The 3 Caucasian Corps is on the path of a strategic hurricane. Part of 2. The backbone of the army group
Acting in the interests of the 3 Army, the 3 Caucasian Army Corps had to perform two combat missions: to help keep the Bieč area and attack in the Zenzkowice – Bobova sector in order to knock out enemy units that had broken through at the junction between the 9 and 10 army enclosures. Such a duality of the task set by the army command has already predetermined the inadequacy of the use of the front reserve. The situation was aggravated by the introduction of the corps into battle in echelon - “packs”. It was not possible to create a powerful strike fist. At the same time, the difficult situation of the 10 Army Corps predetermined the need for the early introduction of fresh forces into the battle - without such support, the army was in danger of a catastrophe.
The materials of the German Reichsarchive report on the course of the battles of April 20: “General von Emmich (infantry general O. von Emmich - commander of the 10 Army Corps - AO) ordered the 11 Bavarian and 119 Infantry Divisions ... to continue the attack from the combat position they had won. The 20 Infantry Division is supposed to arrive at the moment the attack begins ... Intelligence carried out on the morning of May 3 (i.e. April 20, old style - A.O.), reported ... that the main line of resistance (the front edge of the defense) of the enemy is located south of r. Ropa ... north of the flow of the river. Lubaczówka ... General von Francois (General of the infantry G. von Francois - commander of the 41 of the reserve corps - A. O.) planned to continue the 3 attack in May and press on the right flank of his XXXXI reserve corps in order to accelerate advancement in the Ropa Valley ... Under the onslaught of the Austro-Hungarian VI Corps, the enemy left the Moshtenitsa section at dawn on 3. ... The commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General von Arz, therefore believed that his corps could set itself a broader goal, Olzhinka, the high command of the army and the high command of the neighboring guard corps agreed with this. At noon ... the Austro-Hungarian infantry had already approached the Krzymenna (371) - Rosembark ... line ... Even General Baron von Plettenberg (infantry general KF von Plettenberg - commander of the Guard Corps - A. O.) I expected further retreat of the enemy 3 in May and ordered the body of the guards to continue the pursuit ... The enemy counterattacks ... failed. But the enemy seemed determined to continue the resistance. At noon, the 2-I Guards Division was ordered to attack ... the first Guards infantry brigade reached the Olzhinka-Tukhovka line ...
12 hours 20 min. The commander of 11 of the German army gave the following order: “Tomorrow, it is planned to overcome the Vislok in the area of Zmigrod - Kolaschitsa ... routes: Emmikha corps south of Zmigrod, XXXXI reserve corps in Osik-Dembovich district, VI Army Corps Jaslo .... The 19 Infantry Division, an army reserve, today must reach the Turgis-Biskupy-Ripenik Strasovsky area. ”
A German source, noting “strong artillery fire” and “Russian infantry in strong positions” after 15 hours of X minutes, states: “without proper support of artillery, it is impossible to demand an attack from troops worn out by heavy transitions in raw bad roads; ... they remain in the same combat positions. "
By the end of the day, the Germans were detained in positions at the r. Ropa: “From the opposite bank of the Ropa, the enemy effectively flanked the height east of Korczyn ... Only a planned offensive with heavy artillery fire could succeed. Heavy artillery, given the road conditions ... could go into action over the next day. Until then, the gravity of the battle ... lay solely on the shoulders of field artillery. On the Vyslok and at the height of Korchin, the enemy had excellent observant artillery positions ... the attacking German infantry suffered greatly from strong massive defensive fire. ”
Lt. Col. L. von Rothkirch wrote about one of the episodes of these battles: “... located on the position of the 10 Glynic, see the gun battery shelling Beech, in order to prevent the approach of reserves there. It seemed that, thanks to the shelling, the top of the mountain and its slopes had to be completely destroyed and all life on them became extinct. But it was not so in reality: countless Russian machine guns soon came to life again, while the artillery, in view of the closeness of the distance from the advancing infantry, was to move its fire to the rear. The fierce battle continued for several hours. ”
The German source stated: “The counter-attacks of the Russians in the valley of the Rop did not change anything. By evening, the German infantry stormed the last positions of the enemy. At the top of the mountain the bayonet battle once again broke out. ... To use the success achieved in hard struggle, the forces were no longer there. "
Mr. Kellerman wrote that the events of the 1 half of the day on April 20 seemed to justify the expectations of the German command. But the situation changed dramatically as soon as the 11 army formations approached the 2 position of the Russians - they met with no less stubborn resistance than the day before, and were forced to resort to artillery fire. The task on 21 April was: to press the Russians, and try to master the crossings across the river. Visloka - earlier than the Russians introduce fresh forces.
