Military Review

Congo-class battlecruisers

65
Strictly speaking, there should have been an article on this place devoted to the British battle cruiser Tiger, but due to the fact that its construction was greatly influenced by the Congo built at the Vickers shipyard, it makes sense to give it a separate article.


History Japanese battlecruisers began in the Battle of Yalu, during which the fleet of cruisers played a significant, if not decisive, role. However, according to the analysis of this battle, the Japanese concluded that their small armored cruisers did not meet the tasks of a squadron battle with armadillos, and that they needed completely different ships for this. Without a doubt, the new cruisers were supposed to be high-speed, armed with high-speed artillery of 8 inches inclusive, but at the same time they should also be protected with armor capable of withstanding shells of the same caliber. As a result of this decision, the Japanese fleet received six very powerful armored cruisers, and then, on the eve of the war with Russia, was able to buy two more Italian ships, received in the United navy the names "Nissin" and "Kasuga".

As is known, the sea power of the Russian Empire in the 1904-1905 war. was crushed. The Japanese were very pleased with the actions of their armored cruisers, and all their subsequent shipbuilding programs required the presence of such ships as part of the fleet.

Frankly, this decision of the Japanese is, at least, controversial. After all, if you think about it, then what really made their armored cruisers? Without a doubt, the commanders of the Assam, under the protection of very good armor, would have been easy to shoot the Varyag armored cruiser, even if the Russian artillerymen could have driven several of their shells into the armored cruiser of the Japanese.



But “Varyag” in any case was doomed, regardless of whether Chelmulpo had “Assam” or not - the Japanese were superior in numbers. In the 27 battle of January, the armored cruisers of Japan showed themselves nothing. Four armored Japanese cruisers took part in the battle in the Yellow Sea, but how? "Nissin" and "Kasuga" were put in one column with the battleships, that is, the Japanese deliberately abandoned the benefits that gave them the use of armored cruisers as a high-speed wing. Instead, Nissin and Kassuga were forced to portray classical armadillos, but they were too poorly armored and armed for this role. And only bad shooting of the Russian commanders saved these cruisers from heavy damage.

As for the other two armored cruisers, they also did not earn any laurels - the “high-speed” “Asama” was never able to join the battleships of Togo and did not take part in the battle of the main forces, but the “Yakumo” did succeed, but only in the second half of the battle. Some serious achievements are not listed for him, and the only 305-mm Russian projectile that fell into it caused Yakumo significant damage, which confirmed the danger of using this type of cruiser in battle against full-fledged squadron battleships. In Tsushima, Nissin and Kassuga were again forced to pretend to be “battleships”, and the Kamimura squad, although it had a certain independence, also did not act as a “fast wing”, but acted simply as another squad of battleships. As for the battle in the Korean Strait, here the Japanese suffered a real fiasco - after a successful hit knocked out "Rurik" out of order, four armored cruisers Kamimura, having in front of him half the size of the enemy ("Gromoboy" and "Russia") , during the many hours of battle, they could neither destroy nor even destroy at least one of these ships, despite the fact that the Russian armored cruisers that opposed them were never intended to be used in a squadron battle.

No doubt, any Japanese armored cruiser cost significantly less than a full-bodied battleship in 15 000 tons, and it can be assumed that two battleships of the Asahi or Mikasa cost approximately as much as three armored cruisers. However, there is no doubt that if the Japanese had an armadillo instead of 4 armored cruisers at the beginning of the war, their fleet could have achieved greater success. In general, in the opinion of the author of this article, the armored cruisers of the United Fleet as a class of warships did not completely justify themselves, but the Japanese obviously had a different opinion on this issue.

Nevertheless, the Japanese admirals made some conclusions, namely, they understood the absolute insufficiency of the 203-mm guns for a squadron battle. All the battleships and armored cruisers of Togo and Kamimura were built abroad, and after the Russo-Japanese War, two more battleships built in England were included in the United Fleet: Kashima and Katori (both were laid out in 1904 g). However, Japan subsequently stopped this practice, and began construction of heavy warships in its own shipyards. And the very first Japanese armored cruisers of their own construction (of the “Tsukuba” type) received the 305-mm artillery systems - the same as the battleships. Both the Tsukuba type ships and the Ibuki and Kurama that followed were the main-caliber ships of the battleships, while a higher speed (21,5 knots against 18,25 knots) was achieved by weakening the average caliber (with 254-mm to 203 mm) and reservations (from 229 mm to 178 mm). Thus, the Japanese were the first in the world to realize the need to arm large cruisers with the same main caliber as the battleship, and their Tsukuba and Ibuki next to the Kasims and Satsuma looked very organic.

But then the British shook the world with their Invincibles and the Japanese thought about the answer - they wanted to have a ship that was in no way inferior to English. All in all, but in Japan they didn’t know the exact tactical and technical characteristics of Invincible, and therefore the design of an armored cruiser with a 18 displacement 650 t with 4 305-mm 8, 254 10-mm and 120 small caliber guns was created as well as 8 torpedo tubes. Reservations remained at the same level (5 mm of armor belt and 178 mm deck), but the speed had to make 50 nodes, for which the power plant power should be brought to 25 44 hp

The Japanese were already ready to lay the new armored cruiser, but at this time, finally, reliable data appeared on the main Invibible caliber. Admirals Mikado grabbed his head - the designed ship was clearly outdated before the launch, and the designers immediately set to work. The displacement of the armored cruiser increased by 100 t, the power of the power plant and the reservation remained the same, but the ship received ten 305-mm / 50 guns, the same six-inch gun, four 120-mm guns and five torpedo tubes. Apparently, the Japanese properly “conjured” over the ship's lines, because with the same power they now expected to get 25,5 nodes of maximum speed.

The Japanese made several projects of the new ship - in the first of them the artillery of the main caliber was located like the German Moltke, in the next five towers were placed in the center plane, two in the extremities and one in the middle of the hull. In 1909 g, the project of the first battlecruiser of Japan was completed and approved, all necessary drawings and specifications for the start of its construction were developed, and funds for construction were allocated by the budget. But at this very moment messages about laying the battle cruiser Lion came from England ... And the completely ready project became outdated again.

The Japanese realized that progress in the development of naval armaments was still too fast for them, and that, trying to replicate the designs of England, they were unable to create a modern ship — as long as they reproduce what the UK built (even with some improvements), British engineers create something completely new. Therefore, in developing the next project, the Japanese made extensive use of English help.

Vickers proposed to create a battle cruiser according to the improved design of the Lion, Armstrong - a completely new project, but after some hesitation the Japanese were inclined to the proposal of the Vickers. The contract was signed on 17 in October of 1912. At the same time, the Japanese, of course, were counting not only on design assistance, but on receiving the latest British technologies for the production of power plants, artillery and other ship equipment.

The battleship for the United Fleet was now created as an improved Lion, and its displacement quickly grew to 27 000 tons, and this, of course, excluded the possibility of building this ship in Japanese shipyards. As for the caliber of the guns, after long discussions about the benefits of increasing the caliber, the Japanese were still confident that the 305-mm / 50 guns would be the best choice for their ship. Then the British made a "drain" of information - the Japanese naval attache got completely secret comparative test data, during which it became clear that the 343-mm artillery systems, installed on the latest British battlecruisers, significantly outperform the 305-mm / 50 guns the English.

After reviewing the test results, the Japanese radically changed their approach to the main caliber of the future ship - now even the 343-mm guns did not suit them, and they wished for the 356-mm artillery system. Of course, to the great joy of the Vickers, who was tasked with developing a new 356-mm gun for the Japanese battle cruiser.

Artillery

I must say that the main caliber of the Congo-class battlecruisers is no less mysterious than the British 343-mm cannon. As we said earlier, the artillery of the Lion and Orion dreadnoughts received 567 kg shells, subsequent British ships with 13,5-inch guns received heavier 635 kg ammunition. As for the initial speed, there are no exact data - according to the author, the figures of VB are the most realistic. Muzhzhenikov, giving 788 and 760 m / s for "light" and "heavy" shells, respectively.



