Corvettes that will go into battle
Corvette of project 20380, it seems, will become the most massive ship in the Navy. But its shortcomings must be overcome. Photo: Vitaly Spirin, nordsy.spb.ru
Good news about the restart of production of corvettes at the Amur shipyard (ASZ) should not lead to the flaws inherent in these ships being transferred from one ship in a series to another. Now, until a contract for the production of these ships is signed and their final appearance is not "frozen", it is of great importance to raise the issue of eliminating the inherent defects of these corvettes.
Let's make a reservation right away: we are not talking about revealing ALL flaws yet. The fact is that some of them (for example, the use of the RTPU SM-588 for launching torpedoes of the Packet-NK complex instead of normal torpedo tubes or the lack of full-fledged hydroacoustic countermeasures) simply cannot be eliminated if the strict instructions of the Minister of Defense S.K. ... Shoigu to the head of the united shipbuilding corporation A.L. Rakhmanov: "No new ROCs."
Therefore, it is worth raising exactly those problems that can be solved without starting the development of systems that we do not have in mass production, so that the problem is solved as quickly as possible and for the minimum money. But first, it's worth making an excursion into history corvettes of the project 20380 and 20385.
Difficult children of shipbuilding
The creation of project 20380 corvettes began in the late 90s. the last century in the conditions of extreme underfunding of the Ministry of Defense. Initially, the question was this: to start building at least something (and it was originally conceived with practically no development work, R&D), in order to simply preserve surface shipbuilding. So, for example, torpedoes were planned in a caliber of 53 cm, finished products and, in general, the development of something new on the corvette was one: a power plant from the 16D49 engines of the Kolomna plant and a new transmission RRP12000. Everything else was basically planned for serial production.
Note: objectively, the situation at that moment was not so critical and the fulfillment of large export orders for ships showed this clearly. In addition, the Navy has largely driven itself into the stranglehold of severe underfunding, actively participating in the "mistake worse than a crime" with START-2 and the Borey-Bulava program (with an exorbitant protrusion of the NSNF role and squeezing everything else for this).
Those. There was a real opportunity to take a close look around and choose the really optimal option (a good example is the Project 22350 frigate, which appeared that way). But ... subjective factors were at work (including the dissertation of the then Commander-in-Chief of the Navy).
Taking into account the fact that in the early 2000s, the prospects for project 22350 were vague and the only serial surface warship turned out to be a corvette of project 20380, it began to rapidly overgrow ROC.
At the same time, there was nothing wrong with the fact of the OCDs themselves, the problem was in their organization, especially when the most complex and technically risky work deliberately (that is, hiding his head from quite expected problems like an ostrich) shifted to the last stages of implementation, after which, of course, “completely unexpectedly” (for the leaders of these developments) “winter came”, more precisely, very serious problems and delays began (both technical and due to the same naive funding schedule: “at the last moment we will give everything” and “finish us all in a year or two ").
However, the most disastrous thing was that the new corvettes by their "fathers" were actually considered not as warships, but as "flag demonstrators", "technology demonstrators" and "pictures for export."
In narrow circles, the phrase attributed to the former chief of the 1st Central Research Institute of Naval Shipbuilding, said "about" is widely known:
“We will not fight with anyone. The corvette is needed to display the flag. "
A few years later there was the first sea battle in the XNUMXst century - "Mirage" against Georgian boats, but this principle, attributed to I.G. Zakharova, pursues our corvettes as some kind of evil fate. They are still being built as if they were made not for the war, but "for the sake of it."
The situation is aggravated by the organizational problems of the Navy and the complete lack of coordination between scientific institutions. fleet.
So, the real "customer" is the Ministry of Defense (Department of State Defense Order, DOGOZ), and this is not a formal accountant, but a structure that directly leads and supervises the ROC. Moreover, in the Navy itself, the surveillance radar is the RTS (radio-technical) service, and the SAM and SAM is the RAV (missile and artillery armament) service. The fact that at the exit of this process the air defense missile systems are beaten either into “milk” or only at extremely simple targets (such as the RM-15M) is “not concerned” by the ERP personnel, this is the “RAV problem”.
Moreover, this whole fable of Krylov ("Swan, Cancer and Pike") is supervised by various institutions! In the pre-Serdyuk period, the Operations Directorate of the Navy stood above them, which was successfully defeated during the reform (the last person who fought for its restoration, Admiral Suchkov, passed away back in August 2013).