In 20 hours of April 20, the commander of the Russian 3 army reported to the higher command that at night and today the enemy stubbornly attacked, pressing the left flank of the 9 and the center of the 10 body - 9-i went to the line of Karvodrzh - Tukhov-Ryglitz, and 10 th retreated to the line Alpina - Sipetnitsa - Kharilova - Bednarka - vys. Magura. The commander decided to take advantage of the 3-m Caucasian Corps - and to reject the enemy beyond the line of Alpina - Volya-Tseklinsk and to the west - at Zenzkowice - Mushrooms. It was ordered: the 9 Corps, together with the attached troops, to hold their positions, to act actively on the flanks - in order to drive the enemy off the lower Dunajec, contributing to the operations of the 10 and 3 Caucasian Corps; detachment of General Volodchenko (3 infantry regiment, 3 regiment 16-Cavalry Division and 4 regiment 3-th Don Division, supported by 2 horse batteries) to operate at the interface between adjacent flanks 9-th and 10-Corps, interacting with them, and vigorously facilitate the operations of the 10 and 3 Caucasian corps; the group of General Irmanov (10 Corps with attached parts and 3 Caucasus Corps) should decisively attack the enemy on the front of Alpina - Biecz-Volya-Tseklinsk, firmly holding on the left flank at the height of Magura; The 24 Corps, actively working on the right flank, helps to maintain the height of Magura, ensuring the path of the Hornbeam - Smigrod; firmly hold the positions held on the left flank of the 24 corps and the other corps in the Carpathians. The headquarters of the group of General Irmanov to be in Jaslo. Army headquarters in Jaslo.
In fact, the 3-th Caucasian Army Corps became the backbone of the army group (3-th Caucasian Army, 10-th Army Corps and attached parts), designed to solve the most important operational task - to stabilize the situation on the front of the 3-th army, localizing Gorlitsky breakthrough. The detachment of General Volodchenko was, acting at the junction of the 9-th and 10-th army corps, to contribute as much as possible to the performance of the combat mission assigned to the group. The effectiveness of the decision taken by the army command was significantly reduced due to the fact that the combat task of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps was formulated indefinitely: the compound did not indicate the starting line and the start time of the offensive, the interaction of the already fighting 10 Army and the only arrived 3 Caucasian Army was not organized enclosures.
The commander of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps, General of Artillery V.A. Irmanov, and the Commander of the 21 Infantry Division, Major General K. G. Nekrasov, among the Cavaliers of the 84 Infantry Shirvan His Majesty's Regiment. Chronicles of War 1914 - 15 No. 55.
The concentrated attack of the army of A. Mackensen was opposed by the disparate actions of the corps of the 3 Army, and even introduced into the battle in parts. If the battles of 19 and April 20 were absorbed by the army reserve, which was spent on pouring into the combat areas of the fighting first line corps, then 21 — April 22 — was prepared for the frontline reserve.
By the evening of April 20, the 10 Army Corps conducted heavy battles: the enemy with heavy chains, supported by hurricane artillery fire, continued to advance, but again and again, met with rifle and machine-gun fire of the Russian infantry, withdrew heavy losses. Particularly fierce battles took place in the 61 and 9 sectors of the infantry divisions. With the onset of darkness, the corps went to the front of Olszyna - Sipetnitsa - Kharilova - Bedvarka - the height of Magura.
In 23 hours of 35 minutes, the commander of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps gave the following order to parts of his group: “1) At night, from 19 to 20, and today the enemy continued his attacks and pressed the left flank of the 9 corps and the center of the 10 corps the first one went to the line of Karvodře, Tukhov, Ryglitz, and the second one goes to the line Olpina, Sipetnica, Kharklova, height 319, Bednarka, height Magura (height 847); on the remaining sections of the front of the corps, they retained their position yesterday.
2) The army commander decided, by going over to the offensive, to reject the enemy beyond the line of Alpina, Volya-Tseklinska and further to the west in the general direction of Zenkovice, Mushrooms. The 10 Army Corps passes into my submission; To the right of us north of Olpina, there is a detachment of General Volodchenko, to the left, south of the height of 847 (Magura), part of the 24 corps.
3) The subordinate group of troops of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps and the 10 Army Corps I order:
a) Lieutenant General Protopopov (N. I. Protopopov - Commander of the 10 Army Corps - A.O..) with units of the 31, 61 and 63 infantry divisions with their artillery to attack the enemy in front of their front, north of the Jaslo, Biecz highway.
b) Lieutenant-General Artemyev (V.V. Artemyev - Head of the 52 Infantry Division - A.O.) with the 52 th Infantry Division entrusted to it (without the 2 battalions) and with units of the 9 Infantry Division located in the area from r. Ropa to high. 319, west of the Mansion, at dawn to attack the enemy in the lane between the lines: Jaslo, Biech highway, der. Cave church and high. 319, Voitova, Libusha, Mshanka. The 3-th Caucasian Mortar Artillery Division remains at the disposal of Lieutenant General Artemyev.
c) Major General Nekrasov (Konstantin G. Nekrasov - Commander of the 21 Infantry Division - A. O.) with three regiments of the division entrusted to him (without the 2 battalions) and units of the 9 and 81-th infantry divisions, located on the front of the highest. 319, Wola Tseklinska, vys. 847, at dawn to attack the enemy on the front height. 319, Bednark, firmly holding the enemy on its left flank south of Bednark. 1 th driving mountain artillery division remains at the disposal of Major General Nekrasov.
d) The 2 battalions of the 21 Infantry Division and the 2 battalions of the 52 Infantry Division make up my reserve, become a village. Tshinitsa ...
e) 3-th Hopersky Cossack regiment to remain in Jaslo.
