The struggle for the initiative in the battle of Yaroslav. Two counterattacks
Battle of Yaroslav developed (see “The apogee of the 1915 battle of the year near Yaroslav. Canceled order of Radko-Dmitriev "), demanding active decisions by the Russian command. And the Russian command began preparations for a counterattack.
In 23 hours of 16 minutes N. N. Yanushkevich received a dispatch from the front headquarters:
The commander of the 3 Army on the night of 4 on May 5 issued an order to the army, which formed the basis for its actions on May 5: “I order the corps of the army entrusted to me to continue to defend their positions by all means 24 Corps, which take the line Melniki on p. Lyubachevka, Khutka, Olkhova, eastern outskirts of Makowisko, Wetlin. On this line, the 24 body will be strengthened and held at all costs, tightly tied up its flanks with the flanks of the neighboring bodies. The 16 Cavalry Division remains at my disposal and go to the morning of May 5 in the village of Oleszyce ... I transfer the militia brigade located near Tarnogrod to the 3 Caucasian Corps, whose commander immediately draws it to the corps area. ”
The enemy began to build up forces on the right bank of the r. San So, by the 17 hours of the day the 3 bridges were brought across the river, along which 10 infantry (from the German Guards and Consolidated Corps) and 2 cavalry regiments crossed.
The transition of the Russian troops to the counteroffensive became more and more relevant.
On May 5, the newly created Consolidated Corps and 16-th Cavalry Division concentrated behind the left flank of the 24-th Army Corps (south-west of Lyubachev), while the 3-I Don Cossack Division was pulled to Lyubachev. Taking advantage of the reserves approach, RD Radko-Dmitriev gave an order in 11 o'clock in the morning, in which he set the 3 Army for the task, launching a decisive offensive, to strike the right flank of the enemy, which was ferried both directly from Yaroslav and north.
By the time the army went on the offensive, the 8 Infantry Division of the 15 Army Corps, having beaten off several night attacks, advanced and occupied German trenches, some units of the 9 and 10 Army corps crossed to the left bank of the r. San At the front of the 3 of the Caucasian Army Corps, the enemy’s attack at the beginning of the morning of 5 in May from Lezahov to Senyavu was successful, but then the enemy was thrown back to its original positions. On the left flank of the 3 Caucasian Corps, the enemy was advancing from Monasterj, advancing along the r. Lyubachevka, and bypassed the flank of the 52 Infantry Division. Russian units had to retreat to the front of Sieniawa - Shmule, and then - Pichany - Vyleva - Tvarda - Bulls.
In the afternoon of May 5, the enemy, having transferred (even at night) on the front of the 24 corps to the right bank of Sana, Yaroslav had considerable forces, launched an offensive on the whole front. The whole day, as the document noted, there was a cruel cannonade of enemy artillery throughout the whole section of the corps - the latter was bombarded with heavy projectiles up to 10-inch inclusive. Heavy shells, which the enemy "spent in an incredibly large amount" covered the whole area. On the right flank, the Russian units soon moved to the Radov-Tetula front. But the German attack in the center was unsuccessful - units of the 45 Infantry Division repulsed it with heavy losses for the enemy. According to the source, the Russian artillery, meeting the enemy’s attacking chains with destructive fire, swept away entire ranks - after which part of the enemy’s chains lay down, and the other, having suffered huge losses, ran into disarray.
With the onset of darkness, the Germans again went on the offensive on the left flank of the corps - in the sector of the 12-th Siberian rifle division. The attack is repelled, but: “Our losses are very significant, the number of the majority of the regiments does not exceed a quarter of its normal composition, but there are many regiments numbering no more than two hundred people.” The enemy announced the capture of one of the Siberian infantry regiments almost at full strength - 10 officers and 2-x thousand lower ranks.