Corvette air defense problem
The head corvette was built with the Kortik-M anti-aircraft missile and artillery system (ZRAK BR). At the same time, the issue of placing 2 ZRAK on board (in the stern without a system for storing and reloading missiles) was initially considered, together with a command module with a radar "Positive-M" (3-cm range).
The installation of "Kortik", which initially had a parameter of 300 m (ie, capable of hitting targets that went directly to the ship) was due to the loss of the possibility of mass production of the "Dagger" air defense system and the unavailability of the promising Redut air defense system. At the same time, in the future, the series provided for the replacement of "Kortika-M" with "Pantsir-M" (which had much higher performance characteristics). The option was quite working, but ... for beach conditions.
Lead ship of the project, corvette "Guarding" with ZRAK "Kortik-M"
Note: Target heading parameter - the shortest perpendicular distance from the center of the coordinate system, in which the weapon is located, to the projection of the target flying on the horizontal plane. Or more simply: the length of the perpendicular to the projection of the target's trajectory onto the surface (sea, land), drawn from the point from which the target is fired. The higher the heading parameter, the more difficult it is to hit the target, the higher the speed of what is hitting the target (projectile or missile), and the higher the requirements for aiming and guidance. "Zero" parameter is the simplest case, the target goes directly to weaponthat should amaze her.
There were three main problems: a small parameter, restrictions on the defeat of maneuvering targets and a meteorological mm-range of a firing radar - it was corny "blind" not only from rain, but also from dense fog.
The first of this composition from the corvette was removed the stern "Kortik" and the surveillance radar "Positive-M" - in favor of the radar "Fourke", the problems of which were initially clear to the specialists.
From the first serial corvette "with things on the way out" they asked for a "Kortik". Instead, the Redut air defense system that did not exist at that time was installed.
Purely formally, according to the performance characteristics, it was the "best option" (the affected area is larger, the parameter, the all-round shelling is provided), but it was "SAM, which does not exist", moreover with extremely expensive anti-aircraft guided missiles - SAM.
At the same time, "Redut" itself, in fact, did not exist as an air defense system, as a complex. In fact, they were the SAMs themselves with an active radar seeker. In the ship part of the complex, there were simply no means of radio correction of the missile defense system. The corvette housed a launcher for 12 cells (12 missiles 9M96 or 48 missiles 9M100), BIUS "Sigma", which developed the point of inclusion ("opening") of the seeker, and the flight mission of the missile defense system according to the surveillance radar. The target of the missile seeker must find itself.
Launch of the 9M96 SAM system of the anti-aircraft missile "complex" (quotation marks are quite appropriate here) "Redoubt" from the corvette of project 20380
The requirements for targeting from the radar corresponded to the "Positive-M". Errors from "Fourke" were much more than acceptable. In addition, Fourke, operating at a wavelength of 10 cm, had serious problems in working in the drive layer (for targets at ultra-low altitudes) at the physical level.
This was superimposed on the fact that "Redut", having no line of radio correction of the anti-aircraft guided missile, worked on the principle of "fire and forget", i.e. even simple target maneuvers provided a high probability of evading missiles.
Of interest is the assessment of one of the specialists, for obvious reasons, extremely tough and emotional.
... no one is interested in how, in fact, these, no doubt, excellent missiles will fly in the absence of a radio correction line and disgusting target designation from "Fourke" ... So to speak, according to the "fire and forget" scheme. About what!!!!!!! About the goal? Or a rocket? ... the developers of the air defense missile system diligently bypass all sharp corners, such as: "How will your missile defense system see the target in case of target designation errors in the region of 1 degree?" ... Answer: he will see ... Etc.
It was written back in 2006!
Those. all the catastrophic consequences of such a replacement for the air defense of the corvette by officials were immediately understood, but "We will not fight with anyone ... Corvette is needed in order to show the flag ..."
In this situation, the air defense of the corvette became a very good artillery radar "Puma", which actually provided target designation for the "Reduta" (through the BIUS "Sigma"). It is clear that this option was actually a "crutch"; The 360-degree engagement zone of the "Redoubt" was "cut" to the small sector of the "Puma", the channeling of the air defense missile system sharply decreased, the working time increased, and artillery could be used only according to the data of optical sighting devices, despite the fact that the gun of this ship could well used in repelling a missile or air strike.
Fourke, Monolith, Puma and a metal mast creating a "blind sector" in the stern
The tests of the head corvette clearly showed all the problems of the Fourke, but instead of replacing it with the Positive-M, the Navy got involved in a scam to develop a "promising" integrated tower-mast complex (IBMK) "Zaslon", and an organization that did not have any experience in such developments. Subsequent events clearly show that the "justification" for this was far from "technical."