But what is known about the 356-mm / 45 gun of the Japanese fleet? Obviously, it was created on the basis of the British artillery system, while its construction (wire) repeated the design of heavy British guns. But practically nothing is known about the shells for them: we only know that the British, without any doubt, delivered a number of armor-piercing and high-explosive 356-mm shells to Japan, but later the Japanese mastered their production at domestic enterprises.

Some clarity exists only with post-war ammunition - the Japanese Type 91 armor-piercing projectile had a mass of 673,5 kg and an initial velocity of 770-775 m / s. High explosive is more difficult - it is assumed that Type 0 had 625 kg at the initial speed of 805 m / s., But in some publications it is indicated that its weight was higher and amounted to 652 kg. However, I would like to note that on the background of 673,5 kg and 775 m / s armor-piercing projectile, 625 kg and 805 m / s high-explosive look quite organic, but 852 kg and 805 m / s - no, which makes us suspect a banal typo ( instead of 625 kg - 652 kg).

Thus, we can assume that initially 356-mm / 45 guns of Congo-type battlecruisers received an equal-weight 343-mm British 635 kg projectile, which the gun sent to the flight at an initial speed of approximately 790-800 m / s or about that. By the way, these characteristics very well "echo" and with the American 356-mm / 45 guns mounted on the battleships of the types "New York", "Nevada" and "Pennsylvania" - they shot 635 kg with a projectile with an initial speed of 792 m / s. Unfortunately, there are no data on the filling of explosives with shells supplied by England, but it can be assumed that the explosive content did not exceed that of similar British 343-mm shells, i.e. 20,2 kg for armor-piercing and 80,1 kg for high-explosive, but these are only guesses.

Without a doubt, the Japanese got an excellent weapon, which in its ballistic qualities was not inferior to the American one, at the same time slightly superior to the British 343 guns, and besides, it had a great resource - if the British guns were designed for 200 shots of 635 kg shells, the Japanese - on 250-280 shots. Perhaps the only thing that they can be reproached for is the British armor-piercing shells, which turned out to be very poor-quality (as shown by the Battle of Jutland), but subsequently the Japanese eliminated this shortcoming.

I must say that the Japanese ordered the British 356-mm guns "Congo" even before they learned about the transition of the US Navy to 14-inch caliber. Therefore, the news about the 356-mm caliber on the "New York" was perceived by the Japanese admirals with satisfaction - they finally managed to correctly predict the direction of development of heavy artillery ships, the United Fleet did not become an outsider.

In addition to the superiority of the artillery systems themselves, the Congo gained an advantage in the placement of artillery. As is known, the third tower of the Lion-type battlecruisers was located between the boiler rooms, that is, between the chimneys, which limited the firing angles. At the same time, the third Congo tower was placed between the engine and boiler rooms, which made it possible to place all three pipes of the battlecruiser in the space between the second and third towers, which made the ship’s retractable fire in no way inferior. At the same time, the separation of the third and fourth towers did not allow them both to be removed with a single hit, which the Germans were afraid of and how it actually happened to Zeidlitz in the battle of Dogger Banks. Probably, the location of the tower between the engine rooms and boiler rooms had its drawbacks (and at least the need to pull steam lines near the artillery cellars), but the situation on the Lion was the same, so in general, of course, the location of the main caliber Congo ”was noticeably more progressive than that adopted on British battlecruisers. The 356-mm guns for the Japanese fleet apparently also surpassed British ships - confusion is possible here, since the towers of Congo-type battlecruisers were repeatedly upgraded, but presumably their maximum angle of vertical guidance reached 25 when built.

As for the medium artillery "Congo", then there are some oddities. There are no mysteries in the artillery systems themselves - the first liner cruiser of Japan received the 16 152-mm / 50 guns, which were developed by the same Vickers. These guns were quite at the level of the world's best counterparts, sending projectiles with an initial speed of 45,36-850 m / s in flight of 855.

Sources usually indicate that the Japanese did not approve of Fisher’s ideas about the minimum anti-mine caliber, because they knew very well from the experience of the Russo-Japanese War that to defeat attacking destroyers reliably, heavier guns were needed than the 76-102 mm artillery systems installed on British battleships and battle cruisers. But this, seemingly quite logical point of view, categorically does not fit the presence of the second anti-mine caliber on the battle cruisers of Japan - sixteen 76-mm / 40 installations, partly located on the roofs of the main-caliber towers, and in the middle of the ship. All this makes it possible to suspect the Japanese in a purely German approach, because in Germany they have not seen a single reason why the concept of “only big guns” should exclude the presence of medium caliber. As a result, the German dreadnoughts and battlecruisers were armed with both medium (15-cm) and anti-mine (8,8-cm) caliber, and we see something similar on Congo-class battlecruisers.

The torpedo armament of the Japanese ships was also reinforced - instead of two 533-mm torpedo tubes, the Lion and Congo received eight.

Reservation



Unfortunately, the information on the original booking of Congo-class battlecruisers is very contradictory. Perhaps the only element of the ship’s defense, according to which the sources came to a common opinion, is its main armor belt. The Japanese absolutely did not like the British “mosaic” protection system, in which the engine and boiler rooms of the Lion-type battlecruisers defended 229-mm, but the areas of the artillery cellars of the bow and stern towers were only 102-152-mm armor. Therefore, the Japanese went a different way - they reduced the thickness of the citadel to 203 mm, but it defended the board, including the areas of the towers of the main caliber. More precisely, the armor belt did not reach the fourth tower facing the barbet, but the oblique (from the edge of the armor belt through the body to the barbet) of traverses 152-203 mm thick went from it. In the nose of the citadel closed traverse the same thickness, but located perpendicular to the board.

So, conceding 229 mm to the protection of Lion in thickness, the main armor of the Congo had a greater length, as well as a height that was 3,8 m against 3,5 m of Lion. Under normal displacement, the 203-mm Congo armored plates submerged about half in the water, which also distinguished the protection of the Japanese ship from its English “predecessors” (the 229-mm Lion armor was deepened by 0,91 meters). At the same time, below the 203 mm of the armor belt along the entire length from the bow to the aft towers, inclusive, the underwater part of the hull was also protected by a narrow (65 cm of height) 76 mm band of armor.

Outside the citadel, the board defended 76 mm armor, which had the same height in the nose as the 203-mm armor, but in the stern 76-m armor was significantly less. The extremities of the Congo were armored for almost the entire length, the defense did not reach the stem and stern-steed only a little. Above the main armored belt, the board defended 152 mm with armor up to the upper deck, including the casemates of the 152-mm guns located in the ship's hull.

Horizontal protection "Congo" is the subject of numerous disputes, and, alas, reliably about it, nothing is known. O.A. Rubanov, in his monograph devoted to Congo-class battlecruisers, writes:

“For example," Jane's "," Brassey "and" Watts "indicate the thickness of the main deck in 2,75 dm (60 mm), and the" Werweg "talks about 2 dm (51 mm). Now, based on a comparison between Congo and Lion and Tiger, many foreign experts believe that the above data is most likely. ”


I would like to immediately note a typo - 2,75 inches are approximately 69,9 mm, but it is extremely doubtful that the armor has a similar or similar thickness. You just need to remember that the "Lion" had several decks, some of which (main deck, deck of the forecastle) had an increased thickness. For example, the thickness of the armor deck “Lion” both in the horizontal part and on the bevels was 25,4 mm (that is, one inch), but the upper deck within the citadel was also thickened to 25,4 mm, so theoretically there is reason to declare About 50 mm Vertical Protection "Lion". And for a small part of the deck the forecastle in the area of ​​chimneys had 38 mm of thickness - and this again can be “counted” in addition to the previously calculated 50 mm. But even without resorting to this kind of juggling, it is easy to remember that in the bow and stern, outside the citadel, Lion’s armored decks reached 64,5 mm of thickness.

In other words, we see that the booking of “Lion” is completely impossible to characterize by naming one of some kind of thickness, because it will not be clear what is included there. It is quite possible, for example, that the Congo armored deck actually reached 70 mm - outside the citadel, where the Lion had 64,5 mm armor, but what does this tell us about the horizontal defense of the Congo as a whole? Nothing.

