Battle of a Polish city with a Russian name. CH 1. Bridgehead at Yaroslav
Yaroslav is a city in Carpathian Poland (eastern Galicia, on the San river), in the region of which 1 - 7 in May 1915 between the troops of the 3 Russian and 11 of the German army launched a battle on the r. San at the second stage of the Gorlitsk operation 19 April - 10 June 1915
After the end of the fighting in the area of Gorlice (list of articles of the cycle, see the end of the article) Western Galicia was lost by Russian troops. The most important task facing the Russian South-Western Front and its 3 Army in particular was the stabilization of the operational-strategic situation that had developed after the Gorlitsky breakthrough. Immediately without withdrawing the troops of the 3 Army on the river. San, which would have allowed them to detach themselves from the enemy and take up a solid defense, the Supreme and Front Command doomed the battered army corps to retreat to this natural barrier under the blows of the opposing enemy.
The period of battles from 25 to April 27 was a period of fierce attacks by the Germans and the Austrians, who sought to maximize their first success.
The fiercest and stubborn battles were fought in the center of the Russian 3 Army - on the front of the 10, 3 of the Caucasus and 24 of the army corps.
The attacks on the position of the Russian 10 Army Corps cost the Germans and Austrians the loss of an entire division. 3-th Caucasian Army Corps on the front of Velepole, Vieneva, Odrzhikov within three days restrained the attacks of two German-Austrian corps. Russian troops fought heroically, even to the self-sacrifice of the corps commander, who personally led the units to the attack.
The 11 of the German army was assisted by the Austrian 3 and 4. The Russian 24 army corps covered the direction of Sanok, where the main forces of the enemy's 25 army were attacking to 3, in April. Here the corps withstood the attacks of the three enemy corps for two days, successfully repelling their onslaught, but by the end of the day on April 26, it was forced to start a withdrawal. On the front of the 9 Army Corps of the Russian 3 Army, the Austrian 4 Army conducted unsuccessful attacks. Moreover, on April 26 of the 31 division of the Russian 4 Army, they crossed the r. Wisla, destroyed the German part in 3 thousand people.
The actions of the 12 Army Corps of the Russian 3 Army were a model of active defense: it not only fought off the attacks of the 10 Army Corps and the 119 th Infantry Division of the enemy, but on the night of 27 April itself went on the counter and dropped the Austrian 26-th Landveren Infantry Division. By its active actions, the corps forged significant forces of the enemy, contributing to the success of the attack of the 21 Army Corps. The latter’s counteroffensive was being prepared.
On the morning of April 27, the 21 Army Corps began its nomination for a flank attack by the advancing German 11 Army. His blow led to the formation of a breakthrough between the 11 th Bavarian and 119 th infantry divisions of the enemy, but the enemy closed the gap with the advancement of the second-tier division. In addition, units of the Austrian 10 Army Corps launched an offensive against the Russian 21 Army Corps from the south. At the same time, the center of the Russian 3 Army was significantly eastward.
As a result, the counter attack of the 21 Army Corps did not bring any changes in the situation at the front, and by the end of April 27, the corps was forced to begin withdrawal.
On April 28, the Russian 3 army, under the cover of the rear guards, retreated, trying to detain the enemy, allowing the main forces of the corps and the rear to retreat to the r. San, and the front reserves to advance to the battlefield. By this time, the German-Austrian troops, due to large losses and separation from the rear, were no longer able to break the resistance of the Russian rear guards. And before reaching the river, they stopped.
By directive of 28 on April, the Russian Supreme Commander-in-Chief from cavalry, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich defined the line r. R. San and Dniester as an extreme line of withdrawal of the South-Western Front. The commander-in-chief of the armies of the South-Western Front, artillery general N.I. Ivanov, on April 29 also informed the command of the 3 Army: "Our intentions are in the stubborn defense of Sana'a, in order to give time to our armies to settle."