4) The headquarters of the group entrusted to me is in Jaslo ... ”
The commander of the 21 Infantry Division, Major General Nekrasov KG
21 April is the decisive day in the battle of Zigrod.
It was on that day that the command of the army and the front placed high hopes on the counter-offensive of the group of General Irmanov. Thus, in the recording of the conversation of the Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front, Lieutenant-General V.M. Dragomirov and Quartermaster-General of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General of Infantry, Yu.N. Danilov, from April 21 have the following words: “... the enemy puts pressure on us significant forces; Today, the Caucasian Corps is being introduced, after which it will be possible to say how much the position there will be strengthened ... The reinforcements sent and assembled cannot influence the outcome of the struggle to the west of the Vistula River ... Only the participation of the 3 Caucasian Corps, introduced today, will clarify this issue from the positive or negative side. ”
The fact that the actions of the group of General Irmanov were decisive was proved by the lines in the order for the 9 Army Corps at 10 hours 20 minutes: “Today the 10 Corps with the arrived divisions of the 3 Caucasian Corps turns into a decisive offensive in the direction of Zenzkowice, Gribov ".
In 11 hours of 20 minutes, the commander of the 3 army issued an order in which the group of General Irmanov was assigned the following tasks: “The group of General Irmanov should cover Yaslo, occupying a line along the r. Viskloki on its left bank, starting from the crossing der. Blazhkova to the village Samoklenski, where to enter into a close relationship with the right flank of the 24 corps. "
In the first half of the day, the enemy attacked in the 9 Infantry Division, and after 12 hours, the 21 Infantry Division of the 3 Caucasian Corps advanced to the front. The 9 Infantry Division, supported by units of the 3 Caucasian Corps, not only resisted the pressure of the enemy, but also, together with the 21 division, launched an offensive. Initially, the offensive developed successfully. So: "58 th Infantry Regiment (from the composition of the Kneisl Corps - A.O..) attacked Dzielc. The regiment, which suffered greatly from almost flanking artillery fire from Ostra Ha, was surrounded from the northeast by the advancing Russian infantry and thrown back in a southwesterly direction. Apparently, the fight was pretty hard ... ".
But after the enemy entered the battle of fresh reserves, the Russian units retreated to Dembovets. However, the situation has been stabilized for some time. Thus, the operational document from the 13 hours of the 20 minutes reported that if the 31 and 61 infantry divisions were fighting hard at the front, and their situation was difficult, “At the front of the 9 division and parts attached to it, the enemy does not press. "
However, the subsequent withdrawal of the 9 and 21 infantry divisions led to the gap between the 10 and 24 army corps.
Counted on the support of Caucasians and 31-I Infantry Division. Thus, the order for the division in 5 hours 30 minutes read: “Attack the enemy today at dawn, straight in front of you, having the immediate task to seize our position yesterday, then the day before yesterday: and develop further success in the general direction of the left flank on 409, 437, and right - in close connection with the detachment of General Volodchenko. To the left of us will be the 61 Division and the fresh units of General Irmanov's 3 Caucasian Corps, which leads the entire operation .... ”
The 52 Infantry Division was to support the 61 Infantry Division of the 10 Army Corps. The order of the commander of the 3 of the Caucasian Army Corps of the 52 Infantry Division in the 13 hours of 30 minutes prescribed: “... on going to the left (north) bank of the r. Rops to attack and attack the enemy in the lane between the Bunchal line, Sventsany, Lipye (height 425) from the north and the south - the Sedlisky line, Gossarian, Bmnarova, Rosembark, subjugating all parts of this sector ”. The division, in the evening advancing to the Shergips, took upon itself the detachments of the 61-th Infantry Division under the onslaught of the enemy.
The document records the situation that had developed by the 21 hour at this combat station: “... about 7 hour. evenings on the left flank began the offensive part of the 52 division ... The head of the 52 division about 6 hour. in the evening, he arrived at the location of the 61 division and took command of all the units in combat at the Svencana, Sipetnica section. ”
1-I battery of the 3-th Caucasian Mortar Artillery Division. Negative number 935. State archive of the Saratov region. From the personal collection of the author.
