the conflict zone. Now the fleet is used exclusively against Nazm targets, and world trade flows are determined not by the fleet, but by politicians and bankers.
    1. timokhin-aa
      9 September 2019 09: 55 New
      +10
      Which fleet versus fleet? When was the last time the squadrons fought with each other?


      In 2008, the Russian Navy against Georgian boats.
      Prior to this, in the 1991 year, 143 of the destroyed Iraqi ship and ship, both with the help of ship helicopters and anti-ship missiles from small missile ships.
      Prior to this - 1988 year. Operation Mantis
      Prior to this - 1987 year, tanker war.
      Prior to this - the 1986 year, Libya, the destruction by deck aircraft of the 1 Liia MRK, the severe damage to the second, the destruction of the boat.
      Before that - the Falklands.

      In general, Argentina was quite ready to fight, brought AUG into the sea. Belgrano had to participate in the same attack with a couple of destroyers.
      If you didn’t find the ConCaror KUG with the cruiser, the battle would most likely have happened.

      Now the fleet is used exclusively against Nazm targets, and world trade flows are determined not by the fleet, but by politicians and bankers.


      Politicians and bankers of those countries that have fleets.
      1. PPD
        PPD 9 September 2019 10: 31 New
        +2
        In general, Argentina was quite ready to fight, brought AUG into the sea.

        Miraculous are these Argentines, of course. wassat
        Aircraft carrier is- Pkr in bulk (uuuuu-already pieces 3),
        great bombs (triggered once, well, if you're lucky). Attack of ships, as in World War 2.
        Well, how not to fight with such power with England (which has the USA behind its back)? laughing
        R.S. By the way, they often forget about the aircraft carrier.
        1. Walking
          Walking 9 September 2019 13: 02 New
          +2
          Quote: PPD

          Aircraft carrier is- Pkr in bulk (uuuuu-already pieces 3),
          great bombs (triggered once, well, if you're lucky). Attack of ships, as in World War 2.
          .


          The fact that the bombs do not explode learned only during the war. Attacks of the ships, in principle, succeeded.
          1. PPD
            PPD 9 September 2019 17: 06 New
            0
            Attacks of the ships, in principle, succeeded.

            If the British could defend the air defense a little better, I’m afraid there is nothing left of the principle. yes
      2. Town Hall
        Town Hall 9 September 2019 21: 50 New
        +1
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        In 2008 - the Russian Navy against Georgian boats

        It’s not funny to yourself? Why depreciate well-written things with such absurdities?
        1. timokhin-aa
          10 September 2019 14: 04 New
          +1
          And this was a very important fight, by the way. Not by the consequences for the course of hostilities, but by the way in the RIGHT OPTION it was to influence the military-technical policy of the Navy. If the conclusions were made correctly.

          By the way, they still have to make them. Only as usual after a broken physiognomy - “easy” lessons are not for us in vain.
    2. Earthshaker
      Earthshaker 10 September 2019 07: 13 New
      -2
      Just ask yourself a question, based on your postulates, are our Karakurt and other boats capable of repelling an air strike?
      1. Yora dan
        Yora dan 16 September 2019 13: 37 New
        0
        No, but these are ships of the coastal zone, operating under the cover of the coastal air defense system.
  6. max702
    max702 9 September 2019 09: 40 New
    0
    we can recall much more high-profile failures - an unlimited submarine war, which Germany defeated twice in defeat - and both times because the German "cruisers" - submarines - did not have the proper support from their combat fleet.
    But remember what Germany did in these years in any way? Nothing that 70% of the resources went to the eastern front, and it was stupidly not possible to build up the fleet's forces for an adequate confrontation with the allies .. Tell us with whom the USA and England fought the main forces at that time? How many resources did the ground army consume and how many fleets? Maybe from here the defeats of Germany (and Japan) go to sea? It is impossible to embrace the incomprehensible resources ANY are not endless! But the Japanese and the Germans didn’t have enough .. the Soviet Union completely shackled Germany on the ground, and the USA and England just had to build up their fleets and, having a good time, hit the weakened Germany with small means, which they perfectly demonstrated. With Japan, it’s even clearer the picture, being drawn into both the land war in Asia and the naval war with the USA, they stupidly could not digest a piece, everything received on the conquered lands needed to be processed and put to good for the country, but they did not have time for that .. Japan itself missed its chance in this war without attacking together with Germany on June 22, 41.. And so, if they had started a war in the Far East with the USSR, they would have completely forged a grouping of troops, and Moscow would not have received reinforcements at a crucial moment, but on the contrary, the confusion would have been even greater .. And what would come of it? And everything was just the USSR fell, Germany has 1-2 years to develop the resources of the USSR (the USA did not have the physical ability to transfer up to 44g the necessary number of troops to Europe) Japan quite successfully together with Germany confronts the USA at sea, and in the meantime freed up in battles, troops are transferred to the west and take England in a jerk for a couple of months .. EVERYTHING .. By 43-44, Germany and Japan own 3/4 of the world .. Does the USA have chances? No! Germany ceases to spend money on the army and dramatically increases its fleet, everything according to the precepts of the author of the article begins to control the oceans, and by the year 46 together with Japan it is conducting a landing operation against the United States for another 1-2 years and the whole world is under control .. Why this long altistorical opus? And the fact that you need to look at the real situation and not act on patterns that suits one does not suit the others .. It would be possible for the USA or England to build a super fleet if you had to fight not for life but for death on your own land, and not in distant colonies? NO! Everything would have gone to this confrontation. And so the USSR did not have such an opportunity. What the Navy of the USSR 70-80s achieved is, first of all, a complex of ALL forces and means of the USSR (SNF, GSVG, SV SA) and not just fleet forces .. In today's Russia there are no such opportunities! Plus, indeed, progress in armaments has sharply reduced the importance of the Navy .. We cannot control world trade not theoretically not physically, but we don’t need it, but we need to master what we have and not let the adversary take away something or destroy the vital things. Why did they get that a major conflict between the fleets will not lead to an escalation of the conflict? Suppose we drowned the AUG of the USA (successfully using a torpedo \ missile with nuclear weapons) and this all ends? Well, maybe, but vice versa? The United States took drowned our northern or Pacific fleet, and what shall we do? It will be difficult to pay off the United States, but it is possible (Kursk) only for what then is all this fuss about if the US does not receive any income, but some expenses? What are these boat games for? If everyone understands that arguments in the form of strategic nuclear forces will be used? Then the question is, what is the fleet for if it is impossible to use because it will be the beginning of a universal end?
    1. timokhin-aa
      9 September 2019 09: 57 New
      +3
      Nothing that 70% of the resources went to the eastern front, and it was stupidly not possible to build up fleet forces to adequately confront the allies .. Tell us who the United States and England fought with as their main forces at that time? How many resources did the ground army consume and how many fleets? Maybe from here the defeats of Germany (and Japan) go to sea? It is impossible to embrace the incomprehensible resources ANY are not endless!


      Well, what am I talking about?

      We cannot control world trade, not theoretically, not physically


      Why do we need to control trade?
      You have not read it seems that you are commenting.
    2. strannik1985
      strannik1985 9 September 2019 10: 15 New
      +4
      Could not, more precisely, Japan could technically get involved in a fight without the hope of a quick victory.
      According to the experience of Khalkhin-Gol, the Japanese General Staff for the favorable development of events expected the weakening of the Soviet infantry troops by 50%, aviation and armored forces by 2/3, and since this did not happen ...
      Plus oil, they didn’t provide themselves with oil, by 1941 there was a strategic reserve for a year, a significant part of the tanker fleet was rented, there were no proven reserves in the Far East, and they had already received half of the concession from Sakhalin. That is, during the year of land war they will use up their supplies and the fleet will have nothing to fight with the Americans. Deadlock, which is not solved by attack on the USSR.
      1. max702
        max702 9 September 2019 10: 31 New
        +1
        Quote: strannik1985
        That is, during the year of land war they will use up their supplies and the fleet will have nothing to fight with the Americans. Deadlock, which is not solved by attack on the USSR.

        Well, as if everything would end much earlier by December 41, the USSR would have been defeated without having survived on two fronts .. And here it is not important that Japan would conquer something in the Far East, but that it would free German resources for a war with the United States and England .. You see, the USSR itself has lost, the Germans have their hands untied and they will completely defeat the troops of England in Africa and the Middle East, Iranian oil will flow into the river for the needs of Germany and Japan, England is not an enemy at the gates to colonies .. Turkey will clearly support Germany , and Spain will join the strongest and what do we see? Eurasia is under the control of the Reich and Japan, a miserable British islet is surrounded alone, the Germans' resources will make it possible to organize a blockade of the island, and the liberated aircraft will iron it up and down, do not forget that Germany will receive a very good resource base in the USSR .. Japan simply won’t have time to spend it all , and vice versa will repeatedly return costs. The United States simply does not have time to do anything.
        1. strannik1985
          strannik1985 9 September 2019 11: 14 New
          +3
          It does not end, because the Wehrmacht does not go on the Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan line, and Apanasenko immediately forms new divisions instead of the sent ones. Plus, the Americans, they don’t, will enter the war earlier, to organize an excuse is a matter of technology.
          1. max702
            max702 9 September 2019 11: 26 New
            -1
            Quote: strannik1985
            It does not end, because the Wehrmacht does not go on the line Arkhangelsk-Astrakhan

            Why doesn’t that come out? Moscow fell, and with it the largest industrial area, Leningrad fell, was not bombed, but captured by Yaroslavl, after the fall of Moscow, the Luftwaffe quite reaches Gorky destroying another industrial center, production is just beginning to arrive at the evacuation sites and the question is, what will the Red Army fight ? It wouldn’t be about dreaming about the Arkhangelsk Astrakhan line, but think about stopping the Germans in the Urals .. Turkey will trample on itself from the south. Yes, Japan is also pushing the Far East ..
            1. strannik1985
              strannik1985 9 September 2019 11: 51 New
              +6
              Since the company’s half-year of 1941, 12 rifle, 5 tank and 1 motor-rifle divisions were transferred from the Far East, a total of 122 thousand people. During the same period (until December 31, 1941), 821 equivalent divisions were formed and reorganized. Are you seriously claiming that these 18 compounds had a decisive influence on the outcome of the 1941 company?
              1. max702
                max702 9 September 2019 12: 20 New
                +1
                Quote: strannik1985
                Since the company’s half-year of 1941, 12 rifle, 5 tank and 1 motor-rifle divisions were transferred from the Far East, a total of 122 thousand people. During the same period (until December 31, 1941), 821 equivalent divisions were formed and reorganized. Are you seriously claiming that these 18 compounds had a decisive influence on the outcome of the 1941 company?

                I think that the main one.. And if you take into account that for six months battles in the Far East would go on, Moscow would not be able to resist, and everything else would fall in with it. The score there went even not to divisions, but to regiments and battalions.
                1. strannik1985
                  strannik1985 9 September 2019 14: 44 New
                  +1
                  It’s not exactly six months, because the Japanese were waiting until the spacecraft on the Far East would transfer 50% of infantry, 70% of tanks and aircraft. At the same time, Apanasenko mobilizes all who can (by December 01.12.1941, 24, on SD 2, KD 4, TD 39, 1 forces of all divisions, 343 people against 307 on June 703, 704, and even 22.06.1941 more on July 01.07.1942, 49,5 , XNUMX settlement divisions). Even if the Japanese attack the troops, they will still be deployed, simply because the situation there is worse. Even if they attack, there is no guarantee of quick success. And then the United States intervenes and on the thumb, except that Japan will have even harder.
                  Now, if they had found oil in Manchuria ...
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 9 September 2019 15: 02 New
                    0
                    IN
                    Secret Drilling
                    April 22 2017
                    The production of unconventional petroleum products has been established in Northeast China occupied by Japan since 1932. There are the largest reserves of thermal coal and shale in foreign Asia. By 1937, that is, by the beginning of large-scale Japanese aggression on the continent, 145 thousand tons of synthetic oil were produced annually in Manchuria. In terms of the volume of its release, Japan came out on top and occupied it until 1943 of the year. During the period of the Second World Production, according to an estimate given in the American research of the industry ("Refining synthetic matter," National Research Council, Washington, DC, 1980), reached 550 thousand tons per year. Up to 70, percent of the fuel needs of the imperial troops were provided by shale oil products.
                  2. hohol95
                    hohol95 9 September 2019 15: 07 New
                    +1
                    The Japanese introduced a planned economic system in Manzhou-Guo. At the beginning of 1937 the first five-year plan was adopted, and in 1941 the second five-year plan. The country's economy began to grow rapidly. Thus, in 1936, 850 thousand tons of pig iron, 400 thousand tons of steel, 11 700 thousand tons of coal, 145 thousand tons of synthetic oil (distillation of Fushun shales), 4 thousand tons of aluminum were produced, food crops were produced in Manchuria. : rice - 337,2 thousand tons, wheat - 966 thousand tons, legumes - 4201,3 thousand tons, cotton - 15 thousand tons
                    1. strannik1985
                      strannik1985 9 September 2019 15: 46 New
                      0
                      Kopeks, 120-200 thousand tons were mined on Sakhalin, 3,5% of Japan’s annual demand for oil products. For example, in 1941 the strategic oil reserve was 7 million tons; by April 1942, 5 million tons. At the same time, the seizure of intact oil production and refining infrastructure on the island of Borneo (Kalimantan) gives the Japanese 1,4 million tons of oil in 1942.
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 9 September 2019 15: 49 New
                        0
                        A penny saves a ruble!
                  3. max702
                    max702 9 September 2019 17: 38 New
                    +2
                    Quote: strannik1985
                    not half a year in person, because the Japanese were waiting until the spacecraft on the Far East would transfer 50% of the infantry, 70% of the tanks and aircraft

                    And how did this help the Japanese? But no how! Dodges with a bang! So the decision was wrong, the reality confirmed it. In 41 the United States was still sleeping in a peaceful sleep, especially not worrying about anything, by the time the USSR would have recovered everything, Central Asia was everything, Iran was under the Germans and Japan .. In 41, everything was real hung in the balance and the fall of Moscow would have caused such an avalanche that it’s not a fact that we would have survived, but if we take into account that at that time Japan also led a half-year database with us, and after the fall of Moscow and the Turks joined with the Spaniards and Portuguese, then there is very little chance of surviving. And I also forgot about the Swedes, they also kept their nose in the wind ..
                    1. strannik1985
                      strannik1985 9 September 2019 23: 23 New
                      0
                      As part of the existing strategy, Japan has no chance of victory at all, simply because there are no resources for a long war. The Americans deliberately provoked Japan to enter the embargo on the supply of aviation equipment, scrap metal, oil products (and they pressed the Dutch so that they would not sell). Is the sense of the Japanese getting involved if in six months they find themselves with empty tanks against the coalition led by the USA?
                      1. max702
                        max702 10 September 2019 09: 20 New
                        0
                        Quote: strannik1985
                        As part of the existing strategy, Japan has no chance of victory at all, simply because there are no resources for a long war. The Americans deliberately provoked Japan to enter the embargo on the supply of aviation equipment, scrap metal, oil products (and they pressed the Dutch so that they would not sell). Is the sense of the Japanese getting involved if in six months they find themselves with empty tanks against the coalition led by the USA?

                        So I write about the same thing! Japan lost the war initially! And lost! Accordingly, it was necessary to take risks and make non-trivial decisions, as always the creative was not enough for the Asians. This is their main Achilles' heel .. And so you look, start at the same time with the Germans, then the chance would appear .. That's what I .. And Hitler perfectly understood that only he blew the blitzkrieg in a protracted war, and blew out ... Blitzkrieg didn’t work out, and to tell the truth Japan played a small role in this because of his indecision, a dozen experienced divisions (there were still soldiers from 39g there) with the Far East and decided near Moscow at the most critical time .. And so Moscow would not have been waiting for reinforcements with the Far East, but on the contrary would have spent resources to counter the Japanese offensive and this “straw” might not be enough to win .. And thank God that did not happen ..
                      2. bk0010
                        bk0010 10 September 2019 20: 51 New
                        0
                        Quote: max702
                        Japan lost the war initially!
                        Japan did not think so. They had the idea of ​​creating a security barrier from the islands so that the US Navy could not be supplied with them. Then he would not be able to operate normally in the ocean, and the empires could endure the raids. The Japanese succeeded (and the islands were seized, and the U.S. Navy gained access to resources by the order of the gouging), but the Americans learned how to supply from ships, which, given the ratio of production levels of the warring countries, became a sentence for Japan.
                      3. max702
                        max702 11 September 2019 11: 48 New
                        0
                        Quote: bk0010
                        Japan did not think so.

                        What are we talking about! Japan's strategy was wrong .. RI confirmed it! Therefore, we are considering other options, one of them being a joint blow to the USSR on June 22 .. Japan simply wanted to get off with a little blood and put the brunt of the war on the Germans .. Avaricious pays twice .. Japan pays so far .. Having won tactically without risking the burden of war on on land and at sea at the same time they lost EVERYTHING .. Yes, perhaps a joint strike could not give a gain in the war, but another strategy definitely turned out to be a losing RI, I proved it again ..
        2. Cyrus
          Cyrus 9 September 2019 22: 51 New
          -1
          And now, "clever" read the history of the civil war and try to understand why you napapispal nonsense).
  • lucul
    lucul 9 September 2019 10: 34 New
    -1
    We cannot control world trade not theoretically not physically, but we don’t need it

    You do not quite understand the article, because
    The welfare of the people and the statethat this people inhabit is directly dependent on how much this people controls world trade. World trade is sea trade - the delivery of large goods in significant quantities over long distances is unprofitable other than by water, but from other continents it is simply impossible. It is carried out thanks to the presence of a merchant fleet delivering goods, and access (from the sea, of course) to the source of these goods

    If we are in the margins of world trade - i.e. not we set surplus value , then we will never live at the level of the most developed countries of the first five.
    1. max702
      max702 9 September 2019 11: 28 New
      0
      Quote: lucul
      If we are at the outskirts of world trade — that is, we are not setting surplus value, then we will never live at the level of the most developed countries of the first five.