Accordingly, on the same day, the commander of the Russian 3 Army, General of Infantry, R. D. Radko-Dmitriev, issued an order setting as his immediate goal a stubborn, active defense of the r. San from Przemysl through Radymno to Rozvadov. In their sections of the corps, they should firmly take the bridge positions on the left bank of the Sanaa and “hold to the extreme,” giving each other support. The gaps between the positions - to cover the cavalry with the support of infantry.
But the defensive positions were not prepared - X. R.N. Radko-Dmitriev told 29 of April that the “commander-in-chief of the front fortifications of Yaroslav and Radymno found out the dilapidated condition of the old Austrian fortifications that were not suitable for stubborn defense; will have to settle in ordinary field positions. " The acting quartermaster-general of the headquarters of the South-Western Front, Colonel MK Diterikhs, gave the following tactical recommendations to the command of the 3 Army: “For the defense of San on the army entrusted to you, it was possible to confine on the left bank of the Yaroslavl Tête-de-Pona (bridgehead, i.e. bridgehead - A. O.), the flanks of which must be supported by light, mortar heavy artillery from the right bank; in other points defend passively. In passive defense areas, bridges across the San should be completely destroyed. ”
On April 30, the Senior Adjutant of the Division, Quartermaster General of the 3 Army Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel B.P. Lazarev, submitted a note to his immediate superior, Quartermaster General of the 3 Army. In it, he proposed a set of measures and practical measures for their implementation, in the implementation of which the weakened army had a chance to stay with Yaroslav and on the r. San:
Unfortunately, time to properly organize the defense on the river. San and implement this project, was no longer.
From 1-th to 7-th battle unfolded on the river. San, and the city of Yaroslav was a key point of defense of the troops of the Russian 3-th army.
The attack on Yaroslav 1 - May 7 (14 - May 20 in a new style) 1915. German map. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 8. Berlin, 1932.
For the Russians, these battles turned out to be a struggle to consolidate on this natural frontier in order to defend the conquered part of Galicia. The German-Austrian command sought to achieve the maximum development of the tactical success achieved during the Gorlitsky breakthrough, in order to turn it into a strategic one. In order not to give Russian a foothold on the river. San, there was a concentrated strike in the direction of the city of Yaroslav. This task was assigned to Colonel-General A. von Mackensen’s 11 Army. The 4-I and 3-I Austrian armies had to use parallel attacks to assist the 11-th army and cover its flanks. Considering that the German-Austrian troops suffered major losses by this time and demanded that they be put in order, the German army command requested additional troops and redistributed the artillery.
On the part of the enemy, the following operations took part in the operation (without taking into account the reinforcements that came up during it): Guards, 10 Army, 41 Reserve German, 6 Army Austrian Corps. From the Russians: 9, 10, 12, 21, 24, 29 Army, 3 Caucasian Army and Consolidated Corps. The consolidated corps was formed during the operation, the 12 and 21 army corps of May 3 were transferred to the 8 army. The combat composition of the Russian connections was extremely weak. Here it is necessary to note the following circumstance. The division was the main tactical unit, expressing the military power of the state of the era of the First World War. The number of battalions (in contrast to earlier periods) has lost its meaning. On the other hand, the degree of equipment of the infantry division and the army corps with artillery, which is so important for the era of fire-fighting tactics, has acquired particular importance. And in the firepower of the German-Austrian corps surpassed the Russian, which paralyzed the advantage in the theoretical number of Russian divisions and corps. But the German battalion itself was, on average, approximately 20% more than the Russian one, due to the chronic shortage of infantry units of the Russian army. In the face of constant battles and retreats 1915. on the side of the enemy there was a tangible numerical superiority (meaning troops in the battle line), since from many Russian divisions only cadres remained. It was in 1915 that the composition of the Russian divisions differed most sharply from the divisions of the enemy. The first were counted in hundreds of bayonets, while the second were carefully replenished, representing full-blooded combat units. The counting of divisions and corps during this period was particularly clearly different from reality and due to the underestimation of the ratio of artillery. The situation began to improve from the end of 1915 - the beginning of 1916, but the enemy divisions always had fire superiority - first of all, this often explains the increased losses of the Russian troops. By the time of the concentration of the Russian 3-th army on the river. Sun (30 April) after 12-day (for the main forces of the army) continuous battles, its corps actually turned: 10-th, 21-th and 3-th Caucasian army - in the division (by 10 thousand. Bayonets in the buildings, each of which consisted of 4 divisions, and 21-th army - along with the 3-th rifle division), 12-th army corps - in the brigade (8 th. bayonets), 24 th army - in the regiment (5 th. . bayonets in the 3 divisions).
