Military Review

Rifle battle cruisers. Unrealized projects. H. 2

35
In the previous article we reviewed the line-cruising works of Germany, the USA and Japan. And what about England?


I must say that the British sailors after the First World War fell into a very difficult situation. On the one hand, England, as of 1918-1919, had the strongest linear fleetwhich, in general, was approaching a multi-power standard. As of November 1918, there were 33 battleships in the KVMF, counting the “Canada” transferred to Chile, and 9 battle cruisers, except for the “big light cruisers” of the Koreges type. Total - 42 ships (or 41 without the Canada), and the rest of the world had 48 battleships and one battle cruiser (15 - the USA, 9 - Japan, 7 - France, Italy and Russia - 5 each, counting for the latter also “Emperor Alexander III ”, subsequently gone to Bizerte, Spain - 3, Brazil and Argentina - 2 and Turkey - 1 battle cruiser). But on the other hand, the base of the linear fleet of England was still pre-war and quickly became obsolete, while the fleets of the USA and Japan were replenished with the latest battleships and both of these countries began implementing large shipbuilding programs. As early as 1916, the United States adopted a very ambitious program to create 10 battleships and 6 battle cruisers, the war delayed these plans, but in 1918 Congress confirmed its resumption, and starting the next year, 1919, its funding was fully implemented. The Japanese (albeit not immediately) adopted their famous program "8 + 8". Both of these powers immediately began laying the latest battleships armed with 406-410-mm guns.

As a result, to the 1919 g the British were faced with the fact that their powerful fleet is rapidly becoming obsolete. Of the 9, the 4 battlecruisers were Invincible and Indefategebl type ships, which, in fact, were outdated before the outbreak of the First World War, and the remaining five (two types, Lion, Tiger, Ripales and Rinaun ") Because of the extremely weak defense had extremely limited combat utility. From the British 32 battleships (they “honestly handed over Chile to Canada), the 10 were outdated, ships that practically lost their combat value, armed with twelve-inch guns, the 11, although they had impressive 343-mm guns, were designed before World War I, and only the last ten “381-mm” battleships (5 type “Queen Elizabeth” and the same type “Royal Soverin”) could be considered quite modern. At the same time, the same US in 1919 g had 9 battleships with 356-mm guns (although the two earliest ships of the Texas type had steam engines as a power plant) and built an 3 battleship with 406-mm guns according to a new program, getting ready to lay more 7 battleships and 6 battlecruisers. The British, in response to these super efforts, had only the battle cruiser “Hood” in the completion and not a single capital ship in the construction plans.

In general, the British gradually realized that if something was not done, and urgently, then as the United States fulfills its last shipbuilding program, the Royal Navy may be in the shadow of the American. But here, to the “external enemy” the “internal enemy” was added - the country, exhausted by the nightmares of the First World War, was not at all eager to enter into the next, extremely expensive arms race. Moreover, confusion and reeling began in the Admiralty itself, because a number of sailors were quick to declare the linear forces obsolete and dying, while the future belongs to submarines and aviation.

In total, supporters of the resumption of the construction of battleships had to endure two desperate battles, and they won the first - according to the results of a comprehensive study of a specially created Post-War Development Commission, it was concluded that the battleships "have not yet lost their former value." However, the battle for the budget was lost - according to 1919 in August to the “10-year rule,” the budgets of the armed forces of England were to be determined not by their stated needs, but on the basis of the amounts that the treasury could find for them. Of course, the treasury immediately washed its hands ... It was possible to reverse this tendency later, when the Admiralty managed to "beat out" funds for the resumption of construction of linear forces from the financiers on 1921-1922 - laying out the four newest linear cruisers.

It must be said that the British took the projects of post-war ships designed to replenish the linear forces of the CWMF as seriously as possible. Of course, after the approval of the final Huda project, the designers and admirals continued to be entertained with various variants of the battlecruiser, made, in essence, in the same hull. But it was clear to everyone that even the final protection scheme for the Hud was, by and large, outdated and not suitable for the newest ships. And therefore, when the time had come to truly determine the performance characteristics of future battleships and battle cruisers, the British entered the best traditions of naval science and tried to determine ... no, not the tactical and technical characteristics of the ships of Japan and the USA, which were built or designed at that time of time. The British did not seek to create ships capable of resisting battleships or battlecruisers who were building now; they wanted to create ships that could fight both modern and advanced ships of this class.

After conducting various calculations with the "participation" of the most powerful British guns (381-mm and 457-mm caliber), the British concluded that the promising battleships of foreign powers in order to more or less acceptable protection against such powerful projectiles would eventually have to thicken The armor belt is up to 380 mm, and the armored deck is up to 178 mm. As we can see, after looking at the relevant directories, neither the Americans nor the Japanese at that time had planned anything like that. Kaga type battleships had an 305 mm board and total deck thickness (and not an armored deck) up to 160 mm in the thickest places. The South Dakota battleships had an 343 mm board and armored deck with a thickness of up to 89 mm, not counting structural steel decks. However, the British felt that the logic of the development of battleships would sooner or later lead the thickness of the deck and side armor to the above thicknesses.

