The 3 Caucasian Corps is on the path of a strategic hurricane. Part of 3. Day of disaster
I take into account the negative situation prevailing on the front of the 3 Army, in the evening of April 21, the Russian command had to issue an order ordering: to remove the 24 corps from its position at night and, under the cover of the rearguard, retreat to the line of Samoklensk - Miskova - Studenny - Top; to have in the morning of 22 on April one brigade reinforced by the artillery battalion, at Zigrod; 12 body, left flank remaining on the occupied position, move to the line of height. Studeny - Top - Dukla - Pass - Shuko, joining the right flank to the 24 body; 21-th and 29-th corps, by all means holding their positions, to maintain the closest possible connection with the right flank of the 8-th army; 9 Corps, remaining in their positions, push 3-s Caucasian Cossack Division of Lieutenant-General P. L. Helmitsky to Podlova - covering directions to Yanorged, and in the evening of 22-April, 9-corps to withdraw, taking a position from the mouth of the river . Dunajec through Dombrova villages. Dulchovka - sat down. Yavorved on the right bank of the r. Visloka; General of artillery V.A. Irmanov’s group, occupying a line along the left bank of the r. Wislock (from the ferry near the village of Blyazkov to the village of Samoklensk), should have covered Jaslo, closely interacting with the right flank of the 24 corps; Major General N. G. Volodchenko's detachment (16-I Cavalry and 3-I Don Cossack Divisions and 3 Infantry Regiment) should have taken a section of the r. Vislok - at the junction of the adjacent flanks of the 9 Corps and the group of V.A. Irmanov, covering the Brzystok - Frishtak road.
The enemy, taking the group of V.A. Irmanov into ticks, had the opportunity, after its destruction, to break through to the rear of the Carpathian corps of the 3 Army.
Subsequently, the commander of the 3 Army reported to the front leadership that the enemy was suppressed by suppressive forces with the support of numerous heavy artillery (which in a short time literally destroyed the trenches, exterminating their defenders in places), attacking with overwhelming forces - and in such conditions it is difficult to guarantee that the miserable 10 remains th and parts of the 3 of the Caucasian corps will be able to hold on to the most important direction that led to the rear to the rear of the positions of the 3 and 8 armies in the Carpathians. The positions of the 9 body are extremely stretched and held, as long as there is no such strong pressure on it. The southern army corps is planned to withdraw from the mountainous region, taking the line Zmigrod - Mezo-Laborch.
Speaking about the battles of 21 on April, the enemy noted that his aerial reconnaissance had set the withdrawal of Russian troops from Krempna to Zmigrod - which meant the withdrawal of Russian units from the Carpathian front. As a result, General Emmich decided to bring the 20 Infantry Division (Army Reserve) into battle with the aim of seizing the crossing at Smigrod. 11-I Bavarian division had to be active on the river. Wislock, and the 119 Infantry Division was entrusted with the support of the operation from the north-east.
A. Mackensen appealed to the command of the Austrian 3-th Army with a request to send to the r. Visloka your left flank.
Moving from Bednarka, the 11-I Bavarian division at Volya Chiklinsk began a heavy frontal battle with the Russian units. The battle ended only by 18 hours after the application of the flank maneuver. The 119 Infantry Division in the 16 hours 30 minutes took Chiklin. 41-th backup corps acted on p. Ropa The army command of the enemy pointed to the need for the closest interaction of 5 divisions operating south of the river. Ropa
After the 12 watch, the 41 division of the reserve corps clashed with Russian troops in the wooded mountains west of Kharklov, Pagorek. After the fierce battles of the 82-th reserve division, by the 21 hour they managed to throw the Russian units back, and at night to capture the village. The ladies. To the left of the 81-I reserve division could not move - due to the difficult position of the Austrian 6-second army corps its part south of Kunova provided the flank of an ally. The 82-I reserve division held the Pagorzhina area — the heights north of Pagurek, and the 82-I artillery brigade occupied the positions of Vuytova — the height of 379.
As a result of the fighting day, the 41-th reserve corps of April 21 could not reach the goal set by the army command.
Austrian 6 st Army Corps north of r. Ropa got involved in heavy fighting. The Russian reserves met the enemy with energetic counterattacks.
The 12 Infantry Division was deployed to the area northeast of Strzheshyn (interacting with the left flank of the 41 th reserve corps). The compound managed to drop the Russians from the heights to the north of Biecz and by the 17 watch to seize the heights to the east of Sipitnitsa.
39 th I drove infantry division interacted with the Guards Corps on high. 421 (southeast of Lipieux). Hungarian infantrymen managed to cross the river. Ropa and advance to the heights of 332 - 306 (northwest of Kunov). The 39 Division was stopped in front of the Setnitsky station - Russian machine guns, and in the remaining areas - Russian artillery. Having received support from the artillery units of the 41 th reserve corps, the 39 th Hoped Infantry Division advanced north of Binarow (307 - 385 heights). The battle for the heights was decisive. 307. 6 once climbed the Hungarians to a height - and invariably dropped down. And only when the Russians decided that the position could not be held - they retreated before the front of the Austrian 6 Army Corps. But the division failed to reach the eastern bank of the Olchinka brook.