The infantry general O. von Emmich was the commander of the 10 Army Corps 11 of the German Army and Kaiser Wilhelm II. The photo was taken during the monarch's stay in the battle formations of the German troops during the fighting on the r. San New York Public Library.
On April 30, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front gave a directive to the troops of the front, according to which the army of the front took the following positions: 4-i - Radom positions and further south to Rozvadov, 3-i - on r. San from Rozvadov to Peremyshl and 8-I - from Peremyshl to Voloshch, Susulov, r. Dniester. The remaining armies of the front were to occupy the front along the river. Dniester and the state border to the river. Rod.
The right-flank corps of the 3 Army (9, 10, 29 and 3 Caucasian Army) occupied the defense on the right, and the left-flank (24 Army in Yaroslav, 21 Army in Radymno and 12 in Army in Przemysl) - on the left bank of the r. San The obvious mistake of the army command was that half of the army was on the same bank. San, and the other half - on the other. The resolution of the commander-in-chief of the front on what to hold on the left bank of Sana Yaroslav and the position of Radymno-Peremyshl also made a mite in the adoption of this operational decision. But the issue was provided to the commander-3 - in accordance with the situation. And Lieutenant-General V.M. Dragomirov, the front-line head of the front, generally considered that only the occupation of bridgeheads at Yaroslav and Radymno was optimal, whereas the rest of the troops should not be on the left bank.
The lack of a common position on the command of such an important operational issue has borne fruit.
The insistence of corps commanders of the 3 Army, in many respects, contributed to the fact that, at least, the key strongholds on the left bank of the r. San remained in the hands of Russian troops. So, the commander of the 12 Army Corps asked the commander to leave his unit on the left bank, since he expects to "keep a springboard between Radymno and Peremyshl in his hands for the future of our attack in the flank of the enemy." I almost found myself on the right bank and the 21 Army Corps - but it was obvious that the Yaroslavl position without the support of Radymno would quickly fall. In addition, the commander of the 21 Corps brought his opinion (that it was necessary to stay on the left bank of the San River) to the attention of the front command. He, in particular, wrote that, having personally visited Radymno, he testifies that the position occupied on the left bank is strong enough, active and has good shelling. The position is strengthened. At the same time, there are no old fortifications on the right bank of the Sana'a, and the position on the bank is absolutely unprofitable - the troops on it will be shot with impunity from the commanders of the heights of the left bank. Accordingly, to move away from the left bank is to abandon the defense of the river. This withdrawal is now equivalent to a further retreat — since the enemy in contact immediately rushes after it — and it is doubtful that it will be possible to persevere on the unprepared and smooth as a table terrain of the right bank. San In addition, the position on the left bank corresponds to the existing forces, and on the right bank it will be too stretched - the cordon. The division commanders supported the comcor, considering the San defense on the right bank was almost impossible, and the departure for San was very undesirable (including for moral reasons: we are not defeated, but only very tired; there are a lot of people with bloodied legs, but numerically increasing - come backward). Especially as the courage grows with the rest and the realization that since we are on the left bank of Sana'a, we are advancing. Departure for San will deprive even the mighty fire support of the artillery of the forts, and the surrender of bridgehead positions will entail the need for huge casualties while crossing the river, depriving the freedom of maneuvering and reconnaissance. Finally, the withdrawal is bad for the local population. The general asked to leave the troops in their positions - where they were preparing to give a proper rebuff to the enemy.
