Lyubachev battles, May-June of 1915
1) 19 - 22 May 1915 - the advance of the 3 and 8 armies of the Southwestern Front at the second stage of the Gorlitsky operation 19. 04. - 10. 06. 1915
2) 30 of May - 3 of June 1915 was a defensive battle of the 3 and 8 armies at the third stage of the Gorlitsky operation.
During the fighting at Sana'a 1 - 15 on May 1915, the front troops lost bridgeheads on the left bank of the river, and also significantly lost their positions on the right bank of this natural frontier of defense (see battles for Yaroslav and Radymno; list at the end of the article) During the battle on the river. The Sun Command of the Southwestern Front made another attempt to turn the tide. The offensive of the Russian 3 Army was of particular importance in light of the increasing pressure of the German 11 Army and the Austrian 2 Army against the fortress of Przemysl, which was being defended by the troops of the Russian 8 Army. It was necessary to divert the attention of the enemy from this strategic object.
Promising design
The Russian High Command is concentrating additional forces on the Southwestern Front. As a reserve of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the 2 Caucasus (concentration point - Khodorov) and 23th (concentration point - Lviv) army corps were transferred. These formations were to become the core of the new army, the maneuver of which could reverse the unfavorable operational and strategic situation that developed on the South-Western Front as a result of the Gorlitsky breakthrough.
The commander-in-chief of the armies of the North-Western Front, the infantry general M.V. Alekseev believed that one should not miss the time necessary to put in order the 3 army, one should also take advantage of the entry into the Italian war - and begin actions not private, but general values. It is necessary to go on the offensive on the left bank of the river. Wisla, having organized the strike in such a way that, having defeated the opposing enemy troops, seriously threatened the flank and rear of the enemy forces operating on the river. San. The 3 Army needs to be strengthened at the expense of the extreme left flank of the general strategic front, where it makes no sense to continue the offensive - unless in order for the 3 Army to be able to maintain its position. Reinforcements must be sent to the front of Ilzh - Opatov - Sandomir, forming here a new army of 5 corps. Deployed on the Radom - Sandomierz front (the main forces south of the mountainous and wooded area - on the Ostrovets - Sandomir section), this army must deliver a decisive blow along the Vistula.
The enemy offensive on the river. San 11 of May (see Radymno) thwarted this plan. And, given that the position of the Russian troops in Sana'a and the Przemysl region was very serious, the Headquarters believed that, first of all, Galicia should be kept behind as much as possible. Thus, the “space retention” strategy prevailed over the maneuver strategy. All this had far-reaching adverse operational-strategic consequences.
In an effort to wrest the initiative from the hands of the enemy and taking into account the critical situation of the Russian troops at the Przemysl fortress, the concentration of significant enemy forces in the Yaroslav region and the enemy’s active operations against the left flank of the 8 Army, the commander of the South-Western Front, artillery general N. I. Ivanov ordered his the army on the night of May 19 "attack the enemy, defeat and throw him away, trying to get the main forces on the line Baranuv - Rzeszow - Dubetsko - Khirov - Koziuvka - Vyshkov - Korosmeza - Bystrin - Brodil - Kimpolung."
The reserve of the High Command was used - the 2-th Caucasian and 23-th army corps (assigned to the 8-th army), which was introduced into the battle between pp Lyubachevka and Cherry. During the offensive operation against Lyubachev, this group inflicted a major blow on the enemy’s grouping, which bypassed the right flank of the 8 Army and surrounded Przemysl.
The 3 Army, providing itself to the right (from the Vistula River), was supposed to contribute to it — to enter the Yaroslav-Rzeszow line on the right flank. Accordingly, the main strike on the front of the 3 Army was carried out by its right-flank corps (9 Army, 10 Army and 14 Army), which, going with their right shoulders, went to the Rzeszow - Przhevorsk line, and had to operate on the flank and rear enemy defensive line along the river. San. The 15 Army Corps was supposed to cover the strike group. In fact, with the forces of the 9, 10, 14, 15 army corps, the army attacked the front and the left flank of the opposing enemy group.
The 24, 29 and 3 Caucasian army corps of the 3 Army performed a passive task. With an energetic offensive, they had to shackle the enemy, not allowing him to transfer forces from the front of Yaroslav-Senyav.
The 4th Horse Corps, as soon as a tactical breakthrough was formed, was supposed to advance between the 9 and 15 army corps and rush to the rear of the main enemy group. The general direction of movement of the cavalry is on Boyaniv - Kolbushev.
The main enemy of the troops of the Russian 3 Army were the units of the Austro-Hungarian 4 Army: the 9 Army Corps (the 10 Army Infantry Division and the 106 Mountain Land Brigade); 14th Army Corps (3th and 8th Infantry Divisions); Austrian consolidated, 21-I infantry, 37-I and 41-I persecuted infantry divisions; German 47-I reserve division; 11 I Cavalry Division, part of the 2 Cavalry Division.