The German 10 Army Corps was able to break north and south of Alpina. But soon the left flank of the corps had to be pulled south of Mount Obzhar - the Austrians were forced out of there by the Russian counterattack. The commander of the fresh 20 Infantry Division decided to break through to the r. Visloka - in 19 hours 30 minutes he ordered his troops to go out at night to Samokleski and block the valley of the r. Visloka above city Zmigrod.
As a result, the commander of the Russian 3-th army told the commander-in-chief of the front that he would hold onto the front of Dombrov - r. Visloka - Zmigrod - Mezo-Laborch, is not possible, and should withdraw to the front of the mouth of the river. Dunajec - Dombrova - Pilzno - Sanok.
On April 22, an especially energetic offensive of the enemy began on the right flank of the V.A. Irmanov group. One strike group (each by force in a division) advanced on Iodlovo, the second - on Cherno, the third - on Sverzhany.
A. Reniger noted that Francois appointed Wola Dembovetska as the target of the offensive of the 82-th reserve division, and that of the 81-th reserve division - Dembovec. But the general doubted the possibility of reaching the indicated points at the appointed time, since he was now convinced that his opponent - the 3 Caucasian Corps - would stubbornly resist, especially in the large villages Kharklova and the Special Girl adapted to the defense.
The special imprint on the battles that unfolded was imposed by the fact that the artillery fire of the Russians was not strong - in contrast to the rifle-machine-gun fire, which was no less successfully used against artillery. This original battle between the German light artillery brigade and the Russian infantry, which had a fortified position, took place at close range and raged for several hours. The battle between the 41 units of the reserve and the 3 units of the Caucasian army corps is also interesting from the point of view of the unusual confrontation between the Russian infantry and the German gunners. During the day, the infantry not only kept under artillery fire, but also entered into fire confrontation with it. EK Smyslovsky wrote that the rifle fire theoretically could not be particularly valid - because the distance from the heights. 349 to the village of Osobnitsa - 1 - 1,5 km. In the absence of active Russian artillery, the German gunners had the opportunity to take open positions with impunity and act from them (the effect of fire weapons for guns protected by shields at distances of more than a kilometer was minimal) - but the 36 of German guns could not cope with a relatively small number of Russian machine guns and riflemen who occupied a fortified position. On the one hand, the German gunners could be proud of the fact that under infantry fire they crushed the Russian infantry, and the arrows of the 3 Caucasian Corps could be even more proud of the fact that the 36 of German guns, shooting at them in broad daylight, could not do anything with them.
This also speaks of the moral endurance of the 3 infantry of the Caucasian Army Corps: they were not familiar with the writings of artillery tactics, which believed that artillery fire undermined the moral strength of the infantry. In the considered battle, the material effect of this artillery fire was insignificant, and the moral effect was even negative. The shooters held the sweep-through of the Artillery Artillery Fire the whole day and retreated by order. The unfading prowess of the Russian shooters led to the fact that with steadfastness worthy of imitation, they "spat" on the shelling of the brigade, and then on two brigades of German artillery, steadfastly resisting artillery fire - despite the lack of support for their artillery.
But the German artillery, which could not do anything with the "closed" infantry, fell upon the "openly" advancing reserves - stopping the latter. That decided the fate of the battle. The battle was won by a cannon, which managed to hit open targets, but was powerless against closed ones - even from the most effective distances.
In reserve - 1-I battery 3-Caucasian Mortar Artillery Division. Negative number 934. State archive of the Saratov region. From the personal collection of the author
At the front of the Austrian 6 Army Corps, the 12 Infantry Division was advancing towards the shore from the r. Ropa, and the 39-I Hound Infantry Division fought at Svenzana - especially stubborn battles were fought over the height of the 370. Austrian artillery has traditionally operated more effectively than the German. As noted by the above specialist, in technical terms, the Austrian artillery was much higher than the German. If at that time the Germans could not yet master the simple use of the protractor, then the Austrians (the only ones except Russian artillerymen) developed and used the commander protractor-Bauman transformer, similar to the Russian protractor Turov-Michalovsky.
At the front of the Guards Corps, the Germans attacked Cheremna - Lipnitsa: in the afternoon, their vanguards clashed with Russian infantry in positions west of Bachal - Lipnitsa. The fight lasted until night. At night, the Russians left positions west of the r. Visloka, crossing the river.
The enemy developed efforts at the junction of the 3 Caucasian and 24 Army Corps - between the group of V.A. Irmanov and the 24 Army Corps, enemy scouts were already on the right bank of Vislok.