The IBMK, which has not passed the tests and has not shot down a single air target so far, was installed on the last ships of Project 20380 (ie, we actually have not “ships for the fleet”, but “ships for the IBMK”).
Corvette "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" with IBMK. There are suspicions that it will take a long time to successfully hit an air target with this ship. And its price would unpleasantly surprise anyone
The degree of "adequacy" of the development of the IBMK and its accompaniment by the Navy and the Ministry of Defense (DOGOZ) clearly shows such an example that, despite the critical problem of the missile defense missile system for the "Reduta" (on the "rake" of which the Navy "with rapture" x), the installation of the RC for the IBMK was not planned. As the specialists of Zaslon JSC said at IMDS-2000 about this: “The customer did not order this for us”.
That is, the corvette with the IBMK is obviously unable to shoot down maneuverable targets.
From the article by A.V. Zhukov "On the issue of substantiating the requirements for the radar for detecting targets of the shipborne air defense system of the near border" (magazine TsNII VK "Marine Radioelectronics", No. 4, 2004):
... for missiles with a seeker, the use of SOCs with coarse target designation will lead to a chaotic survey of missiles along the stream of targets, and, consequently, the skipping of individual targets without firing.
As for the cost of the IBMK "Zaslon" itself, then, according to experts, it is "close to the cost of the entire head corvette." In general, taking into account such "guidance" and "support" from the Ministry of Defense and the Navy, it is even surprising that the "Zaslon" was so "cheap".
However, the appetite comes with eating. And a "new innovative project 20386" appears. How and with what “tail of uncomfortable questions” (to which the Navy was never able to answer anything intelligible)? Read the articles about it "Worse than a crime. Construction of project 20386 corvettes is a mistake" и "Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam"... It should be noted that these articles had a great resonance, and among the consequences of the second of them, information appeared about the development of the missile defense missile system for the Corvette "Redut" and an emergency reworking of project 20386 began. But that's another story.
There are also questions about the AK-630M anti-aircraft guns installed on the corvette in the amount of two units.
Today their real efficiency is very low, and their developer himself writes about this directly.
From the article by A.V. Zhukov "On the effectiveness of naval artillery installations in repelling anti-ship missiles":
... the answer to the question about the low efficiency of the existing domestic artillery complex AK-630M is in a completely different plane. ... In the AK-630M complex, the quality measurement system, gun mount and fire control system MR-123 MTK 201 are made in the form of four independent posts and are located at different seats ... Separate placement of the gun mount and control system in the AK-630M leads to large firing errors from for the impossibility to take into account the deformation of the ship's hull and inaccuracies in the correction of the parallax between the posts. Shooting errors reach 6 mrad instead of 2 mrad in the "Goalkeeper" complex.
... a multi-point scheme is sometimes offered in domestic complexing systems. Obviously, the effectiveness of artillery fire in this case will be low, which will discredit not only the caliber of the shells, but also the benefits of gun mounts in the short-range air defense system ...
Only a single-post artillery complex with a 30-mm installation and a full-size all-weather control system, radar and optical-electronic (heat-television), will ensure the high efficiency of the nearest border of the ship's air defense.
... a multi-point scheme is sometimes offered in domestic complexing systems. Obviously, the effectiveness of artillery fire in this case will be low, which will discredit not only the caliber of the shells, but also the benefits of gun mounts in the short-range air defense system ...
Only a single-post artillery complex with a 30-mm installation and a full-size all-weather control system, radar and optical-electronic (heat-television), will ensure the high efficiency of the nearest border of the ship's air defense.
A blind sector in the stern of the mast, anti-aircraft guns are not the most effective today, and the firing sectors could be better
Air defense is the most "difficult" problem of this ship, it reduces its combat stability during an air or missile strike to almost zero. It must be solved, and on new, not yet built ships, it can be solved with "little blood" - quickly, inexpensively, and, as S.K. Shoigu, - "without OCD."
Solving the problem of air defense of corvettes
In fact, today we have three fundamentally different air defense systems for a small displacement ship:
1. "Redoubt" (all-round shelling, the largest engagement zone and channel, but the inability to defeat maneuvering targets, extremely expensive missiles and the problem of missing targets in a dense salvo).
2. "Pantsir-M" (cheap missiles, but problems with the defeat of maneuvering targets and especially - the acute meteorological dependence of the complex).