Nevertheless, the author is inclined to believe that within the limits of the Congo citadel 50 mm was protected by armor, since this thickness is quite consistent with the protection that the Japanese provided for in the preliminary projects of the battle cruisers. In addition, the United Fleet assumed that its future battles would take place at great distances and it would be reasonable if its requirements for horizontal booking were greater than those of the British. At the same time, the 50 mm Armored Deck does not look excessively heavy for the Congo-class battle cruiser. But, of course, one cannot exclude the possibility that the battlecruiser, like its English "colleagues", had an 25 mm armored deck and a 25 mm upper deck.

About the defense of the towers, alas, there is also no complete data, it is indicated that the towers and barbettes defended 229 mm armor (although a number of sources indicate 254-mm), but it is obvious that barbety could have such protection only above the upper deck - lower, opposite the sides first protected 152 mm, and then, perhaps, 203 mm armor (unfortunately, it is completely unknown at what height from the waterline there was an armor-deck) barbety, obviously, would have to have a smaller thickness.

About the conning tower, unfortunately, the author of this article does not know anything, we can only assume that its maximum thickness, by analogy with the "Lion", did not exceed 254 mm.

Power plant

The power rating of the Congo machines, consisting of Parsons 4 turbines and Yarrow 36 boilers, was 64 000 hp, which was even slightly less than Lyon’s 70 000 hp. At the same time, the Congo was heavier, its normal displacement was 27 500 t against 26 350 t of the British battle cruiser, but still the chief designer D. Thurston believed that the Japanese ship would reach 27,5 knots, that is, half a node above the contract speed “ Lion. The maximum fuel supply reached 4 200 tons of coal and 1 000 tons of fuel oil, with this reserve the Congo's range should have been 8 000 miles at a speed of 14 knots.



In general, it can be stated that the Congo has become a battlecruiser in the traditional British style - little armor and a lot of speed with the biggest guns. But with all this, he was superior to the ships of the type "Lion" and "Queen Mary" - his artillery was more powerful, and the defense - more rational. Accordingly, a funny situation has developed - in the British shipyards for the Asian state a more perfect ship is being built than for His Majesty’s fleet. Of course, this was unacceptable, and the fourth UK cruiser carrying the 343-mm guns, which was originally supposed to be built with a copy of Queen Mary, was created using a new, improved project.

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  1. avt
    avt 11 May 2018 16: 05
    +4
    Accordingly, there was a funny situation - a more advanced ship is being built at British shipyards for an Asian power than for His Majesty's fleet.
    Yes, it’s really cool, especially in the light of - ,, The British fleet always travels first class, ”the truth is about“ KingA, ”Churchill seemed to say, but it is also applicable to this case.
    Of course, this was unacceptable, and the fourth British battlecruiser carrying a 343-mm gun, which was originally supposed to be built with a copy of Queen Mary, was created according to a new, improved design.
    Well, wait about ,, Tiger " bully
  2. NF68
    NF68 11 May 2018 16: 05
    +2
    Interesting article.
  3. kvs207
    kvs207 11 May 2018 16: 14
    +4
    “Strictly speaking, there should have been an article dedicated to the British battlecruiser Tiger, but due to the fact that the Congo shipbuilder built at the Vickers shipyard had a great influence on it, it makes sense to give it a separate article.”

    Unexpectedly, but all the more interesting. Japanese military shipbuilding, with its eastern approach, is generally a separate song. To the author - respect.
  4. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 11 May 2018 17: 13
    +4
    As you know, the third tower of battlecruisers of the Lyon type was located between the boiler rooms, that is, between the chimneys, which limited the angles of fire. At the same time, the third Congo tower was located between the engine rooms and boiler rooms, which made it possible to place all three pipes of the battlecruiser in the space between the second and third towers, which made the ship’s “retrograde" fire in no way inferior to the "running" one.

    In numbers, this is: 60 degrees in the bow and 90 degrees in the stern on each side with elevation angles of more than 10 degrees, with elevation angles of less than 10 degrees, shooting strictly at the stern is impossible.
    Q turret on the Kongô class was in a more favorable position than those on earlier British battlecruisers, increasing its firing arc to about 60 degrees before the beam and 90 degrees abaft it on either side, although it could not fire directly aft at elevations below about 10 degrees.
    © navweaps
    Moreover, it seems to me that since the British designed the cruiser, the retirement fire even exceeded the linear fire. As you know, on all British ships up to Hood, when the lowered and elevated towers were close to each other, the elevated towers had a dead sector plus / minus 30 degrees from the AP towards the lowered tower - to prevent powder gases from flowing into the lowered tower when fired.
  5. Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 11 May 2018 17: 54
    +2
    However, I would like to note that against the background of 673,5 kg and 775 m / s of an armor-piercing projectile, 625 kg and 805 m / s of a high-explosive shell look quite organic, but 852 kg and 805 m / s are not, which makes us suspect a banal typo ( instead of 625 kg - 652 kg).

    I can’t figure out what’s the matter, but something’s wrong ...
    And the article is wonderful!
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      11 May 2018 19: 45
      0
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      I can’t figure out what’s the matter, but something’s wrong.

      :)))
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      625 kg and 805 m / s high explosive look quite organically, but 852 kg and 805 m / s - no

      read correctly how
      Quote: Senior Sailor
      625 kg and 805 m / s high explosive look quite organically, but 652 kg and 805 m / s - no,

      Quote: Senior Sailor
      And the article is wonderful!

      Spasibki! drinks
    2. NF68
      NF68 11 May 2018 21: 51
      +1
      [quote = Chief Sailor] [quote]

      "Our" greetings to you.
      1. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 12 May 2018 09: 09
        0
        Mutually, dear colleague.
  6. Gepard
    Gepard 11 May 2018 17: 59
    +1
    As always interesting and informative. Thanks Andrew
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      11 May 2018 19: 45
      +1
      You are always welcome, dear Samir.
  7. DimanC
    DimanC 11 May 2018 18: 26
    +1
    Very timely :-) True, there is also enough copy-hole in the text :-) Especially when it comes to masses of shells
  8. ser56
    ser56 11 May 2018 18: 52
    +3
    Curiously, a small remark - the cost of a ton of BRKR still differed from a ton of EDB, so just recalculating the displacement is not entirely legitimate, if within 10% ...
    ". AT 1919 d the project of the first battlecruiser of Japan was completed and approved, all the necessary drawings and specifications for the start of its construction were developed, and funds for the construction were allocated by the budget. But at that very moment, reports came from England about laying the battlecruiser Lyon ... And a fully finished project was outdated again. "
    probably a typo ...
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      11 May 2018 19: 46
      +1
      Quote: ser56
      Curiously, a small remark - the cost of a ton of BRKR still differed from a ton of EDB,

      Yes, but hardly significant.
      Quote: ser56
      probably a typo ...

      Of course, in 1909
  9. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 11 May 2018 19: 02
    +1
    Um what .
    The Espanya mini-dreadnaught with a 203mm belt (well, there are all kinds of restrictions on displacement) is almost not considered a ship, but the Congo with a 203mm belt is almost perfect. Moreover, if the main caliber in the world was 12 ", then still wherever it went, but almost all the leading maritime countries switched to 13,5" -14 ", and some people had already designed and started building fortresses with 15" broads. So 203mm in this case looks like a mockery of common sense. Although the Japanese understood this and stupidly intended to use their ships against an adequate adversary AT BIG DISTANCE of the battle, where 203 mm slabs would already be at least some kind of obstacle for projectiles falling at a large angle, although horizontal protection plays a role here, and we see No. ...
    So the Japanese cruisers were not a miracle at that time. And the British remade the Tiger in their manner because of a more rational deployment of weapons and an increase in PMA from 102mm to 152mm. all the same, even one 6 ”first landmine can do much more damage to the destroyer than the lighter 4” projectiles.
    Personally, I don’t think Japanese are perfect - the typical Fisher concept is "speed is the best armor combined with powerful guns." And she showed herself not from the best side under Jutland.
    Although the “Hiei” withstood several tens of 8 “shells from American cruisers in WWII (which is quite possible by its armor), the Kirishima quite safely went to the bottom, having received dozens of 406mm blanks and about 40-127mm pellets from Washington .
    Morality - means of attack should be comparable with the degree of protection in comparison with their own kind ....
    So, thoughts out loud hi
    Article plus smile
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 11 May 2018 19: 41
      +2
      Quote: Rurikovich
      The Espanya mini-dreadnaught with a 203mm belt (well, there are all kinds of restrictions on displacement) is almost not considered a ship, but the Congo with a 203mm belt is almost perfect.