The army commander informed the commander of the 3 of the Caucasian Army Corps: “... your left flank extends only as far as Dombrov, leaving the most important direction, Smigrod, Dukla, cut off. This is contrary to my order 1230, in the execution of which important, decisive measures, enter into a close relationship with the flank of the 24 corps, covering and the direction of Smigrod, Dukla. " V.A. Irmanov replied to this: “... it is definitely indicated that Zigigrod was occupied by the brigade of the 24 corps. As you know, by night the upset parts of the 9 Infantry Division, supported by parts of other divisions, could not maintain their position and occupied the front of Dembovets, Lazy for the night, and thus the group could not cover Smigrod without fresh forces. Fully aware of the importance of Zigrod, I sent southbound patrols to establish contact with the 24 corps. But these patrols told me that enemy columns were moving towards Zmigoda. In order to prevent the enemy from reaching Zmigroda, I decided to attack the enemy in a southerly direction, but the matter is considerably complicated by the movement of enemy columns on my front and right flank. For the attack in the southern direction, I used up my reserve, with the exception of the Dagestan regiment, which within 36 hours passed 84 miles - ... along heavy mountain roads. ”
At the junction between the 9 Army Corps and the group of V.A. Irmanov, the enemy was also advancing. A detachment of N. G. Volodchenko moved away from Blashkov to the right bank of the Vislok, and the remnants of the 61 and 31 infantry divisions (around 2000 people) were concentrated here. In fact, these divisions dropped out of the group of V. A. Irmanov.
A document from 14 watches reports: “Parts of the 3 Caucasian Corps, which took over the remnants of the 10 corps fighting in three-day battles, total 3 thousand people, occupied the Brziski line, Lipnina Bunchal, Sedliski, the Woman, height 251 from Dembovets ". At the junction between the 9 Army Corps and the group operated 3-I Caucasian Cossack Division.
Three enemy strike groups delivered the main blow to the right flank of the V.A. Irmanov's group and NG Volodchenko's detachment (from the north of the Ropa river) and in the direction of Zigrod (from the south of the Ropa river). In addition, the enemy attacked the group on the entire front - especially strongly on the left flank, south of the river. Ropa German heavy artillery bombarded the Russian shells, causing huge losses.
In such conditions, Russian troops stayed at the r. Rope, but the capture of Zmigrod and the bypass of the right flank of the 24-th Army Corps forced to begin a retreat. An attempt to attack the enemy in the flank from Dembovitz was unsuccessful, since it encountered strong resistance from parts of the German 119 Infantry Division - a barrier on the Osek-Zavadka front. At the same time, the enemy reported: “The center of the 11 Army, consisting of the XLI-th Reserve Corps and VI Austro-Hungarian Corps, stumbled on both sides of the Ropa on the enemy’s stubbornly defended rear positions ... In some places the Russians entered into stubborn counterattacks; it seems important to them to keep the tete-de-pon (bridgehead reinforcement - A. O.) from Jaslo, in order to smuggle troops, columns and carriages flowing to this place to the north, east of the Vistula section ... Francois and F. Arz corps, participating in heavy battles, fought off the enemy’s sections, despite all their efforts, could move up to the valley of the Visloka; The Guards Corps, for its part, could also only slowly move forward. An adversary every minute appeared at the nearest heights in heavily fortified positions. ”
It was the advancement of the enemy in the interval between the group of V.A. Irmanov and the 24 Army Corps that promoted the withdrawal of the command of the 3 Army. The commander told the front commanders that the withdrawal was necessary - the 3 army could not ensure the position of the 4 and 8 armies, and the further onslaught of the enemy north of Jaslo could force the 3 army to withdraw, and elbow communication with neighboring armies would be interrupted. Summary of the Stavka reported that the enemy concentrates its main efforts on the direction of Biecz-Jaslo. Russian troops, due to the superiority of the enemy in heavy artillery, suffer significant losses, but the enemy also suffers severely during attacks from Russian shrapnel and small arms.
As a result, in 23 hours the commander-3 ordered:
The 9 body with the attached parts take the position of Szczucin - Radomysl - Dulchovka - crossing on Wislok at the village. Yavorjed (joint with the left flank of the 4 Army);
The 10 Corps (31-I, 61-I infantry, 16-I cavalry and 3-I Don Cossack divisions) to firmly defend the right bank of the Vislok - from the crossing at the villages. Yavorzhed sat down. Bukova;
3-th Caucasian Corps with attached parts firmly occupy the right bank of the River Visloki - from the villages. Bukov to the mouth r. Jasloki at Jaslo and along the right bank of the r. Jasloki before the villages. Jodlich;
The 24 Corps and the 11 Cavalry Division take a line from the villages. Jodlich to villages. Sentava on r. Visloka;
12-th body to withdraw to the line sat. Sentava - vys. 742 (6 km south of the village. Besko); to take the front 2 divisions, moving the 12 Siberian division into an army reserve to the villages. Zarshin;
The 21 Corps (7 regiments of the 33 and 44 Infantry Divisions and the 3 Infantry Division with artillery occupy the line of 742 Highway. Torn out - 766 High. ;
To commanders of the 3 Caucasian and 24 corps, to place the corps reserves closer to the right flank of their corps - in order to quickly support the neighbors on the right, if necessary;
after crossing the right bank of the Vysloka, all the crossings across the river are destroyed.
