From offensive to defense. The battle of Lyubachev enters a new phase
So, the advance of the strike group of the 8 Army was unsuccessful (see 8 Army strike group tragedy).
A. A. Brusilov tried to shift the blame for the unsuccessful offensive of the strike group of his army and the heavy losses in its units to the poor preparation of these formations, since they arrived from another front. Moreover, the general assigns to these corps a certain share of responsibility for the premature fall of Przemysl. So, he writes in his memoirs that when 2 attacked the aforementioned corps from Lubachev to the south-west, a frontal attack of the enemy was obtained, which had many machine guns and huge artillery, while the advancing neither machine guns nor guns had enough, and even an artillery attack , which was supposed to prepare an infantry attack and support the latter, due to a lack of shells could not take place. The general writes that it could be said in advance that this untimely and insufficient fist, launched in an inappropriate place, will not produce tangible results. As noted by A. A. Brusilov, these 2 corps were of "very high fighting qualities," but, oddly enough, "poorly trained, like most of the troops that arrived to us from the north, and they made an attack not very harsh. Shortly after this attack, Przemysl fell ... ” One gets the impression that it was not the 8 Army command that was responsible for this attack, but someone else. A. A. Brusilov writes about these events as if he was only an outside observer. Let us leave this to the conscience of the honored commander.
The attack of the strike group of the 8 Army was drowned. The offensive of the 3 Army was also unable to realize its goal - by delivering a deep blow to the enemy’s rear, to restore the situation on the river. San and help the 8 Army to stay in Przemysl.
The offensive at Lyubachev expanded the Russian bridgehead on the left bank of the lower reaches of the river. San, restored the situation from Pregendzel to the mouth of the river. Lyubachevka, but did not allow to seize the bridgehead on the right bank of the Sana'a - from the mouth of the river. Lyubachevka, between the river. R. San and Lyubachevka. The enemy managed to concentrate significant forces and firmly strengthen.
Limited tactical success during the offensive at Lubachev was achieved at a high cost - by pulling reserve corps into the battle (the 14 Army in the 3 Army and the 2 Caucasian Army in the 8 Army). The combat strength of the remaining corps was significantly reduced.
The failure of the offensive operation by Lyubachev and the abandonment of Przemysl had a disintegrating effect on the structure of the South-Western Front. Changing operational and strategic tasks and priorities, a new alignment of forces in Galicia and southeastern Poland led to the fact that the front was divided into 2 groups: one - the 4 and 3 armies - based on Lublin, the other - 8 , 11-I and 9-I Army - based on the Kiev Military District.
The operation near Lyubachev 19 - 22 in May is indicative of fierce oncoming battles, successful for the Russian troops, and the manifestation of the highest valor on the part of soldiers and officers of the Russian imperial army.
From a tactical point of view, the limited maneuverability of the formations of the South-Western Front and the poverty in the sphere of material and technical support of the Russian troops had a great influence on the unsuccessful outcome of the offensive operation. A participant in the operation wrote that Russian counterattacks and offensive operations, deprived of the support of the necessary artillery fire, develop either very slowly or not at all, encountering the enemy’s fire curtain and artificial obstacles not destroyed by artillery fire. The adversary uses this slowness to develop his strike in other directions. And by quickly achieving success in other areas, the enemy creates a new environment, in the presence of which the expediency of continuing the attack undertaken by the Russians either completely disappears or even creates the danger of a deterioration in the general situation.
In fact, the offensive at Lyubachev is a battle for Przemysl. The idea itself - by active actions on an adjacent sector of the front to distract the enemy's attention from the assault on the fortress - was absolutely true. The fortress during the First World War could survive only thanks to the success of the field forces. But the same situation was repeated as during the battles at Radymno - the actions of the quantitatively and qualitatively weak Russian 3 Army did not lead to a significant change in the operational-strategic frontier on the South-Western Front. the setting. The effect of the blow, despite the tactical successes of the Russian troops, was minimal, and did not affect the fate of the fortress. The enemy did not begin to transfer additional troops to the offensive zone of the 3 Army, nor did he suspend the assault on Przemysl. As during the battles at Radymno, the enemy ignored the tactical defeat of one of his army (the Austro-Hungarian 4) in order to achieve a strategic goal. As a result, a small area of the left bank of the river was captured. San, but due to an even greater weakening of the troops of the Southwestern Front - primarily the 3 Army. The enemy, covering herself from this army by Austrian troops, dealt the main blow to the Russian 8 Army, using its best formations for this operation - the corps of the German 11 Army. And by May 22, Russian troops left Przemysl. Having solved the strategic task, the enemy began to supplant the remaining armies of the South-Western Front - successively delivering attacks on the 3, 11, and then the 9 armies.
