The 3 Caucasian Corps is on the path of a strategic hurricane. Part of 4. Calculations and prospects

31
Losses of the parties during these battles are difficult to establish. The losses of the 4 of the German corps of the 11 army (Guards, Combined, 41 of the reserve and 10 of the army) according to German data amounted to 1915 28000 soldiers and officers by the middle of May. This figure did not include the losses of the Austro-Hungarian 6 of the army corps of the same army, as well as the losses of the German and Austrian reserves that were brought into battle during the operation. The losses of the Russian troops, due to miscalculations of command and the superiority of the enemy, were higher. L. von Rothkirch wrote that during the period of 19 - 27 on April, Austro-German troops captured more than 100000 prisoners (a significant percentage of prisoners were given by the militia), 80 guns and over 200 machine guns. But this figure included trophies not only of the German 11, but also of the Austrian 3 and 4.

The unsuccessful maneuvering of forces and means by the command of the Russian 3 Army left a significant imprint on the outcome of the operation. Lieutenant-General V.I. Gurko wrote that when Mackensen’s iron phalanxes hit “volcanic lava” on one of our army corps, the latter did not withstand the onslaught and retreated, which led to the withdrawal of neighboring corps. Unfortunately, such a phenomenon as the withdrawal of an entire army on the entire front due to the failure of only one of its corps became commonplace in 1915. The High Command made every effort to combat this phenomenon - not always successful. So that the departure of one corps on the 10-km front did not entail a forced departure of its neighbors, fresh reserves were needed, which could restore the situation with an energetic counterattack. Another, passive way to prevent this situation, was in the usual “patching up of holes” - filling the gap between the flanks of the connections — neighbors of the retreating units with fresh troops. Both methods required reserves, which, as a rule, were absent. Transferring them by rail (when it was necessary to transfer at the border to other echelons - due to the difference in width of the tracks) took time - often the troops did not have time to arrive on time. The most effective means of counteracting the German offensive was the transition to its own offensive - and on the widest possible front. But such actions ran into insurmountable difficulties, associated primarily with the ever-increasing shortage of artillery ammunition. The offensive meant the depletion of the last stocks - which led to the complete absence of ammunition during the transition to defense.




"On the enemy - Fire!". 1-I battery of the 3-th Caucasian Mortar Artillery Division. Negative number 936. State archive of the Saratov region. From the personal collection of the author

At the heart of the miscalculations of the army command lay the inability to operate with the available reserves. Thus, the most powerful reserve - the 3-th Caucasian Army Corps - R. D. Radko-Dmitriev essentially "rass" on the entire front of the 10-th army corps instead of creating a strong strike group that could counter any surprise. While the enemy did not hesitate to pull up troops from other directions (including even Mezo-Laborchskoe), transferring to the main sector, the Russian commander 3 did not stipulate the need for regrouping due to secondary directions in order to enter the battle in the most crucial period and on the main line. This was noticed by N. I. Ivanov, who noted that the 3 Army, which had requested reserves from the front (which had already given 3 divisions - 63, 21 and 52), could have taken some units from its 21 of 29 of enclosures.

And although the army command quite rightly believed that in order to reflect the serious maneuver of the enemy, a strong maneuver reserve was needed consisting of one or two strong corps (because without this, a breakthrough at every point of the thin front line is possible), it did nothing to realize this. sound idea. The lack of a reserve, the linear construction of the corps, the inability to dispose of the available forces and means - these are the most important mistakes of the command of the 3 Army.

The operations of the 3 Army in the period of 19 - April 24 are only scattered actions of the corps belonging to the army, which are not tied to an army battle. Inadequate control is the main flaw in the command of the 3 Army.

At the same time, the competent command and control of troops from the army command of the enemy - 5 divisions operating south of the r. Ropa, were exempted from the care of their flanks. The German command actions on the flanks and joints of units and formations attached particular importance. It also took care of organizing interaction within this group, which led to the seizure of the crossings over Wislock south of Zigrod, when the Consolidated Corps finally succeeded, by the morning of the 4 day of the Gorlitsk offensive, to reach this city, while in sections of the remaining 11- corps th army breakthrough was completed almost a day later. The insignificant pace of advancement of the enemy troops saved the leadership of the Russian 3 Army from even greater trouble: "The German-Austrian movement forward proceeded slowly and with great losses."