Thus, half of the army received active, and half - passive combat missions. The left-flank corps of the army was doomed to an isolated defeat, since in these positions it was necessary "to die, but not to retreat to the right bank."
Undoubtedly, a more competent decision would be to concentrate the whole army on the left bank of the river, and on the right to prepare a strong rear position.
The order of the commander-3 of April 30 set: "1) ... 9 corps as part of the 5, 42 and 70 infantry and corps of the 13 of the Siberian rifle division, militia and 2- th consolidated Cossack division to defend the area from the river. Sana to Razvadov exclusively to Krzheshov inclusive. 2) The 10 Corps, consisting of the 31 and 61 Infantry Corps and parts of other divisions that it has, and the 3 of the Don Cossack Division, should defend the r. Sana from Krzeshov exclusively to Lezajsk inclusive. 3) The 3-th Caucasian Corps, as part of the 21-th, 52-th, 9-th and parts of the 13-th Siberian rifle division and the 7-th cavalry division, to defend the area from p. Sana from Lezajsk exclusively to Lezakhov inclusively, trying to launch an offensive in the area of Senyavy to assist the 24 corps, diverting some enemy forces ... .. 5) to the 21 corps, as part of the 33, 44 and 3 rifle divisions and 16 th cavalry division, to defend the area r. Sana from Tuchenpa exclusively to Zamojsze inclusive. 6) The 12 Corps, as part of the 12 and 19 Infantry Divisions, to defend a section of the r. Sana from Zamojsce exclusively to the northern front of the fort belt of the Przemysl fortress. The commander of the 12 Corps must maintain close contact with the commander of Przemysl for full coordination of the corps and the garrison of Przemysl. 7) Army reserve in the brigade of the 45 division, moving from Zapalov to the village of Makovisko ... 8) The commanders of 9 and 10 corps develop their cavalry with the greatest possible activity, directing it to the flank and rear of the enemy and maintaining their cavalry cavalry in parts .... " The order ordered to persistently defend the front on the river. San from Razvadov to Przemysl, and the stretch from Senyavy to Przemysl is actively defended.
Продолжение следует ...
After the end of the fighting in the area of Gorlice (list of articles of the cycle, see the end of the article) Western Galicia was lost by Russian troops. The most important task facing the Russian South-Western Front and its 3 Army in particular was the stabilization of the operational-strategic situation that had developed after the Gorlitsky breakthrough. Immediately without withdrawing the troops of the 3 Army on the river. San, which would have allowed them to detach themselves from the enemy and take up a solid defense, the Supreme and Front Command doomed the battered army corps to retreat to this natural barrier under the blows of the opposing enemy.
The period of battles from 25 to April 27 was a period of fierce attacks by the Germans and the Austrians, who sought to maximize their first success.
The fiercest and stubborn battles were fought in the center of the Russian 3 Army - on the front of the 10, 3 of the Caucasus and 24 of the army corps.
The attacks on the position of the Russian 10 Army Corps cost the Germans and Austrians the loss of an entire division. 3-th Caucasian Army Corps on the front of Velepole, Vieneva, Odrzhikov within three days restrained the attacks of two German-Austrian corps. Russian troops fought heroically, even to the self-sacrifice of the corps commander, who personally led the units to the attack.
The 11 of the German army was assisted by the Austrian 3 and 4. The Russian 24 army corps covered the direction of Sanok, where the main forces of the enemy's 25 army were attacking to 3, in April. Here the corps withstood the attacks of the three enemy corps for two days, successfully repelling their onslaught, but by the end of the day on April 26, it was forced to start a withdrawal. On the front of the 9 Army Corps of the Russian 3 Army, the Austrian 4 Army conducted unsuccessful attacks. Moreover, on April 26 of the 31 division of the Russian 4 Army, they crossed the r. Wisla, destroyed the German part in 3 thousand people.