In the 23 hours, V.A. Irmanov received the following order: “... the army commander orders you to occupy the village Samoklenski by all means ... and ensure that both banks of the Vislok River are near Zmigrod until the parts of the 24 corps arrive ... The position of the whole army depends on the hands of Samoklensky and Zmigroda ... ”
In pursuance of the order, the corps corps has already set defensive tasks for its units: “1) In view of the difficult situation created on the front of the 10 corps, on both sides of the r. Ropa, the commander of the army ordered to begin the retreat of the army at night.
2) The group entrusted to me is entrusted with the task of covering the retreat of army units east of Jaslo and Zimrod at Krosno.
3) It is ordered to firmly defend the Brzyski, Lipnina, Bonchal, Sedliski section, r. Ropa, heights 349, 357, 272, 251; to the right to the north, the direction to Brzostek is covered by the detachment of General Volodchenko, to the left, from Zigrod to the south, part of the 24 Army Corps. ”
The adverse outcome of the operation was affected by the uneven tension of the combat activities of the Russian corps and the lack of interaction between them. It was these circumstances that led to the fact that the 22-th of April in the junction between the 3-th Caucasian Army and the 24-th Army Corps formed a gap, into which the Germans and Austrians rushed. Operations at the junctions require special command skills. This is due primarily to the tactical properties of the joints. A military specialist wrote: “Just as welded objects most often break in a junction place, so also living organisms are most sensitive to joints. The more important the direction leading through the joint, the more likely an attack can be expected there. ” Connectivity, consistency and unity of action are achieved at the junctions with great difficulty, both as a result of the dual power, and the difficulty of ensuring communication between the flank parts of two different connections. It was necessary to take into account both the special predilection of the German command to carry out operations at the junctions, and his ability to competently choose the direction of such strikes. Maneuvering at army junctions is one of the most complex forms of operational maneuver. Behind an army junction it is useful to place private reserves.
The inability to operate at the junction is one of the problems of the Russian army and front command. This was especially pronounced in the operation in question. As a result, the enemy, having captured the town of Zmigrod, began to threaten the ways of the 24 Army Corps and all the left-flank corps of the 3 Army. Almost three German-Austrian corps were sent to this gap. In the current situation, the combat stability of the 3 of the Caucasian Army Corps was of paramount importance. The corps could withstand the fierce attacks of the enemy, and thus saved the whole army, which could remain forever in the Carpathians. The commander reported that he decided to withdraw the corps from the mountainous region to the line Zmigrod, Mesolaborch. Moreover, over three corps (the German Guards, the Austrian 3, the German 6-th reserve, parts of the German Consolidated) attacked against the 41 of the Caucasian Army Corps.
In this situation, the commander of the 3-th army of April 22 gave the order to withdraw corps for the river. Visloka. On this day, the Chief of Staff of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant-General V.M. Dragomirov, told Quartermaster-General of General Headquarters, General of Infantry, Yu.N. Danilov, that time must be gained, but the 3 Army could not be radically strengthened. The only expedient decision is to withdraw the army for San, and this issue must be resolved today. It is necessary to take the forts of Przemysl, placing between Yaroslav and Przemysl positions on the arc chord, which San describes by placing its flanks on the fortifications of Przemysl and Yaroslav. T. o. it is possible to give a serious rebuff to the enemy, and the 3-I army, having taken a strong position behind the Vistula and San, will be able to put itself in order.
In fact, April 22 is the day of the disaster, the day when the tactical importance of the Gorlitsky breakthrough began to acquire operational significance. The retreat of the troops of the South-Western Front began.
The enemy also noted that at dawn on 23, April, the German 20 division reached Wisloks south of Zigrod - and the troops of the 11 army broke through the entire defensive zone of the Russian 3 army, completing the breakthrough.
The most competent measure for the Russian was the decision to move to the river. San had no time to concentrate a new strong reserve for parrying the German-Austrian offensive. Salvation could be the implementation of a counter-maneuver in the style of General P. A. Plehve during the Tomaszewski battle and the Mitavo-Shavel operation — to jerk away from the enemy at the desired distance and consolidate the front at new lines. Moreover, the defense of the 3 Army began to “crawl away at the seams”, and the troops were drained of blood. That is, such a maneuver was as follows - the creation of sufficient space between the 3 army and the enemy, as well as the immediate attack of A. Mackensen’s army in the flank with a specially concentrated strong reserve. This would make it possible to gain time and, in the future, to retake the initiative.