Allies. Austro-German infantry on the march

Finally, the command of the 3 Army in a tense, hourly changing operational environment was lost. A. A. Brusilov wrote that during the period of “this unfortunate retreat” on the extensive front of the 3 Army, the commanders R. D. Radko-Dmitriev lost control of the reins - and this would not have happened if the commander had organized the technical service in advance communication. He began to ride in the car from one part to another, sending out his adjutants, who gave orders on his behalf to the commanders, bypassing their direct superiors. Yes, and orders were often contradictory. Confusion from such control only increased - and the disorder during the retreat took on a grand scale, and not so much from the defeat itself, as due to the confusion of command instances at all levels, not controlled by a single will, who did not know what the neighbors are doing and what they should do.

The retreat of the army led to the withdrawal of the entire front.

At the same time, a huge share of responsibility rests with the front command, as well as with the High Command. A. A. Brusilov noted that the 3 Caucasian Army Corps, which was listed in the 8 Army and was in the front reserve, had just been transported to Old Place. At this point, he was at the same distance from the 9 Army (NI Ivanov's favorite army) and from the 3 Army. NI Ivanov, ignoring the threatening information that clearly showed the enemy’s impending attack on the front of the 3 Army, did not dare to strengthen RD Radko-Dmitriev. A. A. Brusilov calls this "criminal thoughtlessness".

As noted above, the late timing of the hull was critical to the outcome of the operation.

The High Command banned the withdrawal of the army beyond the r. Visloka. In fact, this order did not allow the battered corps to detach from the enemy. Departure to Vislok from the operational point of view did not give anything - but to break away from the enemy and move away to the r. San 3 th army was not given. Yu. N. Danilov in his work fully confirms this: “Unfortunately, the command of the 3 army failed to create a strong fortified line in its rear and therefore the troops of this army, under the pressure of not weakening attacks of General Mackensen, continued to gradually roll back , despite the categorical demand of the Supreme Commander - to consider the limit of the allowable withdrawal of the 3 Army, the front line determined by the meridian of the lower Visloka. "

But the prospect of fighting on the river. Sun was revealed in any case, whether the Stake wanted to or not. Thus, the Russian official description of the 1915 campaign ascertained this fact: “... after a long series of fierce battles, the third army, with a departure back to May 1, turned around on the r. San. " The question was only about whose initiative will underlie operations on this water barrier.

The operational and tactical miscalculations of the Russian command of the highest level led, in a complex, to the failure of both the Smigrod battle and the Gorlitsk operation in general. A. A. Brusilov stated that the blame for the breakthrough of the front of the 3 Army could not be laid on Radko-Dmitriev - it was Ivanov’s fault. But Radko-Dmitriev is to blame for the extremely disorderly retreat of the army. The latter knew perfectly well that a strike was being prepared, he knew the area in which to expect it. He knew about the situation with reserves and had to take care of collecting all the possible reserves of the army to the threatened point in time. The commander had to give precise orders to his troops - in what direction and order, if necessary, to retreat, on what frontiers to stop, in order to reduce the speed of the enemy’s attack and to carry out the retreat of his army’s forces in a planned and orderly manner. For this purpose, it was necessary to remove the army logistical institutions in advance and to attend to the organization of fortifications on the designated frontiers.

At the same time, G. Kellerman wrote about the results of the operation for the enemy, that: firstly, the German 11-I army did not completely fulfill the task: it did not manage to reach the rear of the Carpathian group of Russian armies (it, however, made them threatened exit to the rear of the Carpathians) and the asset was only conquered space; the Russian troops, taking advantage of the insignificant pace of the advance of the Austro-Germans, led successful defensive battles during the day, and retreated at night, quietly avoiding coverage; secondly, the 3 of the day, which the Germans spent on overcoming the defensive line of the Russians, allowed the last marching procedure to pull up their reserves from the distance to 100 km. During this period, the 3 Caucasian Corps (reserve of the front) and the 24 Corps (removed from the left flank of the 3 Army) approached the breakthrough area - and the 11 Army had to deal with counter-attacks of these formations, which started stubborn battles for . Visloka; and then the 11-I army invariably ran into the resistance of these corps.

E. Ludendorff in relation to the battles of spring - summer 1915 noted that the frontal repulsion (he calls it that way) of the Russian troops in Galicia, with all its sensitivity for the Russians, was not decisive for the war. The Russians retreated with battles, and, not yet fighting in their own land, could concede significant territories. And during these frontal battles, the German losses were considerable.

