The 3 Caucasian Corps is on the path of a strategic hurricane. Part of 4. Calculations and prospects
The unsuccessful maneuvering of forces and means by the command of the Russian 3 Army left a significant imprint on the outcome of the operation. Lieutenant-General V.I. Gurko wrote that when Mackensen’s iron phalanxes hit “volcanic lava” on one of our army corps, the latter did not withstand the onslaught and retreated, which led to the withdrawal of neighboring corps. Unfortunately, such a phenomenon as the withdrawal of an entire army on the entire front due to the failure of only one of its corps became commonplace in 1915. The High Command made every effort to combat this phenomenon - not always successful. So that the departure of one corps on the 10-km front did not entail a forced departure of its neighbors, fresh reserves were needed, which could restore the situation with an energetic counterattack. Another, passive way to prevent this situation, was in the usual “patching up of holes” - filling the gap between the flanks of the connections — neighbors of the retreating units with fresh troops. Both methods required reserves, which, as a rule, were absent. Transferring them by rail (when it was necessary to transfer at the border to other echelons - due to the difference in width of the tracks) took time - often the troops did not have time to arrive on time. The most effective means of counteracting the German offensive was the transition to its own offensive - and on the widest possible front. But such actions ran into insurmountable difficulties, associated primarily with the ever-increasing shortage of artillery ammunition. The offensive meant the depletion of the last stocks - which led to the complete absence of ammunition during the transition to defense.
"On the enemy - Fire!". 1-I battery of the 3-th Caucasian Mortar Artillery Division. Negative number 936. State archive of the Saratov region. From the personal collection of the author
At the heart of the miscalculations of the army command lay the inability to operate with the available reserves. Thus, the most powerful reserve - the 3-th Caucasian Army Corps - R. D. Radko-Dmitriev essentially "rass" on the entire front of the 10-th army corps instead of creating a strong strike group that could counter any surprise. While the enemy did not hesitate to pull up troops from other directions (including even Mezo-Laborchskoe), transferring to the main sector, the Russian commander 3 did not stipulate the need for regrouping due to secondary directions in order to enter the battle in the most crucial period and on the main line. This was noticed by N. I. Ivanov, who noted that the 3 Army, which had requested reserves from the front (which had already given 3 divisions - 63, 21 and 52), could have taken some units from its 21 of 29 of enclosures.
And although the army command quite rightly believed that in order to reflect the serious maneuver of the enemy, a strong maneuver reserve was needed consisting of one or two strong corps (because without this, a breakthrough at every point of the thin front line is possible), it did nothing to realize this. sound idea. The lack of a reserve, the linear construction of the corps, the inability to dispose of the available forces and means - these are the most important mistakes of the command of the 3 Army.
The operations of the 3 Army in the period of 19 - April 24 are only scattered actions of the corps belonging to the army, which are not tied to an army battle. Inadequate control is the main flaw in the command of the 3 Army.
At the same time, the competent command and control of troops from the army command of the enemy - 5 divisions operating south of the r. Ropa, were exempted from the care of their flanks. The German command actions on the flanks and joints of units and formations attached particular importance. It also took care of organizing interaction within this group, which led to the seizure of the crossings over Wislock south of Zigrod, when the Consolidated Corps finally succeeded, by the morning of the 4 day of the Gorlitsk offensive, to reach this city, while in sections of the remaining 11- corps th army breakthrough was completed almost a day later. The insignificant pace of advancement of the enemy troops saved the leadership of the Russian 3 Army from even greater trouble: "The German-Austrian movement forward proceeded slowly and with great losses."
Allies. Austro-German infantry on the march
Finally, the command of the 3 Army in a tense, hourly changing operational environment was lost. A. A. Brusilov wrote that during the period of “this unfortunate retreat” on the extensive front of the 3 Army, the commanders R. D. Radko-Dmitriev lost control of the reins - and this would not have happened if the commander had organized the technical service in advance communication. He began to ride in the car from one part to another, sending out his adjutants, who gave orders on his behalf to the commanders, bypassing their direct superiors. Yes, and orders were often contradictory. Confusion from such control only increased - and the disorder during the retreat took on a grand scale, and not so much from the defeat itself, as due to the confusion of command instances at all levels, not controlled by a single will, who did not know what the neighbors are doing and what they should do.
The retreat of the army led to the withdrawal of the entire front.
At the same time, a huge share of responsibility rests with the front command, as well as with the High Command. A. A. Brusilov noted that the 3 Caucasian Army Corps, which was listed in the 8 Army and was in the front reserve, had just been transported to Old Place. At this point, he was at the same distance from the 9 Army (NI Ivanov's favorite army) and from the 3 Army. NI Ivanov, ignoring the threatening information that clearly showed the enemy’s impending attack on the front of the 3 Army, did not dare to strengthen RD Radko-Dmitriev. A. A. Brusilov calls this "criminal thoughtlessness".
As noted above, the late timing of the hull was critical to the outcome of the operation.