L. von Rothkirch wrote: “The Russian commander-in-chief managed to bring strong reinforcements for the reinforcement of the considerably weakened 3 of the Russian army. Driven by rail to Jaslo, she attacked mainly on the center and left wing of the German active army, while the troops marching from the Carpathian Mountains hit Emmikha’s corps. Soon it was possible to establish, by the newly arrived units, their belonging to various corps: this was how the units of the III Caucasian Corps, which stood at the Old Sambora, were transferred here ... ”
3-I Caucasian Cossack Division supported the actions of the detachment of General Volodchenko. The detachment fought with varying success. Thus, the 2 dismounted hundreds of 32 of the Don Cossack Regiment, along with hundreds of dismounted hundreds of regiments of the 3 of the Don Cossack Division, took two lines of trenches at the height of 507 near the village of Sivashev. In 16 hours 30 minutes 3-I Caucasian Cossack Division received the order: "Due to the extremely difficult position of the detachment of General Volodchenko and the categorical demands of the army headquarters, I order the 3-th Caucasian Cossack Division and 70-th Infantry Division, starting from the Tukhov region, to go by all means a decisive attack on the Tukhov-Zhurava front, directing the main blow to the height of Dobroshin-Zhurava. Execution is immediate and irrevocable. ”
Chief of the 3 Caucasian Cossack Division Lt. Gen. P. Helmitsky
Nevertheless, the situation at the divisional division, supported by the units of the 3 of the Caucasian Army Corps, was hard by the end of the day.
Thus, the report of the chief of the 61 Infantry Division in the 22 hour contained the following lines: “After the battle, the troops of the detachment entrusted to me settled along the line: the northern slope of the height. 306, height between der. Schetnitsa and vys. 392, huts der. Sventsany and vys. 370. In other words, they are located along an arc, the open side of which faces east. The danger of this situation lies in the fact that the right flank hangs in the air and can be easily bypassed in a breakthrough formed between the detachment and the 31 Infantry Division. ” It was noted that (approximately) remains in the ranks: in Lukowski shelf - 6 officers and 160 lower ranks in siedlecki shelf 5 officers and 150 lower ranks in Kholmsk shelf - 5 officers and 200 lower ranks, in the Danube Regiment - 4 officer and 120 of the lower ranks, in the Krasnostava regiment - 6 officers and 120 of the lower ranks and in the Stauchansk regiment - 1760 lower ranks. People are overworked to the point that they are almost asleep on the go. It was stated that if the 52-division had come earlier, the whole squad would have been able to hold out. Captured near 600 prisoners. Starting testified to the valor of the troops, 3 of the day fought under the fire of numerous heavy artillery, inflicting huge losses. 61-division, dying in position, faithfully executed the order of the army commander.
At the front of the 9 Infantry Division: “... the division with the parts attached to it after a stubborn battle with significantly superior enemy forces suffered huge losses and .... goes in separate groups east and west of Dembovets to Jaslo. Zigrodsky direction is open ... The number of cash bayonets in the 9 Infantry Division is very small. Lost 6 guns in a stubborn bayonet battle and firing on the canister. "
In fact, the 3-th Caucasian Army Corps was not only late with the counterattack, but was also introduced into the battle in parts. L. von Rothkirch wrote: "... military units that had just been brought up by rail or arrived in time for the march were sent to a fierce battle without proper guidance and necessary orders." The materials of the Austrian Kriegsarkhiv report: “Radko-Dmitriev tried to restore the position of the counter-attack of the Caucasian corps, whose commander took command over parts of the 10 Army Corps ... the corps arrived on the battlefield too late (but) in parts ... of one of the two divisions, 21, managed to delay the offensive ... ".
Accordingly, a fundamental change in the operational-tactical situation did not occur. The duplication of corps efforts (the direction of a part of the troops to the right flank of the 10 Army Corps) weakened efforts in the area of the main attack of the 3 Army.
The commander of the 3 Army informed the front commanders that as a result of the fighting of that day, the 10 Corps, 61, 63, and 70 Divisions and Volodchenko Detachment were so upset that the approach of the 3 of the Caucasian Corps served only to cover them waste. From the above-mentioned compounds, after stubborn resistance, which cost the colossal losses to the enemy, only remnants remained. Many regiments have only a few hundred bayonets. As a result, to protect its western front, the army has only forces of no more than 5 infantry divisions. After the arrival of the 13-th Siberian and Combined - 7 divisions. Pointing to the insufficiency of these forces, the commander asked for the strengthening of the western front of the army - otherwise it would be difficult to hold on. As a result, “... the left flank of the group of General Irmanov, after the strongest battles, was pushed back to the line Zmigrod, Dembovets”. It was reported that in such a position to stay on the line Dombrova, p. Visloka, Zmigrod, Mesolaborch cannot be - this line can only be an intermediate boundary before moving on to the next line, which is much to the northeast, approximately Sanok, Krosno, Pilzno, Dombrova, the mouth of the r. Dunajec.