And a huge role in the fact that the German ram was losing its shock power, belonged to the 3-th Caucasian Army Corps. The corps suffered heavy losses, but kept the pressure of the whole army - taking the blow of the powerful forces of the enemy at the junction of the 10 and 24 of the army corps, did not allow the army to split (and possibly the front) in half. During the course of the day, he withstood the onslaught of a repeatedly superior enemy — 3's corps, supported by powerful artillery.

And this happened in the conditions of different times of the entry into battle of the corps units and connections. A. A. Brusilov wrote that the connection was moved by echelons, because to travel a considerable distance to the whole corps with one route and one echelon was difficult and would lead to a loss of time, since the corps was stationed in a large area. Echelons troops moved faster, and the process was less tedious. But, of course, it was undesirable to send troops into battle with packets - it was necessary to detain the advance guard on any line, allow the rest of the corps to catch up, allowing the retreating formations to join them. In such conditions, the enemy (albeit temporarily) would be detained and received serious insight. But the corps troops, unfortunately, with their scattered efforts could not provide substantial support to the defeated troops.

But even in such conditions, parts of the corps suspended the advance of the enemy, gave the Russian command a gain of time. The actions of the compound in the battle of Zigrod did not lead to a change in the situation in favor of the Russian weapons, but they turned away from the 3 th army approaching her catastrophe.

Sources of

RGVIA. F. 2007. Op. 1. D. 42. H. 4; D. 48. H. 1; D. 54. H. 1;
Collection of documents of the World War on the Russian front. Gorlitsky operation. M., 1941;
Year of war from 19 July 1914 g. To 19 July 1915 g. M., 1915;
Chronicle of war. 1915. No. 40 of;
Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 7. Berlin, 1931;
Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914 - 1918. Bd ii. Wien, 1931;
Falkengayn E. background. 1914 High Command - 1916 in its most important decisions. M., 1923;
Hoffman M. The war of missed opportunities. M. - L., 1925;
Ignatiev A. A. 50 years in service. T. 2. Petrozavodsk, 1964;
Brusilov A. A. My memories. M., 1983;
Diaries of Emperor Nicholas II. M., 1991;
Ludendorff E. background. My memories of the war 1914 - 1918 years. M. - Mn., 2005;
Gurko V.I. War and revolution in Russia. M., 2007.

Literature

The composition of the German mobilized field corps, cavalry divisions and reserve corps. Printing Office of the Supreme Commander, 1915;
The composition of the German army according to the 1 in May 1915 Warsaw, 1915;
Battle schedule of the Austro-Hungarian army. Comp. according to 25 May 1915. B. m., 1915;
Dubensky D.N. His Imperial Majesty Sovereign Emperor Nikolai Alexandrovich in the army in the field. January-June 1915 of the year. Pg., 1915;
Great War. 1915 d. Sketch of the main operations. Pg., 1916;
Rotkirch T. Fon. Breakthrough of the Russian Carpathian Front at Gorlitsy-Tarnov in 1915, Pb., 1921;
Strategic essay on the 1914 war - 1918's. CH 4. Comp. A. Neznamov. M., 1922;
Ritter H. Criticism of World War. Pg., 1923;
Yu. N. Danilov. Russia in World War 1914 - 1915 Berlin, 1924;
Bonch-Bruevich, M.D., Our loss of Galicia in 1915, Part II. Disaster in the 3 army. M. - L., 1926;
Battle of Gorlitsa-Tarnov 2 - 6 of May 1915. Essay on the joint actions of infantry with artillery / ed. E. Smyslovskogo. M. - L.: 1929;
G. Kellerman. Breakthrough of the 11 of the German Army at Gorlice 2-5 in May 1915. // War and Revolution. 1934. March, April;
Spiridovich A.I. The Great War and the February Revolution (1914-1917). T. 2. New York, 1960.
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31 comment
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  1. +13
    4 November 2018 07: 09
    The most interesting patterns and conclusions. Cognitive Cycle, thank you!
    1. +11
      4 November 2018 08: 23
      Yes, solid material, encyclopedic
      1. +8
        4 November 2018 11: 14
        I join, we are waiting for new cycles
  2. +11
    4 November 2018 08: 27
    Immediately a retreat to San would certainly allow time to maneuver and bring the 3rd Army in order.
    It is true that
    The operational and tactical miscalculations of the Russian command of the highest level led to the failure of the Zmigrod battle and the Gorlitsky operation as a whole in failure.
    and they are professionally analyzed in the article good
    1. +8
      4 November 2018 11: 15
      And this, as we noted earlier, clung to the territory, not realizing that retaining maneuverability and strength, they would return the territory
  3. +10
    4 November 2018 08: 51
    In general, both sides are not up to par.
    The Russian command made a number of miscalculations - failing to fully utilize the available reserves, punching the flank of the advancing ram, organizing rear lines, and quickly maneuvering.
    The Germans, on the other hand, turned the breakthrough into frontal displacement, moving like a tortoise and, again, not always applying reserves to the place and tearing up most of them in the very first days of the operation.
    But the protagonist of the cycle is the front-line elite of the Russian army PMV, the 3rd Caucasian Corps - a real hero of the battles at Zmigrod. Despite introducing him into the battle one at a time, he prevented the tragedy of the 3rd Army and (which is very likely) the front, allowed him to gain time by delaying the enemy and slowing his pace.
    A little-known but very revealing episode from the life of the Russian corps and an important stage in a serious operation.
    Thank you!
    1. +9
      4 November 2018 09: 10
      Know how to formulate gorgeous conclusions good
      And right, no questions asked.
      From the mosaic, a picture of a large operation is formed. And the troops generally need to pay more attention
      1. +9
        4 November 2018 09: 32
        By the way, the series devoted to the history of regiments and divisions were once very popular.
        1. +8
          4 November 2018 11: 16
          Yes, before the revolution, and in the 90s there was a process
  4. +9
    4 November 2018 09: 11
    Informative and interesting, I read it fast, though terms, excerpts from orders, borders
    1. +8
      4 November 2018 11: 17
      And without this, nowhere. It is necessary to read cards, look at orders to clarify the essence of events
  5. +9
    4 November 2018 10: 07
    The operations of the 3 Army in the period of 19 - April 24 are only scattered actions of the corps belonging to the army, which are not tied to an army battle. Inadequate control is the main flaw in the command of the 3 Army.