      That is, we need to win two world wars and enslave 70% of the world, and only then do we establish surplus value? For it is precisely these actions that led to this option among the bourgeoisie ..
      1. lucul
        lucul 9 September 2019 13: 15 New
        +1
        That is, we need to win two world wars and enslave 70% of the world, and only then do we establish surplus value? For it is precisely these actions that led to this option among the bourgeoisie ..

        Building a fleet is the same war of attrition.
        And the one who has more resources wins.
      2. strannik1985
        strannik1985 9 September 2019 14: 11 New
        0
        They have a market economy (as well as with us now), the USSR could afford much more without American “stuff”.
      3. Yuri Simple
        Yuri Simple 9 September 2019 17: 50 New
        0
        Well, you can still wait until the Anglo-Saxons are ashamed and themselves will give them their property today. Although in theory it is possible. (See: History of Russia. Period 1991 - present.)
  • 5-9
    5-9 9 September 2019 13: 13 New
    +1
    Well, the success of Japan’s attack on the USSR is still a grandmother in two. Their SVs were weak, we kept enough troops there, they did not have reliable information about the transfer to Moscow. In comparison with the Red Army, they tried their level at Hassan and Khalkhin-Gol. Preparing for an attack can be opened by us and you can get a preemptive strike (like on Khalkhin Gol) ... and now all this instead of warm seas with Indonesian oil? Even if the USSR succeeds to the Volga near Reich, Nipponians can walk through the forest-steppes-hills to Lake Baikal ... and maybe further, only a little strength can be stupidly enough and .... what? There is no oil, US Navi is safe ... Aloizych is not the fact that the Emirator will rush to help the United States on the Sea of ​​Okane ... there is nothing, and there are plenty of his worries in Europe.
  • bk0010
    bk0010 9 September 2019 22: 28 New
    0
    Quote: max702
    Intellectually, Japan itself missed its chance in this war without attacking together with Germany on June 22, 41.
    You see, in Japan there was almost a civil war between the army and navy (they were controlled by rival feudal clans). The fleet won (not only by intrigue, but also by shooting), so the army had no special resources. If the Kwantung army had attacked, it would have received in the wort, and the Japanese would have been left without the resources of China. This would help the Germans, but certainly not the Japanese. The second option - ours are leaving, transferring resources to Moscow, and the Japanese remain sitting bare back (the supply shoulder is not only long, but also hemorrhoidal) in the "permafrost" before the Americans decide to drive them out of these places (I think no later than 42 years because it is too close to Alaska). They do not even need to be bombed, just to disrupt the supply.
    1. max702
      max702 10 September 2019 09: 29 New
      +1
      Quote: bk0010
      The second option - our depart, transfer resources to Moscow,

      Can you imagine the situation 41g? This is not a computer toy, but a reality .. From the west, the industry is evacuating, millions of people and hundreds of millions of tons of equipment are being moved to the Urals and Siberia, the army is being supplied, and here it’s the same picture from the east .. And how? Today we have one single bridge over the Lena in the city of Ust-Kut, destroy it and all the Far East without railway ... And what to do? Then the trouble was both with roads and with transport .. The evacuation carried out in 41, one of the main miracles of the Second World War, which allowed to win, was unlikely in the conditions of the Japanese offensive on the Far East ..
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 10 September 2019 15: 41 New
      0
      Quote: bk0010
      You see, in Japan there was almost a civil war between the army and navy (they were controlled by rival feudal clans).

      Hehehehe ... there was even feudal fragmentation even in the Army itself. The same Kwantung Army was actually an independent association, not particularly paying attention to the Metropolis. And the Expeditionary Force in China did what they wanted.
  • Victor Dubrovsky
    Victor Dubrovsky 11 September 2019 14: 31 New
    +1
    As always, the "big epaulettes" are preparing for past wars. It is time to realize that a military clash between the Russian Federation and the United States with a high probability will lead to the death of mankind. It is from this that we must proceed from the development of military and naval doctrines. Incidentally, the 2013 Military Doctrine explicitly stated: Russia has no external threat. Try it now, find this version of the doctrine .. :(
  • Old26
    Old26 9 September 2019 09: 43 New
    +3
    Quote: strannik1985
    And what is the US opponent in North America from 1890 to 1945?

    Well, in principle, Spain was the main enemy of the United States at the end of the XIX century. It was at this time that the seizure of Cuba and Puerto Rico, Guam, the fighting against Spain in the Philippines
    1. timokhin-aa
      9 September 2019 09: 58 New
      +2
      Right. But the article is not about US opponents on the continent. This top starter has already come up with something, his own.
      1. strannik1985
        strannik1985 9 September 2019 10: 06 New
        +3
        Well, why your own?
        You wrote about the "continental" and "sea" powers? PMSM USA refers to the latter, because it did not have strong opponents on land at home, i.e. invested resources in the development of the fleet. It is ridiculous to say that by 1939 they had only three complete infantry divisions in the regular troops (out of 9).
        1. timokhin-aa
          9 September 2019 10: 23 New
          -1
          i.e. invested resources in the development of the fleet.


          At this point in time, the United States did not invest anything in its fleet, just Mahan’s book pulled there because the Americans discovered that the continental power could well turn out to be a maritime power. Then they were worse than us. A lot.
          1. strannik1985
            strannik1985 9 September 2019 11: 16 New
            +4
            For the year 1890? I completely agree with you, but they began to invest, and it was easier for them, there is no vacuum cleaner of money in the form of a mass land army.
          2. 27091965
            27091965 9 September 2019 11: 37 New
            +2
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            At this point in time, the United States did not invest anything in its fleet, just Mahan’s book pulled there


            In 1885, a new fleet construction program was developed in Congress, and subsequently it was repeatedly adjusted. Mahan's work was published in 1889.
  • 5-9
    5-9 9 September 2019 09: 51 New
    -1
    Conquer? To fight with the adversary chtol? Well done? This is against the eternal traditions of the Russian fleet (with rare exceptions, only confirming the rule). This is easy for theoreticians to write books, but in real life it is a pity for themselves and the ships. In the Crimean, the Anglo-Hortuzians could well melt themselves while they escorted the convoys around the World Cup to and fro sluggishly. Quite a sailing fleet is quite the steamboats of those years, although this is already an afterthought. But they were afraid and did not check ... they became self-propelled for the first time. In principle, in most large battles of all the fleets of the world, caution and mediocrity are more likely the norm and the one with fewer stocks wins. Then they slept in the RIAV in the shafts and got scared, they made a self-propelled-2. The Germans, after Jutland, were also frightened and stayed too. Ships of a fleet are expensive, very expensive. And one or two accidents can lead to consequences (for money and resources) like the loss of tank divisions. Therefore, the timidity of admirals is understandable.
    Well, and so - the loot defeats evil, it is better to be young rich and beautiful. But we don’t have much money and the country has no economic interests, outside the range of the base aviation. And for the sudden Siryanash and what is enough. Let China and the United States fight for control of the world's oceanic communications with the USA, but we can’t do it ... and if so, then there’s nothing to build (anyway for crazy grandmas) a fleet that a priori will lose
    1. timokhin-aa
      9 September 2019 10: 07 New
      0
      This is easy for theoreticians to write books, but in real life it is a pity for themselves and the ships. In the Crimean, the Anglo-Hortuzians could well melt themselves while they escorted the convoys around the World Cup to and fro listlessly. Quite a sailing fleet is quite the steamboats of those years, although this is already an afterthought. But they were afraid and did not check ... they became self-propelled for the first time. In principle, in most large battles of all the fleets of the world, caution and mediocrity are more likely the norm and the one with fewer stocks wins.


      Because the personnel did not understand the purpose of their type of armed forces, no more, hence the need for a doctrine.

      the country has no economic interests, beyond the range of basic aviation


      Well, work in foreign economic activity for about five years, but not in the oil industry, we will discuss it again, okay?

      Let China and the United States fight for control of the world's oceanic communications, we cannot afford ...


      The problem is that the United States quite seriously established control over such lines as Vanino-Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, for example. And in all seriousness they are going to squeeze us with the NSR. The icebreaker began to be built this year, with plans for six units, and all under Coast Guard. Well, under water, they are already the owners, right behind the edge of our thermal water.

      and if so, then there’s nothing to build (anyway for crazy grandmas) a fleet that a priori will lose


      Katz offers to give up? Let it still be a personal decision of a single person, okay?
      1. 5-9
        5-9 9 September 2019 10: 25 New
        0
        Those. admiral officers in order to drown the adversary, and even not when he himself caught up with you, but either you need to find, or at least not to shy away - you need a doctrine ... because they don’t know why they are needed without it. So the Emperor Nicolas 1st Palkin-terrible-evil Baltic admirals said - swim, stsuki, and they - they will sink us like that ... never sailed.

        Well, with one line, open my eyes to the trade that is significant for us, which any adversary can cut in the World Ocean.

        Is control over such lines as Vanino-Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky with the help of basic aviation not restored? With littoral forces? (By the way, about the under-disarmament of 22160 - how do you feel about two LCS projects? Or Deringi-Burki-Zumvolts without anti-ship missiles?).

        No need to try to go where you lose anyway. The resources that can be spent on the Air Force Army will be spent, but the effect will still be zero. The most misunderstood why we scare the American fleet at Celon ... if we do not want to take their hegemonic place. Do we want to?
        1. Avior
          Avior 9 September 2019 16: 07 New
          0
          All ships are built under the doctrine of application.
          For barrels and others, aviation is fighting with large surface ships, for self-defense there are anti-aircraft missiles.
          Lrasm is being added now
        2. timokhin-aa
          10 September 2019 00: 08 New
          +2
          Well, with one line, open my eyes to the trade that is significant for us, which any adversary can cut in the World Ocean.


          We have 60% of our exports going through the Danish Straits, the Kiel Canal, the English Channel, the Bosphorus, Tsugaru and Tsushima. 60% is it a little or a lot? Doesn’t flash on the economy? The "continental" of Russia is a myth. We depend on sea connections for the sea much more than, for example, Canada.

          Is control over such lines as Vanino-Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky with the help of basic aviation not restored?


          No.

          By the way, about the under-equippedness of 22160 - how do you feel about two LCS projects? Or Daring-Burke-Zumvolta without RCC?


          I am very glad that they have these ships, very much. Daring is still there, but the rest is very good. But we need not look at other people's problems, but solve our own.

          The most misunderstood why do we scare the American fleet at Celon.


          My goal is to frighten him at the Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and Kola Peninsulas. then he’s not scared there for years, as he climbs everywhere at home. We don’t need Ceylon, but the fact is that we won’t even control our thermal water with any batch of any kind - it has already come to this.
          1. 5-9
            5-9 10 September 2019 11: 00 New
            +1
            Forgive the export? As these 60% were received in general, almost everything is exported by pipeline from us. Without our export, its main consumers will freeze and begin to die of hunger. The supply of hydrocarbons, especially in our volumes, is a taboo. Their suppression = world war with MRNAU, what other boats are there .... or are you afraid of pirates? I’m not saying that it’s normal to take control of these places only with tank divisions along the coast, 20 AUGs without control of the coast of these places are helpless.
            In general, why, from an economic point of view, you could not prove a large fleet to us.

            Why the basic aviation and the guard will not be able to push the adversary Vanino-Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky ... I do not understand ...
            1. timokhin-aa
              10 September 2019 13: 12 New
              0
              Excuse me, export? As these 60% were received in general, almost everything is exported from us by pipeline.


              It is only in liberal minds. Look for statistics on the internet if your experience in foreign economic activity is not. The figure in 60% is the real share of export freight traffic at the beginning of the 2000's. Then we increased grain exports, so now I think the figure is even higher.

              Without our export, its main consumers will freeze and begin to die of hunger.


              Where are they freezing? In Egypt, for example, freeze? Where do you get information about the world from? From John McCain with his gas station country? Pull your head out of the shell. It's not like what you think - but exactly the opposite. laughing

              In general, why, from an economic point of view, you could not prove a large fleet to us.


              I didn’t try. I just outlined the options. It’s real. And your opinion will cost a thousand times less than a spent cartridge case, if someone in the West decides to crank something up.
              Oh, by the way.
              https://ria.ru/20180930/1529642748.html

              Why the basic aviation and the guard will not be able to push the adversary Vanino-Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky ... I do not understand ...


              What are the guardmen? Where are they with us? Are you talking about 20380 corvettes right? Or about the patrol 22160?
              How to scare? Do you basically imagine the subject of discussion?

              Here is this adversary whom you are going to shoo - who is this? How is he there? What factors make it possible to detect, and which are impossible? How many days a year can aviation work in those parts? What should be this same "guard" than he will "poo"
          2. Storekeeper
            Storekeeper 10 September 2019 22: 00 New
            0
            [quote] [We do not need Ceylon, but the fact is that we won’t even control our thermal water with any batch — it’s already reached that point. / quote]
            Is it really that bad? It turns out we are no longer masters at home?
      2. karabass
        karabass 9 September 2019 21: 20 New
        0
        Dear Alexander personally know, and personally saw - the NSR does not work and will not work as some people think because it is not profitable. And it will not be profitable until the ships need wiring and an ice class. Even in September, icebreakers are on duty there! you have to pay for it. But it is impossible to squeeze us out of the NSR, because there is no need to squeeze the Court out ANY country of the world has the right to go through the arctic ocean, they just have no icebreakers! As soon as (USA CHINA) appears, we will definitely see them there. Only Russia needs the NSR - nobody needs it anymore, But for some reason we think that now all the ships of the world will trample. There was nobody besides us and there will not be unfortunately
        1. timokhin-aa
          10 September 2019 00: 02 New
          +1
          The Americans have different opinions on all this. And they are already building icebreakers.

          According to the NSR - https://topwar.ru/158829-arkticheskij-front-po-povodu-nashego-dvizhenija-na-sever.html
          1. karabass
            karabass 10 September 2019 13: 35 New
            0
            it's all Manilovism! 20 years ago I was hoping for the development of the NSR with experience an understanding came - there will be no NSR, some hopes
            I don’t know about the Americans, but I think they are going there to the peak of us - there’s no need anymore!
            1. timokhin-aa
              10 September 2019 13: 56 New
              0
              C'mon, there is already only Sabetta how much cargo turnover gave.

              I don’t know about the Americans, but I think they are going there to the peak of us - there’s no need anymore!


              True, but it is also dangerous, as if they had rational reasons.
              1. karabass
                karabass 10 September 2019 17: 01 New
                0
                From Sabetta, gas from the Taimyr anthracite from Norilsk - yes, metal, in the first place is the northern delivery. I’m talking about something else - who deceive themselves and others in vain hopes about TRANSIT to the NSR - they simply deal with verbal diarrhea
                1. timokhin-aa
                  10 September 2019 19: 48 New
                  0
                  Yes, no one is cheating. But this does not cancel the preparation of amers
            2. VVAUSH
              VVAUSH 11 September 2019 18: 43 New
              +1
              Not to spite anyone, they are on their own.
              The next stage in the development of the underwater part. Now the surface part, the underwater part, has long been there.
  • Ivanchester
    Ivanchester 9 September 2019 10: 02 New
    +3
    Alexander, good afternoon!

    Thanks so much for the article.
    It is rarely possible to meet such a brief and at the same time meaningful analysis of the theoretical concepts of the past, supplemented by examples from the practice of conducting military operations in various historical periods.

    For my part, I would like to ask a few questions that you might consider possible to sort out in the sequel to this material.

    1. Even at the peak of its power in the 1980-ies, the Soviet Navy (unlike the US Navy) was not multi-purpose. The tasks that he could solve with varying degrees of success were the destruction of the AUG and SSBNs of a potential enemy. However, in the fight against the “shore”, our ships were practically useless.
    Do you agree with this and, if so, is it necessary to correct this imbalance?
    2. Given the current state of Russian shipbuilding, how and for how many years will our country be able to create a fleet that meets your doctrine? What should be its roughly numerical and qualitative composition (surface and submarine ships, aviation, satellite constellation)?
    3. If I’m not mistaken, in one of your articles you yourself pointed out the disadvantage of Russian geography from the point of view of the fleet: only one naval base from which you can get into the ocean without forcing narrownesses, severe climate, etc. Doesn’t it turn out that nature itself is against the Russian Federation having a fleet capable of dominating the oceans?
    1. Nikolay Semirechensky
      Nikolay Semirechensky 9 September 2019 15: 09 New
      +4
      Of course, I am not the author of the article, but I could not pass by, since the topic is important. I hope uv. The author himself will answer you, but for now I’ll write from myself.

      My opinion is to try to compete with a potential adversary according to his rules (and to build a strong ocean fleet is precisely his sphere and strong side), this is obviously dooming himself to defeat.

      Example: if Nazi Germany hadn’t built Bismarck and Tirpitz (50000 tons each), which were completely useless, they would have had the money and resources for more than 1 tanks. Given that both battleships were built by 1941, this thousand tanks cost the Germans victory, because literally a couple of tank divisions were not enough for them near Moscow.

      Another example: in the Falkland conflict, almost all the losses on both sides were caused by aviation. Oh, how Argentinean aviation was weak, but the British drank a lot of blood.

      In any modern conflict, and especially in the conflict at sea, aviation will play a decisive role. Our fleet in the big war will be alive as long as it can be covered from the coast by naval and fighter aircraft, but since after almost 10 years of rearmament we have a little more than 100 Su-30s and about 80 Su-35s, our fleet will live poorly but not for long.