      Probably because the Spaniard claims to be called a "battleship." While the four sisters “Congo” was originally LCR. And in this class there were specimens with a smaller thickness of the armored belt.
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Although the “Hiei” withstood several tens of 8 “shells from American cruisers in WWII (which is quite possible by its armor), the Kirishima quite safely went to the bottom, having received dozens of 406mm blanks and about 40-127mm pellets from Washington .

      “Hiei” just did not survive - even despite the modernization. The 203-mm shells were enough to turn the Hiei into a Rurik or Bismarck - the steering is out of order, the steering wheel is jammed, the ship is in circulation and is not controlled, flooding through the holes.
      Aircraft from the “Cactus” only finished off the already sinking wounded animal.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 11 May 2018 20: 01
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        While the four sisters “Congo” was originally LCR.

        If only to mention that it was an English version of LCR
        Quote: Alexey RA
        And in this class there were specimens with a smaller thickness of the armored belt.

        yes Are they, panimash or “trendsetters” request smile
        Quote: Alexey RA
        "Hiei" just did not survive

        It was launched at the bottom of bombs and torpedoes, not 203mm shells. And damage to the steering mechanism from a projectile (especially not a battleship caliber) is a consequence of the approach to booking.
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Aircraft from the “Cactus” only finished off the already sinking wounded animal.

        I’m not sure that “Hiei” would have sank, had it not been for further finishing ...
        In any case, the English approach to the concept of a battlecruiser is flawed request hi
    2. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 11 May 2018 22: 51
      0
      I agree with you! “Congo” a step back compared to “Asama” Actually, they wanted “Iow,” but it didn’t work out ..
    3. The comment was deleted.
    4. Kuroneko
      Kuroneko 11 May 2018 22: 59
      +1
      >> Although "Hiei" withstood several tens of 8 "shells from American cruisers in WWII (which is quite within the strength of its armor), the" Kirishima "quite safely went to the bottom, having received about a dozen 406mm blanks and about 40-127mm pellets with" Washington ".
      It should be noted that all LKR type “Congo” went through a very serious pre-war modernization (and in terms of protection), and the Japanese did not just reclassify them as “high-speed battleships”. So talking about the “Hiei” and “Kirishima” of WWII as cruisers is still not entirely correct. Well, as battleships - of course, they could not oppose anything to the enemy 406-mm shells (just as virtually any full-fledged pre-war battleship could not).
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 11 May 2018 23: 34
        0
        Quote: Kuroneko
        ut it should be noted that all LKR type “Congo” went through a very serious pre-war modernization (and in terms of protection), and the Japanese did not just reclassify them as “high-speed battleships”.

        In terms of booking, the Japanese only increased horizontal booking (decks up to 102mm, roofs of towers up to 152mm), booked chimney casings and slightly increased barbettes. Strengthened PTZ due to the installation of boules. The belt and bulkheads were not reinforced. Therefore, in the conditions of nightly pistol duels, there was little sense in such modernization ... But they were re-classified as battleships due to a drop in speed and an increase in displacement after the first modernization.
        This is after the second modernization, which mainly affected SU, which allowed them to reach 30 knots; they became high-speed battleships of the WWII in the usual form ...
        So the thin skin was unchanged throughout life. wink hi
    5. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      13 May 2018 20: 35
      +1
      Quote: Rurikovich
      The Espanya mini-dreadnaught with a 203mm belt (well, there are all kinds of restrictions on displacement) is almost not considered a ship, but the Congo with a 203mm belt is almost perfect.

      Well, Congo is definitely not perfect, but at least he has no open gates to the art cellar :)))) and even how to say it? The British were saved only by German retardation with the growth of calibers, but the Japanese had to whip with the United States, which did not have such retardation. At the same time, 203 mm is something against 280 mm, 50 to 50 against 305 mm and nothing against 356 mm.
      Quote: Rurikovich
      So the Japanese cruisers were not a miracle at that time.

      But how much the Japanese raced with them! How many remade! And yes, after the alterations - some of the most beautiful large ships turned out
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Personally, I do not consider Japanese perfection

      Idem.
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 13 May 2018 21: 12
        +1
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        And yes, after the alterations - some of the most beautiful large ships turned out

        yes
    6. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 14 May 2018 10: 09
      0
      Quote: Rurikovich
      152mm. all the same, even one 6 ”first landmine can do much more damage to the destroyer than the lighter 4” projectiles.


      This is true - the high-explosive fragmentation of a 6 "projectile - even one that exploded nearby - is significantly higher than 4".
      But at the same time, the 4 "gun has unit charges and, accordingly, the practical rate of fire is limited only by the endurance of the loaders - about 14 rounds per minute, which gives a rate of 75% higher than 7-8 rounds per minute with 8" guns.
      Therefore, a mixed type of artillery remained for some time.
  10. Victor Wolz
    Victor Wolz 11 May 2018 21: 53
    +1
    Thanks for the article Andrew! The ships are wonderful and built at the time, it is a pity that we did not build such ships. They got ahead of the Germans with their Mackensen. Of course, by the second world, they were outdated despite modernization, but even then they were dangerous. Apparently, the collapse of the Russian empire is the collapse of the mind, and the projects were exiled by the Tsar Tank, for example.
    1. Kuroneko
      Kuroneko 11 May 2018 23: 06
      +3
      >> The ships are wonderful and built at the time, it is a pity that we did not build such ships.
      Correction: we simply did not build them. Line cruisers of the Izmail type.
      http://tsushima.su/RU/shipsru/shipsrussiaru/ships
      russiadredru / shipsrussiadredlinkrru / linkr-izmail /

      What is funny, the Japanese at one time also did not complete the strongest LCR of the world such as Amagi.
  11. Tomato
    Tomato 11 May 2018 22: 09
    +2
    Great article. Thanks to the author.
    I have 1 question. Throughout the body are such rails, at an angle of 45 g. These are anti-torpedo networks. They were ubiquitous at the beginning of the 20th century, and somehow they suddenly disappeared. Why?
    1. Usher
      Usher 11 May 2018 22: 24
      +1
      Ineffective, and a lot of hemorrhoids.
  12. Usher
    Usher 11 May 2018 22: 23
    0
    A typo, not in 1919, but in 1909?
  13. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 11 May 2018 22: 58
    +1
    in general, in the opinion of the author of this article, the armored cruisers of the United Fleet as a class of warships did not justify themselves at all, but the Japanese obviously had a different opinion on this issue.

    Not useful in one battle, this does not mean that it is not necessary at all!

    Give Christmas full speed to at least the first detachment during Tsusuma and Togo watches would look very pale without the Asam with their slow-moving armadillos.