In order to be able to overcome such a serious defense, the British needed a super-powerful gun, and the stakes were made on the 457-mm gun. At the same time, the British preferred the usual placement of such cannons in four two-turrets, but they understood that the three-gun turrets they disliked could give large weight and size advantages, and therefore, probably, for the first time in stories KVMF started to design three-gun installations simultaneously with two-gun. However, the British were ready to consider and 420-mm guns, and the new 381-mm long-barreled (fifty-caliber) artillery systems: however, such guns did not exist in nature, but the 457-mm still remained favorites. As part of the mine caliber, it was decided to return to using 152-mm artillery - from now on it was supposed to be placed in towers with a high level of mechanization of loading operations, and this leveled the main advantage of lighter 120-140-mm artillery systems - the ability to maintain a high rate of fire for a long time. The displacement of future battleships and battlecruisers was limited only by the dimensions of the available docks, as well as the Suez and Panama canals, but even here options were possible. Underwater protection had to withstand the hit of a torpedo containing explosives in 340 kg. The speed of the battleships was first named 25 knots, but then reduced to 23 knots, but the Americans still had their "pernicious" effect on TZ for the battle cruisers - the British wanted to set the bar on 33,5 first, under the impression of the Lexington's 33,5-node speed. knots, but then the anger was replaced with mercy, allowing to reduce the speed to 30 knots. The range should have been 7 000 miles on 16 nodes.

The first projects of the battleship of the new type (L.II and L.III, the figure indicated the presence of four two-gun or three three-gun towers), presented in June 1920, struck the imagination.



The L.II normal displacement was 50 750 tons, the main caliber was 8 * 457-mm guns, while the towers were arranged linearly (and not linearly sublime!), Anti-mine - 16 * 152-mm guns in two-gun towers. On the one hand, the linear layout of the artillery looked quite archaic, not allowing to fire at the bow and stern with the guns of the two towers, but the British calculated that already at elevation angle in 12 the second and third towers could fire above the first and fourth without damaging the last.

However, the real highlight of the project was the scheme of its reservation.

Rifle battle cruisers. Unrealized projects. H. 2


In this project, the British applied the “all or nothing” principle previously used by the Americans. The armor belt of more than 150 m length and an unusually powerful thickness of eighteen inches (457-mm) had a small height, only 2,4 m, while it was at a large angle to the sea surface (25 degrees). The horizontal part of the armor deck was also unprecedentedly powerful - 222 mm. But this section of the armored form was located significantly higher than the top edge of the 457 mm armor belt, which was quite unusual: the 330 mm bevels connected the armored form not with the bottom, but with the top edge of the armor belt!

There was a certain logic in this (at first glance, completely insane) layout. Without a doubt, 457 mm vertical section, and even at an angle 25 hail was able to withstand the blows of 457-mm projectiles, presumably that 222 mm armor (at least - at medium combat distances) could also reflect it. As for the 330 mm bevels, here, probably, their angle of inclination was chosen very carefully, so that at small and medium distances the projectiles, having a gentle trajectory, would simply ricochet from them. At long ranges, when the trajectory became more hinged, the bevel seemed to be “substituted” for the projectile, but due to its large thickness, it was probably still quite equivalent to 222 mm horizontal protection. At the same time, such a “tortoise-like” protection in cross-section provided a much larger amount of protected space, as compared with the classical armored deck with bevels.

Why are we in the article devoted to the latest British battlecruisers, paid so much attention to the project of the battleship? Only for one reason: in order to illustrate how in the post-war projects of "capital" ships the British were ready to disregard all kinds of traditions, established views on many things, for the combat effectiveness of future battleships and battlecruisers. And that's what they ended up with.

Displacement

Alas, the size of the Suez Canal, coupled with the docks in England, seriously limited the size of future warships - their normal displacement should not exceed 48 500 t, and admirals could not enter these dimensions. As a result, the sailors and designers had to balance the composition of weapons, armor thickness, power plant capacity in order to create balanced battleships and battle cruisers in the dimensions specified. In the draft of the cruiser “G-3”, the normal displacement was 48 400 t (with a normal supply of fuel 1 200 t).

Artillery

As the various variants of the battle cruiser were worked out, the shipbuilders came to the sad conclusion that even three-gun artillery mounts are still too heavy and 9 * 457-mm guns cannot be placed on the ship, unless you don’t sacrifice other parameters too much. As a result, it was decided to first confine to six 457-mm cannons in two towers, but the sailors looked askance at such an innovation — six barrels made it difficult to shoot, and as a result it was decided to lower the caliber first to 420-mm and then to 406 mm Interestingly, “just in case” it was stated that the three-gun 406-mm towers are close in weight to the 457-mm two-gun, so if the opposite decision is made, the placement of the 6 * 457-mm guns in the three two-gun towers will not require how many then a serious redesign of the ship.

In general, the return to 406-mm guns looked quite justifiable and reasonable step, but we should not forget that if it were not for the Washington Maritime Conference, Japan would have started (after two Kaga battleships) to build battleships (and probably battle cruisers) with 457-mm guns. Thus, His Majesty’s fleet in the battle cruiser unit ceased to “travel first class”. But the British would hardly have been worth grieving about this, in essence, there would have been some kind of “composition change” - while during WWI, England neglected to protect its battlecruisers in favor of large guns and speed, Germany limited itself to a smaller caliber with better protection, and such The approach is quite justified. Now, with the construction of the “G-3”, England would already have been in the position of Germany, and Japan - of England.