The actions of the 12 Army Corps of the Russian 3 Army were a model of active defense: it not only fought off the attacks of the 10 Army Corps and the 119 th Infantry Division of the enemy, but on the night of 27 April itself went on the counter and dropped the Austrian 26-th Landveren Infantry Division. By its active actions, the corps forged significant forces of the enemy, contributing to the success of the attack of the 21 Army Corps. The latter’s counteroffensive was being prepared.
On the morning of April 27, the 21 Army Corps began its nomination for a flank attack by the advancing German 11 Army. His blow led to the formation of a breakthrough between the 11 th Bavarian and 119 th infantry divisions of the enemy, but the enemy closed the gap with the advancement of the second-tier division. In addition, units of the Austrian 10 Army Corps launched an offensive against the Russian 21 Army Corps from the south. At the same time, the center of the Russian 3 Army was significantly eastward.
As a result, the counter attack of the 21 Army Corps did not bring any changes in the situation at the front, and by the end of April 27, the corps was forced to begin withdrawal.
On April 28, the Russian 3 army, under the cover of the rear guards, retreated, trying to detain the enemy, allowing the main forces of the corps and the rear to retreat to the r. San, and the front reserves to advance to the battlefield. By this time, the German-Austrian troops, due to large losses and separation from the rear, were no longer able to break the resistance of the Russian rear guards. And before reaching the river, they stopped.
By directive of 28 on April, the Russian Supreme Commander-in-Chief from cavalry, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich defined the line r. R. San and Dniester as an extreme line of withdrawal of the South-Western Front. The commander-in-chief of the armies of the South-Western Front, artillery general N.I. Ivanov, on April 29 also informed the command of the 3 Army: "Our intentions are in the stubborn defense of Sana'a, in order to give time to our armies to settle."
Accordingly, on the same day, the commander of the Russian 3 Army, General of Infantry, R. D. Radko-Dmitriev, issued an order setting as his immediate goal a stubborn, active defense of the r. San from Przemysl through Radymno to Rozvadov. In their sections of the corps, they should firmly take the bridge positions on the left bank of the Sanaa and “hold to the extreme,” giving each other support. The gaps between the positions - to cover the cavalry with the support of infantry.
But the defensive positions were not prepared - X. R.N. Radko-Dmitriev told 29 of April that the “commander-in-chief of the front fortifications of Yaroslav and Radymno found out the dilapidated condition of the old Austrian fortifications that were not suitable for stubborn defense; will have to settle in ordinary field positions. " The acting quartermaster-general of the headquarters of the South-Western Front, Colonel MK Diterikhs, gave the following tactical recommendations to the command of the 3 Army: “For the defense of San on the army entrusted to you, it was possible to confine on the left bank of the Yaroslavl Tête-de-Pona (bridgehead, i.e. bridgehead - A. O.), the flanks of which must be supported by light, mortar heavy artillery from the right bank; in other points defend passively. In passive defense areas, bridges across the San should be completely destroyed. ”
On April 30, the Senior Adjutant of the Division, Quartermaster General of the 3 Army Headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel B.P. Lazarev, submitted a note to his immediate superior, Quartermaster General of the 3 Army. In it, he proposed a set of measures and practical measures for their implementation, in the implementation of which the weakened army had a chance to stay with Yaroslav and on the r. San:
“The combat mission assigned to the army was stubbornly defending the r. San, in view of the unpreparedness of the marked line, the insignificant numerical strength of the units and the extreme moral and physical fatigue of the troops, can hardly be accomplished without the support of strong long-range artillery. The whole question comes down to a time delay until the Germans concentrate their heavy artillery in the area north of Radymno. It is necessary to immediately install in the area of Yaroslav a group of heavy batteries, or removing those from some of the ships (ie, the strongholds of the fortress - A. O.) Przemysl, or at least concentrating heavy artillery divisions available to the army to Yaroslav in the designated area, which will make it possible to organize cross fire defense of the most important section of the river (where the main roads of the region are grouped).