    The 8 "deficiency revealed during the NWR against large ships does not negate the correctness of the very idea of ​​a high-speed detachment in a squadron.
    1. unknown
      unknown 12 May 2018 06: 56
      0
      Finally, a little more, and the Japanese armored cruisers will take their rightful place.
      I have been writing for a long time that these are completely unsuccessful ships built on the podium of myth-making in the wake of self-abasement from Russian historiography.
      Asamas were completely inconsistent with the concept of a high-speed wing. They did not have speed, it was not even laid down in the project, otherwise their contours would not be armored, but cruising. Real long lasting speeds from 15 to 17 knots. It is quite comparable with the real speeds of modern battleships. Where can I get around and embrace. And an example of the teachings of the English fleet, which allegedly showed that two extra nodes allow catching, overtaking and sweeping, contradicts the results of the exercises of the French fleet, the results of which concluded that the minimum speed difference for “overtaking and sweeping” should be EIGHT nodes. But, "Asam" and two nodes were not. The speed of both armadillos and cruisers did not exceed 15 knots. Neither Fuji nor Azuma could go any longer.
      PS Amused passage about the "good" Asama armor. The first pair was protected by a completely disgusting harvey. And Tsushima proved it.
      1. Victor Wolz
        Victor Wolz 12 May 2018 10: 38
        0
        No matter how clumsy cruisers they were, they fulfilled their task, in contrast to the armored and armored cruisers built by Russia. What does their diverse type of Aurora, Varangian, Askold Tower Bogatyr from armored Russia, Stormbreaker and Bayan amaze. The Japanese Asama, Yakuma and Azumo built in different countries did not differ much from each other. The Italian Garibaldians were bought so that Russia would not get it, but they also approximately corresponded to the requirements, Kasuga, only had a 1-254 mm gun and 2-203 mm.
      2. Saxahorse
        Saxahorse 12 May 2018 22: 31
        0
        Quote: ignoto
        Real long lasting speeds from 15 to 17 knots

        Sorry, but these 15-17 knots are the fruit of the “mental” reasoning of today's commentators. But the record numbers obtained during the tests is a fact confirmed by the international acceptance committee and published in many newspapers of that time.

        There is no reason to believe that they were slower than the battleships of that time.
        1. Snakebyte
          Snakebyte 14 May 2018 10: 51
          +1
          Quote: Saxahorse
          Sorry, but these 15-17 knots are the fruit of the “mental” reasoning of today's commentators. But the record numbers obtained during the tests is a fact confirmed by the international acceptance committee and published in many newspapers of that time.

          But these "record speeds" for some reason did not appear in combat service.
          The Kamimura squadron could not catch up with the Vladivostok cruisers, which they could not give more than 18 knots, so that the Rurik would not fall behind.
          And under Ulsan the battle happened because Russia, due to problems with boilers, could not give more than 16 knots.
  14. Senior seaman
    Senior seaman 12 May 2018 09: 15
    +1
    It seems to me that the Asamoids were an attempt to create universal ships suitable both for linear combat and for qualitatively strengthening the cruising forces that the Japanese were frankly miserable. The result was, like any compromise: - not two, not one and a half
    1. Saxahorse
      Saxahorse 12 May 2018 22: 36
      +2
      I see no serious reason to consider the result "wretched." All the tasks these ships successfully completed. The danger of cruising war from Russia was stopped, the main forces of the fleet in a squadron battle were successfully supported. Losses are zero.

      I believe that the mistake was to choose 8 "as the main caliber, for example, it was possible to weaken the medium and small caliber to save weight. In the version with 12" (or at least 10 ") of the main caliber, the enemies sunk by them would become sharply greater.
      1. Senior seaman
        Senior seaman 13 May 2018 11: 06
        +1
        Dear colleague, but you have not tried to read, what are you commenting on?
        I wrote:
        It seems to me that the Asamoids were an attempt to create universal ships, suitable for both linear battle and for high-quality amplification cruising forces that were frankly miserable among the Japanese.

        That is wretched, I called a pack of "Elsviks" who formed the basis of the cruising forces of the Nuclear Forces (low-naval, with weak corps and irrationally selected artillery)
        In principle, the Asamoids coped with the task of strengthening the cruisers, but they hardly succeeded in resisting the battleships ... however, this is already AI :)))
        I believe that the mistake was the choice of 8 "as the main caliber, for example, it was possible to weaken the medium and small caliber to save weight.

        Yes, to weaken the average caliber, according to the tactical views of the end of XIX, is impossible, because then it is the main one
        In the version with 12 "(or at least 10") the main caliber of the enemies sunk by them would become sharply larger.

        With the 12 "it would be completely different ships ... with the single-gun 10", well, I don’t know. "Kasuga" shot not bad and seems to be a logical assumption ...
        1. Saxahorse
          Saxahorse 13 May 2018 19: 30
          0
          Quote: Senior Sailor
          In principle, the Asamoids coped with the task of strengthening the cruisers, but they hardly succeeded in resisting the battleships ...

          However, the tasks of the second armored detachment under Tsushima Kamimura successfully coped. Maybe they do not own most of the fatal blows on the first day of the battle, but Asam's Russian battleships managed to tear to the bones and render them worthless.
          1. Senior seaman
            Senior seaman 13 May 2018 19: 46
            0
            to tear to the bones and to render worthless the Russian battleships of Asama managed.

            Is it?
            But I still considered that the main result of the REV was the understanding that the decisive force of the battleships are twelve-inch ..
            1. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 13 May 2018 20: 22
              0
              Is not it so? I thought that the first concrete result of Tsushima was the defeat of the Russian fleet.
          2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            13 May 2018 20: 29
            +1
            Quote: Saxahorse
            about to strip to the bones and to render worthless the Russian battleships of Asama managed.

            Yes, in general - no. All three EDB Borodino knocked out by Japanese armadillos. Oslyabya went down due to extremely successful hits 12-dm.
            1. Saxahorse
              Saxahorse 13 May 2018 20: 32
              0
              You want to say that Kamimura was generally out of business there? Accidentally swam past? :)
              1. arturpraetor
                arturpraetor 13 May 2018 20: 38
                +1
                He had an important, if not decisive role, to distract and disperse Russian fire with his ships. The Japanese were not at all smiling at raking out the 6 ships (4 EBR and 2 BrKr) shells throughout the 2 th TOE during the battle. But this does not mean at all that Kamimura’s ships could inflict great damage on Russian ships.
                1. Saxahorse
                  Saxahorse 13 May 2018 20: 51
                  +1
                  And even more so, this does not mean that 80 six-inch and 24 eight-inch Kamimura missed this battle.
                  1. arturpraetor
                    arturpraetor 13 May 2018 21: 11
                    0
                    They didn’t miss, but objectively the possibility of causing damage to large ships with guns of this caliber is small. Six-inch guns are generally useless against the groats, only minor local damage, and eight-inch ones ... Well, they are no longer useless, but the effect is very, very limited, simply because of the insufficient weight of the explosive in the “package” sent to the enemy’s ships.
                    1. Saxahorse
                      Saxahorse 13 May 2018 21: 20
                      +1
                      Minor damage! ?? Well, I'm sorry ... Only 4 Mikasa guns listened to you and decided the fate of the battle. Togo personally probably guided.
                      1. arturpraetor
                        arturpraetor 13 May 2018 21: 34
                        0
                        Not 4, but 16 cannons of Japanese armadillos - in fact, it was they who "decided". Well, one ten-inch, do not forget about it laughing Well, it was not possible to inflict heavy damage on eight-inch shells against well-defended ships, except that it would hit the unarmored sections of the hull (but not the fact that vital parts of the ship would suffer) or hits bordering on the lichens. In the end, I didn’t find how much concrete the 203-mm projectile penetrated, but it is doubtful much more than the Russian three times the size fit - and the Russian shells were also weak in terms of effective impact on large ships. Well, let the correction for more powerful Japanese explosives ... But then again - this does not fundamentally improve the picture.
                    2. DimerVladimer
                      DimerVladimer 14 May 2018 11: 25
                      0
                      Quote: arturpraetor
                      They didn’t miss, but objectively the possibility of causing damage to large ships with guns of this caliber is small. Six-inch guns are generally useless against the groats, only minor local damage, and eight-inch ones ... Well, they are no longer useless, but the effect is very, very limited, simply because of the insufficient weight of the explosive in the “package” sent to the enemy’s ships.