However, the situation was seriously complicated by the fact that the UK’s best engineers in the world, unfortunately, did not cope with the creation of an effective 406-mm artillery system and a three-gun installation for it. The fact is that, although the linear cruisers of the G-3 project were never embodied in metal, the 406-mm / 45 tools developed for them took place in the Nelson and Rodney battleships towers, which is why we are good enough imagine what the last British battlecruisers should have armed themselves with.


Tower installations battleship "Nelson"


So, in the years preceding the First World War, the British held to the concept of “heavy projectile - low initial speed” and created quite impressive 343-381-mm guns. But when they were created, the British continued to use a rapidly becoming obsolete concept: the trunk wire structure, which had a sufficient number of flaws, such as, for example, great weight, but one of them was critical - long-barreled tools having such a design were bad. That is why the British did not succeed in the 305-mm / 50 gun, which, although it was put into service, did not suit the British in terms of shooting accuracy and a number of other parameters. As a result, the British were forced to return to guns with a barrel length of no more than 45 calibers, and in order to increase the power of such guns so that they were competitive with the latest German 305-mm / 50 tools, they increased the caliber to 343-mm ... and that is how they appeared super dreadnoughts.

At the same time, the concept of “low initial speed - heavy projectile” answered the “wire” construction of the barrels as well as possible, because for such an artillery system, a long barrel is not something that is not needed, but it is quite possible to do without it. However, according to the results of the First World War, the British came to the conclusion that they were wrong, and that the concept of “light projectile - high initial velocity” is more promising.

In support of this thesis, “British scientists” seemed to have made reasonable theses that in certain circumstances (for example, when they hit armored decks of ships at long distances), shorter “light” projectiles have the advantage of armor penetration before heavy (and, accordingly, long). All this was in theory the case, but alas, in practice, these advantages were of little value. However, the acceptance of such a concept was not in itself an evil - the same Germans created a very formidable 380-mm gun for their Bismarck type battleships. But this, again, occurred to a certain extent because the German artillery system had a long barrel (the longer it is, the longer the impact on the projectile of expanding powder gases, and this increases the initial velocity of the projectile - to certain limits, of course. In the barrel, kilometer long, the shell simply stuck).

So, the mistake of the British was that, by adopting the concept of “light projectile - high initial speed”, they retained the archaic wire structure of the trunk, limiting its length to 45 gauges. As a result, the resulting artillery system had a very low survivability. In order to somehow solve this issue, the British had to go to a significant reduction in the mass of powder charges, which, of course, greatly reduced the initial speed. The result was disappointing - instead of firing 929 kg with a projectile with an initial speed of 828 m / s, the British 406-mm / 50 provided such a projectile with only 785 m / s. As a result, instead of the all-destructive "hands of the gods", the English sailors received a very ordinary and, perhaps, worst-in-class artillery system - as we have said before, an American 406-mm gun mounted on Maryland-type battleships fired 1 016 kg with a projectile the initial speed is 768 m / s., and the Japanese 410-mm gun fired a projectile weighing exactly a ton with an initial speed of 790 m / s. In this case, the American gun had the survivability of the 320 barrel shots, and the British - only 200.

The drawbacks of the artillery system were supplemented from the hands by the archaic and imperfect construction of the towers. The British did not dare to switch to electric control, retaining the hydraulics, although at least they used oil instead of water as a working fluid, which made it possible to switch to thin-walled steel pipes instead of copper ones. But the refusal of the loading mechanism at different angles (the guns were charged at a fixed elevation angle), design errors, due to which the axes of the towers shifted during turns, which caused her shoulder strap and other things to break down, and the like caused the Nelson crews and the "Rodney" their main caliber delivered, perhaps, more trouble than all the fleets of the Axis countries combined.

However, all of the above can not be attributed to the shortcomings of the project of the battle cruiser “G-3”. We can only repeat that the armament of the 9 * 406-mm artillery systems for this ship looked reasonable and sufficient.

The anti-mine caliber was represented by eight two-gun 152-mm towers, anti-aircraft armament was highly developed - six 120-mm guns and four ten-barreled 40-mm “Pope”. “G-3” was supposed to be equipped with two underwater 622-mm torpedo tubes.


622-mm torpedoes on the battleship Rodney


The torpedo weight was 2 850 kg, they carried 337 kg of explosives to 13 700 m range (almost 75 kb) with 35 nodes speed, or almost 18 kbt 300 nodes speed.