By the end of the day, on May 5, the enemy penetrated at the junction between the 3 Caucasian and 24 corps, moving in the direction of Molodich. On the front of other corps, he did not have success, having suffered serious losses. In particular, the document noted that the 8 Infantry Division, which, reflecting the Germans' night attacks, advanced and occupied enemy trenches, found in the last many uncleared corpses - the German lower ranks, and officers. Several German airplanes, artillery spotters, were shot down, and the pilots from one of them were captured. The Germans at Yaroslav, regardless of the losses, under heavy artillery fire Russians sought to establish themselves on the right bank of the r. San
The beginning of the Russian offensive is on the 24 of the May 5 hour. The main attack was to be delivered by the Consolidated Corps (3-I Caucasian Rifle, 77-I infantry and 16-I cavalry divisions) from the Menkish New - Menkish Old line to the Macovisko-Sobetzin front - in order to capture crossings in the bend of the Garbarge river. In the future, the corps should advance along the right bank of the river. San to the flank of the enemy operating against the 24 corps. The basis of the tactical actions of the Consolidated Corps was suddenness - it must attack without firing and shouting "Hurray."
The task of the 24 Army Corps was to hold onto the Melnik-Khutki-Olkhova-Makovisko-Vetlin front; 10-th and 3-th Caucasian Army Corps - to discard the enemy who had crossed over to the left bank of Sana'a; 9 th and 15 th army corps - hit the enemy along the left bank of the river.
On 15 hours of 30 minutes of 5, the commander of the Consolidated Corps was instructed by the commander of the 3 army, and on the 16 hours 30 minutes went to Menkish Stary (the 3 Caucasian Rifle Division ended up there).
After maneuvering the corps, on the night of 6, the 3-I army launched an offensive.
The night offensive of the Consolidated Corps was unsuccessful. First, one of the brigades of the 77 Infantry Division was late with concentration. Secondly, the Russians faced a strong defense of the enemy - the enemy entrenched on the front of Makovisko - Sobitsin - Tumentsi, its parts were supported by powerful artillery fire from the left bank of the r. San Third, the enemy himself went on the offensive, forcing the Russians to go on the defensive.
At the same time, the Austrians and the Germans developed an offensive against Radaw and rejected the right flank of the 24 Army Corps beyond the river. Lyubachevka. The 7 Cavalry Division was moved to the aid of the corps, which detained the enemy on the Byki-Kopan line. In the evening of May 6, part of the corps went on the offensive, pushing the enemy along the river. Lyubachevka. Distinguished, despite the weak combat strength, 49-I Infantry Division.
The lack of a full-fledged reserve made itself felt - by the end of the day on May 6, R. D. Radko-Dmitriev described the situation in the Yaroslav-Senyava area as hopeless, and asked the front command for urgent instructions on how to avoid an army front breakthrough. There were grounds for alarm - between Yaroslav and Senyawa the troops of the German 11 Army seriously shifted the front of the 3 Army and threatened to break into the deep rear of the 8 Army. The commander, in particular, said: “Between Sieniawa and Monasterg the enemy made four bridges. From all I come to the conclusion that tonight and tomorrow the enemy will strive to develop his success on the right bank of the Lyubachevka and bypass the right flank of the 24 corps and the left 3 of the Caucasian corps, which will make our situation critical. He ordered to send most of the forces of General Istomin (Lieutenant-General N. M. Istomin - Commander of the Consolidated Corps - A.O..) to reflect a breakthrough, but this weakened the left flank and center of the 24 corps, as well as the flank and rear of the 8 army. ”
The 3 Caucasian Corps bent the left flank back along the front of Pichany-Vyleva-Tvardy-Kravchi-Kopan, and a gap formed between it and the 24-th army corps defended exclusively by cavalry. Already in 12 hours of 35 minutes, the commander of the 3 army was forced to state: “... the situation ... on the left flank of the 24 corps and on the 3 Caucasian sector is getting worse every hour. An enemy breakthrough between the two corps already exists. I am directing the 77 Division and most of the cavalry to delay the enemy’s deepening for a while, but I doubt that it will be possible to do something solid. ”
In 13 hours, the commander ordered the commander of the Consolidated Corps 10, leaving the barrier at the front, immediately transferring the main forces of the compound to Zapalov-Molodich to deliver a flank strike to the enemy, located between the 3 Caucasian corps, and, closing the breakthrough, stabilize the situation at the front of the army. The corps was to make a maneuver march and go from the left to the right flank of the 24 corps. But the enemy forged significant corps forces, and for the implementation of the maneuver the corps commander was able to single out only an infantry brigade and a cavalry brigade — these forces were clearly not enough to eliminate the breakthrough.