Instead of the expected success of the attack of the 3-th Caucasian Army Corps, which could lead to a significant shift in the situation, there was only some stabilization of the situation. In fact, the corps, sacrificing itself as the “backups” of the 3 Army Corps, gave the army command time - 1-2 precious days. But this time it was necessary to be able to dispose.
Продолжение следует ...
The materials of the German Reichsarchive report on the course of the battles of April 20: “General von Emmich (infantry general O. von Emmich - commander of the 10 Army Corps - AO) ordered the 11 Bavarian and 119 Infantry Divisions ... to continue the attack from the combat position they had won. The 20 Infantry Division is supposed to arrive at the moment the attack begins ... Intelligence carried out on the morning of May 3 (i.e. April 20, old style - A.O.), reported ... that the main line of resistance (the front edge of the defense) of the enemy is located south of r. Ropa ... north of the flow of the river. Lubaczówka ... General von Francois (General of the infantry G. von Francois - commander of the 41 of the reserve corps - A. O.) planned to continue the 3 attack in May and press on the right flank of his XXXXI reserve corps in order to accelerate advancement in the Ropa Valley ... Under the onslaught of the Austro-Hungarian VI Corps, the enemy left the Moshtenitsa section at dawn on 3. ... The commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General von Arz, therefore believed that his corps could set itself a broader goal, Olzhinka, the high command of the army and the high command of the neighboring guard corps agreed with this. At noon ... the Austro-Hungarian infantry had already approached the Krzymenna (371) - Rosembark ... line ... Even General Baron von Plettenberg (infantry general KF von Plettenberg - commander of the Guard Corps - A. O.) I expected further retreat of the enemy 3 in May and ordered the body of the guards to continue the pursuit ... The enemy counterattacks ... failed. But the enemy seemed determined to continue the resistance. At noon, the 2-I Guards Division was ordered to attack ... the first Guards infantry brigade reached the Olzhinka-Tukhovka line ...
12 hours 20 min. The commander of 11 of the German army gave the following order: “Tomorrow, it is planned to overcome the Vislok in the area of Zmigrod - Kolaschitsa ... routes: Emmikha corps south of Zmigrod, XXXXI reserve corps in Osik-Dembovich district, VI Army Corps Jaslo .... The 19 Infantry Division, an army reserve, today must reach the Turgis-Biskupy-Ripenik Strasovsky area. ”
A German source, noting “strong artillery fire” and “Russian infantry in strong positions” after 15 hours of X minutes, states: “without proper support of artillery, it is impossible to demand an attack from troops worn out by heavy transitions in raw bad roads; ... they remain in the same combat positions. "
By the end of the day, the Germans were detained in positions at the r. Ropa: “From the opposite bank of the Ropa, the enemy effectively flanked the height east of Korczyn ... Only a planned offensive with heavy artillery fire could succeed. Heavy artillery, given the road conditions ... could go into action over the next day. Until then, the gravity of the battle ... lay solely on the shoulders of field artillery. On the Vyslok and at the height of Korchin, the enemy had excellent observant artillery positions ... the attacking German infantry suffered greatly from strong massive defensive fire. ”
Lt. Col. L. von Rothkirch wrote about one of the episodes of these battles: “... located on the position of the 10 Glynic, see the gun battery shelling Beech, in order to prevent the approach of reserves there. It seemed that, thanks to the shelling, the top of the mountain and its slopes had to be completely destroyed and all life on them became extinct. But it was not so in reality: countless Russian machine guns soon came to life again, while the artillery, in view of the closeness of the distance from the advancing infantry, was to move its fire to the rear. The fierce battle continued for several hours. ”
The German source stated: “The counter-attacks of the Russians in the valley of the Rop did not change anything. By evening, the German infantry stormed the last positions of the enemy. At the top of the mountain the bayonet battle once again broke out. ... To use the success achieved in hard struggle, the forces were no longer there. "
Mr. Kellerman wrote that the events of the 1 half of the day on April 20 seemed to justify the expectations of the German command. But the situation changed dramatically as soon as the 11 army formations approached the 2 position of the Russians - they met with no less stubborn resistance than the day before, and were forced to resort to artillery fire. The task on 21 April was: to press the Russians, and try to master the crossings across the river. Visloka - earlier than the Russians introduce fresh forces.