3. "Tor-FM" ("machine for shooting down targets", but with significant restrictions on the sector and range of the affected area).
Objectively speaking, not a single air defense missile system separately provides reliable air defense (and this "swan, cancer, and pike" is a clear example of the "quality" of "scientific" support for the development of the Navy today). Ideally, an integrated system is needed, with the ability to upgrade previously built ships and provide them with reliable air defense.
The problem of hitting maneuvering targets for the "Redoubt" is treated simply: by installing a radio correction channel for missiles, technically it is possible and must be done by the Navy yesterday (but it has not yet been done).
In fact, we have a situation that, due to the dense "shish kebab" (a term used by experts to describe an anti-ship missile strike), the approach of an anti-ship missile system with a standard anti-ship missile system “Harpoon”, due to the absence of the “Redoubt” RC, deliberately misses targets (anti-ship missiles) on board. Those. Air defense of the corvette with "Redoubt" against the salvo of even old "Harpoons" is obviously not provided. Taking into account the arrival of the new LRASM anti-ship missiles from the so-called partners (with much less visibility and capture range of the missile defense missile system), the situation is even worse.
For the "near zone" air defense, of course, you need a good all-weather firing radar with "tight control" of the situation - targets and missiles fired and their radio correction. This approach is implemented in ZRAK "Pantsir-M", however, with a very acute issue of meteorological dependence (taking into account the mm-range of the "Pantsir" firing radar).
The old "surveyor" "Pantsir" became the naval "Fourke" (with all its problems). On the new "Pantsir" they switched to a shorter wavelength range ("long centimeters"), but the feasibility of such a range for sea conditions raises questions (especially considering the "threat of LRASM).
As a result, the placement of the Pantsir-M ZRAK on the corvette is currently impossible and impractical. It is impossible to allow such a situation when the ship's air defense "ends" with the onset of bad weather (and this is exactly the case with the "Pantsir").
Kamchatka cyclone. In such weather, "Pantsir-M" is practically incapable of combat
At the same time, the question is very acute (including for the RTOs of project 22800) to replace the millimeter shooting radar "Pantsir" with a radar of at least a 2-cm range. Life will make you do it anyway (and God forbid, that would not be a bloody combat experience). There are compact and efficient radar stations with "short centimeters" that reliably operate on inconspicuous targets in the drive layer.
Corvettes, however, need a quick fix. And it is.
The main thing is to return to the "Positive-M" surveillance radar, originally planned for corvettes. For target designation of missile weapons - "Mineral" (with passive HEADLIGHTS, as on project 22800), for artillery - radar "Puma".
A similar composition of weapons was installed on the first MRK of project 22800, and these design solutions of the "Karakurt" may well be taken for the new corvettes, especially since they are much more successful than on the project 20380 (for example, the "blind sector" of the surveillance radar in the stern has been eliminated) ... In addition, it will improve inter-ship unification.
MRK project 22800 "Karakurt" - almost the same radar, which is needed, pay attention to the radio-transparent insert in the mast. No blind spots
Of course, it is necessary to install radio correction equipment, but this trouble of all corvettes must be eliminated comprehensively for all ships with "Redoubt" and separately from the contract of JSC "ASZ".
Taking into account the high cost of the 9M100 missile defense system, and, most importantly, the fact that in the series, each 9M100 missile launcher means an unreleased 9M96 missile defense system (taking into account the fact that 9M96 are extremely valuable and important for the air defense of the Navy and the country, and they are needed in the largest possible series), it is highly advisable to replace the 9M100 missiles with the 9M338K radio command missiles (with the installation of a control system based on the "Torah"). This solution also solves the acute problems of "bare stern" for the corvettes of the previous construction.
Issue 9M338K should be considered in the order of subsequent modernization, and not a future contract of ASZ JSC.
Offensive weapon
S. Shoigu earlier in one of his speeches voiced the need to increase the number of warships with the "Caliber" missile system. Alas, the project 20380 corvette is not equipped with it. A strange situation arises when we are building small, less than 1000 tonnes of displacement, RTOs capable of using "Calibers" (and, when the firing system is refined, both "Onyxes" and "Zircons"), and large and multipurpose corvettes, which are incapable of this.
It is known that one of the initiators of the mass introduction of the KRO "Caliber" in the Navy is President V. Putin. It is also known that a series of six corvettes, which are planned to be built at the ASZ, will be built on the personal instructions of the president.