During the defensive battles at Lubachev on 30 in May - 3 on June 1915, the main enemy of the Russian troops was the German 11 Army, Colonel General A. von Mackensen. By the end of May, it received significant reinforcements and included: the German Consolidated (56 and 119 I infantry divisions; commander - Major General K. von Behr); 10 Army (19 and 20 I Infantry Divisions; commander - General of Infantry O. von Emmich), 22 I (43 and 44 I Reserve, 107 I Infantry Divisions; commander - General Cavalry E G.N. von Falkengine); Guards (1 and 2 I Guards Infantry Divisions; commander - General of the Infantry K. F. von Plettenberg); 41th reserve (81th and 82th reserve divisions; commander - infantry general G. von Francois) corps; Austro-Hungarian 6th Army Corps (39th Honored Infantry and 12th Infantry Divisions; commander - Field Marshal-Lieutenant A.F. Arz von Straussenburg).
From May 23 to May 29, the adversary remained passive and improved his position.
But on 7 hours of the 30 on May, he opened a strong artillery fire on the right flank of the 24 Army (48 I Infantry Division) and the left flank of the 3 Caucasian Army (52 I Infantry Division) corps. At 9 o'clock in the morning the enemy launched an offensive, especially actively - at Monasterzh, Melnik and between Zaponts and Shmule.
After fierce battles, in the evening of May 30, the 52th Infantry Division moved north, occupying the Senyava-Tsedyly front, and the 48th Infantry Division was pushed north from the river. Lyubachevka - on the Tsedyly line - 189 height. With the support of the reserves of the 48 Infantry Division, it was again possible to occupy the Tsedyly-Veremetsk front.
To be continued ...
Adjutant General A. A. Brusilov for the map
A. A. Brusilov tried to shift the blame for the unsuccessful offensive of the strike group of his army and the heavy losses in its units to the poor preparation of these formations, since they arrived from another front. Moreover, the general assigns to these corps a certain share of responsibility for the premature fall of Przemysl. So, he writes in his memoirs that when 2 attacked the aforementioned corps from Lubachev to the south-west, a frontal attack of the enemy was obtained, which had many machine guns and huge artillery, while the advancing neither machine guns nor guns had enough, and even an artillery attack , which was supposed to prepare an infantry attack and support the latter, due to a lack of shells could not take place. The general writes that it could be said in advance that this untimely and insufficient fist, launched in an inappropriate place, will not produce tangible results. As noted by A. A. Brusilov, these 2 corps were of "very high fighting qualities," but, oddly enough, "poorly trained, like most of the troops that arrived to us from the north, and they made an attack not very harsh. Shortly after this attack, Przemysl fell ... ” One gets the impression that it was not the 8 Army command that was responsible for this attack, but someone else. A. A. Brusilov writes about these events as if he was only an outside observer. Let us leave this to the conscience of the honored commander.
The end of the offensive phase of the battle of Lyubachev
The attack of the strike group of the 8 Army was drowned. The offensive of the 3 Army was also unable to realize its goal - by delivering a deep blow to the enemy’s rear, to restore the situation on the river. San and help the 8 Army to stay in Przemysl.
The offensive at Lyubachev expanded the Russian bridgehead on the left bank of the lower reaches of the river. San, restored the situation from Pregendzel to the mouth of the river. Lyubachevka, but did not allow to seize the bridgehead on the right bank of the Sana'a - from the mouth of the river. Lyubachevka, between the river. R. San and Lyubachevka. The enemy managed to concentrate significant forces and firmly strengthen.
Limited tactical success during the offensive at Lubachev was achieved at a high cost - by pulling reserve corps into the battle (the 14 Army in the 3 Army and the 2 Caucasian Army in the 8 Army). The combat strength of the remaining corps was significantly reduced.
The failure of the offensive operation by Lyubachev and the abandonment of Przemysl had a disintegrating effect on the structure of the South-Western Front. Changing operational and strategic tasks and priorities, a new alignment of forces in Galicia and southeastern Poland led to the fact that the front was divided into 2 groups: one - the 4 and 3 armies - based on Lublin, the other - 8 , 11-I and 9-I Army - based on the Kiev Military District.