      If it’s absolutely unbearable without a fleet, then build corvettes and frigates (and a little submarine). The same type of series. Our large fleet chiefs have a completely irresponsible (if not full-time) tradition to produce and lay down new projects without ensuring the masses of existing ones, so I’m afraid these words will go nowhere.
      Well, of course, common sense dictates that our fleet does not need any aircraft carriers, cruisers, helicopter carriers, ekranoplanes, well, MRC, of ​​course.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 9 September 2019 19: 21 New
        +3
        Quote: Nikolai Semirechensky
        Our large fleet chiefs have a completely irresponsible (if not full-time) tradition to produce and lay down new projects without ensuring the masses of existing ones, so I’m afraid these words will go nowhere.

        Here we can agree with this relatively ... what yes
      2. timokhin-aa
        10 September 2019 00: 01 New
        0
        Example: if Nazi Germany did not build Bismarck and Tirpitz (50000 each), which died completely useless, then they would have the money and resources for more than 1 thousand tanks.


        But first you need to understand why Hitler decided on Operation Barbarossa without solving the problem on the Western Front.
        And if this is done, then the issue with 1000 tanks will sharply “play with other colors”.
        1. Nikolay Semirechensky
          Nikolay Semirechensky 10 September 2019 00: 16 New
          0
          As far as I know history and I can interpret it, he considered Britain to be an ally who would not take Hitler’s side tomorrow. There were certain signs on the part of the British, another conversation, whether it was a radio game, or whether they really could have crossed over to Hitler's side.

          I have no other interpretation, and therefore I do not understand what you are driving at.
          1. timokhin-aa
            10 September 2019 13: 17 New
            0
            As far as I know history and I can interpret it, he considered Britain to be an ally who would not take Hitler’s side tomorrow.


            Is it after Coventry, huh? No, the answer is incorrect. I recommend, as it were, a simple version of the exposition - E. Manstein, "Lost Victories", chapter after the French campaign.

            Then think about it - and here Royal Navy.
        2. VVAUSH
          VVAUSH 11 September 2019 21: 15 New
          +1
          But first you need to understand why Hitler decided on the operation "Barbarossa Front. And if this is done
          1. VVAUSH
            VVAUSH 11 September 2019 21: 18 New
            +1
            Sorry, the connection is buggy. Personally, I am a supporter of Rezun’s version of Operation Thunderstorm.
            Well, or the entire command of the Red Army has gone crazy.
    2. timokhin-aa
      9 September 2019 23: 59 New
      +2
      Do you agree with this and, if so, is it necessary to correct this imbalance?


      Well, in general, it is being straightened out "in good order" - the universal naval firing complex allows you not to fool around on this topic. We need anti-ship missiles, we use anti-ship missiles, we must hit the shore, we put cruise missiles there. As new ships with 3-14 launchers arrive, everything will straighten out by itself.

      2. Given the current state of Russian shipbuilding, how and for how many years will our country be able to create a fleet that meets your doctrine? What should be its roughly numerical and qualitative composition (surface and submarine ships, aviation, satellite constellation)?


      It depends on medium-term military threats and political tasks that, alas, are not voiced to us. To be honest, I don’t want to speculate on how much Russia needs aircraft carriers or cruisers. This is a secondary question. My goal is that, with any opportunities for their construction, the fleet would develop as a balanced system, having a clear doctrine of application, corresponding to real threats, and having a clear and understandable goal. At least one aircraft carrier, at least five.

      Doesn’t it turn out that nature itself is against the Russian Federation having a fleet capable of dominating the oceans?


      It turns out. But there is an antidote, and it was previously used. The next article will be about this.
      1. Ivanchester
        Ivanchester 10 September 2019 10: 05 New
        +2
        To be honest, I don’t want to speculate on how much Russia needs aircraft carriers or cruisers. This is a secondary issue.

        Perhaps it is, of course, secondary, but if you imagine that we need, conditionally speaking, six aircraft carriers to implement the doctrine you proposed, and we are not able to build any in the current realities, it will become obvious that such a doctrine is good, but not viable .
        Therefore, I asked how your balanced fleet could look in the light of our current capabilities?
        1. timokhin-aa
          10 September 2019 13: 23 New
          0
          Balance is not equal in size.

          The fleet should be oriented towards establishing supremacy at sea. Now the zone of domination of the enemy begins at the edge of thermal water. That is, first we must push it away, and establish our zone of domination there, so that at least a way out of the bases is ensured.

          It is not very expensive, but difficult from an organizational point of view.

          If there is a task to provide it off the coast of Syria, then other ships will be needed, an arc fleet, more expensive.

          I am not imposing a strategy in the sense that by the 2025 year we need to ensure dominance near the Aleutian Islands, for which we need such strength in strength.
          I impose principles and criteria for the correct development. There is money for aircraft carriers, and there are tasks to establish dominance somewhere in the ocean — we are building and doing it.
          There is no money - we do not build and do not do it, but concentrate on establishing dominance on our shore (now it does not exist).
          This is what the article is about.
          1. Ivanchester
            Ivanchester 10 September 2019 13: 46 New
            0
            ... concentrate on establishing dominance on its shore ...


            Alexander, I understood your idea and, in general, I completely agree with her.
            Therefore, I would be interested to know your opinion (as a person competent in the subject and owning data not only from open sources) about what we can afford at this stage.

            For example (all indicators are speculative): to establish dominance in the BMZ at the Black Sea Theater, you must have 6 frigates, 8 corvettes, 6 DEPL, 4 MTSC, etc., in the Pacific Ocean - 10 frigates, 15 corvettes, 6 MAPL, etc. .

            Taking into account the current ship composition and the average pace of work of Sevmash, Severnaya Verf, shipyard, etc. it will take us so many years for the fleet to reach the indicated number.
            1. timokhin-aa
              10 September 2019 13: 58 New
              +1
              For example (all indicators are speculative): to establish dominance in the BMZ at the Black Sea Theater, you must have 6 frigates, 8 corvettes, 6 DEPL, 4 MTSC


              This is enough to withdraw one RPLSN from the base))))

              Let’s do this - I’ll write separately about the number.
  • abc_alex
    abc_alex 9 September 2019 10: 25 New
    +6
    With all due respect to the work and intentions of the author, this article is a good example of the fact that techies do not need to read humanitarian texts. The author is absolutely right in the heart of the matter, but honestly, never in the open political doctrines of the development of our army and navy will it be said about gaining dominance at sea. If only because it will immediately provoke a hegemonic response. And it will cause a lot of problems. Dominance anywhere is first achieved, and only then declared. To declare "I am coming to you" is noble, but not far-sighted. Therefore, all and all sorts of “doctrines” and “concepts of development” are nothing more than a verbal curtain for real programs written into budgets.

    But the reality of the programs is such that the domestic military industry makes such ships as it can. And accordingly, not those niches that it is desirable to fill for the implementation of strategic tasks are being filled now, but those that can be filled. What dominance at sea can be discussed if Russia does not have its own ship diesel and serial gas turbine? And in the brains of the admiralty firmly sits the idea of ​​"buy from the Germans"? Although, perhaps, this idea sits because the admirals are not going to fight?

    The author very often appeals to the 2MB experiment, but for some reason leans on the doctrinal component, ignoring the economic and geostrategic. The United States defeated Japan not by the power of doctrine, but by the power of shipyards. And the fact that their production was inaccessible to the attacks of the Japanese forces. That’s the whole secret. And both times Germany was taken to the sea at sea the same way - by quantity. The doctrines of all Europeans were the same. You just need to understand that the fleet is very expensive and difficult and you cannot dominate the sea without dominating the economy, at least at the regional level.
    1. lucul
      lucul 9 September 2019 12: 10 New
      0
      What dominance at sea can be discussed if Russia does not have its own ship diesel and serial gas turbine?

      And it didn’t occur to you - why?
      Why were all R&D of engine building in the USSR under TABU? Why have we always been behind in engine building?
      This is the projection of force by the enemy, when you seem to have all the possibilities and resources for this, but you do not. Together they fool the brains of those who need it so that he doesn’t see the main thing, or, at the suggestion of the enemies, they put in the position of such a person who should not be allowed into power like a Gorbachev. This is the projection of force. And our first priority, if we want to survive, is to project the force to remove.
      What is a good article by an author? She reveals the truth - as it is. Without false propaganda. You can veil the truth with various lies and propaganda, but the winner is always the one who thinks clearly and clearly - perfectly imagining the truth, that is, does not allow himself to be manipulated.
      1. abc_alex
        abc_alex 11 September 2019 09: 17 New
        0
        Quote: lucul
        Why were all R&D of engine building in the USSR under TABU? Why have we always been behind in engine building?

        By mass of objective reasons.
        There was, for example, the "curse of a small series." Well, it is not cost-effective to develop a diesel engine for a series of 3 ships. Here's a series of 300 locomotives and 3000 power plants - you can still talk. This was understood perfectly in the USSR.
        So not that there would be a taboo. There was no normal long-term system planning.
    2. timokhin-aa
      9 September 2019 23: 52 New
      0
      But the reality of the programs is such that the domestic military industry makes such ships as it can. And accordingly, not those niches that it is desirable to fill for the implementation of strategic tasks are being filled now, but those that can be filled.


      It is not true.
      The truth is here - https://topwar.ru/159742-dlja-flota-byli-ne-tolko-dengi-promyshlennye-vozmozhnosti-tozhe.html
      1. abc_alex
        abc_alex 11 September 2019 09: 46 New
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        It is not true.
        The truth is here -

        Last time I did not comment on the article, because I do not have reliable data on whether or not there are problems with the production of various units and assemblies at dozens of enterprises adjacent to the shipbuilding complex. But simply and then and now I would like to point out to the author that in this article he does not deny the logic: "we build what we can." And confirms it. That’s why no visible delays with the completion of ships, that projects with a high degree of realizability by industry were selected for construction. The fact that the assemblies themselves have controversial characteristics is yes. But they are assembled precisely from what we can.
        1. timokhin-aa
          11 September 2019 14: 29 New
          +1
          But simply and then and now I would like to point out to the author that in this article he does not deny the logic: "we build what we can."


          No. We can make corvettes with Kolomensky diesels, but do not lay them.
          We can’t do RTOs because of Star’s inability to produce the right amount of engines, but we are laying them.

          Today one is laid down, for example. They’ll surrender in six years.

          This is one example.
          1. abc_alex
            abc_alex 12 September 2019 00: 38 New
            0
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            No. We can make corvettes with Kolomensky diesels, but do not lay them.

            And apparently, there are no projects. Projects were done when the admirals were all ready to buy from the Germans. Although you are right in many ways.
            1. timokhin-aa
              12 September 2019 13: 46 New
              +1
              There is a project, which is the most interesting. I won’t write the number, on the 11661 case but with the DGEU, in Kolomna.
  • Lyapis
    Lyapis 9 September 2019 10: 42 New
    0
    ... from this year to the mid-2020s, or it’s exactly “quasi-combat,” that is, there are formally weapons on board, but they can’t fight against an adequate enemy (project 22160, which is directly called by the Navy officers as “not a warship” ); or they can perform one or two tasks and only in the absence of serious opposition (RTOs of projects 21631 and 22800)

    In what battle do you want to see the long-suffering project 22160. This patrol ship and it’s stupid to wait for a cloud of batteries with a cr or main caliber of 400+ mm to be stuck on such a ship. It is even more stupid to call such a ship "non-combat" only because it has a strictly adequate patrol ship armament.
    With RTOs the same thing (and all the more ridiculous to blame for the fact that they can perform only 1-2 tasks). What kind of battle does the author want to see - maneuvers of mixed squadrons with airborne artillery volleys and dashing attacks of heavy cruisers a la 44th year in the Pacific Ocean? The fact that the same RTOs have been fighting quite successfully since 2015 (yes, that's right), as it is supposed by the very idea of ​​such ships, does not seem to bother the author.
    Separately, I would like to know which enemy the author sees for the RTOs and the patrol ship as adequate (to such an extent that they can not cope with it) - a missile destroyer? The submarine? Carrier Group? Death star maybe?
    1. Ivanchester
      Ivanchester 9 September 2019 10: 59 New
      +2
      The same author has articles in which he analyzes in detail the combat capabilities of RTOs and patrol ships, compares them with the funds that were (or will be) spent on their construction and indicates how this money could be spent more efficiently, even taking into account the current shipwrecked state.
      1. Lyapis
        Lyapis 9 September 2019 12: 26 New
        -2
        .
        Quote: Ivanchester
        ... how this money could be spent more efficiently

        Maybe more efficiently, or maybe less than that, we will never know, simply because everything looks good and decorously only in the ideal world of the author. In reality, the fleet decided to build patrol ships and RTOs, and probably this makes sense, simply because the people who made these decisions had a disproportionately large (compared to the author) level of competence in the development of the domestic fleet.
        1. timokhin-aa
          9 September 2019 23: 50 New
          +2
          In reality, the fleet decided to build patrol ships and RTOs, and probably this makes sense, simply because the people who made these decisions had a disproportionately large (compared with the author) level of competence in the development of the domestic fleet.


          Unlike you, I had the opportunity to directly ask questions to people who were the executors of these decisions. And they told me completely different things - completely consistent with what I am preaching here about all these patrolmen.
        2. VVAUSH
          VVAUSH 11 September 2019 18: 38 New
          +1
          I recommend Sobolev "Overhaul"
          It is not necessary to be a tailor to see that the tailor sewed you a bad coat and took twice as much.
          1. timokhin-aa
            11 September 2019 19: 47 New
            0
            Oh yes, the monologue is simply gorgeous. "You poorly sew business cards, Admiral Grigorovich!"))

            And since then, nothing really really changed, although there have been attempts.
            1. VVAUSH
              VVAUSH 11 September 2019 20: 05 New
              +1
              Then there was the opportunity to order and build abroad. And good ships
              After, such an opportunity disappeared.
              Skopipastil himself. Russia was not perceived as a threat then.
              "No one prevented the Russian Empire from arming itself. For example, cruisers battleships, destroyers and others built for the Russian Empire abroad: 'Svetlana' - Le Havre, France; 'Admiral Kornilov' - Saint-Nazaire, France; 'Askold' - Kiel, Germany; 'Boyarin' - Copenhagen, Denmark; 'Bayan' - Toulon, France; 'Admiral Makarov' - 'Forge & Chantier', France; 'Rurik' - 'Vickers' in Barrow Inn Furness, England; 'Retvisan'-' William Cramp & Sans', Philadelphia, USA; 'Cesarevich' La Seine-sur-Mer in France ... Destroyer series' Whale '(' Watchful '), shipyard Friedrich Schichau, Elbing, Germany; C Riya 'Trout' ( 'attentive'), A. Norman in France series 'lieutenant Burakou' 'Forge & Chantier' and Norman Plant, France, destroyers Series 'Mechanical engineer Zverev' Sheehan, Germany.

              They built their own: 7 battleships of the types 'Sevastopol' and 'Empress Maria'. Only they can not be compared, neither in terms of caliber of guns, nor in reservation. The main caliber of Sevastopol (305 mm) and 343 mm trunks of Orion, or 356 mm of the Japanese Congo. The attempt of pre-revolutionary Russia to become a sea power failed miserably - the underdeveloped industry of the Russian Empire lost the "arms race" to the leading world powers. Although, you must agree, no one refused to place orders and build ships of the class battleship at home. We will not recall the Mistral helicopter carriers ordered and the reason for the refusal to supply them. "
              1. timokhin-aa
                11 September 2019 20: 32 New
                0
                Well, yes, he hindered. But it is useless without an understanding of why and how to use these ships. Without understanding, there will be Russian-Japanese.
                1. VVAUSH
                  VVAUSH 11 September 2019 21: 23 New
                  +1
                  The conclusion is one about the ability of the Anglo-Saxons to build multi-passages.
                  About the skill ... the squadron then frantically disheveled the fishermen, mistaking them for no one.
    2. ser56
      ser56 9 September 2019 17: 02 New
      +3
      Quote: Lyapis
      This is a patrol ship and it's silly to wait

      the patrol service in the tasks of the FSB naval forces, and not the Navy, why replace it? . request
      Quote: Lyapis
      The fact that the same RTOs have been fighting quite successfully since 2015

      if they were in the form of corvettes, it would be even better to fight ... request
      Quote: Lyapis
      enemy for MRK and patrol ship

      you yourself have shown that a false strategy for the development of the Navy was chosen - instead of building the ships really needed for battle - it’s not clear what is being built and why ... request
      1. Dart2027
        Dart2027 9 September 2019 22: 16 New
        0
        Quote: ser56
        patrol service in the tasks of the FSB naval forces, not the Navy

        The FSB is limited to the territory of the Russian Federation, and the Navy operates outside of it.
        1. timokhin-aa
          9 September 2019 23: 48 New
          +1
          False, the FSB is also tasked with protecting exclusion zones. Read the laws.
          1. Dart2027
            Dart2027 10 September 2019 19: 37 New
            0
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            and protection excl. economic zones

            You about it:
            Exclusive economic zone - an area located outside the territorial sea and adjacent to it, subject to the special legal regime. Its width cannot exceed 200 nautical miles (370,4 km), counted from the baseline.

            Yes it is, but here we are talking about the possibility of protecting their ships a little further, so as not to again drive the BOD there.
            1. timokhin-aa
              10 September 2019 22: 14 New
              0
              Where and from whom are you going to protect them? In the Strait of Malacca and in the Gulf of Guinea, pirates attack from the territorial water of formally normal states, and there they depart. The reaction time is extremely short, minutes.