                      Still, probably "application possibilities critical damage "is not great - but their high-explosive impact caused fires, knocked out the crew, destroyed medium-caliber artillery and mine - that is - steadily reduced the combat effectiveness of the fired ship.
                      I'm not talking about the psychological effect of being in the line (the effect of quantitative superiority) and the demoralization of fired ships because of the constant hits that impede the struggle for survivability of the ship.
                      1. arturpraetor
                        arturpraetor 14 May 2018 12: 08
                        +1
                        This only worked against poorly defended ships like armored cruisers with deck artillery. Against artillery located in casemates and towers, against armadillos with developed armor protection ... Why what, colleague Andrei explained everything below - except for the Ushakov BrKr Kamimura, they did not cause decisive damage to anyone, that's why the 305-mm guns of armadillos were decided to battle.
              2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                13 May 2018 23: 37
                +3
                Quote: Saxahorse
                You want to say that Kamimura was generally out of business there? Accidentally swam past? :)

                Well, in general, yes :))))) In the sense that, apart from Ushakov, not a single ship comes to mind that would receive decisive damage from Kamimura’s RBKR
                1. DimerVladimer
                  DimerVladimer 15 May 2018 12: 07
                  0
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Well, in general, yes :))))) In the sense that, apart from Ushakov, not a single ship comes to mind that would receive decisive damage from Kamimura’s RBKR


                  Oslyabya - solely due to shelling by the 2nd armored detachment of Kamimura - in 15 minutes 15 hits, half of the weapons were disabled.

                  Alexander III is finished off by the second armored detachment.
  15. faiver
    faiver 12 May 2018 18: 21
    +1
    as always, plus article, the author pleases hi
  16. K-50
    K-50 13 May 2018 15: 22
    0
    As for the battle in the Strait of Korea, the Japanese suffered a real fiasco - after a successful hit knocked out the Rurik, four armored cruisers of Kamimura, having in front of themselves the enemy that was twice as numerous in number (Stormbreaker and Russia) , during the many hours of battle, they could neither destroy, nor even knock out at least one of these ships

    Here it’s still worth taking into account that only 4 guns could shoot at Russian cruisers on board, against 16 !!!! Japanese 8 "caliber, the number of 6" guns was almost 3 times more. If we take into account the weight characteristics of the shells (the number of explosives in them, brisance), the one-minute salvo of opposing ships, it turns out that the Japanese were almost FIVE - SIX times stronger !!! what belay
  17. Looking for
    Looking for 13 May 2018 17: 06
    -1
    ... and the fourth British battle cruiser carrying 343-mm guns, which was originally supposed to be built with a copy of Queen Mary, was created according to a new, improved design. And called it "TIGER" ....
  18. exo
    exo 13 May 2018 21: 19
    +1
    Liked :) I look forward to continuing.
    The ship is handsome!
  19. Potter
    Potter 14 May 2018 11: 48
    +1
    THANK! Article plus, and look forward to continuing. Congo is a landmark ship in the history of world shipbuilding.
  20. DimerVladimer
    DimerVladimer 14 May 2018 13: 51
    0
    Quote: arturpraetor
    This only worked against poorly defended ships like armored cruisers with deck artillery. Against artillery located in casemates and towers, against armadillos with developed armor protection ... Why what, colleague Andrei explained everything below - except for the Ushakov BrKr Kamimura, they did not cause decisive damage to anyone, that's why the 305-mm guns of armadillos were decided to battle.


    You are a literate person - how much as a percentage of the area of ​​the reserved surface of the ship that can withstand high explosive and fragmentation effects? - not even 20%!

    Shrapnel holes on "well-reserved" ebras are very clearly visible on some photos - for example, the photo "Eagle"


    It may seem that the fragmentation comes from an internal explosion - but this is not the case - all fragmentation holes with the edges bent inward, which indicates damage from close explosions when detonating high-explosive bombs on the surface of the water ...
    So combat damage 8 "landmines inflicted significant, albeit not critical.


    In addition, they significantly damaged fan pipes and chimneys, reducing draft and reducing boiler performance.
    1. arturpraetor
      arturpraetor 14 May 2018 14: 03
      +1
      Stop, stop, colleague, you obviously somehow somehow misunderstand me. By severe damage, I mean damage that critically affects the combat capability of a ship. Eight-inch land mines yes, destroyed unarmored superstructures, yes, created a bunch of fragments, but with rare exceptions it didn’t lead to the failure of something really important, in the worst case - the fragments flew through the embrasures of the casemates or towers, or which shook out of order some mechanisms, or when a ship hit a water line in a water line through a hole, it began to sip water (but the level of the water line compared to the area affected by the entire ship is very small) - but all this could be easily localized, or damage would Is all not too large. Roughly speaking, eight-inch shells could cause damage, they could destroy superstructures, they could tear freeboard, but they could do critical damage only with a high concentration of fire and a large number of hits (which there were too many targets in Tsushima), or lakishotah. " And 305-mm shells did precisely the critical damage - all ships larger than 10 thousand tons received shells of different calibers and in different quantities, but it was sunk by 305-mm shells, and not 203-mm. But the “Ushakov”, despite the fact that the battleship was small, and that for the “Eagle”, for example, or even the “Sisoy the Great” was just a minor or medium damage, for a ship in 4 with more than a thousand tons of displacement already was severe damage, greatly reducing its combat effectiveness.
      1. DimerVladimer
        DimerVladimer 14 May 2018 16: 34
        0
        Quote: arturpraetor
        And 305-mm shells did exactly the critical damage - all ships larger than 10 thousand tons received shells of different calibers and in different quantities, but it was sunk exactly 305-mm shells,


        Your approach with Andrey is clear and not new.
        And the participants of Tsushima were aware of both approaches to the destruction of the ship - Semenov (Raspat):
        Since ancient times, there have been two directions in naval artillery, differing sharply from one another: one task was to inflict damage on the enemy immediately, albeit a few but deep and severe, to knock out the engine, make an underwater hole, blow up the cellars, in a word - immediately disable the ship; another - sought to inflict the greatest possible number of damage, even if superficial, and minor, damage, sought to "beat" the ship, arguing that such a "beaten" will not be difficult to finish completely, or he will die .
        In modern artillery, following the first, it was necessary to have strong, capable of penetrating armor, i.e. thick-walled shells (which reduces the internal void and explosive charge) and shock tubes with an explosion moderator, so that the shell would burst inside the vessel; adhering to the second - on the contrary: for shells only such strength is sufficient that they do not crack during firing, that is, the thickness of their walls can be minimized, and the internal void and explosive charge are increased to extremes, while the shock tubes must be ignited at the first touch.
        The first view dominated mainly in France, and the second in England. In the past war, we were adherents of the first, and the Japanese - of the second)


        That is, a 305 mm projectile, in order to inflict critical damage, you need to get: Punch armor in the waterline area, punch barbet, punch tower armor, disable steering, disable command tower (and this will not lead to the sinking of the ship), damage cars or boilers (which is a rarity for those guns) - that is, a certain probability of an event is needed in order for critical damage to occur.

        At the same time, 6 "-8" shells steadily reduce the combat effectiveness of the ship:

        Semenov (trilogy reckoning Fight at Tsushima)
        The next shell hit the side near the middle 6-inch tower, and then something banged behind and under me at the left aft. Smoke fell from the staff exit and flames appeared. The shell, hitting the captain’s cabin and breaking through the deck, exploded in the officer’s compartment, where a fire broke out.

        I took out my watch and notebook to mark the first fire, but at that moment something pricked me in the lower back, and something huge, soft but strong hit me in the back, lifted me up in the air and threw me onto the deck ... Probably I lay unconscious for several moments, because the fire was already extinguished and there were no one except for 2-3 dead, on whom water was sprinkled from broken hoses. The blow came from the side of the pilothouse, hidden from me by a beam of beds. I looked there. There should have been flag officers — Lieutenant Novosiltsev, Midshipman Kozakevich, and volunteer Maximov — with a batch of yutovye signalmen. The projectile passed through the cabin, torn against its walls. Signal workers (10-12 people) both stood at the right 6-inch tower and lay there in a cramped heap.