Installation of 120- and 190-poods can be done in 6 hours, transportation is organized by truck. A more important omission is the lack of data preparation for firing (no terrain triangulation has been done, distances to critical points have not been measured, angles have not been determined). On April 27, I verbally reported on the need for reconnaissance of the position and assignment of organizing preliminary defense works to the commander of the 24 corps, who had at its disposal the corps headquarters and 2 of the 26 company of the sapper battalion.
28 also raised the issue of installing heavy batteries in the Yaroslav region. The second question has not yet been implemented, however, and now it is still possible to catch up on lost time.
In any case, the defense of the river. Sana is a difficult matter, and its success cannot be considered secure.
The army is numerically weak, with huge wagons and numerically strong artillery, it is not very suitable for maneuvering actions, and its natural purpose is to serve as frontal barrier in order to give the opportunity to maneuver other armies of the front.
Based on the above, it is extremely important to prepare, reconnoiter and fortify in advance the rear area of the army.
It is necessary:
1) Map the possible frontiers.
2) Designate for reconnaissance the positions of officers of the General Staff and military engineers who are available at headquarters ....
3) Doctrine these positions for artillery defense and triangulate the terrain, for which you can use ... corps topographers and other special officers from the composition of serf artillery units.
4) Take all possible measures for dressing up and installing heavy artillery at target positions. "
Installation of 120- and 190-poods can be done in 6 hours, transportation is organized by truck. A more important omission is the lack of data preparation for firing (no terrain triangulation has been done, distances to critical points have not been measured, angles have not been determined). On April 27, I verbally reported on the need for reconnaissance of the position and assignment of organizing preliminary defense works to the commander of the 24 corps, who had at its disposal the corps headquarters and 2 of the 26 company of the sapper battalion.
28 also raised the issue of installing heavy batteries in the Yaroslav region. The second question has not yet been implemented, however, and now it is still possible to catch up on lost time.
In any case, the defense of the river. Sana is a difficult matter, and its success cannot be considered secure.
The army is numerically weak, with huge wagons and numerically strong artillery, it is not very suitable for maneuvering actions, and its natural purpose is to serve as frontal barrier in order to give the opportunity to maneuver other armies of the front.
Based on the above, it is extremely important to prepare, reconnoiter and fortify in advance the rear area of the army.
It is necessary:
1) Map the possible frontiers.
2) Designate for reconnaissance the positions of officers of the General Staff and military engineers who are available at headquarters ....
3) Doctrine these positions for artillery defense and triangulate the terrain, for which you can use ... corps topographers and other special officers from the composition of serf artillery units.
4) Take all possible measures for dressing up and installing heavy artillery at target positions. "
Unfortunately, time to properly organize the defense on the river. San and implement this project, was no longer.
From 1-th to 7-th battle unfolded on the river. San, and the city of Yaroslav was a key point of defense of the troops of the Russian 3-th army.
The attack on Yaroslav 1 - May 7 (14 - May 20 in a new style) 1915. German map. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 8. Berlin, 1932.
For the Russians, these battles turned out to be a struggle to consolidate on this natural frontier in order to defend the conquered part of Galicia. The German-Austrian command sought to achieve the maximum development of the tactical success achieved during the Gorlitsky breakthrough, in order to turn it into a strategic one. In order not to give Russian a foothold on the river. San, there was a concentrated strike in the direction of the city of Yaroslav. This task was assigned to Colonel-General A. von Mackensen’s 11 Army. The 4-I and 3-I Austrian armies had to use parallel attacks to assist the 11-th army and cover its flanks. Considering that the German-Austrian troops suffered major losses by this time and demanded that they be put in order, the German army command requested additional troops and redistributed the artillery.