              And on the coast of Somalia, the pirates would be softer to put it ... well, in general, Eric Prince was paid a small genocide of their demographic resource. And now rich Eric lives in the Emirates, under the jurisdiction of the Customer, and the number of attacks on ships has dropped to a few a year.

              So why do you need a patrol ship? Money nowhere to go? Well and yes, once again - departed from the principles? Well, then the Tsushima Strait, there is no choice, your Wishlist can’t change the real world.
              1. Dart2027
                Dart2027 11 September 2019 19: 43 New
                0
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Where and from whom are you going to protect them?

                Where required.
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                So why do you need a patrol ship?

                And why the hell do you fleet? Money nowhere to go? In modern realities, Tsushima is unlikely.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  11 September 2019 20: 34 New
                  0
                  And why the hell do you fleet? Money nowhere to go?


                  For example
                  https://topwar.ru/158417-vmf-rossii-protiv-ssha-i-zapada-primer-iz-nedavnih-operacij.html
                  1. Dart2027
                    Dart2027 11 September 2019 21: 01 New
                    0
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    https://topwar.ru/158417-vmf-rossii-protiv-ssha-i-zapada-primer-iz-nedavnih-operacij.html

                    AND? RTOs fought, and the rest how many times they shot and for whom?
    3. Yuri Simple
      Yuri Simple 9 September 2019 18: 02 New
      +3
      Quote: Lyapis
      I would like to know what enemy the author sees for the RTOs and the patrol ship as adequate (so much so that they can’t cope with it) - missile destroyer? The submarine? Carrier Group? Death star maybe?

      A beautiful illustration of the work of consciousness pre-programmed to defeat.
      The simple, and yet extremely understandable idea that the RTOs and patrol ships are not needed (from the word in general) the author of the post did not break through.
    4. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 10 September 2019 15: 56 New
      +3
      Quote: Lyapis
      In what battle do you want to see the long-suffering project 22160. This is a patrol ship

      Patrol ship of what? What should he patrol without having the same CEO?
      80% of the tasks voiced for 22160 are outside the competence of the fleet - because these are the tasks of the Bohr PV FSB. And the remaining 20% ​​is a fight against pirates. Apparently, the Navy has no other pressing problems - they have all been resolved.

      Instead of 22160, the fleet was supposed to receive the IPC for the OVR, because the current IPCs have served since the times of the USSR. The task of which would be just ensuring the release of the SSBNs from the bases. But the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy closed the OVR corvette work in 2014, and instead gave him the task of developing a "patrol ship."
      Quote: Lyapis
      Separately, I would like to know which enemy the author sees for the RTOs and the patrol ship as adequate (to such an extent that they can not cope with it) - a missile destroyer? The submarine? Carrier Group? Death star maybe?

      An adequate adversary for a patrol ship is a boat with Somali pirates. All other opponents will destroy it without entering the zone of defeat of the airborne weapons 22160.
  • Tektor
    Tektor 9 September 2019 11: 12 New
    0
    Any victory at the present stage is possible only in actions in solving problems united by a single concept. The idea can only be strategic, including tactical improvisation. Otherwise, there will be empty snorting, waste of money and demoralization of personnel. The strategic plan should be cunning, secretive and difficult to recognize. Must be masked by false distractions. Therefore, the actions of the fleet must clearly follow the strategic plan. He cannot be on his own.
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 September 2019 13: 24 New
      0
      This is not to build a fleet, but to use it in a war.
    2. VVAUSH
      VVAUSH 11 September 2019 18: 35 New
      +1
      Not anymore. About 50-70 years.
      Mnogohodovochki well work out the Anglo-Saxons, Russia only responds blow to blow.
      There is a whole article about the impossibility of even operational planning for a year or two.
      At the head of the country tactics. Not a strategist.
  • dgonni
    dgonni 9 September 2019 11: 21 New
    +3
    The author missed one factor, while decisive! The fleet can be built on the basis of a powerful and developing economy. If this factor is not present, then you can immediately forget about the fleet as such. And the most important thing is that the economy is not money, it is knowledge-intensive industries that are developing rapidly. In Russia, it seems like money is there, and production and economy are becoming less and less every year. The paradox however!
    1. barsuk
      barsuk 9 September 2019 15: 16 New
      0
      The author just points out that the Fleet and the economy are interconnected and should develop in parallel. And this development does not take place in one five-year period.
    2. timokhin-aa
      10 September 2019 13: 24 New
      0
      You are somewhat wrong in terms of economics.
  • Undecim
    Undecim 9 September 2019 14: 06 New
    +9
    As always with Alexander Timokhin, everything is beautiful and harmonious.
    But if you read it carefully, some flaws are visible.
    The first one. Having paid great attention to the analysis of past naval strategic theories, the author proceeds on their basis to the development of his own. But what about modernity? Naval science does not stand still. It would be logical to analyze current views on the armed struggle at sea and the strategies of the leading world powers today. Without taking these factors into account, sculpting your own "theory of sea power" looks somewhat rash. especially considering the author’s concept "THE MAIN OBJECT OF THE IMPACT OF THE NAVY IS THE NAVY FORCE OF THE OPPONENT AND THEIR COAST INFRASTRUCTURE." It would be nice, when planning to act on an object, to imagine how this object will counteract this effect.
    Moreover, the "adversary" has a slightly different approach to the "paradigms", they do not count on the energy of "patriotic citizens" there and rely more on professionals.
    The British, for example, in 2007 created the Corbett Center for the Study of Maritime Politics (the same one as a theorist), whose task is seen in the analysis of naval politics and providing an information platform for scientists, theorists and practitioners in the field of this very naval policy, statesmen military.
    This is despite the British having such organizations as the Laughton Naval History Unit, the DCDC, and a number of others, which deal specifically with matters of naval construction.
    Cent publishes the monthly magazine Corbett Paper, on the pages of which the aforementioned "comrades" express their thoughts.
    In the August issue of last year, just one of the famous contemporary authorities - theorists in the field under consideration - American Robert C. Rubel posted his article "Navies and Economic Prosperity - the New Logic of Sea Power". "Navy and economic prosperity -
    The New Logic of Sea Power. "
    Professor Robert C. Rubel believes that the main goal of the fleets today is to protect the global economic system and international economic activity.
    In this regard, the author’s task of “CONQUERING LIVING AT SEA”, formulated by the author, looks like such an aggressive plan against the American fleet protecting the world economic system, and a country with such plans is a clear aggressor. Maybe you should work on the wording?
    And the second one. Once Karl von Clausewitz (Corbett’s work basically relies on Clausewitz’s work) determined that politics is a concentrated expression of the economy. Naval policy - including. Subsequently, F. Engels confirmed that "nothing depends so much on economic conditions as the army and navy."
    That is, the state can afford such a naval policy and such a fleet as the economy allows it. Otherwise, it will be an unsupported project.
    Maybe the author in the sequel will open up this question, but it is not yet clear on what economic basis he is building the “popular naval theory”.
    1. timokhin-aa
      9 September 2019 23: 47 New
      +2
      Professor Robert C. Rubel believes that the main goal of the fleets today is to protect the global economic system and international economic activity.
      In this regard, the author’s task of “CONQUERING LIVING AT SEA”, formulated by the author, looks like such an aggressive plan against the American fleet protecting the world economic system, and a country with such plans is a clear aggressor. Maybe you should work on the wording?


      It is not that simple.
      This is THEM so. Why? Because they have already achieved their supremacy in the sea, and they are talking about how to use it, to exploit. Our task is to make it so that we “pick it up” for ourselves at least on the NSR, on the Gulf of Finland-Kaliningrad line, near Kamchatka, and in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk. Naturally, not by aggression against the United States, nor by how they by achieving a level of control over the situation in which sending their forces (the same submarines) to our communications becomes meaningless. Now they are ALWAYS there and mostly untraceable. This is politically bad for the Russian Federation, and provokes extremely dangerous illusions about their own capabilities among the “partners”. At least for a start it must be stopped.

      In addition, not everything is so simple with the defenders of the global economy. Take the example of the South China Sea, where Americans are pushing the theme of "freedom of navigation." And which merchant ships go there mainly? Yes, the Chinese and go. Interesting defense of the global economy and freedom of navigation, huh?

      I will honestly tell you - right now that the West is working as a defender of the global economy, it’s the same myth as the peacefulness of the United States of America. Not so, it is simply. And the fact that the population of Western countries believed in their propaganda makes little difference.

      Or such a question: who will die a painful death in our country if there is no universal freedom of navigation?
      China. This is the main beneficiary of open seas and oceans and the main world industrial site. But the USA is in fact opposing him! Some strange defense of the global economy, do not you think?

      And it is not surprising that the Americans only hear about the BLOCKADE of China along the "first chain of islands", and the Chinese are going to break through this blockade.

      In general, the situation is more complicated than you are trying to show.
      1. Undecim
        Undecim 10 September 2019 00: 15 New
        +2
        I did not try to show it simple. Quite the contrary, I tried to show that it’s not worth it to sail like a sailor to Zimnyi for “gaining supremacy at sea”, since “on the seas” is not so simple, especially taking into account the declared and real doctrines.
        But about the NSR - just a fad recently. There, until no one breaks and until the ice melts - and will not break. But then, if the climate allows and it will be possible to go outside the territorial waters of Russia, then the people will stretch, but they won’t “dominate” there.
        1. timokhin-aa
          10 September 2019 13: 27 New
          +3
          But about the NSR - just a fad recently. There, until no one breaks and until the ice melts - and will not break.


          Well, how not torn ..

          Firstly, under water they are already there. And they dominate there. This is already so.
          And this creates a serious vulnerability for the Russian Federation.
          As in the Avacha Gulf.

          And you don’t need to drag anywhere, you just need to take it for granted - we either should not have the Navy at all, or it should be oriented towards that very domination in terms of equipment and training.
          At the scale in which the budget allows. For example now - at our thermal water.
          1. Storekeeper
            Storekeeper 10 September 2019 23: 14 New
            +1
            I fully support! Whatever the situation in the economy, you need to protect your home! Nothing different to go with us !!! "all sorts of walking here, and then the cows disappear!" laughing
    2. VVAUSH
      VVAUSH 11 September 2019 18: 30 New
      +1
      You are absolutely right.
      Simplistically, the problem is that economists and naval commanders are sitting in different rooms, and the keys to the rooms are in the arms lobby.
      Some do not give funds, others require, still others ask the question-And what do we have with it.
  • Engineer
    Engineer 9 September 2019 15: 52 New
    +5
    History again teaches nothing.
    The Russian fleet can only fight on land. Drowning in the sea, at the bases or sitting or self-flooding. It is a fact. The author presses that now we will arm ourselves with a normal doctrine and then ..... We will not arm ourselves, we will not be able, we will not create.
    This is not to mention the fact that the fleet is a function of the economy in its purest form. No money. No technology, no personnel. And will not be.
    1. Ivanchester
      Ivanchester 9 September 2019 20: 55 New
      +1
      The Russian fleet can only fight on land.


      You insult the thousands of sailors who sacrificed their lives in Gangut, Sinop, Navarin, the island of Corfu and other battles in which the Russian fleet participated with your categorical but unreasoned comment.

      The names of Ushakov, Kornilov, Nakhimov, Lazarev, Istomin, Golovko and other admirals are forever inscribed in the history of our country along with the names of Suvorov, Skobelev, Zhukov and other commanders who commanded the ground forces.

      Even in the unsuccessful wars for Russia, sailors gave examples of military prowess: the cruiser Dmitry Donskoy, the battleship Slava, the icebreaker Alexander Sibiryakov ...

      I believe that it would be right to study the issue a little deeper before making such unambiguous conclusions about the obviously inefficiency of our fleet.
      1. Engineer
        Engineer 9 September 2019 21: 09 New
        +4
        Military prowess and effectiveness are not directly related. These are different categories.
        I am well aware of the heroic episodes. And not only about the well-known. I know about the "Fog" and the "Sibiryakova". That's just the actions of our fleet as a whole in that war is a Shame. and nothing else. There are no complaints against the personnel. To the fleet as a system, only one is better without it.
        Ushakov, excuse me, you will not feed the afflicted. Soon 200 years as without victories (Sinop proud of this is another perversion)
        There was an element of provocation in the message. Here the claim is accepted
        1. Ivanchester
          Ivanchester 9 September 2019 22: 31 New
          +1
          That's just the actions of our fleet as a whole in that war is a Shame.

          Taking into account the fact that at the beginning of the war the USSR did not possess any modern and powerful fleet at all, to call its actions a shame with a capital letter, in my opinion, is unfair. The fleet did what it could: landed troops, delivered military supplies, trawled mines on the Volga, so that oil transit from the Caspian did not stop, and much more. He certainly made his significant contribution to the Victory.

          200 years soon as without victories


          In the last 75 years, other powers did not have significant victories. So the appeal to the historical context is quite appropriate.
          As for Sinop, I did not understand you: do you in Borodino or Poltava also see no reason for pride, or is it something else?
          1. Engineer
            Engineer 9 September 2019 22: 58 New
            +2
            He trawled mines on the Volga, landed tactical assault forces and delivered cargo. It's like that. But what does the Fleet have to do with the type of Armed Forces? A classic of the mosquito genre. At the same time, the underwater forces failed the war. And our “Fleet” sat at the bases even in the years 43-45.
            What was done to evacuate Sevastopol? What was done to prevent the Germans from evacuating Sevastopol? What did large surface ships in the Baltic do in 44-45 years?
            By the criterion of "cost-effectiveness" we are far from the same Germans.
            Sinop- beating battleships of frigates and corvettes of a knowingly insignificant enemy. Borodino is a military draw with the best army in the world. It is even blasphemous to compare.
            1. Yamato1980
              Yamato1980 10 September 2019 05: 56 New
              0
              Well, about the evacuation of Sevastopol. It would be better if the Richtofen guys drew extra marks on the fuselage, and without any loss from their side.
              1. Engineer
                Engineer 10 September 2019 09: 03 New
                +2
                Better is like in Dunkirk, Greece 41 years old and Crete. And as in Tallinn on the 41st too. Losses are heavy, but most are saved in all cases. Tallinn is a wonderful example in general. German minefields are laying mines in our deep operational rear. Our warships do not interfere with this. But then, during the evacuation, destroyers, cruisers and transports all together go as a part of several convoys through minefields under bombs. Replace Kirov and destroyers with an analogue of Siebel and MPF and everything would be much better. Yes, this is afterglow. But can we even draw conclusions now?
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 10 September 2019 16: 20 New
                  0
                  Quote: Engineer
                  Better is like in Dunkirk, Greece 41 years old and Crete.

                  No problem.
                  Just let the army provide air cover as in Dunkirk.
                  Or let industry build a couple of at least “Queen Elizabeth” - to be like in Crete. And by the spring of 1942 the army would not surrender all the Black Sea cities with shipbuilding and ship repair plants.
                  Quote: Engineer
                  And as in Tallinn on the 41st too.

                  Great example. Warships passed the MH and busted in Kronstadt. And the transports were left to crawl without cover on mines and under air strikes. How many ships came from Tallinn? 20 percent?
                  Quote: Engineer
                  Tallinn is a wonderful example in general. German minefields are laying mines in our deep operational rear.

                  What could be the rear of the sea to Vyborg under warring Finland? Since June 22, 1941, an enemy based in southern Finland has been hanging over the communications of the main fleet base. And yes, this is not a mistake - the Germans relocated their ships to the Finns before the start of the war with the USSR, and their MH and TKA worked from Finnish bases until the Finns entered the war.
                  And to do something with this enemy is extremely difficult, because the Finns have extremely strong coastal defense, up to 12 "/ 52 tower defense.
                  Quote: Engineer
                  Replace Kirov and destroyers with an analogue of Siebel and MPF and everything would be much better.

                  To do this, you need an analogue of 8,8 cm and 20 mm “Rheinmetals” in similar quantities. But if we have them, then why do we need the BDB - because this FOR can be safely equipped with transports. smile
                  1. Engineer
                    Engineer 10 September 2019 17: 21 New
                    0
                    In Crete, in Greece, in the Baltic was a significant fighter cover?
                    “Queens” played a key role in Crete?
                    Large warships actually engaged in themselves in the Tallinn crossing. I know it. My thought was why do they even need?
                    How many ships came from Tallinn? 20 percent?

                    A lot more . Googles for one or two
                    You need to look at the number of evacuated. As a result, from half to 2/3 of the people were saved (given the fact that the evacuation partially began before August 27, then even more). For this, everything was started.
                    But if we have them, then why do we need the BDB - because this FOR can be safely equipped with transports.

                    BDB only for transporting anti-aircraft guns are needed as part of an air defense order?

                    To disassemble everything is just laziness. You generally ignored the message context by rushing to refute the details.
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 10 September 2019 17: 59 New
                      0
                      Quote: Engineer
                      In Crete, in Greece, in the Baltic was a significant fighter cover?

                      We read carefully:
                      Quote: Alexey RA
                      Just let the army provide air cover as in Dunkirk.

                      Our counterpart to Dunkirk is the evacuation of Odessa: 62 fighters in cover forces.
                      Quote: Engineer
                      “Queens” played a key role in Crete?

                      Queens played a major role in the air defense of naval formations operating near Crete.
                      Quote: Engineer
                      Was there a significant fighter cover in the Baltic?

                      No. From there and losses.
                      Quote: Engineer
                      A lot more . Googles for one or two

                      Yes, twice as much - 43%.
                      Kronstadt reached the cruiser (100%), two leaders (100%), five destroyers out of ten (50%), six patrol ships out of nine (66%), nine submarines out of eleven (82%), two gunboats out of three (66%), ten base minesweepers (100%), sixteen slow-moving minesweepers out of eighteen (89%), three electromagnetic minesweepers (100%), twenty-six boat minesweepers (100%), thirteen torpedo boats out of fourteen (93%), twenty-three MO boats out of twenty-five (92%), three network traps (100%) and 32 vessels out of 75 (43%).
                      At the same time, of the ships and vessels taken on board, 27 killed about 800 people, including a little more than 11000 - civilians.
                      © Platonov
                      Quote: Engineer
                      BDB only for transporting anti-aircraft guns are needed as part of an air defense order?