The 15 Army Corps, attempting to attack, met stubborn resistance from the enemy, which, however, was broken, and by the evening of May 6, it was occupied by Yezerna - Klochkov - Vidrzh. 9 th Army Corps, forcing the river. Dignity, successfully advanced, taking the evening 6 th May Bartse - Podvolina - Borovina - Struzha. But his units that had crossed from Ulanuv were counterattacked by Podvolina and stopped.
10-th Army Corps fought hard in the area of Lezajsk, but the enemy went to the counter. As a result, parts of the corps that had crossed the San, having suffered significant losses, retreated to the right bank of the river. The 3-th Caucasian Corps in the area of the 52-th Infantry Division fought hard at the Kubakhi-Radaw front.
Thus, the "decisive" offensive failed. On the left bank of the river. Dignity was able to break through only part of the 9-th and 15-th army corps. The consolidated corps took up positions on the left flank of the army. Of particular concern to the army command was the breakthrough of the enemy at the junction of the 24 and 3 of the Caucasian army corps.
Commander-3 On May 6, he telegraphed the command of the front: "The situation requires of course - to withdraw the army back." RD Radko-Dmitriev could not make this decision on his own, as he was afraid to let the 8 Army, which remained in place. Interestingly, R. D. Radko-Dmitriev asked the commander of the 8 armies to take the initiative himself: “In my reports about the impossibility for the 3 armies to maintain their current positions, the commander-in-chief replied to me that it was necessary to act according to the situation. This situation, in my estimation, requires immediate withdrawal of the left half of the 3 Army for the first time to the line Lezajsk, Lyubachov, but I cannot make such a decision myself, because, exposing your right flank, it will put you in a hopeless situation. I reported this to the commander-in-chief of the telegram known to you and asked for his specific orders. I think, however, that you will do well if, without waiting for the command of the commander-in-chief, you take the 21 and 12 corps to the right bank of Sanaaaa night ”. The commander of the 8 Army, cavalry general A. A. Brusilov, immediately informed the commander-in-chief of the front: “Leaving the left flank of the 3 Army to Lyubachov will put the army entrusted to me in a hopeless situation. I petition for a command not to withdraw the left flank of the 3 Army further Melniki, Tukhla ... and then on condition that I will be commanded to leave Peremyshl and withdraw the army. The departure this night is extremely difficult. From Przemysl nothing can be taken out. ”
As a result of the unsuccessful offensive, the commander of the 3 Army in 15 hours 45 minutes gave an order, ordering: "the army to continue to hold the current position."
To solve this problem, the following measures were indicated:
a) the right flank of 10, 15 and 9 army corps - to show maximum activity, going on a decisive offensive, to attract the attention and part of the forces of the enemy; The cavalry of these corps should be sent as far south as possible - in order to threaten the enemy’s messages, to divert the attention of the latter from the front of the 24 and 3 corps.
b) The 3 Caucasian Corps should firmly hold its positions and, going over to the offensive, restrain the enemy from penetrating the resulting breakthrough.
c) The 24 Corps was ordered to hold its positions to the last extreme, waiting for reinforcements from the Consolidated Corps.
d) The 11, 7 and 16 Cavalry, 3 Caucasian and 3 Don Cossack Divisions, concentrating in Molodich, should have restrained further advancement of the enemy into the resulting breakthrough until the approach of the Consolidated Corps.
e) The consolidated corps was required, leaving only the necessary forces (subordinate to the commander of the 24 corps) at the Makovisko-Vetlin site, to gather as much force as possible and move with a forced march to the Molodich-Tetul front - where, decisively attacking the enemy who had broken through, throw him on the left coast Lyubachevka, and if successful, then in San.
But unreasonably high hopes were pinned on the Consolidated Corps, while the enemy concentrated its main forces at the gap between the 3 Caucasus and the 24 corps, which represented a serious threat to the entire front of the army. The trouble was that the units of the 3 Army had already significantly undermined their combat capability, had expended an offensive outburst, and were not able to implement the installation of the above directive. Accordingly, there was a threat not only of splitting the front and defeating the 3 army in parts, but also the danger of the enemy units entering the rear of the 8 army. The retreat of the 3 army forced the neighboring 4 and 8 armies to withdraw, and in the future 11 and 9 armies of the South-Western Front. It turned out a vicious circle.
But the command of the 5 army nevertheless managed to close the breakthrough with the help of the troops of the 29 of the Caucasian and 3 of the army corps. Quartermaster-General Stakes General of Infantry Yu. N. Danilov noted: “With great effort it is possible to close the threatened place”.