On the part of the enemy, the following operations took part in the operation (without taking into account the reinforcements that came up during it): Guards, 10 Army, 41 Reserve German, 6 Army Austrian Corps. From the Russians: 9, 10, 12, 21, 24, 29 Army, 3 Caucasian Army and Consolidated Corps. The consolidated corps was formed during the operation, the 12 and 21 army corps of May 3 were transferred to the 8 army. The combat composition of the Russian connections was extremely weak. Here it is necessary to note the following circumstance. The division was the main tactical unit, expressing the military power of the state of the era of the First World War. The number of battalions (in contrast to earlier periods) has lost its meaning. On the other hand, the degree of equipment of the infantry division and the army corps with artillery, which is so important for the era of fire-fighting tactics, has acquired particular importance. And in the firepower of the German-Austrian corps surpassed the Russian, which paralyzed the advantage in the theoretical number of Russian divisions and corps. But the German battalion itself was, on average, approximately 20% more than the Russian one, due to the chronic shortage of infantry units of the Russian army. In the face of constant battles and retreats 1915. on the side of the enemy there was a tangible numerical superiority (meaning troops in the battle line), since from many Russian divisions only cadres remained. It was in 1915 that the composition of the Russian divisions differed most sharply from the divisions of the enemy. The first were counted in hundreds of bayonets, while the second were carefully replenished, representing full-blooded combat units. The counting of divisions and corps during this period was particularly clearly different from reality and due to the underestimation of the ratio of artillery. The situation began to improve from the end of 1915 - the beginning of 1916, but the enemy divisions always had fire superiority - first of all, this often explains the increased losses of the Russian troops. By the time of the concentration of the Russian 3-th army on the river. Sun (30 April) after 12-day (for the main forces of the army) continuous battles, its corps actually turned: 10-th, 21-th and 3-th Caucasian army - in the division (by 10 thousand. Bayonets in the buildings, each of which consisted of 4 divisions, and 21-th army - along with the 3-th rifle division), 12-th army corps - in the brigade (8 th. bayonets), 24 th army - in the regiment (5 th. . bayonets in the 3 divisions).
The infantry general O. von Emmich was the commander of the 10 Army Corps 11 of the German Army and Kaiser Wilhelm II. The photo was taken during the monarch's stay in the battle formations of the German troops during the fighting on the r. San New York Public Library.
On April 30, the commander-in-chief of the armies of the Southwestern Front gave a directive to the troops of the front, according to which the army of the front took the following positions: 4-i - Radom positions and further south to Rozvadov, 3-i - on r. San from Rozvadov to Peremyshl and 8-I - from Peremyshl to Voloshch, Susulov, r. Dniester. The remaining armies of the front were to occupy the front along the river. Dniester and the state border to the river. Rod.
The right-flank corps of the 3 Army (9, 10, 29 and 3 Caucasian Army) occupied the defense on the right, and the left-flank (24 Army in Yaroslav, 21 Army in Radymno and 12 in Army in Przemysl) - on the left bank of the r. San The obvious mistake of the army command was that half of the army was on the same bank. San, and the other half - on the other. The resolution of the commander-in-chief of the front on what to hold on the left bank of Sana Yaroslav and the position of Radymno-Peremyshl also made a mite in the adoption of this operational decision. But the issue was provided to the commander-3 - in accordance with the situation. And Lieutenant-General V.M. Dragomirov, the front-line head of the front, generally considered that only the occupation of bridgeheads at Yaroslav and Radymno was optimal, whereas the rest of the troops should not be on the left bank.
The lack of a common position on the command of such an important operational issue has borne fruit.