                      BDB without anti-aircraft artillery - money down the drain. It will be just targets.
                      And if we have a ZA in an amount sufficient for the BDB, then the Tallin passage vessels themselves could be repulsed from backlash (because in real life they had a maximum of a pair of “forty-fives” and a pair of KZU M-4).
            2. Ivanchester
              Ivanchester 10 September 2019 09: 54 New
              0
              Classic mosquito genre


              So our fleet during the Second World War was "mosquito". Do you not think that the three battleships inherited from "bloody tsarism", and several cruisers, laid before the WWII, could be considered at least some modern ships at that time (especially in terms of air defense)?

              What was done to evacuate Sevastopol?


              And what did the Red Army do to prevent the occupation of Sevastopol? And also Kiev, Kharkov, Minsk, Rostov-on-Don and many other cities?

              Sinop- beating battleships of frigates and corvettes of a knowingly insignificant enemy.


              That is, if ours won, not being initially in a worse position, then such a victory is not a reason for pride?
              I don’t think that the Japanese are also complexing about Tsushima or the Americans because of the victory in Leyte Gulf ...
              1. Engineer
                Engineer 10 September 2019 11: 28 New
                +1
                That is, if the ship is not modern, then we do not consider it? Fun, but gives away cheating. Three battleships after modernization is no longer a mosquito fleet. Light heavy cruisers like Kirov and leaders like Leningrad are modestly forgotten. destroyers of type 7 and 7U. And dozens of submarines that are not "mosquito fleet" strictly speaking.
                The discussion turns into a banal debate, attracts more and more analogies that are farther from the subject of discussion .. This is pointless.
                My opinion. Our army fought in bloody snot while in a standing knockout. The fleet also fought. But only on land. At the same time, if our fleet was originally "mosquito" with minesweepers, snellbots, MFP (we probably wouldn’t pull the sieges technologically), it would be much cheaper and much more efficient.
                Dreams of a large fleet are already right according to Freud. Well, the witness carrier sect in Russia is a separate sur.
                1. timokhin-aa
                  10 September 2019 13: 46 New
                  0
                  At the same time, if our fleet was originally "mosquito" with minesweepers, snellbots, MFP (we probably wouldn’t pull the sieges technologically), then it would be much cheaper and much more efficient.


                  What do you dislike about the hypothetical fleet of light anti-aircraft cruisers, high-speed guard with good art. weapons, minesweepers, nautical monitors and special landing ships? For those conditions?

                  Well, they correctly write to you - basically the RKKF was a mosquito, not so much in terms of combat composition as in application. With the results corresponding to the mosquito fleet.
                  1. Engineer
                    Engineer 10 September 2019 13: 52 New
                    +1
                    Everyone likes it, only it was not there. Is that light air defense cruisers to remove. Do not pull on the ratio of cost-effectiveness.
                    The fleet was not a mosquito in composition, but the results were “mosquito”. In fact, we see the same thing. But the accents are different
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      10 September 2019 14: 00 New
                      +1
                      The fleet was not a mosquito in composition, but the results were “mosquito”.


                      Results - Black Sea Fleet - disruption of the German offensive on the southern flank, then disruption of the German defense (see Novorossiysk, for example, or Crimea).

                      SF - retention of vital communications (!) With allies. 61% of the total Lend-Lease went there. Disruption of the first German attack on Murmansk (landing in Zap. Lytsa)

                      BaltFlot is a fiasco, yes. But there were bright moments, if that.

                      If you really look.
                      1. Engineer
                        Engineer 10 September 2019 14: 08 New
                        +2
                        Well now it’s possible to debate, and not argue.
                        Black Sea Fleet - Fights on the shore Plus, his role is not decisive. With the army shares both victories and failures.
                        SF - well, it's not funny. An old bike about the exceptional contribution of the SF to the convoy wiring? While our ships joined the guard mainly in the last section on the meridian of about. Bearish. The Royal Navy did all the work. Dot

                        We look real
                      2. timokhin-aa
                        10 September 2019 14: 40 New
                        0
                        Black Sea Fleet - Fights on the shore Plus, his role is not decisive. With the army shares both victories and failures.


                        Not on the shore, but against the shore. And in such things as the delivery of landings, their supply, the supply of the encircled group in Sevastopol, troops on the Malaya Zemlya, the role of the fleet was not that decisive - no one else could do this in principle.

                        SF - well, it's not funny. An old bike about the exceptional contribution of the SF to the convoy wiring? While our ships joined the guard mainly in the last section on the meridian of about. Bearish


                        Well yes. They joined, and still conducted reconnaissance, attacked the German convoys. Well, the landings - we don’t forget about them, at least the first landing operation - the landing in the bay of Zap.Litsa in the autumn of 41 was very important to repel an attack on Murmansk.

                        Plus the wiring of their convoys along the same NSR, something they usually don’t remember about somehow. What else did you want from the fleet, which had one and a half destroyers at the beginning of the war?
                      3. Engineer
                        Engineer 10 September 2019 14: 56 New
                        +1
                        So for all this, an EXCLUSIVELY mosquito fleet was needed. They did not need super-fast handsome leaders, modernized battleships, light cruisers with heavy clappers. They managed to the full. But large minesweepers, small but naval paratroopers, are needed like air.
                        You yourself have come to this line. Mosquito forces are a necessary and sufficient condition.
                        After
                        Lordship at sea is a speculative thing. The most striking example is the Norwegian operation.
                      4. timokhin-aa
                        10 September 2019 15: 36 New
                        0
                        So for all this, an EXCLUSIVELY mosquito fleet was needed.


                        I wrote to you a couple of comments above which fleet was needed for this. This is very far from the "mosquito", which in fact is almost always useless and almost everywhere.

                        In addition, you do not apply your aftertaste to the situation then. Even in 40 it was completely incomprehensible with whom we would fight and when. And without this, it is impossible to determine what to invest in the creation of the fleet.
                      5. Engineer
                        Engineer 10 September 2019 17: 03 New
                        0
                        Well, they correctly write to you - basically the RKKF was a mosquito, not so much in terms of combat composition as in application.

                        Results - Black Sea Fleet - disruption of the German offensive on the southern flank, then disruption of the German defense (see Novorossiysk, for example, or Crimea).

                        SF - retention of vital communications (!) With allies. 61% of the total Lend-Lease went there. Disruption of the first German attack on Murmansk (landing in Zap. Lytsa)

                        This is very far from the "mosquito", which in fact is almost always useless and almost everywhere

                        I think you should check your concept for logic and internal consistency.
                      6. timokhin-aa
                        10 September 2019 19: 54 New
                        0
                        That's right, at the Black Sea Fleet after Verpa, all large NKs were joking, the result - losses at the Kerch-Eltigen, evacuation of the Germans from Crimea.

                        Baltic - large NK posts were not used after the deblockade of Leningrad.
  • timokhin-aa
    10 September 2019 13: 29 New
    0
    landed tactical landings


    The question of competency testing in the issue under discussion - where more troops were deployed - in the Crimea during the Kerch-Feodosia operation or in Algeria during the operation "Torch"? Come back, as in reality please.
    1. Engineer
      Engineer 10 September 2019 13: 48 New
      0
      Why so much pathos?
      The Kerch-Theodosia operation was not tactical, but operational. They played it short, landed 80 thousand. 40 thousand in the first echelon. Given the results, it would not be better at all.
      Torch is an operational-strategic operation. Changed the balance of power, led to the hasty creation of an OSI group of forces in Tunisia. Yes, Algeria dropped less. But in total, more people were planted in the operation, more equipment, much more stock. Created an infrastructure of continuous replenishment. Conclusion is definitely a plus.
      1. timokhin-aa
        10 September 2019 14: 02 New
        0
        The Kerch-Theodosia operation was not tactical, but operational. They played it short, landed 80 thousand. 40 thousand in the first echelon. Given the results, it would not be better at all.


        The result was the non-appearance of the 11 Army near Rostov sometime in January of the 1941 year, or its army near Moscow somewhere in the middle of our counteroffensive, in February, for example.

        This is not even an operational result. Take it higher.
        1. Engineer
          Engineer 10 September 2019 14: 23 New
          +1
          In fact, Manstein took turns taking over our three armies and took Sevastopol. And the Kerch operation only added him force. The loss ratio is catastrophic. These people would do more good elsewhere.
          1. timokhin-aa
            10 September 2019 14: 42 New
            0
            In fact, Manstein took turns taking over our three armies and took Sevastopol.


            And what would he take if he had not been frozen for 200 + days near Sevastopol - this question is important.

            These people would do more good elsewhere.


            In the conditions of the 41 year, they would be wound even faster on the tracks.
            1. Engineer
              Engineer 10 September 2019 14: 59 New
              0
              In the conditions of the 41st year, they would be wound even faster on the tracks

              Well this is pure speculation. There is a fact-defeat. So everything is bad. And no other way. The rest is aiming the shadow on the wattle fence
            2. timokhin-aa
              10 September 2019 15: 00 New
              0
              No, you can never really use experience unless you understand what it was.
            3. Engineer
              Engineer 10 September 2019 15: 04 New
              +1
              Sorry, but this is already from the area you will never know how dangerous electricity is without putting your fingers in the socket.
            4. timokhin-aa
              10 September 2019 19: 56 New
              0
              Well, without an external clue - it is)))

              Realistically, in order to realize historical experience, one must go to analysis by the method of exception. For example, to understand the role of the Black Sea Fleet in the war, one must try to "play" for the Germans, provided that there is no Black Sea Fleet. Then everything will be clear.
            5. max702
              max702 11 September 2019 11: 35 New
              0
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              For example, to understand the role of the Black Sea Fleet in the war, one must try to "play" for the Germans, provided that there is no Black Sea Fleet. Then everything will be clear.

              It’s not a question that we will give ALL the resources that they spent on the Black Sea Fleet to the ground forces and see what would happen ..
            6. timokhin-aa
              11 September 2019 14: 27 New
              0
              Easily. In 1941, the Germans won almost all the battles and battles they met, most often with a terrifying score for us.
              On the other hand, a fleet was partly built before the revolution, the same Komintren-Kagul, for example. The Red Crimea and the Red Caucasus, as well as Chervona Ukraine under the Soviet regime, were only being completed; Parisian-Sevastopol under the Soviet regime passed (a) only modernization. Not so many entered the fleet, but in the end they got an enemy stop on its right flank. And they could get a couple of new boilers in which the troops that didn’t find themselves in the Crimea were killed in a couple of weeks, even by the same 11 army, that's all.
            7. VVAUSH
              VVAUSH 11 September 2019 18: 24 New
              +1
              The Germans won the oncoming battles. Our pre-war concept of smashing the enemy on its territory, advancing and advancing.
              And there were bases, the best tanks and art. But .... it didn’t even go that way, alas.
              And pursue an offensive strategy with the Americans, plus NATO. Well, you can try ... once.
            8. timokhin-aa
              11 September 2019 19: 55 New
              0
              Well, what are the best tanks? T-26 without a radio with cloudy green glasses in the sights? BT with armor, which even an armor-piercing rifle bullet did not always hold? T-34 Mickey Mouse whose transmission flew the first hundred kilometers? This is all not serious. The best tanks appeared when the T-34 received a tower-nut and a transmission that does not fly after 70 hours. And this is already deep 1942.

              In the offensive, the Red Army was, by the way, much worse than in defense. Not a couple of the Wehrmacht unambiguously. They learned to fight in large numbers in fact only by the fall of 1943. Prior to this, or individual glimpses, or "at any cost" or in any way.
            9. VVAUSH
              VVAUSH 11 September 2019 20: 13 New
              +1
              Amount.
              Do not step anywhere, but simply dig in the tower in a checkerboard pattern at the crossroads. Sad joke, but even so.
              And the 34-gun, and the armor. What about HF?
              And armored vehicles with 45 mm guns? They seemed to have more than the tanks of the Germans.
            10. bk0010
              bk0010 11 September 2019 21: 28 New
              0
              Quote: VVAUSH
              And the 34-gun, and the armor. What about HF?
              And what's the point with them? If they didn’t break, they quickly found themselves surrounded, without fuel and shells. Static defense from the blitzkrieg is not saved. The enemy will concentrate the troops and break through the front. The breakthrough will include tank groups (not tanks like ours, but full-fledged formations!). Suppose you managed to gather heroes in their way, ready to stand to their death. Tanks with motorized infantry hit them, raked and moved away. Further, according to the heroes, field artillery and aviation will be worked out, which were called up by the tanks that met resistance. Further, infantry with tanks will hit them again, and not the ones that were at the beginning, but stronger, but slower. And those that were in the beginning, have long bypassed your defense unit and went further. You are surrounded. If you fight off again, then they will hit you with heavy artillery (by that time it would have been pulled up too). It won’t help - they will wait three days, you’ll run out of divisional reserves of everything, and you will go, the sun of the burning, to the east, like all the encirclement. And counterattacks in the style of the First World War will not help: the one who is more mobile will arrange a cauldron for even a stronger opponent. Tactics must be changed. Instead of "standing to death" - mobile defense, etc. Which happened, but rather late.
            11. VVAUSH
              VVAUSH 11 September 2019 22: 00 New
              +1
              There was a famous headquarters game of Pavlov-Zhukov.
              Supervised by Shaposhnikov and Stalin.
              Everything was known about the blitzkrieg and how the Germans would act, too.
              It is a shame for the defending side with the lines of Stalin and Molotov to have a one-to-seven loss. This is still modest. Or the reason is different.
            12. timokhin-aa
              12 September 2019 12: 17 New
              0
              The Red Army more than doubled up, there were no personnel, people from the division stood up in the district for a year. Plus a failed communication organization, plus zero experience, plus the loss of air supremacy.

              M.Katukov commanded the 30th TD. Lost ALL tanks in the first attack, then the division fought like a rifle.
              Such examples are simply in bulk. We did not know how to fight then. The headquarters could drive the mechanized corps along 500-700 km on the roads before joining the battle - and this is with that technique. There was no radio communication, a situation where there were tanks in the connection but there was no transport was all the time.
              Rezun is just a liar, any verification of any of his statements on any documents or books clearly indicates this.

              Examples in bulk. For example, he writes that the concentration of the Red Army was almost completed, and the former commander of the 56 th tank of the 4 tank group Manstein writes that the offensive of the Red Army was excluded in the existing battle formations, this could not be done.
            13. VVAUSH
              VVAUSH 12 September 2019 13: 51 New
              +1
              I read many. Not convinced.
              Whether he is a liar or not, I don’t see another suitable version for explaining the 1941 disaster.
            14. timokhin-aa
              12 September 2019 14: 42 New
              0
              Well, think about what would happen if the Americans on your theater would hit 1989, here's the answer.

              The Germans were a class above.

              I at one time didn’t just read a lot, but sat studying, I had a notebook, where, for example, numbers like “the number of shooters that a fleet of a division can raise” were calculated for our and Germans, in general, if you get deep, then the picture comes out of the wildest mess at all levels, not mobilized troops without transport, without mechanized traction for artillery, staffs that cannot work, operator officers who don’t understand how to drive troops around the area, falling apart gearboxes on tanks, brought to the reorganization of the ALL district anti-aircraft I’m artillery, flight commanders, hammering into the camouflage of aircraft in the parking lots and launching a bullet in the morning of June 22 at the sight of the ensuing rout, Zhukov, who does not know the situation, sits and writes directives, instead of just calling Kuznetsov in the districts and ordering deploy in battle formation and occupy fortifications immediately, Baltic Fleet reconnaissance, having overslept both the passage and concentration of German ships with mines in Finnish ports, and above all this is a top-strategic mistake when the main German strike is expected in Ukraine and there they are massaging forces, and he is in Belarus ...

              And all this is against the Wehrmacht, where each private soldier has two big wars.

              Still lucky that got off like that.
            15. VVAUSH
              VVAUSH 12 September 2019 16: 38 New
              +1
              Funny.
              Almost like Rezun.
              One side, so as not to be suspected of preparing a preemptive strike against Germany, claims that the tanks are old, there is no connection, we are fools and untermenschs. And even though the Germans have ten times less tanks and they are advancing, they have experience and order.
              Then what has the army been doing all these years?
              And the experience of Spain, H. Gola, Finland?
            16. timokhin-aa
              12 September 2019 20: 44 New
              0
              The army was in a state of reorganization, and at the same time at all levels, and the combat experience of all kinds of minor wars was not applicable.

              Like the Syrian experience in the war with the USA for example.
              An example - the Wehrmacht had 2000 trucks in the motor division, and God forbid 900 in the infantry, which is of the non-mechanized type.
              In the division of the Red Army has never been so much, even in the spring of 1945.
            17. VVAUSH
              VVAUSH 12 September 2019 21: 41 New
              +2
              There were not many motivational divisions. Mostly horses and gasoline problems.
              In general, realities need to be, and not blow up a world fire without a ready army and experience.
            18. timokhin-aa
              13 September 2019 10: 44 New
              +2
              The world’s fire is in songs and dances, the real challenge was to be strong enough to take out a border conflict with Poland, Romania, Finland and Japan (on the continent).

              The threats were supposed to be extinguished proactively by the forces of aviation and advisers. In Spain, it did not work out, in China it turned out better.