6 on May 12, the 8-I Russian Army was also active, interacting with 3.
21 and 12 army corps attacked the enemy, located in the Yaroslavl direction along the left bank of the river. San on the flank. The offensive began on the 2 hours of May 6.
The order to the commander of the 12 Army Corps ordered: “A group of 21 and 12 corps under my general direction was ordered to attack the opposing enemy on the night from 5 to 6, developing a strike against Yaroslav, in order not to allow the enemy to drag his troops there where he deals the brunt. Along the right bank of Sana, troops of the 5 Caucasian and 24 corps will advance. I decided:
1) The 21 corps to attack the enemy with a general direction towards Yaroslav, advancing in the zone between San and the line Lovtse, Khlopitsa, Mokra inclusive.
2) The attack of the 21 corps from the west and southwest must be ensured by the corps entrusted to you. ”
A group of 12 and 21 army corps was led by the commander of the latter, Infantry General Ya. F. Shkinsky. But this attack on Yaroslav ended unsuccessfully.
As a result of the May 6 battles, the German 10 Army Corps was constrained by the onset of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps, and the right-flank corps (15, 9 and 10) were thrown by the Germans and Austrians west bank. San and by the end of May 3 took possession of the seats. Mine. But the 7 advance didn’t lead to a significant change in the operational environment. Moreover, the Russian troops had to eliminate the enemy’s breakthrough.
At the same time, the Russian 4 Army north of the r. The Vistula, in the Opatov region, strongly oppressed the 1 Austrian army. Losses of the latter are estimated at 20 - 30 thousand people (Russian damage - three times less).
The Supreme and Front Command did not dare either to change operational-strategic plans, or to scale regrouping of the troops of the South-Western Front. The basic setting was: "not one step back." The situation was aggravated by interruptions in the material and technical supply of the Russian troops.
The ending should ...
In 23 hours of 16 minutes N. N. Yanushkevich received a dispatch from the front headquarters:
“... General Radko-Dimitriev reported that the 24 corps had moved away from Sana'a and retreated center on 10 versts from the river, and right flank five miles away. The news of such a serious failure of the 24 Corps was completely unexpected for the commander in chief, since even today quite general news was received from General Radko-Dimitriev about the situation near Yaroslav. The commander-in-chief, having transferred 3 Caucasian and 77 infantry divisions to General Radko-Dmitriev, ordered to launch an offensive on the entire front of the army on the night from 5 to 6. ”
Battle crisis
The commander of the 3 Army on the night of 4 on May 5 issued an order to the army, which formed the basis for its actions on May 5: “I order the corps of the army entrusted to me to continue to defend their positions by all means 24 Corps, which take the line Melniki on p. Lyubachevka, Khutka, Olkhova, eastern outskirts of Makowisko, Wetlin. On this line, the 24 body will be strengthened and held at all costs, tightly tied up its flanks with the flanks of the neighboring bodies. The 16 Cavalry Division remains at my disposal and go to the morning of May 5 in the village of Oleszyce ... I transfer the militia brigade located near Tarnogrod to the 3 Caucasian Corps, whose commander immediately draws it to the corps area. ”
The enemy began to build up forces on the right bank of the r. San So, by the 17 hours of the day the 3 bridges were brought across the river, along which 10 infantry (from the German Guards and Consolidated Corps) and 2 cavalry regiments crossed.
The attack on Yaroslav 1 - May 7 (14 - May 20 in a new style) 1915. German map. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 - 1918. Bd 8. Berlin, 1932.
Preparing for a counterattack
The transition of the Russian troops to the counteroffensive became more and more relevant.
On May 5, the newly created Consolidated Corps and 16-th Cavalry Division concentrated behind the left flank of the 24-th Army Corps (south-west of Lyubachev), while the 3-I Don Cossack Division was pulled to Lyubachev. Taking advantage of the reserves approach, RD Radko-Dmitriev gave an order in 11 o'clock in the morning, in which he set the 3 Army for the task, launching a decisive offensive, to strike the right flank of the enemy, which was ferried both directly from Yaroslav and north.