In such a situation, it would be logical if the new corvettes were armed with missiles of the Caliber family. For this, it is necessary that instead of project 20380 with a changed composition of electronic weapons (another radar), the ships of project 20385, with the same proposed radar (with "Positive-M"), would be laid according to the finished working design documentation (with minimal changes).
Above 20380, below 20385. In the latter, instead of KRO "Uran" used UKSK with vertical launch units 3S14
Firstly, there will be no difference between 20380 and 20385 in terms of the complexity of construction for the NEA. The ships are in many respects similar, partially unified, the documentation is ready.
Secondly, the construction of just such ships corresponds to the correct position of V. V. Putin and S. K. Shoigu in terms of saturating the fleet with carriers of the Caliber missiles.
Thirdly, such a solution allows in the future to refuse from duplicating such corvettes in terms of the capabilities of the class of ships - MRK, and, accordingly, save money on this. Now each corvette will be able to replace the MRK when striking ground targets.
Fourthly, equipping the corvette with a 3S14 vertical launch installation will allow the use of anti-submarine missiles (PLR) from it.
The latter, taking into account the catastrophic state in which the ship is aviation and the fact that the Ka-27 helicopters, after the so-called modernization, can be considered combat-ready only conditionally, are the only "long arm" of the corvette that allows them to strike an enemy submarine found at the detection range limit of the sonar complex. A corvette without submarines and with our helicopters is a target for submarines.
He, but with a PLR, becomes a hunter, not a prey. Thus, in order to provide corvettes with real combat capability in our reality, it is necessary to move from project 20380 to 20385 with a changed composition of the radar complex.
Some other questions
For solving other (multipurpose tasks) side boats are very important, incl. with the possibility of using unmanned boats (BEC). Unfortunately, the project 20380 corvettes have launching devices for boats that cannot be used in stormy conditions, and ineffective boats. The presence of an "admiral's boat" on the corvette (instead of a worker) causes some bewilderment. The BL-680 boat has a number of serious shortcomings (see the article "Boat scam"), the main thing is that it is impossible to create an effective BEC on its basis.
Replacing these boats and SPU with modern ones is possible and extremely urgent, but here it is necessary to understand that a boat + SPU is a single complex on a ship. Without an effective SPU, the use of boats in stormy conditions is impossible, while the mass of such an SPU can be 1,5-2 the mass of the boat itself.
In the part of hydroacoustics, a BUGAS installation with the longest antenna is required.
The deadlines for the new corvettes are very tough (the delivery of the entire series must meet within the framework of the current GPV), funding is extremely limited, so it is necessary to clearly divide what the Navy needs to do with corvettes "in general" and specifically with ships under the declared state contract with AO ASZ, and first of all, the question is under the "ASZ" contract.
Obviously, question number 1 now is the replacement of the radar system with a combat-ready one: without it, the corvette will be nothing more than a target, and not only for submarines.
Question # 2 - the decision to install the UKSK, i.e. construction of a series according to project 20385.
At the same time, a decrease in the cost of the radar complex (and many times in this case) will allow to pay for the armament of the corvette with "Caliber" and other missiles used from the 3S14 UVP, including PLR, with a general reduction in the price of the entire ship compared to 20380 with the installed IBMK. Such ships will not only be more combat-ready than the usual 20380, not only better armed than the 20380, but also cheaper.
Another solution to reduce the cost may be the replacement of the composite superstructure with a steel one (hopes for a significant reduction due to composites of the ESR superstructure of corvettes were not confirmed on production ships).
You cannot miss the opportunity to reduce the cost of a ship without reducing its combat capabilities.
Conclusion
Speaking about the disadvantages of corvettes, we must also mention the good: the industry (including the NEA) has done a great job of bringing this project into a combat-ready state. So, on the last corvette handed over by the ASZ, "Gromok", those shortcomings from which the Baltic corvettes and partly "Perfect" suffered.
On the ship, almost everything is working, the reliability of the 100-mm gun has been brought to an acceptable level, the exchange of information in the group is working, the main power plant has been brought up. The ships of the project 20380 began to confidently navigate the distant sea zone.
Questions remain only on repelling missile strikes, and another radar will solve them.
It is necessary, while preserving the positive experience of fine-tuning these ships, which the NEA has today, to solve the problems mentioned above. According to experts in the field of shipbuilding, only the replacement of the radar and the abandonment of composites in favor of steel will reduce the cost of the ship by 25-30%, while increasing its combat capabilities. There are no objective obstacles to this.
This means that this must be done as quickly as possible.
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