But the Russian command clung to the territory, putting manpower (the main power of the Russian army) to the brink of destruction. Major General M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich noted that in the name of the strategically unnecessary goal of "retaining conquered space" the best troops were destroyed, turning them into weak cadres; in the name of the same strategically insignificant goal by moving the divisions of the corps to the south, the North-Western Front was also exhausted.
The reserves did not concentrate against the flank of the attacker (this could counter the development of a breakthrough), but were introduced into the case in bundles, which did not lead to a visible result. The actions of the command have been reduced, in fact, “to patching holes”.
The ending should ...
The enemy, taking the group of V.A. Irmanov into ticks, had the opportunity, after its destruction, to break through to the rear of the Carpathian corps of the 3 Army.
Subsequently, the commander of the 3 Army reported to the front leadership that the enemy was suppressed by suppressive forces with the support of numerous heavy artillery (which in a short time literally destroyed the trenches, exterminating their defenders in places), attacking with overwhelming forces - and in such conditions it is difficult to guarantee that the miserable 10 remains th and parts of the 3 of the Caucasian corps will be able to hold on to the most important direction that led to the rear to the rear of the positions of the 3 and 8 armies in the Carpathians. The positions of the 9 body are extremely stretched and held, as long as there is no such strong pressure on it. The southern army corps is planned to withdraw from the mountainous region, taking the line Zmigrod - Mezo-Laborch.
Speaking about the battles of 21 on April, the enemy noted that his aerial reconnaissance had set the withdrawal of Russian troops from Krempna to Zmigrod - which meant the withdrawal of Russian units from the Carpathian front. As a result, General Emmich decided to bring the 20 Infantry Division (Army Reserve) into battle with the aim of seizing the crossing at Smigrod. 11-I Bavarian division had to be active on the river. Wislock, and the 119 Infantry Division was entrusted with the support of the operation from the north-east.
A. Mackensen appealed to the command of the Austrian 3-th Army with a request to send to the r. Visloka your left flank.
Moving from Bednarka, the 11-I Bavarian division at Volya Chiklinsk began a heavy frontal battle with the Russian units. The battle ended only by 18 hours after the application of the flank maneuver. The 119 Infantry Division in the 16 hours 30 minutes took Chiklin. 41-th backup corps acted on p. Ropa The army command of the enemy pointed to the need for the closest interaction of 5 divisions operating south of the river. Ropa
After the 12 watch, the 41 division of the reserve corps clashed with Russian troops in the wooded mountains west of Kharklov, Pagorek. After the fierce battles of the 82-th reserve division, by the 21 hour they managed to throw the Russian units back, and at night to capture the village. The ladies. To the left of the 81-I reserve division could not move - due to the difficult position of the Austrian 6-second army corps its part south of Kunova provided the flank of an ally. The 82-I reserve division held the Pagorzhina area — the heights north of Pagurek, and the 82-I artillery brigade occupied the positions of Vuytova — the height of 379.
As a result of the fighting day, the 41-th reserve corps of April 21 could not reach the goal set by the army command.
Austrian 6 st Army Corps north of r. Ropa got involved in heavy fighting. The Russian reserves met the enemy with energetic counterattacks.
The 12 Infantry Division was deployed to the area northeast of Strzheshyn (interacting with the left flank of the 41 th reserve corps). The compound managed to drop the Russians from the heights to the north of Biecz and by the 17 watch to seize the heights to the east of Sipitnitsa.
39 th I drove infantry division interacted with the Guards Corps on high. 421 (southeast of Lipieux). Hungarian infantrymen managed to cross the river. Ropa and advance to the heights of 332 - 306 (northwest of Kunov). The 39 Division was stopped in front of the Setnitsky station - Russian machine guns, and in the remaining areas - Russian artillery. Having received support from the artillery units of the 41 th reserve corps, the 39 th Hoped Infantry Division advanced north of Binarow (307 - 385 heights). The battle for the heights was decisive. 307. 6 once climbed the Hungarians to a height - and invariably dropped down. And only when the Russians decided that the position could not be held - they retreated before the front of the Austrian 6 Army Corps. But the division failed to reach the eastern bank of the Olchinka brook.
The German 10 Army Corps was able to break north and south of Alpina. But soon the left flank of the corps had to be pulled south of Mount Obzhar - the Austrians were forced out of there by the Russian counterattack. The commander of the fresh 20 Infantry Division decided to break through to the r. Visloka - in 19 hours 30 minutes he ordered his troops to go out at night to Samokleski and block the valley of the r. Visloka above city Zmigrod.