              Then suddenly Hitler and comrade Stalin discovers that he has no pants on. Results - Pact, 7-day workweek, preplanned plans for the evacuation of industry to the east, reorganization of the Red Army, complete with reorganization of ALL formations to completely new states, intensive investment in new weapons - for the first time in the second half of the thirties (an entire era was missed in aviation during this time, for example). It was then that the Germans caught.

              It's like attacking a person when he sits on the toilet - he cannot resist, sorry for such an analogy.
            19. VVAUSH
              VVAUSH 13 September 2019 11: 08 New
              +2
              In my opinion, Bogomolov’s phrase is: “Monstrously deceived by his own intuition.”
              Or Watson (Solomin): "You were warned? After all, you were warned ..."
            20. timokhin-aa
              13 September 2019 11: 21 New
              0
              He was too rational. Germany can win the war on two fronts? No. So it can’t attack, right?
              Well, here ...
            21. VVAUSH
              VVAUSH 13 September 2019 14: 47 New
              +2
              In my opinion the topic has waned.
              Just the two of us and write :-)
  • Yamato1980
    Yamato1980 11 September 2019 05: 27 New
    0
    You look from the side of afterglow. In fact, at the end of 1941-42, the Kerch-Feodosia operation was successful. A large group of the Red Army on the Crimean peninsula landed and supplied (and with some roughness), which in the future had good chances to defeat 11 A Manshtein in the Crimea and this is a FACT.
  • Yamato1980
    Yamato1980 11 September 2019 05: 36 New
    0
    and these armies had nowhere to go from Crimea). According to the situation, it turns out to sit in the Crimea and try to attract as many enemy forces as possible or surrender.
    1. Engineer
      Engineer 11 September 2019 11: 57 New
      0
      Gentlemen, please read first. Read the opponent.
      Any analysis is ALWAYS based on aftertaste. I don’t say anywhere, “haha dibila, I had to do it SO”. My thesis is that our mosquito fleet fought to the best of our ability, our large surface ships and submarines - Shame. If the fleet were even more “coastal and mosquito” it would be much better. "I wrote from the very beginning
      Yes, this is afterglow. But can we even draw conclusions now?

      Timokhin fell into a logical trap: our fleet in the second world mosquito-> our fleet of the Black Sea Fleet and especially the Northern Fleet played a very important role-> the mosquito fleet is useless. When I pointed it out to him, he issued
      That's right, at the Black Sea Fleet after Verpa, all large NKs were joking, the result - losses at the Kerch-Eltigen, evacuation of the Germans from Crimea.

      That is, he once again admitted that the mosquito fleet did all the work actually done on the fact. So who is then useless?
      His favorite landing in the West Face is also a mosquito operation
      Here they rushed to discuss the Tallinn transition without making the slightest effort to understand why I wrote it.
      But why. Tallinn crossing is worse than Crete. The enemy has much fewer planes, but there are much fewer warships on the opposite side plus they rushed to save themselves as soon as possible. And mines. No MINES. A lot of foul mines. When the ships followed in a narrow worn fairway. Evading bombers is possible only at the cost of leaving minefields.
      And what is the result? even with the worst estimate of losses, mosquitoes and transports saved half to 2/3 of the evacuated. Here it is GLORY and heroism. This is when the “big guys” just ran away.

      In Sevastopol, the Fleet was obliged to save people. The experience of Tallinn showed this. He did not. And covered himself with indelible disgrace.

      Regarding the delay and diversion of Manstein’s forces.

      Here it must be clearly understood that the lesion has two stages.

      Phase One. Active organized resistance. We detain the enemy, inflict losses on him, although we ourselves lose more. Win time, knock down the enemy pace. It is beneficial to the defenders in many conditions.
      Phase two. Rout. The organized resistance is broken, the defense breaks up into centers, mass surrender, panic. The enemy is massacre us with minimal losses. We are not winning anything, they are stupidly killing us. This is not beneficial to us under any circumstances.
      For defense, it is imperative that phase one does not develop into phase two.

      Manstein arranged a phase two first for the Kerch landing, and then for the garrison of Sevastopol. These people were slaughtered. Weren't they needed like air in the battle for the Caucasus? And the fleet is directly responsible for organizing this massacre
    2. Yamato1980
      Yamato1980 11 September 2019 17: 36 New
      0
      Where to order the fleet in Sevastopol? The North Bay was surrendered, and with the loss of the North Bay all defense collapsed. But before phase two, Manstein had some unpleasant moments, but they got out, although it would have been possible to register “phase two” for Manstein himself, but objective circumstances interfered. As for Tallinn, but there was no other way out, or at least try to save something, or the whole group is covered with a copper basin WITHOUT options. In Crimea, a completely different situation. To save Sevastopol, at the cost of losing the whole fleet is so-so. No purely humanly necessary, of course, but from a military point of view, this is a big mistake. Petrov’s army quickly fulfilled its task, to pull it out at the cost of the death of the whole fleet is not rational, and they would have saved a maximum of 20 percent no more, so in the battle for the Caucasus the saved formations would not have played a role.
    3. Engineer
      Engineer 11 September 2019 19: 30 New
      0
      Opa, that is, we are defending ourselves until the North is surrendered? And then everything, end, everything was gone. Before the delivery of North evacuate in any way?
      We look at Google maps. In addition to the North, we have Artbukhta, Quarantine. Sand, Streletskaya, round, reed, Cossack. Everywhere piers and ships, that is, depths allow. Even if there were no piers then, they can be equipped. You can carry people on board with boats and scows as you always and everywhere did. There would be a desire, but it was not there.
      Petrov’s army quickly fulfilled its task, to pull it out at the cost of the death of the whole fleet is not rational

      That's why we do not need a fleet, because the ships are so beautiful, they can die. And then there was the Verp
      and then ... nothing. But seriously, with such conclusions about Petrov’s army we will be worse than the Nazis. Reading was just disgusting. I really hope that you really don’t think so.
      Most importantly, it is not necessary to send a fleet to evacuate Sevastopol. It is necessary to send transports, rvbakov, boats, mosquitoes. All who are. And half would be saved. Yes, even if it’s a third, it’s still a lot. But they did not send.
      In the heat of the day, the debaters completely forgot about the possibility of evacuating the Kerch assault. Also there was no possibility? So, conditions were much more favorable. One could even scrape a thin liquid fighter cover. Oh yes, there we also detained Manstein, otherwise he would .... For us, for example, a whole division perished in Adzhimushkaysky quarries. Presumably a lot of energy distracted myself. Otherwise, why would the Germans call phase two the hunt for bustards?
      How much more Tsushim do we need to see clearly?
    4. timokhin-aa
      11 September 2019 20: 10 New
      0
      It is necessary to see, that's just what you offer is called "make life easier for the enemy."

      Or let’s discuss Russian-Japanese without a fleet. How would it go there? Whom would Vladivostok be, as it were called?

      On the other hand, and if the war were taken out to sea, then how would it be?
    5. Engineer
      Engineer 11 September 2019 20: 40 New
      0
      The discussion ended, demagogy began.
      The Japanese, exciting Vladivostok is powerful.
      About the "mosquito" landing in the face is silent
      The Kerch operation is quite a mosquito. Yes, the Red Crimea and the Red Caucasus did a good job, but the result would have been exactly the same without them. Most importantly, large warships were not used to ensure supremacy on the enemy’s seas; there were zero point-ten horseradish, but as high-speed transports, first of all. That is, they also acted like a mosquito.
    6. VVAUSH
      VVAUSH 11 September 2019 21: 30 New
      +1
      Well, the Japanese in Vladik also noted. Even the song is, “Beats in the tight Lazo stove” :-) And the conquest of dominance at sea is closely connected with the dominance in the air. Therefore, they went to sea at night.
    7. timokhin-aa
      11 September 2019 22: 21 New
      0
      The discussion ended, demagogy began.


      Demagogy is to blame the fleet for the poor work of the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters Mehlis and the low quality of Georgian infantry.

      The Japanese, exciting Vladivostok is powerful.


      And why not actually? If there is an opportunity? And she would be.

      About the "mosquito" landing in the face is silent


      strange term, okay. Let’s give a criterion for this mosquito of yours, I remember there EM Kuybyshev in the art support and there were patrol officers in the airborne squad.

      The Kerch operation is quite a mosquito.


      It is so amazing that I don’t even know what to say.

      In advance, from the evening of December 26, in Novorossiysk, loading of materiel and horses onto transports of the 1 detachment (Zyryanin, Jean Zhores, Shakhtar, Tashkent, Azov and Kr. Profintern) began. Two more vehicles, Serov and Nogin, were engaged in transportation to Sevastopol and got into loading on the morning of December 28 and December 27 in the evening, respectively. The loading of troops of the 44 Army on transports began at 17.30 and ended at 23.00 28 on December. On the 1-th squad of transports loaded 236-I SD, on the 2-th squad - 63-th GSS (without one regiment). As a result, the 1th transport detachment accepted 11 270 people, 572 horses, 26 45-mm guns, 18 76-mm guns, 7 122-mm howitzers, 199 vehicles (mainly "one and a half"), 18 tractors, 20 tractors, ammunition, food supplies and other property [296]. On 3.00 28 in December in Tuapse, loading of materiel and horses began, and then landing of the personnel of the 63 GSS on transports of the 2 squad (Kalinin, Dimitrov, Kursk, Fabricius and Krasnogvardeets). 6365 people, 906 horses, 31 76-mm guns, 27 122-mm howitzers, 92 vehicles, 14 tanks, ammunition, food supplies and other property [297] were taken to the detachment’s transports. Thus, by the evening of December 28, the Soviet command had gathered quite large infantry and artillery forces that could radically change the situation in Crimea.

      Did you accidentally land on Okinawa in “mosquitoes”? And then there the "Higgins boats" fought to their full height, I don’t even know what to think about the US Navy now.
    8. Engineer
      Engineer 11 September 2019 22: 53 New
      0
      I didn’t specify there, therefore the claims are fair. Mosquito operations are those for which mosquito forces are involved. Without large warships. It is clear that transports played a key role in the landing, especially equipment. Our argument is about the role of large ships in the war. In the Kerch operation, large ships distinguished themselves during the capture of Theodosius (acting as a reminder of high-speed transports). I recall that the landing occurred in several places. Well done here, but it didn’t solve anything. There were too many forces in the first echelon against one von Sponeck division. Plus we had an advantage in the air. Plus, the Germans quickly repulsed Theodosius back
      Kuibyshev is an old novice. I don’t even know if it is worth arguing with a mosquito or not) Probably not
  • timokhin-aa
    11 September 2019 20: 05 New
    +1
    Timokhin fell into a logical trap: our fleet in the second world mosquito-> our fleet of the Black Sea Fleet and especially the Northern Fleet played a very important role-> the mosquito fleet is useless. When I pointed it out to him


    they signed up for their complete inability to understand a more or less complex process, trying instead to primitize it. In fact, there is no logical trap.

    Black Sea Fleet until the fall of 1943 was a fully-fledged fleet, just very poorly trained in some aspects. The results of the combat activity are a bunch of landing operations, one of which was of strategic importance, still a number of operational ones, plus more than a six-month defense of Sevastopol, which kept the 11 army aside from all the decisive operations of the 41-42 of the years, freezing it on a secondary dead-end theater.

    After Verpa, the rate prohibited BNK from going to sea, and they rose to base. The fleet became a mosquito - only light forces can go out to sea.

    The results - the failure of the landing in Eltigen, the release of the 17-th army on the Romanian scows from the Crimea.

    That is, the Black Sea Fleet at different times was both a normal fleet and a mosquito. All his achievements relate to the period when he was normal.

    Well, in other fleets you can make the same comparison.

    So there is no contradiction and no logical trap.

    Manstein arranged a phase two first for the Kerch landing, and then for the garrison of Sevastopol. These people were slaughtered. Weren't they needed like air in the battle for the Caucasus? And the fleet is directly responsible for organizing this massacre


    The fleet is responsible for the poor management of the Crimean Front, for the mistakes of D.T. Kozlova and L.Z. Mehlis? What a twist!
  • Engineer
    Engineer 11 September 2019 20: 18 New
    0
    [The fleet is responsible for the poor management of the Crimean Front, for the mistakes of D.T. Kozlova and L.Z. Mehlis? What a twist!

    For non-evacuation bears full. As in the case of the Kerch landing
  • timokhin-aa
    11 September 2019 20: 48 New
    0
    Yes? Was the order to evacuate the Crimean Front? And, on the other hand, how did the people get across the Kerch Strait?
  • Engineer
    Engineer 11 September 2019 21: 03 New
    0
    That is, with the fact that you no longer argue with the opportunity to save people?
    Then the next question had to be saved or not?
  • timokhin-aa
    11 September 2019 22: 22 New
    0
    Was there an order or not?
  • Engineer
    Engineer 11 September 2019 22: 35 New
    0
    And now one of the key points.
    I remind you that the commander of the Sevastopol Defensive Region of Oktyabrsky is simultaneously the commander of the Black Sea Fleet. Who should order what? I remind myself that he successfully evacuated himself. Undoubtedly, such things must be coordinated with the Headquarters. As we see, he agreed on his evacuation. I am not an expert on this issue, but are there any reports of Oktyabrsky at Headquarters on the need to evacuate the garrison? I have never heard. If so, there are no complaints. If not, then everything that came after the fall of Sevastopol on his conscience as well.
  • timokhin-aa
    12 September 2019 12: 18 New
    +1
    Without the order of the Bet, no evacuation would have been permissible. Oktyabrsky is understandable what kind of person, but you don’t distort. It is impossible to take and surrender a fortified city without an order.
  • Yamato1980
    Yamato1980 11 September 2019 20: 43 New
    +1
    You probably don’t imagine how loading, unloading on ships occurs. Without a normal pier, you will never be able to load, unload a ship of less or less significant contingent. Naughty boats, boats, of course, it’s good, but 60 thousand personnel with armaments cannot be loaded onto the boats in the rear, at least do something. Google maps are certainly significant, only in the year 42 Petrov did not have them, as there were no moorings in the bays that you listed. There were homemade products that were the maximum that they could unload and unload submarines, and even then at night. Sorry about the "worse than the Nazis", war is such a thing where there is no place for sentiment and emotions, only a cold calculation. About the fleet. Dear Timokhin explained to you. The fleet (Black Sea Fleet) fulfilled its task, but it could have done better (in a spherical vacuum), but then it got into a joke.

    Yes, about the Black Sea Fleet a little remark.

    Before the “Hunting the Bustard”, one of the points of the defensive position of the Crimean Front was that the Germans could not break through from the Black Sea coast, because superiority at sea provides the Black Sea Fleet, but did not grow together, it was along the coast that the main blow was delivered by the 11th army).
  • Engineer
    Engineer 11 September 2019 20: 56 New
    0
    Google maps are certainly significant, only in 42 Petrov did not have them

    My eyes climbed over my forehead. For many months, the defenders of Sevastopol did not learn anything about their city?
    as there were no moorings in those bays that you listed

    This should be argued. That is, even the fishermen did not moor and there were no wooden structures ?. And if it wasn’t, is it really difficult to build a temporary pier? Have there been any cases of saving people right from the beaches in Crete and Dunkirk?
    You understand, you do not need to ship the rear and infrastructure. Only people hardened in hellish battles by soldiers.
    About the possibility of evacuation to the loss of the North and the rescue of the Kerch landing expected silence.
  • Yamato1980
    Yamato1980 11 September 2019 21: 23 New
    +1
    You most likely just troll, but I will answer. The evacuation to the loss of the North and the rescue of the Kerch landing just do not have time. Operation "Bustard Hunt" began on May 7, May 15, the Germans were already in Kerch. On June 29, the Germans forced their way through Severnaya Bay, after 4 days organized resistance in the Crimea was stopped. Once again I say that at the beginning of 42 years the Crimean group of the Red Army operatively had every chance to destroy 11 A of Manstein. Based on the fact, there was no question of any evacuation, on the contrary, that the troops in Sevastopol, that the troops of Kozlov were supplied with everything necessary.
  • Engineer
    Engineer 11 September 2019 21: 45 New
    0
    The specifics went.
    I partially agree with you. There is very little time. It seems to me that one could try to save those who perished in Adzhimushka. This is about the Kerch group,
    But Sevastopol had to be prepared for evacuation immediately after the loss of Kerch. That is, from May 15th. Then there were chances and it seemed like they could make it. And there were reasons for such a decision.
  • ser56
    ser56 9 September 2019 16: 43 New
    0
    Thanks to the author, everything right can be simply and reasonably stated! hi
  • ser56
    ser56 9 September 2019 16: 56 New
    0
    "The second point is fundamentally important - a little later it was Corbett’s strategy that will be chosen by the British as the main one in the war with Germany."
    It is a pity that this strategy was not implemented in the strategic nuclear forces, although there were attempts both from the EQA and from the PA ... but late, at the critical moment of the outbreak of war in the winter of 04, EQA operations were limited ... request
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 9 September 2019 20: 55 New
    +1
    Dear Alexander Timokhin burst into another article on the same favorite topic .... objectively, all respected British and Americans, first lived in metropolitan countries depending on their colonies, all the juices were pumped out, and sea communications were important to them ..... Russia did not have and does not have colonies, and little depends on sea trade, especially the main trade with countries that are likely opponents, that is, with those who pump oil from Russia for nothing ... And with China we have a land border and from the sea doesn’t depend on anything ..... Then Timokhin h it is the marine doctrine of the Russian Federation, he does not like it and he offers CAPSOM something else obscene .... ????
    .
  • Vladimir Lenin
    Vladimir Lenin 9 September 2019 22: 25 New
    +2
    Again, a bunch of "couch experts" in the comments, Doenitz had every chance to win the submarine war with England. The main task of his guys was to paralyze British communications in the Atlantic, stop the flow of resources to the "island", and protect their supplies from Norway. The Germans coped with this perfectly until June 22, 1941. Moreover, the Fuhrer, who looked at the submarine fleet as shit and dreamed of "big ships with big guns," helped, depriving the "German submarine fleet" of most of the necessary resources before the war itself.
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 September 2019 13: 34 New
      0
      An incredible concentration of wrong cliches in a short saying! This is some kind of anti-record!