The operation near Lyubachev 19 - 22 in May is indicative of fierce oncoming battles, successful for the Russian troops, and the manifestation of the highest valor on the part of soldiers and officers of the Russian imperial army.
From a tactical point of view, the limited maneuverability of the formations of the South-Western Front and the poverty in the sphere of material and technical support of the Russian troops had a great influence on the unsuccessful outcome of the offensive operation. A participant in the operation wrote that Russian counterattacks and offensive operations, deprived of the support of the necessary artillery fire, develop either very slowly or not at all, encountering the enemy’s fire curtain and artificial obstacles not destroyed by artillery fire. The adversary uses this slowness to develop his strike in other directions. And by quickly achieving success in other areas, the enemy creates a new environment, in the presence of which the expediency of continuing the attack undertaken by the Russians either completely disappears or even creates the danger of a deterioration in the general situation.
In fact, the offensive at Lyubachev is a battle for Przemysl. The idea itself - by active actions on an adjacent sector of the front to distract the enemy's attention from the assault on the fortress - was absolutely true. The fortress during the First World War could survive only thanks to the success of the field forces. But the same situation was repeated as during the battles at Radymno - the actions of the quantitatively and qualitatively weak Russian 3 Army did not lead to a significant change in the operational-strategic frontier on the South-Western Front. the setting. The effect of the blow, despite the tactical successes of the Russian troops, was minimal, and did not affect the fate of the fortress. The enemy did not begin to transfer additional troops to the offensive zone of the 3 Army, nor did he suspend the assault on Przemysl. As during the battles at Radymno, the enemy ignored the tactical defeat of one of his army (the Austro-Hungarian 4) in order to achieve a strategic goal. As a result, a small area of the left bank of the river was captured. San, but due to an even greater weakening of the troops of the Southwestern Front - primarily the 3 Army. The enemy, covering herself from this army by Austrian troops, dealt the main blow to the Russian 8 Army, using its best formations for this operation - the corps of the German 11 Army. And by May 22, Russian troops left Przemysl. Having solved the strategic task, the enemy began to supplant the remaining armies of the South-Western Front - successively delivering attacks on the 3, 11, and then the 9 armies.
Lyubachev defense
During the defensive battles at Lubachev on 30 in May - 3 on June 1915, the main enemy of the Russian troops was the German 11 Army, Colonel General A. von Mackensen. By the end of May, it received significant reinforcements and included: the German Consolidated (56 and 119 I infantry divisions; commander - Major General K. von Behr); 10 Army (19 and 20 I Infantry Divisions; commander - General of Infantry O. von Emmich), 22 I (43 and 44 I Reserve, 107 I Infantry Divisions; commander - General Cavalry E G.N. von Falkengine); Guards (1 and 2 I Guards Infantry Divisions; commander - General of the Infantry K. F. von Plettenberg); 41th reserve (81th and 82th reserve divisions; commander - infantry general G. von Francois) corps; Austro-Hungarian 6th Army Corps (39th Honored Infantry and 12th Infantry Divisions; commander - Field Marshal-Lieutenant A.F. Arz von Straussenburg).
In the ranks of the enemy are the 1th Guards Field Artillery Regiment, the Guards Corps of the German 11th Army. 1915 Propulsion The Parade of the Guards Corps, infantry general K.F. von Plettenberg and the chief of the 1th Guards Infantry Division, Major General Prince Eithel Friedrich of Prussia, take the parade. New York Public Library
From May 23 to May 29, the adversary remained passive and improved his position.
But on 7 hours of the 30 on May, he opened a strong artillery fire on the right flank of the 24 Army (48 I Infantry Division) and the left flank of the 3 Caucasian Army (52 I Infantry Division) corps. At 9 o'clock in the morning the enemy launched an offensive, especially actively - at Monasterzh, Melnik and between Zaponts and Shmule.
After fierce battles, in the evening of May 30, the 52th Infantry Division moved north, occupying the Senyava-Tsedyly front, and the 48th Infantry Division was pushed north from the river. Lyubachevka - on the Tsedyly line - 189 height. With the support of the reserves of the 48 Infantry Division, it was again possible to occupy the Tsedyly-Veremetsk front.
To be continued ...
Information