As a result, the commander of the Russian 3-th army told the commander-in-chief of the front that he would hold onto the front of Dombrov - r. Visloka - Zmigrod - Mezo-Laborch, is not possible, and should withdraw to the front of the mouth of the river. Dunajec - Dombrova - Pilzno - Sanok.
On April 22, an especially energetic offensive of the enemy began on the right flank of the V.A. Irmanov group. One strike group (each by force in a division) advanced on Iodlovo, the second - on Cherno, the third - on Sverzhany.
A. Reniger noted that Francois appointed Wola Dembovetska as the target of the offensive of the 82-th reserve division, and that of the 81-th reserve division - Dembovec. But the general doubted the possibility of reaching the indicated points at the appointed time, since he was now convinced that his opponent - the 3 Caucasian Corps - would stubbornly resist, especially in the large villages Kharklova and the Special Girl adapted to the defense.
The special imprint on the battles that unfolded was imposed by the fact that the artillery fire of the Russians was not strong - in contrast to the rifle-machine-gun fire, which was no less successfully used against artillery. This original battle between the German light artillery brigade and the Russian infantry, which had a fortified position, took place at close range and raged for several hours. The battle between the 41 units of the reserve and the 3 units of the Caucasian army corps is also interesting from the point of view of the unusual confrontation between the Russian infantry and the German gunners. During the day, the infantry not only kept under artillery fire, but also entered into fire confrontation with it. EK Smyslovsky wrote that the rifle fire theoretically could not be particularly valid - because the distance from the heights. 349 to the village of Osobnitsa - 1 - 1,5 km. In the absence of active Russian artillery, the German gunners had the opportunity to take open positions with impunity and act from them (the effect of fire weapons for guns protected by shields at distances of more than a kilometer was minimal) - but the 36 of German guns could not cope with a relatively small number of Russian machine guns and riflemen who occupied a fortified position. On the one hand, the German gunners could be proud of the fact that under infantry fire they crushed the Russian infantry, and the arrows of the 3 Caucasian Corps could be even more proud of the fact that the 36 of German guns, shooting at them in broad daylight, could not do anything with them.
This also speaks of the moral endurance of the 3 infantry of the Caucasian Army Corps: they were not familiar with the writings of artillery tactics, which believed that artillery fire undermined the moral strength of the infantry. In the considered battle, the material effect of this artillery fire was insignificant, and the moral effect was even negative. The shooters held the sweep-through of the Artillery Artillery Fire the whole day and retreated by order. The unfading prowess of the Russian shooters led to the fact that with steadfastness worthy of imitation, they "spat" on the shelling of the brigade, and then on two brigades of German artillery, steadfastly resisting artillery fire - despite the lack of support for their artillery.
But the German artillery, which could not do anything with the "closed" infantry, fell upon the "openly" advancing reserves - stopping the latter. That decided the fate of the battle. The battle was won by a cannon, which managed to hit open targets, but was powerless against closed ones - even from the most effective distances.
In reserve - 1-I battery 3-Caucasian Mortar Artillery Division. Negative number 934. State archive of the Saratov region. From the personal collection of the author
At the front of the Austrian 6 Army Corps, the 12 Infantry Division was advancing towards the shore from the r. Ropa, and the 39-I Hound Infantry Division fought at Svenzana - especially stubborn battles were fought over the height of the 370. Austrian artillery has traditionally operated more effectively than the German. As noted by the above specialist, in technical terms, the Austrian artillery was much higher than the German. If at that time the Germans could not yet master the simple use of the protractor, then the Austrians (the only ones except Russian artillerymen) developed and used the commander protractor-Bauman transformer, similar to the Russian protractor Turov-Michalovsky.
At the front of the Guards Corps, the Germans attacked Cheremna - Lipnitsa: in the afternoon, their vanguards clashed with Russian infantry in positions west of Bachal - Lipnitsa. The fight lasted until night. At night, the Russians left positions west of the r. Visloka, crossing the river.
The enemy developed efforts at the junction of the 3 Caucasian and 24 Army Corps - between the group of V.A. Irmanov and the 24 Army Corps, enemy scouts were already on the right bank of Vislok.
The army commander informed the commander of the 3 of the Caucasian Army Corps: “... your left flank extends only as far as Dombrov, leaving the most important direction, Smigrod, Dukla, cut off. This is contrary to my order 1230, in the execution of which important, decisive measures, enter into a close relationship with the flank of the 24 corps, covering and the direction of Smigrod, Dukla. " V.A. Irmanov replied to this: “... it is definitely indicated that Zigigrod was occupied by the brigade of the 24 corps. As you know, by night the upset parts of the 9 Infantry Division, supported by parts of other divisions, could not maintain their position and occupied the front of Dembovets, Lazy for the night, and thus the group could not cover Smigrod without fresh forces. Fully aware of the importance of Zigrod, I sent southbound patrols to establish contact with the 24 corps. But these patrols told me that enemy columns were moving towards Zmigoda. In order to prevent the enemy from reaching Zmigroda, I decided to attack the enemy in a southerly direction, but the matter is considerably complicated by the movement of enemy columns on my front and right flank. For the attack in the southern direction, I used up my reserve, with the exception of the Dagestan regiment, which within 36 hours passed 84 miles - ... along heavy mountain roads. ”
At the junction between the 9 Army Corps and the group of V.A. Irmanov, the enemy was also advancing. A detachment of N. G. Volodchenko moved away from Blashkov to the right bank of the Vislok, and the remnants of the 61 and 31 infantry divisions (around 2000 people) were concentrated here. In fact, these divisions dropped out of the group of V. A. Irmanov.