The insistence of corps commanders of the 3 Army, in many respects, contributed to the fact that, at least, the key strongholds on the left bank of the r. San remained in the hands of Russian troops. So, the commander of the 12 Army Corps asked the commander to leave his unit on the left bank, since he expects to "keep a springboard between Radymno and Peremyshl in his hands for the future of our attack in the flank of the enemy." I almost found myself on the right bank and the 21 Army Corps - but it was obvious that the Yaroslavl position without the support of Radymno would quickly fall. In addition, the commander of the 21 Corps brought his opinion (that it was necessary to stay on the left bank of the San River) to the attention of the front command. He, in particular, wrote that, having personally visited Radymno, he testifies that the position occupied on the left bank is strong enough, active and has good shelling. The position is strengthened. At the same time, there are no old fortifications on the right bank of the Sana'a, and the position on the bank is absolutely unprofitable - the troops on it will be shot with impunity from the commanders of the heights of the left bank. Accordingly, to move away from the left bank is to abandon the defense of the river. This withdrawal is now equivalent to a further retreat — since the enemy in contact immediately rushes after it — and it is doubtful that it will be possible to persevere on the unprepared and smooth as a table terrain of the right bank. San In addition, the position on the left bank corresponds to the existing forces, and on the right bank it will be too stretched - the cordon. The division commanders supported the comcor, considering the San defense on the right bank was almost impossible, and the departure for San was very undesirable (including for moral reasons: we are not defeated, but only very tired; there are a lot of people with bloodied legs, but numerically increasing - come backward). Especially as the courage grows with the rest and the realization that since we are on the left bank of Sana'a, we are advancing. Departure for San will deprive even the mighty fire support of the artillery of the forts, and the surrender of bridgehead positions will entail the need for huge casualties while crossing the river, depriving the freedom of maneuvering and reconnaissance. Finally, the withdrawal is bad for the local population. The general asked to leave the troops in their positions - where they were preparing to give a proper rebuff to the enemy.
Thus, half of the army received active, and half - passive combat missions. The left-flank corps of the army was doomed to an isolated defeat, since in these positions it was necessary "to die, but not to retreat to the right bank."
Undoubtedly, a more competent decision would be to concentrate the whole army on the left bank of the river, and on the right to prepare a strong rear position.
The order of the commander-3 of April 30 set: "1) ... 9 corps as part of the 5, 42 and 70 infantry and corps of the 13 of the Siberian rifle division, militia and 2- th consolidated Cossack division to defend the area from the river. Sana to Razvadov exclusively to Krzheshov inclusive. 2) The 10 Corps, consisting of the 31 and 61 Infantry Corps and parts of other divisions that it has, and the 3 of the Don Cossack Division, should defend the r. Sana from Krzeshov exclusively to Lezajsk inclusive. 3) The 3-th Caucasian Corps, as part of the 21-th, 52-th, 9-th and parts of the 13-th Siberian rifle division and the 7-th cavalry division, to defend the area from p. Sana from Lezajsk exclusively to Lezakhov inclusively, trying to launch an offensive in the area of Senyavy to assist the 24 corps, diverting some enemy forces ... .. 5) to the 21 corps, as part of the 33, 44 and 3 rifle divisions and 16 th cavalry division, to defend the area r. Sana from Tuchenpa exclusively to Zamojsze inclusive. 6) The 12 Corps, as part of the 12 and 19 Infantry Divisions, to defend a section of the r. Sana from Zamojsce exclusively to the northern front of the fort belt of the Przemysl fortress. The commander of the 12 Corps must maintain close contact with the commander of Przemysl for full coordination of the corps and the garrison of Przemysl. 7) Army reserve in the brigade of the 45 division, moving from Zapalov to the village of Makovisko ... 8) The commanders of 9 and 10 corps develop their cavalry with the greatest possible activity, directing it to the flank and rear of the enemy and maintaining their cavalry cavalry in parts .... " The order ordered to persistently defend the front on the river. San from Razvadov to Przemysl, and the stretch from Senyavy to Przemysl is actively defended.
Продолжение следует ...
- Oleynikov Alexey
- Under the blow "ram" Mackensen
The 3 Caucasian Corps is on the path of a strategic hurricane. Part of 1. Elite entered into battle
The 3 Caucasian Corps is on the path of a strategic hurricane. Part of 2. The backbone of the army group
The 3 Caucasian Corps is on the path of a strategic hurricane. Part of 3. Day of disaster
The 3 Caucasian Corps is on the path of a strategic hurricane. Part of 4. Calculations and prospects
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