Reservation

It is a pleasure to describe the armored protection system of post-war British battleships and battlecruisers, since it was very simple and understandable. A rather complicated and multi-level booking of ships from the time of the WWI was replaced by the American “all or nothing”. The protection was based on a vertical armor belt of length 159,1 m (with a total length of the ship 259,25 mm along the waterline) and height 4,34 m - in normal displacement it lowered 1,37 m below and rose 2,97 m above the waterline. At the same time, the armor belt had an inclination of 18 degrees, and also - it was internal, that is, it did not protect the board in contact with the sea, but was deepened into the hull so that its upper edge defended by 1,2 m from the side. In the areas of the cellars of the towers of the main caliber (over the length of 78,9 m), the thickness of the armor belt was maximum and was 356 mm, otherwise - 305 mm. In general, the belt fully protected areas of the towers of the main and anti-mine calibers, engine and boiler rooms of the ship. A single armored deck rested on its upper edge: however, the angle of these bevels was so insignificant (only 2,5 degrees!) That it was fit to talk about a single horizontal deck, but formally they were nonetheless. The thickness of the deck, like that of the armor belt, was differentiated: above the cellars of the main-caliber guns (that is, apparently over the 78,9 meter section of the 356 mm side armor), it had 203 mm, sinking into the stern successively to 172, 152, 141 and 102 mm (the last, four-inch thickness of the deck had above the aft boiler and engine rooms), while the areas of the anti-mine caliber towers covered 178 mm armored deck. The citadel was closed by traverses 305 mm thick ahead and 254 m in the stern, but there were still two additional 127 mm bulkheads, so that the aggregate protection was not so bad.

However, something was defended outside the citadel as well — the underwater torpedo tubes (and where to go without them), located in front of the citadel, had protection from 152-mm armor, traverse and armor deck of the same thickness. The steering machine was protected by a 127 mm deck and a 114 mm by traversing. Most likely, this was all, although some sources nevertheless indicate that, apart from the above, there were also lower decks outside the citadel (probably passing below the waterline) in the bow and stern, their thickness was 152 mm and 127 mm, respectively.

Artillery had a very strong defense. The forehead, side plates and the roof of the towers were defended, respectively, with 432 mm, 330 mm and 203 mm armor. The barbety had a thickness of 356 mm, however, closer to the diametral plane, where the barbet was overlapped by an adjacent one, or superstructure, its thickness was reduced to 280-305 mm. But on the conning tower, it can be said, they saved it - 356 mm armor plates protected it only in frontal projection, on the sides and rear it had only 254 and 102 mm armor, respectively.

The anti-torpedo protection (which included an 44 mm armored disperser) was calculated to counter charges equivalent to 340 kg of trinitrotoluene. Its depth reached 4,26 m, not metal pipes (like Hud’s), but water (2 630 tons in total!) Were used as a working medium, while in peacetime it was supposed to keep PTZ compartments drained. Interestingly, for the rapid straightening of the roll, a system was provided for blowing individual PTZ chambers with compressed air.

Power plant

It was assumed that the vehicles of the ship will develop 160 000 hp, while its speed will be ... alas, it is not entirely clear how much, because sources usually indicate the spread of 31-32 knots. However, even the lower limit is very good, and, of course, gave the British battlecruiser many tactical capabilities of a high-speed ship. However, the admirals, recalling the Lexington, were not satisfied with this speed and wanted more: however, reluctantly, agreed, because a further increase in speed required a significant reduction in other martial qualities, which nobody wanted to go to. It’s not quite clear what range the G-3 would have if it was built, but given the impressively large maximum fuel reserve in the 5 000, it would hardly be small, and it could easily have made the initially desired 7 000 miles on 16 knots or so. “Hood” with a maximum fuel capacity of about 4 000 t was able to overcome 7 500 miles on 14 nodes.

Layout



It must be said that the first look at the layout of the G-3 battle cruisers immediately recalls a rather old saying: “A camel is a horse made in England.” Why, well, why did the British need to abandon the normal and absolutely sensible placement of the towers “two in the bow, one in the stern” in favor of ... this ?! However, oddly enough, the British had very serious reasons for putting the third tower in the middle of the building.

I must say that the first design iterations of battleships and battlecruisers of the British were carried out in a completely traditional manner.


Project "K-3", October 1920 g


But ... the fact is that at that time in all British "capital" ships, according to the "Hood" inclusive, the charging compartments of the main caliber were located above the projectile. This was due to the fact that the ship's hold is relatively compact, and the shells occupy a much smaller volume than the powder, which should throw them out of the gun barrels. That is why the charge storages were always located above the slug compartments.

But now the British saw a flaw, because it was the powder “depots” that posed the greatest danger to the ships — fires followed by detonation in the battle of Jutland, according to authoritative commissions, caused the penetration of fire into the powder, and not into the shell cellars. In general, on test shells proved to be somewhat more resistant to the effects of a shock wave and flame. Therefore, the British came to the conclusion that the location of the charging compartments at the very bottom, under the storage of shells, will provide the newest battleships and cruisers with much better survivability than was possible before. But alas, it was impossible to swap the storage of shells and charges with the traditional layout. That is, it would certainly be possible, but the layout ceased to be rational, it was necessary to lengthen the citadel, which led to an increase in displacement, etc., and so it was until someone suggested exactly the scheme we see in the final project “G-3”. The location of the three 406-mm towers in close proximity to each other helped to place the powder cellars under the shell, without sacrificing other characteristics of the ship. This was the reason why the British adopted for their newest battleships and battlecruisers such a seemingly strange arrangement of artillery of the main caliber.