A document from 14 watches reports: “Parts of the 3 Caucasian Corps, which took over the remnants of the 10 corps fighting in three-day battles, total 3 thousand people, occupied the Brziski line, Lipnina Bunchal, Sedliski, the Woman, height 251 from Dembovets ". At the junction between the 9 Army Corps and the group operated 3-I Caucasian Cossack Division.
Three enemy strike groups delivered the main blow to the right flank of the V.A. Irmanov's group and NG Volodchenko's detachment (from the north of the Ropa river) and in the direction of Zigrod (from the south of the Ropa river). In addition, the enemy attacked the group on the entire front - especially strongly on the left flank, south of the river. Ropa German heavy artillery bombarded the Russian shells, causing huge losses.
In such conditions, Russian troops stayed at the r. Rope, but the capture of Zmigrod and the bypass of the right flank of the 24-th Army Corps forced to begin a retreat. An attempt to attack the enemy in the flank from Dembovitz was unsuccessful, since it encountered strong resistance from parts of the German 119 Infantry Division - a barrier on the Osek-Zavadka front. At the same time, the enemy reported: “The center of the 11 Army, consisting of the XLI-th Reserve Corps and VI Austro-Hungarian Corps, stumbled on both sides of the Ropa on the enemy’s stubbornly defended rear positions ... In some places the Russians entered into stubborn counterattacks; it seems important to them to keep the tete-de-pon (bridgehead reinforcement - A. O.) from Jaslo, in order to smuggle troops, columns and carriages flowing to this place to the north, east of the Vistula section ... Francois and F. Arz corps, participating in heavy battles, fought off the enemy’s sections, despite all their efforts, could move up to the valley of the Visloka; The Guards Corps, for its part, could also only slowly move forward. An adversary every minute appeared at the nearest heights in heavily fortified positions. ”
It was the advancement of the enemy in the interval between the group of V.A. Irmanov and the 24 Army Corps that promoted the withdrawal of the command of the 3 Army. The commander told the front commanders that the withdrawal was necessary - the 3 army could not ensure the position of the 4 and 8 armies, and the further onslaught of the enemy north of Jaslo could force the 3 army to withdraw, and elbow communication with neighboring armies would be interrupted. Summary of the Stavka reported that the enemy concentrates its main efforts on the direction of Biecz-Jaslo. Russian troops, due to the superiority of the enemy in heavy artillery, suffer significant losses, but the enemy also suffers severely during attacks from Russian shrapnel and small arms.
As a result, in 23 hours the commander-3 ordered:
The 9 body with the attached parts take the position of Szczucin - Radomysl - Dulchovka - crossing on Wislok at the village. Yavorjed (joint with the left flank of the 4 Army);
The 10 Corps (31-I, 61-I infantry, 16-I cavalry and 3-I Don Cossack divisions) to firmly defend the right bank of the Vislok - from the crossing at the villages. Yavorzhed sat down. Bukova;
3-th Caucasian Corps with attached parts firmly occupy the right bank of the River Visloki - from the villages. Bukov to the mouth r. Jasloki at Jaslo and along the right bank of the r. Jasloki before the villages. Jodlich;
The 24 Corps and the 11 Cavalry Division take a line from the villages. Jodlich to villages. Sentava on r. Visloka;
12-th body to withdraw to the line sat. Sentava - vys. 742 (6 km south of the village. Besko); to take the front 2 divisions, moving the 12 Siberian division into an army reserve to the villages. Zarshin;
The 21 Corps (7 regiments of the 33 and 44 Infantry Divisions and the 3 Infantry Division with artillery occupy the line of 742 Highway. Torn out - 766 High. ;
To commanders of the 3 Caucasian and 24 corps, to place the corps reserves closer to the right flank of their corps - in order to quickly support the neighbors on the right, if necessary;
after crossing the right bank of the Vysloka, all the crossings across the river are destroyed.