        After all, on July 28, for several hours of battle, the “Tsesarevich” received only 19 large shells, and I seriously intended in the upcoming battle to record the moments and places of individual hits, as well as their destruction. But where was there to write down the details, when it was impossible to count the hits! Such a shooting, I not only never saw, but also did not imagine. The shells poured continuously, one after the other ... (Japanese officers said that after the surrender of Port Arthur, in anticipation of the second squadron, they were so prepared for her meeting: each commander fired five rounds of shells when firing at the target. Then the worn guns were all replaced by new ones) ....
        ... For 6 months at the Arthur squadron I nevertheless looked at what - both shimoza and melinite were, to a certain extent, old acquaintances, - but there was something completely new here! .. It seemed that not shells hit the board and fell to the deck, and whole mines ... They were torn from the first touch of something, from the slightest delay in their flight. The grab rail, the back of the pipe, the top of the sloop beam - this was enough for an all-destructive explosion ... Steel sheets of the side and superstructures on the upper deck were torn to shreds and knocked people out with their scraps; iron ladders rolled into rings; intact guns were torn off the machines ...
        This could not be done either by the force of the impact of the projectile itself, much less by the force of the impact of its fragments. Only the power of the explosion could do this ...
        ... And then - an unusually high temperature of the explosion and this liquid flame, which seemed to flood everything! I saw with my own eyes how a steel board flashed from the explosion of a shell. Of course, not steel was burning, but the paint on it! Flammable materials such as bunks and suitcases stacked in several rows, traverses, and watered with water, flashed instantly with a bright bonfire ...


        He also has:
        The enemy has already completed the turn; his 12 ships in the correct order, at tight intervals, went parallel to us, gradually moving forward ... No confusion was noticeable. It seemed to me that through Zeiss binoculars (the distance was a little more than 20 cable) I even distinguish bed restraints on bridges, groups of people ... And we? I looked around. What a destruction! .. Flaming cuttings on the bridges, burning debris on the deck, piles of corpses ... Signal, rangefinding stations, posts watching the fall of shells - everything is swept away, everything is destroyed ... Behind - "Alexander" and " Borodino ", also shrouded in smoke of fire ...
        No! It was completely unlike July 28th!


        That is, at the time of the end of the turn of the Japanese - the ship can still shoot, but there is no one to adjust the fire - each tower shoots according to its own understanding - the fire efficiency of our squadron battleships (and not so high) from the first minutes of the battle rapidly decreased with each high-explosive hit.
        1. DimerVladimer
          DimerVladimer 14 May 2018 16: 37
          0
          Semenov’s there
          It was 2 hours 5 minutes. in the afternoon.
          Someone came running to report what got into the aft 12-inch turret. I went to see. Part of the roof from the side of the left gun was torn and bent up, but the tower rotated and energetically shot ...
          The senior officer in charge of the fire parties had his leg torn off and he was carried away. There were fewer people. From everywhere, even from towers where fragments could penetrate only through narrow gaps of embrasures, they demanded reinforcements to replace the departed. The killed, of course, were left to lie where they fell, but even the cleaning of the wounded did not have enough hands ...
          On military courts, every person in battle is assigned his place and his own business; superfluous - no; reserve - does not exist. The only resource we had available was a servant of 47-mm cannons and machine guns, which, in order not to expose it to vain execution, was removed under the armored deck with the start of the battle. Now these people were completely free, since all their artillery, standing openly on the bridges, was already destroyed without a trace. They used them. But it was a drop in the ocean ... Regarding the fire - even if there were people, there was no means to fight the fire. Hoses, no matter how many times they were replaced with spare ones, immediately turned into rags. Finally, stocks ran out. And without hoses, how was water to be supplied to the bridges and rostrums where the fire was raging? .. Especially the rostrums, where 11 wooden boats stood in a pyramid ... So far this forest warehouse was burning only in places, since the boats still had water in them before the fight. But it flowed out through numerous holes pierced by fragments, and when it flows out ...
          ... - The last halyards burned down, - Demchinsky informed me, - I think to take my people somewhere for cover.
          Of course, I completely agreed with him: why did the signalmen hang around under the gunfire when there was no money left for the alarm.
          It was 2 hours and 20 minutes. in the afternoon.
          Making his way between the debris in the stern, he ran into Redkin, hurrying to the tank.
          - Ah! by the way! - He spoke excitedly, - you can’t shoot from the left stern. Under it, there is a fire around. People choke on heat and smoke ...
          ... As I expected, in my report the admiral only shrugged:
          - Let them put out the fire. There is nothing to help from here ...
          In the wheelhouse was no longer two, but five or six people killed; for lack of steering, Vladimirsky was at the helm ....
          ... - The aft tower exploded! (We saw from the neighboring ships how the armored roof of our aft tower flew above the bridges and then collapsed to the yut. What, in fact, happened? - is unknown) - they transmitted from somewhere ...
          Almost at the same time, a peculiar hum came over us; a piercing clang of tearing iron was heard; something huge and heavy seemed to sag; boats roared and broke on rosters; some burning debris fell from above, and impenetrable smoke enveloped us ... Then we did not realize what was the matter, - it turns out that the front pipe fell ...
          ... It was 2 hours 30 minutes. in the afternoon.
          When the smoke cleared somewhat, I wanted to go to the yut, see what had become of the aft tower, but on the upper deck any communication between the bow and the stern was interrupted. I tried to go with the top battery, from where, through the admiral's cabin, there was a direct exit to the yut, but here the headquarters was covered by a continuous fire ... Returning, I met a flag officer Lieutenant Kryzhanovsky quickly descending the ramp.
          -- Where are you going?
          - To the tiller compartment! The steering wheel jammed! .. - he threw on the run ...
          Only this was missing, I thought, rushing upstairs ....
          ... Meanwhile, if we almost did not see the enemy behind the smoke of our own fire, he saw us well and concentrated all the power of his fire on the wrecked battleship, trying to finish it off completely. Shells rained down one after another. It was some kind of whirlwind of fire and iron ... Standing almost in place and slowly turning around the cars to take the proper course and follow the squadron, the Suvorov took turns to expose the battered sides to the enemy, frantically firing from the surviving (already few) guns ...

          From interrogations I learned that at the same time as the steering gears were damaged and the Suvorov failed in the wheelhouse, the Admiral and Vladimirsky were wounded in the head. The latter went to the dressing, and he was replaced, taking command of the battleship, the third lieutenant - Bogdanov. The admiral ordered, following the machines, to follow the squadron. Hits in the front axle were becoming more frequent. Fragments of shells bursting under the mushroom-shaped roof of the cabin, destroyed all the instruments in it, smashed the compass ... Fortunately, they survived: the telegraph - in one car, the intercom - in another. A fire started on the bridge itself - the bays lit up, which were supposed to protect themselves from splinters, and a small navigational cabin, which was located behind the battle tower. The heat became unbearable, and most importantly - thick smoke covered everything, and, in the absence of a compass, it was impossible to keep any course. It was necessary to transfer control to a combat post, and to leave the cabin ourselves to some other place, from where the surrounding could be seen ...
          ... The upper deck was a burning ruin, and therefore the admiral could not go beyond the upper battery (all the same place in the ship's image). From here he tried to penetrate the left middle 6-inch tower, but this did not succeed, and then he went to the corresponding right one. At this passage, the admiral received a wound that immediately felt like a severe pain - a fragment fell into his left leg, near the ankle, and interrupted the main nerve. The foot was paralyzed. The admiral has already been entered into the tower and here they put him on some kind of box. However, he still found enough strength in himself to immediately ask:
          “Why doesn't the tower shoot?” - and ordered the approaching Kryzhanovsky to find commandants, form a servant and open fire ... But it turned out that the tower was damaged and did not rotate. Incidentally, Kryzhanovsky had just returned from the steering compartment: the steering machine was working, but all three drives to it were killed; likewise, there was no means for transmitting orders from the combat post to the steering machine, since there was no telephone pipe at all, the electric indicators were damaged, and the telephone did not work. It was necessary to drive cars from the combat post, i.e., to spin more on the spot than to go forward ....
          ... - But we have a decent roll to the left! ..
          “Yes, there will be eight degrees ...” I agreed, and taking out my watch and notebook, noted: “3 hours 25 minutes in the afternoon; strong roll to the left; there’s a big fire in the upper battery.”