In 20 hours of April 20, the commander of the Russian 3 army reported to the higher command that at night and today the enemy stubbornly attacked, pressing the left flank of the 9 and the center of the 10 body - 9-i went to the line of Karvodrzh - Tukhov-Ryglitz, and 10 th retreated to the line Alpina - Sipetnitsa - Kharilova - Bednarka - vys. Magura. The commander decided to take advantage of the 3-m Caucasian Corps - and to reject the enemy beyond the line of Alpina - Volya-Tseklinsk and to the west - at Zenzkowice - Mushrooms. It was ordered: the 9 Corps, together with the attached troops, to hold their positions, to act actively on the flanks - in order to drive the enemy off the lower Dunajec, contributing to the operations of the 10 and 3 Caucasian Corps; detachment of General Volodchenko (3 infantry regiment, 3 regiment 16-Cavalry Division and 4 regiment 3-th Don Division, supported by 2 horse batteries) to operate at the interface between adjacent flanks 9-th and 10-Corps, interacting with them, and vigorously facilitate the operations of the 10 and 3 Caucasian corps; the group of General Irmanov (10 Corps with attached parts and 3 Caucasus Corps) should decisively attack the enemy on the front of Alpina - Biecz-Volya-Tseklinsk, firmly holding on the left flank at the height of Magura; The 24 Corps, actively working on the right flank, helps to maintain the height of Magura, ensuring the path of the Hornbeam - Smigrod; firmly hold the positions held on the left flank of the 24 corps and the other corps in the Carpathians. The headquarters of the group of General Irmanov to be in Jaslo. Army headquarters in Jaslo.
In fact, the 3-th Caucasian Army Corps became the backbone of the army group (3-th Caucasian Army, 10-th Army Corps and attached parts), designed to solve the most important operational task - to stabilize the situation on the front of the 3-th army, localizing Gorlitsky breakthrough. The detachment of General Volodchenko was, acting at the junction of the 9-th and 10-th army corps, to contribute as much as possible to the performance of the combat mission assigned to the group. The effectiveness of the decision taken by the army command was significantly reduced due to the fact that the combat task of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps was formulated indefinitely: the compound did not indicate the starting line and the start time of the offensive, the interaction of the already fighting 10 Army and the only arrived 3 Caucasian Army was not organized enclosures.
The commander of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps, General of Artillery V.A. Irmanov, and the Commander of the 21 Infantry Division, Major General K. G. Nekrasov, among the Cavaliers of the 84 Infantry Shirvan His Majesty's Regiment. Chronicles of War 1914 - 15 No. 55.
The concentrated attack of the army of A. Mackensen was opposed by the disparate actions of the corps of the 3 Army, and even introduced into the battle in parts. If the battles of 19 and April 20 were absorbed by the army reserve, which was spent on pouring into the combat areas of the fighting first line corps, then 21 — April 22 — was prepared for the frontline reserve.
By the evening of April 20, the 10 Army Corps conducted heavy battles: the enemy with heavy chains, supported by hurricane artillery fire, continued to advance, but again and again, met with rifle and machine-gun fire of the Russian infantry, withdrew heavy losses. Particularly fierce battles took place in the 61 and 9 sectors of the infantry divisions. With the onset of darkness, the corps went to the front of Olszyna - Sipetnitsa - Kharilova - Bedvarka - the height of Magura.
In 23 hours of 35 minutes, the commander of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps gave the following order to parts of his group: “1) At night, from 19 to 20, and today the enemy continued his attacks and pressed the left flank of the 9 corps and the center of the 10 corps the first one went to the line of Karvodře, Tukhov, Ryglitz, and the second one goes to the line Olpina, Sipetnica, Kharklova, height 319, Bednarka, height Magura (height 847); on the remaining sections of the front of the corps, they retained their position yesterday.
2) The army commander decided, by going over to the offensive, to reject the enemy beyond the line of Alpina, Volya-Tseklinska and further to the west in the general direction of Zenkovice, Mushrooms. The 10 Army Corps passes into my submission; To the right of us north of Olpina, there is a detachment of General Volodchenko, to the left, south of the height of 847 (Magura), part of the 24 corps.
3) The subordinate group of troops of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps and the 10 Army Corps I order:
a) Lieutenant General Protopopov (N. I. Protopopov - Commander of the 10 Army Corps - A.O..) with units of the 31, 61 and 63 infantry divisions with their artillery to attack the enemy in front of their front, north of the Jaslo, Biecz highway.
b) Lieutenant-General Artemyev (V.V. Artemyev - Head of the 52 Infantry Division - A.O.) with the 52 th Infantry Division entrusted to it (without the 2 battalions) and with units of the 9 Infantry Division located in the area from r. Ropa to high. 319, west of the Mansion, at dawn to attack the enemy in the lane between the lines: Jaslo, Biech highway, der. Cave church and high. 319, Voitova, Libusha, Mshanka. The 3-th Caucasian Mortar Artillery Division remains at the disposal of Lieutenant General Artemyev.
c) Major General Nekrasov (Konstantin G. Nekrasov - Commander of the 21 Infantry Division - A. O.) with three regiments of the division entrusted to him (without the 2 battalions) and units of the 9 and 81-th infantry divisions, located on the front of the highest. 319, Wola Tseklinska, vys. 847, at dawn to attack the enemy on the front height. 319, Bednark, firmly holding the enemy on its left flank south of Bednark. 1 th driving mountain artillery division remains at the disposal of Major General Nekrasov.
d) The 2 battalions of the 21 Infantry Division and the 2 battalions of the 52 Infantry Division make up my reserve, become a village. Tshinitsa ...
e) 3-th Hopersky Cossack regiment to remain in Jaslo.