In the 23 hours, V.A. Irmanov received the following order: “... the army commander orders you to occupy the village Samoklenski by all means ... and ensure that both banks of the Vislok River are near Zmigrod until the parts of the 24 corps arrive ... The position of the whole army depends on the hands of Samoklensky and Zmigroda ... ”
In pursuance of the order, the corps corps has already set defensive tasks for its units: “1) In view of the difficult situation created on the front of the 10 corps, on both sides of the r. Ropa, the commander of the army ordered to begin the retreat of the army at night.
2) The group entrusted to me is entrusted with the task of covering the retreat of army units east of Jaslo and Zimrod at Krosno.
3) It is ordered to firmly defend the Brzyski, Lipnina, Bonchal, Sedliski section, r. Ropa, heights 349, 357, 272, 251; to the right to the north, the direction to Brzostek is covered by the detachment of General Volodchenko, to the left, from Zigrod to the south, part of the 24 Army Corps. ”
The adverse outcome of the operation was affected by the uneven tension of the combat activities of the Russian corps and the lack of interaction between them. It was these circumstances that led to the fact that the 22-th of April in the junction between the 3-th Caucasian Army and the 24-th Army Corps formed a gap, into which the Germans and Austrians rushed. Operations at the junctions require special command skills. This is due primarily to the tactical properties of the joints. A military specialist wrote: “Just as welded objects most often break in a junction place, so also living organisms are most sensitive to joints. The more important the direction leading through the joint, the more likely an attack can be expected there. ” Connectivity, consistency and unity of action are achieved at the junctions with great difficulty, both as a result of the dual power, and the difficulty of ensuring communication between the flank parts of two different connections. It was necessary to take into account both the special predilection of the German command to carry out operations at the junctions, and his ability to competently choose the direction of such strikes. Maneuvering at army junctions is one of the most complex forms of operational maneuver. Behind an army junction it is useful to place private reserves.
The inability to operate at the junction is one of the problems of the Russian army and front command. This was especially pronounced in the operation in question. As a result, the enemy, having captured the town of Zmigrod, began to threaten the ways of the 24 Army Corps and all the left-flank corps of the 3 Army. Almost three German-Austrian corps were sent to this gap. In the current situation, the combat stability of the 3 of the Caucasian Army Corps was of paramount importance. The corps could withstand the fierce attacks of the enemy, and thus saved the whole army, which could remain forever in the Carpathians. The commander reported that he decided to withdraw the corps from the mountainous region to the line Zmigrod, Mesolaborch. Moreover, over three corps (the German Guards, the Austrian 3, the German 6-th reserve, parts of the German Consolidated) attacked against the 41 of the Caucasian Army Corps.
In this situation, the commander of the 3-th army of April 22 gave the order to withdraw corps for the river. Visloka. On this day, the Chief of Staff of the Southwestern Front, Lieutenant-General V.M. Dragomirov, told Quartermaster-General of General Headquarters, General of Infantry, Yu.N. Danilov, that time must be gained, but the 3 Army could not be radically strengthened. The only expedient decision is to withdraw the army for San, and this issue must be resolved today. It is necessary to take the forts of Przemysl, placing between Yaroslav and Przemysl positions on the arc chord, which San describes by placing its flanks on the fortifications of Przemysl and Yaroslav. T. o. it is possible to give a serious rebuff to the enemy, and the 3-I army, having taken a strong position behind the Vistula and San, will be able to put itself in order.
In fact, April 22 is the day of the disaster, the day when the tactical importance of the Gorlitsky breakthrough began to acquire operational significance. The retreat of the troops of the South-Western Front began.
The enemy also noted that at dawn on 23, April, the German 20 division reached Wisloks south of Zigrod - and the troops of the 11 army broke through the entire defensive zone of the Russian 3 army, completing the breakthrough.
The most competent measure for the Russian was the decision to move to the river. San had no time to concentrate a new strong reserve for parrying the German-Austrian offensive. Salvation could be the implementation of a counter-maneuver in the style of General P. A. Plehve during the Tomaszewski battle and the Mitavo-Shavel operation — to jerk away from the enemy at the desired distance and consolidate the front at new lines. Moreover, the defense of the 3 Army began to “crawl away at the seams”, and the troops were drained of blood. That is, such a maneuver was as follows - the creation of sufficient space between the 3 army and the enemy, as well as the immediate attack of A. Mackensen’s army in the flank with a specially concentrated strong reserve. This would make it possible to gain time and, in the future, to retake the initiative.
But the Russian command clung to the territory, putting manpower (the main power of the Russian army) to the brink of destruction. Major General M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich noted that in the name of the strategically unnecessary goal of "retaining conquered space" the best troops were destroyed, turning them into weak cadres; in the name of the same strategically insignificant goal by moving the divisions of the corps to the south, the North-Western Front was also exhausted.
The reserves did not concentrate against the flank of the attacker (this could counter the development of a breakthrough), but were introduced into the case in bundles, which did not lead to a visible result. The actions of the command have been reduced, in fact, “to patching holes”.
The ending should ...
- Oleynikov Alexey
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