      In fact, the Britons realized effective countermeasures and began to implement them since the 40 year, at the same time the Americans began to adjoin them slowly, by the fall of the 42 one, a turning point in the submarine war took place, and in the 43-m Germany lost it.

      Like in the last war.

      A cruising war is not won without a squadron, no one could, it does not work. Calm down already and stop meditating on a rake - their handle is already broken on other people's heads.
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 10 September 2019 16: 00 New
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        A cruising war is not won without a squadron,

        certainly won, especially since they are little related to each other in place, goals, purpose, methods and means
        1. timokhin-aa
          10 September 2019 19: 58 New
          0
          They are connected directly by the fact that the fleet of the defending side cannot defend itself from the "cruisers", because it is connected by military operations.

          So it was in the Pacific Ocean.

          And if you climb into a cruising war without a combat fleet, then the result will be the same as in Germany - a defeat, and TWICE.
          1. Vladimir1155
            Vladimir1155 11 September 2019 01: 36 New
            +1
            dear Alexander, do not distort, you know perfectly well that I am against surface cruisers, for underwater cruisers, so you will have to prove the unprovable, because surface squadrons will not be able to provide any support to underwater cruisers, because the latter use their stealth and not cover for ephemeral surface ships which are only defenseless targets visible on the sea surface and easily destroyed by a single missile.
            1. timokhin-aa
              11 September 2019 14: 23 New
              0
              You rush against historical facts. The Germans twice lost the submarine war - a fact.
              Lost because there was no one to defeat the Allied surface forces in the Atlantic - a fact.
              The Americans won the same war - a fact.
              Due to the lack of any anti-submarine forces in Japan - a fact.
              These forces could not have appeared - all the resources of the im.fltoa went to war with the US Navy - a fact.

              What other facts do you need?

              for the latter use their secrecy,

              This secrecy is easily lost. And after the attack - a priori is lost. And then you can not always restore it later.

              Separation from PLC is a difficult matter, you can only make a mistake once. Surface ships, Vladimir, protect the submarines not by dangling above them. And by the fact that somewhere far away they pull on themselves enemy surface forces, bind them with battles and prevent them from releasing ships for protection from submarines.

              I am ashamed that the officer does not understand these things.
              1. Vladimir1155
                Vladimir1155 11 September 2019 19: 10 New
                0
                you give facts and all the worse for facts, the loss of the submarine in the Baltic is obvious, due to the narrowness of irrigation, and not because of the ephemeral lack of the presence of large ships, and Germany and Japan had the largest battleships all died ingloriously. You write to me as an officer that surface ships should draw on the enemy’s resources? I answer as an officer: Is this a vicious strategy and tactic to draw resources with blood, with drafts against tanks? with defenseless ships against missiles? ..... not many enemy resources are delayed by the use of one missile, but cruiser battleships, destroyers, aircraft carriers delay their resources, it’s not measured. And returning to the Russian-Japanese experience of WWI and WWII, it was the senseless pulling of resources to the battleships that killed the losing country, didn’t have enough shells for field artillery, didn’t have enough submarines of tank planes, and so on ....... learn tactics!
                1. timokhin-aa
                  11 September 2019 20: 15 New
                  0
                  Loss of submarines in the Baltic is obvious, due to narrow watering


                  The loss of the submarines in the Baltic was due to the inability of the fleet to detect and stop offensive mining by the Germans and Finns, due to the inability of intelligence to detect the passage of German ships to Finland before the war.

                  Due to TOO BASED PREPARED AND WEAK NAVY in the end. Weak not in numbers, but in training.

                  It was necessary to pay MORE attention to the Navy, there would be no mines, no networks.

                  I answer as an officer: Is this a vicious strategy and tactic to draw resources with blood, with drafts against tanks? with defenseless ships against missiles? .....


                  So you go with tanks against tanks, and charge rockets in the PU of ships, Vladimir laughing
                  1. Yamato1980
                    Yamato1980 11 September 2019 20: 52 New
                    0
                    Well, there is not so much the narrowness of the straits as the depth is not very. I agree about offensive mining; they flogged the Porkalo-Udskaya position mediocre and spinelessly request
                  2. Vladimir1155
                    Vladimir1155 11 September 2019 22: 47 New
                    0
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    It was necessary to pay MORE attention to the Navy, there would be no mines, no networks.
                    there would be mines and planes could be thrown, and the nets were in such a narrow strait and so far from our forces that all the battleships could not cope so far from sin and hid them in Kronstadt ... well, what if there were more of them there would be more if they had to take berths, that’s all. They would go out to sea that inglorious current and perish, like German and Japanese, coupled with English ...... sunk submarines and aircraft ........
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      12 September 2019 12: 20 New
                      0
                      there would be, mines and aircraft could be thrown, and the nets were in such a narrow strait and so far from our forces that all the battleships could not cope so far from sin and hid them in Kronstadt ...


                      Well, compare how much you can sketch from an airplane and how much from a minzag. In order to disrupt the mining battleships were not needed, and destroyers would be enough even with a little air support. And the supply of networks could well be frustrated without battleships - it would be to whom.
                      1. VVAUSH
                        VVAUSH 12 September 2019 15: 33 New
                        +2
                        It’s not interesting from the plane.
                        Then the radar is not very, you need visibility. A mine on a parachute is easily detected from ships. Minesweeper there immediately, or round off.
                        Night, fog, or D. curtain .. from the ship is the most. There is a lot of experience, one operation of the minzag in 1914 with the outbreak of war is considered a classic ..
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 10 September 2019 16: 29 New
      0
      Quote: Vladimir Lenin
      Dönitz had every chance of winning the submarine war with England. The main task of his children was to paralyze British communications in the Atlantic, stop the flow of resources to the "island", and protect their supplies from Norway. The Germans coped with this perfectly until June 22, 1941.

      Yeah ... they coped like that the tonnage of the British merchant fleet sank a few percent only once - in the second half of 1942.
      When the US shipbuilding company works for Britain, who built escort aircraft carriers for it in the spring of 1941, not to mention other escort trifles, victory in the war under water is impossible. Neither technically nor economically - because one submarine - "seven" stands as three escort - "flower".
  • Cyrus
    Cyrus 9 September 2019 22: 42 New
    0
    Better not tell.
  • AICEMAN1988
    AICEMAN1988 9 September 2019 23: 19 New
    +1
    Thanks to the distinguished author for the article. He was going to register for a long time and, thanks to her, finally "matured". The theme of the fleet is very close, because I repair it myself. Regarding the main points of the article and conclusions, I completely agree. To protect our national interests, we need precisely a strong fleet capable of promptly responding to any challenges. Unfortunately, we have neither the first nor the second quality. I personally watched the preparations for the campaign of our Corvettes of the Stereguschiy type - the sight was simply sad, as was the technical condition of all the ships of the series without exception. Separately, I want to speak out about the need to build ships for the fleet. We CAN and SHOULD build them, and with a pace much higher than the current ones. There are all the possibilities for this !!!
    1. Morzh Redkovich Borschitsky
      Morzh Redkovich Borschitsky 10 September 2019 13: 36 New
      0
      To protect our national interests

      Multinational, you mean?
  • AICEMAN1988
    AICEMAN1988 9 September 2019 23: 23 New
    0
    Quote: Engineer
    History again teaches nothing.
    The Russian fleet can only fight on land. Drowning in the sea, at the bases or sitting or self-flooding. It is a fact. The author presses that now we will arm ourselves with a normal doctrine and then ..... We will not arm ourselves, we will not be able, we will not create.
    This is not to mention the fact that the fleet is a function of the economy in its purest form. No money. No technology, no personnel. And will not be.

    All this is, the problem is in the heads and no more.
  • Shopping Mall
    Shopping Mall 10 September 2019 08: 28 New
    +2
    All right

    But there is a suspicion that in the 21st century SEAPOWER change to SPACEPOWER. If SpaseX succeeds with BFR, i.e. if they can actually launch 100 tons of 100 times at the NOU with one rocket, it will be a revolution in delivering goods to orbit, which will cause a chain reaction of the development of civil and military space.

    It is BFR, although it is possible that to a lesser extent it can be New Glenn Bezos and even a modified Falcon Heavy, if there is a delay with BFR. But no NASA SLS or Yenisei of Roscosmos, because without reusability it will be just a reincarnation of the achievements of the 20th century, such as Saturn V and Energy.

    As before, there were two types of powers - with a powerful navy, capable of dominating the ocean, and without it, and now, there will be powers with cosmic forces, capable of crushing those who do not possess such powers with impunity.
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 September 2019 13: 30 New
      +1
      May be so. By the way, there is even a theory that it is necessary to exchange dominance at sea for dominance in space.)))

      But this is not today.
      1. Town Hall
        Town Hall 10 September 2019 13: 36 New
        0
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        May be so. By the way, there is even a theory that it is necessary to exchange dominance at sea for dominance in space.)))

        But this is not today.

        Will containers with goods through space send?)
        1. timokhin-aa
          10 September 2019 13: 41 New
          0
          Well yes. Google, for example, “Peak of phosphates” - the problem is very serious, although it will shoot no earlier than 2050 of the year.

          So that you have to bullet from the moon containers with phosphates, then they are then caught from the water))))
          1. Town Hall
            Town Hall 10 September 2019 13: 51 New
            0
            We are about reality and not about unscientific fiction). The seas will remain the main trade routes for a long time.
        2. Shopping Mall
          Shopping Mall 10 September 2019 13: 43 New
          +2
          Quote: Town Hall
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          May be so. By the way, there is even a theory that it is necessary to exchange dominance at sea for dominance in space.)))

          But this is not today.

          Will containers with goods through space send?)


          The question is that the possibilities for projecting forces from outer space will be so high that, having the most powerful and most perfect ocean fleet, it would be simply pointless to communicate with such an adversary who has reached a new level of development. And nobody will just stick close to the containers.
          1. timokhin-aa
            10 September 2019 13: 53 New
            0
            They have been like that since the first Global Rocket.
          2. Town Hall
            Town Hall 10 September 2019 14: 01 New
            -1
            Quote: AVM
            The question is that the possibilities for projecting power from space will be so high

            I also love science-fiction, but the author reasonably described why a fleet is needed to control the sea. Moreover, a surface fleet. Neither tanks, nor aircraft, nor submarines, nor satellites will provide control
            1. Morzh Redkovich Borschitsky
              Morzh Redkovich Borschitsky 10 September 2019 14: 17 New
              -1
              Bathing places, for example, are controlled by buoys. It would be convenient if the bather anywhere in the ocean could be sure that the nearest buoy was nearby.
            2. Vladimir1155
              Vladimir1155 11 September 2019 01: 43 New
              +1
              just satellites, submarines and aviation can only provide control, and at the same time melt all surface ships with one missile
  • Morzh Redkovich Borschitsky
    Morzh Redkovich Borschitsky 10 September 2019 13: 33 New
    +1
    Mahan, having accomplished a great deed, did not create a harmonious theory, however.

    No need to create "harmonious theories." They are like a mirage - rushing towards them, the mind perishes in the desert of separation from reality. You need to clearly know the facts, understand their meaning and be able to draw a conclusion and make a decision. And spoil the facts of the enemy, slipping him a misinformation. Well, or "well-formed theory."

    Empiricism rules, and slender theorists plunge into the virtuality of their theories.
    1. timokhin-aa
      10 September 2019 13: 42 New
      +1
      The fact is that the fleets of "opponents" fighting "in theory" win, creating new facts that confirm the theory. Such is empiricism.

      Good theories are always based on something that can be empirically proven.
  • The comment was deleted.
  • exo
    exo 10 September 2019 18: 52 New
    0
    Good article, with a claim to analytics. Apparently, those in power who believe that the war will end after being hit by missiles of various types are in power. But, as yet not one victory in the war, did not get without the use of ground forces. So: transportation by sea will be required. And they will have to try and counteract. Without a normal fleet, and not this set of surface shells, such a goal cannot be achieved. And the submarine forces (except SSBNs) that we have, in comparison with the West, are also unlikely to be enough.
    While Russia, the enemy overseas, it is doomed to be a naval power.
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 11 September 2019 01: 46 New
      +1
      Quote: exo
      victory in the war did not go without the use of ground forces. So: transportation by sea will be required.
      and where are you going to take her darling from us?
    2. VVAUSH
      VVAUSH 11 September 2019 18: 18 New
      +1
      While Russia, an enemy overseas, it is doomed to consider itself a maritime power.
      1. timokhin-aa
        11 September 2019 22: 25 New
        0
        Sea powers n exists, it's fantastic)))
        1. VVAUSH
          VVAUSH 11 September 2019 23: 01 New
          +1
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          Sea powers n exists, it's fantastic)))

          Well, yes, white submarines and an island empire.
          1. timokhin-aa
            12 September 2019 12: 21 New
            0
            There is a country with a combat fleet and there is without. All.
  • Sasha_rulevoy
    Sasha_rulevoy 10 September 2019 20: 51 New
    0
    Quote: Ivanchester
    and we in the current realities are not able to build a single


    Built for India.
    1. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 11 September 2019 01: 45 New
      0
      Quote: Sasha_rulevoy
      Built for India.

      not built, but repaired, and by the way the dock then drowned from old age, so now there’s nowhere to repair Kuzyu .... not to build
      1. timokhin-aa
        11 September 2019 14: 30 New
        0
        In a year there will be a dry dock for Kuzi.
        1. VVAUSH
          VVAUSH 11 September 2019 18: 17 New
          +1
          Roly house, Manka not.
          There will be a dock, drown Kuzyu. Look, I’m not wanging .... but somehow a scumbag :-)
          1. timokhin-aa
            11 September 2019 20: 16 New
            0
            Tipun to your tongue.
            1. VVAUSH
              VVAUSH 11 September 2019 21: 35 New
              +1
              While they will call conscripts to the fleet, it will sink, burn and explode.
        2. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 11 September 2019 19: 15 New
          0
          Pr Ephraim the Syrian
          Art. 15-20 And the speech of God to Abraham ... I will give you a child from Sarah: and I will bless him, and will be in tongues ... And Abraham on his face, and laughing, and a speech in his thought, verb: century-old food ... a son will be born? food and Sarah ninety years old ... give birth?
        3. Vladimir1155
          Vladimir1155 11 September 2019 19: 21 New
          0
          Quote: timokhin-aa
          In a year there will be a dry dock for Kuzi.


          And one of them said: I will be with you again at the same time [next year], and Sarah your wife will have a son. And Sarah listened at the entrance to the tent, behind him. Abraham and Sarah were old in their advanced years, and the commonplace among women at Sarah ceased. Sarah laughed inwardly, saying: Do I, when I am old, have this comfort? and my lord is old. And the Lord said to Abraham: why did this [in herself] laugh, Sarah, saying: "Can I really give birth when I grow old?"
  • Yamato1980
    Yamato1980 11 September 2019 05: 00 New
    +1
    Quote: Engineer
    Better is like in Dunkirk, Greece 41 years old and Crete.

    The first one. In Tallinn, on Crete (Dunkirk there could be sailed to Britain by boat if desired) there were places where the ships could even moor. Yes, under shelling, but under air strikes, but it was possible After the loss of the North Bay, the ships simply had nowhere to moor in order to at least somehow organize the evacuation. And what's the point of hanging out at sea, waiting for planes to arrive?
    The second is the 8th Richthofen air corps, which was the best strike force in the entire Luftwaffe. It was after the arrival of this squadron in Crimea that the supply of Petrov’s army almost completely ceased (delivery of submarines at night was not serious). So, Oktyabrsky had the choice of either drowning the fleet without any benefit or not drowning the fleet. He chose the second.
  • VVAUSH
    VVAUSH 11 September 2019 12: 52 New
    +2
    Alexander, good afternoon.)))
    ZRBD... not Watch, but Action
    It is practiced by exercises. This is called by war, or at the stage of combat deployment.
    In peacetime, the patrol route (area).
    My mentor, Konorev N.A., wrote about this for a long time.
    He was the one who developed the concept of using the fleet. Well, one of the main ones.
    There are means and desire, there is a fleet.
    Remember the article with the surname Evmenov? )))
    Konorev "The stability of the fleet gives the economy"
    http://nvo.ng.ru/navy/2000-07-28/3_flott.html
    “The restoration of Russia's position as a sea power can be carried out only on the basis of a long-term state policy for the development of all the components of the state’s marine power. Until recently, the absence of the legally approved Russian Maritime Doctrine as a strategic document in the field of maritime activities led to inconsistency and opportunism in solving problems related to Russia's activities in the oceans, to the loss of its international authority as a sea power, which is unacceptable in any Astoyan, even more so in buduschem.Izdanie Presidential Decree of March 4, 2000 "On improvement of Russian maritime activities" has become a real step to move from declarations to practical implementation of the long-term national interests of Russia in the world's oceans. "
    1. timokhin-aa
      11 September 2019 14: 33 New
      +1
      Good. Understood, correct)))

      Regarding the economy - this is another question, but we already have some kind of economy, but the fleet does not correspond to it at all.
      1. VVAUSH
        VVAUSH 11 September 2019 18: 10 New
        +1
        Well, you can not edit :-)
        How many comments, no one grunted. Having hit, he might have noticed.
        About the economy ..... I do not chop in this. It seems that Andrei Chelyabinsk linked GDP to the fleet in his article.
        Your horizons are wider, so write.
        1. timokhin-aa
          11 September 2019 20: 20 New
          0
          Slipper already wrote. Briefly - instead of a brood of RTOs, patrol freaks, a sawn 20386, you could get twenty anti-submarine corvettes.
          And instead of any An-140 and God forgive Poseidon, I had to invest in a new patrol plane, albeit a small one, and competently carry out modernity. Ka-27.