However, it should be noted that the most extravagant layout was still not the battle cruisers of the project “G-3”, but the battleships “N-3”, which the Admiralty was going to lay a year after the battle cruisers



As it is known, on the warships, the placement of boiler rooms closer to the stem was considered, and the engine rooms - to the stern stem, that is, steam engines (or turbines) were located behind the boilers, closer to the stern. The same was true of the G-3 battlecruisers. However, on the battleships "N-3" the British managed to swap them - that is, after the third tower, they first went to the engine rooms, and only then - the boiler rooms!

Comparison with "classmates"

After studying the projects of post-war battlecruisers (the last military ones for Germany), we come to the conclusion that the British G-3 is clearly superior to the German, American and Japanese ships of the same class. His nine 406-mm guns, at least on paper, were almost as good as the most heavily armed Amagi, while the G-3 was superior to the Japanese in speed by one knot and simply had an incomparably more powerful reservation. American “Lexington” at a meeting with the “G-3” could count only on the “retreat to the prepared positions”, or rather to run, because the speed was the only parameter by which this battle cruiser had superiority over the “G- 3 ”(33,5 knots vs. 31-32). But in practice, he most likely would not have succeeded, but in a battle the “American” simply had no chance, only hope for a miracle.

The most intelligible chances of success against the G-3 would have been that the German battleship did, but the nine 406-mm English ship still looked preferable to the 6 * 420-mm German, and the 350 mm belt of the latter, though exceeding the length of 356 mm the “G-3” section, but was significantly lower, and the second armored belt was only 250 mm. It should not be forgotten that the Germans used vertical plates, while the British planned to set them at an angle, and the reduced thickness of the British defense was 374 and 320 mm for the 356 mm and 305 mm sections, respectively. But most importantly, the G-3 had incomparably more powerful horizontal protection. In the previous article, we indicated that the thickness of the main armored deck of the German ship was 30-60 mm, but this question requires further clarification, and perhaps it still had 50-60 mm throughout. But, for obvious reasons, even if this is so, then such a thickness cannot be compared with the X-NUMX-102 mm armored "G-203". Of course, the German cruiser still had an armor (or just thick structural steel) deck in 3 mm, but such spaced armor has less durability than a single armor plate of the same thickness, and the advantage of G-20 is still overwhelming. In general, in general, it is the armor protection of the “G-3” that is the real “highlight” of the project, thanks to which it significantly surpasses the similar projects of other countries.

However, we can also see that the design of the last British battlecruiser also had significant drawbacks. And first of all it concerned, oddly enough ... the booking system, which we have just called the most impressive. But in fairness, it should be pointed out that only a section of the citadel that had 406 mm (356 mm reduced) vertical armor and 374 mm armored deck looked more or less acceptable protection against 203-mm shells. That would be enough, but the length of this section of the citadel is quite small - only 78,9 m or 30,4% of the total length of the waterline. The rest of the citadel, which had 320 mm reduced vertical armor, and 102-152 mm horizontal, was no longer sufficient protection against projectiles of this caliber. Also, the barbets of the towers of the main caliber, even in their 356 mm parts, were quite vulnerable, although it would not be so easy to pierce them: they had a circular cross section, so getting into the barbet at an angle close to 90 degrees was very difficult.

The vertical armor belt “G-3” was “sunk” into the board, which allowed saving on the mass of the armor decks, as it made it already, but at the same time reduced the volume of the reserved space: while the enemy shells could cause serious (although not threatening to destroy the ship) damage without even breaking through the armor belt. The ship’s extremities were completely unprotected, which was more or less acceptable in the battle of battleships, but it was a major drawback in most other combat situations - even relatively minor damage from high-explosive bombs and shells could cause extensive flooding, a strong trim on the bow or stern and as a result , a significant drop in combat effectiveness of the battlecruiser.