          That's about how damage is described to the squadron battleship Prince Suvorov in the Tsushima battle as an eyewitness.
          It is clear that the fire of several ships was concentrated on it - but the main damage - from high-explosive shells - was actually a loss of combat readiness due to the failure of rangefinding posts, signal posts, control, communications, failure of the fire system and commands to combat ship survivability.
          http://az.lib.ru/s/semenow_w_i/text_1907_2_boy_pr
          i_tzusimi.shtml
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            14 May 2018 18: 11
            +1
            Dmitry, you are right in many ways, but you are still mistaken. Your logic worked well if the Japanese fired 305 mm armor-piercing and 8 dm HE shells at Tsushima. But the fact is that in Tsushima, the Japanese used mainly high-explosive 305-mm shells, which inflicted decisive damage on our ships, which caused them to lose their combat effectiveness. But 8 dm was not enough for this
            The fact that heavy high-explosive shells can also reduce the combat capability of an armadillo to zero I examined in the Tsushima cycle.
            1. DimerVladimer
              DimerVladimer 15 May 2018 10: 23
              0
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Dmitry, you are right in many ways, but you are still mistaken. Your logic worked well if the Japanese fired 305 mm armor-piercing and 8 dm HE shells at Tsushima. But the fact is that in Tsushima, the Japanese used mainly high-explosive 305-mm shells, which inflicted decisive damage on our ships, which caused them to lose their combat effectiveness. But 8 dm was not enough for this
              The fact that heavy high-explosive shells can also reduce the combat capability of an armadillo to zero I examined in the Tsushima cycle.


              Undoubtedly, 305 mm shells did a lot of damage. However, due to their higher rate of fire, medium-caliber guns - 8 "shells and 6" shells, had more hits, and due to their high-explosive action - they caused permanent damage by fires, shrapnel, destruction of the anti-mine caliber and medium caliber.

              I am not giving you eyewitness accounts for nothing, but not my own fabrications - a huge number of fragments disabled the gun servants in the towers, contributed to their jamming and reduce the effectiveness of fire during autonomous guidance.

              Do you think that the main damage was caused by 12 "shells? - With a rate of fire of 1-2 rounds per minute? Obviously the damage from them is significant.
              But will create 12 "shells sensations" flurry of shells "?
              According to Semenov, even making a discount on combat shock, he was not the first time under fire and could soberly assess the fire impact.
              It was 8 "6" shells that made up the bulk of the hits, neglecting their effect is not true.

              A quarter of an hour after the start of the battle, Oslyabya lost the mainsail, and there were at least 15 holes in the bow. The ship gradually sank and bowed to the port side. A large shell, destroying the armor, fell into a coal pit No. 10, which quickly flooded; water began to spread into the left spare hook chamber. To level the roll, they began to flood the right corridors, and then the cartridge chambers. The aft turret and two 152 mm aft casemate guns continued to shoot at the enemy, the remaining guns were disabled

              In 15 minutes, weaken the ebras of the 2nd class by almost half - not bad for 8 "-6" shells, given that only the second armored squad fired at Oslyab.
              And in the subsequent - the 2nd armored detachment actively participated in the battle, finished off "Alexander III".
              Suvorov was finished off by torpedoes of destroyers - that is, even 12 "guns with HEs did not lead to the death of the ship, although its combat value dropped to the only surviving 75 mm gun ...
              The destruction of Borodino is attributed to the 12 "shell that hit the cellar 6" guns.
              I believe that the effect of reducing the combat capability of the Russian armadillos equally belongs to 12 "and 8" - 6 "shells - a small combat distance contributed.
  21. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 14 May 2018 22: 14
    +1
    Quote: arturpraetor
    all ships larger than 10 thousand tons received shells of various calibers and in different quantities, but it was sunk 305 mm shells, and not 203 mm.

    Let me find out how you determined this with such accuracy?

    "Oslyabya" - it is believed that it is sunk by three or four hits of large shells in one place. Died in the 43rd blow job. Why are you sure that it was the 12 "shell that became the last? At that time, Kamimura’s detachment bombarded it.

    "Suvorov" - sunk by a destroyer. At the time of his death, he lost all his guns of medium and main caliber and was defenseless. Why are you sure that 6 "shells have nothing to do with it?

    “Alexander” and “Borodino” - sharply capsized. They obviously had hundreds of tons of water rolling over the deck like the Eagle. Are you sure that 6 "shells have nothing to do with this?

    The attitude to 6 "and 8" shells as to harmless rubber balls is surprising. Even during WWII, hitting several 6 "at once turns into a pile of ruins a considerable ocean destroyer of that time. Under Tsushima, the Japanese fired about 1000 pieces of 8" shells and about 8000 pieces of 6 "shells. And of course, not evenly throughout the squadron, and first of all to the first detachment directly leading the battle, the consequences of such a hail of large shells are more serious.
    1. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 15 May 2018 12: 28
      +2
      Quote: Saxahorse
      "Oslyabya" - it is believed that it is sunk by three or four hits of large shells in one place. Died in the 43rd blow job. Why are you sure that it was the 12 "shell that became the last? At that time, Kamimura’s detachment bombarded it.


      I absolutely agree - the 2nd armored squad of Kamimura concentrated fire on the vice flagship - Oslyab, and after 15 minutes of battle, the 2nd-rank battleship received 15 hits in the bow, lost half of the guns and had trim on the nose. That is, talking about the inability of 8 "6" guns to cause damage is not true. Oslyabya "fell out" of the system somewhat earlier than Suvorov, on whom the fire of 4 armadillos of the first armored detachment concentrated.

      Quote: Saxahorse
      Under Tsushima, the Japanese fired about 1000 pieces of 8 "shells and about 8000 pieces of 6" shells. And of course, not evenly throughout the squadron, but primarily in the first detachment, directly leading the battle. The consequences of such a hail of large shells should be taken more seriously.

      Precisely - this is a sect of witnesses 12 ", to paraphrase Fisher - ONLY BIG GAN :))

      In general, it is strange that people who write articles on the reservation of ships, that is, should represent the impact of a particular shell on the armor, refute the obvious - 80% of the ship is unarmored and turn into burning ruins and are subject to fires from high explosions and 6 "-8" inch shells, which steadily reduce the combat effectiveness of ships, despite the fact that they do not cause critical damage. First of all, optical devices, communications, control, fire and drainage devices suffer, traction falls, gun servants in casemates and towers are struck, jammed turret towers are jammed, and rescue parties are destroyed.
      This can be seen in many battles before WWII.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        15 May 2018 16: 09
        +2
        Dear Dmitry, since this question is so interesting, I will try this week to prepare an article on this subject (it will get to the main one next week). Sorry, but it is not possible to answer reasonably within the framework of a comment.
        1. DimerVladimer
          DimerVladimer 16 May 2018 12: 32
          +1
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Dear Dmitry


          Thank you dear Andrew.

          At one time I had to work with detonating chemicals, select proportions for detonation of explosives and solid fuel compositions with varying degrees of metallization, but with the inverse problem - to avoid detonation.
          I have a good idea of ​​the design of the ship since I studied both material science and theoretical mechanics - I can imagine the armored effects of explosives in a non-mathematical representation, as well as shock and vibration effects on the structure.
          But nevertheless, in my assessments, as a follower of historical science, I do not proceed from personal assumptions, but from the testimonies of eyewitnesses - and there are a lot of them for naval battles of 1904-1905. Moreover, the majority are educated officers who provide a lot of information for analysis.

          In your article, pay attention not so much to the thickness of the armor and the probability of penetration by a projectile, but to the location of the crew according to the shuttle schedule on the ships - dancers, standing on open bridges on which fire control depended, observers fixing the fall of their shells by bursts and compare them open location, with a drop in firing accuracy of the Russian squadron.
  22. Conductor
    Conductor 4 August 2018 12: 46
    0
    Andrei is always on top.