The High Command banned the withdrawal of the army beyond the r. Visloka. In fact, this order did not allow the battered corps to detach from the enemy. Departure to Vislok from the operational point of view did not give anything - but to break away from the enemy and move away to the r. San 3 th army was not given. Yu. N. Danilov in his work fully confirms this: “Unfortunately, the command of the 3 army failed to create a strong fortified line in its rear and therefore the troops of this army, under the pressure of not weakening attacks of General Mackensen, continued to gradually roll back , despite the categorical demand of the Supreme Commander - to consider the limit of the allowable withdrawal of the 3 Army, the front line determined by the meridian of the lower Visloka. "
But the prospect of fighting on the river. Sun was revealed in any case, whether the Stake wanted to or not. Thus, the Russian official description of the 1915 campaign ascertained this fact: “... after a long series of fierce battles, the third army, with a departure back to May 1, turned around on the r. San. " The question was only about whose initiative will underlie operations on this water barrier.
The operational and tactical miscalculations of the Russian command of the highest level led, in a complex, to the failure of both the Smigrod battle and the Gorlitsk operation in general. A. A. Brusilov stated that the blame for the breakthrough of the front of the 3 Army could not be laid on Radko-Dmitriev - it was Ivanov’s fault. But Radko-Dmitriev is to blame for the extremely disorderly retreat of the army. The latter knew perfectly well that a strike was being prepared, he knew the area in which to expect it. He knew about the situation with reserves and had to take care of collecting all the possible reserves of the army to the threatened point in time. The commander had to give precise orders to his troops - in what direction and order, if necessary, to retreat, on what frontiers to stop, in order to reduce the speed of the enemy’s attack and to carry out the retreat of his army’s forces in a planned and orderly manner. For this purpose, it was necessary to remove the army logistical institutions in advance and to attend to the organization of fortifications on the designated frontiers.
At the same time, G. Kellerman wrote about the results of the operation for the enemy, that: firstly, the German 11-I army did not completely fulfill the task: it did not manage to reach the rear of the Carpathian group of Russian armies (it, however, made them threatened exit to the rear of the Carpathians) and the asset was only conquered space; the Russian troops, taking advantage of the insignificant pace of the advance of the Austro-Germans, led successful defensive battles during the day, and retreated at night, quietly avoiding coverage; secondly, the 3 of the day, which the Germans spent on overcoming the defensive line of the Russians, allowed the last marching procedure to pull up their reserves from the distance to 100 km. During this period, the 3 Caucasian Corps (reserve of the front) and the 24 Corps (removed from the left flank of the 3 Army) approached the breakthrough area - and the 11 Army had to deal with counter-attacks of these formations, which started stubborn battles for . Visloka; and then the 11-I army invariably ran into the resistance of these corps.
E. Ludendorff in relation to the battles of spring - summer 1915 noted that the frontal repulsion (he calls it that way) of the Russian troops in Galicia, with all its sensitivity for the Russians, was not decisive for the war. The Russians retreated with battles, and, not yet fighting in their own land, could concede significant territories. And during these frontal battles, the German losses were considerable.
And a huge role in the fact that the German ram was losing its shock power, belonged to the 3-th Caucasian Army Corps. The corps suffered heavy losses, but kept the pressure of the whole army - taking the blow of the powerful forces of the enemy at the junction of the 10 and 24 of the army corps, did not allow the army to split (and possibly the front) in half. During the course of the day, he withstood the onslaught of a repeatedly superior enemy — 3's corps, supported by powerful artillery.
And this happened in the conditions of different times of the entry into battle of the corps units and connections. A. A. Brusilov wrote that the connection was moved by echelons, because to travel a considerable distance to the whole corps with one route and one echelon was difficult and would lead to a loss of time, since the corps was stationed in a large area. Echelons troops moved faster, and the process was less tedious. But, of course, it was undesirable to send troops into battle with packets - it was necessary to detain the advance guard on any line, allow the rest of the corps to catch up, allowing the retreating formations to join them. In such conditions, the enemy (albeit temporarily) would be detained and received serious insight. But the corps troops, unfortunately, with their scattered efforts could not provide substantial support to the defeated troops.
But even in such conditions, parts of the corps suspended the advance of the enemy, gave the Russian command a gain of time. The actions of the compound in the battle of Zigrod did not lead to a change in the situation in favor of the Russian weapons, but they turned away from the 3 th army approaching her catastrophe.
Sources of
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Year of war from 19 July 1914 g. To 19 July 1915 g. M., 1915;
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Gurko V.I. War and revolution in Russia. M., 2007.
Literature
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The composition of the German army according to the 1 in May 1915 Warsaw, 1915;
Battle schedule of the Austro-Hungarian army. Comp. according to 25 May 1915. B. m., 1915;
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- The 3 Caucasian Corps is on the path of a strategic hurricane. Part of 1. Elite entered into battle
The 3 Caucasian Corps is on the path of a strategic hurricane. Part of 2. The backbone of the army group
The 3 Caucasian Corps is on the path of a strategic hurricane. Part of 3. Day of disaster
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