But still, in general, it should be stated that in the G-3 project, the British were as close as possible, much closer than other countries, to the concept of a high-speed battleship during the Second World War. And if something didn’t work out for them, it’s not because the English admirals and designers didn’t understand something, or didn’t take it into account, but only because at the given normal displacement (48 500) on 20 It’s absolutely impossible to design and build an 30-node battleship that carries an 406-mm gun and is well protected from projectiles of the same caliber. The British knew exactly what they wanted, understood the inaccessibility of their desires and were forced to make conscious compromises. And we can justifiably say that as a result of these compromises, it turned out that the project of the cruiser G-3, though not perfect, but extremely successful and well-balanced.
Author:
Articles from this series:
Battle Cruiser: Fon der Tann vs Indefatigeble
Battle Cruiser: Fon der Tann vs Indefatigeble. H.2
Line Cruiser Rivalry: Moltke vs. Lion
Line Cruiser Rivalry: Moltke vs. Lion. H. 2
Line Cruiser Rivalry: Moltke vs. Lion. H. 3
Rifle battle cruisers. "Seidlits" vs "Queen Mary"
Line Cruiser Rivalry: Derflinger vs. Tiger
Congo-class battlecruisers
Rifle battle cruisers. "Derflinger" against "Tager". H. 2
Rifle battle cruisers. "Derflinger" against "Tiger"? H. 3
Line Cruiser Rivalry: Rinaun and Mackensen
Line Cruiser Rivalry: Rinaun and Mackensen
Rifle battle cruisers. Large light cruisers "Koreydzhes"
Rifle battle cruisers. "Hood" and "Ersatz York"
Rifle battle cruisers. "Hood" and "Ersatz York". H. 2
Rifle battle cruisers. "Hood" and "Ersatz York". H. 3
Rifle battle cruisers. Unrealized projects
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  1. kvs207
    kvs207 22 August 2018 06: 52
    +4
    As always +. Thanks to the author.
    I wonder why, after the Nelsons, did the British switch to the classic layout scheme and reduce the main caliber?
    1. Snakebyte
      Snakebyte 22 August 2018 10: 30
      +6
      They reduced the caliber according to the London agreements of 1930, then it was proposed to limit the caliber to 14 ", but if all countries did not support this, a return to the 16" caliber followed.
      American "North Carolines" were designed for 14 "4-gun turrets, when Japan refused to support the London restrictions, the turrets were replaced with 16" 3-gun turrets. But the armor remained counting on the opposition 14 ".
    2. yehat
      yehat 22 August 2018 23: 38
      -2
      there was no "decline" after the Nelsons. Nelsons are generally a separate topic for battleships, they were made with the expectation of actions in the shallow Baltic and were specially facilitated for this.
  2. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 22 August 2018 07: 08
    +4
    Article chic five good smile
    The British are considered to be inveterate conservatives, although during the development of their main and beloved brainchild - the Navy - they throughout the history created advanced models of technology. It is worth noting that, nevertheless, conservatism had a negative impact on these projects and contributed its fly in the ointment for these samples.
    But for the sake of fairness, this applies to all countries. After all, the wishes of admirals are fundamentally different from the capabilities of the economy and industry, because the main wars were between customers and designers and builders. And since the ship is still the brainchild of compromises, a reasonable approach in design and the consensus reached with the customer gave rise, in principle, to quite good ships balanced within the available displacement framework. Departure from this gave rise to beautiful "freaks" with a clear bias towards some quality. It is good that most of these projects remained on paper, and those that were embodied in metal, if they had their advantages depending on the concept of their use, then life made its own adjustments and their shortcomings influenced the degree of their use. "Rodney")
    As in that joke: The ideal man has a slender figure, does not drink, does not smoke, is kind, loves mother-in-law, gives a salary, always gives flowers and does not exist ....
    PS. Aviation won the battle of battleships .... hi
  3. Conductor
    Conductor 22 August 2018 08: 09
    0
    Again, why TA on battleships? Tsushima also showed that TA is not needed for battleships.
    1. faiver
      faiver 22 August 2018 10: 21
      +1
      yeah, it's interesting to see how a battleship enters a torpedo attack lol
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 22 August 2018 15: 55
        +2
        Quote: faiver
        yeah, it's interesting to see how a battleship enters a torpedo attack

        Fight with "Bismarck" ... more precisely, finishing off "Bismarck". Rodney fired a dozen torpedoes and announced one possible hit.
        1. Conductor
          Conductor 22 August 2018 17: 21
          +1
          Rodney finished off, I just don’t remember that either from the torpedo attack of heavy ships. The same Zara and Paula were beaten by artillery.
    2. Senior seaman
      Senior seaman 22 August 2018 11: 45
      0
      These were the interesting views of the admirals. Ours also freaked out, creating projects for "torpedo battleships".
      1. Conductor
        Conductor 22 August 2018 17: 25
        0
        Yeah, and managed to drive 7 and 7 to the North.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 22 August 2018 18: 31
          +2
          Quote: Conductor
          Yeah, and managed to drive 7 and 7 to the North.

          So ... RKKF still had no other EMs.
          In addition, the corps of the "sevens" behaved equally rotten in the North and the Black Sea. Cracks and corrugation of the skin, deformation and fracture of the hull's structural structures in a storm at the EM KChF was practically the norm.
          On March 22, the destroyer “Boyky”, being on the Sochi beam, fell into a severe storm (wind 9 points, excitement up to 8 points). The forecastle began to dig deep into the water, its flooring, despite the installation of reinforcements, sagged and deformed. In some places cracks formed in the case, tore and washed the view overboard.
          On February 5-6, the destroyer fell into a severe storm and received serious damage. In particular, cracks up to 50 cm long were formed in the upper deck (mainly along welds) and in the outer skin of the side, coamings and manhole covers were deformed, rip-offs were torn off, fuel oil began to leak into neighboring rooms from almost all fuel tanks.

          In the campaign on February 21, which took place immediately after the completion of the scheduled preventive repair, the destroyer “Soobrazitelny” got the most out of it. Under the blows of 8-point waves, the deck bent in the region of the 23-26th frames, the pillers bent, cracks appeared in the flooring sheets. Corrugations formed in the outer skin on the 35th to 36th frames. Water began to ooze through the deformed doors and manhole covers, portholes under the forecastle. The rope view on the forecastle, 6 racks of the guard rail, fenders, 2 ventilation fungi were torn and taken to sea. Cracks formed in the shields of the 1st and 4th 130-mm guns, the left arm of the large bomb-thrower bent, the windows in the cabin windows broke. Finally, with a sharp roll to the port side, the main mast broke and fell into the water.