By the time the army went on the offensive, the 8 Infantry Division of the 15 Army Corps, having beaten off several night attacks, advanced and occupied German trenches, some units of the 9 and 10 Army corps crossed to the left bank of the r. San At the front of the 3 of the Caucasian Army Corps, the enemy’s attack at the beginning of the morning of 5 in May from Lezahov to Senyavu was successful, but then the enemy was thrown back to its original positions. On the left flank of the 3 Caucasian Corps, the enemy was advancing from Monasterj, advancing along the r. Lyubachevka, and bypassed the flank of the 52 Infantry Division. Russian units had to retreat to the front of Sieniawa - Shmule, and then - Pichany - Vyleva - Tvarda - Bulls.
In the afternoon of May 5, the enemy, having transferred (even at night) on the front of the 24 corps to the right bank of Sana, Yaroslav had considerable forces, launched an offensive on the whole front. The whole day, as the document noted, there was a cruel cannonade of enemy artillery throughout the whole section of the corps - the latter was bombarded with heavy projectiles up to 10-inch inclusive. Heavy shells, which the enemy "spent in an incredibly large amount" covered the whole area. On the right flank, the Russian units soon moved to the Radov-Tetula front. But the German attack in the center was unsuccessful - units of the 45 Infantry Division repulsed it with heavy losses for the enemy. According to the source, the Russian artillery, meeting the enemy’s attacking chains with destructive fire, swept away entire ranks - after which part of the enemy’s chains lay down, and the other, having suffered huge losses, ran into disarray.
With the onset of darkness, the Germans again went on the offensive on the left flank of the corps - in the sector of the 12-th Siberian rifle division. The attack is repelled, but: “Our losses are very significant, the number of the majority of the regiments does not exceed a quarter of its normal composition, but there are many regiments numbering no more than two hundred people.” The enemy announced the capture of one of the Siberian infantry regiments almost at full strength - 10 officers and 2-x thousand lower ranks.
By the end of the day, on May 5, the enemy penetrated at the junction between the 3 Caucasian and 24 corps, moving in the direction of Molodich. On the front of other corps, he did not have success, having suffered serious losses. In particular, the document noted that the 8 Infantry Division, which, reflecting the Germans' night attacks, advanced and occupied enemy trenches, found in the last many uncleared corpses - the German lower ranks, and officers. Several German airplanes, artillery spotters, were shot down, and the pilots from one of them were captured. The Germans at Yaroslav, regardless of the losses, under heavy artillery fire Russians sought to establish themselves on the right bank of the r. San
The beginning of the Russian offensive is on the 24 of the May 5 hour. The main attack was to be delivered by the Consolidated Corps (3-I Caucasian Rifle, 77-I infantry and 16-I cavalry divisions) from the Menkish New - Menkish Old line to the Macovisko-Sobetzin front - in order to capture crossings in the bend of the Garbarge river. In the future, the corps should advance along the right bank of the river. San to the flank of the enemy operating against the 24 corps. The basis of the tactical actions of the Consolidated Corps was suddenness - it must attack without firing and shouting "Hurray."
The task of the 24 Army Corps was to hold onto the Melnik-Khutki-Olkhova-Makovisko-Vetlin front; 10-th and 3-th Caucasian Army Corps - to discard the enemy who had crossed over to the left bank of Sana'a; 9 th and 15 th army corps - hit the enemy along the left bank of the river.
On 15 hours of 30 minutes of 5, the commander of the Consolidated Corps was instructed by the commander of the 3 army, and on the 16 hours 30 minutes went to Menkish Stary (the 3 Caucasian Rifle Division ended up there).
The “decisive” offensive of the corps of the 3 Army
After maneuvering the corps, on the night of 6, the 3-I army launched an offensive.
The night offensive of the Consolidated Corps was unsuccessful. First, one of the brigades of the 77 Infantry Division was late with concentration. Secondly, the Russians faced a strong defense of the enemy - the enemy entrenched on the front of Makovisko - Sobitsin - Tumentsi, its parts were supported by powerful artillery fire from the left bank of the r. San Third, the enemy himself went on the offensive, forcing the Russians to go on the defensive.
At the same time, the Austrians and the Germans developed an offensive against Radaw and rejected the right flank of the 24 Army Corps beyond the river. Lyubachevka. The 7 Cavalry Division was moved to the aid of the corps, which detained the enemy on the Byki-Kopan line. In the evening of May 6, part of the corps went on the offensive, pushing the enemy along the river. Lyubachevka. Distinguished, despite the weak combat strength, 49-I Infantry Division.