          Already exhaust would be - with the same economy.
          1. VVAUSH
            VVAUSH 11 September 2019 21: 44 New
            +1
            A bit of strategic fantasy.
            Provided output SSBN. Did they sink and disappear right away?
            The problem is the multi-tiered US PLO system.
            Gone from Losa, take SOSUS. Gone from SOSUS will catch SAR. Will lead mobile forces in the form of P-8.
            New PLO ships pushed the provision area a little. or responsibility.
            As far back as the 80s, KUGs, Orions and 1-2 submarines operated practically on the entire route of their movement.
            Remember about K-500 Kopeikin, how she was driven out of the SSBN area of ​​work.
            1. timokhin-aa
              11 September 2019 22: 29 New
              0
              Gone from Losa, take SOSUS. Gone from SOSUS will catch SAR. Will lead mobile forces in the form of P-8.


              Let's estimate that we bombarded the first Kuril mine with air mines, set the multiplicity to 2 and drove the SSBN there in the water position.

              The question is - how do Losos get there?

              In war, the sine reaches 4's, and a completely different math begins, not the kind that you've been doing all your life, similar, but not like that.

              Remember about K-500 Kopeikin, how she was driven out of the SSBN area of ​​work.


              Yes, there were many who drove, not only K-500, but after all, for example, there was also Dudko.
              1. VVAUSH
                VVAUSH 11 September 2019 23: 23 New
                +2
                If it comes to mines, then I think the boat will simply not reach there. At least they can ram. AU and B were driven there after K-219 Britanova and because of their inability to shoot at the surface, read from the pier. That is, duty in the database does not roll. Mines in the First xs. The AU commander that went there, spoke about the need to have a decent move, otherwise he could throw it away. It will take down the yins, and that’s all. It is easier to put TFR there with RBU, for example.

                Skopipastil interesting.
                Here are just a few of what was in my memory and in which I had to participate myself: 1. BS-1 to-446 September-December 1983.-Checking the absence of tracking by Aviation (POS Av), followed by separation from the Foreign Submarine, crossing the Aleutian Ridge 2. BS-2 K-451 March-May 1984.-POS Aviation, followed by separation from the IPL, followed by forcing three straits of the Kuril ridge. When returning from a BS in the Avchinsky Gulf, IPL was independently discovered before ascending to the NP. 3. BS-3 K-258 March-May 1985 - Separation from tracking of the US Navy BPA, Forcing the Hawaiian ridge, 28 day old epic of tracking rpkSN two KPUG (8 NK), BPA, US Navy Support Court, which were first used at the Pacific Fleet TAKTASS. Theme is "White Plaque". 4. BS-4 K-446 September-December 1985 - Evasion from tracking PLC equipped TAKTASS. 5. BS-5 K-430 April-June 1986 - Carrying a BS in the Kuril Strait, forcing 8 ??? straits, evasion of tracking the BPA and IPL, evasion of the deployment of FGM led by Missouri flying from the island of Okinawa-Sea of ​​Japan, pruneLaperuza-Sea of ​​Okhotsk, Fourth Kuril Strait, Pacific Ocean, Aleutian Islands and further USP. 6. BS-6 K-436 November 1986-February 1987 — Maneuvering in the northern part of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk in shallow water under ice, crossing the Kuril ridge and avoiding the BPA. This is only at the Combat Services in which I participated personally ... and our other missile and multipurpose submarines ??? - And constant contacts with the IPL and even the Kyrgyz Republic of Tikonderoga in the BP areas in Avacha Gulf ??? -A meeting in the Chukchi Sea passing from the SF rpkSN and SSGN pr.949-A, I participated in two meetings. - for the development of the 3rd generation of multi-purpose nuclear submarines pr.971 and pr.949-A, when that is not an exit to the sea, then the detection of IPL ...
                1. timokhin-aa
                  12 September 2019 12: 29 New
                  0
                  It is easier to put TFR there with RBU, for example.


                  In wartime, it will need to be protected from an attack from the air. Plus, the IPL commander is not made with a finger, they can also detect it. Then 1124 on the foot somewhere to disguise ...
                  1. VVAUSH
                    VVAUSH 12 September 2019 14: 03 New
                    +1
                    The advantage of MG-339.
                    Minus, you need to stop. Minus Shelon on a string :-) but there are no depths in the strait.
                    Still currents, constantly need to work with the machine, acoustics is not great. Another minus against the surf, the strait is narrow.
                    Just as a scarecrow, he won’t see anything there, thresh the station for nothing.
                    Well, probably scare away.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      12 September 2019 14: 21 New
                      0
                      Well, the submarine’s watchdog can simply detect. As a result, we return to the bottom (so that it did not blow) mines)))

                      Well, in general it’s all fantasy, I just wanted to say that when evaluating how and what it will be necessary not to remember your real actions, but what you have never done but wrote in different plans in case of war.

                      It seems to me from long games of cat and mouse, both we and Amers have a certain professional deformation, because in the war there will be "have contact = opened fire" more often even without classification. And this requires a different approach to everything, not the one that everyone is used to.
                      1. VVAUSH
                        VVAUSH 12 September 2019 15: 25 New
                        +2
                        Alexander, well, you wrote :-) In the annual plan, two short-term searches and one search operation. I personally planned three of them and organized the event. Plus BPshnikov, his teachings twice a year. It is with playing the deployment option. I communicated my part to them, but their plan. The difference is that we were looking for an American, and they had a "blue" boat for the enemy. And all this was superimposed by firing range and torpedo throwing. The difference from the war is not great. Plus developmental deployment at the control room, that is, on the boat posting maps, with introductory and intermediaries. And a lot was allocated.
                      2. timokhin-aa
                        12 September 2019 15: 47 New
                        0
                        I don’t argue. But for example, a war has been going on, for some time now, there are already losses, and here the MPK commander receives an acoustics report “noise of submarine screws, bearing, range, depth”. But he knows that there should not be any submarines in the designated area, which was brought to him by an appropriate order.

                        Further, there will be a considerable difference with peacetime, right? Instead of classifying a contact, report, etc. there will be a volley from RBU right away. Especially considering how seriously the submarine commanders will keep clear of those areas where they should not be, in comparison with peacetime.

                        Take the Soldatenkov saga when their fishermen pulled in tows to the search area and threw them at the foot, where they found the IPL - this will not happen in the war. My mine example may also not be entirely successful, but it seems to me that the difference in the approaches of peacetime and wartime seems to show.

                        When the middle contracting staff and staff officers at the high contracting parties reach how much their hands are now untied, mass surprises begin, you may not agree, but I am sure of that.
                      3. VVAUSH
                        VVAUSH 12 September 2019 16: 48 New
                        +2
                        Everything can be.
                        There are peace and war commanders, Budanov, Ulman, Rokhlin.
                        In wartime, a detected target is considered an enemy.
                        About mines he himself was not very, had to do with them once when hanging on the IL-.38.
                        In the exercises this was worked out, but the topic is very closed, no matter how stronger Yao. I did not delve into, and who will allow it .-
                        But they conditionally set something.
                      4. VVAUSH
                        VVAUSH 12 September 2019 17: 33 New
                        +2
                        In the conversation they forgot the most important thing. I'm good too :-) :-) :-)
                        The first Kuril boat can pass only in the surface position.
                        There is no acoustics at all. Searchlight and navigation radar.
                        Midshipman ashore with a rocket launcher :-)
                      5. timokhin-aa
                        12 September 2019 20: 16 New
                        0
                        It is in the strait itself and right in front of it. And "on the outskirts"? Where else depth allows you to go at least under the periscope.

                        I don’t understand anything in hydrology, but probably, with certain characteristics of the soil from which the bottom is stacked, the “sending” of GAS in the active mode can go very far. It seems Max said that Polynom penetrates the entire Persian Gulf immediately from the Strait of Hormuz. So it can be anti-submarine ships with a GAS at the entrance to the strait and it will prove useful, although I would bet on mines.
                      6. VVAUSH
                        VVAUSH 12 September 2019 21: 34 New
                        +2
                        It is rather hydroacoustics than hydrology. Rocky soil, bottom reverb. A polynomial may get it, but the same story as with ZGRLS. One can see (hear) something, and classify ??? I'm not special. Once I sat spinning a trackball when driving courses in Severomorsk at 1155 in 1985. Ideas were simpler. Programs "Anagran" and "Diabase". Cable around the perimeter of the air defense system or in the strait. Induction, who entered is the signal and place of the section. By the type of appar. Lead cable, just the opposite. (AVK-50). However, Lexins should know, not their direction, but their institution. Already wrote, people poorly imagine the vastness of the ocean and how difficult it is for a grain of sand to ship to view all this.
                      7. timokhin-aa
                        13 September 2019 11: 02 New
                        +1
                        One can see (hear) something, and classify ???


                        Here it is peacetime thinking. laughing

                        And in war, all the whales will be extinguished with bombers.
                      8. VVAUSH
                        VVAUSH 13 September 2019 11: 15 New
                        +2
                        Well, hardly. The ammunition reserve is limited, especially, in my opinion, 956 out of eight missiles have two reserve fleets. You can’t touch it.
                        Americans go through all this on simulators.
                        I was at the headquarters of the Federation Council on the simulator, we scrolled the search there.
                        Only in 1985 did the new Dialom-Zapevala simulator be installed.
                        Shadow theater, just to say. :-)
                        You need to prepare to use weapons on them, and imperceptibly :-)
                        Like in the movie Ender's Game. The war is in full swing, but everything is on the buttons.
                      9. timokhin-aa
                        13 September 2019 11: 23 New
                        0
                        When adrenaline pins you, you shoot at everything that moves, and sometimes at the sound.

                        Although I can, of course, be wrong about someone.
                      10. VVAUSH
                        VVAUSH 13 September 2019 14: 33 New
                        +2
                        Adrenaline is not entirely appropriate. It’s important for the cowboy speed, but here involved a chain of performers and time, of course. He struck in the head and pressed :-) Not the case, the use of weapons is preceded by events, nts is the start-up, bulls, special guys at last. Although there were Chapaevs. An article on this subject is "Like Vasya a little ... or a philosophy of dope" http://samlib.ru/s/semenow_aleksandr_sergeewich333/kakvasiaifilosofiaduri.shtml There is about the K-22 voyage with an American. Rear Adm Stefanov writes. Then St navigator 11fl in Gremikha. This is alcohol and adrenaline :-) Comments are also interesting. http://samlib.ru/comment/s/semenow_aleksandr_sergeewich333/kakvasiaifilosofiaduri I tried to explain to woodpeckers that the rules are written in blood in aviation and Chapaev is not our hero.
                      11. VVAUSH
                        VVAUSH 13 September 2019 14: 54 New
                        +1
                        In the same topic and the commanders of 877, about the freaking Masha. :-)
                        As Zadornov wrote, a foreigner came to the pool and reads the instructions, ours immediately jumps into it, without even looking to see if there is water.
                        Chronic dislike of rules and laws. "What drawbar ... Do not stick to the charter like a blind wall ... living under the regulations is hard for joints ..."
  • Morzh Redkovich Borschitsky
    Morzh Redkovich Borschitsky 11 September 2019 15: 04 New
    0
    I propose to make a fleet of transport ships. Some should be equipped under the control of the sky, others under the launch of drones, and others under the transportation and maintenance of mines, buoys and underwater robots. Fourth landing, fifth supply.
    1. VVAUSH
      VVAUSH 11 September 2019 18: 14 New
      +1
      "Where can I find all the teeth? So unemployment ..." (Vysotsky)
      Who will be staffing the crews?
  • Sckepsis
    Sckepsis 12 September 2019 07: 15 New
    -1
    Utter nonsense. As always, the author has tones of conceit, zero objectivity.
    1. timokhin-aa
      12 September 2019 12: 22 New
      0
      Just do not lie that you have mastered 50000 characters. laughing
  • iouris
    iouris 12 September 2019 22: 14 New
    0
    Since the XNUMXth century, the navy has created huge problems for peace and wartime for some large states (Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, Kaiser Germany, Italy, the Russian Empire). The fleet diverted enormous resources, while the ships did not take an active part in the hostilities, somehow they were very quickly destroyed by the enemy (the Austro-Hungarian fleet was destroyed by Italians at a time), and the revolutionary sailors became the driving force of the revolutions.
    A graduate of the Riga Polytechnic Institute, an employee of Siemens, the inventor of three-phase electric machines, Russian engineer Dolivo-Dobrovolsky, probably would not have spoken like that on an important issue, i.e. question your reputation if he didn’t have good reason.
    1. timokhin-aa
      13 September 2019 10: 58 New
      0
      Since the 19th century, the navy has created for some large states


      Why not remember the USA, Japan, Great Britain, France? Immediately Austria-Hungary, but earlier (do you remember the battle of Liss?)

      The fleet diverted huge resources, while the ships did not take an active part in the hostilities, somehow they were very quickly destroyed,


      No doctrine - no result. In addition, you distort, neither Russia nor Germany lost their fleet in WWI, Russia lost part of it in the Civil War for obvious reasons, Germany just shamefully surrendered - and this is the result of a mock "risk strategy" Tirpitz (I'm sure a person doing such peremptory statements are known about Tirpitz and the risk strategy, right?).

      Russian engineer Dolivo-Dobrovolsky

      it was another Dolivo-Dobrovolsky. And he meant about the same as me.
  • maden.usmanow
    maden.usmanow 14 September 2019 13: 25 New
    0
    Interestingly, a blockade of Leningrad would be possible if a powerful aircraft carrier fleet were in the Gulf of Finland.
    1. SovAr238A
      SovAr238A 19 September 2019 22: 12 New
      0
      Quote: maden.usmanow
      Interestingly, a blockade of Leningrad would be possible if a powerful aircraft carrier fleet were in the Gulf of Finland.


      And why was the Baltic Fleet blocked? Remember?
      And what ways of communication would the Baltic Fleet give us to supply the same Leningrad ...

      Well, at least you would think putting such illogical and incomprehensible introductory ...
  • Basarev
    Basarev 16 September 2019 14: 03 New
    0
    The main question: what to do when the rival has already seized sea dominance and there is no chance to go to sea?
    1. timokhin-aa
      17 September 2019 11: 07 New
      0
      before this you do not have to bring.
      1. Basarev
        Basarev 17 September 2019 13: 10 New
        +1
        The only secret is that this is exactly the situation in Russia now. Our fleet, so to speak, is securely locked in three puddles - the Baltic, Black and Okhotsk - and not escape.
        1. timokhin-aa
          17 September 2019 13: 23 New
          0
          Wait for the continuation, already writing)))
    2. SovAr238A
      SovAr238A 19 September 2019 22: 10 New
      0
      Quote: Basarev
      The main question: what to do when the rival has already seized sea dominance and there is no chance to go to sea?

      No way ...
      If you were disarmed and cornered, and your enemy is stronger than you, then you have practically no chance ...
      as if I didn’t want to ...
      no matter how it is dreamed of ...
      That feeling. that no one is in boxing. against a much stronger and older (more experienced) opponent did not stand in the ring.
      1. Basarev
        Basarev 20 September 2019 08: 45 New
        0
        That is, Russia does not need a fleet because it is useless?
  • SovAr238A
    SovAr238A 19 September 2019 22: 05 New
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    Bravo..
    Really.
    The best I have read over the past few years in terms of patriotism.
    Let here not be so beloved TTX.
    But the article is worthy of the term - PPKS ...
  • andrew42
    andrew42 9 October 2019 16: 10 New
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    The article is good at revelation that "dominance at sea" is not necessarily "power overwhelming by the quantity and declared characteristics." But as you read, you can see how the idea of ​​a banal increase in the number of pennants and the military power of these pennants is being pushed through. It is expected that the next series should be about the fact that aircraft carriers are archival and archival. It is occasionally difficult to disagree with the author, both about the “quasi-fighting units” and about the Russo-Japanese war (panic fear of losing expensive toys in battle). But the constant mistake of the catching side is the desire to fit into the old armor of a successful winner, and the winner is in the past. And the winner then hung the old armor on the wall, put up for auction. Well, Mahan's concept of "power over the seas" was relevant, well done, handsome. But this is a misfortune, since then 1) military transport aviation appeared and developed as a tool for projecting power, coupled with the impossibility of organizing mass battles requiring massive sea transport of people and equipment; 2) the dependence of fleets on the availability of coastal bases on the theater with infrastructure for repair / supply / cover from the air has increased significantly, in short, now you can’t get anywhere without A2 / AD 3) the technical capabilities of weapons to destroy ships, especially surface ones, have grown significantly defeat distances (try to come closer to me). So "power over the seas" without integrated A2 / AD in the region of interest is an empty phrase, you can hang out at sea for as long as you want, and on the way get acquainted with the next "engineer Garbin hyperboloid", which, although in Tolstoy’s science fiction, is the first on the pages portrayed this notorious A2 / AD. Coastal air defense / coastal defense / coastal aviation / naval squadron (autonomous ships with anti-ship missiles / missile defense + multipurpose nuclear submarines) should "work" in a complex in a region of particular interest. At least in the Russian concept. If Russia does not have the opportunity to have support "on the far shores," there is nothing for the Russian fleet to hang out in any quantities. We are not colonialists; the mass transfer of invasion forces does not interest us.
  • Alexey Petrovichev
    Alexey Petrovichev 11 October 2019 10: 26 New
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    Well written. All right.