          During the campaign on the night of February 21, "Smyshlennyy" fell into a severe storm. The sea state reached 8 points with an unusually short (30 - 50 m) wave. The destroyer received numerous injuries: cracks appeared in the outer skin, riveted seams lost tightness, one frame burst ...
          1. Saxahorse
            Saxahorse 22 August 2018 22: 26
            0
            This is their life. The destroyers. As there the British wrote about their first destroyers: ".. through the thin skin the frames were clearly visible .." :)
    3. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 22 August 2018 16: 19
      +2
      Quote: Conductor
      Again, why TA on battleships? Tsushima also showed that TA is not needed for battleships.



      Why torpedoes on TAVKR Kiev? :))
      Just in case, let it be ... the sailors decided.


      And at the same time, RCC to the heap ...
      1. arturpraetor
        arturpraetor 22 August 2018 17: 12
        +3
        Actually, the TAs on the 1143s also performed the functions of PLO, as far as I remember, firing the SET-53 and SET-65 self-guided anti-submarine torpedoes. That the function is not entirely superfluous to itself, although traditionally shifted to an escort - but 1143 in general is like special ships.
        1. Conductor
          Conductor 22 August 2018 17: 23
          0
          PLO torpedoes are normal, probably, but against surface ships! It would be much, the same Rodney, Bismarck got, Hardly.
          1. arturpraetor
            arturpraetor 22 August 2018 17: 56
            +1
            That no, 1143 is a different era, different realities. And other torpedoes. For ships of the time of "Rodney" TA is clearly unnecessary, although you can use them by dancing with a tambourine.
      2. Conductor
        Conductor 22 August 2018 17: 26
        +1
        You still remember Surkuf)))) Here is where the flight of thought.
      3. Conductor
        Conductor 22 August 2018 17: 30
        0
        Or these, Japanese monsters, from the time of Tsushima, with one gun of the Civil Code, fired and that’s all, we charge.
    4. yehat
      yehat 22 August 2018 23: 42
      +1
      if we consider the ship separately, then TA for battleships is not particularly needed, but in the conditions of linear squadron combat, torpedoes are very useful, I'm not talking about the fact that finishing ships is much cheaper with torpedoes.
  4. Potter
    Potter 22 August 2018 10: 45
    +3
    I knew a little about this project, it was interesting to read. Now in the logic of the appearance of "Nelsons" there are more understandable places.
  5. DimanC
    DimanC 22 August 2018 11: 49
    +2
    I remember looking for images of these battleships and cruisers for a long time. Somehow they were not in such wide access as, for example, the same "Hood". It is interesting that the British began to break some traditions, but continued to adhere to others: instead of changing the recipes for gunpowder (for the same German ones), they began to get out with the layout of the ships. Which, by the way, to the French later came out sideways ...
  6. anzar
    anzar 22 August 2018 12: 38
    +2
    +++ to the author! A great continuation (or end?) Of the cycle. Not without discussion points however ...
    ... the main compartment’s charging compartments were located above the shells. This was due to the fact that the ship’s hold is relatively compact, and shells occupy a much smaller volume than gunpowder

    But what, charges are not in the hold?))) No, it was due to the fact that the shells weigh more (i.e. the metacentric height of the ship will be more)
    In general, during the tests, the shells proved to be somewhat more resistant to the effects of the shock wave ...

    ??? What is gunpowder? No comment!
    ... the location of the charging compartments at the very bottom, under the storage of shells, will provide the latest battleships and cruisers with much better survivability

    This is the true truth, and ALL builders of modern battleships have come to this location. The thing is the addiction of shell cellars detonate from nearby underwater explosions of mines or torpedoes, so we had to put them away from the bottom. This "inclination" came from the modern filling, before the brown powder in the shells did not detonate, and the charge of torpedoes and mines was small. There is no more WWII ... (remember the death of Peresvet)
    Here is the Yamato section in the cellar area — they are additionally raised and booked from below!

    In general, I do not see any advantages in the layout of the G3, except for the large admiral's premises in the stern (as in Nicholas I))) If you change the third tower with the boiler room, there will be no difference in the depth of the PTP for 1 and 3. True, the thickness of the belt against the cars is smaller, and it is impossible to alternate the thickness of the belt without a traverse, apparently this is the "secret" of the layout.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 August 2018 08: 20
      0
      Quote: anzar
      But what, charges are not in the hold?))) No, it was due to the fact that the shells weigh more (i.e. the metacentric height of the ship will be more)

      Anzar, I write about the reasons for the British shipbuilders. If you think that you know how they were guided better than themselves, then I strongly recommend descending from heaven to sinful earth.
      And I can recommend at least occasionally including such a thing as logic - it helps a lot in analysis. So if you analyze the damage of large warships in battle, you will see that the fire and / or energy of the explosion that arose as a result of the breakdown of the tower or barbet, with the traditional layout, falls into the charging, not shell cellar.
      Quote: anzar
      ??? What is gunpowder? No comment!