The lack of a full-fledged reserve made itself felt - by the end of the day on May 6, R. D. Radko-Dmitriev described the situation in the Yaroslav-Senyava area as hopeless, and asked the front command for urgent instructions on how to avoid an army front breakthrough. There were grounds for alarm - between Yaroslav and Senyawa the troops of the German 11 Army seriously shifted the front of the 3 Army and threatened to break into the deep rear of the 8 Army. The commander, in particular, said: “Between Sieniawa and Monasterg the enemy made four bridges. From all I come to the conclusion that tonight and tomorrow the enemy will strive to develop his success on the right bank of the Lyubachevka and bypass the right flank of the 24 corps and the left 3 of the Caucasian corps, which will make our situation critical. He ordered to send most of the forces of General Istomin (Lieutenant-General N. M. Istomin - Commander of the Consolidated Corps - A.O..) to reflect a breakthrough, but this weakened the left flank and center of the 24 corps, as well as the flank and rear of the 8 army. ”
The 3 Caucasian Corps bent the left flank back along the front of Pichany-Vyleva-Tvardy-Kravchi-Kopan, and a gap formed between it and the 24-th army corps defended exclusively by cavalry. Already in 12 hours of 35 minutes, the commander of the 3 army was forced to state: “... the situation ... on the left flank of the 24 corps and on the 3 Caucasian sector is getting worse every hour. An enemy breakthrough between the two corps already exists. I am directing the 77 Division and most of the cavalry to delay the enemy’s deepening for a while, but I doubt that it will be possible to do something solid. ”
In 13 hours, the commander ordered the commander of the Consolidated Corps 10, leaving the barrier at the front, immediately transferring the main forces of the compound to Zapalov-Molodich to deliver a flank strike to the enemy, located between the 3 Caucasian corps, and, closing the breakthrough, stabilize the situation at the front of the army. The corps was to make a maneuver march and go from the left to the right flank of the 24 corps. But the enemy forged significant corps forces, and for the implementation of the maneuver the corps commander was able to single out only an infantry brigade and a cavalry brigade — these forces were clearly not enough to eliminate the breakthrough.
The 15 Army Corps, attempting to attack, met stubborn resistance from the enemy, which, however, was broken, and by the evening of May 6, it was occupied by Yezerna - Klochkov - Vidrzh. 9 th Army Corps, forcing the river. Dignity, successfully advanced, taking the evening 6 th May Bartse - Podvolina - Borovina - Struzha. But his units that had crossed from Ulanuv were counterattacked by Podvolina and stopped.
10-th Army Corps fought hard in the area of Lezajsk, but the enemy went to the counter. As a result, parts of the corps that had crossed the San, having suffered significant losses, retreated to the right bank of the river. The 3-th Caucasian Corps in the area of the 52-th Infantry Division fought hard at the Kubakhi-Radaw front.
Thus, the "decisive" offensive failed. On the left bank of the river. Dignity was able to break through only part of the 9-th and 15-th army corps. The consolidated corps took up positions on the left flank of the army. Of particular concern to the army command was the breakthrough of the enemy at the junction of the 24 and 3 of the Caucasian army corps.
Commander-3 On May 6, he telegraphed the command of the front: "The situation requires of course - to withdraw the army back." RD Radko-Dmitriev could not make this decision on his own, as he was afraid to let the 8 Army, which remained in place. Interestingly, R. D. Radko-Dmitriev asked the commander of the 8 armies to take the initiative himself: “In my reports about the impossibility for the 3 armies to maintain their current positions, the commander-in-chief replied to me that it was necessary to act according to the situation. This situation, in my estimation, requires immediate withdrawal of the left half of the 3 Army for the first time to the line Lezajsk, Lyubachov, but I cannot make such a decision myself, because, exposing your right flank, it will put you in a hopeless situation. I reported this to the commander-in-chief of the telegram known to you and asked for his specific orders. I think, however, that you will do well if, without waiting for the command of the commander-in-chief, you take the 21 and 12 corps to the right bank of Sanaaaa night ”. The commander of the 8 Army, cavalry general A. A. Brusilov, immediately informed the commander-in-chief of the front: “Leaving the left flank of the 3 Army to Lyubachov will put the army entrusted to me in a hopeless situation. I petition for a command not to withdraw the left flank of the 3 Army further Melniki, Tukhla ... and then on condition that I will be commanded to leave Peremyshl and withdraw the army. The departure this night is extremely difficult. From Przemysl nothing can be taken out. ”
As a result of the unsuccessful offensive, the commander of the 3 Army in 15 hours 45 minutes gave an order, ordering: "the army to continue to hold the current position."