    and topic for organizational conclusions
    Combat actions in the battle at Zmigrod did not lead to a turning point in favor of Russian weapons, but they turned away the catastrophe approaching from the 3rd Army.

    certainly
    1. +9
      4 November 2018 11: 19
      Radko-Dmitriev was replaced by Lesh. A good choice, but only in early June.
      And the corps, yes, said his word. Honor and glory to the heroes who laid their belly for the Fatherland!
      1. +9
        4 November 2018 11: 58
        Lesh yes, the hero is still RYAV, George 4th degree and shell shock. Brave and, importantly, energetic commander
        1. +4
          5 November 2018 11: 51
          He went to the Russian-Japanese volunteer, commander of the 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment
  6. +9
    4 November 2018 11: 21
    the German 11th Army did not fully fulfill the task: it failed to go to the rear of the Carpathian group of Russian armies

    the most important thing
    she, however, made them threaten to leave the Carpathians behind the rear

    nothing, a year later returned with a little - at the rink of a breakthrough in again to the Carpathians
    and the asset turned out to be only conquered space

    enough space. The main thing with us is people, they must be protected
    1. +8
      4 November 2018 12: 39
      The lines in this bulletin are
      “The advance of the German-Austrians was slow and with great losses”
      - the best praise for the actions of the 3rd Caucasian Army Corps in the events considered
  7. +8
    4 November 2018 12: 52
    Yes, interesting articles, I agree with commentators. I have a question for the author: what did the Russian command do with the generals who lost the battle? Well, or systematically losing the battles to the German and Austro-Hungarian troops? What then became of them? if you can comment please.
    1. +8
      4 November 2018 13: 37
      As for the systematic question of course interesting)
      For example, following the results of the East Prussian 1914 operation, the main culprit in the failure of the North-Western Front, cavalry general Ya. G. Zhilinsky, following the results of the investigation, was not only removed from his post as front commander, but also lost his post as Warsaw governor-general. According to some reports, it even came to a breakdown from him by the Chief Prince Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich chase and fights. True, he was later appointed representative of the Russian command at the Allied Council in France. Do not shoot Zhilinsky - if you are about this. Time was different.
      Commander 1 P.G. K. Rennenkampf only after the одód operation in November 1914 (his actions became the subject of proceedings of a special commission - General Baranov) was removed from command of the army, and 06.10.1915 was dismissed from service.
      But you are probably more interested in the fate of the commanders of the 3 army, about which this cycle? She withstood the brunt of the Germans and Austrians during the Gorlitsk operation. Mostly - with dignity.
      But her command made a number of miscalculations.
      So, commander R.D. Radko-Dmitriev (an ethnic Bulgarian) was removed from office (order signed 20 May 1915) with a decrease. He became a comic of 2 and later of 7 of the Siberian corps. In March, 16 was appointed again as the army commander - 12, and proved to be a good tactician, proving himself in the Mitava operation in December 1916.
      Army Chief of Staff - Lieutenant-General SK Dobrorolsky was also removed from his post with a downgrade, 03.06.1915 he was transferred to the post of chief of the 78 Infantry Division.
      Komkory - X. NUMX-th army A.M. Dragomirov, 9-th army N.I. Protopopov (his corps took the main blow at Gorlitsa), 10-th army (L.V. Lesh) (later became commander of 12-th army), 3 th A.A. Tsurikov, 24 th Ya. F. Shkinsky, 21 th D. P. Zuev retained their posts. Moreover, 29 of them (Lesh and Tsurikov) subsequently became commanders.
      Finally, the main protagonist of the article, V. A. Irmanov, a commander-3 of the Caucasian Army, even longed for commanders (by a general from artillery) and combat experience, remained the permanent commander, and led the Caucasians into the battle throughout the war.