4) The headquarters of the group entrusted to me is in Jaslo ... ”
The commander of the 21 Infantry Division, Major General Nekrasov KG
21 April is the decisive day in the battle of Zigrod.
It was on that day that the command of the army and the front placed high hopes on the counter-offensive of the group of General Irmanov. Thus, in the recording of the conversation of the Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front, Lieutenant-General V.M. Dragomirov and Quartermaster-General of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General of Infantry, Yu.N. Danilov, from April 21 have the following words: “... the enemy puts pressure on us significant forces; Today, the Caucasian Corps is being introduced, after which it will be possible to say how much the position there will be strengthened ... The reinforcements sent and assembled cannot influence the outcome of the struggle to the west of the Vistula River ... Only the participation of the 3 Caucasian Corps, introduced today, will clarify this issue from the positive or negative side. ”
The fact that the actions of the group of General Irmanov were decisive was proved by the lines in the order for the 9 Army Corps at 10 hours 20 minutes: “Today the 10 Corps with the arrived divisions of the 3 Caucasian Corps turns into a decisive offensive in the direction of Zenzkowice, Gribov ".
In 11 hours of 20 minutes, the commander of the 3 army issued an order in which the group of General Irmanov was assigned the following tasks: “The group of General Irmanov should cover Yaslo, occupying a line along the r. Viskloki on its left bank, starting from the crossing der. Blazhkova to the village Samoklenski, where to enter into a close relationship with the right flank of the 24 corps. "
In the first half of the day, the enemy attacked in the 9 Infantry Division, and after 12 hours, the 21 Infantry Division of the 3 Caucasian Corps advanced to the front. The 9 Infantry Division, supported by units of the 3 Caucasian Corps, not only resisted the pressure of the enemy, but also, together with the 21 division, launched an offensive. Initially, the offensive developed successfully. So: "58 th Infantry Regiment (from the composition of the Kneisl Corps - A.O..) attacked Dzielc. The regiment, which suffered greatly from almost flanking artillery fire from Ostra Ha, was surrounded from the northeast by the advancing Russian infantry and thrown back in a southwesterly direction. Apparently, the fight was pretty hard ... ".
But after the enemy entered the battle of fresh reserves, the Russian units retreated to Dembovets. However, the situation has been stabilized for some time. Thus, the operational document from the 13 hours of the 20 minutes reported that if the 31 and 61 infantry divisions were fighting hard at the front, and their situation was difficult, “At the front of the 9 division and parts attached to it, the enemy does not press. "
However, the subsequent withdrawal of the 9 and 21 infantry divisions led to the gap between the 10 and 24 army corps.
Counted on the support of Caucasians and 31-I Infantry Division. Thus, the order for the division in 5 hours 30 minutes read: “Attack the enemy today at dawn, straight in front of you, having the immediate task to seize our position yesterday, then the day before yesterday: and develop further success in the general direction of the left flank on 409, 437, and right - in close connection with the detachment of General Volodchenko. To the left of us will be the 61 Division and the fresh units of General Irmanov's 3 Caucasian Corps, which leads the entire operation .... ”
The 52 Infantry Division was to support the 61 Infantry Division of the 10 Army Corps. The order of the commander of the 3 of the Caucasian Army Corps of the 52 Infantry Division in the 13 hours of 30 minutes prescribed: “... on going to the left (north) bank of the r. Rops to attack and attack the enemy in the lane between the Bunchal line, Sventsany, Lipye (height 425) from the north and the south - the Sedlisky line, Gossarian, Bmnarova, Rosembark, subjugating all parts of this sector ”. The division, in the evening advancing to the Shergips, took upon itself the detachments of the 61-th Infantry Division under the onslaught of the enemy.
The document records the situation that had developed by the 21 hour at this combat station: “... about 7 hour. evenings on the left flank began the offensive part of the 52 division ... The head of the 52 division about 6 hour. in the evening, he arrived at the location of the 61 division and took command of all the units in combat at the Svencana, Sipetnica section. ”
1-I battery of the 3-th Caucasian Mortar Artillery Division. Negative number 935. State archive of the Saratov region. From the personal collection of the author.