      It's good that "no comment" is scary to think about what you were going to say about my quote
      1. anzar
        anzar 23 August 2018 11: 59
        0
        you will see, then the fire and / or the energy of the explosion that arose as a result of the breakdown of the tower or barbet, with the traditional layout, gets into the charging, not shell cellar.

        Sure! By products of the explosion, the projectile is "more difficult" to set fire to than a silk cap))) And this is regardless of the order of location.
        And I can recommend at least occasionally include such a thing as logic

        And you - turn on "reading" It was about detonation of shells and not about a fire with an explosion of gunpowder (cordite) Yes, gunpowder usually does not detonate from nearby explosions (concussions), but modern. the filling of the shells is good. That's what you mean "scary to think".
        If you think you know how they were guided better than themselves ...

        What, they just wrote what they were guided by? Then my words are what guided everyone else)))
  7. prodi
    prodi 22 August 2018 15: 41
    +1
    In my opinion, if in booking the "project" the lower bevels are slightly lengthened, the upper bevels are shortened by three times and an obstruction of the armored deck (significantly variable thickness towards the center) is made, then one could save money.
    I don’t understand why the armored displacement was used as anti-torpedo protection? Wouldn’t it be easier to just lower, say, 10cm screens to a given depth
  8. NF68
    NF68 22 August 2018 15: 57
    +1
    As always, interesting material.
  9. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 22 August 2018 22: 31
    +1
    Honestly, I didn’t understand what was stopping me from swapping shell and charging cellars in some places in the classical scheme. And the link to the exchange of cellars in places, as the main motive in choosing such a strange layout, sounds strange.
    1. anzar
      anzar 23 August 2018 00: 21
      +1
      Honestly, I didn’t understand what was stopping me from swapping shell and charging cellars in some places in the classical scheme

      Nothing prevents you from changing places even with the classic (as seen on others) This layout is more likely the result of a desire to place all three towers together due to the difference in the thickness of the belt against them and the CMU. With the classic one, two internal traverses would have to be placed during transitions, otherwise the projectile, breaking through the "thin" belt of the CMU at a small horizontal angle, could explode into the cellar. That is, this is a product of weight savings (apparently they believed that getting into some kind of boiler room not so fatal))) It is surprising that earlier, in the era of armadillos, they believed the opposite!
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        23 August 2018 08: 22
        0
        Quote: anzar
        Nothing prevents you from swapping places with the classic (as seen on others) This layout is more likely the result of desire

        Anzar, no need to replace the real conclusions of the British indefatigable imagination
        1. anzar
          anzar 23 August 2018 12: 33
          0
          The citadel was closed with traverses 305 mm thick in front and 254 m in the stern, but there was still two additional 127 mm bulkheads

          Will you indicate where they were?
          Anzar, no need to replace real British conclusions ...

          So I thought that they copied something (from the Times newspaper))) And then the expert (really!) How to write this is surprised
  10. Vedzmin
    Vedzmin 22 August 2018 23: 52
    +1
    Thank you very much to the author for the next part of the material about battlecruisers! This whole series has very seriously enriched me with knowledge on the topic. A separate plus - links to previous parts!
  11. Comrade
    Comrade 23 August 2018 01: 52
    0
    Dear Andrew,
    article is very good +! It can only be added that the estimated cost of the G3 battle cruiser, dated April 1921, was £ 9, while the Royal Sovereign superdreadnought at completion was £ 000.

    Yes, here is another project of the Austro-Hungarian battlecruiser, four guns of the 420 caliber mm, Skoda guns, 33 000 tons displacement.
    1. anzar
      anzar 23 August 2018 12: 17
      0
      here is the same, but more beautiful)))

      It is noteworthy that in all projects, despite the year (1917-18), the caliber of weapons and a large VI (36ct full), the belt is only 225mm
      PS You can download them in higher resolution (4300/2000) along with the data from here.
      https://www.deviantart.com/tzoli/art/Austro-Hungarian-Project-IV-Battlecruiser-Design-697007938
  12. kitt409
    kitt409 25 August 2018 19: 16
    0
    Thank you for the article!!!"
  13. ser56
    ser56 31 August 2018 15: 05
    0
    Thanks to the author, not bad ... about booking the G-3 especially!
    As a positive criticism repeat - unfortunately, the author does not think about the perception of information by readers - for example:
    "As a result, instead of the all-crushing" hand of the gods ", the British sailors received a very ordinary and, perhaps, the worst artillery system in its class - as we said earlier, the American 406-mm cannon, installed on battleships of the" Maryland "type, fired 1 kg shell with an initial speed of 016 m / s, and a Japanese 768-mm gun fired a shell weighing exactly one ton at an initial speed of 410 m / s. " in general, everything is correct, but not clear ... but if the author compared the muzzle energy, everything would be clearer ... England -790 (286%), USA -91,7 (299%) and Japan -96 MJ (312%)
    I will note that "however, at least they used oil instead of water as a working fluid, which made it possible to switch to thin-walled steel pipes instead of copper ones" this water saved EBR Fuji under Tsushima ... request
    Curiously, “as a“ working fluid ”, not metal pipes (like in the Hood) were used, but water (in total - 2 630 tons!)” - why not fuel?