      Thus, the command of the 3-th army was removed from its positions by decreasing Gorlitsa.
      Did I at least partially answer your question?
      1. +8
        4 November 2018 13: 48
        Yes thank you. The answer is clear and interesting in itself. I didn’t know this for sure. You can find a lot of information about the events of the WWII, but I didn’t see anything about the generals who lost the battle. You would think that the general lost the battle - well, okay, with whom it does not happen. We close our eyes to this, maybe the next time this will not happen. Now I understand that the bid and the First (or rather the second, in the sense of Nikolai) reacted to events promptly and on business. Thank you for the interesting information, good luck and success.
        1. +6
          4 November 2018 15: 11
          I recommend for you and in general those interested in the higher command personnel of the First World Book of the Missile Officer Professor at the Military Institute for Advanced Studies of Mobilization Plans - A.A. Poroshina.
          The formation of commanders commanders of the armies of the fronts of the First World War. Saratov, 2011.
          1. +5
            4 November 2018 20: 30
            Ok, leafing through. Moreover, the author of the book, my colleague (I work at a military university myself, though on a different topic). Thank.
  8. +8
    4 November 2018 14: 07
    I did not know about the battles of Zmigrod, informative and informative
    success to the author in deepening further research
  9. +7
    4 November 2018 15: 09
    Very interesting material, thank you!
  10. +7
    4 November 2018 16: 07
    To see the prospects, we need to analyze the miscalculations
    which means there is no more important debriefing hi
    read with interest, we look forward to continuing
    1. +4
      5 November 2018 13: 17
      welcome
      Yes, we are waiting!
  11. +5
    4 November 2018 18: 36
    The photo is very in topic, and to the 3rd Caucasus, and it can be seen why the enemy was called by the Austro-Germans (or German-Austrians as you like)
    in short, very, very complex
  12. +6
    4 November 2018 21: 14
    A difficult page in the history of our army. However, despite all the efforts of the troops of the central powers, they failed to defeat the Russian troops. Yes, there was definitely a defeat. However, taking into account what tasks were set by the enemy, the resources and efforts expended by him, the result was to be a total defeat, a catastrophe of our troops. But, despite a number of blots, and sometimes outright mistakes, our command was able to take control of the situation. The Russian army of the 15th model was still very combat-ready and proved it in battles with a superior enemy. Austro-German troops will carry out similar "ramming" operations more than once, in 15 year our army did not succeed .... And what happens when it turns out, you can see the example of the Italians under Caporetto.
    1. +3
      5 November 2018 16: 41
      The glory page of Austrian weapons is believed to have worked not only sausages laughing
      Returned to Lviv and Przemysl
      1. +7
        5 November 2018 20: 23
        Passing by the tragedy of the confrontation in the past of friendly empires and the fact of underestimating the role of the Austrian army, I will say yes - the page of glory and Austrian weapons, for example, the 39th Honved distinguished themselves in Gorlitsky events.
        And yet. If we take the Gorlitsky breakthrough directly, then the German 11th Army broke through it (it consisted of 5 corps - 4 of them are German and 1 Austrian, that is, only one fifth of the Austrians are in it), but the participants of the entire Gorlitsky OPERATION - 3 armies ( German 11th and Austrian 3rd and 4th) - here already just the same Austrians are two-thirds and Germans are in the minority. And by the way, the Austrian 4th Army invariably in the summer of 15 was part of the Mackensen Austro-German Army Group and was very active.
  13. +4
    6 November 2018 08: 22
    Awesome cycle and comments.

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