Corps strike
On the night of May 19, the corps of the Russian 3 Army went on the offensive.
15-th Army Corps occupied the village. Kaimuv, Otsice, Sulikov, but the hurricane artillery fire stopped his progress. The weakness of their own heavy artillery was the most important factor hindering the success of this formation. It was possible after a stubborn battle to seize the northern outskirts of villages. Vija. Attempts by the Germans to attack the left flank of the corps were repelled. Toward the end of the operation - on the night of May 21 - a stubborn battle was fought on the Vija-Kravets line.
The 9 Army Corps was successful in capturing two lines of enemy trenches. But the left flank of the compound met stubborn resistance - and he failed to advance. But the German counterattacks were repulsed. On May 20 in the area of Verkhole - Podvolina - Borovina during the brilliant attack of the 42 Infantry Division, the Austrian division was defeated, guns, machine guns and a significant number of prisoners were captured.
The cavalry was introduced into the breakthrough. The military journal of the 20 Don Cossack Regiment (3 I Don Cossack Division of the 4 Horse Corps) reports: “At 2 at midnight, from 20 to 21 on May, the regiment made an alarm out of s. Maltse to Nisko as part of the 1-th brigade to develop the success of the infantry, knocking the enemy out of position with Nisko. On p. Novoselyets was sent a detachment of cornet Timoshchenkov Pavel, who, having caught the rear guard of a retreating enemy, attacked the Austrians in captivity 20. From Novoselyets, the regiment was moved around in Zalesye, but stumbled upon a fortified position near Zalesye. Having taken the position of the 1, 3, and 4, hundreds of regiments engaged in fire combat with the enemy and stopped his work to improve his trenches. "
Russian infantry and cavalry pursued the enemy in the direction of Novoselyets. On the 21 of May, the 9th Army Corps advanced along the entire front and occupied the front of Mazarne - Novoselice - Kosice.
The 14th Army Corps took possession of the villages. Struza - and the enemy hastily retreated. The right flank of the junction contributed to the left flank of the 9 body. Having captured Strus, parts of the corps launched an offensive on the ground. The mine, having also taken possession of it. The Rudnik - Zarzhiny section was the most promising for the subsequent development of success, but the lack of reserves did not allow to expand the offensive. On the night of the 21, the corps advanced south of places. The mine and went to Novoseltsy. The offensive continued - on 22 on May they managed to take possession of the villages. Groble. For 19 - 20 on May corps trophies amounted to 32 officers, 2683 lower ranks, 10 machine guns and a searchlight (including the 18 I infantry division captured 20 officers, 1902 lower ranks and 6 infantry 70 divisions 12 infantry , 781 lower rank, 4 machine gun and spotlight). An order was received - on the night of May 23, the offensive should be suspended and consolidated.
The 10 Army Corps was confronted with heavily fortified enemy positions with powerful wire fences. However, the advanced parts of the body crossed to the left bank of the river. San, having mastered the farm and advanced enemy trenches. On the night of May 21, Tarnogura and Zarzhiny took control. Enemy attacks were repelled. Then the corps, having met with strong resistance, switched to defense.
The 3-th Caucasian Army Corps, also meeting stubborn resistance of the enemy, crossed to the left bank of the river. Lyubachevka. The onset of the compound was hampered by heavy artillery fire. Focusing on the left bank of the river. Lyubachevka, parts of the corps carried out an unsuccessful attack - and with great losses they went over the river.
The 24 Army Corps, having met stubborn resistance of the enemy in a strongly fortified position, could not achieve tactical success. Some units crossed to the left bank of the river. Lyubachevka, but their attempts to go on the offensive were unsuccessful, and the corps remained at the starting lines. The artillery officer recalled how the infantry was melting like a wax candle among the infernal bonfires. In such an environment, and artillery work became incredibly difficult. Gunners all the time occupied the most risky positions. All observation posts were either directly in front of the infantry trenches or in front of them. All the time I had to deal with a huge amount of heavy and heaviest artillery. The Germans were the enemy all the time. And all the time the team worked with great dedication.
The 29-th Army Corps took possession of a strongly fortified position at the places. Tsetula (on the right flank of the compound, while the left flank advanced less successfully). Under the influence of enemy artillery fire, the right flank of the corps had to retreat to their original positions. Parts of the left flank captured the height of 204 north of places. Fuses. On the 20 of May, the right flank of the compound again occupied the 186 height (north of Cetula), but on the night of the 21 of May it was necessary to leave the 204 height and move back to the starting positions.
During the Lyubachev fights in the 3 Army, there was a lack of heavy artillery and ammunition. Already on the 18 of May (that is, even before the offensive), the Supreme Commander categorically demanded to save the ammunition available in the troops.
To be continued ...
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Information