L. von Rothkirch wrote: “The Russian commander-in-chief managed to bring strong reinforcements for the reinforcement of the considerably weakened 3 of the Russian army. Driven by rail to Jaslo, she attacked mainly on the center and left wing of the German active army, while the troops marching from the Carpathian Mountains hit Emmikha’s corps. Soon it was possible to establish, by the newly arrived units, their belonging to various corps: this was how the units of the III Caucasian Corps, which stood at the Old Sambora, were transferred here ... ”
3-I Caucasian Cossack Division supported the actions of the detachment of General Volodchenko. The detachment fought with varying success. Thus, the 2 dismounted hundreds of 32 of the Don Cossack Regiment, along with hundreds of dismounted hundreds of regiments of the 3 of the Don Cossack Division, took two lines of trenches at the height of 507 near the village of Sivashev. In 16 hours 30 minutes 3-I Caucasian Cossack Division received the order: "Due to the extremely difficult position of the detachment of General Volodchenko and the categorical demands of the army headquarters, I order the 3-th Caucasian Cossack Division and 70-th Infantry Division, starting from the Tukhov region, to go by all means a decisive attack on the Tukhov-Zhurava front, directing the main blow to the height of Dobroshin-Zhurava. Execution is immediate and irrevocable. ”
Chief of the 3 Caucasian Cossack Division Lt. Gen. P. Helmitsky
Nevertheless, the situation at the divisional division, supported by the units of the 3 of the Caucasian Army Corps, was hard by the end of the day.
Thus, the report of the chief of the 61 Infantry Division in the 22 hour contained the following lines: “After the battle, the troops of the detachment entrusted to me settled along the line: the northern slope of the height. 306, height between der. Schetnitsa and vys. 392, huts der. Sventsany and vys. 370. In other words, they are located along an arc, the open side of which faces east. The danger of this situation lies in the fact that the right flank hangs in the air and can be easily bypassed in a breakthrough formed between the detachment and the 31 Infantry Division. ” It was noted that (approximately) remains in the ranks: in Lukowski shelf - 6 officers and 160 lower ranks in siedlecki shelf 5 officers and 150 lower ranks in Kholmsk shelf - 5 officers and 200 lower ranks, in the Danube Regiment - 4 officer and 120 of the lower ranks, in the Krasnostava regiment - 6 officers and 120 of the lower ranks and in the Stauchansk regiment - 1760 lower ranks. People are overworked to the point that they are almost asleep on the go. It was stated that if the 52-division had come earlier, the whole squad would have been able to hold out. Captured near 600 prisoners. Starting testified to the valor of the troops, 3 of the day fought under the fire of numerous heavy artillery, inflicting huge losses. 61-division, dying in position, faithfully executed the order of the army commander.
At the front of the 9 Infantry Division: “... the division with the parts attached to it after a stubborn battle with significantly superior enemy forces suffered huge losses and .... goes in separate groups east and west of Dembovets to Jaslo. Zigrodsky direction is open ... The number of cash bayonets in the 9 Infantry Division is very small. Lost 6 guns in a stubborn bayonet battle and firing on the canister. "
In fact, the 3-th Caucasian Army Corps was not only late with the counterattack, but was also introduced into the battle in parts. L. von Rothkirch wrote: "... military units that had just been brought up by rail or arrived in time for the march were sent to a fierce battle without proper guidance and necessary orders." The materials of the Austrian Kriegsarkhiv report: “Radko-Dmitriev tried to restore the position of the counter-attack of the Caucasian corps, whose commander took command over parts of the 10 Army Corps ... the corps arrived on the battlefield too late (but) in parts ... of one of the two divisions, 21, managed to delay the offensive ... ".
Accordingly, a fundamental change in the operational-tactical situation did not occur. The duplication of corps efforts (the direction of a part of the troops to the right flank of the 10 Army Corps) weakened efforts in the area of the main attack of the 3 Army.
The commander of the 3 Army informed the front commanders that as a result of the fighting of that day, the 10 Corps, 61, 63, and 70 Divisions and Volodchenko Detachment were so upset that the approach of the 3 of the Caucasian Corps served only to cover them waste. From the above-mentioned compounds, after stubborn resistance, which cost the colossal losses to the enemy, only remnants remained. Many regiments have only a few hundred bayonets. As a result, to protect its western front, the army has only forces of no more than 5 infantry divisions. After the arrival of the 13-th Siberian and Combined - 7 divisions. Pointing to the insufficiency of these forces, the commander asked for the strengthening of the western front of the army - otherwise it would be difficult to hold on. As a result, “... the left flank of the group of General Irmanov, after the strongest battles, was pushed back to the line Zmigrod, Dembovets”. It was reported that in such a position to stay on the line Dombrova, p. Visloka, Zmigrod, Mesolaborch cannot be - this line can only be an intermediate boundary before moving on to the next line, which is much to the northeast, approximately Sanok, Krosno, Pilzno, Dombrova, the mouth of the r. Dunajec.
Instead of the expected success of the attack of the 3-th Caucasian Army Corps, which could lead to a significant shift in the situation, there was only some stabilization of the situation. In fact, the corps, sacrificing itself as the “backups” of the 3 Army Corps, gave the army command time - 1-2 precious days. But this time it was necessary to be able to dispose.
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