To solve this problem, the following measures were indicated:
a) the right flank of 10, 15 and 9 army corps - to show maximum activity, going on a decisive offensive, to attract the attention and part of the forces of the enemy; The cavalry of these corps should be sent as far south as possible - in order to threaten the enemy’s messages, to divert the attention of the latter from the front of the 24 and 3 corps.
b) The 3 Caucasian Corps should firmly hold its positions and, going over to the offensive, restrain the enemy from penetrating the resulting breakthrough.
c) The 24 Corps was ordered to hold its positions to the last extreme, waiting for reinforcements from the Consolidated Corps.
d) The 11, 7 and 16 Cavalry, 3 Caucasian and 3 Don Cossack Divisions, concentrating in Molodich, should have restrained further advancement of the enemy into the resulting breakthrough until the approach of the Consolidated Corps.
e) The consolidated corps was required, leaving only the necessary forces (subordinate to the commander of the 24 corps) at the Makovisko-Vetlin site, to gather as much force as possible and move with a forced march to the Molodich-Tetul front - where, decisively attacking the enemy who had broken through, throw him on the left coast Lyubachevka, and if successful, then in San.
But unreasonably high hopes were pinned on the Consolidated Corps, while the enemy concentrated its main forces at the gap between the 3 Caucasus and the 24 corps, which represented a serious threat to the entire front of the army. The trouble was that the units of the 3 Army had already significantly undermined their combat capability, had expended an offensive outburst, and were not able to implement the installation of the above directive. Accordingly, there was a threat not only of splitting the front and defeating the 3 army in parts, but also the danger of the enemy units entering the rear of the 8 army. The retreat of the 3 army forced the neighboring 4 and 8 armies to withdraw, and in the future 11 and 9 armies of the South-Western Front. It turned out a vicious circle.
But the command of the 5 army nevertheless managed to close the breakthrough with the help of the troops of the 29 of the Caucasian and 3 of the army corps. Quartermaster-General Stakes General of Infantry Yu. N. Danilov noted: “With great effort it is possible to close the threatened place”.
The counter attack of the shock group 8 Army
6 on May 12, the 8-I Russian Army was also active, interacting with 3.
21 and 12 army corps attacked the enemy, located in the Yaroslavl direction along the left bank of the river. San on the flank. The offensive began on the 2 hours of May 6.
The order to the commander of the 12 Army Corps ordered: “A group of 21 and 12 corps under my general direction was ordered to attack the opposing enemy on the night from 5 to 6, developing a strike against Yaroslav, in order not to allow the enemy to drag his troops there where he deals the brunt. Along the right bank of Sana, troops of the 5 Caucasian and 24 corps will advance. I decided:
1) The 21 corps to attack the enemy with a general direction towards Yaroslav, advancing in the zone between San and the line Lovtse, Khlopitsa, Mokra inclusive.
2) The attack of the 21 corps from the west and southwest must be ensured by the corps entrusted to you. ”
A group of 12 and 21 army corps was led by the commander of the latter, Infantry General Ya. F. Shkinsky. But this attack on Yaroslav ended unsuccessfully.
Ya. F. Shkinsky
As a result of the May 6 battles, the German 10 Army Corps was constrained by the onset of the 3 Caucasian Army Corps, and the right-flank corps (15, 9 and 10) were thrown by the Germans and Austrians west bank. San and by the end of May 3 took possession of the seats. Mine. But the 7 advance didn’t lead to a significant change in the operational environment. Moreover, the Russian troops had to eliminate the enemy’s breakthrough.
At the same time, the Russian 4 Army north of the r. The Vistula, in the Opatov region, strongly oppressed the 1 Austrian army. Losses of the latter are estimated at 20 - 30 thousand people (Russian damage - three times less).
The Supreme and Front Command did not dare either to change operational-strategic plans, or to scale regrouping of the troops of the South-Western Front. The basic setting was: "not one step back." The situation was aggravated by interruptions in the material and technical supply of the Russian troops.
The ending should ...
Information